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**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/19/2005

**File Folder** REDUCTIONS OF OVERSEAS STAFFING AT US  
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

**FOIA**

F06-114/10

**Box Number** 33

YARHI-MILO

3312

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11151	CABLE	060137Z MAR 86 <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	11	3/6/1986	B1
11152	CABLE	080147Z MAR 86 <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	7	3/8/1986	B1
11153	CABLE	080646Z MAR 86 <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	4	3/8/1986	B1
11154	CABLE	110251Z MAR 86 <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	5	3/11/1986	B1
11155	CABLE	112222Z MAR 86 <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	2	3/11/1986	B1
11156	CABLE	120204Z MAR 86 <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	2	3/12/1986	B1
11142	MEMO	COY/NORTH TO POINDEXTER RE REDUCTION OF OVERSEAS STAFFING AT U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS <b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	3/31/1986	B1
11143	MEMO	MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE REDUCTION OF OVERSEAS STAFFING AT U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS <b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11144	MEMO	DIRECTIVE FROM THE PRESIDENT REDUCTION OF USG OVERSEAS PRESENCE	4	ND	B1
11145	NSDD	NSDD NUMBER 207 THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATting TERRORISM <b>R 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10</b>	9	1/20/1986	B1
11146	MEMO	SAME AS 30518	1	2/24/1986	B1
11147	MEMO	COY/NORTH TO POINDEXTER RE OVERSEAS STAFFING AT U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS <b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	2	4/8/1986	B1
11148	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11142 <b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	3/31/1986	B1
11149	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11143 <b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	ND	B1
11157	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE REDUCTION OF OVERSEAS STAFFING AT U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS	5	2/19/1986	B1
11150	NSDD	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11145 [INCLUDES 9 PGS FOR REFERENCE] <b>R 3/28/2011 F2006-114/10</b>	<del>18</del> 9	1/20/1986	B1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: IMPOSING A PERSONNEL CEILING ON THE SIZE  
OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
(S/S: 8602636, 8602648)

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE NEXT.

2. THE SECRETARY HAS DECIDED US INTERESTS REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. USUN AND THE DEPARTMENT WILL INFORM THE UNSYG AND THE SOVIET UN MISSION, AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY, RESPECTIVELY, ON MARCH 7. THE NSC HAS CONCURRED IN THE PLANNED REDUCTIONS. PARA 8 OF THIS CABLE CONTAINS SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH THE UNSYG AND THE SOVIETS. PARA 9 IS THE TEXT OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENT TO BE RELEASED WHEN USUN OR THE DEPARTMENT RECEIVE NEWS INQUIRIES. PARA 10 PROVIDES PRESS GUIDANCE, AND PARA 11 CONTAINS TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE. USUN SHOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SALUTATION AND CLOSURE. PLEASE REPORT UNSYG AND SOVIET REACTIONS BY IMMEDIATE CABLE TO DEPARTMENT AND MOSCOW.

3. TIMING: WHILE THERE WILL NEVER BE AN IDEAL MOMENT TO INFORM THE SOVIETS OR THE UNSYG, NOW IS PROBABLY THE BEST WE ARE LIKELY TO HAVE TO IMPLEMENT OUR DECISION. WE HAVE SELECTED MARCH 7 AS THE TIME TO INFORM SIMULTANEOUSLY THE UNSYG, THE SOVIET UN MISSION AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY. THE CPSU CONGRESS IS NOW OVER AND WE ARE NOT YET INTO THE RUN-UP TO A SUMMIT MEETING.

4. EAST EUROPEANS: TO FORESTALL ANY SOVIET EFFORTS TO PRESSURE THEIR EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THEIR OWN MISSIONS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ASSETS LOST BY THE SOVIETS. USUN SHOULD INFORMALLY TELL THE UN MISSIONS OF THE FOUR WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ON WHICH WE RECENTLY IMPOSED OFM TRAVEL SERVICE REQUIREMENTS (GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND BULGARIA) THAT WE ARE PREPARED SIMILARLY TO CONSTRAIN THEIR SIZE IF WE SEE THEM PICKING UP THE SLACK.

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5. IMPLEMENTATION: THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS ARE CURRENTLY STAFFED BY APPROXIMATELY 275 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL. REDUCTIONS WILL BE ACHIEVED OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, INVOLVING FOUR TRANCHES FOR THE SOVIET UN MISSION AND TWO TRANCHES FOR THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN UN MISSIONS. THE SOVIETS WILL BE REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN, AND VISAS WILL BE ISSUED ONLY TO APPLICANTS REPLACING AN IDENTIFIED POSITION. EXCESS POSITIONS SHOULD LARGELY BE ELIMINATED THROUGH ATTRITION. THE SOVIET MISSION ITSELF WILL HAVE TO IDENTIFY 218 POSITIONS IT WISHES TO RETAIN AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1986. THE PHASED REDUCTION FOR THE SOVIET UN MISSION WILL PROCEED AS FOLLOWS: 195 AFTER APRIL 1, 1987, 173 AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1987, AND 150 AFTER APRIL 1, 1988. SIMILARLY, THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS, CURRENTLY STAFFED BY 17 AND 15 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL, WILL HAVE TO IDENTIFY 13 POSITIONS THEY WILL RETAIN AFTER APRIL 1, 1987, AND THE FINAL TEN POSITIONS THEY WILL RETAIN AFTER APRIL 1, 1988. THE TOTAL SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS BY APRIL 1, 1988 WILL BE 170. THIS REPRESENTS A REASONABLE, GRADUAL REDUCTION THAT SHOULD MAKE PERSONNEL DISLOCATIONS MANAGEABLE FOR THE SOVIETS.

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6. BRIEFINGS: DEPARTMENT PLANS TO BRIEF CONGRESS ALSO ON MARCH 7. ONCE THE UNSYG AND SOVIETS ARE INFORMED OF OUR DECISION, THE NEWS WILL CERTAINLY LEAK. THE SOVIETS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RESPOND PUBLICLY AND FORCEFULLY. WE WILL BE BRIEFING CONGRESS THE SAME DAY THAT WE INFORM THE SOVIETS. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT USUN BRIEF SIMULTANEOUSLY ALLIED MISSIONS. THE NEXT LARGEST MISSION AFTER USUN IS THE PRC MISSION. USUN SHOULD ASSURE THE CHINESE THAT THE USG DOES NOT VIEW THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE PRC MISSION AS UNREASONABLE, AND HAS NO PLANS TO REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THAT MISSION'S SIZE.

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7. PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY: DEPARTMENT WILL ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHEN NEWS MEDIA INQUIRIES ARE RECEIVED. OUR STATEMENT AND THE PRESS GUIDANCE (PARAS 9 AND 10) SEEKS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR DECISION IS BASED ON U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND NOT AIMED AT CREATING OBSTACLES TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS. THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY EMPHASIZES THE UNREASONABLE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS, THE NON-UN RELATED BUSINESS IN WHICH THE SOVIET MISSIONS ENGAGE, THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR OUR DECISION, AND OUR CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.

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8. SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS:

-- THE UNREASONABLE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONTINUES TO BE OF CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

-- THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ARE LARGER THAN THE NEXT TWO LARGEST MISSIONS COMBINED (US - 126, PRC - 116).

-- THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE DOUBLED IN THE PAST TWO DECADES. AT PRESENT, THERE ARE 275 SOVIETS PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS; TWENTY YEARS AGO THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 130.

-- THE PRESENT SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS IS NOT WARRANTED BY STAFFING NEEDS FOR OFFICIAL UN BUSINESS.

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-- WE HAVE ON PRIOR OCCASIONS MADE KNOWN TO THE SOVIET SIDE OUR CONCERN ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITY UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS BY SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE HAS NOT DRAWN THE CORRECT CONCLUSIONS FROM OUR WARNINGS.

-- THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NO OTHER CHOICE BUT TO INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS WILL BE REDUCED TO A COMBINED TOTAL OF 170 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL BY APRIL 1, 1988. UNDER THIS CEILING, THERE WILL BE A SUBCEILING OF 10 EACH FOR THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN UN MISSIONS.

-- EVEN AFTER THESE REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE LARGEST UN MISSION REPRESENTATION.

-- IN ORDER TO MAKE THE REDUCTIONS AS SMOOTH AS POSSIBLE, THEY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN FOUR STAGES. THE SOVIET SIDE IS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS IT WISHES TO RETAIN AT EACH STEP OF THE PHASED-IN REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIET UN MISSION WILL BE LIMITED TO 218 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1986. VISAS DURING THIS TIME WILL BE ISSUED ONLY TO REPLACE IDENTIFIED POSITIONS. THE SOVIET MISSION SHOULD IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS IT WISHES TO RETAIN. THE SOVIET MISSION WILL BE LIMITED TO 218 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1986. THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD IDENTIFY THE 195 POSITIONS AT THE SOVIET UN MISSION AND THE 13 POSITIONS EACH AT THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS TO BE RETAINED AFTER APRIL 1, 1987. THE SAME PROCEDURE IS TO BE FOLLOWED TO REDUCE THE SOVIET UN MISSION TO 173 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MEMBERS BY OCTOBER 1, 1987, AND 150 MEMBERS BY APRIL 1, 1988. SEPARATE CEILING OF TEN EACH WILL BE IN PLACE FOR THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS AFTER APRIL 1, 1988.

-- WHILE WE ANTICIPATE THAT MUCH OF THE REDUCTION CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH MINIMAL DISLOCATION THROUGH ATTRITION, IT WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO ENSURE THAT THE SIZE OF ITS MISSIONS HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE APPROPRIATE LEVELS. THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ISSUE VISAS TO SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL UNLESS THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS CONFORMS WITH THE LIMITATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

-- TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL ARE NOT INCLUDED UNDER THESE LIMITATIONS. ASSIGNMENT OF TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH PAST SOVIET MISSION PRACTICE, INCLUDING THE UNGA SESSION, WILL BE PERMITTED. HOWEVER; WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPOSE SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL IF WE JUDGE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS USING TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO CIRCUMVENT THE CEILING ON THE SIZE OF THE PERMANENT STAFF OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS.

-- LIMITING THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS TO A REASONABLE SIZE IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

--WE ARE DETERMINED TO PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

-- WE WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS STEP IS TAKEN AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. WE SEE NO REASON WHY THIS MEASURE SHOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR SHARED EFFORTS TO BUILD ON

THE START MADE IN GENEVA. WE CONSIDER THE ISSUE

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UNCONNECTED TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN OTHER AREAS.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SOVIET SIDE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT IN ORDER TO ENSURE MINIMAL INCONVENIENCE.

-- ANY RETALIATION, HOWEVER, AGAINST OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WILL MEET, AS ALWAYS, WITH AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. THIS IS NOT A BILATERAL MATTER AND WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE A CYCLE OF RETALIATION AGAINST THE MISSIONS OF BOTH SIDES.

-- I WANT TO STRESS THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE CHOOSES TO START A CYCLE OF RETALIATION, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN IMBALANCE IN OUR RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATION IN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. END TALKING POINTS.

