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Withdrawer CAS

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FOIA M02-005

File Folder (SATURDAY GROUP - NOTES_ (NOV - DEC 1983)

DATE 3/21/2007

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
2	NOTES	RE MEETING (#2)	4	11/19/1983	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
4	BRIEFING PAPER	RE POLICY FRAMEWORK (#4)	1	ND	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
5	NOTES	SAME TEXT AS ITEM #2	4	11/19/1983	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
6	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE BREAKFAST MEETING (#5)	2	12/3/1983	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
7	PAPER	RE US-SOVIET RELATIONS (#6)	2	ND	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
8	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS ITEM 6	2	12/2/1983	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
9	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS 7	2	ND	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	
10	PAPER	2 COPIES OF ITEM 7 AND P. 1 OF ITEM 7	5	ND	
			<i>MVH</i>	<i>3/17/08</i>	

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. agenda (1p)	R 11/20/03 MOZ-005 #1	n.d.	P-1 ✓
2. meeting notes (4pp)	R - - #2	1/19/83	P-1 P-5 →
3. paper	re: US-Soviet relations (1p)	n.d.	P-1 →
4. briefing paper	R - - #3	n.d.	P-1 →
	R - - #4		P-5
5. meeting notes	copy of # 2 (4pp)	n.d.	P-1 →
	R - - #2 (same text as)		P-5
6. memo	from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: meeting (2pp)	12/3/83	P-1 →
	R 11/20/03 MOZ-005 #5		P-5
7. policy paper	re: US-Soviet Relations (2pp)	n.d.	P-1 →
	R - - #6		P-5
8. memo	same as item # 6 (2pp)	12/3/83	P-1 →
	R - - #5 (same text as)		P-5
9. policy paper	copy of item # 7 (2pp)	n.d.	P-1 →
	R - - #6 (same text as)		P-5
10. draft policy paper	re: US/Soviet relations (5pp)	n.d.	P-1 →
	R - - #6 (- -) (two copies of DRAFT & 1 FIRST PAGE OF DRAFT)		P-5
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: [Saturday Group - Notes] (Nov - Dec 1983) OA 92219 Box 34			10/13/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

"SMALL GROUP"

The Vice President

Secretary Shultz

Mr. McFarlane

Mr. Meese

NSC: Matlock
Fortier

State: Dam
Eagleburger
Burt
Hartman
Azrael

DOD: Thayer

CIA: Gates

Gen. Scowcroft

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Soviet Core Group

Agenda for September 3 Meeting

Communicating with the Soviets

- I. What is the best way of communicating with the Soviets?
What has past experience taught us? How does the current situation in Moscow affect our ability to communicate?
- II. Different forms of communication
 - A. Diplomatic Channels
 - o Ambassadorial meetings in Washington and Moscow
 - o Ministerial contacts
 - B. Presidential Communications
 - C. Private communications utilizing special emissary
 - D. Public Diplomacy

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M02-005 #1

BY 11/20/03 NARA, DATE CKL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SMALL GROUP

Meeting of November 19, 1983

7:30 A.M., Secretary's Dining Room, Department of State

Present: The Vice President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Meese, Mr. McFarlane, and the following representatives of agencies: NSC: Matlock, Fortier; State: Dam, Eagleburger, Burt, Azrael; DOD: Thayer; CIA: Gates. (Gen. Scowcroft and Amb. Hartman were not in Washington.)

Two preliminary papers, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twelve Months," and "Suggested Policy Framework" were distributed before and during breakfast.

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by going over the following topics:

Ground Rules: During a meeting with Shultz and McFarlane November 16, the President had directed that a small group be formed to work in complete confidentiality to review the state of our relations with the Soviet Union and to consider appropriate policy. Members had been chosen either because of their overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy, or their expertise and positions enabling them to request studies and information from their organizational units in the normal course of their duties. The group should not be mentioned to persons not members, although discussion among members is encouraged. Matlock would serve as executive secretary and would keep the sole copy of any papers developed by the group.

