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File Folder SOVIET UNION - SALT EE 2/2

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11294	REPORT	TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	15	8/5/1981	B3
11295	PAPER	USSR SALT R 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	2	ND	B1
11296	PAPER	USSR AND THIRD WORLD R 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	2	ND	B1
11297	FAX COVER SHEET	PIPES RE SALT	1	8/13/1981	B1
11298	MEMO	SCHNEITER TO SALT IG WORKING GROUP RE SALT POLICY	1	8/13/1981	B1
11299	PAPER	US OBJECTIVES RE STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS PAR 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10	5	BD	B1
11300	FAX COVER SHEET	LEHMAN TO PIPES/SCHWEITZER PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	8/13/1981	B3
11301	MEMO	LEHMAN RE SALT WORKING GROUP PAR 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	8/13/1981	B1 B3
11304	PAPER	US FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11302	FAX COVER SHEET	BURT TO PIPES PAR 7/18/2008 F06-114/10	1	9/23/1981	B3
11303	MEMO	BLACKWILL RE SALT IG R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10	1	9/23/1981	B1
11306	PAPER	BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR US SALT POLICY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	8	ND	B1
11307	CABLE	081835Z OCT 81	2	10/8/1981	B1
11313	CABLE	USSR D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1	9	10/15/1981	B1 B3
11315	CABLE	091715Z DEC 81 D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1	1	12/9/1981	B1 B3
11316	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11315 D 7/18/2008 F06-114/10; D UPHELD 12/27/2012 M554/1	1	12/9/1981	B1 B3
11308	CABLE	101552Z DEC 81 R 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10	3	12/10/1981	B1

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11311	PAPER	SOVIET INTEREST EXHIBITED IN CONTINUED INTERIM RESTRAINT R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	6/9/1985	B1

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SALT

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DOBZINASKY

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE

(b) (3)

Trends in Communist Media

this issue includes . . .

- Moscow on new U.S. SALT positions
- Soviet posture on Poland

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F06-114/10 # 11794

By hbs, NARA, Date 7/18/08

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5 AUGUST 1981
FB TM 81-031

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The analyses in this report are based exclusively on foreign media output and behavior and are issued without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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U S S R - U . S .

MOSCOW REACTS TO U.S. WARNINGS ON THIRD WORLD BEHAVIOR

A hardening U.S. posture on Soviet international behavior has spurred discussion in Moscow of the linkage between detente with the United States and support for leftist regimes in the Third World. Elaborating on President Brezhnev's proposal last April for a vaguely worded superpower "code of conduct," Soviet spokesmen have been skeptical about the chances for achieving more specific agreement between Moscow and Washington on rules of behavior in the Third World. A senior Central Committee official has asserted in PRAVDA that current trends in U.S. policy dictate an increase rather than a reduction in communist assistance to leftist regimes. But some Soviet Americanologists have contended that U.S.-Soviet competition must be better managed and that a resumption of dialogue could accomplish that goal.

Soviet commentary has ascribed the declining fortunes of detente policy in Washington in large part to U.S. concern over the inroads of socialism in the Third World, but Soviet official spokesmen have been slow to address this linkage as grounds for mutual concern. The Soviet Union's public response to U.S. censure of its intervention in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan consisted of restatements of the traditional position that detente does not mean a "freezing of the social status quo." Brezhnev's proposal in April for a superpower code of conduct, while repeating only familiar principles of Soviet foreign policy, did signal a recognition in Moscow that the linkage issue had to be joined more effectively.*

Two different approaches to the detente-Third World nexus have been apparent in articles by prominent Soviet foreign policy spokesmen since Brezhnev's speech.

Zagladin in PRAVDA. The Central Committee International Department's second-ranking official, Vadim Zagladin, assumed a combative stance in a 23 July PRAVDA article on the communist movement. Zagladin took

* For a discussion of Brezhnev's speech, see the TRENDS of 6 May 1981, pages 1-4.

issue with "some representatives of leftwing forces" who favored restrictions on support for Third World leftist regimes in the interests of world peace. "It is precisely in current conditions," he countered, "that it is necessary to step up considerably the struggle against the imperialist policy of exporting counterrevolution."

USA Institute Officials. Officials of Moscow's USA and Canada Institute have taken a different tack, questioning the feasibility of specific rules of behavior but expressing more concern than Zagladin to overcome the deleterious effects of Third World crises on U.S.-Soviet relations. Both of these themes were carried to the American audience by Genrikh Trofimenko, head of the Institute's U.S. Foreign Policy Department, in an article in the summer 1981 issue of the American journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS devoted to U.S.-Soviet competition in the developing world.

Trofimenko's article contained the most explicit public Soviet argument yet against a quest for anything but the most general "code of conduct" in the Third World. Instability is endemic to developing countries, he argued, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can control it. The fact that Moscow and Washington are on "different sides of the barricades" in interpreting these changes, he said, means that efforts to spell out specific rules of behavior have "little practical chance of success."

The alternative prescription offered by Trofimenko for resolving U.S.-Soviet differences in the Third World amounted to the reverse of the U.S. approach to linkage. A return to active Soviet-American dialogue, he wrote, is required to "defuse explosive situations before they break out." Trofimenko counseled the United States to take up Soviet offers to negotiate on specific trouble spots, such as the Persian Gulf, rather than try to exclude the USSR from such regions. By way of example he argued that, to avoid "backsliding toward a major war" in the Middle East, Washington and Moscow must return to an "honest collective search" for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

Trofimenko's article for the U.S. audience is consistent with the approach taken in the Soviet press by Georgiy Arbatov and other USA Institute officials. Arbatov has argued in commentaries for PRAVDA since the mid-1970's that detente in bilateral affairs creates the necessary preconditions for containing differences over the Third World. He has repeatedly drawn on the situation in the Middle East as an example. The Soviet leadership itself has credited the favorable climate resulting from the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit with enabling Washington and Moscow to defuse the Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1973 before it could develop into a major East-West confrontation.

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SOVIETS SLOW IN RESPONDING TO NEW U.S. SALT POSITIONS

Moscow has been ignoring the Reagan Administration's SALT negotiating posture promulgated in the recent public statements of Secretary Haig and other U.S. officials. Soviet officials have brusquely rejected American attempts to link arms control to Soviet international behavior. But there has been no authoritative reaction and a minimum of media commentary on such specific issues as the Administration's emphasis on limiting overall throw weight, or payload, in the next round of negotiations. Past Soviet comment, however, makes it clear that Moscow is unlikely to be receptive to the new U.S. positions.

Linkage. Moscow responded quickly and negatively to Reagan Administration statements linking progress in arms control with changes in Soviet international behavior. President Brezhnev's response in a speech last April simply reaffirmed the longstanding Soviet position on this issue. In a major address before the Czechoslovak party congress, Brezhnev ridiculed linkage as an approach to arms negotiations that no one could take seriously. Those supporting this concept, he said, demand "that in payment for the West's agreement to talks, we should give up elementary concern for our own security and aid to our friends when they are subjected to aggression or to the threat of attack. A strange position to say the least."

Moscow has argued that the United States would also reject linkage if it were to be mutual. Washington would view Soviet leaders as "simpletons," Brezhnev said in April, if they demanded that the United States abandon its military bases abroad or end its arming of "dictatorial terrorist regimes" before talks could begin. Soviet officials have cited as worthy of emulation Moscow's refusal to cancel the May 1972 U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow, at which SALT I was signed, even when the United States stepped up its attacks on North Vietnam on the eve of President Nixon's visit.

Throw Weight Equality. Moscow has not been as forthcoming in responding to remarks by arms control officials Rostow and Rowny suggesting that throw weight should replace numbers of delivery vehicles as the central focus of the next round of negotiations. Soviet media have not reported U.S. statements on this issue such as the one by Rowny before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or by Rostow in a 19 July interview with WASHINGTON STAR correspondent Henry Bradsher. But Georgiy Arbatov may have had the

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payload question in mind in a pointed response to the Administration during a 20 July interview with the BBC that was not reported in the USSR. The people in the Administration "like Rostow" who are responsible for SALT, Arbatov said, "talk about impossible things. We will never agree to it." The only direct comment on the payload issue monitored by FBIS came in a radio commentary for audiences abroad citing missile throw weight as among the Administration's "new principles" that could lead the negotiations "into a blind alley." Moscow's longstanding objections to a negotiating focus on nuclear payload have been apparent during previous rounds of talks in its public complaints about U.S. attempts to restrict Soviet "heavy missiles."

Reductions of Strategic Forces. Moscow has yet to respond to statements by Rostow and Rowny suggesting that when the negotiations resume the United States will press for significant reductions in strategic forces. Soviet officials have long professed interest in mutual reductions in nuclear arsenals and proffered proposals to that end in the UN General Assembly. Specifically in the SALT context, President Brezhnev in a series of statements since the beginning of SALT II discussions in 1972 has insisted that Moscow is prepared to discuss reductions in delivery vehicles during the next stage. In the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on Strategic Arms Limitation, signed by Brezhnev and President Carter at the Vienna summit in June 1979, the two sides pledged to seek "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms." Soviet leaders have intimated on a number of occasions that heretofore unaddressed issues, such as U.S. forward based strategic systems and the strategic forces of other countries, would have to be taken into account in any movement toward major reductions.

Verification. Moscow has chosen not to respond to the SALT verification issue raised by Secretary of State Haig and other Administration officials. Soviet reporting on Secretary Haig's 14 July speech on arms control before the Foreign Policy Association in New York is illustrative. The official TASS report on the speech reported his criticism of past Soviet policies on verification but ignored his assertion that "as much as any other single factor," the Soviet approach to verification would determine the degree of progress on arms control in the 1980's. TASS repeated the standard Soviet position that the SALT II treaty provides for "clear and strict verification." The version of the TASS report published in PRAVDA two days later deleted all references to the verification issue. Soviet commentaries have launched accusations of their own on this issue, charging that the Administration is intent on developing new types of strategic weaponry that "greatly complicate or rule out" effective verification.

USSR - POLAND

MOSCOW RESTRAINED AS WARSAW COPEs WITH STREET DEMONSTRATIONS

The outbreak of widespread public demonstrations in Poland has provided Moscow and the Polish leadership with their first major test since last month's Polish communist party congress. So far, Moscow has shown restraint, still apparently prepared to leave Warsaw the responsibility for taking measures to bring the situation under control.

Moscow media have apprised the Soviet people of the heightened tension in Poland by reporting the latest demonstrations, although the coverage has been less alarmist than in some earlier periods of the crisis. Soviet reports monitored to date draw mainly on official Polish sources. Unlike some of its hardline East European allies, Moscow is publicizing few details about the latest disturbances and is withholding direct comment.

A 2 August TASS report on a Polish party Politburo session-- apparently the source of Western press reports of a hardened Soviet line--was a virtually verbatim replay of an official Polish statement on the meeting broadcast the day before by Warsaw radio. As published in PRAVDA in abbreviated form on 4 August, the TASS report quoted the Polish Politburo as warning that "planned strikes, particularly street demonstrations," posed "a serious threat to the state." The report also pointed to a "threat of nationwide conflict" over food shortages and to efforts by branches of the Solidarity union to "cast doubt on the political line" of the recent party congress. Two other recent Soviet reports on growing problems in Poland also drew on Polish sources: a 3 August Moscow radio report on a Polish military council meeting and a report on a Warsaw party resolution, carried by Moscow radio and TASS on the 4th.

The latest Soviet reports are not the first since the congress to register Moscow's concern about the unrest. An IZVESTIYA article on 23 July, three days after the congress had ended, said that "tension is again building up in the country" after a period of relative calm because of new Solidarity strike threats. A NEW TIMES article on 24 July said Poland was still facing a "serious crisis."

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The Polish leadership has tried to project continued resolve in the face of the demonstrations, calling a party plenum for 8 August and setting up an "anticrisis operational headquarters" on the 4th. The announcement of the latter move, carried by Warsaw television on the 4th, said the "operational headquarters" would have sweeping powers over a range of economic decisions bearing on the production and supply of consumer goods. The announcement also sought to show regime firmness by declaring an "absolute war on speculation" and including representatives of the defense and interior ministries in the new body's membership. Warsaw media have continued to report on the disturbances and the government's talks with Solidarity while challenging the need for and appropriateness of the demonstrations.

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USSR - IRAN

SOVIET OBSERVERS DIFFER IN ASSESSMENTS OF CLERICAL REGIME

Soviet uncertainty over how to deal with the anti-Soviet leanings of the clerical regime in Tehran was reflected in a recent Soviet television discussion by two of Moscow's most candid foreign policy observers. Addressing the two facets of the Tehran regime's "neither East nor West" stance, IZVESTIYA's Aleksandr Bovin and the Oriental Institute's Yevgeniy Primakov inconclusively debated whether the benefits of Iran's anti-Americanism outweighed the drawbacks of its anti-Soviet attitude. Their discussion of the "alarming" situation in Iran stands out against Moscow's generally neutral media treatment of Iranian developments.

A detailed, essentially negative view of the factional strife in Iran was presented by IZVESTIYA political observer Aleksandr Bovin in a 25 July "Studio Nine" national television program on the situation in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Bovin's remarks, along with interjections by Oriental Institute head Yevgeniy Primakov, suggested that Soviet decisionmakers are undecided as to how best to handle relations with the unpredictable fundamentalist regime or, for that matter, with any successor regime drawn from opposition factions.

Bovin in effect wrote off the "fanatical clergy," ticking off anti-Soviet statements and actions by regime officials, including Ayatollah Khomeyni, to explain to viewers the "real atmosphere" prevailing in Iran. Primakov in turn implied that the outlook for Soviet interests was not much better among the opposing "majority" of diverse groups with a pro-Western orientation. Disagreeing with Bovin, he argued that "those Islamic fundamentalists" at least held "patriotic"--that is, anti-U.S.--positions on a range of issues. An unconvinced Bovin maintained that it was impossible to rebuild Iran in accordance with fundamentalist principles--"in other words, to return to a way of life set down in the Koran nearly 1,500 years ago." Bovin predicted that the experiment would not succeed.

USSR - AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW PREPARES GROUNDWORK FOR UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE

Evidently anticipating another UN General Assembly debate on Afghanistan this fall, Moscow has published an authoritative PRAVDA article designed to cultivate Third World support for the Soviet position. The article appeared as the UN Secretary General's special envoy arrived in Pakistan for talks with the Islamabad government on the Afghan problem.

The lengthy PRAVDA article, published on 5 August, sought to play on sensitivities to Western involvement in the internal affairs of Third World states, which voted overwhelmingly against the Soviets on the two earlier UNGA resolutions on Afghanistan. Signed "A. Petrov," a pseudonym used by Moscow on occasion to address foreign policy issues, the article emphatically restated Soviet rejection of the European Council's recent proposal for two-stage negotiations on Afghanistan. Petrov said the proposal reflected a "typically imperial approach" of deciding the destiny of peoples "behind their backs."

The Petrov article is Moscow's strongest denunciation of the European Council's proposal. Less than a week after British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington had presented the idea to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Moscow, TASS reported briefly that Gromyko, in a 10 July meeting with Afghan Ambassador to the USSR Habib Mangal, had dismissed the proposal as "unrealistic" and "unacceptable." Petrov repeated Moscow's earlier calls for negotiations on the basis of Kabul's 14 May 1980 proposals and stressed again that Western, especially American, "interference" in Afghanistan was "only part of a vast plan for destabilization of the situation throughout the region."

USSR - THE GAMBIA

MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON COUP ATTEMPT, CRITICAL OF INTERVENTION

Soviet media coverage of the apparently unsuccessful coup attempt in The Gambia on 30 July has been typically cautious. Focusing on Senegal's intervention, Moscow has refrained from directly taking sides in the internal situation and has not mentioned the rebels' stated intention of establishing a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship or their reported appeal to the Soviet Union for help.

Soviet press, news agency, and radio reporting of events in The Gambia has been indirectly critical of Senegal's intervention on behalf of President Jawara, citing Western news sources, and predictably defamatory about Western designs in the region. Soviet reporting was exemplified by a Moscow radio report for the domestic audience on 31 July and a TASS roundup of Western news agency dispatches the next day. The radio report was so worded as to suggest--without directly charging--that the Senegalese involvement constituted an effort by "imperialist powers" to "safeguard their presence" in West Africa. TASS cited the French press agency in alleging that Senegalese troops had intervened under the "pretext" of ensuring Senegal's security. The same dispatch reported French press speculation that Paris had approved the intervention in advance.

It is normal for Moscow to withhold direct public assessment of a political upheaval in the Third World while the outcome is in doubt. Overhasty public approval of the overthrow of Sudanese President Numayri in 1971 caused Moscow considerable embarrassment when Numayri, reinstated in a counter coup three days later, promptly executed three leading Sudanese communists, withdrew the Sudanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, and expelled a Soviet Embassy counselor. Moscow played it safe the next time around: the abortive coup in Sudan in 1976 was initially handled in brief, cautious news reports, followed by defensive rejections of Arab--primarily Egyptian--insinuations of Soviet involvement in the coup attempt.

Moscow was careful not to burn its bridges during the first few days of the coup staged by pro-Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1978. Soviet commentary did not overtly support the victors until they had established themselves in power, formed a new government, and issued several revolutionary proclamations.

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U S S R

MOSCOW FIGHTS POLISH SPILLOVER WITH IDEOLOGY, REFORM

There are increasing signs that the Polish events are causing Soviet leaders to take measures aimed at forestalling dissatisfaction among the USSR's own workers. In the past several months, the Soviet Union has been conducting a major campaign to heighten ideological vigilance--an effort specifically linked in recent commentary with concerns raised by the Polish unrest. At the same time, the Soviet government has adopted an organizational reform clearly aimed at demonstrating a solicitous official attitude toward the workers. This two-pronged approach suggests that Soviet leaders are heeding the advice offered by Brezhnev at the CPSU congress in February to avoid the mistakes of Poland by lending a more "sensitive" ear to the "voice of the masses."

The stress on ideology is evident in an authoritative 31 July PRAVDA article by R. Kosolapov, chief editor of KOMMUNIST and a member of the CPSU Central Committee. Kosolapov is concerned with what he sees as a serious deterioration of class consciousness in the working class. He attributes this trend in part to the growing influence of Western ideas on the working class, and he points to Poland as an example of what may happen if the trend is ignored. Kosolapov ascribes the spread of such subversive notions in Poland to weak ideological work and the encouragement of unrealistically high popular expectations for material benefits. He cautions ruling communist parties in other countries to avoid these mistakes, warning that making promises that cannot be fulfilled will backfire. He admonishes the parties that only through their effective leadership will workers develop "spiritual immunity" to "bourgeois individualist" ideas.

Kosolapov's article is the latest in a series of efforts aimed at heightening the ideological consciousness of Soviet citizens. For example, an unusually strongly worded editorial in a May issue of KOMMUNIST (No. 8) was aimed at deterring the penetration of Western values among Soviet workers by appealing to Soviet patriotism. A series of ideology conferences taking place throughout the Soviet Union reflect similar concerns. One of the most recent of these conferences, in Latvia, linked these concerns directly with the

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Polish situation. According to an account published in the 19 July SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, First Secretary Voss warned that the events in Poland attest to the effectiveness of Western subversion and cautioned that the effect on the population must not be "under-estimated."

The other more administrative aspect of the recent Soviet efforts to counter potential worker dissatisfaction was evident at the recent plenum of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU). The session reflected efforts over the past year to make the Soviet trade unions appear more representative of workers' interests. This theme was evident in a 29 July TRUD report of the speech by AUCCTU chief Shibayev, which called on union leaders to strengthen their ties with the masses during preparations for the next union congress. The role of the trade unions as defenders of workers' rights was addressed in a speech by AUCCTU Secretary Matskyavichyus on the subject of workers' letters. According to the report of his remarks in the 30 July TRUD, he cited letters which he said showed that the trade unions were not doing an adequate job of protecting workers' interests. He "strongly reproached" the offending organizations and called on them to improve their work in defending the rights of their members to better living and working conditions. The AUCCTU underscored its commitment to paying closer attention to the complaints of workers by adopting a resolution requiring all trade union organizations to carefully scrutinize and follow through on all workers' complaints.

The professed Soviet objective of improving working conditions was also displayed recently by the creation of a state committee for workers' safety. According to the 28 July IZVESTIYA announcement, the State Committee for Safe Working Practices in Industry and for Mine Supervision was created by upgrading a previously existing committee under the USSR Council of Ministers. The appointment of Ivan Vladychenko to head the new organization lent greater public impact to the move. Vladychenko had been serving as a secretary of the AUCCTU and has long advocated greater worker participation in management as well as improved working conditions. Vladychenko's reputation in this regard contrasts sharply with that of L.G. Melnikov, who headed the precursor organization until his death in April. Melnikov, a former first secretary of the Ukrainian party, had apparently been given the post as a sinecure.

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FBIS TRENDS--05 AUG--U.S.-USSR

TAKE 1--FBIS TRENDS: U.S.-USSR

AG052110 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS

1. SOVIETS SLOW IN RESPONDING TO NEW U.S. SALT POSITIONS

MOSCOW HAS BEEN IGNORING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S SALT NEGOTIATING POSTURE PROMULGATED IN THE RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY HAIG AND OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE BRUSQUELY REJECTED AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO LINK ARMS CONTROL TO SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO AUTHORITATIVE REACTION AND A MINIMUM OF MEDIA COMMENTARY ON SUCH SPECIFIC ISSUES AS THE ADMINISTRATION'S EMPHASIS ON LIMITING OVERALL THROW WEIGHT, OR PAYLOAD, IN THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. PAST SOVIET COMMENT, HOWEVER, MAKES IT CLEAR THAT MOSCOW IS UNLIKELY TO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE NEW U.S. POSITIONS.

