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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/23/2005

File Folder SOVIET UNION: SCIENCE/SPACE, ETC. 2/2

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 34

YARHI-MILO

3408

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11371	REPORT	SOVIET SPACE POLICY [26 - 32]	7	2/1/1984	B1
	R	1/2/2008			NLRRF06-114/10
11374	LETTER	CUNNINGHAM TO BORMAN RE ASTRONAUTS [39 - 40]	2	3/30/1984	B6
11375	LETTER	WORDEN TO SCHWEICKART RE SPACE CONGRESS [41 - 43]	3	3/7/1984	B6
11376	LETTER	SCHMITT TO SCHWEICKART RE ASTRONAUTS [44 - 45]	2	2/9/1984	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11366	PAPER	IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECEMBER 1984 USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ELECTIONS [46 - 64] PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	19	4/15/1985	B3
11372	MEMO	COOPER TO MATLOCK RE BRIEFING PAPER [65 - 65] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	5/1/1985	B1
11373	PAPER	IIASA-US RELATIONS [67 - 69] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	3	ND	B1
11367	PAPER	USSR [72 - 72] D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	ND	B1 B3

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11368	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO SHULTZ RE U.S.- SOVIET SPACE COOPERATION [73 - 73] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	7/29/1985	B1
11369	PAPER	NON-PAPERS US AND USSR [74 - 74] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
11370	MEMO	MATLOCK/RYE TO MCFARLANE [75 - 75] R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10	1	7/25/1985	B1

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FILE - SOV
4708 Add-On Research Training

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 11, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: HR 601, the Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983

REF: Mr. Keel's memorandum of July 1, 1983

My views, in brief, are the following:

- Personnel and infrastructure for training and research in the Soviet and East European area have suffered serious erosion over the past few years and we face a crisis in maintaining an adequate private sector capacity.
- It is clearly in the national interest to preserve for the future a strong training and research program, not merely to insure an adequate flow of trained specialists for government service, but also to insure wider public knowledge of our principal adversary and thus bolster our public diplomacy efforts.
- Private funding, while improving slightly of late, is inadequate to do the job alone.
- The proposed legislation might benefit from fine-tuning--and indeed there may be alternate approaches to achieve the same end--but unless the Executive Branch can agree promptly on a better approach and present a viable alternative to the Congress, it seems preferable to support the Congressional proposal.
- To insure a sustained, well-planned effort, a "trust fund" approach has many advantages. It might well start at a lower figure, however (e.g., \$20-25 Million).
- Since this is an effort in the broad national interest, budget offsets should not be sought from a single department, but from a combination of those whose interests are served by it (State, Defense, USIA, CIA and--not least--Education and the National Endowment for the Humanities).
- OMB should be encouraged to take the lead in putting together a "package" of offsets to bring this funding within the budget ceiling, with the Department of Education sharing the burden with the foreign affairs agencies.

A more detailed exposition of my thoughts on the subject is attached.

RECOMMENDATION

That I discuss informally along these lines with OMB.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That I discuss informally with Hamilton (the Congressional sponsor) to obtain his view regarding possible offsets and variants (e.g., lower funding initially).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

3

RESEARCH AND TRAINING ON
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
(HR 601)

The Problem: Following the launching of sputnik in 1956 and the National Defense Education Act which followed it, area and language studies, including notably those related to the USSR and Eastern Europe, were greatly expanded and with very substantial results. By the early seventies we had developed a strong base and the academic community produced many research studies of direct usefulness to the government (for example, techniques for analyzing Soviet national income, psychological profiles of Soviet citizens--based on emigre interviews, analyses of Soviet decision-making processes, and many case studies of Soviet activities in the "Third World").

During the seventies, however, this base suffered serious erosion. The following factors were relevant:

-- The "post-Vietnam" syndrome, including a turning inward by many young people. Enrollments in Russian language, for example, dropped to less than half of the peak reached in the 60's.

-- End of the NDEA coincided with the phasing out of much Foundation funding, itself increasingly directed to domestic concerns.

-- The combination of low enrollments and financial stringency caused many universities to cut back on support for Soviet and East European area studies. The recent termination of Georgetown's PhD program in Soviet studies is but the latest in a series of such actions.

While the productivity of scholars already trained and in place masks these trends, inroads in our training capacity have reached proportions which are truly alarming for the national interest in the future. It takes many years to develop research centers and to train specialists; if something is not done now to stem the erosion, we shall be sorely lacking in needed expertise in the 1990's. And if we wait until then, it will take another ten years or so to build it up again.

The Federal Government Interest

One of the reasons it has been difficult to focus the attention of the bureaucracy on this growing problem is that the question is usually posed in narrow terms. Specifically, agencies have been asked if they can still recruit a sufficient number of specialists to meet their personnel needs. The answer is normally yes, and many then assume that cries of alarm are unfounded. But this is not the key question, because government agencies hire very few young specialists, and if we ever reach the point that we cannot find those limited numbers, then this

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will only confirm that relevant training facilities have already collapsed.

There is another reason for not basing our judgment entirely on the potential pool of recruits for government service. In our democracy we can only sustain an effective foreign policy if familiarity with our adversaries is widely spread among the population, particularly among influential citizens. Nothing contributes more to a basic understanding of what is at stake in defending our values and our way of life, and of the need for firmness, than a close study of the Soviet Union. While relatively few Americans will ever specialize in Soviet studies, the existence of area study centers at universities throughout the U.S. facilitates a healthy input of facts and realism into the stream of public opinion formation.

Finally, the research efforts of scholars are of frequent and direct utility to policy makers. Not being burdened by the need to make day-to-day operational decisions, scholars can often take a longer and more detached view of developments and bring important insights to bear that might otherwise be clouded by a preoccupation with short-term problems. And the existence of competent, well-informed private researchers provides some insurance against "group thinking" inside a bureaucracy. Remember the "Team B" intelligence analysis--something which would not have been possible if all the expertise were concentrated within the government.

Is Federal Funding the Answer?

I wish it weren't, but practically speaking I see no other source of funding which will be adequate to the task. Not that private money is totally absent--the universities still commit considerable resources, the Harriman gift will strengthen things at Columbia, and government research funds help keep the think tanks afloat--but this is not sufficient to maintain a strong overall base. And whereas other area studies can benefit from corporate donations and even support from governments of the countries in question (Arab money for chairs in ME studies, for example), neither is feasible for Soviet studies.

The Congressional Proposal: HR 601: This is the first concrete proposal, to my knowledge, which addresses the overall problem which we face. I am not in a position to pass judgment on its details--it clearly represents only one way to go, and there may well be others--but I am convinced that something like it is necessary, and necessary very soon. Unless the Executive Branch can gear up to produce very quickly an alternate--and I doubt that we can--I think that we should go with the bird in hand. If we detect any glaring deficiencies, we should of course try to get them corrected, but my initial impression is that it is a workable approach, although it might be desirable to spell out more specifically how the "trust fund" will work and provide more specifics as to how it would be managed.

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While OMB is dubious about the multi-year funding aspects of the "trust fund" approach, I believe that this is justified in this instance, since we need to address a long-term problem, and erratic levels of annual funding would simply be a waste of money. The field needs predictable and steady--even if modest--support if the funds are to be used effectively.

That said, I am not certain that a \$50 million fund is necessary from the very beginning. It will take some time to plan expenditures and to obligate the funds wisely. One might consider as an alternative, an initial allocation of \$20-25 million, with the possibility of adding a like amount after a year or two, if the initial experience justifies it. A staged approach would also reduce the offset problem, facilitate course corrections in light of experience, and meet some of the concerns for future oversight.

As for the offsets required to stay within budget ceilings, I think it is clear that these should not be the burden of a single agency of the government. The need and potential benefits are quite general and each individual agency can argue logically that it has higher priorities. They will also resist reducing their own budgets to provide money for someone else. From their parochial points of view, they are doubtless right. Yet I believe this effort represents a fairly high national priority, and our task is to find a way to accommodate this to responsible fiscal planning.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

July 1, 1983

C. Lehman
J. Matlock
P. Sommer
Your views?
Burd
6

POTTER

BIRD

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

FROM: Alton G. Keel Jr.
Associate Director for National Security and
International Affairs

AK

SUBJECT: H.R. 601, the Soviet-Eastern European
Research and Training Act of 1983

I am writing to seek your views and assistance in formulating a coherent Executive Branch position on H.R. 601, which would authorize a \$50 million endowment to support U.S. education and research on Soviet and Eastern European Affairs. On April 29, we returned to the State Department their proposed draft of a letter to the Congress supporting the bill. At that time we indicated OMB concerns about H.R. 601 and requested further information and justification. As yet we have received no reply and, in spite of a staff level meeting on May 25, no progress has been made in developing an Executive Branch position. Congressional consideration of the bill is proceeding without Executive Branch views.

Our concerns about the bill are threefold:

1. No adequate justification of the need for this new Federal activity has been provided by the Department. There has been no specification of the deficiencies in numbers or types of people or kinds of research that may exist. To the contrary there is some evidence that State has considerably more qualified applicants than it needs in the area of Eastern European studies. Moreover, it appears that private sector fund raising activities may finance any needed enhancements of university programs related to Eastern Europe.
2. To fund the bill as drafted would require \$50 million in budget authority beyond what has been requested by the President. As you know, the Administration has serious problems with the excessive funding levels contained in a number of the 1984 appropriation bills,

already reported or passed in the Congress. We have asked State to identify budget offsets that would make this additional request acceptable, but the Department has failed to respond.

- 3. The administrative provisions of the bill are not appropriate. No Federal agency is made responsible for the program and, therefore, adequate Federal financial oversight is lacking. Furthermore, a trust fund is not the appropriate funding mechanism, because no "trust" relationship would exist under the bill. Annual appropriations subject to Presidential review and congressional enactment are more appropriate.

On the basis of the above concerns, we are inclined to oppose the bill as it is presently drafted. However, we are aware that Judge Clark and some NSC staff members are particularly interested in it. We would appreciate your views on how the bill might be improved. Perhaps an annually appropriated research grant program under State's INR bureau would accomplish the same ends with significantly smaller first year costs.

Bob -

Frankly, this looks like a "nice-to-have", but low priority item in State. Private funding effort is preferred approach and apparently is on-going. It's tough to justify given other Foreign Assistance items which are highly unneeded.