9. BEGIN TEXT OF DEPARTMENT STATEMENT: ON MARCH 7, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALLY INFORMED THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS (SOVIET, UKRAINIAN, AND BYELORUSSIAN) MUST BE REDUCED IN FOUR STAGES OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD FROM THE CURRENT LEVEL OF 275 TO A STAFFING LEVEL OF 170 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL BY APRIL 1, 1988. UNDER THIS OVERALL CEILING, THERE IS A SUBCEILING OF TEN EACH FOR THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN UN MISSIONS.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS LONG BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNREASONABLY LARGE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. THE SOVIET MISSIONS ARE LARGER THAN THE NEXT TWO LARGEST MISSIONS COMBINED. THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS IS NOT WARRANTED BY THE STAFFING NEEDS FOR OFFICIAL UN BUSINESS. MOREOVER, IT POSES A THREAT TO U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY. OVER THE YEARS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ITS CONCERN THAT SOVIET UN MISSIONS PERSONNEL HAVE ENGAGED IN INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES. THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS, UNFORTUNATELY, HAVE CONTINUED TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS, INCLUDING ESPIONAGE.

OUR ACTION IS A REASONABLE, PRUDENT STEP. WE HAVE STRUCTURED THE REDUCTIONS IN A WAY INTENDED TO TO MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS FOR THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. EVEN AFTER THE REDUCTIONS ARE ACHIEVED, THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UN WILL CONTINUE TO BE LARGER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

WE HAVE IMPOSED THIS CEILING AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN HEADQUARTERS TREATY AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS MOVE NEED HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING THE EFFORTS BEGUN BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN THEIR GENEVA MEETING TO BUILD A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE FOUNDATION FOR U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS.

10. PRESS GUIDANCE:

IF NEWS LEAKS BEFORE INFORMING SOVIETS:

Q. IS IT TRUE THAT THE U. S. IS PLANNING TO REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS?

A. WE HAVE NO COMMENT.

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Q. WHY IS THE US TAKING THIS STEP NOW, AND WON'T THIS ACTION IMPAIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR? WON'T THIS STEP COMPLICATE PROSPECTS FOR A REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT?

A. WE SEE NO REASON WHY THIS STEP SHOULD IMPAIR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS IS NOT CONNECTED TO US-SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD ON THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT. THERE IS NO REASON WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD AFFECT THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT MEETING.

Q. HOW DID YOU INFORM THE SOVIETS, AND WHAT WAS THEIR REACTION?

A. WE INFORMED THE SOVIETS AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME THAT WE INFORMED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. WE DO NOT WISH TO CHARACTERIZE CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS.

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Q. HOW WAS THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTION DETERMINED, AND HOW WILL IT BE ACHIEVED? WHAT IF THE SOVIETS DON'T COOPERATE?

A. THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS ARE LARGER THAN THE NEXT TWO LARGEST MISSIONS COMBINED (US - APPROX. 126, AND PRC APPROX. 116). MOREOVER, THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS HAVE DOUBLED IN SIZE OVER THE LAST TWO DECADES.

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THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS DO NOT JUSTIFY 275 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MISSION MEMBERS TO CONDUCT OFFICIAL UN BUSINESS. WE BELIEVE THAT 170 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL (WITH SUBCEILINGS OF TEN EACH FOR THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MISSIONS) IS AMPLE FOR THE NEEDS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. EVEN AFTER THIS REDUCTION, THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS WILL BE LARGER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY.

REDUCTIONS FROM THE PRESENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 275 TO 170 PERSONNEL WILL BE ACHIEVED IN EQUAL INCREMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND APRIL 1, 1988. WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIETS IDENTIFY AT EACH STAGE THOSE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN UNDER THE CEILING. WE WILL ONLY ISSUE VISAS TO FILL OR REPLACE IDENTIFIED POSITIONS UNDER THE CEILING.

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THESE REDUCTIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED MOSTLY THROUGH ATTRITION, AND SHOULD RESULT IN MINIMAL DISLOCATION FOR THE SOVIET MISSIONS. WE WILL MONITOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ARE ACHIEVED.

IF THE SOVIETS REFUSE TO IDENTIFY POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN UNDER THE CEILING, WE WILL ONLY ISSUE VISAS UP TO THE PERMITTED CEILING. THE FOUR TRANCHES OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD WILL REQUIRE THE SOVIET MISSION ITSELF (EXCLUDING THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN MISSIONS) TO REDUCE FROM ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 243 TO 218 BY OCTOBER 1, 1986. REDUCTIONS IN TURN WILL PROCEED ACCORDINGLY: DOWN TO 195 BY APRIL 1, 1987; DOWN TO 173 BY OCTOBER 1, 1987; AND DOWN TO 150 BY APRIL 1, 1988. SIMILARLY, THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS MUST REDUCE FROM THEIR PRESENT SIZE OF 17 AND 15, RESPECTIVELY, TO 13 EACH BY APRIL 1, 1987, AND TEN EACH BY APRIL 1, 1988.

Q. WHY ARE YOU CUTTING THE NUMBER OF SOVIETS AT THEIR UN MISSIONS IN NEW YORK WHEN YOU HAVE AGREED TO ALLOW A NEW SOVIET CONSULATE TO OPEN IN NEW YORK?

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A. THE EXACT NUMBER OF SOVIETS THAT WILL STAFF THE NEW CONSULATE IN NEW YORK, AND THE DATE OF ITS OPENING IS STILL TO BE DETERMINED. THE SIZE AND OPENING DATES, HOWEVER, WILL BE STRICTLY RECIPROCAL FOR THE SOVIET NEW

YORK CONSULATE AND THE U.S. CONSULATE IN KIEV. EVEN WITH THE ADDITION OF SOVIET CONSULATE PERSONNEL, THERE WILL BE A MAJOR REDUCTION IN THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES AS THE CUTS IN THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS ARE EFFECTED. WITH THE OPENING OF A NEW SOVIET CONSULATE, THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO CONDUCT CULTURAL, CONSULAR, TRADE, AND OTHER BILATERAL ACTIVITIES IN THE NEW YORK AREA THAT ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR UN MISSIONS. IMPOSING A PERSONNEL CEILING ON THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS SHOULD HELP LIMIT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO UN BUSINESS.

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Q. AREN'T THE SOVIETS LIKELY TO RETALIATE BY LOWERING THE NUMBER OF USG EMPLOYEES IN THE SOVIET UNION? AND WON'T THIS COMPLICATE USG EFFORTS TO INCREASE OUR OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE USSR?

A. WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS WILL BECOME AN ISSUE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE PRESENT SIZE OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL IS LIMITED TO AN OVERALL CEILING OF 320 (279 AND 41 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL, RESPECTIVELY). FOR NOW THIS IS GREATER THAN THE SIZE OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND CONSULATE GENERAL IN LENINGRAD (200 AND 28 RESPECTIVELY). THERE IS NO CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL IN THE USSR.

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AS WE ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF OUR POSTS IN THE U. S. S. R., WE WILL ALSO BE REPLACING A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SOVIET NATIONAL EMPLOYEES WITH AMERICANS. AS A RESULT, OUR OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN THE USSR WILL INCREASE, MAKING THE RESPECTIVE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT. IF THE SOVIETS RETALIATE FOR THESE REDUCTIONS IN NEW YORK, WE ARE PREPARED TO RECIPROCATATE.

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Q. DID CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE CONTRIBUTE TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION, AND HAVE YOU BRIEFED CONGRESS?

A. WE SHARE CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT. THE DEPARTMENT HAS IMPLEMENTED A NUMBER OF STEPS TO CONTROL THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT, AND IS PREPARED TO TAKE STEPS, AS NECESSARY, WHEN IT IS IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. WE HAVE ALREADY BRIEFED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON OUR DECISION.

Q. HOW WILL A REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS PROTECT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. WON'T THE SOVIET CIRCUMVENT THIS CEILING BY TASKING THEIR WARSAW PACT ALLIES AND INCREASING THE SIZE OF THOSE MISSIONS?

A. OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT DO NOT OBLIGE US TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN A MISSION OF UNLIMITED SIZE OR TO ENGAGE IN INAPPROPRIATE OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. THESE CUTS WILL RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UN, FROM THE CURRENT OVERALL TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 275 TO 170 PERSONNEL.

WE HAVE WARNED CERTAIN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THAT WE WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE WHETHER THEY ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE SLACK BY INCREASING THE SIZE OF THEIR UN MISSIONS, AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED SIMILARLY TO CONSTRAIN WARSAW PACT MISSIONS TO THE

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UN IF WE DETERMINE THAT ANY OF THEM IS INCREASING ITS PRESENCE TO COMPENSATE FOR LOST SOVIET ASSETS.

EXDIS

Q. DOES THIS CEILING APPLY TO TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL? IF NOT, ISN'T THIS A WAY FOR THE SOVIETS TO CIRCUMVENT THESE REDUCTIONS?

A. THE CEILING DOES NOT APPLY TO TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL. THERE ARE TIMES WHEN UN MISSIONS HAVE A LEGITIMATE NEED FOR TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL. AN EXAMPLE IS DURING THE UNGA OR DURING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON A PARTICULAR TOPIC. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR CLOSELY THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO ENSURE THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH ACCEPTABLE PRACTICE. WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO USE TEMPORARY DUTY PERSONNEL TO CIRCUMVENT THIS CEILING.

EXDIS

Q. BY WHAT RIGHT DOES THE USG PRESUME TO DETERMINE THE "REASONABLE SIZE" OF ANOTHER COUNTRY'S MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS? IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE REVERSED AND THE UNITED NATIONS WERE IN LENINGRAD, WOULD NOT THE US MISSION TO THE UN BE OF SIMILAR SIZE TO THAT OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN NEW YORK?

A. IN THE UN HEADQUARTERS TREATY, THE UNITED STATES RESERVED THE RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY. PERMITTING A SOVIET UN MISSION OF UNLIMITED SIZE CLEARLY WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. IN IMPOSING THIS CEILING, WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE SOVIET UNION'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD. THE CEILING WILL PERMIT THE AMPLE SOVIET PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN BUSINESS.

EXDIS

Q: WHY IS THE USG CUTTING BACK THE CEILING OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS?

A. WE CONCLUDED, AFTER CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTORS, THAT THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS (USSR, BYELORUSSIA, AND THE UKRAINE) FAR EXCEEDS THE STAFFING NEEDS THAT FLOW FROM THE CONDUCT OF UN BUSINESS. WE HAVE IMPOSED A PERSONNEL CEILING WHICH WILL ALLOW THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS ENOUGH PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN-RELATED BUSINESS, BUT CUT SHARPLY THEIR MARGIN FOR ANY ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO THE UN AND/OR DAMAGING TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. EVEN WHEN THIS CEILING IS REACHED, THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE LARGER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY'S MISSION.

EXDIS

Q. IS THIS DECISION PART OF AN ONGOING USG EFFORT TO PENALIZE THE UN BY IMPOSING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS, ARBITRARY CUTBACKS IN ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLEMICAL CRITICISM?

A. NO. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS SYSTEMATICALLY WORKED FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS TO MAKE THE UNITED NATIONS RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER. OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND AIMED TOWARD THIS GOAL.

OUR DECISION IS PART OF A MAJOR EFFORT TO COUNTER ACTIVITIES BY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO OR WORKING FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK WHICH ARE INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, SUCH AS ESPIONAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE IMPOSED LAST FALL TRAVEL MEASURES ON SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE-COUNTRY EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND ON CERTAIN EASTERN EUROPEANS.

-- OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN, ASSESSED AND VOLUNTARY, ARE IN LARGE PART A FUNCTION OF OUR DOMESTIC BUDGETARY SITUATION AND CAPABILITIES. WE ARE WORKING WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF THE UN BUDGET PROCESS, AND GREATER PROPORTIONAL INFLUENCE FOR MAJOR DONORS. WE ARE MAKING CLEAR TO UN OFFICIALS AND OTHERS THE IMPACT OF RELEVANT US LEGISLATION, INCLUDING THE KASSEBAUM AMENDMENT AND

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GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS, ON OUR UN ACCOUNTS.