LINKAGE

MOSCOW RESPONDED QUICKLY AND NEGATIVELY TO REAGAN ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS LINKING PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL WITH CHANGES IN SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE IN A SPEECH LAST APRIL SIMPLY REAFFIRMED THE LONGSTANDING SOVIET POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. IN A MAJOR ADDRESS BEFORE THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY CONGRESS, BREZHNEV RIDICULED LINKAGE AS AN APPROACH TO ARMS NEGOTIATIONS THAT NO ONE COULD TAKE SERIOUSLY. THOSE SUPPORTING THIS CONCEPT, HE SAID, DEMAND "THAT IN PAYMENT FOR THE WEST'S AGREEMENT TO TALKS, WE SHOULD GIVE UP ELEMENTARY CONCERN FOR OUR OWN SECURITY AND AID TO OUR FRIENDS WHEN THEY ARE SUBJECTED TO AGGRESSION OR TO THE THREAT OF ATTACK. A STRANGE POSITION TO SAY THE LEAST"

MOSCOW HAS ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO REJECT LINKAGE IF IT WERE TO BE MUTUAL. WASHINGTON WOULD VIEW SOVIET LEADERS AS "SIMPLETONS," BREZHNEV SAID IN APRIL, IF THEY DEMANDED THAT THE UNITED STATES ABANDON ITS MILITARY BASES ABROAD OR END ITS ARMING OF "DICTATORIAL TERRORIST REGIMES" BEFORE TALKS COULD BEGIN. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE CITED AS WORTHY OF EMULATION MOSCOW'S REFUSAL TO CANCEL THE MAY 0972 U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, AT WHICH SALT I WAS SIGNED, EVEN WHEN THE UNITED STATES STEPPED UP ITS ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT.

THROW WEIGHT EQUALITY

MOSCOW HAS NOT BEEN AS FORTHCOMING IN RESPONDING TO REMARKS BY ARMS CONTROL OFFICIALS ROSTOW AND ROWNY SUGGESTING THAT THROW WEIGHT SHOULD REPLACE NUMBERS OF DELIVERY VEHICLES AS THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF THE NEXT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET MEDIA HAVE NOT REPORTED U.S. STATEMENTS ON THIS ISSUE SUCH AS THE ONE BY ROWNY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OR BY ROSTOW IN A 19 JULY INTERVIEW WITH WASHINGTON STAR CORRESPONDENT HENRY BRADSHER. BUT GEORGIY ARBATOV MAY HAVE HAD THE PAYLOAD QUESTION IN MIND IN A POINTED RESPONSE TO THE ADMINISTRATION DURING A 20 JULY INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC THAT WAS NOT REPORTED IN THE USSR. THE PEOPLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION "LIKE ROSTOW" WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SALT I ARBATOV SAID, "TALK ABOUT IMPOSSIBLE THINGS. WE WILL NEVER AGREE TO IT." THE ONLY DIRECT COMMENT ON THE PAYLOAD ISSUE MONITORED BY FBIS CAME IN A RADIO COMMENTARY FOR AUDIENCES ABROAD CITING MISSILE THROW WEIGHT AS AMONG THE ADMINISTRATION'S "NEW PRINCIPLES" THAT COULD LEAD THE NEGOTIATIONS "INTO A BLIND ALLEY." MOSCOW'S LONGSTANDING OBJECTIONS TO A NEGOTIATING FOCUS ON NUCLEAR PAYLOAD HAVE BEEN APPARENT DURING PREVIOUS ROUNDS OF TALKS IN ITS PUBLIC COMPLAINTS ABOUT U.S. ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT SOVIET "HEAVY MISSILES."

REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC FORCES

MOSCOW HAS YET TO RESPOND TO STATEMENTS BY ROSTOW AND ROWNY SUGGESTING THAT WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUME THE UNITED STATES WILL PRESS FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES. SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE LONG PROFESSED INTEREST IN MUTUAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND PROFERRED PROPOSALS TO THAT END IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. SPECIFICALLY IN THE SALT CONTEXT, PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IN A SERIES OF STATEMENTS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF SALT II DISCUSSIONS IN 1972 HAS INSISTED THAT MOSCOW IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS IN DELIVERY VEHICLES DURING THE NEXT STAGE. IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, SIGNED BY BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT CARTER AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT IN JUNE 1979, THE TWO SIDES PLEDGED TO SEEK "SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS." SOVIET LEADERS HAVE INTIMATED ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT HERETOFORE UNADDRESSED ISSUES, SUCH AS U.S. FORWARD BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY MOVEMENT TOWARD MAJOR REDUCTIONS.

VERIFICATION

MOSCOW HAS CHOSEN NOT TO RESPOND TO THE SALT VERIFICATION ISSUE RAISED BY SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. SOVIET REPORTING ON SECRETARY HAIG'S Q4 JULY SPEECH ON ARMS CONTROL BEFORE THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION IN NEW YORK IS ILLUSTRATIVE. THE OFFICIAL TASS REPORT ON THE SPEECH REPORTED HIS CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET POLICIES ON VERIFICATION BUT IGNORED HIS ASSERTION THAT "AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER SINGLE FACTOR," THE SOVIET APPROACH TO VERIFICATION WOULD DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL IN THE Q980'S. TASS REPEATED THE STANDARD SOVIET POSITION THAT THE SALT II TREATY PROVIDES FOR "CLEAR AND STRICT VERIFICATION." THE VERSION OF THE TASS REPORT PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA TWO DAYS LATER DELETED ALL REFERENCES TO THE VERIFICATION ISSUE. SOVIET COMMENTARIES HAVE LAUNCHED ACCUSATIONS OF THEIR OWN ON THIS ISSUE, CHARGING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS INTENT ON DEVELOPING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONRY THAT "GREATLY COMPLICATE OR RULE OUT" EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

(MORE)

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2. MOSCOW REACTS TO U.S. WARNINGS ON THIRD WORLD BEHAVIOR

A HARDENING U.S. POSTURE ON SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR HAS SPURRED DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND SUPPORT FOR LEFTIST REGIMES IN THE THIRD WORLD. ELABORATING ON PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL LAST APRIL FOR A VAGUELY WORDED SUPERPOWER "CODE OF CONDUCT," SOVIET SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR ACHIEVING MORE SPECIFIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON ON RULES OF BEHAVIOR IN THE THIRD WORLD. A SENIOR CENTRAL COMMITTEE OFFICIAL HAS ASSERTED IN PRAVDA THAT CURRENT TRENDS IN U.S. POLICY DICTATE AN INCREASE RATHER THAN A REDUCTION IN COMMUNIST ASSISTANCE TO LEFTIST REGIMES. BUT SOME SOVIET AMERICANOLOGISTS HAVE CONTENDED THAT U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION MUST BE BETTER MANAGED AND THAT A RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE COULD ACCOMPLISH THAT GOAL.

SOVIET COMMENTARY HAS ASCRIBED THE DECLINING FORTUNES OF DETENTE POLICY IN WASHINGTON IN LARGE PART TO U.S. CONCERN OVER THE INROADS OF SOCIALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD, BUT SOVIET OFFICIAL SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN SLOW TO ADDRESS THIS LINKAGE AS GROUNDS FOR MUTUAL CONCERN. THE SOVIET UNION'S PUBLIC RESPONSE TO U.S. CENSURE OF ITS INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA, THE HORN OF AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN CONSISTED OF RESTATEMENTS OF THE TRADITIONAL POSITION THAT DETENTE DOES NOT MEAN A "FREEZING OF THE SOCIAL STATUS QUO." BREZHNEV'S PROPOSAL IN APRIL FOR A SUPERPOWER CODE OF CONDUCT, WHILE REPEATING ONLY FAMILIAR PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, DID SIGNAL A RECOGNITION THAT THE LINKAGE ISSUE HAD TO BE JOINED MORE EFFECTIVELY.

TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE DETENTE-THIRD WORLD NEXUS HAVE BEEN APPARENT IN ARTICLES BY PROMINENT SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMEN SINCE BREZHNEV'S SPEECH.

ZAGLADIN IN PRAVDA

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT'S SECOND-RANKING OFFICIAL, VADIM ZAGLADIN, ASSUMED A COMBATIVE STANCE IN A 23 JULY PRAVDA ARTICLE ON THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. ZAGLADIN TOOK ISSUE WITH "SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF LEFTWING FORCES" WHO FAVORED RESTRICTIONS ON SUPPORT FOR THIRD WORLD LEFTIST REGIMES IN THE INTERESTS OF WORLD PEACE. "IT IS PRECISELY IN CURRENT CONDITIONS," HE COUNTERED, "THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO STEP UP CONSIDERABLY THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF EXPORTING COUNTERREVOLUTION."

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BY LSJ NARA DATE 7/18/08

USA INSTITUTE OFFICIALS

OFFICIALS OF MOSCOW'S USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE HAVE TAKEN A DIFFERENT TACK, QUESTIONING THE FEASIBILITY OF SPECIFIC RULES OF BEHAVIOR BUT EXPRESSING MORE CONCERN THAN ZAGLADIN TO OVERCOME THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF THIRD WORLD CRISES ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. BOTH OF THESE THEMES WERE CARRIED TO THE AMERICAN AUDIENCE BY GENRIKH TROFIMENKO, HEAD OF THE INSTITUTE'S U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT, IN AN ARTICLE IN THE SUMMER 1981 ISSUE OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEVOTED TO U.S.-SOVIET COMPETITION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

TROFIMENKO'S ARTICLE CONTAINED THE MOST EXPLICIT PUBLIC SOVIET ARGUMENT YET AGAINST A QUEST FOR ANYTHING BUT THE MOST GENERAL "CODE OF CONDUCT" IN THE THIRD WORLD. INSTABILITY IS ENDEMIC TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, HE ARGUED, AND NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR THE SOVIET UNION CAN CONTROL IT. THE FACT THAT MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON ARE ON "DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE BARRICADES" IN INTERPRETING THESE CHANGES, HE SAID, MEANS THAT EFFORTS TO SPELL OUT SPECIFIC RULES OF BEHAVIOR HAVE "LITTLE PRACTICAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS."

THE ALTERNATIVE PRESCRIPTION OFFERED BY TROFIMENKO FOR RESOLVING U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES IN THE THIRD WORLD AMOUNTED TO THE REVERSE OF THE U.S. APPROACH TO LINKAGE. A RETURN TO ACTIVE SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, HE WROTE, IS REQUIRED TO "DEFUSE EXPLOSIVE SITUATIONS BEFORE THEY BREAK OUT." TROFIMENKO COUNSELED THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE UP SOVIET OFFERS TO NEGOTIATE ON SPECIFIC TROUBLE SPOTS, SUCH AS THE PERSIAN GULF, RATHER THAN TRY TO EXCLUDE THE USSR FROM SUCH REGIONS. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE HE ARGUED THAT TO AVOID "BACKSLIDING TOWARD A MAJOR WAR" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW MUST RETURN TO AN "HONEST COLLECTIVE SEARCH" FOR AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT.

TROFIMENKO'S ARTICLE FOR THE U.S. AUDIENCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS BY GEORGIY ARBATOV AND OTHER USA INSTITUTE OFFICIALS. ARBATOV HAS ARGUED IN COMMENTARIES FOR PRAVDA SINCE THE MID-1970'S THAT DETENTE IN BILATERAL AFFAIRS CREATES THE NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS FOR CONTAINING DIFFERENCES OVER THE THIRD WORLD. HE HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ITSELF HAS CREDITED THE FAVORABLE CLIMATE RESULTING FROM THE 1972 NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT WITH ENABLING WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW TO DEFUSE THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN OCTOBER 1973 BEFORE IT COULD DEVELOP INTO A MAJOR EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

(ENDALL)

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BASIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR SALT POLICY

I. US Objectives Regarding Strategic Arms Negotiations

A. National Security Objectives

1. Strategic objectives, policy and programs

(S) The most basic US national security goal is to preserve the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact. In support of that, the fundamental strategic, national defense objective is to prevent nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies. To accomplish this, US strategic forces and strategy have a fourfold mission: (1) to deter a nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies--a priority mission; (2) to deter a major conventional attack against our Allies, especially against NATO; (3) to limit damage to the US population and economic assets if a limited nuclear attack should occur, or if the United States should decide to resort to the use of nuclear weapons consistent with its Alliance commitments; (4) to minimize the extent to which Soviet nuclear threats could be used to influence, coerce, or intimidate the United States or our Allies.

(S) It is US defense policy to maintain nuclear forces, including supporting C3I systems, capable at all times of carrying out these missions. The capabilities of US strategic forces must be such that, in a crisis, the Soviets will have no incentive to strike first. That is, they must perceive the costs of initiating strategic nuclear attack as higher than the potential gains and thus conclude that there is no possibility of achieving their politico-military objectives.



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(S) The US intends to pursue a balanced improvement of force capabilities needed to carry out the strategic defense policy. First priority is the improvement of the capabilities of forces already programmed and approved. Second priority is accorded longer-term expansion of the essential peacetime force structure.

(S) Force planning seeks to redress the current strategic imbalances through an aggressive and comprehensive modernization program. The development of our strategic forces will achieve:

-- greater survivability both in offensive capability and associated command and control structure;

-- a sub-set of strategic offensive forces that have a high probability of enduring survival in a nuclear war;

-- [redacted] with sufficient remaining forces to deter or defeat any subsequent Soviet strikes; and

-- a capacity to expand nuclear forces during a period of strategic warning or during a conventional war. (This includes such shorter term approaches as changes in readiness and other measures to increase the useful nuclear force levels, some of which may be effective during a protracted period of preparation.)


(S) In the future greater emphasis will be placed on the multiplicity of strategic systems and basing modes to strengthen the benefits of the TRIAD. The purpose of the TRIAD (and additional arrangements for multiplicity of strategic offensive forces) is to complicate Soviet defense and attack planning, to create synergism among our strategic force elements in attack planning and execution, and to hedge against unforeseen degradations in individual force elements.

(C) The criteria used in evaluating acquisitions and allocating resources among competing systems for strategic forces will change from what they have been in the past. There are several reasons for this: (1) the increased vulnerability of some traditional basing modes; (2) the increasing recognition of the importance of enduring survival; and (3) a less simplistic view of deterrence.

(S) We will attempt to strengthen deterrence by increasing our capabilities to [redacted] and achieving a posture that will make Soviet assessments of war outcomes uncertain and unfavorable. [redacted]

[redacted] after our forces have absorbed a Soviet first strike, in order to deprive them of any confidence that they could outlast us or reach a situation in which they could maintain significant nuclear capabilities while our own would either be eliminated or could no longer endure or be effectively employed.

(S) The US must have strategic defensive forces and C³I systems for North America that can provide timely, accurate, and unambiguous tactical warning and attack assessment through all phases of conflict, and, in conjunction with Canada, limit damage to strategic retaliatory forces and control access to North American airspace. We will continue development of an integrated defense capability to monitor space systems and negate threats to US space systems. Moreover, we must increase our potential to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and to augment North American air defenses as needed. In this connection, we will study carefully all the possibilities inherent in ABM-type defenses, particularly exploring new discoveries and incorporating the results of our latest R&D.



(S) In the near-term, equal emphasis will be given to readiness for nuclear and conventional war, survivability and endurance with C³I having the same priorities as the systems they support. The strategic C³I priorities are: (1) war deterrence in peacetime through capability to prosecute the SIOP during or after enemy attack; and (2) flexible response and support of protracted conflict.

(S) An overall reevaluation will be made of our cruise missile development programs (land, sea, air; nuclear and non-nuclear) to include mix, force size, and range capabilities.

(S) Evolving strategic programs will include the following:

-- Since improving the survivability of the land-based element of the Triad is an urgent national requirement, this objective must have the highest priority. The program will provide enough flexibility to accommodate the results of the MX basing review.

-- A study will be made of an SLBM modernization program to enhance submarine survivability and provide a sea-based hard target kill capability. A program leading to an IOC in the late 1980s will be developed for evaluation.

-- The strategic bomber force will be modernized to include new technology and to increase the flexibility it provides, e.g., by the addition of stand-off weapons.

(NOTE: The following forecasts in US strategic force planning are based on OSD staff estimates using preliminary Program Objectives Memorandum information from the military services. The near-term plans are subject to change, particularly with regard to the forthcoming MX and strategic bomber decisions. The far-term plans include considerable speculation about such force elements as a follow-on for the C4 SLBM.)

(S) According to current planning judgements, the US ICBM forces will be significantly changed in the future. The Titan system may be phased out in the early 1990's. The [redacted] Minuteman II system may be retired in the mid-1990's. If so, a replacement ICBM could begin deployment in the early 1990's and remain active beyond 2000. The Minuteman III system will probably stay in the strategic inventory past the end of the century. The MX ICBM system is to be deployed in the mid-to-late 1980's and will stay active beyond 2000. The payloads of the various ICBM systems will probably vary during the next twenty years because of changes in mission requirements and steady improvements in guidance capabilities, RVs, etc.; [redacted] especially if there is a significant change to the ABM Treaty.

(S) The US strategic SLBM program will also be subject to changes in the future. The Polaris SLBM system will be deactivated by the end of 1981. The Poseidon system will continue being deployed with both the C3 and C4 missiles until the mid-1990's. The Trident submarine fleet will begin operational deployment in 1982 with the C4 missile, which may be replaced by an upgraded C4 missile or a new missile, the D5, in the early 1990's; the Trident deployment is planned to continue past 2000. As with ICBM's, the SLBM payloads are expected to evolve over time.

(S) Significant changes are planned for the US strategic bomber force as well. The B52's strategic nuclear role as solely a penetrating bomber will be phased out in the later 1980's; from 1982 to the early 1990's B52's will also carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) externally, and from the late 1980's to the mid 1990's they may carry both internal and external ALCMs. A variant of the B1 bomber could enter the strategic force in the mid 1980's as a penetrator, and in the late 1980's would probably be equipped to carry ALCMs to shoot before penetration. Such a B1 variant would probably stay in the force beyond 2000. An advanced technology bomber (e.g., Stealth technology) may be deployed around 1990, first in a penetration-only role, and then in a shoot-penetrate role; such an advanced technology bomber would remain deployed beyond 2000.

(S) The US ballistic missile defense (BMD) program has an active research and development program underway for a possible low-altitude, nuclear defense of the MX; this could begin deployment in the mid-to-late 1980's. The US BMD program is also addressing the technology associated with a high-altitude, non-nuclear defense; this would be appropriate for a layered (high-altitude, low-altitude combination) defense of silos.

2. National Security Objectives Regarding Strategic Arms Negotiations

(C) Our first priority must be to formulate and implement our defense program so as to redress the current military imbalance. The US needs to establish firmly the primacy of its military programs as the basis for ensuring national security; indeed, this is the only way we can expect to achieve meaningful limits on Soviet weaponry. Negotiations are unlikely to result in significant progress at least until we are resolutely embarked on the path of correcting the military imbalance that has been allowed to develop. At the same time, adequate preparations are required for the eventuality that arms control agreements might breakdown or might fail to produce the desired restraint in a Soviet buildup. The effect of US-Soviet agreements and negotiations on our security has been rather disappointing. However, a cautious and pragmatic search should continue for more effective approaches to arms control.

(C) Consequently, our arms control policy should be framed to support our larger national security policies and programs rather than letting arms control negotiations and discussions contribute to a strategic imbalance by delaying needed defense programs in the hope of achieving an agreement. A strategic arms agreement should be in our national security interest from a strictly military point of view. It should directly enhance national security, limiting those Soviet systems which are threatening to us and permitting essential force modernization plans.

(C) Arms control should be supportive of US military programs by allowing for deployment of diverse, survivable, strategic systems. SALT cannot substitute

for necessary modernization of our strategic forces. The SALT framework must be compatible with our national security needs allowing for systems which rely on mobility, location uncertainty, or proliferation to achieve survivability. Consequently, it is necessary that our negotiating positions support strategic force decisions, and permit the flexibility to respond to Soviet threats which may not be constrained by a future agreement. We should not seek limitations on technology for its own sake. We need to recognize that many force modernization measures and technological advances actually could contribute to the arms control goal of stability.

(S) Any treaty which limits US forces must contain militarily significant constraints on Soviet capabilities which threaten us. For such constraints to play a role in enhancing stability and reducing uncertainty they must be verifiable and free from the prospect of significant circumvention. The US should establish a verification and monitoring strategy that will ensure the necessary development, funding, and allocation of resources to maintain confidence in Soviet compliance with arms control obligations. We must insist upon strict Soviet compliance and, if not satisfied with Soviet compliance with agreements, we must be prepared to withdraw from the agreements.

(S) The United States should operate from the principle that it can negotiate successfully with the Soviets only if it demonstrates clear and unmistakable evidence of US national resolve to redress the strategic balance, if need be without arms control, and to compete with the USSR, or to confront it, whenever and wherever US interest dictates. The United States should establish a detailed negotiating strategy with reviews to assess progress and to identify critical R&D and force modernization programmatic decision points. It should integrate this negotiating strategy with other related arms control initiatives, such as long-range theater nuclear force and nuclear test limitations, and the forthcoming ABM Treaty review.