Related Study: Secretary Shultz had earlier requested Eagleburger and Bosworth to do a special study relevant to the group's interests. It seemed in pretty good shape and would be distributed to members soon for their consideration.

Pattern of Relations with Soviets: In the spring we initiated a pattern of meetings: Shultz with Dobrynin and Hartman with Gromyko, and the President had met with Dobrynin once for two hours. He stressed his interest in the Pentacostalists at that time, and their subsequent release was probably a result, although we are careful not to claim credit publicly. We went on to negotiate a grain agreement (which the Soviets are unlikely to give us credit for since they understand the domestic pressures here) and to start negotiations on bilateral matters such as consulates and an exchanges agreement. We had intended that the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid would be the first in a series, with Gromyko coming here for meetings in New York and perhaps with the President in Washington, followed perhaps by a Shultz visit to Moscow. KAL had derailed these plans, and furthermore

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NLS 107-00572

BY CW NARA, DATE 11/20/83

the Soviets seemed to have welched on a deal we thought we had for Shcharansky's release.

Recent meetings with Dobrynin: Shultz resumed meeting Dobrynin a couple of weeks ago, but the latter seemed uninstructed on any subject except INF. Two recent meetings by Hartman and Gromyko also seemed unproductive. At the meeting with Dobrynin yesterday (Nov. 18), attended by Eagleburger, Dobrynin seemed totally uninstructed.

At that meeting, Shultz had told Dobrynin that we were willing to have a totally private dialogue. He mentioned our dismay in our experience with the Shcharansky deal and also with the Soviet misrepresentation of our INF position to our allies. He asked if the Soviets were interested in discussing START conceptually, and stressed the explosiveness of the situation in the Middle East and the dangers of their involvement with the Syrians. Overall, his presentation was an attempt to stick to our agenda, by making it clear that arms control cannot be dealt with in isolation.

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that we can proceed on the foundation of three years of work by the Administration, during which we have been able to mend the disrepair in our defenses, get our economy moving again, and shore up the Alliance. Now we are in a position of strength in dealing with the Soviets.

Regarding the items on the agenda for the meeting, Matlock observed (1) that we probably cannot expect major adjustments in Soviet policy over the next 12 months because of the leadership situation in the Soviet Union and other factors such as INF deployments and the U.S. Presidential election; (2) that it is nevertheless important to convey, both publicly and privately, a clear message to the Soviets, since this could be a factor in the leadership struggle and could prepare for significant changes in 1985; and (3) that we must have a credible and consistent negotiating stance to ensure the sustainability of our policies with our public and with our allies. He noted the paper headed "Suggested Policy Framework" as an initial attempt to articulate our policy.

The Vice President observed that there is a public perception that we are not communicating with the Soviets, and this makes the public uneasy. There is a need to convince the public that we are in fact in communication.

Eagleburger observed that our dialogue is like ships passing in the night. We must get into more discussion of fundamental questions. We should structure the discussions so that we are conveying to them clearly our views on various important issues such as the Middle East and Cuba in some detail. He recalled that studies had been done sometime back of the view from Moscow and the view from Washington, in order to get a feel for the

difference in perspectives, and wondered whether it might not be useful to commission updated studies on these topics at this time.

Secretary Shultz agreed on the need for discussing regional issues with the Soviets and noted that this does not mean formal negotiations or formal consultation.

McFarlane observed that the Soviets are facing an abrupt change in their expectations. Their expectation of a decline in the West has been dashed. They have not decided how to react to this and are uncertain regarding our global intentions.

Burt noted that the past year has been a difficult one for the Soviets. The INF deployments will put great strain on the relationship, but further out there may be opportunities. The Soviets have painted themselves in a corner to a degree that it may be impossible for them to do business for a while.

Secretary Shultz observed that we should turn around the Soviet charge that they cannot do business with the Reagan Administration, by pointing out that in fact we cannot do business with them.