Q. WHY DOES THE USSR HAVE THREE UN MISSIONS?

A. THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE LAST YEARS OF WORLD WAR II THAT LED TO THE SIGNING OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN SAN FRANCISCO IN JUNE 1945 INVOLVED SEVERAL TRADEOFFS BETWEEN THE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION. ONE TRADEOFF INVOLVED GIVING THE USSR THREE SEATS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (HENCE, THREE UN MISSIONS), IN EXCHANGE FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE HEAVILY WESTERN MAKEUP OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS (US, UK, FRANCE, CHINA, USSR). IN PRACTICE, THE THREE SOVIET MISSIONS ACT AS ONE.

Q. HOW DID YOU INFORM THE SECRETARY GENERAL? WHAT WAS THE UNSYG'S REACTION?

A. WE HAVE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON DETAILS OF CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS.

Q. HOW IS THIS DECISION RELATED TO THE 1985 MOVES TO IMPOSE TRAVEL CONTROLS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET AND OTHER "HOSTILE-NATION" EMPLOYEES IN THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND TO REQUIRE SELECTED EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS AND EAST EUROPEAN EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT TO USE THE SERVICES OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL IN THE UNITED STATES?

A. THE ADMINISTRATION IS DETERMINED TO COMBAT ESPIONAGE AND OTHER ACTIVITIES INIMICAL TO U.S. INTERESTS. WE ARE MAKING A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT TO ENHANCE OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. THIS EFFORT INCLUDES THE DECISION INVOLVING THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS, TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET AND OTHER HOSTILE COUNTRY EMPLOYEES OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT SELECTED EASTERN EUROPEANS IN THIS COUNTRY USE OFM TRAVEL SERVICES FOR OFFICIAL TRAVEL. EACH OF THESE ACTIONS WAS TAKEN ON ITS OWN MERITS AND AFTER A CAREFUL WEIGHING OF OUR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

Q. IS THIS ACTION LEGAL? DOES IT CONFORM WITH USG OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND THE UN CHARTER?

A. LIMITING THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS TO A REASONABLE SIZE IS CONSISTENT WITH USG OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, THE UN CHARTER, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, RELEVANT TREATIES INCLUDE THE 1947 TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE FOR THE UNITED STATES, PURSUANT TO CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION ON NOVEMBER 27, 1947, AND THE CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH, PURSUANT TO SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT, ENTERED INTO FORCE FOR THE UNITED STATES APRIL 29, 1970. NEITHER OF THESE INSTRUMENTS CONTAINS PROVISIONS THAT EXPLICITLY DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF THE SIZE OF MISSIONS OF UN MEMBERS. NOWHERE IN THESE TREATIES IS THERE ANY SUGGESTION THAT A MEMBER STATE MAY UNILATERALLY ABUSE ITS RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION BY STAFFING ITS UN MISSION WITH A MULTIPLE OF THE NUMBER OR RANGE OF PERSONNEL THAT ITS REPRESENTATION REQUIREMENTS OBJECTIVELY WARRANT. THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF THE SWOLLEN SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS OF THE PAST YEARS CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF THE RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION. THE UNITED STATES, ACTING WITHIN ITS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AS A PARTY TO THE UN HEADQUARTERS TREATY AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES, IS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING TO CORRECT THIS ABNORMAL AND WRONGFUL SITUATION.

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AS INDICATED ELSEWHERE IN OUR STATEMENTS, U. S. ACTION IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET MISSIONS DOES NOT PRESAGE SIMILAR ACTION WITH RESPECT TO OTHER MEMBER STATES OF THE UN.

Q. WHAT OTHER UN MISSIONS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THIS DECISION?

A. NONE. WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO IMPOSE CEILINGS ON OTHER UN MISSIONS.

Q. WHY ARE YOU NOT IMPOSING CEILINGS ON THE PRC UN MISSION AND OTHER "UNFRIENDLY" MISSIONS (NICARAGUA, IRAN, LIBYA, ETC.)?

A. AS NOTED, WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO IMPOSE CEILINGS ON OTHER MISSIONS. THE SIZE OF OTHER COUNTRIES' MISSIONS IS NOT UNREASONABLE GIVEN THEIR STAFFING NEEDS.

Q. WHY DID THE U. S. ALLOW THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS TO GROW TO SUCH AN "UNREASONABLE" SIZE?

A. THROUGH THE YEARS WE HAVE MONITORED THE GROWTH AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, WE HAVE WARNED THE SOVIETS ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS. THESE MISSIONS ARE NOT SURROGATE EMBASSIES OF CONSULATES FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIET MISSIONS ON OCCASION HAVE ENGAGED IN CONSULAR, CULTURAL, TRADE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES UNRELATED TO UN BUSINESS. WE RECENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET MISSIONS HAD REACHED A SIZE FAR BEYOND WHAT THEY NEED TO CONDUCT LEGITIMATE UN-RELATED BUSINESS. THE NEW CEILING IS AN EFFORT TO CUT THEM BACK TO A REASONABLE SIZE. IT IS ALSO A REASONABLE, PRUDENT STEP TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE.

Q. WHAT EVIDENCE DO YOU HAVE THAT THE PERSONNEL AT THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS HAVE ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE?

A. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS WE ARE UNABLE TO MAKE PUBLIC CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ABOUT ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS.

THE LAST TIME A SOVIET UN MISSION MEMBER WAS PUBLICLY PNGED WAS 1983 (FIRST SECRETARY ANATOLIY MALNEV). SINCE THAT TIME, THERE HAVE BEEN UNPUBLICIZED EXPULSIONS.

Q. DO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES BY SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO BE A PROBLEM

A. WE CAN CONFIRM THAT SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES. A RECENT PUBLICATION THAT MAKES REFERENCE TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL IS ARKADY SHEVCHENCKO'S RECENT BOOK, BREAKING WITH MOSCOW.

Q. WHAT ABOUT SPYING BY MOSCOW'S WARSAW PACT ALLIES? AND SHOULDN'T THEIR MISSIONS BE SIMILARLY LIMITED?

A. ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IS OF CONCERN TO US WHATEVER THE COUNTRY. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR ALL HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE NO CURRENT PLANS TO LIMIT THE MISSIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SIZE OF THE EAST EUROPEAN MISSIONS IS AS FOLLOWS: BULGARIA - 24, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 20, GDR - 39, HUNGARY - 22, POLAND - 22, ROMANIA - 13.

11. DIPLOMATIC NOTE. (APPROPRIATE SALUTATION AND CLOSURE TO BE PROVIDED BY USUN.) BEGIN TEXT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE UN MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION, BYELORUSSIA, AND THE UKRAINE HAVE TOGETHER REACHED A SIZE THAT FAR EXCEEDS THE STAFFING NEEDS ARISING FROM THE PURSUIT OF UN-RELATED BUSINESS. SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE THE SOLE REASON FOR WHICH SOVIET UN PERSONNEL ARE ADMITTED INTO THE

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UNITED STATES.

FROM TIME TO TIME THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE KNOWN TO THE SOVIET MISSION ITS CONCERN ABOUT INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN BUSINESS UNRELATED TO UN AFFAIRS AND INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR STATUS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSION HAS CONTINUED A STEADY GROWTH. IT IS NOW DOUBLE WHAT IT WAS 20 YEARS AGO.

THE UNITED STATES REGRETS THAT THE SOVIET MISSION HAS NOT DRAWN THE CORRECT CONCLUSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES HAS DECIDED TO REDUCE THE COLLECTIVE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSION IN STAGES TO 150 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL BY APRIL 1, 1988. THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO A CEILING OF 10 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL EACH. THIS WILL PROVIDE FOR AN OVERALL TOTAL OF 170 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL FOR THE THREE SOVIET UN MISSIONS.

TO FACILITATE THE SMOOTH ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIET MISSIONS SHOULD LOWER IN STAGES THEIR LEVEL OF PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL. THE SOVIET MISSIONS SHOULD IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN AT EACH STAGE OF THE REDUCTIONS. THE UNITED STATES WILL ISSUE ENTRY VISAS ONLY

TO PERSONS ASSIGNED TO FILL IDENTIFIED POSITIONS.

EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1986, THE SOVIET MISSION TO TH UNITED NATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO 218 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MISSION MEMBERS. THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS (AND THE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL WHO OCCUPY THOSE POSITIONS) TO BE RETAINED AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1986.

EFFECTIVE APRIL 1, 1987, THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO 195 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MEMBERS. AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME THE SOVIET MISSION SHOULD IDENTIFY 195 POSITIONS, AND THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS SHOULD IDENTIFY 13 POSITIONS TO BE RETAINED AFTER APRIL 1, 1987.

SIMILARLY, THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE LIMITED TO 173 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MEMBERS EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1987. AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS TO BE RETAINED AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1987.

FINALLY, THE SOVIET MISSION WILL BE LIMITED TO 150 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MEMBERS, AND THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS WILL EACH BE LIMITED TO 10 PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED MEMBERS EFFECTIVE APRIL 1, 1988. THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS TO BE RETAINED AFTER APRIL 1, 1988.

THE UNITED STATES IS CONFIDENT THAT THESE REDUCTIONS CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY ACHIEVED BY ATTRITION. IT WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO ENSURE THAT THE THREE MISSIONS REACH THE INDICATED LEVELS OF MISSION STAFFING.

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED ON TEMPORARY DUTY STATUS ARE NOT INCLUDED UNDER THESE CEILINGS. THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS THAT THE SOVIET MISSION WILL FOLLOW A POLICY OF ASSIGNING TDY PERSONNEL WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH ITS PAST PRACTICE. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL NOT PERMIT THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO USE TDY PERSONNEL TO CIRCUMVENT THE NEW CEILINGS.

SHOULD THE SOVIET SIDE REFUSE TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE REDUCTIONS, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE STEPS TO ASSURE THAT THESE REDUCTIONS ARE ACHIEVED.

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SHOULD THE SOVIET SIDE CHOOSE TO START A CYCLE OF RETALIATION, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD LEAD TO AN IMBALANCE IN OUR RESPECTIVE LEVELS OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION. WE WANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS STEP IS TAKEN AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO WISH TO HAVE THIS MEASURE ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR SHARED EFFORTS TO BUILD ON PROGRESS MADE AT THE NOVEMBER 1985 MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SOVIET MISSION IN IMPLEMENTING THIS REQUIREMENT IN A TIMELY MANNER.  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00592

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR WALTERS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CEILING ON SOVIET UN MISSIONS:  
- OKUN-SAFRONCHUK MEETING

REF: STATE 068011

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR OKUN MARCH 7 DELIVERED THE  
NOTE REQUIRING PHASED REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE  
SOVIET UN MISSIONS USING REFTEL TALKING POINTS. AS  
EXPECTED SOVIET ACTING PERMREP SAFRONCHUK

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CHARACTERIZED U.S. ACTIONS AS ARBITRARY, UNWARRANTED, UNPRECEDENTED AND ILLEGAL. HE SAID THAT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD INEVITABLY BE AFFECTED. HE SOUGHT TO DEFEND SMUN'S SIZE BY CITING GROWTH OF UN ACTIVITIES AND SMUN'S NEED TO IMPORT ALL PERSONNEL. WE EXPECT THE DEFINITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE WILL LIKELY PORTRAY THE U.S. ACTION AS A BLOW AGAINST BILATERAL RELATIONS AND UNJUSTIFIED IN THE LIGHT OF OBJECTIVE SMUN NEEDS. END SUMMARY.