(S) It is important to stress realistic expectations for future negotiations and to emphasize that arms control is not a substitute for needed modernization. The United States must guard against a belief that negotiations will in themselves allow it to achieve its national security objectives or that negotiations can be concluded rapidly. Recognizing that prolonged negotiations are better than accepting bad agreements, we should pursue arms control agreements that make tangible contributions to US and allied security. We should recognize that this arms control strategy may make it unlikely that negotiated agreements will be achieved in the short run.

I.C. Impact of SALT on the Economy and the Military Budget

(U) In the past, arms control negotiations were pursued and agreements signed in the hope that they would stabilize and slow the pace of the arms competition and eventually lead to force reductions. While defense budget savings were not a primary objective, there were hopes that agreements would permit budgetary reductions and allow the transfer of resources to domestic enterprises. In fact, however, neither the SALT process nor past SALT agreements resulted in the transfer of significant resources from the defense budget to domestic enterprises. With respect to the future, in terms of its impact on the economy, SALT would be a minor factor in comparison to overall defense requirements or other economic factors.

(U) On the other hand, both the SALT process and agreements have affected the military budget in significant ways. In the past, overly optimistic expectations about the process and end product led to measurably reduced support in the Executive Branch, Congress, and public for required defense improvements. Care will need to be exercised in the future to assure that the process of negotiation and future agreements are not misconstrued by the Congress or the public as indicating a lessened need, either to modernize US military capabilities which might be limited or to improve forces which are not covered by the agreement.

(U) Assuming this care is exercised, the impact that future SALT agreements might have on the military budget is difficult to ascertain. On the one hand, savings on strategic programs in a given year may turn out to be merely a postponement of later expenses. Further, costs could be increased to the extent that arms control provisions constrain us from deploying more cost-effective systems in the future. On the other hand, sound arms control measures, properly implemented, could help bound the threat and render the costs of defense and the allocation of critical resources more manageable. In contrast, an unrestricted arms competition with the Soviet Union likely would require a further diversion of critical resources.

(U) On balance, however, it may well be that future SALT agreements will not result in significantly smaller defense budgets. This is for two basic reasons: One, the strategic portion of the US defense budget constitutes only about 10% of the overall defense budget and therefore even a substantial reduction in strategic spending would impact overall defense spending only slightly. And secondly, even an agreement requiring reductions in strategic forces will not necessarily reduce strategic spending significantly because of requirements for modernization of the remaining forces (i.e., survivability and penetrability). Any savings resulting from an arms control agreement are likely to be used to address our many non-strategic needs which now cannot be met because of resource constraints, even with the substantial budget increases planned by the Reagan Administration. Additionally, expenditures for the non-strategic elements of our defense budget would increase if the Soviets shift their defense spending from the SALT limited systems to areas unconstrained by SALT.

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MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
OSD	George Schneider	695-0931	5-A-670
JCS	COL. Frank Jenkins	695-9148	2D990
CIA			
NSC	Sven Kraemer	395-5014	(OEOB) 380
VP Military Office	Michael Fry	395-4224	(OEOB) 294
OMB	William Schneider	395-6190	(OEOB) 262

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

29

August 13, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED (with SECRET attachment)

MEMORANDUM TO: ACDA - James Timbie

[Redacted]

31, B3

- JCS - Col. Frank Jenkins
- NSC - Sven Kraemer
- OSD - George Schneider
- VP's Military Office - Michael Fry

FROM: PM/SNP - Christopher M. Lehman

ML

SUBJECT: SALT Working Group

Attached is the final version of "US Foreign Policy Objectives" (Section I.B. of the "Basic Considerations" outline) as approved by the Working Group at its meeting of August 11.

Attachment:

As stated.

cc:OMB:WSchneider

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BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

I. B. US Foreign Policy Objectives

1. General Considerations

SALT should be one element in a comprehensive US security and foreign policy structure, whose primary objectives are to blunt and contain Soviet imperialism, deter aggression by others, contain crises, reduce sources of conflict and achieve a stable military balance. Our most important general objective in SALT, therefore, is ensuring that any SALT agreement contributes to maintaining a strong, survivable and enduring US nuclear deterrent. Any SALT agreement should also be consistent with, and to the extent possible enhance, a US strategic force posture sufficient to ensure that we are able to carry out our world-wide defense and foreign policy commitments, and that in a crisis the Soviets are not able to place us in a disadvantageous position by raising, or threatening to raise, the military ante. (See Section I. A. above.)

In addition to SALT's role in achieving and maintaining an acceptable US-Soviet nuclear balance, SALT can -- if properly conceived, implemented and verified -- help manage the diplomatic aspect of the superpower nuclear relationship by reducing mutual uncertainties regarding strategic plans and by demonstrating to US and Allied publics that this Administration is seriously pursuing diplomatic as well as programmatic paths to reducing the risk of nuclear war.

In the past, SALT has been considered a central element in East-West relations. Pressures to pursue SALT for the sake of preserving "detente" and SALT's emergence as the "center-piece" of the US-Soviet political relationship have in the past worked against our interests. Our current objective should be to scale down unrealistic public expectations about the talks. SALT should not be considered the bellwether of East-West relations. Even an agreement with militarily significant limitations would not eliminate the root causes of the US-Soviet adversary relationship.

We face pressure, however, from our Allies and other countries to resume the arms control process. Unless dealt with, these could undermine Allied unity and deprive us of the support we need to proceed with key elements of our global strategy. We need to pursue a strategy that will meet these Allied concerns while at the same time preserving US flexibility and maintaining tougher substantive standards for the arms control process. In particular, we should not allow SALT to raise expectations which could reduce either US or Allied willingness to bear the burdens which will be necessary to redress the strategic balance and to contain Soviet expansion. We need to establish a public perception of the primacy of military programs as the only sure basis for ensuring national security.

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In pursuit of those goals and to avoid arousing unrealistic public expectations about the talks, our approach to SALT should be as low key as possible. Although the opening of any talks will certainly attract great public and press interest, we should adopt a cautious and patient public stance during the negotiations. We should not appear overly eager to reach agreement or allow the pace to be hurried by events external to the negotiations.

II. US-Soviet Relations

Relations between the US and the USSR reflect a fundamental and enduring conflict of interest. The Soviets have always viewed negotiations with the US, including arms control talks, as one element in the rivalry between the two systems. It is essential that the US not over-estimate the extent to which SALT could moderate Soviet international behavior. Arms control agreements negotiated simply to improve the atmosphere of superpower relations but which do not affect the actual course of Soviet weapons development and deployment can be more harmful than none at all, insofar as they are mistakenly perceived to enhance US national security or decrease the Soviet threat.

SALT will inevitably be an important part of our relations with the USSR, but this Administration will view the process as complementary to our broader political and strategic objectives. Thus, the US SALT posture should demonstrate both our resolve to compete successfully with the Soviets in strategic nuclear and other areas, and our willingness to cooperate in areas of mutual benefit. It should also be designed to counter Soviet propaganda that only the USSR is interested in arms control, while the US is attempting to sabotage the process, and to place the onus on the Soviets if the talks fail.

Furthermore, since arms control should be a means of complementing rather than an alternative to a vigorous strategic modernization program, SALT should be pursued in a climate shaped by a major US effort to improve its strategic position, which, in addition to ensuring that our force requirements are met, will also give us greater leverage than before. Finally, we must maintain a strong and consistent emphasis on compliance, and ensure that all treaty provisions are subject to effective verification.

Linkage

The US has made it clear to the Soviets that linkage is a fact of life and that Soviet behavior inevitably will affect prospects for arms control. Our policies with respect to regional issues should be calculated to reinforce their perceptions of this fact, without, however, precluding a measure of

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policy flexibility. We should, for example, continue to emphasize the favorable impact progress toward resolution of such issues as Afghanistan and Kampuchea would have on prospects for arms control, without being pinned down to specifics. We also should make it clear to the Soviets that a US consensus in support of a SALT agreement will be achievable only in a climate of Soviet international restraint.

III. US-Allied Relations

Our SALT strategy must be one element of a coherent Alliance security policy. Any SALT agreement must permit continued US capability to defend our Allies against any level of Soviet threat, both conventional and nuclear, as well as Allied confidence in that capability and in US will to use it. SALT cannot be allowed to interfere with necessary efforts by the Alliance to increase its conventional and nuclear defenses in response to the major Soviet buildup of recent years. Solidifying Allied support for the TNF deployment decision will, therefore, be a major element in our strategy toward SALT talks -- and naturally toward talks on TNF as well. As our planning advances for talks on TNF and SALT, we will need to devise an appropriate connection between these talks, as well as any agreements reached in them. In the future we must seek to de-emphasize the central role arms control plays in our relations with our Allies and avoid an automatic linkage between modernization and arms control.

We must also seek to take into account particular British and French concerns that any SALT agreement not create conditions which could undermine the effectiveness of their independent nuclear deterrent forces. In this regard, we cannot accept any provisions which would restrict our right to transfer technology we deem necessary and appropriate to support these Allied nuclear forces, e.g., the UK Trident deal.

At the same time, US Allies are concerned that the SALT process continue. Until we are in a position to satisfy that concern, we can expect continuing difficulties in ensuring Alliance unity on political-military questions. Our SALT strategy, therefore, should be designed to enhance Allied cohesion on both security and broader political matters and to counter Soviet efforts to drive wedges between the US and our Allies while preserving US options to correct the military imbalance. Through continuing close consultation as the SALT process develops we must convince the Allies that we are taking account of their legitimate security and political concerns. At the same time, we must not allow the Allies to assume that they can exercise a "veto" over US SALT policy.

By explaining and demonstrating our genuine interest in a meaningful, balanced and verifiable SALT agreement, we can counter Soviet propaganda that only the USSR is interested in

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arms control and reduce the influence of neutralist and anti-US currents in Allied publics. At the same time, any initiation of SALT talks should not be allowed to evoke unrealistic anticipation that a return to "detente" is imminent and that the Alliance can slacken its concern about the nature of the long-term Soviet threat.

IV. Third World

The primary US SALT objective with respect to the Third World is to ensure that any agreement is based on a strategic force posture which makes it possible for us to defend our Allies and legitimate interests in the region. Our SALT strategy should also be designed to demonstrate to Third World nations that Soviet actions are driving the arms competition and that the US is genuinely interested in limiting the strategic competition through negotiations as well as by maintaining a balance through our own programs. Such a posture would have some positive impact on the US position in multilateral fora devoted to arms control, where Third World nations are generally in the majority, and would ease pressures from Third World nations for movement in arms control areas we would prefer to avoid, e.g., CTB.

V. Non-Proliferation

US-SALT strategy should also demonstrate that the US takes seriously its commitment under Article VI of the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race...." and that lack of progress is the result of Soviet unwillingness to accept equitable, stabilizing and verifiable agreements. Serious SALT negotiations should at a minimum deny non-signatory nations an excuse for postponing adherence and could encourage some of these nations to conclude that possession of nuclear weapons is not required to meet their legitimate security concerns.

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LDX MESSAGE NO. 000149 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 9

FROM: Richard Burt PM 632-9022 7319
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION SALT IG

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
CIA	Raymond McCrory		
JCS	BGen. Joseph Skaff	695-5903	2-E-1008
NSC	MGen. Robert Schweitzer	395-3330	(OEOB) 386
OSD	Richard Perle	695-0942	4-E-813
VP Office	Michael Fry	395-4224	(OEOB) 298
OMB	William Schneider	395-6190	(OEOB) 262

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REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

S/S Officer: *CM* Clay McManaway

O. Sticker

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By LOS, NARA, Date 7/18/08



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1981

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TO: ACDA - Norman Terrell
 CIA - Raymond McCrory
 JCS - BGen. Joseph Skaff
 NSC - MGen. Robert Schweitzer
 Negotiator - Ambassador Rowny
 OSD - Richard Perle
 VP Military Office - Michael Fry

FROM: PM - Robert Blackwill, Acting **RB**

SUBJECT: SALT IG

A meeting of the SALT IG will be held on Thursday, October 1 from 2:30-4:00 p.m. in room 6530 in the Department of State. The meeting will discuss the following topics:

- A paper, drafted by ACDA, on the U.S. strategy for the upcoming SCC session;
- An Executive Summary (attached) of Sections I-III of our long-term SALT study, "Basic Considerations for U.S. SALT Policy". The summary, which was drafted and thoroughly reviewed by the SALT working group, sets forth the basic principles which should guide our future SALT strategy;
- A future work program for the SALT IG.

cc:OMB: William Schneider

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Basic Considerations for US SALT Policy: Executive Summary

I. US Objectives Regarding Strategic Arms Negotiations

A. US National Security Objectives in SALT

1. Broad US Strategic Force Objectives

US strategic forces have a fourfold mission: 1) Deter a nuclear attack on the US and its Allies; 2) Deter a major conventional attack against our Allies; 3) Limit damage to the US in a limited nuclear conflict; and 4) Minimize Soviet ability to coerce the US or our Allies. The US intends to pursue a balanced improvement in force capabilities needed to carry out our strategic policy. Current force planning seeks to redress the existing strategic imbalance through a modernization program to achieve: 1) greater survivability, 2) endurance, and 3) more effective second strike capability against military and civilian targets as well as enhanced deterrence against subsequent Soviet strikes, and 4) a capacity to expand nuclear forces during a period of strategic warning or conventional war. (This includes short-term approaches, such as changes in readiness, and other measures which may be effective during a protracted period of preparation.)

2. National security objectives in strategic arms negotiations

We must establish the primacy of military programs as the basis for ensuring national security. However, we should also continue a cautious and pragmatic search for effective approaches to strategic arms control. SALT should support -- and not substitute for -- US military programs. A strategic arms agreement should be in our national security interest from a strictly military point of view. It should directly enhance national security, limiting those Soviet systems which are threatening to us and permitting essential US force modernization programs.

Arms control should be supportive of US military programs by allowing for deployment of diverse, survivable, strategic systems. The SALT framework must be compatible with our national security needs, allowing for systems which rely on mobility, location uncertainty, or proliferation to achieve survivability. Consequently, it is necessary that our negotiating positions support strategic force decisions, and permit the flexibility to respond to Soviet threats which may not be constrained by a future agreement, as well as possible breakout from it. We should not seek limitations on technology for its own sake. We need to recognize that many force modernization measures and technological advances actually could contribute to the arms control goal of stability.

Any treaty which limits US forces must contain militarily significant constraints on Soviet capabilities which threaten us. For such constraints to play a role in enhancing stability and reducing uncertainty they must be verifiable and free from the the prospect of significant circumvention.

B. US Foreign Policy Objectives in SALT

1. General Considerations

SALT should be one element in a comprehensive US security and foreign policy structure whose primary objective is to promote a more stable and peaceful world order by containing Soviet expansionism, deterring aggression by others, containing crises, reducing sources of conflict and achieving a stable military balance.

2. US Soviet Relations

The Soviets have always viewed negotiations with the US, including arms control talks, as one element in a fundamental and enduring rivalry. The US must not over-estimate the extent to which SALT can moderate Soviet behavior. SALT will inevitably be an important part of our relations with the USSR, but it should be viewed as complementary to our broader political and strategic objectives. Thus, our SALT posture should demonstrate our resolve to compete successfully with the Soviets in strategic and other areas, as well as our willingness to cooperate on the basis of genuine mutual benefit.

3. US-Allied relations

Any SALT agreement must preserve our capability to defend our Allies against the Soviet nuclear and conventional threat, and maintain Allied confidence in our will to defend them. At the same time, our SALT strategy should satisfy Allied concerns that the SALT process continue and counter Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between ourselves and the Allies. SALT cannot be allowed to interfere with the Alliance defense response to the continuing Soviet nuclear and conventional build-up. In particular, Allied support for TNF deployment will be a major element in our strategy toward SALT including the question of an appropriate connection between talks on TNF and SALT central systems. Close consultations will be required to convince Allies that we are taking account of their interests, without allowing an Allied "veto" over US policy. We must also avoid SALT provisions which could restrict our ability to transfer necessary military technology to the Allies as well as take account of British and French concerns regarding the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrents.

C. Congress and SALT

Congress has displayed significant and enduring interest in SALT since the beginning of the process. It will play a significant role in future talks. The Administration must maintain effective communication with Members to ensure that Congressional concerns are addressed during planning for and conduct of negotiations. Too direct a Congressional involvement in the process, however, could undercut the separation of powers. Moreover, Congress does not speak with one voice on SALT. As our preparations for SALT advance we need to consider the

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degree of direct Congressional involvement in the process which we desire. We will certainly want to provide regular briefing on the progress of the talks but we will need to look very carefully at whether to include Members as advisers to the delegation.

II. A. Soviet National Security Objectives in SALT

The Soviets view their strategic arms policy in the context of a long-term competition with the US for global power. The aims of their forces are to deter attack, support their foreign policy, and prevail over the US should war occur. We judge that the foremost military objective of Soviet SALT policy is the protection of their own strategic programs in order to enhance their strategic warfighting capability. Their policy is also formulated to slow the pace of US strategic force development, to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war; and to reduce uncertainty for Soviet military planners. (DIA believes that the overriding consideration governing Soviet strategic arms policy is to develop the forces needed to create military and political opportunities for Soviet expansion.)

The Soviets have been striving to acquire and maintain forces to achieve these aims. Soviet ICBMs have the potential to destroy the bulk of US land-based ICBMs in a counterforce first strike. Their SLBMs and heavy bombers add increased flexibility to their targeting options. The Soviets are upgrading their Moscow ABM system to give it increased capability to defend against some US reentry vehicles, third-country threats, and accidental launches. Soviet air defenses, if they survive a US missile attack, probably would have good capabilities against high- and medium-altitude targets but poor capabilities against low-altitude targets. The Soviets lack effective means with which to counter US SSBNs at sea.

The Soviets have major R&D programs under way to improve all elements of their strategic forces. We are not yet able confidently to assess their expected effectiveness against US strategic force improvement options. The Soviets will probably continue to pursue their traditional conservative approach in system development, making incremental improvement in most new or modified systems in order to avoid high technological risks. However, faced with a serious threat or the prospect of making a significant gain over the US, we expect the Soviets vigorously to pursue developments which press the state-of-the art in advanced technologies.

We believe that the USSR has altered certain development and deployment programs because of the terms of the SALT I and SALT II agreements. None of these alterations, however, would significantly affect the capabilities of Soviet strategic forces, including the capability to destroy US ICBM forces.

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On balance, the Soviets believe that the SALT process has had real political and military value. In the near term, they are unlikely to take any irreversible steps that would openly contravene SALT I or II unless they were firmly convinced that the US is undertaking or is about to undertake programs barred by current agreements. They will, however, continue ambiguous activities such as telemetry encryption. In the event the US took action inconsistent with SALT I or II, the Soviets would be well-positioned to undertake quickly a spectrum of measures that would be evidence of their intentions openly to contravene SALT.

II. B Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives in SALT

SALT plays a prominent role in Soviet security policy designed to shift the global balance in favor of the USSR. There has been considerable consistency in Soviet foreign policy objectives toward SALT since the beginning of the process, but the Soviets have also been flexible in taking account of changed political conditions. The Soviets believe that a resumption of SALT talks would serve the following major long-range foreign policy objectives vis a vis the US.

-- Foster the perception of a return to "detente" in order to reduce US support for military modernization, facilitate relations in other areas, especially trade and technology transfer; and demonstrate that strategic arms control can be divorced from wider linkages.

-- Shift the overall balance of forces in their favor and hence enhance their political leverage, with the ultimate aim of achieving a strategic posture which would permit them to influence international political events to their advantage and would give them the best chance of prevailing in a confrontation with the US.

-- Reduce the likelihood of nuclear war by increasing Soviet certainty about potential US strategic responses in a crisis.

-- Reduce the economic costs to the Soviets of achieving their strategic forces objectives against the US.

The Soviets also seek to achieve the following major objectives vis a vis US Allies through a resumption of SALT talks:

-- Reduce Allied willingness to increase defense spending.

-- Stimulate and exploit Allied fears about the reliability of the US as a guarantor of their security interests, and

-- Facilitate the development of East-West ties, especially

trade and technology transfer, in isolation from Soviet adventurism in the Third World, and encourage tendencies within Western Europe to adopt positions more in accord with Soviet interests.

At present, however, Moscow seeks to capitalize on European concerns about the hiatus in SALT through a diplomatic and propaganda campaign aimed at: 1) driving wedges between the US and its Allies; 2) thwarting TNF modernization; and 3) increasing pressure on the US for an early return to talks.

III. Implications of the Above Objectives for US Policy on Strategic Arms Negotiations

A. Benefits and Liabilities

1. Verification and Compliance

The closed and secretive nature of Soviet society means that the US faces an inherently more difficult task than the Soviets in negotiating agreements that will ensure effective verification. This asymmetry allows the Soviets to seek to offer verification concessions in return for substantive US concessions in other areas. In addition, it has important security implications for the US, since it increases the risk of Soviet breakout while it is essentially impossible for the US to acquire, undetected, a breakout capability.

Effectively verifiable agreements can benefit the US by facilitating our ability to collect military intelligence. SALT I provisions banning certain deliberate concealment measures may have had some positive impact on our ability to monitor Soviet strategic developments and their absence would further complicate US intelligence collection. On the other hand, SALT can enhance Soviet knowledge about US intelligence capabilities, and some Soviet concealment activities have significantly increased since the signing of SALT I.

While the Soviets will continue to exploit ambiguities or loopholes in agreements, they can be expected to abide closely to the specific terms of provisions which are tightly drafted and where compliance can be clearly judged.