Also, how much do we we have to survive in Congressional initiatives -- doesn't seem to be buying us much. Maybe we should learn to say "no" -

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 601

To help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 6, 1983

Mr. HAMILTON (for himself and Mr. SIMON) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Education and Labor

A BILL

To help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 " SHORT TITLE

4 SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Soviet-East-
5 ern European Research and Training Act of 1983".

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FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

SEC. 2. The Congress finds and declares that—

(1) factual knowledge, independently verified, about the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is of the utmost importance for the national security of the United States, for the furtherance of our national interests in the conduct of foreign relations, and for the prudent management of our domestic affairs;

(2) the development and maintenance of knowledge about the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries depends upon the national capability for advanced research by highly trained and experienced specialists, available for service in and out of Government;

(3) certain essential functions are necessary to ensure the existence of that knowledge and the capability to sustain it, including—

(A) graduate training;

(B) advanced research;

(C) public dissemination of research data, methods, and findings;

(D) contact and collaboration among Government and private specialists and the facilitation of research based on the extensive data holdings of the United States Government; and

1 (E) firsthand experience of the Soviet Union
 2 and Eastern European countries by American
 3 specialists including onsite conduct of advanced
 4 training and research to the extent practicable;

5 (4) three existing institutions already organized to
 6 conduct the functions described in this section on a na-
 7 tional scale are the National Council for Soviet and
 8 East European Research, the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
 9 national Center for Scholars, and the International Re-
 10 search and Exchanges Board of the American Council
 11 of Learned Societies; and

12 (5) it is in the national interest for the United
 13 States Government to provide a stable source of finan-
 14 cial support for the functions described in this section
 15 and to supplement the financial support for those func-
 16 tions which is currently being furnished by Federal,
 17 local, State, regional, and private agencies, organiza-
 18 tions, and individuals, and thereby to stabilize the con-
 19 duct of these functions on a national scale, consistently,
 20 and on a long range basis.

21 DEFINITIONS

22 SEC. 3. As used in this Act—

23 (1) the term "Board" means the International Re-
 24 search and Exchanges Board organized in 1968 by the

1 American Council of Learned Societies and the Social
2 Science Research Council;

3 (2) the term "Center" means the Woodrow
4 Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smith-
5 sonian Institution;

6 (3) the term "Fund" means the Soviet-Eastern
7 European Research and Training Fund established by
8 section 4;

9 (4) the term "institution of higher education" has
10 the same meaning given such term in section 1201(a)
11 of the Higher Education Act of 1965;

12 (5) the term "National Council" means the Na-
13 tional Council for Soviet and East European Research,
14 a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of
15 the District of Columbia in 1978; and

16 (6) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of
17 the Treasury.

18 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN
19 RESEARCH AND TRAINING FUND

20 SEC. 4. There is established in the Treasury of the
21 United States a trust fund to be known as the Soviet-Eastern
22 European Research and Training Fund. The Fund shall con-
23 sist of—

24 (1) amounts appropriated to it under section 5;
25 and

1 (2) interest and proceeds credited to it under sec-
2 tion (8)(c).

3 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FUND

4 SEC. 5. Effective October 1, 1983, there are authorized
5 to be appropriated to the Fund, without fiscal year limitation,
6 \$50,000,000.

7 USES OF PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND

8 SEC. 6. (a) The interest on any obligations held in the
9 Fund shall be available for payments to the National Council,
10 upon approval of an application in accordance with section 7,
11 for use in accordance with subsection (b).

12 (b)(1) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year
13 shall be used by the National Council—

14 (A) in consultation with officials of the United
15 States Government designated by the Secretary of
16 State, to develop and keep current a research agenda
17 of fundamental research dealing with major policy
18 issues and questions of Soviet and Eastern European
19 development; and

20 (B) to conduct a national research program at the
21 postdoctoral or equivalent level in accordance with that
22 agenda, such program to include—

23 (i) the dissemination of information about the
24 research program and the solicitation of proposals
25 for research contracts from American institutions

1 of higher education and not-for-profit corporations,
2 which contracts shall contain shared-cost provi-
3 sions; and

4 (ii) the awarding of contracts for such re-
5 search projects as the Board of Trustees of the
6 National Council determines will best serve to
7 carry out the purposes of this Act after reviewing
8 the proposals submitted under clause (i).

9 (2) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year
10 shall be used by the National Council—

11 (A) to establish and carry out a program of gradu-
12 ate, postdoctoral, and teaching fellowships for ad-
13 vanced training in Soviet and Eastern European stud-
14 ies and related studies, such program—

15 (i) to be coordinated with the research pro-
16 gram described in paragraph (1);

17 (ii) to be conducted, on a shared-cost basis,
18 at American institutions of higher education; and

19 (iii) to include—

20 (I) the dissemination of information on
21 the fellowship program and the solicitation of
22 applications for fellowships from qualified in-
23 stitutions of higher education and qualified
24 individuals; and

1 (II) the awarding of such fellowships as
 2 the Board of Trustees of the National Coun-
 3 cil determines will best serve to carry out
 4 the purposes of this Act after reviewing ap-
 5 plications submitted under subclause (I); and

6 (B) to disseminate research, data, and findings on
 7 Soviet and Eastern European studies and related fields
 8 in such a manner and to such extent as the Board of
 9 Trustees of the National Council determines will best
 10 serve to carry out the purposes of this Act.

11 (3) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year to
 12 the National Council shall be used for payments to the
 13 Center—

14 (A) to provide fellowship support and research
 15 facilities in the District of Columbia for American spe-
 16 cialists in the fields of Soviet and Eastern European
 17 studies and related studies to conduct advanced re-
 18 search with particular emphasis upon the use of data
 19 on the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries;
 20 and

21 (B) to conduct seminars, conferences, and other
 22 similar workshops designed to facilitate research col-
 23 laboration between Government and private specialists
 24 in the fields of Soviet and East European studies and
 25 related studies.

1 (4) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year to
 2 the National Council shall be used for payments to the Board
 3 to conduct specialized programs in advanced training and re-
 4 search on a reciprocal basis in the Union of Soviet Socialist
 5 Republics and the countries of Eastern Europe designed to
 6 facilitate access for American specialists to research insti-
 7 tutes, personnel, archives, documentation, and other research
 8 and training resources located in the Union of Soviet Social-
 9 ist Republics and Eastern European countries.

10 APPLICATIONS; PAYMENTS TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

11 SEC. 7. (a) The National Council shall prepare and
 12 submit an application to the Secretary once each fiscal year.
 13 Each such application shall—

14 (1) provide a description of the purposes for which
 15 the payments will be used in accordance with section
 16 6; and

17 (2) provide such fiscal control and such accounting
 18 procedures as may be necessary (A) to insure a proper
 19 accounting of Federal funds paid to the National Coun-
 20 cil under this Act, and (B) to insure the verification of
 21 the costs of the continuing education and research pro-
 22 grams conducted by the National Council under this
 23 Act.

24 (b) The Secretary shall expeditiously approve any appli-
 25 cation that meets the requirements of this section.

1 (c)(1) Payments to the National Council under this Act
2 shall be made as soon after approval of the application as
3 practicable.

4 (2) Payments to the National Council under this Act
5 may be made in installments, in advance, or by way of reim-
6 bursement, with necessary adjustments on account of over-
7 payments and underpayments.

8 MANAGEMENT OF THE FUND

9 SEC. 8. (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to invest
10 such portion of the Fund as is not, in his judgment, required
11 to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made
12 only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in
13 obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by
14 the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be
15 acquired on original issue at the issue price or by purchase of
16 outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for
17 which obligations of the United States may be issued under
18 the Second Liberty Bond Act are extended to authorize the
19 issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the Fund.
20 Such special obligations shall bear interest at a rate equal to
21 the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the
22 calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne
23 by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United
24 States then forming a part of the public debt; except that
25 where such average rate is not a multiple of one-eighth of 1

1 per centum, the rate of interest of such special obligations
2 shall be the multiple of one-eighth of 1 per centum next
3 lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall
4 be issued only if the Secretary determines that the purchase
5 of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or
6 of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by
7 the United States on original issue or at the market price, is
8 not in the public interest.

9 (b) Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special
10 obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the
11 Secretary at the market price, and such special obligations
12 may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.

13 (c) The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or
14 redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be cred-
15 ited to and form a part of the Fund.

16

REPORT

17 SEC. 9. The National Council shall prepare and submit
18 to the President and the Congress at the end of each fiscal
19 year in which the National Council receives assistance under
20 this Act a report of the activities of the National Council, and
21 the activities of the Board and the Center, supported by as-
22 sistance under this Act, together with such recommendations
23 as the National Council deems advisable.

○

Paula -

18

Mark Palmer is scheduled to testify before HFAC on HR 601 on Wednesday July 13. We hope that OMB will clear the attached testimony, but are not yet certain. We would also like your clearance and any suggestions you may have.

Byron Morton
632-2248

STATEMENT OF
MARK PALMER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JULY 13, 1983

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TODAY TO PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON H.R. 601, "THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND TRAINING ACT," H.R. 1220, "THE EXCHANGE FOR UNDERSTANDING ACT," AND H.J. RES. 254 ON CREATING A US-SOVIET STUDENT EXCHANGE FOR PEACE PROGRAM.

CONCERNING H.R. 601, TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AMERICAN DECISION-MAKERS MUST BE EQUIPPED WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE INFORMATION, ANALYSIS AND CREATIVE POLICY THINKING. IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT THE NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES US TO THOROUGHLY UNDERSTAND THE OTHER NATION WITH THE POWER TO END CIVILIZATION AS WE KNOW IT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE LEADERSHIP OF THAT NATION IS SO SECRETIVE AND SO HOSTILE TO OUR VALUES AND WORLDVIEW. THIS TASK CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED IF WE HAVE A BROAD, CAPABLE AND WELL-COORDINATED BASE OF GOVERNMENTAL AND ACADEMIC EXPERTS AND AREA SPECIALISTS CONCENTRATING ON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. THE NEED FOR SUCH A BASE IS GROWING AS THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION GROWS.

WITHIN THE NEXT DECADE, HOWEVER, THE U.S. WILL LOSE A LARGE NUMBER OF ITS SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN AREA SPECIALISTS TO RETIREMENT. LESS THAN ADEQUATE PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE IN RECENT YEARS TO TRAIN YOUNG AREA SPECIALISTS TO REPLENISH OUR RESERVE OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SCHOLARS AND EXPERTS. IN THE PAST DECADE THERE HAS BEEN A DRASTIC DROP IN THE NUMBER OF EASTERN BLOC PROGRAMS WITHIN THE ACADEMIC

-2-

COMMUNITY. THIS TREND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED IN PART TO THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE U.S. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. AS UNIVERSITIES HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CUT BACK PERSONNEL AND ACADEMIC PROGRAMS, SEVERAL SOVIET STUDIES PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. IF THIS DECLINE IS NOT HALTED, MORE VALUABLE CAPABILITIES WILL DISAPPEAR, TO THE DETRIMENT OF SOVIET AREA RESEARCH AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST.