3. PER REFTEL AMBASSADOR OKUN MET WITH USSR ACTING PERMREP SAFRONCHUK MORNING MARCH 7, CONCERNING REDUCTION IN SIZE OF SOVIET UN MISSION. USUN COUNSELOR MOLLER AND REIS ACCOMPANIED. SMUN MINISTER OLEANDROV AND FIRST SECRETARY SBIRUNOV ALSO ATTENDED.

4. OKUN CAREFULLY READ TALKING POINTS AND GAVE NOTE TO SAFRONCHUK. SAFRONCHUK OBSERVED OKUN HAD MADE A VERY IMPORTANT STATEMENT THAT WOULD CERTAINLY BE COMMUNICATED TO MFA, WHERE IT WOULD BE STUDIED THOROUGHLY. HE SAID HIS FIRST IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE U.S. HAD RAISED A LARGE NUMBER OF SERIOUS QUESTIONS THAT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT U.S.-USSR RELATIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE U.S. DENIAL OF AN INTENTION OF MAKING THIS A BILATERAL ISSUE. HIS PRELIMINARY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE U.S. ACTION WAS NOT WARRANTED, WAS WITHOUT FOUNDATION, WAS UNPRECEDENTED, AND WAS IN VIOLATION OF U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE FORCED TO DRAW ALL THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS VERY ARBITRARY ACTION.

5. SAFRONCHUK REJECTED THE U.S. DESCRIPTION OF THE GROWTH OF SMUN AS UNWARRANTED. THE BUSINESS OF THE



UN HAD INCREASED GREATLY IN THE LAST DECADES, UN MEMBERSHIP HAD DOUBLED IN THE LAST 20 YEARS, AND THE NUMBER OF UN BODIES ON WHICH THE USSR HAD TO BE REPRESENTED HAS GREATLY INCREASED. THIS INCREASE IN WORK MUST NECESSARILY BE REFLECTED IN AN INCREASE IN THE SMUN'S SIZE. HE REJECTED AS ARBITRARY AND UNFOUNDED THE CHARGE THAT SOME SMUN PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED IN NON-UN ACTIVITIES. CONSIDERING THAT USUN EMPLOYS PERSONS LOCALLY, ITS EFFECTIVE SIZE WAS MORE NEARLY THAT OF 300 OR 360, HE SAID. IN CONTRAST ALL SMUN STAFF, INCLUDING MENIAL WORKERS, HAD TO BE BROUGHT FROM THE USSR.

6. SAFRONCHUK ADDED THAT SMUN IS IN THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE THE UN IS HERE. THE SOVIET PERMREP IS ACCREDITED TO THE SYG, NOT TO THE U.S. IF ANYONE WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE A SAY AS TO THE SIZE OF MISSIONS, IT WOULD BE THE SYG, NOT THE U.S. NOT ONLY THE USSR BUT OTHER UN MEMBERS WOULD HAVE TO DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. THIS ACTION WAS ALSO AN ATTACK ON THE UN. THE UN WAS FREE TO GO ELSEWHERE IF THE U.S. WOULD NOT HONOR ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

7. SAFRONCHUK SAID NOT ONLY WAS THE U.S. VIOLATING EXISTING LEGAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, BUT UNDER DEVELOPING NORMS IN THE (1975 VIENNA) CONVENTION ON REPRESENTATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (COMMENT: NOT IN FORCE; USSR HAS SIGNED). FINALLY, SMUN COULD NOT ACCEPT THE U.S. NOTE ON BEHALF OF THE BYELORUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN UN MISSIONS. SMUN WAS NOT A POST OFFICE.

8. OKUN RE-EMPHASIZED THE U.S. WISH THAT THIS MATTER

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NOT HAVE BILATERAL EFFECTS. IF THERE WERE TO BE SUCH, IT WOULD BE DUE TO THE SOVIET POSITION, NOT OURS AND THE USSR WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. OKUN SPELLED OUT OUR REJECTION OF BT

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00592

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR WALTERS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CEILING ON SOVIET UN MISSIONS:

SAFRONCHUK'S DESCRIPTION OF U. S. ACTIONS AS ILLEGAL, POINTING OUT THAT NEITHER THE UN CHARTER NOR THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT GIVES A UN MEMBER THE RIGHT TO INCREASE ITS STAFF TO A SWOLLEN NUMBER BEYOND WHAT IS WARRANTED BY ITS NEEDS. THERE IS AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS, WHICH OUR NOTE FULLY ENTAILS. THIS IS A MATTER ON WHICH THE U. S. IS ENTITLED AS A PARTY TO THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT TO HAVE ITS VIEWS.

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9. OKUN RECALLED LONG-STANDING U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMPT SMUN TO REDUCE ITS PERSONNEL. EVEN AFTER THE REDUCTION NOW BEING CALLED FOR, HE STRESSED THAT SMUN WOULD REMAIN THE LARGEST UN MISSION IN NEW YORK. IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY ABLE TO CARRY OUT ITS UN DUTIES EFFECTIVELY. AS NOTED, USUN WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH SMUN IN IMPLEMENTING THE ACTIONS REQUIRED BY THE NOTE. IN RESPONSE TO SAFRONCHUK'S QUESTION, OKUN CONFIRMED THAT THE REDUCTION APPLIES TO SMUN PERMANENT STAFF, NOT TO AD HOC PERSONNEL UPSURGES DUE TO UNGA OR ECOSOC SESSIONS.

10. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH SAFRONCHUK'S STATEMENT THAT THE USSR WOULD PRODUCE OBJECTIVE FACTS TO DISPROVE THE U.S. THESIS. OKUN SAID THAT OUR DISAGREEMENT WAS PLAIN AND REITERATED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING UNWARRANTED, ILLEGAL OR ARBITRARY IN THE U.S. ACTION. IN CONCLUSION HE NOTED THAT THE USG HAD ATTACHED A SECURITY RESERVATION TO OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

11. LATER MARCH 7 MORNING OKUN BRIEFED THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE U.S. NOTE AND THE MEETING AT SMUN. HE SAID WE WISHED TO KEEP THE SYG INFORMED, ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT ASK FOR ANY ACTION ON HIS PART. PEREZ DE CUELLAR APPRECIATED THE BRIEFING. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SAFRONCHUK WOULD SEEK TO INVOLVE HIM IN THE MATTER, BUT IN ANY CASE HE WOULD KEEP THE U.S. INFORMED. OKUN NOTED THE REDUCTION INVOLVES SMUN ONLY, AND THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT ENGAGING IN ANY ATTACK ON THE UN AND THE CONDUCT OF UN BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES.

12. COMMENT: THE MEETING WAS SOBER AND SERIOUS. NOTEWORTHY BY ITS ABSENCE FROM SAFRONCHUK'S

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PRESENTATION WAS THREAT TO RETALIATE AGAINST EMBASSY MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT YET COME. BASED ON SAFRONCHUK'S COMMENTS, WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE TO STRESS THAT OUR ACTION; (A) IS DESIGNED TO HARM U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS; (B) IS UNWARRANTED; (C) HURTS LEGITIMATE SOVIET NEEDS FOR A LARGE STAFF; (D) VIOLATES HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT; AND (E) IS AN ATTACK ON THE UN. WE ARE WELL POSITIONED TO COUNTER THESE CHARGES SINCE, EVEN AFTER CUTS, SOVIETS WILL STILL HAVE LARGEST UN MISSION.

13. WE WILL BE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON BRIEFINGS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN, CHINESE AND REPRESENTATIVE WESTERN EUROPEAN MISSIONS.

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5142

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0305  
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 071362

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, OFDP, PINR, PINS, UR  
SUBJECT: RIDGWAY-SOKOLOV MEETING ON REDUCTIONS IN THE  
- SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS  
REF: STATE 068011

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY MET WITH SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELOR SOKOLOV AT 3:30 P.M., MARCH 7, AND DELIVERED TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL. SOKOLOV WAS UNAWARE THAT USUN HAD INFORMED THE SOVIET UN

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MISSION EARLIER SAME DAY. HE CHARACTERIZED THE ACTION AS AN UNFRIENDLY STEP THAT WAS BOUND TO HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

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3. SOKOLOV BEGAN BY STATING THAT HE HAD JUST FINISHED SPEAKING TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, WHO WOULD BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON AGAIN BEFORE RESUMING HIS NEW DUTIES IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT. THE DATE OF RETURN WAS STILL UNCLEAR.

4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY DELIVERED TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL, AND STRESSED THAT THERE WAS NO REASON

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OUR DECISION TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS SHOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. SHE EMPHASIZE THE UNREASONABLY LARGE SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS, AND THE EXTENSIVE GROWTH IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL AS THE LEGITIMATE BASIS OF USG CONCERN. THE REDUCTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO BRING THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS DOWN TO A REASONABLE NUMBER WITH A MINIMAL DEGREE OF DISLOCATION. THE US SIDE IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SOVIET MISSIONS TO EFFECT THE REDUCTIONS IN AS SMOOTH A MANNER AS POSSIBLE. WE, THEREFORE, WERE REQUESTING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IDENTIFY THE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN.

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5. SOKOLOV, WHO WAS GIVEN A COPY OF THE TALKING POINTS, SAID THE UPSHOT OF OUR ACTION IS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL VIEW OUR ACTION IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. QUOTE THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY IT COULD BE VIEWED. UNQUOTE. HE COMPLAINED THAT IT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST THE USSR, AND WAS AN UNFRIENDLY ACTION.

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6. RIDGWAY AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT THIS STEP WAS UNCONNECTED TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. SHE SAW NO REASON WHY IT HAD TO DAMAGE US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. AFTER THE CUTS, THE SOVIET MISSIONS WOULD STILL BE LARGER THAN THAT OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY. WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE THE REDUCTIONS PRINCIPALLY THROUGH ATTRITION WITH MINIMAL DISLOCATIONS. WE WERE REQUESTING, THEREFORE, THAT THE SOVIETS IDENTIFY THOSE POSITIONS THEY WISH TO RETAIN AT EACH STAGE UNDER THE PLANNED REDUCTIONS. VISAS WILL ONLY BE ISSUED TO SOVIET UN MISSION PERSONNEL IF THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS CONFORMS WITH THE CEILING. IF THE SOVIETS RETALIATE AGAINST OUR POSTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, WE ARE NOT PREPARED, RIDGWAY STRESSED, TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME THAT RESULTS IN AN IMBALANCE IN THE RESPECTIVE SIZE OF OUR MISSIONS.

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7. SOKOLOV REMARKED THAT THE STEP WAS UNEXPECTED. SOKOLOV ALSO ASKED WHO AT THE UN MISSION HAD BEEN INFORMED BY AMBASSADOR OKUN (FYI DEPUTY PERM REP SAFRONCHUK) OF OUR DECISION EARLIER THE SAME DAY INDICATING HE HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SOVIET UN MISSION. WITHOUT ELABORATING, SOKOLOV CONCLUDED BY

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SAYING THAT THIS STEP CAME AT A QUOTE MOST INOPPORTUNE TIME UNQUOTE IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE ALSO IMPLIED THAT A US GOVERNMENT AGENCY OTHER THAN THE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACTION.