Force Posture Asymmetries

Existing asymmetries in strategic forces -- with the Soviets ahead in many areas and the US in others -- introduce considerable complexity into negotiations. The Soviets have the advantage of current momentum, but the US will gain increased leverage as a tangible US commitment to modernize our strategic forces is translated into real systems.

Alliance Factors

US Allies have far greater economic, technological and military strength than do the Warsaw Pact "allies" of the Soviet Union. The military forces of US Allies, including independent British and French strategic forces, complicate Soviet military planning. It is clear, however, that the Allies cannot defend themselves against the Soviet Union and their combined nuclear forces are heavily outnumbered by the European peripheral strategic and LRTNF forces of the Soviet Union.

The basis of the NATO Alliance -- genuine common interest -- helps ensure its long-term stability. It is important for the US to have Allied support for our defense and arms control policies. This gives the Allies a certain influence over US policies. It also allows the Soviets to advance proposals designed to weaken and divide the Alliance. Moreover, the Soviets have the advantage of direct propaganda access to Western European publics. A US SALT policy which is developed in close consultation with the Allies should have a positive effect on Alliance unity. An early US commitment to resumption of SALT negotiations -- consistent, of course, with our force modernization efforts, the state of our internal SALT preparations, and linkage considerations -- could be useful in countering Soviet efforts to divide the Alliance.

III. B. Criteria For Strategic Arms Negotiations

1. Principles on which US SALT policy should be founded

a) Instrument of National Security Policy: Our arms control effort will be an integral part and an instrument of our national security policy. We must ensure that any SALT agreement contributes to maintaining a strong, survivable, and enduring US nuclear deterrent. (See section I.A.1. above.)

But the primary basis for ensuring our national security must be our military programs. SALT cannot be viewed as a substitute for necessary strategic modernization. We can negotiate successfully only if we demonstrate clear resolve to redress the strategic balance, if need be without arms control.

b) Equality: Nothing less than overall equality is acceptable in any future strategic arms limitation agreement both for political/perceptual and for military reasons. Any future pact must permit a real equality of strategic capabilities, particularly survivability and counterforce capabilities. It is probably impossible, and not necessarily desirable to establish equality in every category of strategic measurement. We must however insist on strict equality in the most highly visible and relevant measures of effectiveness or ensure that any Soviet advantage preserved by the agreement is offset by comparable US advantage preserved by the agreement.

c) Strategic Stability Enhancing strategic stability is a major goal of our SALT policy. In order to achieve this goal an agreement should restrain the most threatening Soviet systems, such as heavy ICBMs, and reduce Soviet counterforce capabilities generally, while enhancing the survivability of US systems and permitting the US to close the existing counterforce gap.

d) Effective Verification: Any agreement must allow effective US verification. The basic US verification strategy will be to devise substantive positions, including units of limitation, that meet our fundamental strategic objectives, and construct a series of measures to assure verifiability. Such measures could include counting rules, collateral constraints, cooperative measures (either intrusive or remote) and data base information.

Effective verification requires (1) precise and simple provisions, (2) capability to monitor these provisions within acceptable levels of confidence, (3) willingness to make a judgment that a violation has occurred, and (4) the means and willingness to take effective and timely action to redress the situation.

For each provision the basic question is whether or not compliance with the limits can be determined to the extent necessary to safeguard our security -- that is, whether or not in the face of Soviet concealment and deception we could detect a violation and whether we would have the means and time to redress the disadvantageous results of that violation. We may, of course, deliberately allow some ambiguous provisions, if these are judged to be in the U.S. interest -- for example, if they preserve greater flexibility for U.S. programs or if they place more significant restrictions on the Soviets despite uncertainties. In view of the inherent asymmetries between the open U.S. and closed Soviet system (see Section III A for a fuller discussion), such instances where ambiguity is judged to be in the U.S. interest will probably occur rarely. But, we may need to deal with substantive provisions that do not admit to effective verification even with extensive cooperative measures, either by omitting them from the agreement, being prepared to live with the uncertainties or deciding to do without an agreement entirely.

We must make it clear that progress in arms control depends on a more forthcoming Soviet attitude on verification. The US should avoid substantive concessions to gain Soviet concessions on verification. We must resist any tendency to relax verification standards as talks continue. We should avoid provisions whose monitoring depends on a single vulnerable asset or where problems in revealing intelligence sources and methods could make compliance discussion difficult.

e) Reduction: We should seek meaningful reductions in strategic forces so as to reduce the level of destruction which nuclear war could bring. In so doing, however, we must take account of the effect of such reductions on deterrent capabilities of our nuclear forces, in equality and strategic stability and in verification effectiveness.

f) Linkage: Soviet international conduct directly affects the prospects for success in arms control. The US approach to SALT must take account of Soviet international behavior, developments in other arms control negotiations, and Soviet military developments in non-strategic systems. The Soviet response to compliance concerns we have raised with other agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, should influence our approach to negotiating SALT.

2. US Negotiating Strategy Should Take into Account

a) Objectives of US Military Programs The impact of any potential US negotiating position on planned US programs must be carefully considered. We must also consider the totality of defense programs, for example, the relationship between offensive and defensive forces; and theater and strategic forces. It is essential that strategic arms negotiations not restrict elements of US strategic force modernization efforts without careful consideration of interrelationships with other areas. In considering the totality of defense programs and their relationship to offensive forces referred to in the preceding paragraph, the US should undertake an intensive and thorough review of the ABM Treaty.

b) Risks inherent in trading off US program flexibility for limits on Soviet forces: There is an inherent risk here because the Soviets have much greater advance knowledge about planned US programs than we have about theirs. Our negotiating strategy must carefully weigh this risk, including Soviet potential for circumvention, non-compliance and breakout, against the benefits of treaty restrictions on Soviet forces.

c) Low-key approach: Our approach to SALT should be as low key as possible. SALT should not be considered the bellwether of East-West relations. We should restrain public expectations about the results or the pace of talks, which could reduce US or Allied willingness to bear necessary defense burdens. We must be prepared for long and difficult negotiations and must avoid any impression that the Soviets can extract concessions to avoid delay. The talks themselves should be primarily conducted through delegations.

3. Timing

Before we make a decision on resuming SALT negotiations, we should have completed our SALT policy review and demonstrated a clear commitment to programs to redress the strategic balance. Once these conditions are met, and provided Soviet global conduct allows, further delay in negotiations aimed at enhancing US security and based on equality, verifiability, and reductions would work against US interests.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 16869

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 12/10/01 (MCCALL, SHERROD B) OR-P
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET LECTURER ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: SOVIET LECTURER ON DISARMAMENT AND THE ARMS RACE RECENTLY GAVE A LOW-KEYED PRESENTATION ON THE SOVIET PEACE PROGRAM. THE MAIN CONTENT OF HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT: THE PARTY HAS FOLLOWED A CORRECT POLICY SINCE WWII ACHIEVING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES WITHOUT INVOLVING THE USSR IN A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. THE USSR UNDER THE PARTY'S LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN SEEKING TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE INITIATIVES OUTLINED AT THE LAST THREE PARTY CONGRESSES, AND THE USSR'S STRENGTH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PEACE IN EUROPE THESE LAST 30 YEARS. TO COUNTER THE USSR'S SUCCESSES THE U.S. HAS EMBARKED ON MAJOR MILITARY PROGRAMS AND INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING. HE EMPLOYED STANDARD ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE "EXISTING" BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE, BUT FAILED TO ATTACK DIRECTLY THE PRESIDENT'S INF PROPOSAL OR TO CHARACTERIZE PROSPECTS FOR THE INF TALKS. THE U.S. ARMED FORCES WERE DESCRIBED AS "HIRED," AND THE U.S. "FAILURE" IN THE IRAN HOSTAGES RESCUE ATTEMPT WAS CITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF U.S. WEAKNESS. THE LECTURER RESPONDED TO A QUESTION WHY PRAVDA DID NOT PRINT ALL OF SCHMIDT'S REMARKS BY SAYING, "COMRADES, WE ALL HAVE PARTY CARDS, YOU KNOW NOT EVERYTHING IS PUT IN THE PAPERS." END SUMMARY.

3. SPEAKING TO AN AUDIENCE OF 75 PERSONS MOSTLY IN THEIR MID TO LATE 50'S AT MOSCOW'S "TEACHERS' HOME" A SOVIET CANDIDATE OF MILITARY SCIENCE AT IMEMO GAVE A LOW KEYED TALK ON DISARMAMENT AND THE ARMS RACE. HE BEGAN BY NOTING THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN OCTOBER OF THE "REAGAN STRATEGIC PROGRAM," BREZHNEV'S SPIEGEL INTERVIEW, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CLUB SPEECH, AND THE INF TALKS AT GENEVA.

4. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO PEACE IS AIMED ON LIMITING ARMS, CONTROLLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND STRENGTHENING DETENTE, HE SAID. THE USSR'S POLICY HAS BEEN CLEARLY OUTLINED AT THE LAST THREE PARTY CONGRESSES, AND RESTS FIRST ON THE USSR'S OWN STRENGTH ("ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY") AND SECOND ON THE USSR'S "SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE" POLICIES.

5. HE USED THE KOREAN WAR, VIETNAM, AND THE 1979 PRC-VIETNAMESE BORDER INCURSIONS TO ILLUSTRATE HOW SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN EACH CASE, HE SAID, THE USSR WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE A FAVORABLE SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AVOIDING BOTH A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. AND DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. ("IN KOREA, U.S. TROOPS MOVED CLOSE TO OUR BORDER, AND WE PREPARED OUR TROOPS IN CASE, OF COURSE, THANK GOD, IT WAS NOT NECESSARY.") DURING THE PRC-VIETNAM CONFRONTATION, HE WENT ON, "WE HAD AN AGREEMENT WITH VIETNAM ON FRIENDSHIP, ON COOPERATION, THAT ALSO INCLUDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. EACH OF US WONDERED HOW IT WOULD END UP. EVERYONE KNEW WE WOULD FULFILL OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS."

6. SECURITY IN EUROPE AND PRESERVATION OF PEACE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS FACING THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY IN THE 80'S. HE WENT ON. THANKS TO THE USSR'S STRENGTH, PEACE IN EUROPE HAS BEEN PRESERVED FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS.

7. THE SPEAKER THEN MOVED ON TO THE ARMS RACE. ("I KNOW THIS IS HARD FOR WOMEN TO UNDERSTAND, SO I WILL TRY TO KEEP IT SIMPLE," HE SAID. THE AUDIENCE, FULLY HALF OF WHICH WAS FEMALE, MADE NO VISIBLE REACTION TO THIS COMMENT.) HIS PRESENTATION CONTAINED STANDARD MATERIAL ON THE HIGH COSTS AND THE LARGE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES GOING INTO U.S. AND NATO MILITARY PROGRAMS, BUT HE GAVE NO CORRESPONDING FIGURES FOR SOVIET SPENDING. HE CLAIMED THE U.S. HAS 30 - 32,000 WARHEADS, BUT "WE HAVE MORE POWERFUL ONES TO COMPENSATE." THERE IS "APPROXIMATE EQUALITY" NOW, HE SAID, BUT "WE HAVE A DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL SITUATION FROM THE U.S. THUS, IT IS HARD TO COMPARE THE TWO SIDES. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIFFERENT PROPOSALS OF BREZHNEV AND REAGAN," HE SAID CAMIDLY. TURNING TO THE INF TALKS, THE SPEAKER GAVE A BRIEF RUNDOWN ON THE HISTORY OF SALT AND THEN NOTED THAT TACTICAL WEAPONS AND U.S. FBS HAD NEVER BEEN DISCUSSED BEFORE. NOW, BECAUSE
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ACTION (U.S.7)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 16869

OF THE STRATEGIC THREAT THESE WEAPONS POSE FOR THE USSR, AND BECAUSE OF MASSIVE EUROPEAN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE U.S. HAD BEEN FORCED TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. HE GAVE NO OPINION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA TALKS, BUT DID STRESS THAT "UNLIKE MBFR WHICH HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR 9 YEARS, AGREEMENT ON TNF MUST BE REACHED BY 1983."

8. THE SPEAKER WENT ON TO RECOUNT THE RESULTS ACHIEVED IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, GIVING ALL THE CREDIT TO THE USSR FOR ITS INITIATIVES. SINCE 1959, HE SAID, 29 MILITARY-POLITICAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED WITH THE WEST. STILL, NOT ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED. IN THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF THE U.S. HAS BROKEN OFF DISCUSSIONS ON FIVE AREAS (CAT, ASAT, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN WERE MENTIONED). DUE TO THE "HARDHEADEDNESS OF OUR PARTNER," THE MBFR TALKS HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR 9 YEARS AND NOT A SINGLE TROOP HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN EXCEPT FOR THE 20,000 UNILATERALLY TAKEN OUT OF GERMANY BY THE SOVIETS. STILL, HE SAID, SOME TALKS ARE PROCEEDING, SUCH AS NPT AND CSCE. USSR-FRG RELATIONS, THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM RANGE ROCKETS IN EUROPE, AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS TALKS SET TO BEGIN NEXT YEAR ALL GIVE IMPULSE TO FURTHER EAST-WEST CONTACTS.

9. TURNING TO MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES, THE SPEAKER CLAIMED THAT SINCE 1977 THE USSR HAS MODERNIZED ITS MISSILE FORCE WITH "200 TO 250" SS-20'S WHICH HAVE CREATED A "LOUD NOISE" IN THE WEST, BUT NATO HAS NOW DECIDED TO INTRODUCE ENTIRELY NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS, THE GLCMS AND PERSHING 2'S. THE U.S., HE CONTINUED, HAS MANY MILITARY PROGRAMS: MX, TRIDENT, THE B-1. WHY, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, DO THEY NEED MORE MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS? AFTER TAKING THE USUAL LINE THAT THE USSR CANNOT INFLUENCE THE U.S. IN ITS STRATEGIC WEAPONS DECISIONS, THE SPEAKER SAID, "MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES, THOUGH, ARE IN EUROPE AND ARE A GREAT THREAT TO US THAT HAS NOT EXISTED BEFORE." WHEN HE DISCUSSED THE SHORT FLIGHT TIMES ("5-6 MINUTES FOR THE PERSHING 2'S"), THE AUDIENCE SHOWED VISIBLE CONCERN. SEIZING ON THIS, THE SPEAKER CONTINUED TO EMPHASIZE FOR HIS AUDIENCE, THE "QUALITATIVE JUMP" AND "STRATEGIC" THREAT THE WEAPONS REPRESENT. HOWEVER, HE REASSURED THE GROUP, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN HALTING THEIR DEPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF THE MASSIVE PROTESTS IN THE WEST (THE USSR WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE "ZERO

VARIANT" WAS INHERENTLY UNFAIR AND THAT FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY TALLY OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES), BECAUSE "OUR DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE IS NOT WITHOUT SUCCESS" (BELGIUM IS NOW "AFRAID" TO DEPLOY THE NEW NATO WEAPONS), AND BECAUSE OF THE U.S.-USSR TALKS.

10. IN CONCLUDING, HE ASSURED HIS LISTENERS THAT THE "WORLD REVOLUTION" WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT THE SOVIET POLICY OF PRESERVING THE EXISTING ARMS EQUILIBRIUM WOULD REMAIN. EVEN THOUGH "THE U.S. STRENGTH IS ENORMOUS" AND SPENDING IS INCREASING AT SEVEN PERCENT YEARLY, THE USSR WOULD PRESERVE ITS SECURITY AND THAT OF ITS ALLIES. "WE ARE IN A WORSE SITUATION," HE ADMITTED IN REFERRING IMPLICITLY TO THE SOVIET DEFENSE BURDEN ON THE ECONOMY, "AND YOU KNOW IT," BUT THE USSR WOULD MATCH U.S. SPENDING. ---"

11. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WERE OF INTEREST:

Q: HOW BIG IS THE U.S. ARMY?

A: IT IS MASSIVE. ABOUT 2 1/2 MILLION. IT IS ALSO EXPENSIVE AND ACCOUNTS FOR ALMOST ONE-THIRD OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET. SOLDIERS GET UP TO \$1000 PER MONTH (OOHS AND AHS FROM THE AUDIENCE). BUT IT IS A MERCENARY (NAYEMNAYA) ARMY. HOW CAN IT BE STRONG?

Q: WHY IS THE UK COMMUNIST PARTY OPPOSED TO OUR AFGHAN POLICY?

A: THERE ARE MANY PRESSURES ON IT IN THE WEST, BUT ITS OPPOSITION IS NOT STRONG.

Q: THE U.S. WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL IN VIETNAM, WHY DO THEY THINK THEY CAN DEFEAT US?

BT

ACTION

INFO DJJS(*) SJCS(1) J3(5) NIDS(*) SAGA(1) (I,M)
J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) USRMCLD(1) RDJTF:LO(1) WSC(5)
PMO-1(1) SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(7) ARPA(1) USDP(15)
USDR(3) ASD:PA(1) ASD:PA&E(1) ATSD:AE(2) DI-5(1)
NMIC(*) SWS(1) AT-X(1) DIO(1) VP-A2 FRD(1) DE(1)
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+CNO WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 16869

A: THE U.S.'S "AMBITIONS ARE MANY, BUT AMMUNITION IS LITTLE." REMEMBER IRAN. MORALLY THEY WERE RIGHT. BUT WHAT HAPPENED? THE HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT ENDED IN "FAILURE."

Q: WHY WAS SCHMIDT'S SPEECH NOT FULLY PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA?

A: "COMRADES, WE ALL HAVE PARTY CARDS, YOU KNOW NOT EVERYTHING IS PUT IN THE PAPERS."

A FITTING END TO AN INTERESTING LECTURE. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PROTECT CITE AND VENUE OF THIS PARTICULAR LECTURE SERIES. HARTMAN
BT

ACTION (I.M)

INFO
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SECT 03 OF 03

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TO PRESIDENT

FROM MCCLURE, JAMES

DOCDATE 01 JUN 83

60
SALT

KEYWORDS: CO

MX

VERIFICATION

SALT

USSR

SUBJECT: CONCERN RE USSR COMPLIANCE W/ SALT

ACTION: RECOMS TO NSC/S

DUE: 21 JUN 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

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 INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE DATE 830601 RECEIVED DATE 830609
 (PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)
 THE HONORABLE JIM MCCLURE
 TITLE:

ORGANIZATION: UNITED STATES SENATE

STREET:

CITY: WASHINGTON STATE: DC ZIP: 20510

COUNTRY:

SUBJECT: OFFERS TO HELP, AT ANY TIME, IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL VERIFICATION PANEL STUDYING SOVIET SALT VIOLATIONS

AGY/OFF	ACTION CODE	TRACKING DATE	
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STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN MEDIA: L OPID: GF TYPE: IBA
COMMENTS:

CODES: REPORT INDIV: 1220 USER:

✓ NSC Sec. R 830616⁶

62
June 13, 1983

Dear Senator McClure:

The President has asked me to thank you for your recent letter forwarding a copy of your May 25 speech on the Senate floor supporting the MX deployment decision.

It was good of you to bring your analysis to our attention; and we appreciate your offer to be of help to the National Security Council's Verification Panel studying Soviet SALT violations. We have taken the liberty of sharing your letter with the appropriate advisers for further review and response.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable James A. McClure
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: w/copy of inc, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response (with copy to Ken Duberstein)

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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CHARLES A. TRABANDT, CHIEF COUNSEL
D. MICHAEL HARVEY, CHIEF COUNSEL FOR THE MINORITY

June 1, 1983

#145976

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On May 25, 1983, I gave a speech on the Senate Floor supporting your MX deployment decision. (Enclosed)


Mr. President, former President Carter deferred the Senate debate on SALT II in January, 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in order to "assess Soviet intentions." I call your attention to my speech entitled "Deploying The MX As A Countermeasure Against Soviet SS-19 Heavy ICBM Deployment Circumventing SALT I." My analysis shows conclusively that the Soviets succeeded in deceiving the US three times in SALT negotiations on their SS-19 heavy ICBM, and then went on to circumvent or violate SALT by deploying the SS-19.

In my judgement, a careful examination of the history of the Soviet SS-19 heavy ICBM provides the best example of Soviet intentions in arms control. The Soviets use deception and duplicity in negotiations, and then they turn around and circumvent the agreements.

Accordingly, Mr. President, I stand ready at any time to help in your National Security Council' Verification Panel studying Soviet SALT violations.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,



James A. McClure
United States Senator

McC:dsn

Enclosure

15 minutes before impact), the impact points of RVs could be predicted. The locations of detonations of submarine-launched RVs on the United States might also be known. By this time, only 5 to 10 minutes would remain for decisionmaking.

One might legitimately question whether, if the United States possessed a survivable ICBM force, better information that this would be available to support a retaliatory decision within a short time. That is, given the widespread confusion and disruption of communications following even a small attack, the information supplied by warning sensors in the first few minutes might in fact be the most complete available for a long time after the attack. Deployment of a survivable force might actually lead the United States to deploy fewer and less robust sensors than it would deploy if relying on LUA. Thus, as a practical matter, the information upon which to gauge response could conceivably be less with survivable forces than with LUA.

Despite the redundancy and technical variety of the warning sensors, there could be reluctance on the part of decisionmakers to base launch decisions on information collected by such remote means.

Decision timelines

Depending on the circumstance, the amount of time available for deciding on a response to Soviet attack could range from an upper limit of 20 minutes to no time at all. Meeting this timeline would probably require at least some provisional advance planning by the President and other NCA.