IN A STUDY PUBLISHED IN 1982, THE SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FOUND A TOTAL REQUIREMENT FOR SOME 1660 PRIMARY PERSONNEL IN THIS FIELD TO MEET THE NATIONAL NEED IN GOVERNMENTAL, ACADEMIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS. IT FOUND, HOWEVER, ONLY 1074 PRIMARY PERSONNEL ACTIVE IN THE FIELD, EXCLUDING LANGUAGE TEACHERS IN ELEMENTARY INSTRUCTION. A SUMMARY BREAKDOWN BY DISCIPLINE SHOWS WHERE THE COMMITTEE FOUND THE NEED FOR MORE PEOPLE GREATEST:

	<u>CURRENT</u>	<u>NEED</u>	<u>ABSOLUTE GAP</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE GAP</u>
SOCIOLOGY	18-20	88	68-70	360
POLITICS	260	500-520	240-260	96
ECONOMICS	100-120	200-225	100-105	93
HISTORY	420	675	255	61
LANGUAGE/LITERATURE	220	420	200	91

SOURCE: WALTER D. CONNOR, "SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: ACADEMIA, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC," IREX OCASIONAL PAPER, 1982.

DESPITE THESE NEEDS THE FLOW OF PEOPLE INTO THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH FIELD IS DRYING UP. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS THE FACT THAT IN THE AREA OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY THE NUMBER OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS DEFENDED IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES IN RECENT YEARS IS MINISCULE. IN THE YEARS 1974-79 THE AVERAGE NUMBER WAS EIGHT, AND LESS THAN SIX WHEN DISSERTATIONS BY FOREIGN STUDENTS WERE ELIMINATED. IN THE STUDY OF SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES, THE RECORD IS EVEN WORSE WITH FEW NEW SPECIALISTS IN GRADUATE TRAINING.

OF ADDITIONAL CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE, THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION HAS FOUND THAT BETWEEN 1972 AND 1980 AMERICAN COLLEGE ENROLLMENT IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE COURSES FELL BY ONE-THIRD. COLLEGE ENROLLMENTS IN THE LANGUAGES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET MINORITY NATIONALITIES RANGE FROM SMALL TO NON-EXISTENT, THIS AT A TIME WHEN EVENTS IN POLAND AND ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS A CRITICAL AREA FOR THE FUTURE, AND WHEN MINORITIES ARE BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL FACTOR IN THE USSR. UNDERSTANDING OF A FOREIGN SOCIETY PROBABLY CAN NEVER BE PERFECT, BUT STUDY OF A SOCIETY WITHOUT THE AID OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LANGUAGE OF ITS PEOPLE IS LARGELY GROPING IN THE DARK.

WE BELIEVE THE NEED TO REVERSE THE DECLINE IN A VITAL NATIONAL CAPABILITY IS CLEAR. WE ARE, HOWEVER, UNABLE TO SUPPORT H.R. 601 IN ITS PRESENT FORM, BECAUSE THE METHOD OF FINANCING IT, I.E. THROUGH A TRUST FUND, IS INAPPROPRIATE. THE ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS THAT ANY PROGRAM OF SUFFICIENT NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE TO REQUIRE THE USE OF FEDERAL TAX DOLLARS SHOULD BE FINANCED BY AN ANNUAL GENERAL FUND APPROPRIATION. IN THIS CURRENT STRINGENT OVERALL BUDGET ENVIRONMENT FUNDING FOR ANY NEW INITIATIVE TO MEET THIS NEED SHOULD NOT BE MADE AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAMS.

AS CONCERNS H.R. 1220, THE DEPARTMENT OPPOSES IT ON GROUNDS BOTH OF POLICY AND OF PRACTICABILITY. AS DRAFTED, THE BILL WOULD EFFECTIVELY FREE FROM FOREIGN POLICY GUIDANCE AND CONTROL EXCHANGES FUNDED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN EXCHANGES COMMISSION TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER IT. IN THE ABSTRACT, FREEING PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING FROM POLITICAL RESTRAINTS MAY SEEM ATTRACTIVE, BUT IN PRACTICE IT WOULD PLACE THE AMERICAN SIDE, WITH OUR OPEN SOCIETY, AT A GREATER DISADVANTAGE THAN AT PRESENT IN DEALING WITH REGIMES WHICH SUBJECT EVERY ASPECT OF EXCHANGES TO TIGHT POLITICAL CONTROLS.

THE DRAFT BILL PROVIDES NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY COMMISSION-FUNDED ACTIVITIES. IT PROVIDES ONLY VERY GENERAL GUIDELINES ON THE TYPES OF EXCHANGES TO BE FUNDED AND NONE AT ALL ON WHAT CATEGORIES OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION. WITHOUT WELL-DEFINED AND FAIRLY RESTRICTIVE GUIDELINES ON ELIGIBILITY FOR PARTICIPATION THE COMMISSION STAFF COULD EXPECT TO BE FACED WITH LARGE NUMBERS OF APPLICATIONS FOR FUNDING FOR WHAT IN MANY CASES WOULD BE LITTLE MORE THAN TOURISM. IN ADDITION, THE DRAFT CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE, WHICH HAS BEEN BASIC TO THE SUCCESSFUL FUNCTIONING OF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

WE BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE THAT FUNDING FOR US GOVERNMENT EXCHANGE PROGRAMS CONTINUE TO COME FROM ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS TO ENSURE THAT CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATION INTENT IS PROPERLY OBSERVED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ADDITIONAL, NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDING IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A USEFUL LEVEL OF EXCHANGES.

IN A RELATED MANNER, THE DEPARTMENT IS SYMPATHETIC TO THE IDEALISTIC INTENT OF THE H.J. RES. 254, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT IT COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED OR THAT IT WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN REDUCING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. AS TOURISM AND VARIOUS

PROGRAMS FOR EXCHANGES OF VISITS SHOW, THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MOST PART DO NOT HOLD ANY ANTAGONISM TOWARD EACH OTHER. THE ANTAGONISMS WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION RESULT NOT FROM PERSONAL FEELINGS, BUT FROM FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN THE IDEOLOGY AND POLICIES OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. NO SIMPLE ANSWER EXISTS TO THE PROBLEM OF RESOLVING THOSE DIFFERENCES.

A MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO INTEREST IN SENDING YOUTH OF THE AGES PROPOSED IN THE LEGISLATION TO WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR EXTENDED STAYS. THEY PREFER NOT TO EXPOSE PEOPLE AT AN IMPORTANT FORMATIVE STAGE IN THEIR MENTAL DEVELOPMENT TO INFLUENCES NOT IN HARMONY WITH COMMUNIST IDEOLOGICAL TENETS.

THIS CONCLUDES MY WRITTEN TESTIMONY. I THANK THE COMMITTEE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON THESE THREE ITEMS. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE.



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS
AND
RESEARCH

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File 26 ✓

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~~(U)~~ SOVIET SPACE POLICY

~~(C)~~ Summary

Soviet space policy, set by the Politburo, is closely supervised by the highest levels of the Soviet Government so that it will support such broad national goals as the expansion of Soviet influence and power. The Soviets view their space program as contributing to improvement of the correlation of forces between East and West. These forces include primarily military, diplomatic, economic, scientific, and prestige factors.

The use of space activity to strengthen the Soviet position in all of these areas is an important Soviet aim, but space is also a dangerous and costly medium in which to conduct operations. The Soviets accordingly have adopted certain practices, such as the acquisition of Western technology, to diminish the risks and costs of operating in space.

* * * * *

Military Aspects of Space Policy

~~(S/NF)~~ Approximately 90 percent of the current Soviet space program in terms of annual launches and estimated total costs serves military purposes. Currently there are about 110 active Soviet satellites for military reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-ship weapons targetting, anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, communications, early warning, electronic intelligence, order-of-battle assessment, navigation, radar and laser calibration and testing, precision mapping and target location, and meteorological support. Roald Sagdeev, the Soviet equivalent of the US administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), has noted: "There is no such thing as a Soviet civil space program."

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NLRR 106-114/10 #11371
BY CY NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR (Howells, W. D.)

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED

Report 769-AR
February 1, 1984

(C) The general outlines of Soviet doctrine for the military use of space are discernible from Soviet military writings and teachings as well as from current trends in Soviet space programs. Clearly, Soviet military thinkers do not consider space to be a demilitarized zone with status similar to that of Antarctica. They view space as a battle zone, fundamentally similar in that respect to land, air, and sea. They reject both the contention that war could be waged in space without involving land and sea theaters and its corollary that a major conflict on earth could be prosecuted without including space as a medium.

(U) Marshal Sokolovskiy, one of the most authoritative Soviet military writers, has noted that "the concept of a theatre of military operations may include the entire territory of a belligerent or coalition, whole continents, large bodies of water, and extensive regions of the atmosphere, including space." It is likely, therefore, that some of the general precepts that apply to the Soviets' doctrine of terrestrial warfare, such as the importance of surprise, the necessity of confusing the enemy and paralyzing his reactions, and the need for sudden and decisive use of overwhelming force to secure military objectives, also apply to their doctrine of war in space.

(S) The Soviet doctrine of combined arms operations calls for the mutually reinforcing integration of all types of forces into an organic fighting unit. Military space systems are viewed as an integral part of the armed forces and would be used as such in conflict. Evidence supporting this argument is found in classified Soviet military teachings on readiness levels of military space equipment. They state that the combat readiness of space military assets must be comparable to that of the forces those assets are called upon to support.

(S) Soviet military teachings also acknowledge the need for a "correct relationship between active equipment in orbit and standby equipment on the ground." This includes the maintenance of reserve equipment, both in orbit and on the ground, sufficient to replace anticipated losses. In short, at least with regard to readiness, support, and reserves, the Soviets view their assets in space no differently than the rest of their armed forces.

(S) The Soviets have sufficient knowledge of the types and missions of Western space equipment to target their offensive capabilities against the particular systems that they would wish to negate. The initial decision to attack a chosen set of space assets would be made at the highest levels of the government and would be implemented by the General Staff in such a way as to maximize the benefit to Soviet military operations. Therefore, operations during a major conflict would not include any activity for warning or demonstration purposes. ASAT attacks probably

would include electronic warfare and lasers in order to negate Western satellites not destroyed by the orbital interceptor. Soviet military writers stress decisive use, especially by surprise, of the fruits of the "military-technological revolution."

(S) The Soviets are devoting substantial resources to the development of high-energy lasers for ASAT use. Their advantages over the currently operational orbital interceptor include much faster response time and multi-shot capability (the current interceptor destroys itself when attacking a target). In addition, the Soviets may perceive an operational advantage in NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional conflict in which both sides experience significant space system losses. Soviet space assets, because of their short lifetime, are by nature and design more replaceable than their individually more expensive and durable American counterparts.