Burt suggested that we (a) state a willingness to engage in a dialogue on the issues; (b) point out to them that START has the greatest potential if the Soviets are willing to bite; (c) consider discussions of regional issues as a form of pre-crisis management; and (d) examine the possibilities of trade-offs, since the Soviets have more interest in some issues and we in others.

Dam agreed that we should look for tradeoffs in the bilateral area.

Matlock pointed out that we need to make a basic decision whether to continue the suspension of negotiations on bilateral issues because of KAL or whether to proceed at some point, and under what conditions.

Secretary Shultz noted that he had suggested to Dobrynin yesterday that, even if the Soviets were unwilling to pay compensation, they could easily cooperate in providing navigation assistance to planes flying the route in order to avert tragedies in the future.

Gates observed that the prospects for an improvement in US-Soviet relations are dismal over the next 12 months. The Soviets must turn inward and look at their succession problem. It will be hard for them to react to new initiatives. Furthermore, any initiatives from us will be seen in the context of election-year politics. The question is really how to use the next year to put down building blocks for the second term. Indeed, the

election of the President to a second term will convey an important message, that the U.S. has recovered from the vacillations of the recent past and is on a steady course. Thus, we need to convey our views for the role they can plan in the Soviet succession and in order to establish a basis for 1985.

Meese pointed out some of the political factors involved: many are criticizing the President for excessive rhetoric and for not being serious about negotiation, while the right feels he has not taken enough punitive action, and indeed would like a policy based on the "missing elements" in the paper suggesting a policy framework. We thus need to articulate our policy more clearly and develop a unique Reagan Administration view.

Azrael observed (1) that there were some areas where we might desire to "push" the Soviets, and that this could cause complications in relations, and (2) that at some point we must come to grips with the fact that some proposals are non-negotiable from the Soviet point of view.

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Eagleburger pointed out that the Soviets could be dangerous when they are in trouble and there is uncertainty in their leadership. We must keep that in mind and take steps to reduce the potential for miscalculation.

The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS: THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS

Points to Consider

1. What specific objectives should we set for the next twelve months, and what events may possibly influence the situation?

- a. In bilateral relations
- b. In regional conflicts
- c. In arms control negotiations
- d. In public diplomacy

2. What modalities should we employ to communicate with the Soviets? Possibilities include:

- a. Public statements
- b. Formal diplomatic contacts
- c. Informal contacts by officials
- d. Contacts by members of Congress (how to utilize)

3. How should we articulate our policy to maximize success, both in dealing directly with Soviets and with our and allied publics?

4. What specific steps should be taken, and in what sequence? Possibilities include:

- a. Speech by President on U.S.-Soviet relations;
- b. Possible reply to Andropov's August letter on INF;
- c. Steps to activate the dialogue on levels below that of Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister;
- d. More systematic use of informal and unofficial means of communication;
- e. Reconsider appropriate fora for renewed contact;
- f. Analyze regional conflicts and problems for opportunities to bring greater pressure to bear on Soviets;
- g. Activate public diplomacy, particularly in Europe, to convey more accurate view of our policy toward Soviets.

DECLASSIFIED / (2/19/95)

NLS MOZ-005 413

BY CK NARA, DATE 11/20/03

SUGGESTED POLICY FRAMEWORK

Our Agenda: Our principal objectives can be grouped in three interdependent categories:

1. Reduce use and threat of force in international disputes;
2. Lower high levels of armaments by equitable and verifiable agreements; and
3. Establish minimal level of trust to facilitate the first two objectives, including
 - a. Compliance with past agreements;
 - b. Human rights performance;
 - c. Specific confidence-building measures;
 - d. Bilateral ties when mutually beneficial.

Our Approach: We should attempt to make progress on the above aims on the following basis:

- a. Realism: We recognize that our competition with the USSR is basic and there is no quick fix. We also recognize the nature of the system with which we must deal.
- b. Strength: We know that without adequate attention to our strength: military, economic, alliance solidarity and political will and cohesion, we cannot deal with the Soviet threat effectively.
- c. Negotiation: We are willing to negotiate differences in an honest attempt to find ways to reduce tensions. But we must insist on a real reduction of tension, not agreements which simply cover up real problems and thus mislead the public.