Possibilities for diplomatic and other activities

The LUA timeline would leave no time for diplomatic activities between attack and response. At very least, such activity could serve to signal to the Soviets U.S. perceptions of their attack and the intent of any U.S. response. Communication with other governments, U.S. overseas installations, and U.S. military forces worldwide might also be accomplished at this time.

However, it is not clear to what extent the circumstances of nuclear war, especially as regards disruption of communications, would permit such activities within a short period of an initial attack anyway.

Providing for launch authority

Timely command decisions by authorized NCA is clearly a requirement for reliance on LUA.

This requirement would be most difficult to satisfy if the Soviets intended deliberately to destroy or "decapitate" the NCA. In this circumstance, possible options might be: LUA fails (not intended for this extreme case)—; provision is made for very early NCA decision; decisions decided on in advance by the NCA are executed by others if the NCA does not veto or change them; launch authority is delegated to others than the NCA.

Which of these options, if any, would be acceptable is a matter not of technology but of decision at the highest levels of political authority.

Even in the less extreme case in which no attack on the NCA is intended, provision must be made for the NCA to be available at all times for rapid decision. Such procedures might be onerous for the President and other NCA.

Fear that U.S. LUA capability could somehow be sidestepped

The analysis presented here indicates that, from a technical point of view, sensors and communications could, with money and effort, be provided to make at least the technical elements of the LUA capability exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for

the Soviets to disrupt. Procedures to support decisionmaking are another matter. Even if both hardware and procedures were devised which were very robust indeed, it might not be possible to eradicate completely a lingering fear that the Soviets might find some way to "sidestep" the system. These fears could become aggravated at a time of crisis.

Risk of error

There are two risks of error in a basing system of reliance on LUA: the risk that launch would take place when there was no attack and the risk that launch would fail to take place when there was an attack.

Insofar as technology is concerned in the assessment of these risks, one can in principle make arbitrarily small the probability that electronic systems by themselves make either kind of error, though beyond a point efforts to decrease the chance of one error could increase the chance of the other.

But it would seem that the principal source of error might not be electronic or mechanical malfunction by itself. The odds that a sensor indicates something out of the ordinary might be quite high, but the chances that it indicates something resembling a plausible Soviet attack would be much smaller. The probability that several sensors based upon different physical principles indicated the same plausible attack would be much smaller still. That is, electronic systems tend to make random, rather than highly structured, errors. On the other hand, electronic systems have a very limited ability to correct errors once made. Human beings, by contrast, have a high capacity to correct errors, but also a high capacity to commit highly structured errors. The risk of error for an LUA system would seem highest when the human being's ability to make highly structured errors combines with the machine's limited ability to correct them. Mistakenly initiating a "simulated" attack by, e.g., loading the wrong tape into a computer, would be an error of this type. It is obviously not possible to set and enforce a bound on the probability that such an error could occur in an LUA system.

Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, let me read the three concluding paragraphs of the OTA report:

Reliance on LUA * * * has some serious drawbacks. Decision time would be very short. Depending on the circumstances, decisionmakers could lack crucial information regarding the extent and intent of the Soviet attack * * * such information could be necessary to gage the proper response. Decisionmakers would also lack an interval between attack and response during which an effort could be made to assess intelligence information, consider diplomatic measures, and signal the intent of the U.S. response.

No matter how much money and ingenuity were devoted to designing safeguards for the U.S. capability to launch under attack, and even if these safeguards were very robust indeed, it would never be possible to eradicate a lingering fear that the Soviets might find some way to sidestep them.

Finally, despite all safeguards, there would always remain the possibility of error; depending on the nature of the error, it could mean a successful Soviet first strike against MX or it could mean a nuclear war started by accident.

Mr. President, I submit to the Senate that this is the issue which must be of overriding concern as we debate the MX.

Mr. President, we cannot afford the potential of limiting the national command authority of this Nation to a

launch under attack response to a warning of a Soviet missile launch toward U.S. Minuteman of MX silos. A 1981 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies entitled, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" outlines the most succinct reason that we must never rely on launch under attack. The report states:

One of the most important lessons of past conflicts and crises is that command and control arrangements never work at the outset as laid down in manuals, and that communications systems and procedures often fail, frequently at the most inopportune times, simply because of human error.

Mr. President, over the years we have spent \$40 billion for command, control, and communications facilities to support our strategic forces. The administration has embarked on a \$20 billion improvement in the C-cubed capabilities. But as the OTA report indicates, regardless of the amount of money we spend, regardless of the sophisticated technology we employ, we will never be sure enough that the system will work good enough to support launch under attack.

Mr. President, the MX in Minuteman silos is a destabilizing weapons system. It will lead the superpowers closer to a hairtrigger response. It distorts deterrence and in a vulnerable basing mode it increases the chances of nuclear war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Idaho.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.

Mr. McCLURE. Mr. President, there are nine main reasons for deploying the MX ICBM in existing Minuteman silos. Such deployment of MX is the absolute minimum U.S. response to the relentless Soviet strategic buildup. The Soviets already have clear strategic superiority over the United States.

I refer to the chart which the President used on a recent television broadcast which shows the numbers of launching vehicles before a first strike by either side.

First, the Soviets already have deployed 820 new ICBM's equivalent to the MX. Last year, the Soviets deployed more MX-size warheads—over 1,000—than the United States plans to deploy late in this decade.

Second, the Soviets are 13 years ahead of the United States in deploying ICBM's equivalent to the MX, and also 13 years ahead of the United States in deploying a new small mobile ICBM.

I would refer Senators to the chart in the back of the room that indicates that deployment.

The Soviets already have 6,000 ICBM warheads, compared to only 2,000 for the United States. MX deployment will only make it 6,000 to 3,000.

Third, the Soviets are already following both of the main Scowcroft

Commission recommendations. Before the United States has even tested MX or begun development of another new small mobile ICBM, the Soviets are flight-testing their PL-4 ICBM and their PL-5 ICBM. The PL-4 is better than the MX. The Soviets are already planning to replace the MX equivalent ICBM's they deployed in the mid to late 1970's with the new PL-4 ICBM. The PL-5 is better than the Midgetman U.S. small mobile missile which will not be flight tested until 1990.

Fourth, deployment of 100 MX ICBM's is only one-eighth of the counterforce capability the United States would need to have counterforce parity with the Soviets. This is because the Soviets have well over twice as many hard targets than the United States, which are themselves on the average of over three times as hard as U.S. hard targets. And the Soviets have over three times the U.S. hard target, counterforce capability.

And again I invite the attention of Senators to the large chart at the back of the room.

Fifth, the MX will add, albeit marginally, to the survivability of U.S. strategic forces and ICBM's. This is because the deployment of MX will allow a few more warheads to survive if the United States must ride-out a Soviet first strike on our ICBM's. Moreover, if the United States were to launch our ICBM's from under attack, the MX would provide somewhat more counterforce capability.

Sixth, many experts believe that the Soviets are breaking out of the SALT I ABM Treaty. The Soviets have developed and are deploying a prohibited nationwide ABM defense. The MX's deployment will increase somewhat United States ability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses.

Seventh, massive U.S. unilateral restraint in strategic force cutbacks over the last 15 years makes MX deployment all the more necessary. Since the late 1960's, the United States has deactivated over 8,000 nuclear warheads. Since 1972, the United States has cut over 710 strategic delivery vehicles either existing or planned for deployment, carrying over 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads. The Reagan administration itself has deactivated 292 strategic delivery vehicles carrying over 500 warheads. In the face of these massive U.S. unilateral strategic deactivations, the United States needs to modernize its ICBM force by deploying MX.

Eighth, the United States should also deploy 100 stockpiled Minuteman III MIRV'd ICBM's at the same time we deploy MX in existing silos. If the United States were to make these stockpiled Minuteman III's additive to our force, and also redeploy Minuteman ICBM's replaced by 100 MX, ICBM's, the United States could have 750 MIRV'd ICBM's in our existing silos. While this option would violate the unratified SALT II Treaty and go against the build-down concept, it

would strongly bolster United States strategic deterrence capability.

Ninth, over three-quarters of all Soviet strategic warheads are carried on delivery vehicles less than 5-years old.

I refer to a chart that shows comparative age.

In contrast, over three-quarters of all U.S. strategic warheads are carried on delivery vehicles 15 years or more old.

Mr. President, for all of these reasons and more I think it is important that we ratify the action here today by an affirmative vote.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that some additional comments together with attachments thereto be made a part of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPLOYING THE MX AS A COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST SOVIET SS-19 HEAVY ICBM DEPLOYMENT CIRCUMVENTING SALT I

Mr. McCURE. Mr. President, President Reagan recently told the nation that the Soviets have several times more counterforce warheads than the U.S., and that they can destroy almost all U.S. ICBM's in a first strike. This is the measure of Soviet strategic superiority over the U.S.

The Defense Department's most recent edition of Soviet Military Power shows that the Soviets have 6,000 ICBM warheads to America's 2,000. So the Soviets have at least three times the ICBM counterforce capability of the U.S.

Another set of facts further accentuates the Soviet counterforce advantage, however. First, the Soviets have far fewer U.S. hard targets to aim at than the U.S. does, and these U.S. hard targets are much softer than most Soviet hard targets. In contrast, the Soviets have over twice as many hard targets as the U.S., which are on the average three times as hard as U.S. hard targets. Thus it is much more difficult for the U.S. to attack Soviet hard targets than it is for the Soviets to attack U.S. hard targets.

Mr. President, since 1972 when SALT I was signed, the Soviet capability to engage in a counterforce strike against U.S. ICBM's with only a fraction of their own ICBM's has grown by a factor of five or more. Not only do the Soviets have three times the number of ICBM warheads than the U.S. but on the average, these warheads are more accurate, and about ten times as powerful as each U.S. ICBM warhead. This is the second and more important measure of the Soviet hard target advantage over the U.S.

The Soviet SS-19 is the most accurate and lethal Soviet ICBM. Since 1974, the SS-19, which carries six MIRV'd warheads, began replacing 360 single warhead SS-11s. Since then, the Soviets have increased the number of warheads carried on these 360 SS-11s by a factor of five by deploying 360 six-MIRV'd SS-19s in their place. Thus in place of 360 small, inaccurate single SS-11 warheads, the Soviets now have 2,160 large yield, highly accurate SS-19 warheads. This is a 500 percent increase in warhead number alone, a net gain of 1,800 warheads.

Since 1973, the Soviets have developed four versions of the SS-19, each one more lethal than the first, and they are about to flight-test at any time a follow-on to the SS-19, which will be even more lethal.

In contrast, four years from now in 1987, the U.S. plans to begin deploying 100 MX

ICBM's carrying 10 MIRV's each in 100 silos containing Minuteman III's with three MIRV's each. The MX force will have 1000 warheads but it will replace a force with 300 warheads, for a net gain of only 700 warheads. Thus the U.S. will be deploying only one third as many warheads with the MX as the Soviets did with their SS-19. And we have already seen that the U.S. needs many more hard target ICBM warheads than the Soviets even to have counterforce parity with them, due to the wide differences in the target sets each side faces, and warhead yields and accuracies. The planned U.S. MX deployment is only about a two fold increase in the number of U.S. hard target warheads, compared to the five fold increase for the Soviets that their SS-19 represents. The SS-19 is a four fold increase in throw-weight, and at least a ten fold increase in megatonnage.

THE U.S. MX IS THE EQUIVALENT OF THE SOVIET SS-19

The U.S. MX ICBM was designed to have the same throw-weight as the Soviet heavy SS-19 ICBM. The MX is thus the equivalent to the heavy Soviet SS-19 in many ways, except that the SS-19 has been deployed since 1974, and the MX may not be deployed until 1987, over 13 years later. One reason for deploying the MX that is rarely recognized is the fact that the Soviets deceived the U.S. three times regarding the heavy SS-19-MX equivalent in SALT I and SALT II. Moreover, the Soviet heavy SS-19 MX-equivalent violates or circumvents SALT I.

Dr. Henry Kissinger warned Congress on June 15, 1972:

"The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow [SALT II] Agreements as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. *If this happens, the United States will have to respond . . . If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field.*" (Emphasis added.)

During the decade since SALT I, the Soviets have in fact both circumvented and violated both the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT I ABM Treaty. Today they are also violating the SALT II Treaty, just as they violated most treaties between 1917 and 1962. But the U.S. has yet to take compensatory countermeasures, as Dr. Kissinger pledged.

One important countermeasure against further Soviet SALT violations is deployment of the MX, which is the equivalent to the notorious Soviet SS-19.

Mr. President, it is necessary for me to remind the Senate of the grisly history of the Soviet SS-19, as we debate the deployment of its American equivalent, the MX.

The Senate Intelligence Committee report of October 1979 on the verifiability of the SALT II Treaty stated in retrospect that:

"The Soviet's unanticipated ability to replace the much larger SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo *circumvented* the safeguards the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the substitution of heavy for light ICBM's." (Emphasis added.)

SOVIET SS-19 DECEPTION

It has long been clear that the Soviets engaged in negotiating deception in May 1972 on the key issue of SALT I—heavy ICBM deployment. After successfully fooling the U.S. into signing a grossly disadvantageous SALT I Interim Agreement, the Soviets then went on to circumvent the agreement by deploying their heavy SS-19 ICBM.

In SALT I, the U.S. gave up entirely its superior ABM capability for worse than

nothing—a fivefold increase in the very Soviet offensive capability our ABM was designed to defend against.

What did SALT I say about Soviet deployment of heavy ICBMs? Article II of the SALT I Agreement stated:

"The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time." (Emphasis added.)

As can readily be seen, in order to constitute an effective constraint, this provision calls for a definition of a "heavy ICBM." But unknown to the U.S. in May 1972, the Soviet SS-19 ICBM was indeed a heavy ICBM, both by the U.S. definition, and more significantly, also by the Soviet's own definition. Moreover, the Soviets in May 1972 also had secret plans to deploy the heavy SS-19 very widely as the main replacement for their light SS-11 ICBM. Thus in May, 1972, the Soviet leadership faced a severe negotiating problem. How could they agree to Article II while still deploying the heavy SS-19?

Mr. President, one way that the Soviets could do so was not to agree to the required definition of a heavy ICBM, thus rendering SALT I's Article II ineffectual.

This is exactly what happened. No agreement was reached on a definition of a heavy ICBM, leaving a large loophole in the provision designed to deal with the most important U.S. goal in SALT I: Constraints on Soviet heavy ICBMs. The U.S. finally was forced to offer the following Unilateral Statement on May 26, 1972:

"The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. delegation believes it necessary to state the following: *The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM.* The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration." (Emphasis added.)

Mr. President, at the May 1972 Summit meeting in Moscow where SALT I was resolved, the top Soviet political and military leaders used negotiating deception to mislead President Nixon and Henry Kissinger about their heavy SS-19 ICBM.

On the heavy ICBM issue, the diplomatic record clearly indicates that Soviet negotiators, including the late Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev himself, engaged in negotiating deception on the Soviet SS-19 heavy ICBM. Brezhnev and other Soviet negotiators made many false statements from 1971 to May 1972 which had the intended effect of misleading the U.S. about the size of their then-secret new large ICBM, the heavy SS-19.

Indeed, there is evidence that the Soviets themselves considered the SS-19 to be a heavy ICBM, which it certainly was by U.S. standards. But in May 1972, only the Soviets knew of the existence and size of the heavy SS-19.

Mr. President, the Soviet leaders argued falsely that an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM was unnecessary.

Their most significant deception was their many false statements during the negotiations that they did not intend to replace light ICBMs (the SS-11) with heavy ICBMs. This turned out to be precisely the opposite of their plans, as confirmed by events, and completely contrary to Article II of SALT I. As noted, Article II prohibits just such replacement of light ICBMs with heavy ICBMs.

The Soviets also claimed quite falsely that both sides already knew which ICBMs were heavy, when in fact only the Soviets knew about the SS-19 and its heavy size.

The Soviets went on to argue falsely that this understanding of what ICBMs were heavy would not change during the five year term of SALT I. Of course, the Soviets knew it would take the U.S. several years to determine the large size and heavy throw-weight of their SS-19.

The Soviets actually argued several times that the U.S. could "trust" them not to convert light ICBMs into heavy ICBMs.

In order to further deflect U.S. concerns about heavy ICBMs replacing light ones, the Soviets also suggested that it might be possible to ban a missile like the SS-19 turned out to be, even as they were planning to deploy such a missile widely as the main replacement for their light SS-11. When the U.S. expressed interest in such a ban, they quietly dropped their proposal, which had already achieved its purpose of stimulating U.S. complacency about real Soviet heavy ICBM intentions.

Finally, the Soviets also deceptively bargained to successfully persuade the U.S. to abandon attempts to gain an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM. They did this by arguing that a heavy ICBM definition was superfluous and then by linking resolution of this issue on their terms to resolution of other issues.

The Soviet heavy SS-19 was first tested to long range in 1973, and it took the U.S. until 1975 to determine its characteristics. By then, SALT I only had two years until its expiration.

Mr. President, the heavy SS-19 turned out to be 400 percent heavier in throw-weight than the light SS-11, and its volume is about 50 to 60 percent greater than the small SS-11. The deployment of the heavy SS-19 helped to quintuple the Soviet counterforce threat to the U.S. by the time of SALT I's expiration in 1977. Even the Carter Administration conceded publicly that the heavy SS-19 was even more deadly than the super-heavy SS-18, because of the SS-19's enhanced accuracy and larger deployment. There are 326 SS-18s deployed, but 360 SS-19s deployed.

OTHER EVIDENCE OF SS-19 DECEPTION

In addition to the diplomatic record, there is important intelligence evidence indicating Soviet deception on the SS-19. This evidence was acquired in 1972. Congressman Jack Kemp has described this evidence in the Congressional Record, citing William Beecher's article in the Boston Globe of October 10, 1976 entitled "United States May Reply to Soviet Rays."

According to Beecher, the United States eavesdropped on Soviet communications in Moscow in May 1972, during the SALT I negotiations. According to the Congressional Record and to Beecher:

"In May 1972, in the hours immediately preceding agreement on the SALT I pact in Moscow, a conversation was intercepted in which Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev checked with a top weapons expert to get assurance that an about-to-be concluded formula covering permissible silo expansion would allow the Soviets to deploy a bigger new missile than under development. That intercept provided the first solid information that the SS-19, as it is now known, was destined to replace some of the relatively small SS-11 missiles, which comprise the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. The SS-19 has three to four times the throw-weight of the old missile." (Emphasis added. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, August 2, 1972, p. E 4076.)

There is another description of this evidence. As William Safire wrote in The New

York Times of August 6, 1981 ("Deception Managers," page A-23):

"The first inkling of duplicity came to us in May, 1972, via 'Gamma Gupy,' our tuning in to limousine telephone conversations between Leonid Brezhnev, Andrei Gromyko, and Soviet missile designers at the Moscow Summit Conference. These transcripts quoted Mr. Brezhnev talking about a 'main missile' that had never been mentioned in SALT negotiations, which turned out to be the SS-19. The surprised Henry Kissinger considered this 'sharp practice'."

Mr. President, this highly significant intercept occurred on May 26, 1972, just before SALT I was signed. It indicated that the then secret SS-19 was a large, heavy ICBM. Moreover, this intercept also indicated that Brezhnev himself intended the heavy SS-19 to replace the light SS-11 on a large scale. This was precisely what Article II prohibited. Yet Brezhnev and the other top Soviet negotiators repeatedly told U.S. negotiators that the USSR did not intend to replace light ICBMs with heavy ICBMs. Indeed, Soviet negotiators told U.S. negotiators that the U.S. could "trust" the Soviets not to replace light ICBMs with heavy ICBMs.

Thus this intercept conclusively confirms Brezhnev's negotiating deception on their heavy SS-19. Brezhnev knew that the heavy SS-19 would violate or circumvent Article II's prohibition of heavy ICBMs replacing light ICBMs, but he also knew that in May 1972 the U.S. did not then know about the heavy SS-19.

But Brezhnev was cleverly disingenuous about his SALT I negotiating deception at the time of the May 1972 Moscow SALT I Summit. President Nixon, a direct victim of Brezhnev's duplicity on the SS-19, reports that Brezhnev told him then:

"If we are trying to trick one another, why do we need a piece of paper? We are playing clean on our side. The approach of 'catching each other out' is quite inadmissible."

CONFIRMATION OF SOVIET SS-19 DECEPTION IN SALT I

Former SALT I negotiator Gerard Smith, former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former President Richard Nixon, the leading critic of SALT, Senator Henry Jackson, and even 1976 Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter have all confirmed that the U.S. was deceived by the Soviets on the heavy SS-19, the key issue of SALT I by all accounts. This negotiating deception in turn constitutes either a violation or a circumvention of SALT I.

Gerard Smith testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 1972:

"If they [the Soviets] tried to deploy in SS-11 holes a missile substantially larger in volume than the SS-11, that would be considered a heavy missile . . . and would be a violation . . . We will have to look at what comes along [in new Soviet ICBMs] . . . We have put them on clear notice that any missile having a volume significantly larger than their SS-11, we will consider that as incompatible with the Interim Agreement." (Emphasis added.)

Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger conceded two years later, in March 1974:

"What we were unprepared for was the enormous expansion of Soviet throw-weight represented by the SS-X-19 as the potential replacement for the SS-11 . . . the SS-17 and SS-19 can no longer be treated as light missiles . . . [the] breadth, depth, and momentum [of the Soviet strategic R&D program] as now revealed come as something

of a surprise to us . . . subsequent to the signing of the [SALT I] agreement, we see a Soviet research and development program of *astounding* breadth and depth . . . Many people, particularly people in the arms control community, have been *surprised* by the strength of those programs." (Emphasis added.)