(S) Military doctrine is a useful guide to the direction in which the Soviets are taking their space program; it is not, however, a measure of their capabilities, which are still short of their requirements. Among the material weaknesses of the Soviet space program as a military instrument are the vulnerability of vital launch and ground control sites, the unreliability of many types of spacecraft, and the inadequacy of the current orbital interceptor as an ASAT weapon. There are only two launch pads capable of supporting the booster that puts this weapon in orbit. The Soviets are aware of these weaknesses. There are indications, for example, that they are developing mobile ground stations in order to provide survivable means of control over and communication with space assets and are attempting to improve the reliability of their spacecraft.

Diplomatic Aspects of Space Policy

(U) In international forums and in their public diplomacy the Soviets have gone to great lengths to characterize their space program as purely "peaceful and scientific" in contrast to that of the US, which they have termed aggressive and militaristic. The key elements of Moscow's "peace offensive" in space are two arms control proposals:

- a draft treaty to ban all weapons from space, modified and reissued in August by Andropov to a group of visiting US Congressmen; and
- a moratorium, analogous to the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) moratorium, on ASAT launches as long as the US does not test its own miniature homing vehicle ASAT interceptor.

(C) Such initiatives are carefully coordinated both with Soviet military developments and with political objectives in

various international bodies. The Soviets are publicizing their diplomatic efforts and combining them with propaganda and "active measures." Even if they are unsuccessful in their goal of halting or slowing down US programs, they can at least argue that their efforts on behalf of global peace are blocked by US intransigence.

(C) The Soviets have consistently shown a preoccupation with potential space threats to Soviet territory and other possible space-borne violations of Soviet sovereignty. They argue that the US is preparing for space war and point to such developments as the establishment of a US space command, a Presidential Directive which they allege orders the Pentagon to prepare for the conduct of military operations in space, and the military potential of the US space shuttle.

(e) Their concern and respect for Western intentions and technological capabilities, an awareness of the limitations of their own space systems, and a desire to limit costs have been the basis for persistent Soviet efforts to negotiate mutual restraints on space activities, particularly when equal restraints tend to give them a disproportionate advantage. For example, the Soviets' offer to dismantle their own ASAT in exchange for the US forgoing the development of the miniature homing vehicle is motivated largely by their awareness of the MHV's superior operational capabilities.

(e) Although acknowledging and benefiting from the right of free passage through space, the Soviets consider certain space activities to be illegal and reserve the right to take action against them. Such activities include space-based intelligence gathering for other than treaty verification and direct broadcast satellites that could interfere with their control of the flow of information to the Soviet populace. A 1972 convention proposed to the UN by the Soviet Union expressed the view that a state has a right to use any means to counteract such activities, not only within its own territory but also in outer space.

Economic Aspects of Space Policy

(S/NF) The space program provides substantial and unique benefits to the Soviet economy, and Moscow is actively working to expand these contributions. The most important benefit is the acquisition of economically useful information on such items as crop growth, mineral deposits, and fault lines in the Soviet Union. Obtaining economic intelligence on harvest prospects and resource developments in other countries also provides the Soviets with advance knowledge of international market trends. In the wake of the post-Afghanistan grain embargo, Soviet reconnaissance against Argentine grain-producing areas preceded Soviet purchases of grain from Argentina.

(C) Space exploitation is also viewed as a means of shrinking distances within the USSR and advancing the progress of its vast underdeveloped regions. Communications satellites have permitted remote areas to be interconnected without the expense of laying cables through difficult terrain and have greatly facilitated political and economic control from Moscow.

(C) The Soviet Union has already launched an Indian satellite and is expected to market space launch and telecommunications services to other countries, in competition with NASA and the European Space Agency. The provision of such services would constitute an important source of hard currency and would give the Soviet Union a measure of influence and leverage over purchasing states.

(S) Finally, the Soviets view the zero-gravity environment of space as affording unique advantages in manufacturing and materials processing. They have already experimented with the manufacture of semiconductors, superconductors, and special alloys on their Salyut space stations. When economically feasible, such items probably will be manufactured in space and returned to earth on a regular basis once the Soviet space shuttle and a large space station become operational. The Soviets have already declared publicly that they will have a module on this station for manufacturing.

(S) Scientific Aspects of Space Policy

The Soviets have a long tradition of interest in the basic sciences; they have conducted some pure research and experimentation in space, and they will continue to support the study of basic geophysical, solar, and astronomical sciences. However, the scientific aspect of the Soviet space program is not viewed as autonomous. Most research in space over the last few years has been in direct support of either the military services or the national economy.

Prestige Aspects of Space Policy

(U) Soviet policymakers perceive one of the greatest benefits from the space program to be its contribution to the Soviet Union's status as a superpower. Moscow supports the space program as a source of prestige and influence internationally as well as of pride and legitimacy at home.

(U) The Soviets have set and publicized an impressive array of space records, including the first satellite, the first man to orbit the earth, the first automatic resupply spacecraft, the first spacecraft refueling, the first woman in space, and the largest total of man-days in space. They have also gained substantial international recognition from such programs as their unmanned expeditions to Venus; the hosting of cosmonauts from Third World countries (as well as France) on their Salyut space

stations; and their Cospas satellite, which in a joint program with the US, France, and Canada has picked up and located emergency signals from ships and aircraft in distress.

(C) If the Soviet Union were to establish itself as the unquestioned leader in the exploration and use of space, it would significantly enhance its international influence, which at present is almost wholly dependent on its military capabilities. One of the motivations of the expensive manned space program, which includes the nationally declared goal of a large, permanently manned space station, is to regain the recognition as leader in space that the Soviets lost with the successful US moon program and the first flights of the US shuttle.

(C) Domestically, the Soviet leadership supports the space program as a demonstration of the effectiveness of the Soviet system. Soviet achievements in space are heavily publicized and are always identified with the communist party, which is depicted as the guiding force behind all such accomplishments. Cosmonauts such as Yuriy Gagarin, who are invariably members of the CPSU, are idealized and turned into heroes not as individuals but as representatives of the party and the Soviet people.

(S) Technical Aspects of Space Policy

Space is considered a hostile environment in which operations are costly and difficult. To minimize risks, the Soviets have adopted a cautious design and engineering philosophy in establishing their space systems. Wherever possible they innovate through progressive modification rather than high-risk, novel designs.

They also tend to use systems that offer substantial flexibility and cost savings. This policy is most evident in the manned space station program, with its reliance on modular building blocks, but is also evident in other programs. Photoreconnaissance satellites, for example, are modified manned vehicles; and the first stage of the new medium-lift launch vehicle, the SL-Y, also will serve as a strap-on booster for the Saturn 5 class SL-W heavy-lift launch vehicle.

In the event of a satellite's malfunction, the only option currently available to the Soviets is replacement. To diminish the chance of malfunction, Soviet satellite types--with two exceptions--are designed for one mission only and are built as simply and ruggedly as possible. The Soviets also insure against the consequences of malfunction or loss in a high-priority satellite network by maintaining some inactive satellites in on-orbit storage. When a satellite fails, a replacement often can be quickly activated.

The Soviets also tend to add new space systems without retiring old ones. In consequence, they are steadily increasing their backup capabilities. For instance, the advent of high-altitude Comsats has not led to the abandonment of older communications systems, and even expensive landlines continue to be maintained and improved. In contrast, the US has dealt with these problems by emphasizing high engineering standards and by devoting substantial resources to quality control, to which the Soviets have given much less emphasis.

The cost of space vehicles is high, but the Soviets have realized substantial R&D savings by applying concepts and technology developed elsewhere. They have, for example, used the US Dyna-Soar vehicle and Shuttle Orbiter as models for their own space plane and shuttle. Partly by choice and partly by necessity, the Soviets have realized some savings from economies of scale in the production of their space equipment. Their high launch rates and relatively short vehicle lifetimes have required regular production lines for both launch vehicles and spacecraft. As a byproduct of this, space launches are much more routine in the Soviet Union (about 2-3 per week) than they are in the United States.

Prepared by G. Manfred Schweitzer
632-0926

Approved by W. D. Howells
632-2043

VSSR - Science & Space

~~Matlock~~

File 33


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 26, 1984

Dear Mr. Schweickart:

Robert C. McFarlane has asked me to respond to your letter of April 11, informing us of your plans to establish a professional organization composed of individuals who have flown in space. We appreciate your informing us of this proposal and sincerely hope that if you proceed with this project, you will conform strictly to the guidelines contained in your letter. In particular, I would stress the necessity of following the points which explicitly prohibit the use of this organization as an instrument of political propaganda rather than as an educational forum promoting space explorations.

Sincerely,



Jack F. Matlock
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr. Lynn Paskoe
EUR/SOV
Department of State

Mr. Russell L. Schweickart
892 La Sierra Drive
Sacramento, California 95825

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34

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ROUTINE

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FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MR. KIMMITT / ~~WASHINGTON~~ BEIJING

SITTO # 146 TOR: 252320Z APR 84

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK / TYRUS W. COBB *tw*

SUBJECT: Astronaut-Cosmonaut Meeting

Attached at Tab A is a letter that was hand-delivered to Ty at the NSC by Mr. Jim Hickman, a consultant working with the Rockefeller Foundation. He is coordinating a meeting between former American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts at Pocantico Hills in May. The letter to you is from former astronaut Rusty Schweickart, who has been active in promoting this sort of activities.

- By way of background, there is some enthusiasm among our former astronauts for this enterprise, but also a certain degree of hesitancy based on concern over White House evaluation of the project and potential political fallout. At Tab C are examples of correspondence sent to Gil Rye indicating that the astronaut community is far from unanimous on this issue.
- One group, led by Rusty Schweickart, is pressing for expanded cooperation, to include work toward the "First Planetary Congress" referenced in his letter. Schweickart also has his own agenda, including controversial disarmament and space schemes, that concerns many of the astronauts.
- Another group of more "conservative" astronauts, principally Collins, Schmitt and Cunningham, support the project, but do not wish to proceed unless they are assured that the White House is either in favor or has no objection. They fear that, given the downturn in relations, we might wish to discourage these contacts. These astronauts have serious reservations about Schweickart's motives and fear that an astronaut/cosmonaut meeting could degenerate into an election year political football.

Hickman has been in touch with State (SOV/EE) and Ambassador Hartman in Moscow, who feel that there may be some value in these meetings as a small step forward in Soviet-American relations. At the same time, they have explicitly reminded the organizers of the potential for political propaganda it represents and of the possibility of Soviet attempts to use the gatherings to promote their national security policies (such as the demilitarization of space).

In short, while we should do nothing to obstruct the meeting (this would receive maximum press play), we should also do nothing to encourage it. We feel that Jack Matlock should respond to Schweickart on your behalf, indicating that we are aware of the project and have no objections as long as the ground rules laid out in his letter are observed.

Ron Ron Lehman and Gil/*Rye* Rye concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Jack Matlock responding to Schweickart with the letter at Tab B.

Approve *per Ron 4/20* Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab A - Letter from Schweickart
- Tab B - Matlock Letter to Schweickart
- Tab C - Astronaut Correspondence to Gil Rye

Russell L. Schweickart
892 La Sierra Drive
Sacramento, CA 95825

37

11 April 1984

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

Over the past two years [redacted] American astronauts and Soviet [redacted] have been informally developing [redacted] the Planetary Congress of Space Explorers, a professional organization of people who have flown in space. The [redacted] would be to provide a private [redacted] have been [redacted] for the First Planetary Congress to be held in a third country within the next year.

The [redacted] are [redacted] Because of the potential for political exploitation by the Soviet Union, [redacted] and with Richard [redacted] and Lynn [redacted] respectively the former and current Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, Department of [redacted] Ambassador Hartman recently advised us of the desirability of informing you directly of the background and plans for our activities.

[redacted] by a group of former astronauts whose participation is [redacted] It has been organized in consultation with representatives from the [redacted], the [redacted], and the [redacted] A planning committee of former astronauts will meet privately with the cosmonauts at the [redacted] The purpose of this meeting is to discuss organizational issues, establish an agenda for the First Planetary Congress, and identify topics for discussion such as development of space rescue capability. Following this meeting, the cosmonauts will visit New York City, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Boston to meet with other astronauts, do some sightseeing, and attend several welcoming receptions.

[redacted] over the last year. In April 1983, former astronauts Dr. Edgar [redacted] Michael [redacted] and [redacted] meeting for the project. At the meeting we agreed that:

- a) the [redacted] of the organization would be [redacted] and oriented toward gaining popular support for space exploration;
- b) a final organizational meeting would be held in the US prior to the First Planetary Congress;

Mr. Robert McFarlane
11 April 1984

Page 2

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
c) no public statement concerning this effort would be made without agreement
of both sides;

d) the opinions or views or actions of participants in this effort

A meeting in March 1984 was hosted by Mr. Donald Kendall at PepsiCo head-
quarters in New York where eight astronauts agreed on an invitation for the
cosmonauts to visit the US in May. In preparation for the May meeting, we
would be happy to consider any advice you might offer to assist us in insuring
our success. We would appreciate an opportunity
to brief you in more detail in the near future.

On behalf of the organizing committee, I am,

Respectfully yours,



Russell L. Schweickart

RS/jg

cc: Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Dr. Tyrus Cobb
Mr. Lynn Pascoe
Mr. Richard Combs

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NLS F06-114/10#11366

LOJ, NARA, Date 7/18/08

(b) (3)

SECRET [redacted]

46

Implications of the December 1984 USSR Academy of Sciences Election

15 April 1985

The Academy of Sciences elected 55 new full members and 112 new corresponding members last December. Analysis of the election results and the subsequent administrative changes within the Academy suggests that the Party has increased its influence within this prestigious body and that the Party intends to use that influence to better direct the efforts of the Academy in the Party's widely publicized science and technology campaign. [redacted]

The creation and staffing of the new Department of Information Science, Computer Technology and Automation, the naming of Konstantin Frolov to the newly created position of vice president for machinebuilding, and the increased number of academicians connected with the defense industries seem intended to strengthen the Academy's role in accelerating the 'scientific-technical revolution' that has received such heavy stress in over the past two years by the country's political leaders. [redacted]

The gender and ethnic background of the newly elected members indicate that despite changes in the political makeup of the Academy, its demographic base remains largely Russian and male. Family ties continue to influence selection to some extent. [redacted]

[redacted]

SWM 85-10065
SOVM 85-10090

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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

47

Significance of Academy Elections

The USSR Academy of Sciences is the most prestigious scientific organization in the Soviet Union, and election to membership in the Academy is the highest honor a Soviet scientist can achieve. In a country that stresses the "scientific" nature of its political and economic philosophy, the title Academician entails in Soviet society respect bordering on reverence. [redacted]

Elections to membership in the Academy are carried out by secret ballot by the body of academicians meeting at an Academy General Assembly. (The General Assembly, consisting of the entire body of full members, is by Academy statute the highest organ of the Academy and the place where issues affecting the Academy are decided--by simple majority in ordinary cases or by two-thirds majority in significant cases.) To be elected, nominees must receive a two-thirds majority approval vote of the academicians at both the department and General Assembly levels. [redacted]

The election procedure in the General Assembly appears to be largely pro forma. Candidates placed on the ballot are actually pre-selected at the Academy department level so that the General Assembly's function is that of confirming or denying the department's choices. Rejection of a candidate would be a slap in the face not only to the candidate but to the sponsoring department as well. The vote is, however, unlikely to be unanimous in most cases: a candidate may have antagonized one or more academicians sometime during his career, or a department head may have enemies in the General Assembly who wish to show their distaste for a department head by voting against his candidate. Unless there is widespread aversion to a particular candidate among the academicians, however, there is little likelihood of any serious challenge to the election of a candidate once the department has granted its approval. [redacted]

Several criteria determine who gets elected to the Academy:

- ° One, quite naturally, is scientific competence. Indeed, an Academy statute specifically states that only those "scientists who have enriched science with works of paramount scientific importance" are to be elected; most academicians and corresponding members bear the degree of doctor of sciences.^{1/}

^{1/} It is unusual, but not impossible, for a major scientific figure to be turned down in the election process. Were he not already an academy member, Andrey Sakharov, the noted Soviet physicist, would probably be turned down for his dissident activities.

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- ° Directors of Academy institutes are often elected to the Academy, even when those individuals are not first-rate scientists.
- ° -Proteges of prominent academicians or scientists with political clout have a better chance than other scientists to be selected, all else equal.
- ° Scientists who head important classified design bureaus are elected (especially to the Department of Mechanics and Control Processes, which is largely composed of technical specialists and engineers).
- ° Finally, some individuals are elected merely to reward a long, if not especially distinguished, career. [redacted]

The recent elections increased the numbers of members and corresponding members in the Academy. After the 1984 elections, there appeared to be 295 academicians and about 630 corresponding members, compared with 269 academicians and 536 corresponding members following the elections in 1981. Although the number of positions is generally fixed--with individuals being elected to membership only to replace members who have died--occasionally in the past the Council of Ministers has authorized an increase in the number of positions. This appears to have been the case for the recent election. Many of the extra slots were needed to staff the new Department of Information Science, Computer Technology, and Automation: fourteen academicians and 26 corresponding members were elected to this department. (The principle difference between academicians and corresponding members is that only academicians have the right to vote on questions (including membership elections) before the General Assembly). [redacted]

Strengthened Party Representation

The recent election continued the trend toward increasing the number of academicians who belong to the Communist Party--at least 50 of the 55 new academicians have party membership. The percentage of party members among academicians is higher now than at any point in history. Of the total membership of 295 academicians following the 1984 elections, at least 213 (72 percent) were members of the party compared to 33 percent in the mid-1950s, 52 percent in 1966, and 59 percent by the mid-1970s. The influx of party members solidifies the party's two-thirds majority in the Academy General Assembly, first achieved in the 1981 elections. [redacted]

The party's strengthened position in the Academy means that should a significant issue come before the General Assembly, it is now more likely than ever that the party's wishes on that issue would prevail. All members of the party are subject to party discipline and required to

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attend party meetings, and breaches of party discipline can result in official reprimand or, in serious cases, expulsion from the party. Once a party position is presented at a party meeting, it would be unwise for a party member to publicly disregard that position. Nevertheless, this influence probably will not guarantee party control over votes in the General Assembly. Most scientists join the party for career reasons rather than for ideological reasons, and therefore do not always fully share party views. In the past academicians who are party members have not always supported party positions. [redacted]

Should the party now wish to test the effectiveness of party discipline among the academicians, it might require the Academy to publish another condemnation of dissident Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov, personally signed by all academicians. Such a test would force the academicians to decide whether they dare put professional concerns ahead of party wishes. Two similar condemnations in the past by the academy met with only lukewarm success, but it is unlikely that those condemnations were regarded as a litmus test of party loyalty. As another test of party loyalty the party might also call for (and expect) the General Assembly to condemn President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), an action that would almost certainly require a two-thirds vote of the academicians. (Academy Vice President Yevgeniy Velikhov has been an active spokesperson against the SDI.) This type of test would have useful political value without forcing Academy members to make bitter decisions. [redacted]

We believe the party will use its increased influence to further its scientific-technical campaign. This program, spelled out in the August 1983 Central Committee resolution "On Measures for Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress in the National Economy" has as its primary goal more closely tying science to industry. Although leadership attempts to effect such closer ties are not new in the Academy's history, increased party influence should lead to greater success in this sphere. [redacted]

One example of how the party has benefited from its increased influence is the election to corresponding membership of Vadim Medvedev, head of the CPSU Department of Science and Educational Institutions. Medvedev's predecessor, Sergey Trapeznikov, had been turned down repeatedly for corresponding membership before his election in 1979. Medvedev, in contrast, was elected on his first bid after assuming leadership of the department. Medvedev's election probably indicates that the Academy--in accordance with party wishes--has decided to institutionalize a slot for the head of that party organ. [redacted]

Even if the party leadership were to refrain from frequently wielding its increased influence in an open fashion, the large party majority

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in the Academy might cause some changes in attitude among the academicians as a group. The growing number of post-war academicians--reported by observers as being more interested in the status and material benefits conveyed by Academy membership than in the scientific doors such membership opens--might make it easier for the party to enforce its policy preferences. One possible result would be the development of increasing scientific autarky--a tendency among academicians to be less open with Western scientists--although the consequent prospects of diminished travel might mitigate the tendency to some extent. [REDACTED]

Staffing of the New Computer Department

The December elections installed the first scientists to be members of the new Department of Information Science, Computer Technology and Automation, created in March 1983. This department--one of 17 and the first to be created within the Academy since 1968 (see figure 1)--was a step taken by the Soviet leadership to enhance the guiding role of the Academy in the computerization of Soviet society. Those individuals elected in December are the first to be elected since the the department was founded. [REDACTED]


A list of 12 institutes to be included in the new department was published in December. Among these are three new institutes, whose creation was announced in April 1984--the Problems of Cybernetics Institute in Moscow, the Problems of Technology of Microelectronics and Ultrapure Materials Institute in Chernogolovka, and the Microelectronics Institute in Yaroslavl. [REDACTED]

The importance both the national and Academy leadership attributes to this new department was apparent in the naming of a vice president of the Academy, Yevgeniy Velikhov, as its first chairman. Velikhov, who in November 1977 was promoted to a newly-created vice presidency for science and technology and who is currently considered a leading candidate to be the next president of the Academy, has long urged that greater attention be paid to the problems of introducing the fruits of applied science throughout the economy. Now vice president for Applied Physical and Mathematical Sciences--and thus in overall control of almost all physical-mechanical research conducted at the Academy--Velikhov is certain to exercise considerable influence in enhancing the department's role in the spread of computer technology. [REDACTED]

Another indication that the Soviet leadership feels the problems of the computer gap more strongly than ever lies in the fact that when the list of vacancies was first published in September 1984, only 7 academician and 15 corresponding member slots were listed as available, but 14 academicians and 26 corresponding members were elected in December. The positions and backgrounds of the individuals elected to Velikhov's and other departments give a clear indication of the extent of the regime's

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FIGURE I
 ORGANIZATION OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES



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concern with the computerization of industry. (See appendix for a listing of the members of Velikhov's department.) Two of the academicians elected to the computer department are directors of those institutes now subordinate to the department. All but two of the new academicians were formerly corresponding members in either the Mechanics and Control Processes, the Mathematics, the General Physics and Astronomy or the Siberian Departments. Two were already academicians in the regional academies. [REDACTED]

Creation of a Vice Presidency for Machinebuilding

One of the more interesting new electees is Konstantin Frolov. In March (only three months after becoming academician) Frolov was promoted to the newly created position of vice president for machinebuilding, and to Academician Secretary (head) of the Department for Mechanics and Control Processes. The rapidity of Frolov's promotion is unprecedented in Academy history. [REDACTED]

We believe Frolov's machinebuilding vice presidency was established because of the Soviet leadership's recognition of that sector's key role in Soviet industrial modernization. Frolov is director of one of the principal Soviet research institutes involved with robotics--the Blagonravov Machine Science Institute--and chairman of the Scientific Council on Machine Theory and Machine Systems. The choice of Frolov for the new vice presidency is likely intended to intensify Academy involvement in directing the automation of Soviet industry. [REDACTED]

Frolov's appointment creates a bureaucratic problem for the Academy. Frolov's Department of Mechanics and Control Processes is organizationally subordinate to the Section for Physical, Technical, and Mathematical Sciences, currently headed by Academy Vice President Yevgeniy Velikhov (see figure 2). We believe that in the near future the Academy may create a new section for Frolov, consisting of his own department and possibly the Department of Physical Technical Problems of Power Engineering. The purview of such a new section would likely be the automation of machinebuilding. [REDACTED]


Election of Defense-Related Scientists

The recent election increased the number of scientists in the Academy who are connected with defense-related work. Two of the most prominent new academicians are Vladimir Utkin and Mikhail Reshetnev. Utkin, chief designer at the Dnepropetrovsk Missile Development and Production Center, is the designer of the SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs as well as the SL-11 and SL-14 space launch vehicles. Reshetnev, chief designer at the Krasnoyarsk Space Components Plant, has designed several series of Soviet satellites. Both Utkin and Reshetnev were elected to the Department of Mechanics and Control Processes, which has traditionally had the

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FIGURE II
THE BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP OF FROLOV AND VELIKHOV

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This figure is Unclassified.

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highest percentage of defense-related scientists among its members. [REDACTED]

Defense-related scientists were elected to other departments as well. Velikhov's new department was a major recipient: Anatoliy Savin, chief of the Kometa Design Bureau, Lev Koshkin, chief of a design bureau in Klimovsk, and Germogen Pospelov, Soviet general and automatic control specialist, formerly head of the Academy's Section of Applied Problems (the Academy's liaison with the Soviet military-industrial complex) all were elected academicians in this new department. New defense-related corresponding members in Velikhov's department include such individuals as Veniamin Yefremov (in the Ministry of Radio Industry) and Anatoliy Kalyayev (Kalmykov Radio Engineering Institute in Leningrad). Other corresponding members with defense-related backgrounds include Pavel Agadzhanov (major general and first director of the Air Defense Systems Engineering Institute in Moscow) and Dmitriy Kozlov, head of the design bureau for space and missile system components at Kuybyshev Plant Progress. [REDACTED]

The number of the newly elected scientists who hold military rank is uncertain. We know of only three such academicians: Utkin, Reshetnev, and N. S. Solomenko, a rear admiral whose scientific speciality is structural mechanics and who also belongs to the Department of Mechanics and Control Processes. Nevertheless, reserve commissions are common for those in the Soviet defense industries, and thus we would expect the number to be significantly higher. [REDACTED]

Growing Slavic Dominance

Demographically, the 1984 election further strengthened the majority of ethnic Slavic males in Academy ranks. Of the total 167 persons newly elected, fully 70 percent of the new members in both the academician and corresponding member categories appear to be ethnic Russians or Belorussians. Next to those, the next most numerous group are the Ukrainians (see table). [REDACTED]

From the appearance of the names of those elected, four of the new academicians and five of the new corresponding members are Jewish. The total of nine represents 5 percent of the new members. The overall current figure of those who are Jewish is 10 percent, down from the approximately 11 percent prior to the election. One new academician of Jewish background, Izrail' Gel'fand, was elected to the Mathematics Department, (which has been reported to be strongly anti-Semitic), and three of the nine were elected to Velikhov's department. Thus almost half of the new members with Jewish names were elected to departments concerned with mathematics, traditionally a discipline in which Soviet Jews have been strongly represented. It would appear that scientific competence can still, to some extent, overcome traditional Soviet anti-Semitism. [REDACTED]

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Table 1
Nationalities of the Newly-Elected Academicians* [REDACTED]

NATIONALITY	NUMBER OF ACADEMICIANS	NUMBER OF CORRESPONDING MEMBERS
Russian or Belorussian	41	84
Ukrainian	8	9
Georgian	2	3
Armenian	1	5
Tatar	2	1
Lithuanian	1	1
Azeri	--	2
Tadzhik or Turkmen	--	2
Uzbek	--	1
Latvian	--	1
Kazakh	--	1
Avar	--	1
Kabardin-Balkar	--	1

*Based upon name analysis.

This table is Unclassified.

Soviet women, however, were not so fortunate. Of the total individuals nominated (202 academician and 1069 corresponding member candidates), only 25 were women; and of the total members elected to the Academy (167), only one was a woman (to the Department of Literature and Language). The percentage of women in the Academy now is less than 1 percent (16 individuals). The small number of women in the Academy reflects the current position of women in Soviet science at large. Very few women reach the top ranks in any stratum of Soviet society. [REDACTED]

Importance of Family Ties

The list of candidates for the 1984 elections contains a number of sons of prominent Soviets. Given the high status and the financial rewards (academicians get a lifetime stipend of 500 rubles per month and corresponding members 250 rubles per month), it is not surprising that prominent scientists and politicians sponsor their children for membership in the Academy. Successful son/candidates were Nikolay Bogolyubov

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(corresponding member in his father's Department of Mathematics) and Aleksey Tupolev (son of aircraft designer Andrey Tupolev and now an academician in the Department of Mechanics and Control Processes). Stanislav Yemel'yanov, academician in the Department of Information Science, Computer Technology, and Automation, may be the son of Vasiliy Yemel'yanov, well-known metallurgical physicist and corresponding member of the Academy. Aleksey Bonch-Bruyevich, a new corresponding member in the Department of General Physics and Astronomy, may be the son of the late noted scientist Mikhail Bonch-Bruyevich. Other successful candidates who are probably sons of prominent Soviets are: Academician Boris Naumov, probably son of corresponding member Nikolay Naumov (deceased); Academician Aleksandr Isayev, probably son of agricultural geneticist Sergey Isayev; corresponding member Yuriy Tret'yanov, probably son of biologist D. K. Tret'yanov (deceased); corresponding member Aleksey Bogdanov, probably son of geologist Aleksey Bogdanov; corresponding member Dmitriy Rundkvist, probably son of prominent mining engineer Vasiliy Rundkvist; academician Konstantin Frolov, probably son of Vasiliy Frolov, retired chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Machinebuilding Department. [REDACTED]

Sons of prominent Soviets nominated to academician status but not selected include Nikolay Ustinov, son of the late Minister of Defense Dmitriy Ustinov, and Andrey Kapitsa, son of the late Nobel Prize laureate Petr Kapitsa. Offspring nominated but not elected to corresponding member status include Andrey's brother, Sergey Kapitsa; Oleg Smirnov, son of the head of the Military Industrial Commission, Leonid Smirnov; Konstantin Skryabin, son of the Academy Chief Scientific Secretary Georgiy Skryabin; Yevgeniy Tamm, son of late Nobel prize laureate Igor' Tamm; and Vladimir Millionshchikov, (presumably) son of the late Academy vice president Mikhail Millionshchikov. Oleg Tikhonov, nominated but not elected to the Department of Geology, Geophysics and Geochemistry, may be the son of Soviet premier Nikolay Tikhonov (Oleg's patronymic, Nikolayevich, and birthdate, 1937, are consistent with this assumption). Somewhat surprisingly, Anatoliy Gromyko, son of Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko, was not even nominated for academician status, although he had been elected a corresponding member in the previous election. Election to academician status generally requires much stronger scientific credentials than does election to corresponding membership, and therefore, nepotism is probably less of a factor with respect to the former. [REDACTED]

Whether a son of a prominent Soviet is elected probably depends on a number of factors. One, of course, is the degree of scientific competence of the individual nominated. Sons who are mediocre scientists obviously have less chance of success than sons who are first-rate scientists. The closer the relationship of the candidate to the head of the department to which the candidate is nominated the more chance of success that candidate has. (Nikolay Bogolyubov probably was chosen mainly

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because his father headed his department.) Sons who have engaged in dissident activities are usually turned down at least several times. Sergey Novikov, although the nephew of then Academy president Mstislav Keldysh and son of prominent mathematician Petr Novikov, was turned down several times in the 1970s because he had protested the trial of two dissident mathematicians. As pointed out above, the Academy has not hesitated to turn down even sons of top Soviet political officials. [REDACTED]

Other prominent scientists turned down at the December elections are: Iosif Shklovskiy, the late astrophysicist who coauthored a book with US astronomer Carl Sagan; aircraft designer Aleksey Il'yushin; Andrey Monin, controversial director of the world's largest oceanographic organization, the Institute of Oceanology; cosmonaut Konstantin Feoktistov, design bureau chief at the Moscow Missile and Space Development Center; Vladilen Letokhov, a world leader in molecular spectroscopy and laser chemistry. We are unaware of the reasons for the rejection of these men. [REDACTED]

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Appendix A

NEW ACADEMICIANS AND THEIR AFFILIATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF BIOCHEMISTRY, BIOPHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY OF PHYSIOLOGICALLY ACTIVE COMPOUNDS

Petrov, Rem Viktorovich: director, Immunology Institute Moscow

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Ar Miskin, Aleksandr Ivanovich: chief, Economic Forecasting Department, Central Economics and Mathematical Institute, Moscow

Lubinov, Ivan Illarionovich: director, Economics Institute, Kiev

Nikonov, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich: president, Academy of Agricultural Sciences

DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL BIOLOGY

Isayev, Aleksandr Sergeevich: director, Forestry and Wood Institute imeni V. N. Sukhachev, Krasnoyarsk

DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL PHYSICS AND BIOLOGY

Aleksandrov, Kirill Sergeevich: director, Physics Institute imeni L. V. Kirenskiy, Krasnoyarsk

Bogomolov, Aleksey Fedorovich: senior researcher, Space Research Institute, Moscow

Kagan, Yuriy Moiseyevich: deputy chief, Solid State Physics Laboratory, Atomic Energy Institute imeni I. V. Kurchatov, Moscow

Mesyats, Gennadiy Andreyevich: director, High Current Electronics Institute, Tomsk

Khalatnikov, Isaak Markovich: director, Theoretical Physics Institute imeni L. D. Landau, Moscow

Kharadze, Yevgeniy Kirillovich: director, Astrophysical Laboratory, Abastumani

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DEPARTMENT OF GEOLOGY, GEOPHYSICS AND GEOCHEMISTRY

Logachev, Nikolay Alekseyevich: director, Earth's Crust Institute, Irkutsk

Pushcharovskiy, Yuriy Mikhaylovich: researcher, Geology Institute, Academy of Sciences

Puzyrev, Nikolay Nikitovich: deputy director, Geology and Geophysics Institute, Novosibirsk

Shemyakin, Yevgeniy Ivanovich: deputy chairman, Siberian Department; director, Mining Institute, Novosibirsk

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Vinogradov, Vladimir Alekseyevich: director, Scientific Information on Social Sciences Institute, Moscow

DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION SCIENCE, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND AUTOMATION

Alekseyev, Anatoliy Semenovich: director, Computer Center, Novosibirsk

Gulyayev, Yuriy Vasil'yevich: deputy director, Radio Engineering and Electronics Institute, Moscow

Koshkin, Lev Nikolayevich: director, Koshkin Design Bureau, Ministry of Defense Industry

Mikhalevich, Vladimir Sergeyevich: director, Cybernetics Institute, Kiev

Moiseyev, Nikita Nikolayevich: deputy director, Computer Center, Moscow

Naumov, Boris Nikolayevich: director, Electronic Control Machines Institute, Moscow

Pospelov, Germogen Sergeyevich: chief, Automated Control Systems Laboratory, Computer Center, Moscow

Pozhela, Yuras Karlovich: director, Semiconductor Physics Institute, Vilnius; president, Lithuanian Academy of Sciences

Rzhanov, Anatoliy Vasil'yevich: director, Semiconductor Physics Institute, Novosibirsk

Savin, Anatoliy Ivanovich: chief, Kometa Design Bureau

Sheremet'yevskiy, Nikolay Nikolayevich: director, Electromechanics Scientific Research Institute, Moscow

Valiyev, Kamil' Akhmetovich: director, Microelectronics Institute, Yaroslavl

Yemelyanov, Stanislav Vasil'yevich: deputy director, Systems Research Scientific Research Institute, Moscow; director, International Management Scientific Research Institute, Moscow

Yershov, Andrey Petrovich: chief, Computer Science Laboratory, Computer Center, Novosibirsk

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DEPARTMENT OF LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE

Gamkrelidze, Tamaz Valerionovich: member, Language and Literature Department, Georgian Academy of Sciences
Markov, Dmitiy Fedorovich: director, Slavic and Balkan Studies Institute, Moscow

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS

Gel'fand, Izrail' Moiseyevich: chief, Bionics Laboratory, Applied Mathematics Institute imeni Keldysh, Moscow
Maslov, Viktor Pavlovich: head, Faculty of Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Electronic Machinebuilding
Mishchenko, Yevgeniy Frolovich: deputy director, Mathematics Institute imeni Steklov, Moscow
Mitropol'skiy, Yuriy Alekseyevich: director, Mathematics Institute, Kiev

DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICS AND CONTROL PROCESSES

Fedosov, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich: Moscow Higher Technical School imeni Bauman
Frolov, Konstantin Vasil'yevich: director, Machine Scientific Research Institute imeni A. A. Blagonravov, Moscow
Novozhilov, Genrikh Vasil'yevich: director, general designer, Ilyushin Aircraft Design Bureau
Raushenbakh, Boris Viktorovich: director of engineering, Institute of Control Science
Reshetnev, Mikhail Fedorovich: chief, Design Bureau of Applied Mechanics, Ministry of General Machinebuilding, Krasnoyarsk
Solomenko, Nikolay Stepanovich: rear-admiral-engineer, professor at an unidentified naval academy
Tupolev, Aleksey Andreyevich: general designer, Tupolev Special Design Bureau, Moscow
Utkin, Vladimir Fedorovich: general designer, Dnepropetrovsk Missile Development and Production Center, Ministry of General Machinebuilding

DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS

Barkov, Lev Mitrofanovich: laboratory chief, Nuclear Physics Institute, Novosibirsk

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DEPARTMENT OF OCEANOLOGY, PHYSICS OF THE ATMOSPHERE, AND GEOGRAPHY

Avsyuk, Grigoriy Aleksandrovich: researcher, Geography Institute, Academy of Sciences
Kondrat'yev, Kirill Yakovlevich: laboratory chief, Limnology Institute, Academy of Sciences, Leningrad

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND LAW

Kudyravtsev, Vladimir Nikolayevich: Institute of State and Law, Moscow

DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICO-CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF INORGANIC MATERIALS

Buslayev, Yuriy Aleksandrovich: deputy director, General and Inorganic Chemistry Institute imeni N. S. Kurnakov
Gorynin, Igor' Vasil'yevich: field: plasticity of materials; affiliation unknown
Fridlyander, Iosif Naumovich: laboratory chief, All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials

DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICO-TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF POWER ENGINEERING

Demirchyan, Kamo Seropovich: professor, Leningrad Polytechnical Institute imeni M. I. Kalinin

DEPARTMENT OF PHYSIOLOGY

Govyryn, Vladimir Aleksandrovich: director, Physiology Institute imeni I. P. Pavlov, Leningrad
Ugolev, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich: chief, Nutrition Laboratory, Physiology Institute imeni I. P. Pavlov, Leningrad

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Appendix B

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS ELECTED DECEMBER 1984

Department of Biochemistry, Biophysics, and Chemistry of Physiologically Active Compounds

Bogdanov, Aleksey Alekseyvich
Dobrovol'skiy, Gleb Vsevolodovich
Privalov, Petr Leonidovich
Salyayev, Ryurik Konstantinovich

Department of Economics

Abalkin, Leonid Ivanovich
Granberg, Aleksandr Grigor'yevich
Medvedev, Vadim Andreyevich
Petrakov, Nikolay Yakovlevich
Sitaryan, Stepan Aramaisovich
Vol'skiy, Viktor Vatslavovich
Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich

Department of General Biology

Andreyev, Lev Nikolayevich
Shilov, Igor' Aleksandrovich
Yablokov, Aleksey Vladimirovich

Department of General Physics and Biology

Bonch-Bruyevich, Aleksey Mikhaylovich
Chirikov, Boris Valerianovich
Didenko, Andrey Nikolayevich
Galanin, Mikhail Dmitriyevich
Golant, Viktor Yevgen'yevich
Gurevich, Aleksandr Viktorovich
Karlov, Nikolay Vasil'yevich
Kovtunenکو, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich
Pis'mennyy, Vyacheslav Dmitriyevich
Syunyayev, Rashid Aliyevich
Zakharov, Vladimir Yevgen'yevich

Department of Geology, Geophysics, and Geochemistry

Abasov, Mitat Teymur ogly
Dobretsov, Nikolay Leont'yevich
Karus, Yevgeniy Villiamovich
Koval'skiy, Vitaliy Vladimirovich
Krendelev, Fedor Petrovich
Rundkvist, Dmitriy Vasil'yevich
Rykunov, Lev Nikolayevich
Ryabchikov, Igor' Dmitriyevich

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Department of History

Novosel'tsev, Anatoliy Petrovich
Pisarev, Yuriy Alekseyevich

Department of Information Science, Computer Technology and Automation
Aven, Oleg Ivanovich

Agadzhanov, Pavel Artem'yevich
Babayan, Boris Artashesovich
Basistov, Anatoliy Georgiyevich
Gribov, Boris Georgiyevich
Gus'kov, Gennadiy Yakovlevich
Ivannikov, Viktor Petrovich
Kalyayev, Anatoliy Vasil'yevich
Kolesnikov, Vladislav Grigor'yevich
Kozlov, Dmitriy Il'ich
Krasnoshchekov, Pavel Sergeyeovich
Kuznetsov, F. A.
Kurdyumov, Sergey Pavlovich
Mikaelyan, Andrey Leonidovich
Miroshnikov, Mikhail Mikhailovich
Mizin, Igor' Aleksandrovich
Parkhomenko, Pavel Pavlovich
Presnukin, Leonid Nikolayevich
Ryabov, Gennadiy Georgiyevich
Stogniy, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
Sumarokov, Leonid Nikolayevich
Shipunov, Arkadiy Georgiyevich
Shokin, Yuriy Ivanovich
Yefremov, Veniamin Pavlovich
Zhuravlev, Yuriy Ivanovich

Department of Literature and Language

Balashov, Nikolay Ivanovich
Dmitriyev, Lev Aleksandrovich
Gamzatov, Gadzhi Gamzatovich
Nikolayev, Petr Alekseyevich
Novikov, Vasiliy Vasil'yevich
Shmelev, Dmitriy Nikolayevich
Shvedova, Natal'ya Yul'yevna
Solntsev, Vadim Mikhaylovich
Stepanov, Yuriy Sergeyeovich
Tennishev, Edkhyam Rakhimovich
Tolstoy, Nikita Il'ich

Department of Mathematics

Arnol'd, Vladimir Igorevich
Bogolyubov, Nikolay Nikolayevich
Kudryavtsev, Lev Dmitriyevich
Mikhaylov, Gennadiy Alekseyevich

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Pokhozhayev, Stanislav Ivanovich
Sevast'yanov, Boris Aleksandrovich

Department of Mechanics and Control Processes

Anfimov, Nikolay Apollonovich
Belyanin, Petr Nikolayevich
Nepobedimyy, Sergey Pavlovich
Osipov, Yuriy Sergeyeovich
Semikhatov, Nikolay Aleksandrovich
Spasskiy, Igor' Dmitriyevich
Vasil'yev, Valeriy Vital'yevich
Yeger, Sergey Mikahylovich

Department of Nuclear Physics

Gershteyn, Semen Solomonovich
Mostovoy, Vladimir Iosifovich
Nikol'skiy, Sergey Ivanovich
Polyakov, Aleksandr Markovich
Tavkhelidze, Al'bert Nikiforovich

Department of Oceanology, Physics of the Atmosphere, and Geography

Khublaryan, Martin Gaykovich
Vinogradov, Mikhail Yevgen'yevich
Zalikhanov, Mikhail Chokkayevich

Department of Philosophy and Law

Mshveniyeradze, Vladimir Vlasovich
Starushenko, Gleb Borisovich

Department of Physico-Chemistry and Technology of Inorganic Materials

Krasnoshchekov, Yuriy Ivanovich
Purin, Bruno Andreyevich
Rusanov, Vladimir Dmitriyevich
Tret'yakov, Yuriy Dmitriyevich

Department of Physico-Technical Problems of Power Engineering

Alemasov, Vyacheslav Yevgen'yevich
Khabibullayev, Pulat Kirgizbayevich
Kiryukhin, Vladimir Ivanovich
Kulakov, Anatoliy Vasil'yevich
Makarov, Aleksey Aleksandrovich
Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Nikolay Nikolayevich

Department of Physiology

Chaylakhyan, Levon Mikhaylovich
Fanardzhyan, Viktor Varfolomeyevich
Vasil'yev, Nikolay Nikolayevich

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Ambassador Matlock — 5/1/85 65

From

C.L. Cooper

Attached is a briefing paper prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna at the request of the Foreign Minister.

Foreign Minister Graz met with Tom Lee (Director of IASA) a week or so ago and indicated that in his session with the Secretary of State and, separately, with Gromyko prior to the Skultz - Gromyko meeting he planned to mention Austria's interest in IASA. This briefing paper was written in IASA and was delivered to the Ministry on 30 April.

A copy was delivered to DCM Block at our Embassy on 25 April. I assume it was forwarded to State soon after.

Chet Cooper

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1. Historical Background

IIASA has been established in 1972 as a joint US-Soviet venture. According to the Charter the member organizations from the United States (the National Academy of Sciences) and from the Soviet Union (the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) have contributed to the dues-derived budget 25% each (category A), the contribution of the other members (category B) being 0.15 of the category A contribution.

Although IIASA is a non-governmental organization, the financial resources of the National Member Organizations, both from Western and Eastern countries, are coming directly or indirectly from governmental sources.

This was also the case in the US until 1982; the National Academy of Sciences received its IIASA related funds from the National Science Foundation.

2. The US Problem

In 1981 the US administration decided to end government funding for annual dues payments to IIASA, therefore the NAS withdrew its membership in IIASA effective January 1, 1983.

The US scientific community which was in favor of a continuous US membership in IIASA reacted and organized itself. As a result of the strong commitment of distinguished scientists, the US membership in IIASA was transferred in 1982 from the NAS to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences which set up a Committee for IIASA chaired by Professor H. Brooks and represented on the IIASA Council by IIASA's first Director, Professor Howard Raiffa. It is important to notice here that thanks to these efforts, continuous participation of the United States in IIASA has been secured at the same level as before.

The Council of IIASA has responded with great understanding to this new situation and adopted a flexible attitude towards the new US NMO:

In 1983 the US NMO was allowed to pay 60% of the category A dues; the Soviet NMO having accepted to contribute for this first year of transition the full category A obligation which was 36 MAS, with the understanding that from 1984 it will match the US NMO contribution.

In 1984 the Council adopted a reduced dues obligation for category A members: 26 MAS. The US NMO contributed only 50% of that reduced dues obligation.

3. The Evolution of the US Situation

In June 1984 the Council appointed Professor Thomas H. Lee from the MIT as the new Director of IIASA.

As a follow up of actions undertaken both in the United States and by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the visit of President Kirchsclaeger to the United States (February 1984), State Secretary Shultz sent a letter to Minister Lanc (copy attached) in which he explained the position of the US administration:

- no direct governmental funding; private sectors have to contribute to IIASA dues
- "green light" given to government agencies (NSF, EPA, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture) to support specific IIASA projects.

In September 1984 the Social Science Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement of Science joined the American Academy as members of the Committee for IIASA.

From February 11-15 Professor Thomas H. Lee visited several governmental agencies in Washington where he met with Jan Mares, Assistant Secretary, Department of Energy, John H. Gibbons, Director, Office of Technology Assessment, William Schneider, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Milt Russell, Assistant Secretary, Environment Protection Agency, and Richard S. Nicholson, Acting Deputy Director, National Science Foundation, to examine the support these agencies could provide for specific projects of IIASA. He also met with Frank Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences, and George Keyworth, Science Advisor to President Reagan.

The more favorable position of the US administration towards IIASA is reflected in the letter sent by Dr. George Keyworth to Director Lee (copy attached) and by the facts that two US foundations (MacArthur and Sloan) confirmed their financial support to IIASA for 1985-1986. Further actions are under consideration within the Congress in order to restore financial support of IIASA.

4. Perspectives

These recent developments indicate a promising outlook for the future but time will be needed to achieve the main objective which is a stable financial US contribution at the normal level of category A members.

The Western NMOs and authorities in charge of IIASA consider that a US governmental involvement is necessary to secure IIASA's long term development based on a balanced contribution (both scientific and financial) from the Soviet Union and the United States which is reflected in IIASA's management structure: Chairman from the Soviet Union and Director from the United States.

5. Suggested Guidelines for a talk with State Secretary Shultz

- Express satisfaction for the improvement of the US situation. Gratitude to the State Department for the support it has provided, particularly encouraged by the recent letter sent by Dr. Keyworth to Director Lee.
- Express satisfaction for the new IIASA management - the short term crisis is now under control.
- Austrian authorities are interested in long term perspectives as they support IIASA which is an unique organization.
- The recent IIASA initiatives to increase its cooperation with industrial sectors, the establishment of an Advisory Board, the objective of 25% external funding will be very useful for planning of projects.
- The present US involvement has its own limits:
the private sectors are having difficulties in raising enough money because IIASA's projects are long-range and open to public;
the government agencies are willing to consider project funding but it takes a very long time.

As a consequence the Soviet NMO is paying more than the US NMO. Therefore the Austrian government supports the general opinion expressed by Western NMOs and authorities in charge of IIASA, that a US government involvement is necessary to secure IIASA's long-term development based on a balanced contribution (both scientific and financial) from the Soviet Union and United States which is reflected in IIASA's management structure: Chairman from the Soviet Union, Director from the United States.

April 25, 1985

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1984

Dear Erwin:

As I promised you during our meeting on February 27, 1984, the United States Government has reviewed its decision to cease funding through the National Academy of Sciences of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA).

Since the decision to withdraw this indirect U.S. Government funding for IIASA, American participation in this organization has continued through a variety of private channels, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has succeeded the National Academy of Sciences as the non-governmental organization that is the American member of IIASA. In addition, various U.S. Government agencies have funded specific projects undertaken by IIASA.

Having reviewed developments concerning IIASA since the withdrawal of indirect U.S. Government funding, we have concluded that our decision to limit U.S. Government involvement in the organization was the correct course of action. We believe that the increased role of private U.S. individuals and foundations is consistent with the President's goal of reducing the role of government in those areas where private sector involvement is more appropriate.

Should a U.S. Government agency wish to fund participation in an IIASA project because of its scientific interest to the agency, the Department would consider sympathetically such requests. They will be considered on a case-by-case basis to ensure that they are consistent with U.S. policies on international scientific and technological exchanges. In addition, organizations in the U.S. private sector will, of course, continue to provide that level of funding for IIASA which they consider consistent with their interests and abilities.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz



His Excellency
Erwin Lanc,

Affairs of Austria.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 20, 1985

Dear Dr. Lee:

Thank you for your letter of February 26. It was useful for Dr. Bulkley and me to meet you and Dr. Cooper a few weeks ago. As I indicated on that occasion, I believe that the concept of IIASA is a good one. I quite agree that the task ahead is to ensure that the Institute performs work of high quality and of targeted policy relevance. It appears that this is your major objective during the next few years.

I hope you and the American Academy are successful in obtaining the necessary resources to accomplish your plans. As I indicated during our meetings, I would be glad to share my views on what issues are of scientific and technical importance to the United States. I wish you and IIASA well as you move into the years ahead. It was a pleasure meeting with you.

Yours truly,



G. A. Keyworth
Science Advisor to the President

Dr. Thomas H. Lee
Director
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
A-2361 Laxenburg
AUSTRIA

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Matlock~~
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July 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S./Soviet Space Cooperation (U)

Attached is a proposed non-paper on the above subject for your use during discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Helsinki on July 31, 1985. We have coordinated the paper through the interagency process. DOD has concerns about this initiative but I feel confident that if we approach the subject carefully, we can structure an agreement that is in the overall U.S. national interest and avoids many of the disadvantages cited by DOD. (S)

If you elicit a positive response from the Soviets, we would appreciate the opportunity to structure the delegation for any follow-on meetings with the Soviet Union. (U)


Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment
Non-Paper

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BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

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NON-PAPER

The United States would like to suggest that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. enter into discussions aimed at improving cooperation between our two nations on the peaceful uses of space. We continue to believe a joint simulated space rescue mission would be mutually beneficial as previously proposed by President Reagan, the U.S. would also be interested in exploring the potential for renegotiation of the broader intergovernmental space agreement which expired in 1982.

In the context of examining a new intergovernmental agreement, the U.S. would like to discuss cooperation in such areas as planetary exploration, life sciences, manned space flight, earth sciences, astrophysics, and possibly others. We believe that such cooperation could provide benefits to both of our nations and to other nations of the world.

If the U.S.S.R. wishes to explore the possibility of negotiating an agreement for cooperation in space activities, the U.S. is prepared to designate a delegation to conduct the necessary negotiations with their Soviet counterparts.

The U.S. team would be prepared for a meeting at any mutually convenient time and place from mid-August 1985.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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July 25, 1985

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GILBERT D. RYE *GR*
JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*
SUBJECT: U.S./Soviet Space Cooperation

We forwarded the proposed non-paper on the above subject to DOD, State, OSTP and NASA for comments. All except DOD endorse this initiative. Agency comments are at Tab II (NASA responded orally with only a minor modification). The rationale for the DOD negative position is extremely weak and overly bureaucratic. DOD's concerns could be addressed through careful structuring of the negotiating team and the follow-on agreement. Note that DOD comments were signed out by the Executive Secretary rather than the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense indicating, in our view, that they are not "hard over." State has already added this subject into the talking points for Secretary Shultz along the lines of the non-paper.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Secretary Shultz.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Secretary Shultz
- A Non-Paper
- Tab II Agency Comments

Note: State has requested this document by Sunday night (July 28).

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BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/09