Missing Elements: Some desirable objectives should not be part of our explicit policy:

- a. Challenging legitimacy of Soviet system;
- b. Military superiority;
- c. Forcing collapse of the Soviet system (as distinct from exerting pressure on Soviets to live up to agreements and abide by civilized standards of behavior).

Attempts to pursue such objectives openly make it much more difficult to obtain other objectives and, indeed, to obtain these desirable objectives. They must be approached in indirect ways.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS

MOZ 005 # 4

BY

CKJ

NARA, DATE

11/20/03

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AUTHORITY MUZ-005 #2

BY CIS NARA, DATE 11/20/03

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The meeting ended at approximately 9:30.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Burt -

- ① Promised Pres. Draft speech this weekend - (Tomorrow morning)
 - ② Tom get together
 - ③ Discussion sometime next week with Pres, [Paper for Pres that pulls together what we discussed]
- ① Communicate
 - ② Speech
 - ③ Sov attitudes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

④ Stockholm -

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

AGENDA

- I. Update on Current Status of US-Soviet Relations:
Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and Other Developments
- II. Next Steps
 - A. Contacts
 1. Diplomatic: Shultz/Dobrynin; Gromyko/Hartman
 2. Ministerial Meetings
 3. Military-to-Military
 4. Parliamentary and Other
 - B. Substance
 1. Arms Control
 2. Regional
 3. Human Rights
 4. Bilateral

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY RA, NARA, Date 10/10/95

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

National Security Council
The White House

NON-SYS

EYES ONLY

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Wilma Hall	2	✓	_____
Bud McFarlane	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	I
John Poindexter	4	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>MATLOCK</i>	5	<i>[Signature]</i>	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*have read mtg transcript
but not attached*

Dec. 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*
SUBJECT: Today's Breakfast Meeting

Since I will be on a trip until Wednesday morning, I'd like to pass on the following thoughts emerging from the meeting this morning.

1. I believe that the President should deliver the speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. This is important for both our public and private diplomacy, since we need an enunciation of our policy at the highest level. A speech by anyone else could lead to speculation as to whether the policy really reflects the President's views or not, and therefore could not have the same impact. If possible, it should be delivered before Christmas, to distance it a bit from the election year and to provide a basis for our public and private diplomacy early next year.

2. In my view, the speech, while explaining where we are and how we got there, should concentrate on policy for the future and should cover the following points:

✓ a. Reasons for the current tension: Soviet actions over more than a decade and Soviet reaction to our success in arresting the decline of U.S. and Western strength.

✓ b. The fact that the world is not more but less dangerous in terms of direct superpower military confrontation, because our policies have our defenses under repair. The Soviets understand that and are less likely to produce a confrontation by miscalculation of our strength or will.

c. Our approach to the Soviets: the broad agenda (reducing use and threat of force, lowering level of arms, building confidence, including in human rights area), and the three "pillars" of our approach: realism, strength, dialogue.

✓ d. That we have told and will continue to tell the truth about the Soviet Union, but this does not mean we are unwilling to deal with them on a fair basis.

✓ e. How our policies differ from detente and all-out military confrontation.

✓ f. A challenge to the Soviets to join us in a search for a more peaceful world (not a flat prediction that they will do so).

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS M02-005 45

BY CJS NARA, DATE 11/20/03

Most of these elements are in the draft speech given you yesterday, but it needs more persuasive language on points a, b and e, as well as editing for style and conciseness.

3. Since we did not get very far last time in defining goals, I have jotted down some rather laconic thoughts regarding the framework in which our implicit goals might be cast (TAB A). If you have time to look at it and note your reaction, that would be helpful.

4. I will aim to do the paper Secretary Shultz requested by the end of next week so that you can take a look at the draft over next weekend. Please let me know if there are any other steps you would like me to undertake.

I. OVERALL GOAL

Given the long-term nature of the Soviet threat, we need a policy which:

A. Provides adequate deterrence against Soviet military, political or economic aggression against the U.S. and its Allies;

B. Provides adequate military, political and economic means to defeat attempts by the Soviets to tip the balance of power in their favor, either regionally or globally; and

C. Is sustainable in a democratic society over the long term.

Our principal goals, therefore, lie in sustaining and increasing our own strength and cohesion and in maintaining the health and political will of our Allies.

Negotiation and possible cooperation with the Soviets in limited areas should be considered in that context: to the extent that they contribute to the basic ends, they should be pursued, but only so long as both the process and the results are consistent with a deterrence posture.

Willingness to negotiate real differences, and a fair negotiating posture, however, is an essential element in maintaining broad public support for deterrence. They are equally important in maintaining the health and political will of allied nations, which constitute an essential element of our strength in confronting Soviet expansionism.

II. GOALS FOR 1984

Background: Limiting factors on what achievements are possible:

A. Disarray in the Soviet leadership, which complicates the decision-making process;

B. Soviet reluctance to offer confirmation that the Reagan Administration policies work;

C. The U.S. election campaign, which will influence Soviet decisions;

D. Soviet doubts that any significant deals are possible;

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This requires moving simultaneously on several "tracks":

1. Articulate a clear policy line and project it consistently, both publicly and privately.

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3. Demonstrate the constancy of our basic policy.

4. Make clear to the Soviets that negotiations are possible if they are directed at reducing the real causes of tension.

A

Dec. 3, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT: Today's Breakfast Meeting

Since I will be on a trip until Wednesday morning, I'd like to pass on the following thoughts emerging from the meeting this morning.

1. I believe that the President should deliver the speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. This is important for both our public and private diplomacy, since we need an enunciation of our policy at the highest level. A speech by anyone else could lead to speculation as to whether the policy really reflects the President's views or not, and therefore could not have the same impact. If possible, it should be delivered before Christmas, to distance it a bit from the election year and to provide a basis for our public and private diplomacy early next year.

2. In my view, the speech, while explaining where we are and how we got there, should concentrate on policy for the future and should cover the following points:

a. Reasons for the current tension: Soviet actions over more than a decade and Soviet reaction to our success in arresting the decline of U.S. and Western strength.

b. The fact that the world is not more but less dangerous in terms of direct superpower military confrontation, because our policies have our defenses under repair. The Soviets understand that and are less likely to produce a confrontation by miscalculation of our strength or will.

c. Our approach to the Soviets: the broad agenda (reducing use and threat of force, lowering level of arms, building confidence, including in human rights area), and the three "pillars" of our approach: realism, strength, dialogue.

d. That we have told and will continue to tell the truth about the Soviet Union, but this does not mean we are unwilling to deal with them on a fair basis.

e. How our policies differ from detente and all-out military confrontation.

f. A challenge to the Soviets to join us in a search for a more peaceful world (not a flat prediction that they will do so).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MOZ-005 #5
BY CRJ, NARA, Date 11/20/03

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I. OVERALL GOAL

Given the long-term nature of the Soviet threat, we need a policy which:

A. Provides adequate deterrence against Soviet military, political or economic aggression against the U.S. and its Allies;

B. Provides adequate military, political and economic means to defeat attempts by the Soviets to tip the balance of power in their favor, either regionally or globally; and

C. Is sustainable in a democratic society over the long term.

Our principal goals, therefore, lie in sustaining and increasing our own strength and cohesion and in maintaining the health and political will of our Allies.

Negotiation and possible cooperation with the Soviets in limited areas should be considered in that context: to the extent that they contribute to the basic ends, they should be pursued, but only so long as both the process and the results are consistent with a deterrence posture.

Willingness to negotiate real differences, and a fair negotiating posture, however, is an essential element in maintaining broad public support for deterrence. They are equally important in maintaining the health and political will of allied nations, which constitute an essential element of our strength in confronting Soviet expansionism.

II. GOALS FOR 1984

Background: Limiting factors on what achievements are possible:

A. Disarray in the Soviet leadership, which complicates the decision-making process;

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