8. IN REPLY, RIDGWAY COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE IS NEVER A GOOD TIME FOR THESE KINDS OF THINGS, WE BELIEVED THAT THE UNWARRANTED SIZE OF THE SOVIET UN MISSIONS REQUIRED US TO TAKE THIS STEP. SHE MADE CLEAR ALSO THAT



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THE DEPARTMENT WAS NOT QUOTE MERELY DELIVERING THE MAIL UNQUOTE. THE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN THE PRINCIPAL DECISION MAKER ON THIS QUESTION, WITH THE SECRETARY HIMSELF TAKING A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE ISSUE.

9. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO REPORT COUNTRY/MISSION REACTIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT AND USUN.

EXDIS

10. PER REFTEL, DEPARTMENT STATEMENT AND PRESS GUIDANCE WAS RELEASED ONLY AFTER PRESS INQUIRIES WERE RECEIVED LATE AFTERNOON MARCH 7.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2841

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8001

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 00608

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CEILING ON SOVIET UN MISSIONS;  
SYG-OKUN MEETING MARCH 10

REF: STATE 68011

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR OKUN MET WITH SYG AT LATTER'S REQUEST AFTERNOON MARCH 10 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF USG DECISION TO REQUIRE THE SOVIET MISSION TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF ITS STAFF. ALSO PRESENT WERE SYG'S LEGAL COUNSEL FLEISCHAUER AND HIS SPECIAL ASSISTANT DE SOTO AS WELL AS USUN POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR IMMERMAN, HOST COUNTRY COUNSELOR MOLLER AND ADVISER REIS.

3. NOTING THAT HE HAD NOT OFFERED ANY IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO OUR NOTE VERBALE OF MARCH 7 (RETEL), SYG GAVE AMB OKUN A "NON-PAPER" CONTAINING THE SECRETARIAT'S THINKING ON THE ISSUE (FULL TEXT PARA 8). HE SAID THE NON-PAPER REFLECTED HIS "VERY STRONG FEELING" THAT THE U. S. AND USSR SHOULD TRY TO RESOLVE THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE THROUGH CONSULTATIONS. USUN ANALYSIS OF NON-PAPER FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.

4. SYG INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE AT THE DISPOSAL OF BOTH SIDES AND READY TO ASSIST THE U. S. IN TRYING TO PREVENT THIS ISSUE FROM HAVING A BAD EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS. HE HAD REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING PUBLICLY, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HE WAS STUDYING THE MATTER, AND WISHED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO AVOID DRAMATIZING IT. HE WOULD BE PRESENTING THE SAME NON-PAPER TO SOVIET ACTING PERM REP SAFRONCHUK LATER MARCH 10 BUT DID NOT PLAN TO MAKE IT PUBLIC AND HOPED WE WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING SO.

5. AMBASSADOR OKUN SAID THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY TRANSMIT THE NON-PAPER AND SYG'S COMMENTS TO WASHINGTON. HE REITERATED THAT AS HOST COUNTRY THE USG BELIEVED WE

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WERE WITHIN OUR RIGHTS TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSION BUT THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF HARMING BILATERAL RELATIONS. WHILE HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE ANY OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE SYG'S SUGGESTION THAT WE CONSULT WITH THE SOVIETS, HE HAD TOLD SAFRONCHUK ON MARCH 7 THAT THE U. S. MISSION WISHED TO WORK WITH THEM TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE NEW PROCEDURES. THIS SUGGESTED A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION.

EXDIS

6. THE SYG ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE U. S. PROPOSAL. AMBASSADOR OKUN THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT WASHINGTON WOULD CHANGE ITS POSITION ON EITHER THE NEED FOR REDUCTIONS OR THE MANNER OF IMPLEMENTATION, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE HAD PROVIDED FOR A PHASED REDUCTION OVER A TWO-YEAR PERIOD, WERE NOT PREVENTING THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE USUAL NUMBER OF TDY PERSONNEL AND WERE PERMITTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORK.

EXDIS

7. THE SYG ASKED WHETHER THE U. S. NOTE VERBALE WAS CONFIDENTIAL. AMBASSADOR OKUN REPLIED THAT WHILE THE USG DID NOT PLAN TO RELEASE IT, WE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE SOVIETS MAKING IT PUBLIC. THE SYG SAID THAT HE WOULD INFORM US OF THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS MEETING WITH SAFRONCHUK.

8. BEGIN TEXT OF SYG'S NON-PAPER:

EXDIS

---ON 7 MARCH 1986, THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS HANDED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR HIS INFORMATION A COPY OF A NOTE VERBALE, OF THE SAME DATE, WHICH HAD BEEN DELIVERED BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE PERMANENT MISSION

OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. IN THIS NOTE THE UNITED STATES CALLS FOR A PHASED REDUCTION, OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS, OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND ALSO TO THE PERMANENT MISSIONS OF THE BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC.

EXDIS

---IN BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AS IS CLEARLY REFLECTED IN ARTICLE 11 OF THE 1961 VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, IT IS FOR THE RECEIVING STATE TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF A DIPLOMATIC MISSION WHICH IT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT FROM A SENDING STATE. 1/ IN REACHING SUCH A DETERMINATION, IN THIS RESPECT, NATIONAL SECURITY AND OTHER FACTORS ARE DOUBTLESS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLE IS ONE OF RECIPROCITY.

---HOWEVER, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND PROCEDURES ALSO HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHERE MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE CONCERNED DUE TO THE FACT THAT SUCH

(RECATEGORIZED EXDIS PER ROBER PACE, S/S-O)

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 00608

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CEILING ON SOVIET UN MISSIONS:

MISSIONS ARE NOT ACCREDITED TO THE HOST COUNTRY, AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY RECIPROCITY IS NOT POSSIBLE. THE TEST IS AN OBJECTIVE ONE, NAMELY WHAT IS REASONABLE AND NORMAL HAVING REGARD TO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION, THE NEEDS OF THE PARTICULAR MISSION AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS IN THE HOST STATE. THIS TEST IS EMBODIED IN ARTICLE 14 OF THE 1975 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE REPRESENTATION OF STATES IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 2/ WHILE THIS CONVENTION IS NOT YET IN FORCE, IT REFLECTS A COMMON CONSENSUS ON THE MATTER.

---AS FAR AS MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE CONCERNED, IF THE HOST STATE HAS ANY RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE SIZE OF A MISSION, SUCH RESERVATIONS ARE TO BE RESOLVED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND, IF THESE FAIL, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES. 3/

---THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT OF 1947 BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANYTHING DIFFERENT, AND FORESEES IN SECTION 15 (2) AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SENDING STATE, THE HOST COUNTRY AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON STAFF TO BE ASSIGNED TO MISSIONS. 4/

---IN THE PAST HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION, NO CASE HAS ARISEN WHERE THE HOST STATE HAS CALLED FOR CEIINGS ON OR REDUCTIONS IN THE SIZE OF MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

---IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE PRESENT CASE CAN BE RESOLVED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AS INDICATED BY THE APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW, AND IN KEEPING WITH ARTICLE I OF THE CHARTER ACCORDING TO WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS IS TO BE A CENTRE FOR HARMONIZING THE ACTION OF NATIONS IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE COMMON ENDS SPELT OUT AS THE PURPOSES OF THE ORGANIZATION.

10 MARCH 1986

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FOOTNOTES

1/ ARTICLE 11 (1) OF THE 1961 VIENNA CONVENTION PROVIDES THAT:

"IN THE ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENT AS TO THE SIZE OF THE MISSION, THE RECEIVING STATE MAY REQUIRE THAT THE SIZE OF THE MISSION BE KEPT WITHIN LIMITS CONSIDERED BY IT TO BE REASONABLE AND NORMAL, HAVING REGARD TO CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS IN THE RECEIVING STATE AND TO THE NEEDS OF THE PARTICULAR MISSION."

2/ ARTICLE 14 OF THE 1975 VIENNA CONVENTION PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SIZE OF THE MISSION SHALL NOT EXCEED WHAT IS REASONABLE AND NORMAL, HAVING REGARD TO THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION, THE NEEDS OF THE PARTICULAR MISSIONS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS IN THE HOST STATE."

3/ THE COMMENTARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON WHAT BECAME ARTICLE 14 OF THE 1975 VIENNA CONVENTION PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:

"IN THIS RESPECT, THE COMMISSION WISHES TO OBSERVE THAT, UNLIKE THE CASE OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY, THE MEMBERS OF MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. NOR ARE THEY ACCREDITED TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PROPER SENSE OF THE WORD. AS WILL BE SEEN IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES, REMEDY FOR THE GRIEVANCES WHICH THE HOST STATE OR THE ORGANIZATION MAY HAVE AGAINST THE PERMANENT MISSIONS OR ONE OF ITS MEMBERS CANNOT BE SOUGHT IN THE

PREROGATIVES WHICH DERIVE FROM THE FACT THAT DIPLOMATIC ENVOYS ARE ACCREDITED TO THE RECEIVING STATE AND FROM THE LATTER'S INHERENT RIGHT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, TO REFUSE TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH THE SENDING STATE. IN THE CASE OF MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SENDING STATE IN THE COMPOSITION OF ITS MISSION AND THE CHOICE OF ITS MEMBERS MUST BE RECOGNIZED IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. REMEDIES AGAINST ANY MISUSE OF THAT FREEDOM MUST BE SOUGHT IN THE CONSULTATION AND CONCILIATION PROCEDURE (S)...."

(UPGRADED EXDIS PER ROBER PACE, S/S-O)

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 00608

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CEILING ON SOVIET UN MISSIONS:

4/ SECTION 15 (1) REFERS TO PRINCIPAL RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES AND SECTION 15 (2) TO "SUCH RESIDENT MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS AS MAY BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER CONCERNED" WHO SHALL "BE ENTITLED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SAME PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES" AS ARE ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC ENVOYS ACCREDITED TO THE UNITED STATES.

END TEXT.  
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(UPGRADED EXDIS PER ROBER PACE, S/S-O)

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*Amby*  
*Whitaker*

EXDIS

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR REED

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR, UN  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL CEILING ON SOVIET UN MISSION:  
- SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NON-PAPER

REF: USUN 608

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S "NON-PAPER" WILL BE REGARDED BY THE USSR AS EXTREMELY UNHELPFUL. WHILE THE NON-PAPER OBSERVES THAT THERE IS NO PRECEDENT IN THE HISTORY OF THE UN FOR A REDUCTION ON THE SIZE OF A MEMBER STATE'S MISSION, IT MAKES NO CHARACTERIZATION WHATEVER OF SUCH A COMPELLED REDUCTION AS ILLEGAL, ARBITRARY, UNWARRANTED, ETC. ON THE CONTRARY, IT EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZES THAT THE SIZE OF THE MISSION SHALL NOT EXCEED WHAT IS REASONABLE AND NORMAL. IT TAKES NO POSITION ON WHETHER THE SOVIET MISSION IS UNREASONABLE AND ABNORMAL. IT THUS OFFERS NO SUPPORT FOR WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE EMERGING SOVIET POSITION THAT THERE CAN BE NO LIMIT.

3. IN HANDING THE NON-PAPER TO AMBASSADOR OKUN, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STRESSED HIS DESIRE PERSONALLY TO BE HELPFUL, IF THE U. S. THINKS IT APPROPRIATE, IN ANY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SMUN AND USUN. LIKewise, HE OFFERED THE SERVICES OF HIS UN LEGAL COUNSEL, FLEISCHHAUER (FRG NATIONAL), IF WE WISHED THEM. PRESUMABLY HE HAD IN MIND THE QUIET ROLE THE UN PLAYED IN SECURING THE DEPARTURE OF THE NORTH KOREAN SECRETARY O IN 1984, WHICH THE U. S. HAD SO LONG SOUGHT. THIS IS THE CONTEXT OF THE OBSERVATION IN THE NOTE THAT "... IF THE HOST STATE HAS ANY RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE SIZE OF A MISSION, SUCH RESERVATIONS ARE TO BE RESOLVED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS AND, IF THESE FAIL, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES."