Former Defense Secretary Laird explicitly charged in December 1974:

"There is no question that if . . . SS-X-19 missile deployment will go forward in 1975 with a volume of 50 percent greater than the SS-11, such deployment would be in violation of the 1972 [SALT I] Interim Agreement." (Emphasis added.)

Mr. President, the distinction between SALT negotiating deception, circumvention, and violation is difficult for most observers to make, partly because the SALT provision, Article II, is imprecise and ambiguous without definitions of light and heavy ICBMs. The deception in the case of the heavy SS-19, however, was deliberately intended by the Soviets.

According to Dr. Henry Kissinger's authoritative biographers, Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger himself understood Soviet negotiating strategy in SALT even before the negotiations began in 1969. Kissinger believed then that Soviet strategy "would be to engage in arms talks to lull the Americans into a false sense of security."

On June 15, 1972, Dr. Kissinger tried to synthesize the agreed wording of Article II with the U.S. Unilateral definition of a heavy ICBM. Thus he made a U.S. Unilateral Statement appear to be binding upon the Soviets. Kissinger told Senators and Congressmen at the White House:

"First, there is the *safeguard* that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted . . . As far as the break between the light and heavy missiles is concerned, we believe we have *assurances* . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Kissinger did not specify the Soviet "assurances," but they presumably were the many Soviet statements that the U.S. could "trust" them not to convert light ICBMs into heavy ICBMs, and the many Soviet pledges that they did not plan to do so.

Mr. President, this June 15, 1972 Kissinger policy statement is wholly inconsistent with the evidence of Brezhnev's May, 1972 deception as described in the Beecher and Safire accounts of the communications intercepted above. Serious questions about the dissemination and analysis of intelligence in June 1972 are therefore raised by this inconsistency. Several published accounts of this problem suggest that key intelligence evidence was suppressed. Eugene V. Rostow stated in 1979:

"Kissinger's policy was that the facts about Soviet power and policy of expansion must be 'concealed' from the American people while the government negotiates the 'best deal it can get.'"

Kissinger later made four admissions, however. He himself evidently was "lulled" by the Soviets, and their "assurances" turned out to be completely deceptive.

First, on December 9, 1975, Kissinger stated that:

"We obviously did not know in 1972 what missiles the Soviet Union would be testing in 1974 . . ."

More explicitly, Kissinger openly acknowledged on August 12, 1979, on national television:

"What we did not understand at the time [May, 1972] and on which we had no evidence whatever at the time, because it didn't exist, was that the Soviet Union would construct a missile [the SS-19] which was sort of half way between the SS-11 and the SS-9 . . . It was simply our lack of

knowledge that such a missile existed or could be built . . . I would call it [Soviet development of the SS-19 after SALT I was signed] *sharp practice*." (Emphasis added.)

"Sharp practice" in SALT negotiation on the most important issue of SALT I—heavy ICBMs—must be regarded as Soviet negotiating deception. It also represents Soviet violation or circumvention of SALT I as it was explained to the Congress and to the American people.

Kissinger also testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979 that in SALT I:

"We resorted to [Unilateral Statements] ourselves to perhaps an excessive degree in 1972, and in speaking to a group of Congressmen in the White House at the time [on June 15, 1972], I mentioned unilateral statements that we had made as a *restraint on Soviet conduct*. I think experience has shown that the unilateral statements that we have made are *not a restraint on Soviet conduct*, that they do not bind the Soviet Union." (Emphasis added.)

This is a quite remarkable retraction by Kissinger of his 1972 attempt to synthesize Article II and the U.S. Unilateral statement defining a heavy ICBM.

Finally on August 12, 1979, Kissinger also confessed on national television:

"I think the Soviets have pressed against the legal limits of SALT I."

Thus even to Kissinger, SALT I's greatest apologist, the Soviets have come close to violating SALT I, possibly circumventing SALT I in their "sharp practice." But Kissinger also said in 1972 that if SALT I was circumvented by the Soviets, or exploited as a tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict, the U.S. would have to deploy compensating strategic programs. This we have not done, despite the clearcut Soviet circumventions of the SALT I Interim Agreement and ABM Treaty.

Most authoritatively of all, we now have former President Nixon's statement made in 1980:

"First they [the Soviets] try to *deceive* us, in order to disguise their intentions and make us relax our will . . . in some cases, such as substitution of heavy SS-17 and SS-19 ICBMs for the light SS-11s, Soviet force modernization exploited loopholes in the SALT I Agreement *contrary to our understanding of that agreement*." (Emphasis added.)

Such fundamental U.S. misunderstanding of the terms of SALT I constitutes conclusive confirmation of Soviet negotiating deception and circumvention or violation of SALT I.

Senator Henry Jackson also confirmed Soviet SALT I deception on June 28, 1976, in a very telling statement:

"My interpretation [in 1972] as to what the Soviets could do with the SS-11 turned out to be absolutely true. [Jackson predicted in 1972 that the Soviets would replace the light SS-11 with a heavy ICBM as large as the SS-19.] And what the understanding was on the part of the President's representatives was contrary to that. And as you know, Secretary Laird has said that it is a complete violation of the understanding that they [the Nixon Administration] had . . . We [the Senate] were lied to in SALT I . . . We were lied to by the Secretary, the now Secretary of State Kissinger . . . It turned out that the things we predicted were right . . . Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has since corroborated it, that they [the Nixon Administration] were misled [by the Soviets]." (Emphasis added.)

1976 Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter himself even recognized that in general the Soviets had deceived the U.S. in SALT I. During the 1976 campaign he stated that:

"In many instances we've been out-traded by the Soviet Union."

And Candidate Carter asserted that he would be: "much tougher in negotiations."

But this did not prove to be the case in his own resolution of the SS-19 ICBM issue in SALT II.

In an interview in *Conservative Digest* published in November, 1981, former Director of the Arms Control Agency, Professor Eugene Rostow, was asked if he believed the Soviets engaged in negotiating deception in SALT. Rostow answered:

"In SALT I, they [the Soviets] certainly did [engage in negotiating deception]."

The heavy SS-19 was the key issue of SALT I, and Brezhnev himself played an important role in negotiating on this and all issues of SALT I. As a former top CIA official, Cord Meyer, wrote in 1980:

"The Soviets in the SALT I negotiations succeeded in winning crucial advantages by hard bargaining and by the *deliberate concealment* of the fact that *new types* of ICBMs were ready for testing." (Emphasis added.)

The Reagan Administration even regards the heavy SS-19 to be a large ICBM. In The United States Budget In Brief for Fiscal Year 1983, the Administration declares on page 34 that the U.S. is developing a "new large ICBM, the MX." The MX was explicitly designed to have the same throw-weight as the Soviet SS-19. Thus if the MX is a large ICBM, it follows that its counterpart the SS-19, is also a large ICBM. But the Carter Administration, like the Nixon-Ford Administration before it, insisted on calling the heavy SS-19 a "light" ICBM. And recall that for years after 1972, U.S. Intelligence continuously tried to insist that the SS-19 was a "new small ICBM" for deployment in "new small silos."

SOVIETS DECEIVE U.S. THREE TIMES ON HEAVY SS-19

Mr. President, the Soviets deceived the U.S. twice more on their heavy SS-19, for a total of three times. SALT I's Article II was preserved in the November 1974 Vladivostok SALT II accord, but again without an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM. The Vladivostok Accord, in turn, was the basis for the SALT II Treaty, and Article II was thus carried forward into SALT II unchanged, for a total three times that the U.S. was deceived by the Soviets on their heavy SS-19 ICBM. The Soviets deceived the U.S. on the SS-19 in 1972, 1974, and 1979.

As Winston Churchill III stated in his recent book, "Defending the West":

"The naivete of Western governments and negotiators was matched only by the calculating cynicism of their Soviet counterparts. No sooner was the SALT I agreement signed than the Kremlin launched a test program of an entire new generation of four ICBM systems . . . The massive strategic buildup was to give the Soviet Union . . . strategic superiority over the United States . . . Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance were babes in arms when it came to dealing with the Russians, and Kissinger had the frankness to admit as much."

Mr. President, I believe that the history of the Soviet equivalent to the MX, the heavy SS-19, has great relevance to the Congress as we vote on whether to deploy the MX. The Soviets have resorted to negotiating deception and circumvention or violation of SALT I in order to deploy their MX equivalent. They may also violate SALT II again when they flight-test their successor to the

SS-19. The U.S. needs to deploy the MX as a minimal response to this dismal history.

THE HART AMENDMENT PROHIBITS TWO U.S. ICBM'S, WHILE THE SOVIETS TEST TWO NEW ICBM'S

(By U.S. Senator James McClure)

SUMMARY

The Scowcroft Commission recommended recently that the US deploy 100 MX ICBMs in existing Minuteman silos, while simultaneously beginning development of a new, small mobile ICBM for first flight test in about 1987. The Hart Amendment, however, prohibits the US from following both of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations. The purpose of the Hart Amendment is to enforce US compliance with SALT II, which allows only one new type ICBM. The Appropriations Committees and both the House and the Senate have less than 45 days in which to accept both Scowcroft recommendations, or repeal the Hart Amendment. Unless the Hart Amendment is canceled, the US must continue to comply unilaterally with SALT II, and no second new ICBM can be developed.

Meanwhile, in contrast to American restraint, the Soviets are already flight-testing two new ICBMs—a new MX size ICBM and a new small mobile ICBM—in violation of SALT II. Their new small mobile ICBM, the "PL-5" violates five SALT II provisions.

There is an open and shut case, established from official documents and statements, that the Soviets are violating the most important provision of the SALT II Treaty—Article IV, Paragraph 9—by flight testing two new types of ICBMs, SALT II Article IV, Paragraph 9 specifically allows for only one new type ICBM to be flight-tested on each side. The Soviets are flight-testing a new medium ICBM the size of the MX, and a new small mobile ICBM.

The Soviets are violating SALT II by doing precisely what the US is prevented from doing in order to comply with SALT II. The US is prohibited by the "Hart Amendment" to the Fiscal Year 1983 Extended Continuing Resolution from flight-testing the MX ICBM and simultaneously planning to develop a new small ICBM for possible first flight test in 1987 or 1989.

The Hart Amendment to the fiscal year 1983 Extended Continuing Resolution enforces US compliance with the SALT II new type ICBM provision—Article IV, Paragraph 9. The Hart Amendment was, indeed, justified to the Senate for the express purpose of ensuring U.S. compliance with SALT II Article IV, Paragraph 9.

It is clear from the Senate debate that the intent and purpose of the Hart Amendment is to comply with the SALT II Treaty.

On December 20, 1982, Senator Gary Hart (Democrat of Colorado and Presidential Candidate) offered an amendment to the fiscal year 1983 Extended Continuing Resolution Appropriations Bill. This amendment is a significant case of US unilateral compliance with SALT II. Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) and Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho) were the only senators to speak and vote against the Hart Amendment. The Hart Amendment states:

"... no initial flight test of the MX missile may be conducted until after both Houses of the Congress have agreed ... [to] a basing mode for such missile." (Emphasis)

MX flight-testing under the Hart Amendment is delayed indefinitely.

Why would any Senator want to delay MX flight-testing? There are no technical, military or economic reasons to do so. The Hart Amendment will delay MX flight testing indefinitely due to the US unilateral

policy of complying with the unratified SALT II Treaty. While the wording of the Hart Amendment itself does not specifically mention the unratified SALT II Treaty as the reason for delaying indefinitely the first flight test of the MX ICBM, it is clear that the intent and purpose of the Hart Amendment is to comply with SALT II. Indeed, SALT II compliance is the sole and only purpose of the Hart Amendment, as revealed by Senator Hart's justification for the amendment.

In his December 16, 1982 Senate speech justifying the Hart Amendment, Senator Hart stated that under the terms of "SALT II, ... each side was limited to the testing of one new ICBM type." This Hart statement establishes clearly the fact that the Hart Amendment was designed solely to enforce U.S. compliance with the new types provision of SALT II. Article IV of SALT II does in fact limit both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to only one new type ICBM each. This was what the Carter Administration told the Congress that SALT II achieved. Indeed, the Carter Administration argued that the main constraint of SALT II was the prohibition on no more than one new type ICBM on a side.

Senator Hart went on to argue correctly that the MX ICBM is the one new type ICBM allowed for the U.S. and that any "common missile" or road mobile missile would not be allowed to the U.S. Hart successfully argued that MX could not be flight-tested until the U.S. abandoned plans for a new small road mobile ICBM. These arguments by Senator Hart conclusively establish the fact that the purpose of the Hart Amendment is to comply with SALT II by prohibiting the U.S. from testing no more than one new type ICBM.

Under the second agreed statement to paragraph 9 of Article IV of the unratified SALT II Treaty, the U.S. should not flight test a "new type" ICBM which has a different number of stages, diameter, length, launch weight, or throw-weight from that of the first new ICBM type to be flight-tested.

In other words, once the U.S. initially flight tests the first MX, we could not under SALT II then legally test launch a second new ICBM type which differed from the MX in key parameters by more than 5 percent. A small ICBM would be much smaller in diameter and much shorter in length, and much lighter in launch weight and throw-weight.

Senator Garn stated on December 16, 1982 in a speech against the Hart Amendment: "I said to the Senator from Colorado, the Soviets are testing two or three new types ICBMs right now. Under Senator Hart's interpretation [of SALT II], right now the Soviets are in absolute violation of SALT II three or four times over for the new generation of missiles they are testing." Senator Garn is correct, and his statement thus confirms the fact that the Hart Amendment is intended to enforce U.S. compliance with SALT II.

For the past six years, the first flight test of the MX ICBM has been scheduled for January 1983. Now, under the Hart Amendment, this test is delayed indefinitely, and perhaps permanently, all because of continued U.S. compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty.

Beyond the above constitutional, legal, and political problems, the Hart Amendment would also have the following deleterious effects on the MX program:

First, it delays MX flight-testing indefinitely, which previously the Congress, the President, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had all agreed should go forward as soon as possible as a top priority.

Second, it will increase the cost of the MX program.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are violating SALT II by testing two new type ICBMs. The Soviets also have 2 more new type ICBMs ready for testing at any time. In sum, SALT II is not affecting Soviet ICBMs testing, but it is affecting US ICBM testing.

Thus, the U.S. can not even test the MX and develop a new small ICBM, because the Congress and the President believe that this would violate SALT II. While the Hart Amendment prevents the U.S. from testing the MX, and developing a new small ICBM, in order for the U.S. to comply with SALT II, the Soviets are doing precisely what the U.S. is prevented from doing. The Soviets are testing a new large ICBM and a new small ICBM. If the Congress and the President believe that the U.S. would violate SALT II by testing the MX missile and developing a new small missile, then the Soviets must be violating SALT II by doing precisely that themselves.

Thus by the legislative history of the Hart Amendment, as accepted by the President, there is a clearly agreed U.S. interpretation of SALT II's Article IV Paragraph 9, under which only one new type ICBM is allowed on either side. Under this established U.S. interpretation of SALT II, the Soviets are in violation.

There is very strong evidence that the second new type Soviet ICBM violates SALT II. While there are indeed loopholes and ambiguities in the SALT II Treaty, the provision of SALT II on one new type ICBM is in no way ambiguous. The Soviets are not allowed to make significant changes beyond 5 percent increases in the characteristics, especially throw-weight, of old ICBMs. The only allowable Soviet solid-fuel old ICBM is the SS-13, which was first flight-tested in 1965. It is inconceivable that a new Soviet ICBM, the PL-5 first tested in 1983, would be within 5 percent of the throw-weight of the SS-13. Indeed, the SS-16, first flight-tested in 1972, is a useful guide to estimating the throw-weight of the PL-5. The Soviets are not known to design new missiles inferior to old ones, and if the SS-16 was greatly superior to the old SS-13, the PL-5 is likely to be even more superior.

The SS-16 is somewhat smaller than the old SS-13, but it has 200 percent of the SS-13's throw-weight. By this precedent, and other evidence, the PL-5's throw-weight must be at least comparable to that of the SS-16 and probably greater, which would clearly be more than 5 percent greater than the SS-13's throw-weight. Indeed, it is reported that the PL-5 transporter-erector-launcher is almost two meters longer than that of the SS-16, suggesting that the PL-5 itself is larger than the SS-16 and thus has more throw-weight even than the SS-16. Indeed, on May 4, 1983, General Scowcroft himself testified to the Senate that the Soviets are currently testing "two new kinds" of ICBMs, and he implied that the PL-5 has a Post Boost Vehicle. The SS-13 does not have a Post-Boost Vehicle. Thus the Soviet tests of the PL-5 clearly are tests of a second new type ICBM, and can only be described as a blatant violation of the SALT II Treaty.

I have asked whether or not the weight of the PL-5 warhead is well below half the total throw-weight of the PL-5 missile? If the weight of the PL-5 warhead is less than half the total weight of the PL-5, then this is a violation of the SALT II Treaty, Article IV Paragraph 10, Third Agreed Statement, which states:

"Each party undertakes:
(c) not to flight-test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single reentry vehicle ...

with a reentry vehicle the weight of which is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM."

In sum, the PL-5 reportedly is at least a triple violation of the SALT II Treaty:

1. Reports of nearly complete encryption of PL-5 telemetry—95 percent to 100 percent—in violation of Article XV;

2. Evidence that the PL-5 has at least 200 percent the throw-weight of the SS-13, making it a new type ICBM (in violation of Article IV, Paragraph 9);

3. Reports that the PL-5 is a modified SS-16, and is carried on a modified SS-16 transporter-erector-launcher, making it a follow-on to the banned SS-16 (in violation of Article IV Paragraph 8, Common Understanding). There is strong evidence from many sources that the PL-5 is indeed an SS-16 follow-on.

If the PL-5's warhead is less than one half of the PL-5's throw-weight, as has been questioned, then the PL-5 could also be in violation of the SALT II Article IV, Paragraph 10, Third Agreed Statement. This would make the fourth SALT II violation achieved by the PL-5.

There are press reports that the PL-5 does indeed have a warhead which weighs less than half of the total PL-5 throw-weight. If these reports are correct, then this would be the PL-5's fourth violation of the SALT II Treaty.

There are also press reports that the PL-5 has always been flight-tested at night, similar to Soviet testing of the related SS-16 and SS-20 mobile missiles. Such flight testing is impossible to observe through reconnaissance. But SALT II prohibits concealment measures which make it impossible to determine the relationship between a missile and its launcher. This would be the PL-5's fifth SALT II violation.

The key element in the Cohen-Nunn strategic "build-down" proposal is the concept of a "new type" ICBM. In order to modernize strategic forces and replace them with fewer new ICBMs, there must be a definition of a "new type" ICBM. Drafts concepts of the "build-down" proposal, both within the Reagan Administration and in the Congress, use the SALT II "new type ICBM" definition, and if there is conclusive evidence of Soviet violation of this provision of SALT II, then the fundamental definition of the "build-down" concept can be called into question.

Mr. President, we now have more than a decade of arms control experience with the Soviet Union. It is certainly time that we start learning from that experience. I am deeply disturbed by the increasing support that has developed for the so-called "build-down" proposal.

Rarely before have we been asked to consciously base new arms control proposals on approaches that have clearly failed, and indeed approaches we are virtually certain the Soviets are violating. This is the effect of the "build-down" proposal.

The "build-down" proposal is conceptually simple. For each "new" weapon introduced by either side, two existing weapons would have to be retired. It would be difficult to conceive of a proposal that is more conceptually disadvantageous to the United States. The Soviet modernization program is far more extensive than that of the United States. The Soviets have introduced 10 variants of at least three new ICBMs that existed in 1972. The US added nothing since 1972.

However, we are faced with the fundamental reality that the effectiveness of such an agreement critically depends upon definition of "new missile". One of the most sig-

nificant compliance problems with SALT II involves precisely what constitutes a "new" ICBM. SALT II limited both sides to "one new type" of ICBM. It defined "new type" of a missile as one that differed from an existing type (in 1979) by more than 5% in launch weight, throw weight or had a different type of fuel, solid or liquid, and a different number of stages or different number of warheads. We are now virtually certain that the Soviet Union is violating the SALT II new type rule. While the SALT II rule is linked to a different type of limitation (a ban on more than "one new type" rather than a "build-down" linked to "new" types), under both of these cases the effect of the limit is critically linked to the definition and our ability to monitor deviations from existing types of missiles—and Soviet willingness to honor such a commitment once made. Our experience with SALT II suggests there is no meaningful capability to verify Soviet willingness to honor it.

Concerning Soviet ICBM programs, the Secretary of Defense reported in recent months that we have seen:

First tests of a new solid propellant ICBM similar in size and payload to the US MX.

The first test of a new small solid-propellant ICBM, which could be deployed on mobile transporters,

Preparations to begin testing other new ICBMs, probably in 1983.

There are only two possible interpretations of these events. Either the SALT II "new missiles" type limitation is completely ineffective in limiting the growth of Soviet ICBMs or the Soviets are violating the SALT II provision.

In either event, the wisdom of basing the next arms control agreement on a limitation that is either conceptually ineffective or being violated by the Soviet Union is somewhat subject to question.

President Reagan has characterized the test of the second new Soviet ICBMs as "the closest to indicating that it is a violation" of the SALT II Treaty. I believe that this understates the case. There is not significant doubt that the Soviet Union has tested two new ICBMs, and attempted to pass the second one off as a permissible modification of the SS-13 ICBM—something that it could not possibly be.

The new small Soviet ICBM, the PL-5, is a successor to the Soviet SS-16 (which itself may have been clandestinely deployed by the Soviet Union.) The Soviet SS-13 was first tested in 1965. The SS-16 was tested first in 1972. The PL-5 was first tested in February 1983. There is simply no significant possibility that the Soviets would test a new missile in 1983 that was within five percent of the launch weight and throw weight of the SS-13 and first generation ICBM of 1965 vintage.

The Soviet SS-16 is a clear illustration of the impossibility of the PL-5 being within 5 percent of the launch weight and throw weight of the SS-13. In 1975 then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger reported that, "The SS-X-16 may be slightly smaller in volume than the SS-13, but it carries about twice the throw weight over the same range." How likely would it be that the Soviet Union designed a follow-on missile to the SS-16, using a decade more advanced technology, and designed it to be somewhat larger than the SS-16 and have only half its throw weight or destructive potential? This is, of course, nonsense. However, the fact that the Soviet Union resorted to such an argument indicates how ineffective the "new" missile limitation of SALT II is, and how ineffective a similar limitation tied to a "build-down" proposal would be.

The Soviets did not have to violate the SALT II Treaty. The provision in question

could have been complied with and the Soviets could have substantially modernized their forces. In regard to Soviet Liquid fuel ICBMs the provision in question was largely a loophole. Only in the solid fuel missile area was there a significant limitation. The Soviets could well have lived with the introduction of what amounted to three new ICBMs. The very fact that they have done something as blatant as testing a new small solid fuel ICBM with the characteristics of the PL-5, the only thing that they could not conceivably do under any reading of SALT II, is a strong indication of what their intentions are.

The nuclear freeze, like the build-down, is an irresponsible approach to arms control.

A leading apologist for irresponsible approaches to arms control, former CIA Director William Colby, argues that we can verify virtually anything. His logic is quite appealing to those with little understanding of the compliance problem. He has recently stated that, "The Administration's own reports show that we are doing exactly that in our attention to potential violations of SALT II and the steady buildup of Soviet power." The problem, however, is not detecting "potential violations of SALT II" or any other arms control agreement. We literally have had dozens of "potential" violations. The problem is proving that the Soviet Union, a police state that has the most effective internal security system in the world and which places much of its country off limits to foreigners, completely controls its press, and the contacts of its people with foreigners, is actually violating an arms control agreement. This is much more difficult than detecting potential violations. It matters little if we detect potential violations and subject them "to outside scrutiny." The Soviets simply deny them. The only issue, in the last analysis, is whether or not the Soviet Union is violating the treaties and can we prove this.

It is not a simple matter to accuse the Soviet Union of violating an arms control agreement, irrespective of whatever the evidence is. President Reagan has characterized the problem of enforcing compliance in terms of obtaining evidence that will stand up in a court of law. In the words of President Reagan, "If you can't get that kind of courtroom evidence you need, then you can't make the charge of violation." Irrespective of the rightness or wrongness of adopting a judicial standard for arms control compliance (We could not convict the man who shot the President in front of TV cameras in a court of law), it becomes clear that limitations that are subject to detailed technical analysis always involve ambiguity and hence are not effectively enforceable.

Take the recent PL-5 episode as an example. The rationalizations that have been put forward in support of not charging the Soviet Union with a violation are truly amazing. We have been told by various former officials of the Carter Administration that we cannot charge that the PL-5 is a violation because the Soviets are encrypting telemetry to such a degree that it is not possible to determine compliance. (Such telemetry encryption is itself a violation of the agreement.) Another suggested the real fault was with the Reagan Administration not vigorously pursuing these issues with the Soviet Union in the Standing Consultative Commission established by the SALT I Treaties. As Professor George Friedman of Dickenson College has observed, these statements are "extraordinary, condemning not the Russians for their violations but the President for reporting them to the public. This sophistry by the Democrats should be borne in mind by all of us as we grope

toward a decision on the future of American nuclear policy."

The Soviets are virtually certain to violate the "new" missiles limit of SALT II twice more this year. They will test follow-on missiles to both their SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. SALT II prohibits the follow-on missiles from being any larger in launch weight and throw weight. Do we really believe that the Soviet Union has invested billions of dollars to develop new missiles, and will spend tens of billions to deploy new missiles, that are no better than their existing missiles?

If the so-called "build down" proposal was in effect, these two missiles would be allowed, but the Soviet Union would have to retire twice the number of warheads carried for every one of the new missiles they deployed. Does anyone believe that they would do this? Or would they simply claim that the two new follow-on missiles were permissible modifications of the SS-18 or SS-19? Irrespective of how we wrote the "new" missile definition—even if we draft a far more restrictive version than included in SALT II—the Soviet Union will always claim that whatever they test meets the criteria for permissible modification. Thus the question will always be: are we prepared to pursue compliance vigorously despite the supposed political costs of accusing the Soviet Union of violations? Thus far, our experience with arms control compliance issues does not suggest that we are willing to take the necessary action to enforce compliance or to generate a penalty for Soviet non-compliance.

Thus in the future we should only pursue limitations that are subject to high confidence verification, and insist on cooperative procedures that are required for verification. The "build-down proposal" is simply an invitation to sign another agreement that virtually amounts to unilateral disarmament of the United States.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT II

SS-18 rapid reload and refire.
Covert deployment of 100 to 200 SS-16's at Plesetsk Test Range.
AS-3 Kangaroo long range ASM on 100 TU-95 Bear bombers.
New long range ASM on Bears.
Deployment of long range ASM's on Backfire bombers.
Almost total (95-98 percent) encryption of telemetry.
ICBM: SS-18 Mod X; PL-4.
SLCM: SS-NX-19.
SLBM: SS-NX-20.
IRBM/ICBM: SS-20.
Total encryption on second new ICBM-PLS.
2 new ICBM's in development tests.
Direct attack on U.S. digital imaging satellite.

Wide spread camouflage, concealment, deception.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF GENEVA PROTOCOL AND BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

BW manufacture and storage at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk.
Percent other suspect production and storage facilities.
Expansion of BW facilities after 1972 and 1975, continuing today.
CW and toxin weapons employment and assistance to satellites: Kampuchea, Laos, Afghanistan.
Toxin assassination weapons.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV CUBA AGREEMENT

Soviet offensive capabilities deployed to Cuba.
Combat brigade.
Golf and Echo class nuclear submarines.

Nuclear capable aircraft.
Mig-23; Bear—TU-95 D.F (TU-142, with operable bombays).
Military communications center.
Use of Cuba as revolutionary base:
Training terrorists and revolutionary forces.
Equipment supply to revolutionary forces.
DGI 4th largest intelligence organization.
Supply of drugs (heroin) to illegal drug dealers in U.S. probable BW/CW facility.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974):
Over 15 Soviet tests above 150 kilotons (2 with lowest possible yield above 150).
Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963):
Over 30 unambiguous Soviet ventings of radioactive debris.

SOVIET SALT I VIOLATIONS AND CIRCUMVENTIONS

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty:
Sam testing in ABM mode—SAM-5, SAM-10, SAM-12.
Deployment of ABM battle management radars.
ABM camouflage and concealment.
Falsification of ABM deactivation use of new test range without prior notification.
Development of a rapidly deployable, mobile ABM.

SOVIET SALT I VIOLATIONS AND CIRCUMVENTIONS

Interim agreement:
Deployment of the heavy SS-19 ICBM as the replacement of the light SS-11.
Failure to deactivate old ICBMs on time, and continuous falsification of official deactivation reports.
Bringing back ICBM equipment to deactivated ICBM complexes.
Keeping 18 SS-9 ICBMs at an ICBM test range illegally operational.
Soviet deployment of "IIIX" silos with a configuration too similar to a missile-launch silo.
Increased use of deliberate camouflage, concealment, and deception.
Encryption of missile telemetry.
Camouflage of ICBM testing, production, deployment.
Concealment of SLBM submarine construction, berthing, dummy subs, construction of berthing tunnels.
Constructing over 68 strategic submarines, when only 62 were allowed.
Violation of Brezhnev's pledge not to build mobile ICBM's.
Deploying SS-11 ICBM's at SS-4 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites.
Keeping about 1,300 to several thousand old ICBMs stockpiled for both covert soft launch and rapid reload of silos for refire.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS

Better mutual understanding and business-like cooperation.
In the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.
Normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.
Spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.
Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

Promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties.

The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contracts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology.

[From the New York Post, May 20, 1983]

SECRET REPLY ON NUKE TEST

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

In a response described by Pentagon and intelligence community hardliners as "false and contemptuous," the Soviet Union on May 12 sent a formal reply to President Reagan's understated complaint early this month about Soviet SALT II violations. The White House is keeping the response—and even its existence—secret for the present.

The response, sent to Secretary of State George Shultz, brushed off the principal question raised by the U.S.: whether the Feb. 8 Soviet test of an intercontinental ballistic missile violated a formula in the treaty on what is called the missile's throw-weight.

Under the terms of the treaty, which the U.S. has not ratified, but along with the Soviet Union has agreed to abide by, the warhead weight may not be less than 50 percent of the throw-weight. The reason for this is highly technical. It is designed to prevent one side from deceiving the other on the number of warheads that might be placed on a new missile.

Nor did the Soviet response to the long, five-page U.S. complaint come to grips with U.S. protests on Soviet encryption of telemetry transmissions from the missile during the test. SALT II drastically limits either side's right to conceal these performance reports.

The Soviet reply claimed that the disputed new missile was well within treaty limits for modernizing existing missiles and was not the one "new-type" missile each side may test and deploy under the terms of the treaty. But the U.S. privately claims that, to the contrary, the test had strong earmarks of being that of a new missile. Since the Soviets have confirmed that they flight-tested a new type of missile last fall, the Feb. 8 test appeared to violate the limitation on more than one such new weapon.

Adding to suspicions within the administration that the Soviets are giving false answers to the U.S. was the fact that only a few days after the U.S. letter was handed to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, another test of the disputed missile was conducted on May 5 from the Plesetsk range.

Analysts in Washington say it breached yet another part of the treaty. It was conducted at night, raising strong suspicion that the Soviets were deliberately contriving to conceal from the U.S. the relationship between the missile itself and its launcher. That relationship is another requirement under terms of the treaty.

President Reagan made clear in his press conference Tuesday night that, although he is deeply suspicious about Soviet violations, he is wary about making a major public issue of it because he is not certain. Some specialists doubt that under the often ambiguous terms of the treaty it will ever be possible to be absolutely certain—until too late.

[From the Washington Times, May 20, 1983]

U.S., SOVIET AIR FINDING OF ARMS PACT VIOLATIONS

(By Bill Kling)

Substantial evidence of Soviet violations of arms control agreements with the United States has been uncovered by a high-level White House investigating team and "is

being discussed" with the U.S.S.R., a senior administration official confirmed yesterday.

The official also discussed that President Reagan, at a morning meeting with his White House staff yesterday, ordered administration consultations with Congress to clear the way for a possible decision, perhaps this morning, on the proposed sale of sophisticated F-16 warplanes to Israel.

Consultations with Congress were carried out yesterday on whether the F-16 sale to Israel "should go forward or be held in abeyance longer," the official told the Washington Times in an interview. There was no indication when Reagan's decision would be announced.

The official also discussed the possible Middle East ramifications of some recent Soviet military movements, pending United States-Soviet talks on a possible long-term grain deal and the current Reagan administration assessment of Soviet weapons development.

"Evidence (of Soviet arms violations) is mounting on a wider scale and, I might add, that evidence is being discussed at a certain level with the Soviets now," the official said.

Information obtained in the special investigation is under continuing review by a White House committee under the chairmanship of William Clark, Reagan's national security adviser, the official said, and will be presented to the president "when we're satisfied with the quantum of evidence on the several issues."

Reagan, during his nationally televised White House press conference Tuesday night, acknowledged there is "reason to believe" the Soviets have tested new weapons in violation of arms control agreements "but we don't have solid evidence."

Several weeks ago, a senior administration official indicated that the Reagan administration, spurred by demands from Capitol Hill, had not ruled out the possibility of issuing a comprehensive public report on Soviet violations of a number of agreements with the United States.

One such demand for public disclosure of Soviet treaty infractions came from Sen. James A. McClure, R-Idaho, chairman of the Senate Republican Conference, who wrote Reagan a five-page letter April 25 seeking information and White House understandings about Soviet missile testing and "conclusive evidence of Soviet violation of the biological and chemical warfare treaties.

A spokesman for McClure said yesterday that the senator has received a brief response from David Gergen, White House communications director, acknowledging receipt of McClure's request and promising a more substantive answer later.

The administration official told The Washington Times that United States intelligence-gathering systems have detected "no evidence of a switch in priorities" toward the manufacture of consumer goods rather than weapons in the Soviet Union under Yuri Andropov.

"We know it's been discussed within the party and the government, but I am unaware of any change in priorities," the official said.

On the Middle East, the official said the White House still is hopeful that Syria eventually will agree to withdraw its troops from Lebanon even though Syrian officials have refused to discuss the matter with Philip Habib, Reagan's special envoy in the area.

The official indicated that the Reagan administration is "very concerned about the Soviet buildup in the past four months leading to 7,000 Soviet troops and technicians around the new SAM (surface-to-air missile) sites and an increased Soviet naval presence

in the eastern Mediterranean on the one hand, (and) on the other, we feel it is really in no one's interest, including the Soviets, that hostilities (in the Middle East) reopen."

"And yet, as each day goes by, we recognize the risk heightens that there could be an incident, a triggering mechanism for hostilities, and that is why the push not only by ourselves but by Arab neighbors on Syria to do the correct thing . . . and to move on back," the official said.

The official denied that the administration had offered any long-term grain deal with the Soviets.

"It was more a communication from (Secretary of State) George Shultz to Mr. (Anatoly) Dobrynin (Soviet ambassador to the United States) that the consensus in the administration was that we explore the possibilities of a long-term grain agreement," the official said. "Would they be interested in sitting down to discuss that exploration, and after some three weeks' time? The answer was 'yes.'"

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1983]

BLIND EYE ON CENTRAL AMERICA

(By George F. Will)

To begin, a two-question quiz.

First question: since détente was codified at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1973, the Soviet Union has forced a nuclear alert by threatening to intervene with troops in the October 1973 war in the Middle East (a war incited and financed by the Soviet Union); has organized and financed the destruction of the Paris accords and a U.S. ally; has intervened with Cubans and others in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Cambodia, Nicaragua and El Salvador; has invaded Afghanistan; has orchestrated the crushing of Poland; has made a mockery of the Helsinki agreements; has repeatedly violated the informally agreed-to threshold test ban treaty (although we even changed the way we measure violations, in an effort to avoid the need to make protests that would dampen détente); has tried to murder the pope; is violating the terms of SALT II (an amazing feat, considering that SALT II is a tissue of loopholes and ambiguities); is funding and organizing terrorism worldwide; and is continuing an arms buildup unambiguously designed for political intimidation and military aggression. The first quiz question is: why is there a "return to the Cold War"?

Answer: President Reagan gave a speech referring to the Soviet Union as an evil empire.

Second question: the Soviet Union has an army brigade (2,600-3,000 men), 2,500 military advisers (increased 500 last year) and 6,000-8,000 civilian advisers in Cuba. It gave Cuba 66,000 metric tons of military supplies in 1981, 68,000 in 1982 (worth \$1 billion). Moscow's annual economic aid to Cuba is \$4 billion (more than one-quarter of Cuba's GNP). Cuba has 200 MiGs, including two squadrons of MiG-23 Floggers, at least 650 tanks, at least 90 helicopters, including Mi24 attack helicopters, a Koni-class frigate, two Foxtrot attack submarines, at least 50 torpedo attack boats, two amphibious assault ships. A Grenada minister says Cuba will use Grenada's new airport when supplying Cubans in Africa. Cuba, with one-seventh of Mexico's population, has military forces twice the size of Mexico's. The Soviet Union is giving 20 times more military assistance to Cuba than the United States is giving to all of Latin America. In the newest Soviet satellite, Nicaragua, 39 percent of all males over 18 are in uniform, and the regime intends to build a 250,000-person armed force, so one in 10 Nicaraguans will soon be in the military or militia. (All of

Honduras' security forces total 20,000. El Salvador's total 32,000.) Nicaragua's regime has built 36 new military bases and garrisons (the previous regime had 13). Nicaraguan pilots and mechanics are being trained in Bulgaria. The regime has received, so far, 50 Soviet tanks, 1,000 East German trucks, 100 anti-aircraft guns, Soviet 152-millimeter howitzers with a range of 17 miles. Cuba has 4,000 to 5,000 civilian advisers in Nicaragua, plus 2,000 military and security advisers. There also are East Germans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, Soviets and members of the PLO. The second quiz question is: about what in Central America does Congress seem most worried?

Answer: fifty-five U.S. trainers in El Salvador.

Events in Central America are spinning rapidly toward a decisive moment in U.S. history. None of the fictions that were used to rationalize acceptance of defeat in Vietnam can be used regarding Central America. The threat there is close, clear and indisputably communist. There the United States will show—will learn—whether it is any longer capable of asserting the will a great power requires, or whether the slide into paralysis is irreversible.

Governments such as Costa Rica's and Panama's are listening as congressional complaints mount. The complaints are against U.S. assistance to armed opponents of Nicaragua's Stalinists, and about even minimal aid for the democratically elected government of El Salvador that is under attack from forces that are extensions, through Nicaragua and Cuba, of the Soviet Union.

The conjunction of these complaints can mean, in effect, the extension of the Brezhnev doctrine in this hemisphere. That is, communist attacks on a regime leech away the regime's legitimacy, and produce pressures for negotiations aimed at "power-sharing" with Stalinists who do not believe in sharing power. But a communist regime, however, freshly planted and dependent on foreign totalitarians, as in Nicaragua, must be treated as legitimate and irreversible.

There is a war raging, and if all the substantial, determined military assistance is one-way, there can be but one result. The result will be a communist Central America, and an Iran just a wade across the Rio Grande.

TWO NEW SOVIET STRATEGIC MISSILES

Within four months, the Soviet Union has launched two new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In a top-secret report, the American Central Intelligence Agency describes the two missiles as the PL-4 and the PL-5. With these launchings, the Soviet Union appears to have violated the 1980 Salt-2 treaty, which has not been ratified by the United States, in three ways.

The PL-4 was launched on October 26th. Apparently the first stage failed to ignite and the test was aborted. It seems to be a variation of the mirrored, four-warhead SS-17. It uses solid fuel (unlike most Soviet missiles). Solid fuel is easier for ground crews to handle; its use enables scientists to make missiles more accurate. All American missiles except the ageing Titans use it.

The PL-4 was also tested last December. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, informed the state department about it and said that this was the one new missile allotted to the Soviet Union under the terms of Salt-2.

The second missile, the PL-5, was launched from the remote Plesetsk range on February 8th. It is light, mobile and intercontinental. It is described as a variation of the SS-16. This was an enlargement by a

third-stage rocket of the SS-20, which cannot reach beyond west European targets; it was banned under Salt-2.

According to the CIA, the three violations of Salt-2 are:

The testing of the PL-5 violates article four of Salt-2's Agreed Statements and Common Understandings referring to the SS-16.

The PL-5 violates article four's limit of only one new land-based missile being tested by each signatory. For the Soviet Union, the argument runs, the PL-4 is the new missile; for the United States it will be the MX.

For the first time, the Soviet Union has encrypted all of its radio telemetry during a test. This contravenes article 15 of Salt-2 which says that "neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the treaty".

Encryption makes radio transmissions from the missile to its base illegible to outsiders. Normally these transmissions, when intercepted by the Americans, allow the defence department to decide whether the missile test is in compliance with Salt. Telemetry can tell the United States the weight of the missile at launching; its carrying capacity (throw weight); the number of warheads aboard; the type of fuel; and procedures for releasing the warheads.

Soviet encryption has been increasing. Early tests of the new Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-NX-20, fired from the new Typhoon submarine, have been 80 percent encrypted. The remaining 20 percent contained enough information to enable the United States to decide what kind of missile it was. Another test of the missile late last year, however, was 95 percent encrypted. When the PL-4 was tested in December, says the CIA, it was 98 percent encrypted. The test of the PL-5 on February 8th was 100 percent encrypted.

These Soviet missile developments seem certain to set off a new nuclear debate in the United States. The CIA is worried about the Soviet Union's growing advantage in strategic weapons over the United States as the Americans phase out old B-52 bombers and Titan missiles and the Russians add strategic bombers.

This CIA table, which does not include the 10-warhead Soviet SS-NX-20 and the 330-odd intermediate-range SS-20s or the American MX and cruise, gives the latest American analysis:

	January 1981		July 1981		January 1983	
	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.
ICBM's.....	1,054	1,398	1,053	1,398	1,046	1,398
SLBM's.....	576	950	544	950	544	950
Heavy bombers.....	348	356	347	356	300	430
Total.....	1,978	2,704	1,944	2,704	1,890	2,778

[From the New York Times, May 2, 1983]
WHEN MOSCOW CHEATS ON ARMS

TO THE EDITOR: The demand by several leading Democrats, among them Senators Cranston and Pell, that the Administration not publicize evidence that the Soviets are in violation of the 1979 arms limitation agreements (news story April 22) is shocking and ought to raise serious doubts about the wisdom of any future arms control agreements.

The two Senators, who have both been in the forefront of critics of secrecy in foreign policy, are now urging the withholding of information which would damage policies which they support. This turnabout on the public's right to know raises serious doubts

about the sincerity of their previous position and the wisdom of their current views.

One of the chief objections to any nuclear arms reduction agreement has been that the Russians are likely to cheat and thereby gain a secret, and potentially catastrophic, advantage over the U.S. Additionally, some have felt that, even if violations were detected, political interests in this country would be such that no serious response would be likely.

For one thing, Soviet violations would be an embarrassment to those who supported the treaties and who would then do anything to pretend that they were in fact working. For another, the U.S. has, along with the liberal democracies of Western Europe, a deep social and political aversion to the financial strains involved in an arms race.

Prior to World War II, we did everything possible to avoid confronting the evidence that Germany was grossly violating legal limits on its armed forces. So, too, opponents of nuclear arms treaties fear that future leaders would be loath to incur the expense of rebuilding nuclear forces, no matter what the evidence of Soviet violations and no matter how terrible the consequences of their willful self-delusion. The Democrats' current behavior has done much to confirm these fears.

The statement by Senator Pell that publicizing Soviet violations "would be widely interpreted as a cheap shot tactic to build support for the Administration's arms program," and not a serious attempt to deal with suspected Soviet violations is extraordinary, condemning not the Russians for their violations but the President for reporting them to the public.

This sophistry by the Democrats should be borne in mind by all of us as we grope toward a decision on the future of American nuclear policy.

GEORGE FRIEDMAN,
Associate Professor of
Political Science, Dickinson College.

[From Businessweek, May 9, 1983]
BLOW THE WHISTLE ON ARMS CHEATING?

A bitter argument is raging within the Reagan Administration over whether to publicize Soviet violations of arms agreements. The State Dept. argues that publicly denouncing Soviet violations would make the negotiation of new agreements even more difficult. Hard-liners led by National Security Adviser William P. Clark counter that the President's military budget—to which Reagan has clung despite a revolt among congressional Republicans—can be justified only by exposing the continuing Soviet military buildup.

The confrontation pits Clark and his staff against Secretary of State George P. Shultz and his, with conservatives and liberals on Capitol Hill joining in. Shultz believes that harping on Soviet duplicity would add to the image of a bellicose and inflexible Ronald Reagan, already rampant in Western Europe. In the highly complex negotiations, State maintains, it is almost impossible to document violations conclusively. Clark's group argues that it is precisely the lack of publicity given to recent blatant Soviet treaty violations that has skewed understanding of disarmament in both Europe and the U.S. In an effort to resolve the issue, Clark has been named to head a task force to make recommendations to the President.

OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE

Reagan told a press conference early this year: "You could say, 'I'm convinced that these are violations,' but it would have been very difficult to find the hard evidence to

make it hold up in court. This last [Soviet test] comes the closest to indicating that it is a violation." Reagan was referring to the testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles limited under the SALT II treaty—and part of the informal agreement undertaken by both sides after the Senate refused the Carter Administration's request to ratify the treaty following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Pentagon document Soviet Military Power, issued in March, listed three specific new Soviet ICBM violations. Moscow claims that a new solid-propellant ICBM is a modification of its SS-13. The U.S. calls it a new missile, the PL-5, after the Plesetsk Test Range where it was fired on Feb. 8. Furthermore, the PL-5 is the second new Soviet ICBM tested, and Article IV permits development of only one new ICBM during the treaty's life. At Plesetsk, the Russians also deployed SS-16s, banned under a prohibition against mobile ICBMs.

In January, when the Russians tested the SS-NX-20—a missile launched from the Soviets' new Typhoon-class submarines that has a range of 5,000 mi. and carries 12 warheads—95 percent of the signals were in cipher. The treaty requires signals understandable to anyone listening. "A violation of this part of the agreement—which we would quickly detect—would be just as serious as a violation of the limits on strategic weapons themselves," said Henry A. Kissinger, who began the negotiations for the agreement. Another ICBM test by the Soviets this year violated a treaty clause that a warhead may constitute no less than 50 percent of the weight of the total reentry package.

Last year, General David C. Jones, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, referred to possible violations of the antiballistic missile treaty. And the U.S. suspects that the Soviets are violating limits on overall nuclear testing. Referring to Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos, the President, in his State of the Union message in January, said: "Given the overwhelming evidence of Soviet violations of chemical and biological weapons, we also insist that any agreement we sign can and will be verifiable."

[From the New York Times, May 12, 1983]

U.S. SEES NEW SOVIET ARMS VIOLATION
(By Hedrick Smith)

WASHINGTON, May 11.—In two high-level private diplomatic approaches, the Reagan Administration has accused the Soviet Union of testing two new intercontinental missiles and asked Moscow to explain why this does not violate the 1979 strategic arms agreement, American officials disclosed today.

The second nuclear arms treaty permits each nation to test and develop only one new intercontinental missile.

Administration officials reported that new concerns had been raised by a second Soviet test of a missile known here as the Plesetsk-5. The first test of the missile on Feb. 8 led to political questions here about possible Soviet treaty violations.

Pentagon and State Department officials said the initial analysis of the latest Soviet test, conducted early last Thursday, had not been completed, but the missile involved appeared to be the same one tested in February. Much to American frustration, the officials said, the electronic data from the test had been "heavily encrypted" by the Soviet Union.

TWO PREVIOUS TESTS

Administration sources and American representatives about two earlier tests, in October and February, were made to the Soviet

Union in late April through the Joint Special Consultative Committee in Vienna. The sources said the Americans responded more forcefully in a follow-up meeting on May 5 between Acting Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Ambassador Dobrynin met again with Mr. Dam today at Soviet request, possibly to deliver the Kremlin's response, but American officials declined to discuss the substance of the meeting and Mr. Dobrynin could not be reached.

After the session, however, American officials said United States concerns had not been put to rest and uncertainties about the pattern of Soviet tests had "not been resolved."

Although Mr. Reagan opposed the 1979 nuclear arms agreement when he was a candidate in 1980 and has declined as President to press for its ratification, his Administration has observed it in practice.

The Administration has recently come under pressure from Senate Republican conservatives to accuse Moscow publicly of violating this treaty, among others, on grounds that the Russians had tested two new intercontinental missiles and had heavily encoded data from the tests to foil American monitoring operations. The treaty bans encoding that impedes verification of compliance.

President Reagan, after edging toward public confrontation with Moscow, indicated at a new conference on April 22 that the Administration preferred first to pursue the matter through private diplomatic channels. Although he said earlier that there has been "increasingly serious ground for questioning" Soviet compliance with the treaty, he emphasized in April the difficulty of obtaining "hard and fast evidence."

A few days later, Administration officials said, a complaint was made to the Soviet Union by Ambassador Richard Ellis, the American representative on the Special Consultative Committee.

The committee is a panel set up to deal with interpretations and complaints under Soviet-American nuclear arms treaties. Until now the Reagan Administration had used it sparingly to deal with the 1979 arms treaty.

A FORCEFUL RESPONSE

Administration officials said a more forceful, higher-level follow-up was made by Mr. Dam with Ambassador Dobrynin to emphasize the seriousness of American concern. Mr. Dam reportedly asked for a speedy Soviet reply.

In both cases, however, the United States was reported to have stopped short of accusing Moscow of violating the arms treaty. But in what was described as a tough representation Mr. Dam took some issue with previous Soviet explanations of the Feb. 8 missile tests, officials said.

In response to initial American inquiries back in February, Moscow told the United States that the Plesetsk-5 missile was a modified version of the three-stage, solid-fuel SS-13 missile permitted under the 1979 treaty. The Kremlin had already identified the Plesetsk-4 missile as the one new intercontinental ballistic missile permitted under the treaty.

Mr. Dam was said to have told Ambassador Dobrynin that American analysis indicated the Plesetsk-5 exhibited characteristics that exceeded the modifications permitted under the treaty for an old missile—5 percent change in length, diameter, launch weight and throw weight, and a clear retention of a single warhead—and thus it technically constituted a new missile.

THE ISSUE OF CODING

Some American officials were concerned that the latest Soviet test constituted an indirect Russian reply, adding to American anxieties that Moscow was proceeding with two new missiles.

These officials said the electronic telemetry data from the test was totally encoded, which many officials considered a violation of the 1979 treaty.

But other officials said the Soviet encoding had not been total, and cautioned that American assessment of the test would be hampered by the fact that an American radar-equipped tracking ship, vital to United States monitoring of Soviet missile tests, had not been on station for the May 5 test.

These officials said American interpretation of the Feb. 8 test had also been hampered because not all American intelligence-gathering equipment was functioning that day.

[From the Washington Post, May 12, 1983]

NEW SOVIET ICBM TEST CONCERNS ADMINISTRATION

(By Walter Pincus)

The Reagan administration is "seriously concerned" about a third test flight last week of a Soviet ICBM that may violate the SALT II treaty, according to a top-ranking government official.

The May 4 test came as American officials were trying through diplomatic channels to determine from the Soviets whether a violation had occurred during two earlier tests of the small, solid-fueled missile.

"Nobody has any conclusive information" on the latest shot, one government official said yesterday. He added that there were "anomalies" in the data collected that might indicate either that the Soviets had tried to hide electronic information about the test or that U.S. monitoring systems had not functioned properly.

The test, like the earlier ones, was held at night "so that we could not see the mobile launcher," according to one source familiar with intelligence data.

In Geneva, American representatives at the Standing Consultative Commission, which monitors adherence to U.S.-Soviet arms treaties, have raised questions about Soviet missile testing, according to Washington sources.

And just days before the May 4 test, the United States took an unusual step by putting a series of questions about the two earlier tests to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. No response has been received, according to government sources.

Answers received in Geneva and from the questions given Dobrynin will be included in an interagency verification committee study ordered by President Reagan and directed by national security adviser William P. Clark. That study is to determine whether SALT II has been violated, and if so, what the U.S. response should be.

Last week's test, according to one conservative source on Capitol Hill, was Moscow's "contemptuous response" to the administration's questions. Conservatives have urged the administration to go public with information about alleged Soviet SALT II violations before new strategic arms negotiations in Geneva.

Under SALT II, both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit themselves to one new ICBM. Although the treaty has not been ratified, both sides have said they will respect its provisions.

Last October, the Soviets tested a large, solid-fueled ICBM which, Dobrynin later said, was the one permitted under SALT II. Then on Feb. 8, the Soviets test fired the

smaller ICBM and later told the United States it was a modification of an older missile, the SS13. The smaller missile was tested again in March and failed.

Some U.S. analysts said the second missile exceeded the modification limits set by SALT II. Reagan administration officials called the data "somewhat ambiguous" and said they would await another test to see if they could prove a violation.

[From the Washington Times, May 25, 1983]

NEW SOVIET MISSILE VIOLATES SALT, EXPERTS CLAIM

(By Russell Warren Howe)

Soviet tests this year of a new-design single-warhead missile appear to be in contravention of SALT II, U.S. strategic warfare experts report, citing actual and circumstantial evidence.

The tests reportedly were conducted at Plesetsk, about 200 miles south of the White Sea.

Sen. James A. McClure, R-Idaho, has written President Reagan, claiming that this is only one of a series of Soviet breaches of SALT I, SALT II and the threshold test ban treaty.

Defense sources confirmed yesterday that there had been two tests of the new weapon, which the United States designates as PL-5. But they declined to label the tests as a breach of SALT II, pending further investigation of the nature of the missile, which they said could be a permitted modification of an earlier weapon.

Certain modifications are allowed under the 1979 agreement.

The first test of the PL-5 (Plesetsk launch-5) was on Feb. 8, the second on May 5.

McClure insists that the launches were a double violation of the arms limitation treaty because they involve a second new Soviet ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missile and because, at the second test, "all the telemetry was encrypted."

SALT II allows only one new strategic ICBM to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Moscow has designated the SSC-24 (also known as the PL-4) as its permitted weapon. The new U.S. system is the MX.

The pact forbids more than partial encrypting (encoding) of telemetry—the signals sent back by the missile which enable both sides to monitor its range, weight, number of warheads, type of fuel, warhead-release methods and performance.

The United States does not encrypt telemetry at all; the Soviet Union always encrypts part of it. Strategic missile experts say considerably less than 50 percent needs to be left unencrypted to permit SALT verifications.

Defense sources say the PL-5 has the same solid-fuel booster as the SSX-24. They compare the weapon to the proposed U.S. Armadillo or "Midgetman" missile, which would be an American breach of SALT II if tested before the treaty expires on Dec. 31, 1985. Armadillo is still at the design stage.

Soviet ICBMs in existence on May 1, 1979, when SALT II was signed, were the SS-11, SS-13, SS-16, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. Moscow agreed not to deploy the SS-16, then in the test phase.

The Senate has not ratified SALT II but both the U.S. and Soviet governments have agreed to observe its terms.

Modifications not permitted under the treaty are more than 5 percent increases in length, diameter, launch weight and throw weight, the addition of a further rocket stage—which increases range—or a change from liquid to solid fuel.

The SSX-24 had an abortive test on Oct. 26, 1982, when its first stage failed to ignite. This was reported at the time to be a major variation of the four-warhead SS-17, but reliable U.S. sources emphatically denied this.

"It was as different from the SS-17 as MX is from Minuteman," one of these sources told The Washington Times. "It was an entirely new weapon."

The SSX-24 was successfully tested last December, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin informed the State Department that it was Moscow's permitted new ICBM. When the PL-5 was first launched, British intelligence described it as a modification of the SS-16, deployment of which is forbidden under SALT II. The SS-16 is the triple-warhead SS-20 (a medium-range weapon deployed against Western European and Asian targets) with a third rocket stage added to give it intercontinental range.

The Soviet Union says PL-5 is a permitted modification of the SS-13, a single-warhead missile. All U.S. sources questioned agreed that it was a single-warhead weapon, but Dave Sullivan, a McClure aide, claims it has an SS-16-type launcher. He says the throw weight (explosive power over distance) of the PL-5's is "200 percent" greater than SS-13s, thus exceeding the SALT-II 5 percent limit.

The SS-13 was, until last year, Moscow's only ICBM using solid fuel—a technology 20 years old in the United States.

Solid fuel, which has the consistency of a pencil eraser, occupies less space and burns in its container, obviating the need for the pumping mechanisms which move liquid fuel to the combustion chamber. This improvement in propulsion technology makes ICBMs much smaller and more effective.

McClure says that the circumstantial evidence that Moscow is not telling the full truth about the PL-5 comes partly from the alleged second violation—the total encryption—and partly from the fact that, at both launches, the missile was moved from its manufacturing plant at night and launched from a camouflaged launcher in a wooded area.

U.S. spy satellites thus got no clear picture of the launcher, raising the suspicion that it was not an SS-13 launcher, but one designed for a new weapon.

On May 12, Dobrynin responded to U.S. complaints about the PL-5 tests. The State Department will not reveal the contents of Dobrynin's memorandum but defense sources say he ignored an American query on whether the PL-5 warhead was less than 50 percent of the missile's throw weight, which would be a further breach of SALT-II.

This treaty clause was intended to ensure that range is not increased by reducing the number of warheads on a missile. Dobrynin's silence on this point has raised suspicions that the Russians may have put a single warhead on a banned SS-16 missile.

Official U.S. sources denied a suggestion that the Reagan administration was delaying open condemnation of the missile as a treaty breach to avoid poisoning the atmosphere at the stalemated Geneva arms-reduction talks even further.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, for the opposition, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. LEAHY. I thank my friend from Mississippi.

Mr. President, in Senate Concurrent Resolution 26, which would release funds for the MX, the Senate once again turns to the most divisive and difficult strategic issue this country has faced since the ABM. The MX

missile program has preoccupied four administrations, drained scarce defense dollars, skewed American arms control policy, and plagued Congress. Until very recently, only one point of agreement stood out like a beacon amid the turmoil and dissension: The highly accurate, 10-warhead, hard-target-killing MX had to be based survivably if Congress was to approve funding for the program.

President Reagan has come to the Congress with a new recommendation, based on the findings of the Commission on Strategic Forces so ably chaired by Gen. Brent Scowcroft. Mail from my constituents in Vermont has overwhelmingly—virtually unanimously—condemned the President's decision. They know that racetrack basing, interim basing in silos, and dense pack have all been proposed and rejected. Vermonters are aware that over the last decade this has been the fate of more than 30 basing modes.

Now, after more months of study, we are back to a dressed-up version of the President's interim silo basing option of 1981. He asks us to approve placing 100 MX missiles in vulnerable Minuteman silos. Perhaps in honor of George Orwell, we ought to refer to this latest plan as "long-term interim basing."

Basing the MX in vulnerable silos is as unnecessary, wasteful, and destabilizing now as it was when we rejected it in 1981. Nothing has changed in the strategic equation.

Why, then, are we preparing to vote on a funding resolution which will open the way to procurement and development of the MX in Minuteman silos? It is because of the strange, perverse outcome of the Scowcroft Commission on Strategic Forces.

President Reagan's decision last December to appoint this Commission, coming on the heels of defeat of his dense pack scheme, was one of the most important and sensible things he has done in strategic affairs. Though I certainly cannot take any credit for his decision, this was a step I urged during the debate on dense pack. The draining experience of the MX debate had convinced me of the imperative need for a detached, sober, and objective analysis of our strategic triad and the future of fixed intercontinental ballistic missiles in our deterrent force.

I believed such a Commission should have had a broader membership, including representatives from both parties, as well as persons experienced in foreign policy.

It should have had much more time to accomplish its goals, and wider terms of reference to examine American strategic policy and posture. The fact that the Commission was composed primarily of "national security" experts, all of whom had favored the MX in the past, did not enhance my confidence in its impartiality and breadth. The political reality, quite frankly, was that the Commission's top priority was to find a plausible

framework for gaining congressional approval of MX deployment. In saying this, I do not wish to appear to be casting aspersions on the outstanding men who made up the Scowcroft panel. Within the realities which bound them, they have done a superb job. If one subtracts the politically driven MX conclusion from the report, the Commission has performed a great service to the Nation.

I sent the members of the Commission a letter outlining my ideas about how the United States might forge a sound strategic modernization and arms control policy. Leaving aside MX, I am struck by the similarities between the Commission's views and my own on the future directions of U.S. strategic modernization and arms control. I ask unanimous consent that the text of my letter to the Scowcroft Commission be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit I.)

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, this is why I can say that the Commission's final report is as encouraging as it is disappointing.

On the positive side, the report contains a lucid and compelling analysis of the strategic problems confronting the United States. It offers a set of recommendations for strategic modernization and arms control objectives that, in the main, I can support.

In fact, if we were to subtract all its findings except one, the Commission did an important service by exposing the hollowness of the catch phrase "window of vulnerability." For once and for all, they closed the window of vulnerability. I applaud the President in admitting and accepting the fact that in his campaign slogans and the expression he used in 2½ years as President, he was wrong, and that indeed we have not had a window of vulnerability.

Our overall deterrent is sound; there is no reason for haste or panic in deciding how to deal with the problem of vulnerable, fixed, land-based intercontinental missiles.

The report also candidly admits that the decision made in the late 1960's to take "advantage" of our temporary technological lead to deploy multiple, independently targetable warheads instead of seeking to ban them in SALT I was a terrible mistake. The vast growth in the numbers of warheads on accurate land-based MIRV'd missiles was the single most destabilizing step in the sad history of the arms race.

The Soviets have concentrated on land-based MIRV's while we emphasized sea-based MIRV's. Now, we find our silo-based Minuteman force increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. This is not a scenario in which I place much stock. Nevertheless, it must be resolved in the interests of strategic stability.

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - JUNE 9, 1985

1. SOVIET INTEREST EXHIBITED IN CONTINUED INTERIM RESTRAINT

A number of recent Soviet actions--including silo destruc- tions, bomber retirements, and cooperative gestures in the SCC in Geneva--seem designed to underscore Moscow's continuing com- mitment to interim restraint at a time when the USSR has known the United States was reconsidering its own restraint policy.

* * *

Since last summer, the Soviets have taken steps apparently intended to offset the effect of new deployments on the overall size of their strategic arsenal as limited by SALT II:

--Earlier this year they completed destruction of 20 SS-11 silos. In April they announced at the SCC, as a gesture of "good will" not required by SALT II, that these had been destroyed to offset the deployment of 18 mobile missiles (SS-X-25s). Their response to an ensuing request for clarification was unusually prompt and detailed.

--Since last summer, as they began deployment of the new Bear H ALCM carrier, the Soviets have retired 35 Bison bombers to an auxiliary airfield. The fact that no maintenance has been done on them confirms their retired status. While bomber dismantlement procedures were never completed for SALT II, it appears that the Soviets are offsetting the 40 Bear H ALCM carriers currently in the force.

The effect of these actions, from the Soviet perspective, has probably been to keep the number of their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles accountable under SALT II slightly below the 2,504 they had when the treaty was signed in 1979.

Over the past several weeks the Soviets have also destroyed 18 SS-9 silos at the Tyuratam test range (before their deacti- vation in 1983, these were considered part of the Soviets' operational force). SALT II would have required the Soviets to destroy at least 12 of the silos (six could have been used for testing modernized missiles), but only after the treaty's entry into force. The action the Soviets have taken, like their recent destruction of 10 other test silos, goes beyond their obligation under interim restraint.

In the SCC, the Soviets continue adamantly to reject US charges of Soviet treaty violations, but in other ways they have been more than usually accommodating. They have signed a long- deferred new common understanding on concurrent SAM/ABM opera- tions proposed by the US, responded positively to a US proposal for explicit extension of the Nuclear Accidents Agreement to cover terrorist contingencies, and suggested the possibility of developing a new SALT common understanding to clarify treaty restrictions on ABM rapid reload, about which we had raised compliance questions.

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BY CJ NARADATE 1/2/08