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4. AS NOTED REFTEL, SECRETARY-GENERAL WILL HAVE GIVEN THE NON-PAPER TO SMUN ACTING PERMREP SAFRONCHUK LATER MARCH 10. WE SHOULD PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF THE NON-PAPER FOR THE TIME BEING.  
WALTERS

NOTE BY OC/T: MESSAGE UPGRADED EXDIS PER S/S MR. WAGNER  
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EXDIS

LONDON FOR AMBASSADOR REED

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OFDP, PINR, PINS, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: UN: SOVIET MISSIONS REDUCTIONS: NEW YORK  
-- STATUS -- MARCH 11

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 4058; (B) USUN 593; (C) STATE 71362;  
-- (D) USUN 608 (EXDIS)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SOVIETS HAVE COMPLAINED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT THE SMUN REDUCTION, CLAIMING IT IS AIMED AT THE UN. THEY WILL RAISE THE MATTER IN THE HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE MARCH 13. END SUMMARY.

3. SOVIET COMPLAINT TO SYG: UNSYG CHIEF OF CABINET DAYAL TELEPHONED AMBASSADOR OKUN MARCH 11 TO REPORT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING SMUN REDUCTIONS.

4. DAYAL SAID ACTING SOVIET PERMREP SAFRONCHUK HAD CALLED ON THE SYG LATE MARCH 10 "TO COMPLAIN BITTERLY" ABOUT THE USG ACTION. SAFRONCHUK NOTED HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND WOULD RETURN TO THE MATTER AGAIN. SAFRONCHUK'S LINE WITH THE SYG WAS THAT OUR ACTION, IN REALITY, WAS AIMED AT THE UNITED NATIONS, THAT THE USSR COULD LOOK AFTER ITSELF AND WOULD SURVIVE, BUT THE UN WAS REALLY THE U. S. TARGET.

5. THE SYG SHOWED SAFRONCHUK THE NON-PAPER HE HAD PASSED TO US MARCH 10 (REF. D). SAFRONCHUK REACTED NEGATIVELY, CLAIMING THAT THE SYG'S NON-PAPER "DID NOT DRAW CONCLUSIONS," I. E. DID NOT STATE THAT THE USG ACTION WAS ILLEGAL. (DAYAL ADDED THAT THE PAPER, OF COURSE, HAD NO SUCH INTENT.)

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PAGE 02 OF 02 USMISSION USUN NEW 0621 DTG: 120204Z MAR 86 PSN: 069356

6. AMBASSADOR OKUN THANKED DAYAL FOR THE INFORMATION; TOLD HIM AGAIN THAT THE USG ACTION WAS LEGAL AND WAS BASED ON THE SWOLLEN SIZE OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS, A MATTER WHICH WAS NOT IN DOUBT GIVEN THE NUMBERS; SAID THAT THE MEASURE WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THE UN, AS THE SOVIETS ALLEGED; SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO ESCALATE THE ISSUE THEY OF COURSE COULD SO SO, BUT THAT IT WAS OUR DESIRE THAT THIS NOT HARM OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

7. SOVIET ACTION IN HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE: CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR MOUSHOUTAS, HEAD OF THE UN'S HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE, TOLD AMBASSADOR OKUN AFTERNOON MARCH 11 THAT HE HAD GRANTED A SOVIET REQUEST TO CONVENE AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON MARCH 13. HE NOTED THAT SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO STIMULATE GENERALIZED CONCERN AMONG MEMBERSHIP OVER USG ACTION IN LIMITING SIZE OF SMUN. WALTERS  
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*Jack Matlock*

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*File*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 31, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH  
CRAIG P. COY

SUBJECT: Reduction of Overseas Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic Missions

Attached at Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to Nicholas Platt forwarding comments on a State Department proposed Presidential Directive (Tab II) to reduce the size of all U.S. overseas missions.

NSDD-207, the National Program for Combatting Terrorism, directed a review of personnel levels at high-threat locations and called for an increase in human intelligence gathering and law enforcement exchanges (Tab III).

The memo at Tab I indicates that NSDD-207 provides the Presidential authority for the Secretary of State to conduct a review of personnel levels overseas. Therefore, another directive is not required.

Ken deGraffenreid, Ray Burghardt, Jock Covey, Mike Donley, Jack Matlock, and Phil Rindahl concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to initial and forward the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - McDaniel Memo to Platt
- Tab II - Platt Memo to Poindexter of February 19, 1986
- Tab III - NSDD-207

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NLRR F06-114/10 #11142

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Declassify: OADR

**SECRET** BY CW NARA DATE 6/25/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reduction of Overseas Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic  
Missions (S)

Your February 19, 1986 memo proposed a new initiative to reduce overseas staffing at U.S. diplomatic missions. For all the reasons cited in the draft NSDD, it is important to proceed with an in-depth review. (C)

NSDD-207, the National Program for Combatting Terrorism, dated January 20, 1986, provides the authority for the Secretary of State to conduct such a review. NSDD-207 directs that State "lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high-threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs." (S)

In addition to reductions of non-essential personnel, this review should also consider other policy implications contained in NSDD-207 such as:

- The Director of Central Intelligence is to "expand human intelligence collection efforts against international terrorist organizations."
- The DCI, in conjunction with the Attorney General, is to "train counter-terrorist specialists in exchange programs with law enforcement agencies" both domestically and overseas. (S)

This is an important initiative that will require the cooperation of all departments and agencies. We are prepared to assist and support this review with the goal of not only protecting our employees overseas, but also improving our ability to combat international terrorism. (C)

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NLRR MDM F06-117/10 #11143

BY GS NARA DATE 6/25/09

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520


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February 19, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reduction of Overseas Staffing at U.S.  
Diplomatic Missions

As part of the Administration's effort to cut spending and reduce our security vulnerability, Secretary Shultz would like the President's support for an initiative to reduce the number of American employees at our diplomatic missions and constituent posts. After he has discussed this with the President, he would like the attached Presidential Directive sent to the Secretaries of Defense, Justice, Transportation, the Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce and the Directors of the CIA, USIA, AID and the Peace Corps. This would be transmitted with notification of the date, time and location of a meeting on this subject to be chaired by the Secretary.

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Presidential Directive

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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NLRR File-114/11 #11145  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/28/11

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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January 20, 1986

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National Security  
Decision Directive Number 207

THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATting TERRORISM (U)

The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism has completed an in-depth review of our current policies, capabilities, and resources for dealing with the terrorist threat. I have reviewed the Task Force Report and accompanying recommendations and concluded that our strategy is sound. I have determined that we must enhance our ability to confront this threat and to do so without compromising our basic democratic and human values. (U)

Terrorists undertake criminal acts that involve the use or threat of violence against innocent persons. These acts are premeditated, intended to achieve a political objective through coercion or intimidation of an audience beyond the immediate victims. U.S. citizens and installations, especially abroad, are increasingly being targeted for terrorist acts. Our policy, programs and responses must be effective in ameliorating this threat to our people, property and interests. (U)

Policy

U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms whether it is domestic terrorism perpetrated within U.S. territory, or international terrorism conducted inside or outside U.S. territory by foreign nationals or groups. The policy is based upon the conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more American citizens at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of protecting the greatest number of people and ensuring their safety. At the same time, every available resource will be used to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists. (U)

The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available. The United States is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. (U)

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States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests. The USG will pay no ransoms, nor permit releases of prisoners or agree to other conditions that could serve to encourage additional terrorism. We will make no changes in our policy because of terrorist threats or acts. The United States is determined to act against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. We oppose asylum, sanctuary, or safehaven for terrorists and will make every legal effort to extradite and prosecute terrorists. The USG encourages other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism. (U)

### The National Program

The national program to combat terrorism is designed to provide coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents. Our program includes measures to deter, resolve and, when necessary, respond proportionately to terrorist attacks. The implementation of this strategy requires an organization compatible with the overall structure of the U.S. Government, and relies on the authorities and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies. (U)

The coordination of the Federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in and responsibility for dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. The Lead Agency will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be designated as follows:

- The Department of State for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of U.S. territory. (U)
- The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents that take place within U.S. territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents. (U)
- The FAA for aircraft hijackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States. (U)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainty on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities. (U)

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The entire range of diplomatic, economic, legal, military, para-military, covert action, and informational assets at our disposal must be brought to bear against terrorism. To ensure that these measures are fully integrated and mutually supportive, the following interagency groups will assist the Lead Agencies in the coordination of our national program to combat terrorism. (C)

1. The Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG). To support the Special Situation Group (SSG -- see NSDD-3 and NSDD-30) during a terrorist incident, a Terrorist Incident Working Group has been established. This group consists of representatives from State, Treasury, DOD, Justice, CIA, JCS, FBI, the Office of the Vice President, and the NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies as required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or at the request of any of the members. The NSC staff will provide a senior representative to chair the TIWG, and a staff member to serve as the Executive Director of the TIWG and chair the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG to review ongoing non-crisis operations/activities. The TIWG will normally remain convened for the duration of a terrorist incident. The Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism will serve as the Vice Chairman of the TIWG. (S)
2. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T). The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, is responsible for the development of overall U.S. policy on terrorism, including, *inter alia*, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, interagency training activities, coordinated budget/programs, and policy direction of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. Membership will include all departments and agencies supporting the national program to combat terrorism. Vice Chairmen of the IG/T will be the Department of Justice and the Executive Director of the TIWG. (C)
3. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Counter-Terrorism and Narcotics (NIO/CT-NARC), provides intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG. It focuses and coordinates interagency intelligence efforts to counter international terrorist threats. In anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements, such as more rapid dissemination of critical information. (S)

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Actions

The Vice President's Task Force affirmed our fundamental approach for dealing with terrorism, however they made numerous recommendations to further improve our capabilities. Accordingly, I have reached the following decisions:

1. The recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism are to be fully and consistently implemented as follows:
  - A. For Immediate Implementation
    - (1) The Secretary of State shall:
      - Submit to the NSC a policy framework prepared by the IG/T for making decisions on the use of force in response to international terrorist threats or attacks. (Task Force Recommendation No. 5) (U)
      - Expand State Department's outreach program to hostage families. (Task Force Recommendation No. 12) (U)
      - Continue efforts to enlist international cooperation in combatting terrorism through both bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. Particular emphasis should be given to concluding agreements for more effective measures for apprehending, extraditing and prosecuting known terrorists. (Task Force Recommendations No. 17 and 18) (U)
      - Continue a dialogue with media representatives to obtain support for denying terrorists the visibility they seek. (Task Force Recommendation No. 29) (U)
      - Monitor abuses of diplomatic immunities in support of terrorists for possible sanctions against violators of the Vienna Convention. (Task Force Recommendation No. 32) (U)
      - Provide, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, more extensive publicity regarding the terrorist reward program in order to more effectively integrate it into the overall counterterrorism (CT) effort. (Task Force Recommendation No. 34) (U)
      - Through the IG/T and with the concurrence of the DCI, provide policy guidance for terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments. (Task Force Recommendation No. 22) (S)

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(2) The Attorney General shall:

- Prepare and encourage enactment of legislation that makes the murder of U.S. citizens abroad a Federal crime. (Task Force Recommendation No. 35) (U)
- Pursue enactment of legislation that permits the death penalty for the murder of U.S. citizens during a hostage-taking. (Task Force Recommendation No. 36) (U)
- Pursue enactment of legislation establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence (the Hyde proposal). (Task Force Recommendation No. 37) (U)
- Pursue enactment of legislation permitting deportation of aliens from the United States who are suspected of engaging in support for or conspiracy to conduct terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 40) (C)
- Expedite deportation proceedings against Libyan, Iranian, and PLO activists who have violated their visa status. (Task Force Recommendation No. 40) (C)

(3) The Secretary of Defense shall:

- Review, in conjunction with the State Department and NSC, current criteria and procedures for deploying and employing U.S. military CT forces. Consideration should be given to political and legal questions involved and to forward deployment or prepositioning of CT elements in or near areas of most likely employment. (Task Force Recommendation No. 7 and Proposed Recommendation No. 1) (S)

(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall:

- In conjunction with the Department of State, expand terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments. (Task Force Recommendation No. 22) (U)
- Establish an all-source intelligence fusion center for international terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 23) (S)
- Establish a clandestine service capability for preventing, pre-empting and/or disrupting international terrorist activity. (Task Force Recommendation No. 43) (TS)

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- (5) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall:
- Establish and maintain, in conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice and the NSC, a national programming document that depicts resources dedicated to combatting terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 1) (U)
- (6) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall:
- Establish a full-time position on the NSC with a small staff dedicated to the national program. Ensure that the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG conducts periodic reviews of CT activities and those operations requiring interagency coordination. (Task Force Recommendation No. 3) (S)
  - Provide coordinated public affairs/Congressional guidance to all departments/agencies involved in resolving a terrorist incident. (Task Force Recommendation No. 4) (C)
  - Maintain a current list of options for responding to terrorist activity. (Task Force Recommendation No. 6) (S)
  - Increase coordination and oversight of research and development (R&D) related to terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 14) (S)
  - Ensure senior government participation in NSC-coordinated terrorist incident simulations and exercises. (Task Force Recommendation No. 15) (C)
- B. For Implementation by May 1, 1986
- (1) The Secretary of State shall:
- Lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high-threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (Task Force Recommendation No. 9) (U)
  - Review government-wide policies on travel documentation for U.S. employees and promulgate consistent guidelines throughout the Government. (Task Force Recommendation No. 10) (U)

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- Provide coordinated interagency briefings on U.S. policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism for all senior U.S. officials stationed overseas. (Task Force Recommendation No. 16) (U)
- Pursue bilateral arrangements for terrorism-related R&D exchanges. (Task Force Recommendation No. 19) (U)
- In conjunction with the Departments of Justice and Treasury, improve computerized systems for monitoring cross-border travel and visa control of known or suspected terrorists. (Task Force Recommendation No. 20) (C)
- Develop a long-range strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. (Task Force Recommendation No. 28) (U)
- Under the auspices of the IG/T, review and submit proposals for:
  - New NSC Policy, Planning, and Operations Coordinating Boards. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 2) (S)
  - A private sector data base. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 4) (C)
- Devise an interagency coordinated plan to expand the current Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, consistent with the President's budget, for aiding friendly governments in their efforts to combat terrorism. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 5). (C)
- (2) The Attorney General shall:
  - Stimulate private and academic initiatives addressing the relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal systems. (Task Force Recommendation No. 31) (U)
  - In conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence, expand the international terrorist informant program, adding incentives such as immunity from prosecution, parole, citizenship, and residency grants. (Task Force Recommendation No. 33) (U)

- Review the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and determine whether terrorist movements or organizations are abusing its provisions. (Task Force Recommendation No. 38) (U)
  - Evaluate whether present activities by some U.S. companies and individuals, such as paying ransoms, buying kidnapping insurance, and purchasing interviews with terrorists, might not be effectively made illegal under U.S. law. (Task Force Recommendation No. 41) (C)
  - Ensure that training and support of terrorists at so-called mercenary camps in the United States are not permitted under U.S. law. (Task Force Recommendation No. 39) (U)
  - Pursue legislation to permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files so that individuals can be more thoroughly screened prior to being granted unescorted admission to nuclear reactor facilities. (Task Force Recommendation No. 42) (U)
  - Complete review of the proposal to enhance Federal jurisdiction over domestic terrorist incidents. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 3) (U)
- (3) The Secretary of Defense shall:
- Develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy for CT forces, considering public acknowledgment of the existence of U.S. CT forces. (Task Force Recommendation No. 8) (C)
  - Develop plans for integrating psychological operations more closely into the overall CT effort. (Task Force Recommendation No. 30) (C)
  - Review requirements and develop alternatives for more effective intelligence and operational support to CT forces/operations. (Task Force Recommendation No. 44) (S)
- (4) The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
- Extend Secret Service protection to "accompanying spouses" of visiting heads of state. (Task Force Recommendation No. 13) (U)

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- (5) The Secretary of Transportation shall:
- Survey, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence, current port security procedures and assess the terrorist threat to vessels, passengers, and crewmembers. (Task Force Recommendation No. 21) (C)
- (6) The Director of Central Intelligence shall:
- Expand human intelligence collection efforts against international terrorist organizations, movements and groups, using alternative cover arrangements as appropriate. (Task Force Recommendation No. 24) (S)
  - Establish an interdepartmental career program for terrorism intelligence analysts. (Task Force Recommendation No. 25) (C)
  - In conjunction with the Attorney General, ensure that police and law enforcement information is incorporated in U.S. intelligence data bases, and train CT specialists in exchange programs with law enforcement agencies. (Task Force Recommendation No. 26) (S)
  - Examine, in conjunction with the IG/T and the IICT, the current countermeasures program and recommend enhancements for denying terrorists use of chemical and biological agents. (Task Force Recommendation No. 27) (C)
- (7) The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall:
- Identify, under the auspices of the IG/T, the extent to which various critical U.S. infrastructure elements (e.g. the computerized banking system, power grids, and communications networks) are vulnerable to acts of terrorism and propose near- and long-term solutions. (Task Force Recommendation No. 11) (C)
2. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall review progress made on the implementation of this directive and report the results to me by July 1, 1986. (C)
3. The provisions of NSDD's 30 and 138 are hereby modified in accordance with this directive. (C)

*Ronald Reagan*

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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

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ACTION OFFICER: NORTH DUE: MONDAY, 2/24

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____ to _____                      |   |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\* PHONE\* to action officer at ext. 3345

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COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

Jack Matlock

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

April 8, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOB-114/10 #11147

BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/09

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH  
CRAIG P. COY

SUBJECT: Overseas Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic Missions

Secretary Shultz has called a meeting to discuss an initiative to reduce the number of American employees at our diplomatic missions and constituent posts and requested that the President drop-by (schedule proposal forwarded separately -- SYSTEM I 2814). The meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, April 9, 1986, at 3:30 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. Attached at Tab I are proposed talking points for your use at the meeting.

The package at Tab II had been prepared in response to State proposal for a new NSDD to reduce the size of all U.S. overseas missions (see Tab II in original package). The meeting on Wednesday has, however, pre-empted the NSC response which would have opposed a new NSDD.

NSDD-207, The National Program for Combatting Terrorism, directs the Secretary of State to conduct a "review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in the high-threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs." NSDD-207 also called for expanded human intelligence collection efforts against international terrorism, as well as an increased emphasis on law enforcement efforts. For these reasons, our position is to ensure any program to reduce the size of overseas missions is carefully reviewed to prevent arbitrary reductions.

Ken deGraffenreid, Ray Burghardt, Jock Covey, Mike Donley, Jack Matlock, and Phil Ringdahl concur (see original package at Tab II).

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the talking points at Tab I and the package at Tab II prior to the meeting on Wednesday.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Talking Points
- Tab II - North/Coy Memo to Poindexter of March 31, 1986 w/attachments

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TALKING POINTS

Wednesday, April 9, 1986  
3:30-4:30 p.m.  
Roosevelt Room

- NSC fully supports and endorses a review of the size of our overseas missions.
- NSDD-207, The National Program for Combatting Terrorism, directed the Secretary of State to conduct such a study.
- In conducting the review, we need to keep in mind the overall goal which is to:
  - reduce the threat to USG officials overseas and ensure the safety of those assigned to the mission improve;
  - our ability to combat terrorism through expanded intelligence capabilities;
  - bring terrorists to justice by building the cooperation between our law enforcement agencies and their counterparts overseas.
- Of course, Graham-Rudman-Hollings is a pressure on all of us, but our national security interests are such that we must weigh the implications of simply reducing.

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JM

National Security Council  
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1/3</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	<u>2</u>	<u>By 4-4</u>	
Don Fortier			
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
Rodney McDaniel			
NSC Secretariat	<u>North 4</u>		<u>FFA</u> <u>(will give you info on 4/9 meeting)</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other \_\_\_\_\_

Bob, ~~Bob~~ Talked to Allie - he will turn into a "points to be made at the Tuesday meeting" if we can get you may want to talk to Nick Platt intel re this memo in view of 4/9 mtg in Spino Roosevelt Room chaired by Shultz. DLM memo seems like a reasonable approach but am not sure what GPS agenda at meeting will be.

BSZ

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1986

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ACTION

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NLRR F06-114/10711148

BY CW NARA DATE 6/25/09

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH  
CRAIG P. COY

SUBJECT: Reduction of Overseas Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic Missions

Attached at Tab I is a memo from Rod McDaniel to Nicholas Platt forwarding comments on a State Department proposed Presidential Directive (Tab II) to reduce the size of all U.S. overseas missions.

NSDD-207, the National Program for Combatting Terrorism, directed a review of personnel levels at high-threat locations and called for an increase in human intelligence gathering and law enforcement exchanges (Tab III).

The memo at Tab I indicates that NSDD-207 provides the Presidential authority for the Secretary of State to conduct a review of personnel levels overseas. Therefore, another directive is not required.

Ken DeGraffenreid, Ray Burghardt, Jock Covey, Mike Donley, Jack Matlock, and Phil Rinsdahl concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to initial and forward the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - McDaniel Memo to Platt
- Tab II - Platt Memo to Poindexter of February 19, 1986
- Tab III - NSDD-207

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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NLRR F06-714/10 #1149

BY GN NARA DATE 6/25/09

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reduction of Overseas Staffing at U.S. Diplomatic  
Missions ~~(S)~~

Your February 19, 1986 memo proposed a new initiative to reduce overseas staffing at U.S. diplomatic missions. For all the reasons cited in the draft NSDD, it is important to proceed with an in-depth review. ~~(C)~~

NSDD-207, the National Program for Combatting Terrorism, dated January 20, 1986, provides the authority for the Secretary of State to conduct such a review. NSDD-207 directs that State "lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high-threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs." ~~(S)~~

In addition to reductions of non-essential personnel, this review should also consider other policy implications contained in NSDD-207 such as:

- The Director of Central Intelligence is to "expand human intelligence collection efforts against international terrorist organizations."
- The DCI, in conjunction with the Attorney General, is to "train counter-terrorist specialists in exchange programs with law enforcement agencies" both domestically and overseas. ~~(S)~~

This is an important initiative that will require the cooperation of all departments and agencies. We are prepared to assist and support this review with the goal of not only protecting our employees overseas, but also improving our ability to combat international terrorism. ~~(C)~~

Rodney B. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

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NLRR FD6-114/10 #11150

BY RW NARA DATE 3/28/11

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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January 20, 1986

National Security  
Decision Directive Number 207

THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM (U)

The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism has completed an in-depth review of our current policies, capabilities, and resources for dealing with the terrorist threat. I have reviewed the Task Force Report and accompanying recommendations and concluded that our strategy is sound. I have determined that we must enhance our ability to confront this threat and to do so without compromising our basic democratic and human values. (U)

Terrorists undertake criminal acts that involve the use or threat of violence against innocent persons. These acts are premeditated, intended to achieve a political objective through coercion or intimidation of an audience beyond the immediate victims. U.S. citizens and installations, especially abroad, are increasingly being targeted for terrorist acts. Our policy, programs and responses must be effective in ameliorating this threat to our people, property and interests. (U)

Policy

U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms whether it is domestic terrorism perpetrated within U.S. territory, or international terrorism conducted inside or outside U.S. territory by foreign nationals or groups. The policy is based upon the conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more American citizens at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of protecting the greatest number of people and ensuring their safety. At the same time, every available resource will be used to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists. (U)

The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available. The United States is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. (U)

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States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests. The USG will pay no ransoms, nor permit releases of prisoners or agree to other conditions that could serve to encourage additional terrorism. We will make no changes in our policy because of terrorist threats or acts. The United States is determined to act against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. We oppose asylum, sanctuary, or safehaven for terrorists and will make every legal effort to extradite and prosecute terrorists. The USG encourages other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism. (U)

### The National Program

The national program to combat terrorism is designed to provide coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents. Our program includes measures to deter, resolve and, when necessary, respond proportionately to terrorist attacks. The implementation of this strategy requires an organization compatible with the overall structure of the U.S. Government, and relies on the authorities and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies. (U)

The coordination of the Federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in and responsibility for dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. The Lead Agency will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be designated as follows:

- The Department of State for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of U.S. territory. (U)
- The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents that take place within U.S. territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents. (U)
- The FAA for aircraft hijackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States. (U)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainty on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities. (U)

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The entire range of diplomatic, economic, legal, military, para-military, covert action, and informational assets at our disposal must be brought to bear against terrorism. To ensure that these measures are fully integrated and mutually supportive, the following interagency groups will assist the Lead Agencies in the coordination of our national program to combat terrorism. (C)

1. The Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG). To support the Special Situation Group (SSG -- see NSDD-3 and NSDD-30) during a terrorist incident, a Terrorist Incident Working Group has been established. This group consists of representatives from State, Treasury, DOD, Justice, CIA, JCS, FBI, the Office of the Vice President, and the NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies as required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or at the request of any of the members. The NSC staff will provide a senior representative to chair the TIWG, and a staff member to serve as the Executive Director of the TIWG and chair the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG to review ongoing non-crisis operations/activities. The TIWG will normally remain convened for the duration of a terrorist incident. The Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism will serve as the Vice Chairman of the TIWG. (S)
2. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T). The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, is responsible for the development of overall U.S. policy on terrorism, including, inter alia, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, interagency training activities, coordinated budget/programs, and policy direction of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. Membership will include all departments and agencies supporting the national program to combat terrorism. Vice Chairmen of the IG/T will be the Department of Justice and the Executive Director of the TIWG. (C)
3. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Counter-Terrorism and Narcotics (NIO/CT-NARC), provides intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG. It focuses and coordinates interagency intelligence efforts to counter international terrorist threats. In anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements, such as more rapid dissemination of critical information. (S)

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Actions

The Vice President's Task Force affirmed our fundamental approach for dealing with terrorism, however they made numerous recommendations to further improve our capabilities. Accordingly, I have reached the following decisions:

1. The recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism are to be fully and consistently implemented as follows:
  - A. For Immediate Implementation
    - (1) The Secretary of State shall:
      - Submit to the NSC a policy framework prepared by the IG/T for making decisions on the use of force in response to international terrorist threats or attacks. (Task Force Recommendation No. 5) (U)
      - Expand State Department's outreach program to hostage families. (Task Force Recommendation No. 12) (U)
      - Continue efforts to enlist international cooperation in combatting terrorism through both bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. Particular emphasis should be given to concluding agreements for more effective measures for apprehending, extraditing and prosecuting known terrorists. (Task Force Recommendations No. 17 and 18) (U)
      - Continue a dialogue with media representatives to obtain support for denying terrorists the visibility they seek. (Task Force Recommendation No. 29) (U)
      - Monitor abuses of diplomatic immunities in support of terrorists for possible sanctions against violators of the Vienna Convention. (Task Force Recommendation No. 32) (U)
      - Provide, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, more extensive publicity regarding the terrorist reward program in order to more effectively integrate it into the overall counterterrorism (CT) effort. (Task Force Recommendation No. 34) (U)
      - Through the IG/T and with the concurrence of the DCI, provide policy guidance for terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments. (Task Force Recommendation No. 22) (S)



- (2) The Attorney General shall:
  - Prepare and encourage enactment of legislation that makes the murder of U.S. citizens abroad a Federal crime. (Task Force Recommendation No. 35) (U)
  - Pursue enactment of legislation that permits the death penalty for the murder of U.S. citizens during a hostage-taking. (Task Force Recommendation No. 36) (U)
  - Pursue enactment of legislation establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence (the Hyde proposal). (Task Force Recommendation No. 37) (U)
  - Pursue enactment of legislation permitting deportation of aliens from the United States who are suspected of engaging in support for or conspiracy to conduct terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 40) (C)
  - Expedite deportation proceedings against Libyan, Iranian, and PLO activists who have violated their visa status. (Task Force Recommendation No. 40) (C)
- (3) The Secretary of Defense shall:
  - Review, in conjunction with the State Department and NSC, current criteria and procedures for deploying and employing U.S. military CT forces. Consideration should be given to political and legal questions involved and to forward deployment or prepositioning of CT elements in or near areas of most likely employment. (Task Force Recommendation No. 7 and Proposed Recommendation No. 1) (S)
- (4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall:
  - In conjunction with the Department of State, expand terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments. (Task Force Recommendation No. 22) (U)
  - Establish an all-source intelligence fusion center for international terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 23) (S)
  - Establish a clandestine service capability for preventing, pre-empting and/or disrupting international terrorist activity. (Task Force Recommendation No. 43) (TS)

(5) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall:

- Establish and maintain, in conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice and the NSC, a national programming document that depicts resources dedicated to combatting terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 1) (U)

(6) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall:

- Establish a full-time position on the NSC with a small staff dedicated to the national program. Ensure that the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG conducts periodic reviews of CT activities and those operations requiring interagency coordination. (Task Force Recommendation No. 3) (S)
- Provide coordinated public affairs/Congressional guidance to all departments/agencies involved in resolving a terrorist incident. (Task Force Recommendation No. 4) (C)
- Maintain a current list of options for responding to terrorist activity. (Task Force Recommendation No. 6) (S)
- Increase coordination and oversight of research and development (R&D) related to terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 14) (S)
- Ensure senior government participation in NSC-coordinated terrorist incident simulations and exercises. (Task Force Recommendation No. 15) (C)

B. For Implementation by May 1, 1986

(1) The Secretary of State shall:

- Lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high-threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (Task Force Recommendation No. 9) (U)
- Review government-wide policies on travel documentation for U.S. employees and promulgate consistent guidelines throughout the Government. (Task Force Recommendation No. 10) (U)

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- Provide coordinated interagency briefings on U.S. policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism for all senior U.S. officials stationed overseas. (Task Force Recommendation No. 16) (U)
  - Pursue bilateral arrangements for terrorism-related R&D exchanges. (Task Force Recommendation No. 19) (U)
  - In conjunction with the Departments of Justice and Treasury, improve computerized systems for monitoring cross-border travel and visa control of known or suspected terrorists. (Task Force Recommendation No. 20) (C)
  - Develop a long-range strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. (Task Force Recommendation No. 28) (U)
  - Under the auspices of the IG/T, review and submit proposals for:
    - New NSC Policy, Planning, and Operations Coordinating Boards. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 2) (S)
    - A private sector data base. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 4) (C)
  - Devise an interagency coordinated plan to expand the current Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, consistent with the President's budget, for aiding friendly governments in their efforts to combat terrorism. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 5). (C)
- (2) The Attorney General shall:
- Stimulate private and academic initiatives addressing the relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal systems. (Task Force Recommendation No. 31) (U)
  - In conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence, expand the international terrorist informant program, adding incentives such as immunity from prosecution, parole, citizenship, and residency grants. (Task Force Recommendation No. 33) (U)

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- Review the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and determine whether terrorist movements or organizations are abusing its provisions. (Task Force Recommendation No. 38) (U)
- Evaluate whether present activities by some U.S. companies and individuals, such as paying ransoms, buying kidnapping insurance, and purchasing interviews with terrorists, might not be effectively made illegal under U.S. law. (Task Force Recommendation No. 41) (C)
- Ensure that training and support of terrorists at so-called mercenary camps in the United States are not permitted under U.S. law. (Task Force Recommendation No. 39) (U)
- Pursue legislation to permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files so that individuals can be more thoroughly screened prior to being granted unescorted admission to nuclear reactor facilities. (Task Force Recommendation No. 42) (U)
- Complete review of the proposal to enhance Federal jurisdiction over domestic terrorist incidents. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 3) (U)
- (3) The Secretary of Defense shall:
  - Develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy for CT forces, considering public acknowledgment of the existence of U.S. CT forces. (Task Force Recommendation No. 8) (C)
  - Develop plans for integrating psychological operations more closely into the overall CT effort. (Task Force Recommendation No. 30) (C)
  - Review requirements and develop alternatives for more effective intelligence and operational support to CT forces/operations. (Task Force Recommendation No. 44) (S)
- (4) The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
  - Extend Secret Service protection to "accompanying spouses" of visiting heads of state. (Task Force Recommendation No. 13) (U)

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- (5) The Secretary of Transportation shall:
  - Survey, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence, current port security procedures and assess the terrorist threat to vessels, passengers, and crewmembers. (Task Force Recommendation No. 21) (C)
- (6) The Director of Central Intelligence shall:
  - Expand human intelligence collection efforts against international terrorist organizations, movements and groups, using alternative cover arrangements as appropriate. (Task Force Recommendation No. 24) (S)
  - Establish an interdepartmental career program for terrorism intelligence analysts. (Task Force Recommendation No. 25) (C)
  - In conjunction with the Attorney General, ensure that police and law enforcement information is incorporated in U.S. intelligence data bases, and train CT specialists in exchange programs with law enforcement agencies. (Task Force Recommendation No. 26) (S)
  - Examine, in conjunction with the IG/T and the IICT, the current countermeasures program and recommend enhancements for denying terrorists use of chemical and biological agents. (Task Force Recommendation No. 27) (C)
- (7) The Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall:
  - Identify, under the auspices of the IG/T, the extent to which various critical U.S. infrastructure elements (e.g. the computerized banking system, power grids, and communications networks) are vulnerable to acts of terrorism and propose near- and long-term solutions. (Task Force Recommendation No. 11) (C)
- 2. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall review progress made on the implementation of this directive and report the results to me by July 1, 1986. (C)
- 3. The provisions of NSDD's 30 and 138 are hereby modified in accordance with this directive. (C)

*Ronald Reagan*

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**  
**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

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TIME STAMP

SYSTEM 11  
 SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 20136

ACTION OFFICER: NORTH

DUE: MONDAY, 2/24

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For President                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew    |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo                                     | to  |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. 3345

- | FYI   | FYI  | FYI                                      |
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- INFORMATION  McDaniel  Pearson  Secretariat  
 Rodman  Lehman  \_\_\_\_\_  
 Poindexter (advance)  Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat