

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Reciprocity – USSR (3)
Box: 33

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/19/2005

File Folder USSR-RECIPROCITY 3/8

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 33

YARHI-MILO

3306

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11076	MEMO	WHEELER TO PATRICK RE REPORT ON TRAVEL CONTROLS ON DIPLOMATS <i>R 7/18/2008 F06-114/10</i>	1	11/18/1982	B1
11080	PAPER	TRAVEL IN THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10</i>	8	ND	B1
11078	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE REPORT ON TRAVEL CONTROLS ON DIPLOMATS <i>R 11/28/2011 F2006-114/10</i>	1	11/9/1982	B1
11081	MEMO	WICK TO CLARK <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	2/18/1983	B1
11082	CABLE	101815Z FEB 83 <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	3	2/10/1983	B1
11083	MEMO	LATEST SOVIET POSITION ON PRIVATE EXCHANGES <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	2	2/11/1983	B1
11062	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO LENCZOWSKI RE RECIPROCITY IN E-W EXCHANGES <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	4/12/1983	B1
11064	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11062 <i>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</i>	1	4/12/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/19/2005

File Folder USSR-RECIPROCITY 3/8

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 33

YARHI-MILO

3306

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11084	CABLE	132030Z APR 83 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	4/13/1983	B1
11066	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO LENCZOWSKI RE ARBATOV R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	4/14/1983	B1
11068	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO CLARK RE ARBATOV VISA R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	4/13/1983	B1
11069	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO CLARK R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	4/13/1983	B1
11072	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #11062 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	4/12/1983	B1
11085	CABLE	191621Z JUL 83 R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	7/19/1983	B1
11074	MEMO	ACCESS TO SOVIET SOCIETY R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
11086	PAPER	STRATEGY FOR US-USSR EXCHANGES AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	7/26/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/19/2005

File Folder USSR-RECIPROCITY 3/8

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 33

YARHI-MILO

3306

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11087	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE NEW MAP OF AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET DIPLOMATS R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	7/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

7843

Dobrensky
file USSR/dipl
1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR CAROL PATRICK
PFIAB

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER

SUBJECT: Report on Travel Controls on Soviet and Eastern
European Diplomats in the United States and on
U.S. Diplomats in the USSR and Eastern Europe

The attached is a summary of a report you requested of the travel controls imposed on American diplomats in the Soviet Union and on Soviet diplomats in the United States. The situation for Eastern Europe is also mentioned. We have no comment on the attached report.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10#11076

BY NOJ NARA DATE 7/18/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



United States Department of State

0254475
11078

2

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 9, 1982


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Travel Controls on Soviet and Eastern European
Diplomats in the United States and on US Diplomats in
the USSR and Eastern Europe

Enclosed is a summary of the travel controls imposed on
American diplomats in the Soviet Union and on Soviet diplomats
in the United States, as requested by Carol Patrick of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The situation for Eastern Europe is as follows. There are
no travel restrictions on American diplomats in the German
Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Romania. In Bulgaria, American diplomats must make travel
arrangements through the official state travel agency, but
travel is not otherwise restricted. There are no restrictions
on the travel of Eastern European diplomats assigned to the
United States.


L. Paul Bremer, II
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10* 11078

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~I. TRAVEL IN THE SOVIET UNIONOVERVIEW

Since 1941, Soviet authorities have closed off vast portions of their country to travel by foreigners, and tightly controlled the travel of those foreigners whom they admit. These restrictions are not readily apparent to Western tourists, who are carefully guided by the official Soviet tourist agency, Intourist. For resident foreigners, however, travel controls are an intrusive and constantly present irritant.

The Soviets have two weapons in their constant battle to keep the foreigners at bay. On the one hand, all resident foreigners are required to submit official travel requests 24-48 hours in advance. The organization which receives the requests has the option of denying the travel in whole or in part, of altering the modes of transportation, or of discovering technical deficiencies which cause them to reject the requests. In the case of diplomats, this function is performed by the Protocol Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

The other weapon is central control over all bookings for transportation and accommodations in the entire country. Thus, even if the MFA does approve a diplomat's travel, the Diplomatic Services Agency (UpDK) can, and frequently does, inform the prospective traveler that the rail or air connections requested are non-existent or completely booked. Similarly with overnight accommodations, no hotel rooms are to be found for months on end, when it pleases the authorities.

Even worse, the two weapons can be used in tandem to frustrate even the most determined traveler. Thus, UpDK can call up to say that there are no hotel rooms in one of the destinations, or that rail tickets are not available between two of the points on the trip. This necessitates re-working the entire trip, and resubmitting a new travel request to the foreign ministry. If departure is less than 48 hours away, an exception request is required and can easily be denied.

The areas formally closed to travel by foreigners constitute about 20 percent of the Soviet Union's land area. However, a CIA study estimates that in fact only 1 percent of the territory of the USSR is actually open to travel. Over the years, the US Embassy has kept records of all requests to visit Soviet cities. Many, nominally open, are in fact closed: all requests to visit them are routinely denied. Furthermore, travel by automobile is only permitted in practice on certain routes in European Russia, and deviations from these main routes, or stop-

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/10 #11080

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11

~~SECRET~~

-2-

overs, are not permitted. For example, recently the Consulate General in Leningrad requested that some of their members be allowed to take a day trip in the countryside around Leningrad, driving through rural villages and along local roads. This request was repeatedly denied until the message got through: no such travel was going to be permitted.

Another Soviet tactic to frustrate travel is to close transportation into an open area. By closing one major city with the only airport or rail junction for hundreds of miles around, for example, the entire region is effectively closed.

The nature of the Soviet system makes enforcement of travel restrictions much simpler than in the U.S. Check points along highways and document checks required to board air flights make it easy to detect unauthorized travel. Plus, no hotel in the Soviet Union would dare accept on-the-spot bookings from foreigners, including foreign diplomats. A typical case recently involved an American Embassy official who made reservations for himself and his family to travel to Leningrad by train. Inadvertently, no travel note was submitted. When they arrived in Leningrad, the police were waiting for them and forced them back onto a train returning to Moscow.

Over the years, some modifications to the Soviet system have evolved. Ambassadors, accompanied by members of their family, a chauffeur and an interpreter, may travel note-free to open areas. Certain nearby recreational destinations in the Moscow area beyond the 40-kilometer free movement zone may be reached without a travel note. Also, Leningrad and some destinations in the Moscow region require 24 rather than 48 hours advance notice.

II. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OF SOVIETS IN U.S.

OVERVIEW

American travel controls are a direct result of the Soviet travel controls first imposed in 1941. After attempting for more than 10 years to convince the Soviets to modify or eliminate their scheme, the U.S. reluctantly imposed similar controls on Soviet diplomats. Over the years, various misguided attempts have been made to convince the Soviets to relax their controls by unilaterally modifying our own system. All such attempts ended in failure. We have a standing offer to the Soviet Union, encompassed for instance in the 1967 diplomatic note which established our current travel control regime, to modify or

~~SECRET~~

abolish travel controls strictly on a reciprocal basis. This offer has not been taken up by the Soviet side.

The United States controls the travel of all Soviets resident in the United States except for employees of the United Nations Secretariat, lawfully-admitted permanent resident aliens, and refugees of Soviet origin. (Non-resident Soviets are subjected to various travel regimes depending on the purpose of their visit.) For most Soviets resident in the U.S. there is a zone of free movement within 25 miles of the city of assignment in which they may travel to open areas without notification. Beyond the 25-mile zone, all travel must be notified in advance except for the Soviet Ambassador who, accompanied by members of his family, a chauffeur and an interpreter, may travel without notification to open areas -- our Ambassador in the USSR enjoys exactly the same privileges. Also, in the Washington area there are certain nearby recreational destinations which, on the basis of reciprocity, do not require travel notification.

Approximately 24 percent of the United States is closed to travel by Soviets subject to travel controls, and special permission is required to travel in those areas.

LEGAL BASIS FOR TRAVEL CONTROLS

The rationale for the United States policy for maintaining these travel restrictions is a legal principle derived from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, which was signed by the USSR and the United States. Article 47(1) of the Convention establishes a general principle of non-discrimination as between States in applying the provisions of the Convention. Article 47(2)(a) provides that discrimination does not arise when a receiving State applies any provisions "restrictively" because of a restrictive application of that provision to its mission in a sending State. Article 26 of the Convention permits a State to impose travel restrictions upon diplomatic missions for reasons of national security.

CLASSES OF SOVIET CITIZENS SUBJECT TO TRAVEL CONTROLS

(1) Embassy and Consulate Diplomats and Employees. All Soviet diplomats and employees stationed in Washington and San Francisco are subject to travel controls and must file travel requests with the exception of a few specified destinations from Washington (the Soviet recreational property at Pioneer Point, Maryland; Winchester, Virginia; Front Royal, Virginia; Luray,

Virginia; Frederick, Maryland; Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; and Ocean City, Maryland) which may be undertaken without notification or request. Embassy and Consulate General personnel may enter or leave the United States only at Washington, D.C., New York, N.Y. or Rouse's Point, N.Y. Embassy travel notes are submitted to the Department of State; Consulate General notes go to the USIA reception center in San Francisco, which immediately relays them by telephone to the Department of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs.

(2) Soviet Mission to the U.N. Soviet diplomats and employees at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN), the Ukrainian Mission to the United Nations (UMUN), and the Byelorussian Mission to the United Nations (BMUN), are subject to essentially the same travel controls as those applied to Soviet diplomats at the Embassy in Washington and the Consulate General in San Francisco. The major difference that exists is that SMUN, BMUN and UMUN personnel can travel note-free to open areas within 25 miles of UN headquarters but do not have any other note-free trips that they can make. They may enter or depart the United States only at New York City. They submit travel notes to the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN), which informs the Office of Soviet Union Affairs.

(3) Soviet employees of the U.N. Secretariat. Travel controls do not apply to Soviet citizen officers and employees of the U.N. Secretariat. Essentially, these people can travel when and where they want -- regardless of closed areas, time notification, etc. Except when traveling on official UN business, they have only one authorized port of entry and departure -- New York City. They do not submit travel notes.

(4) TDY Personnel. Soviet personnel on temporary assignment to Washington, San Francisco, SMUN, BMUN, UMUN or any combination thereof are subject to travel controls. It is possible for them to specify on their visa applications the dates for which they wish to be present in each city. If this is not done -- or if any other travel is contemplated -- they must submit travel notes. They are subject to restrictions applicable to SMUN, BMUN and UMUN employees while TDY in New York and should submit travel notes to USUN. While TDY to Washington or San Francisco they submit travel notes to the Department of State in Washington and the USIA office in San Francisco respectively.

(5) Journalists. All Soviet journalists resident in the United States are subject to the same travel controls as the diplomats, including the notification requirements and closed

area restrictions.

(6) Commercial representatives: All resident commercial representatives (Aeroflot, Intourist, Amtorg, etc.) are subject to the same travel controls as the diplomats and journalists. They submit their travel requests to the Office of Soviet Union Affairs which verifies their itineraries with the American sponsors before approving the travel.

(7) Exchangees: Soviets in the United States under exchange agreements, usually for short-term stays, occasionally for six months or a year, are subject to a different travel regime. This category also includes all Soviets in the SPLEX (special exchange) program, including those coming to the U.S. for conferences, to study, to perform, to accompany an exhibit, as part of an organized tour group, or for similiar activities. In most instances, their travel plans are included in their visa applications. Itineraries are confirmed by telephoning sponsors. Deviations must be approved by the Office of Soviet Union Affairs. Closed areas do not apply.

(8) Business visitors: All business visitors must submit their itineraries at the time they apply for their visas. The Office of Soviet Union Affairs verifies their appointments and makes sure there are no vacant spots in their schedule before approving visa issuance. Deviations from the approved itinerary must be approved in advance by the Office of Soviet Union Affairs. Generally, closed areas do not apply.

(9) Tourists: Travel controls and closed areas do not apply to tourists. In virtually all instances these are people visiting close relatives who live in the United States. They are requested not to go more than 25 miles from their destination in the United States without notifying the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

(10) Orthodox priests: Four Russian Orthodox priests from the Soviet Union serve at St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City and some Russian Orthodox parishes in New York State. Their travel is subject to notification and closed areas. They submit travel notes to the State Department. Their requests are routinely granted. Closed areas apply, but exceptions are normally granted.

CLOSED AREAS

The closed areas are chosen with both security and reciprocity

8

~~SECRET~~

-6-

interests in mind, and a current revision of the map -- the first since 1967 -- will take both into account. However, the reason areas containing sensitive military installations are chosen for closed areas is designed to frustrate and hamper the Soviets in their intelligence collection efforts, rather than give any real counterintelligence protection.

HOW TRAVEL IS CONTROLLED

All decisions on whether to permit or deny travel are made in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, except for military attaches, whose travel is notified to and controlled by the service -- Air Force, Navy, Army -- to which they are accredited. There are several criteria which are examined in each case.

1. Technical accuracy: All travel notes must be in correct form, be submitted within the proper time limits, and contain correct routings. (Notes must arrive one full work day in advance for travel to cities in open areas on interstate highways in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee, and in California on interstate highways 80 and 5 north of Kern County. Travel between Washington and San Francisco and Washington and New York is also subject to this 24 hour rule. All other notes must arrive two full work days in advance.) If notes are not submitted in a timely fashion, or if they request travel in closed areas they must explicitly ask for an exception. If they do not meet these requirements they are not registered and no further consideration is given them. If the Soviets still desire the travel, they must correct the technical deficiencies in a new note and resubmit it. By then, a time exception would normally be required. Soviets are not permitted to travel if notes are not registered.

2. Reciprocity: The primary purpose of the travel control program is to encourage the Soviets to be as forthcoming as possible in letting American diplomats travel in the Soviet Union. Thus, when travel to open areas is denied to us, we retaliate by choosing a similar trip and denying it for reasons of a temporary nature, the rubric employed by the Soviets themselves. We routinely deny all travel requests to closed areas, granting exceptions on a one-for-one basis when the Soviets have given us one. This is a rare event.

3. Security: The travel control program does not by itself provide counterintelligence protection. It does assist the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-7-

FBI by giving timely notice of travel to enable them to organize surveillance should they so desire and have the resources available. (It might be noted, however, that due to technical means the FBI is frequently aware of contemplated travel plans before the travel notes are submitted, and is usually more cognizant of the purpose of the travel than the State Department.)

In instances where the FBI or DOD has particular security concerns (e.g., sensitive military exercises, difficulty in assuring adequate coverage of travel), the Department gives overwhelming weight to their requests to deny travel. Similarly, when the FBI for particular reasons requests that travel be permitted (e.g., asset development, interest in finding out exactly why the trip is made), the Department will also look on these requests favorably.

Each travel request, after being examined for technical accuracy, and lacking security objections from the FBI or DOD, is approved or denied on the basis of reciprocity. Monthly summary reports, and occasional spot reports from Moscow and Leningrad keep the Department informed about the situation facing US diplomats in the Soviet Union: how many and what kinds of exceptions are granted and refused; how many trips are refused to open areas and where; and other information that enables us to respond to the Soviets here as they deal with us in the Soviet Union.

If a travel request does not contain an exception request (closed area or time), travel may be undertaken unless the request is denied by the Department. If an exception is requested, no travel may be undertaken until the Department informs the Soviets that the exception has been approved. The Department is prepared to be as strict as necessary, and turn down any kind of travel request when conditions in Moscow or Leningrad would indicate. Linkages are normally made between travel requests Embassy to Embassy, Consulate to Consulate, journalists to journalists, etc. Also, linkages are made for recreational versus official travel when necessary.

In years past, the efforts of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs to enforce strict reciprocity occasionally foundered on political considerations. Attempts to deny Soviet travel to speak to American groups, for instance, frequently generated such political pressure that decisions were reversed. This has not been a problem under the current Administration.

~~SECRET~~

10

~~SECRET~~

-8-

ENFORCEMENT

Detection of travel violations by Soviets subject to the controls is not an easy task. Not all trips are now covered by FBI surveillance teams. Occasionally, travel violations are detected by the State Department through conversations with American citizens. In one recent case, a travel violation was detected by INS inspectors, and copies of the INS arrival/departure forms can also occasionally uncover violations.

Whenever violations are detected and confirmed, the Department protests vigorously to the Soviet Embassy. Depending on the seriousness of the violations, or if a pattern of repeated violations is present, the offender can be expelled from the United States. Denial of future travel for an appropriate period is also employed.

The Department has recently asked the FBI to intercept Soviet travellers who deviate from their approved itineraries and to return them to the proper path on the spot. We understand that the FBI is agreeable and is preparing to implement this request.

Our impression is that overall compliance with travel restrictions is already high. The Soviets are convinced that they are subject to far more surveillance than they actually receive, and they find accusations of travel violations highly embarrassing. The added indignity of being stopped by the FBI would, we believe, push compliance even higher.

We have attached the U.S. diplomatic notes which lay out the parameters of our travel control program, a map showing areas in the United States closed to travel by Soviet officials, and an analagous map of the Soviet Union.

Attachments:

- A - Department of State Note of July 26, 1967
- B - Department of State Note of September 6, 1973
- C - Department of State Note of April 5, 1974
- D - Map of closed areas in the United States
- E - Map of closed areas in the USSR

~~SECRET~~

A.
11

The Department of State refers to its note of November 12, 1963, to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning regulations applicable to certain Soviet citizens traveling in the United States.

The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel restrictions for foreigners in 1941. After many attempts to win the relaxation or abolishment of the strict limitations on travel by Americans in the USSR, the United States Government reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on January 3, 1955. At the time it was pointed out that should the Soviet Government relax or abolish its restrictions on travel by American citizens, the United States Government would reciprocate. Almost every year since 1955, and most recently in its note of March 15, 1966, the Department of State has proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions. On one occasion in 1957 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR indicated readiness to discuss reciprocal reductions of closed areas, to which the United States Government responded promptly and positively. But no reply was received from the Soviet Government and all other United States proposals have gone unacknowledged. Further, the Soviet Government has continued to impose additional restrictions on American travelers above and beyond those officially published, with the result that vast expanses of the territory of the USSR have been "temporarily" closed to travel for many years.

The United States Government has taken careful note of Circular Note No. 60 of July 22, 1966, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR superseding earlier lists of areas closed to travel. It appears that there has been a slight reduction in the area of the Soviet Union formally closed to travel by United States citizens if not in the area effectively closed. In accordance with the United States Government's long-standing offer to match any reduction or abolition of Soviet travel restrictions, a similar reduction of the area of the United States closed to Soviet travelers has been effected and is incorporated in the enclosures, which supersede all previous travel regulations announced by the United States Government. Areas within the conterminous United States (the continental United States, excluding the states of Alaska and Hawaii), closed to Soviet travel are listed in enclosure 1 while open cities and transit routes in otherwise closed areas are listed in enclosure 2. Special permission is required for travel to the states of Alaska and Hawaii and to United States possessions, territories and areas under United States administration.

These regulations apply to travel in the conterminous United States by all Soviet citizens possessing valid passports issued by the Government of the USSR, except for Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations while their conduct is the responsibility

of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Soviet tourists, and Soviet citizens who are visiting the United States within the framework of the US-USSR Exchange Agreement.

All Soviet citizens to whom these regulations apply who have not declared their itinerary for travel in the United States at the time of application for a United States visa must submit official notification at least forty-eight hours in advance of any travel to any point more than twenty-five miles from the center of New York or Washington. In the case of Soviet citizens assigned permanently or temporarily to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, or Amtorg, this notification must be addressed in writing to the Department of State, the Army, Navy or Air Force Foreign Liaison Offices, or the United States Mission to the United Nations, as appropriate. In the case of Soviet correspondents temporarily or permanently assigned in the United States written notification is to be addressed to the Department of State. Such notification will continue to include the names of all travelers, description of their itinerary, identification of means of transportation used, route numbers of all roads traveled by car listed in the order in which the roads are taken, and the location of each overnight stop.

Transit travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed areas continues to be permitted when necessary to reach open areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. During such transit travel Soviet citizens may leave the immediate vicinity of rail or air terminals within closed areas only to make connections for onward travel, and all travel within the closed area must be by the most direct route. Transit travel of closed areas by bus or car is permitted only on the routes listed in enclosure 2.

Soviet citizens subject to these regulations may not hire unchauffered automobiles nor may they charter helicopters or aircraft. Boat travel through closed areas or within United States territorial waters bordering closed areas is also prohibited. Unless specifically authorized, entry into to stopping in the vicinity of identifiable military installations is prohibited.

The United States Government takes this occasion to reiterate its firm preference for the abolition of all restrictions on free travel and to repeat its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any proposal to this end. The United States side has taken prompt steps to match recent Soviet reductions in the amount of Soviet territory formally closed to United States citizens and is prepared to match any further reductions which the Soviet side

chooses to make. The Department is prepared at any time to discuss any or all past United States proposals to this end, as well as any proposals the Soviet side may care to make.

Enclosures:

1. Areas closed to Soviet travelers.
2. Open cities in closed areas, and open transit routes.

Department of State,

Washington, D. C., July 26, 1967

SAN FRANCISCO

9/6/73 14

The Department of State refers to the note of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated August 3, 1973, in regard to travel in the Leningrad and San Francisco areas. The Department of State has conducted a de novo review of this matter, in particular of the existing conditions under which travel can be performed in the respective areas and of the manner in which Soviet travel regulations were implemented in the Leningrad area.

Motivated by a desire to accord Soviet personnel in this country treatment which is reciprocal to that enjoyed by American personnel in the Soviet Union, the Department informs the Embassy of the following changes in the United States travel regulations. These changes constitute amendments to the travel regulations applying to certain Soviet citizens in the United States, which were conveyed to the Embassy by the Department's note of July 26, 1967.

In and around San Francisco there will be a zone of free movement without notification for personnel of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and of all consulates of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States within the limits of a circular zone having a radius of 18.5 miles, the center of which is the intersection of the roads Skyview Way and Cityview Way in the southeastern part of Twin Peaks Park in the City of San Francisco, California. The zone of free movement in Marin County, California will include only the City of Sausalito reached over the Golden Gate Bridge and US Highway 101.

The zone of free movement in Contra Costa County, California, will include only that portion of the County north of Wildcat Canyon Road and Bear Creek Road.

should be "SOUTH"

The zone of free movement shall extend to the south of the city within an area described as follows: Starting at the intersection of the arc of the circle described above and the Pacific coast thence northeast to the intersection of such arc and the coast of San Francisco Bay, thence southeast along the coast to Highway 34, thence southeast along Highway 34 to Highway 101, thence northwest along US Highway 101 again to Highway 34, thence southwest along Highway 34 to Highway 35, thence southeast along Highway 35 to Highway 9, thence south on Highway 9 to Felton, California, thence west on Empire Road to Bonny

3.

Doon Pine Flat Road, thence south on Bonny Doon Pine Flat Road to Highway 1, thence to the coast of the Pacific Ocean, thence northeast along the coast to the point of origin. The right of movement in the indicated zone extends to Felton, California, and also includes the right of passage on those parts of Highway 84, Wildcat Canyon Road, Bear Creek Road, US Highway 101, Highway 35, Highway 9, Empire Road and Bonny Doon Pine Flat Road which form the boundaries of the zone.

In addition, Highway 152 from the western border of Merced County, California, to US interstate Highway 5 and US interstate Highway 5 south through Merced County as well as through Kings, Kern and Los Angeles Counties shall be added to the list contained in Enclosure 2B to the Department of State note of July 26, 1967, to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of routes of automotive transit through closed areas which are open to travel by the personnel of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of all consulates of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United States.

In informing the Soviet Embassy of the foregoing changes in the United States travel regula-

4''

tions, the Department of State reiterates that it is prepared to make further changes which will facilitate travel by Soviet personnel in this country provided that the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs reciprocally facilitates travel by American personnel in the Soviet Union.

Department of State,

Washington, September 6, 1973

Drafted by:
EUR/SOV: FULynn:cr
X-22137, 8/26/73

Cleared by:
EUR/SOV:WDyess
EUR/SOV:WLuers
EUR:GSSPRINGSTEIN
S/S: [Signature]
EUR:JAArmitage (draft)

24-Hour
EXCEPTION
4/5/74
180

The Department of State refers to note No. 52/Pr of February 13, 1974 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to note No. 37 of March 19, 1974 from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington concerning increased travel opportunities for American officials in the Soviet Union and for Soviet officials in the United States. The Department of State welcomes the measures taken by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to facilitate travel by the Chief of Mission in Moscow and the staffs of the Embassy and the Consulate General as a positive step which will facilitate improved relations between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Effective April 5, 1974, the following changes will be introduced into the regulations affecting travel by certain Soviet citizens in the United States as set forth in the Department's note of July 26, 1957.

The Chief of Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Washington may travel without prior notification by any means of transport to open areas and cities in the United States accompanied by members of his immediate

family, an interpreter, and personal chauffeur.

Family members unaccompanied by the Chief of Mission may also travel without prior notification and may be accompanied by a chauffeur if travel is by automobile.

Personnel of the Soviet Embassy in Washington may travel by automobile or bus without prior notification along the routes specified to the cities of:

Winchester, Virginia, via route US 50,

Front Royal, Virginia, via routes US 50 and

Virginia 340,

Luray, Virginia, via routes US 50 and Virginia 340,

Frederick, Maryland, via route I70S,

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, via routes I70S, Maryland

15 and Pennsylvania 15,

Ocean City, Maryland, via route US 50

and via routes US 50, US 301, and Maryland 13 to the Soviet Embassy recreational property located at Pioneer Point, Maryland.

Soviet Embassy personnel who travel to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania as specified above may also visit, without prior notification, the Gettysburg National Military Park as well as a circular area eight miles in diameter centered upon the Park headquarters.

Embassy and Consulate General personnel may travel by any means of transport, on the basis of written notification 24 hours in advance (eight hours of which correspond to one working day), between Washington and San Francisco and between Washington and New York, and to cities otherwise open to travel by Soviet official personnel which are located on the interstate highway network in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee.

In addition, Embassy and Consulate General personnel may travel by any means of transport, on the basis of notification in writing at least 24 hours in advance (eight hours of which correspond to one working day), to cities and towns otherwise open to travel by Soviet official personnel which are located in the State of California on interstate route 80 and on interstate route 5 north of Kern County.

Regulations on travel to cities and areas of the United States other than those mentioned above remain unchanged.

The regulations concerning modes of transport which may be employed by Soviet citizens subject to the regulations outlined in the Department's note of July 26, 1967 remain in effect.

The Department reiterates its readiness to make further changes in the regulations governing the travel of Soviet citizens in the United States in reciprocity for changes which may be instituted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the controls governing the travel of American citizens in the Soviet Union.

Department of State,

Washington, APR 5 1974



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dobuonsky

February 18, 1983

Dear Bill:

The enclosed cable (tab A) from Moscow was brought to my attention after I sent you my February 14 memo "NSSD 75 on 'U.S. Relations with the USSR.'"

The enclosed memo to me (tab B) reviews the telegram. It points out that there is some cause for concern that our position may be eroding vis a vis "full reciprocity" in exchanges with the Soviets.

I pass this information to you for your consideration as a supplement to the information conveyed in my February 14 memo.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Leonard J. Baldyga, Dir.
Office Symbol: EU
OADR: February 18, 1989

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR Feb 714/10 #11081
BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

EM

INCOMING
TELEGRAM 23

PAGE 01

015450 ICA414
10/10352

015458 ICA414

ACTION OFFICE EU-03

INFO 100-01 000-02 DIS-01 PGMD-02 PDC-04 GC-02 ECA-03
/023 A4 9

P 101015Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3466

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3286

INFO RUHFLG/AMCONSUL Leningrad 0583

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 01743

USIA FOR EU (DILLEN), E/A, P/RSE, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E.O. 12356: DECL: 02/09/89

TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

SUBJECT: MORE ON MINCULT AND POSSIBLE PRIVATE
CULTURAL EXCHANGES

REF: (A) MOSCOW 0151; (B) 82 MOSCOW 15245;
(C) 82 MOSCOW 105050

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: EMBOFF MET WITH MINCULT OFFICIALS TO PURSUE DISCUSSION OF SOVIET INTEREST IN UNDERTAKING CULTURAL EXCHANGES OF PERFORMING ARTISTS THROUGH PRIVATE CHANNELS. WHAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN AN INFORMAL CHAT WITH THE AMERICAN DESK OFFICER WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A MORE SUBSTANTIVE SESSION WHEN SOVIET SIDE PRODUCED DEPUTY CHIEF OF FOREIGN RELATIONS SECTION. SOVIET OFFICIALS SAID THAT THEY HAD MODIFIED THEIR POSITION ON WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE FROM U.S. SIDE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PRIVATE EXCHANGES. THEY ALSO EMPHASIZED THEIR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, BUT REITERATED THEIR POSITION THAT A CULTURAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO BOTH SIDES. END SUMMARY.

3. CAO ARRANGED A MEETING WITH MINCULT AMERICAN DESK OFFICER V. I. LITVINOV TO PURSUE AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF A RECENT VISIT BY DR. ARMAND HAMMER AND SOVIET INTEREST IN PURSUING PRIVATE CHANNELS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF PERFORMING ARTISTS. EMBOFF HAD INDICATED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS PLANNING TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR CONSULTATIONS AND MINCULT OFFICIAL HAD AGREED FOR MEETING BEFORE THAT TIME SO THAT THE AMBASSADOR COULD BE INFORMED OF LATEST SOVIET POSITION.

4. UPON ARRIVAL EMBOFF WAS TOLD THAT THEY WOULD BE JOINED BY ALLA DUTROVA, HEAD OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN SECTION OF MINCULT FOREIGN OFFICE (THIS HAD BEEN INDICATED DURING PHONE CONVERSATION) AND BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE FOREIGN SECTION IVAN BODYUL. THE LATTER'S INCLUSION WAS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF COURTESY, BUT LITVINOV HINTED THAT THEY HAD THEIR OWN AGENDA TO BRING UP.

5. THE FIRST PART OF THE MEETING WAS CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY WITH BODYUL STATING ONCE AGAIN THAT A CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE "OUR" RELATIONS--"OUR" IMPROVING WORKING RELATIONS AT THIS LEVEL--MUCH EASIER AND WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO BOTH SIDES. EMBOFF SAID THAT WHILE THIS WAS CERTAINLY

TRUE, IT MISSED THE POINT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT RENEWED THE EXCHANGES AGREEMENT TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INDICATION OVER SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS. SOVIET SIDE REPLAYED ITS POSITION ON THIS ISSUE BUT WITHOUT THE ACRRIMONY OF PAST CONVERSATIONS. BODYUL WENT ON TO NOTE THAT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT, BUT THAT THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO REOPEN CULTURAL RELATIONS WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT.

6. SOVIET SIDE LISTED A NUMBER OF UNDERTAKINGS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND CANADA WHICH WERE PROCEEDING WITHOUT THE FRAMEWORK OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT AND STATED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE PROBLEM. HE FELT THAT IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH AMERICAN IMPRESARIOS--HE NAMED WEINTRAUB AND HAMMER BUT INDICATED THAT THERE WERE OTHERS--THEY HAD BEGUN THESE CONCRETE STEPS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD MODERATED ITS POSITION ON WHAT IT WOULD LIKE FROM THE USG TO FACILITATE THESE EXCHANGES.

7. WHEN QUERIED BY EMBOFF FOR SPECIFICS, BODYUL STATED THAT SOVIET SIDE WOULD LIKE FROM USG--STATE, USIA OR OTHER APPROPRIATE USG AGENCY--A NOTE INDICATING OFFICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE SPECIFIC EXCHANGE. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, BODYUL SAID THAT THE FORM AND LANGUAGE OF THE NOTE WERE UP TO THE USG AND NEED NOT CONTAIN DESIGNATION OF SOVIET ARTISTS AS "OFFICIAL GUESTS."

8. EMBOFF RECALLED THAT IN PAST SOVIET SIDE HAD ASKED THAT "SECURITY" GUARANTEES BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A NOTE.
BT
#1743

DECLASSIFIED # 11082
NLRR Feb 7/14/10
BY AD NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

ROUTING
TELEGRAM

24

PAGE 01

015461 ICA415
10/1035Z

015461 ICA415

ACTION OFFICE LU-03
INFO TCO-01 ~~DCG-02~~ D15-01 PGMD-02 FDC-04 GC-02 PGMR-01 ECA-06
/D24 A4 9

P 101815Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3467
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3297
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL Leningrad 0684

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 01743

USIA FOR EU (LILLEN), E/A, P/RSE, P/DC (CARSTONES)

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, EUR/SOV/SOEX

E.O. 12356: DECL: 02/09/89
TAGS: UR, OEXC, SCUL

~~SUBJECT: MORE ON HINCULT AND POSSIBLE PRIVATE~~
BODYUL INDICATED THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY. IF
USG WOULD INCLUDE IN THIS NOTE A STATEMENT THAT
IT HAD CONSULTED COMPETENT ORGANS TO ENSURE PHYSICAL
PROTECTION OF SOVIET ARTISTS THAT WOULD BE FINE, BUT
IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IF USG INDICATED EVEN INFORMALLY
THAT IT HAD COMMUNICATED THIS MESSAGE TO COMPETENT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES. PERHAPS, EVEN ASSURANCES THAT
LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAD CONTACTED AMERICAN ORGANIZERS
MIGHT SUFFICE, HE SAID.

9. WHEN EMOFF BEGAN TO ASK ABOUT WHAT SPECIFICALLY
WAS REQUIRED IN THESE GUARANTEES ENSURING THE PRO-
TECTION OF SOVIET ARTISTS, BODYUL SAID THAT HE
KNEW WHAT WAS ON EMOFF'S MIND AND THAT HE WANTED
TO ASSURE HIM THAT IF A SOVIET ARTIST DECIDED NOT
TO RETURN TO THE U.S.S.R. THAT WAS HIS FREE CHOICE,
BUT THAT SOVIET SIDE WAS CONCERNED (1) WITH PHYSICAL
SECURITY AND (2) THAT USG "SPECIAL SERVICES" NOT LURE
SOVIET ARTISTS AWAY. THE FIRST, HE SAID, WAS A MAJOR
CONCERN AND COULD BE HANDLED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS AS
HE HAD EARLIER INDICATED. THE SECOND WAS MORE COM-
PLICATED IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION, BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT
THAT ANY USG OFFICIALS WOULD EVER PUT SUCH GUARANTEES
IN WRITING; HE HAD HOPED THAT THE USG WOULD GIVE THE
SOVIET SIDE AT LEAST AN INFORMAL ASSURANCE THAT THEY
WOULD NOT PROVOKE DEFECTIONS.

10. BODYUL STATED THAT NOW THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD
SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFIED ITS POSITION, HE HOPED THAT
AMERICAN SIDE WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY. EMOFF
INDICATED THAT HE WOULD REPORT RESULTS OF THE MEETING
TO THE AMBASSADOR. HE HOWEVER POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS
NOT WITHOUT IRONY THAT, THOUGH THE SOVIETS WERE PUR-
SUING A PRIVATE CHANNEL FOR EXCHANGES, THE USG WAS
BEING CALLED UPON TO SANCTION THESE PRIVATE VENTURES.

11. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION ABOUT DR. HAMMER'S RECENT
VISIT, BODYUL STATED THAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED A
NUMBER OF VERY SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS, INCLUDING SOME
MAJOR ART EXHIBITS. (COMMENT: AS AN ASIDE, BUTROVA
SAID THAT A USG WAIVER IN 1921 FOR A SMALL EXHIBIT
WHICH ALSO INVOLVED HAMMER WAS SEEN AS A PRECEDENT
TO INDICATE THAT SUCH EXCHANGES WOULD BE POSSIBLE.
END COMMENT) BODYUL THEN SAID THAT HAMMER/WEINTRAUB
WERE INTERESTED IN THE MOSCOW CIRCUS WHICH WAS ALREADY
SCHEDULED FOR PERFORMANCES IN CANADA. A CURIOUS
EXCHANGE OCCURRED WHEN EMOFF SUGGESTED THAT THERE
WAS SOME CONFUSION ON THE AMERICAN SIDE AS TO THE

SPONSORSHIP OF THE CIRCUS. AFTER A BRIEF PAUSE,
BODYUL EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD HAD PRELIMINARY
CONVERSATIONS WITH MADISON SQUARE GARDEN (LILLEN GRANT),
BUT THAT THESE HAD NOT WORKED OUT APPARENTLY FOR
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND NOW HAMMER/WEINTRAUB WERE
INTERESTED.

12. COMMENT: OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS WE HAVE NOTED
THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE'S GROWING INTEREST IN PRIVATE
EXCHANGES ACCOMPANIED BY AN OVERRIDING CONCERN WITH
TWO QUESTIONS; SECURITY AND USG APPROVAL. WE HAVE
SEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON BOTH
MATTERS. ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY THEY APPEAR TO
HAVE ABANDONED THEIR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A USG COMMIT-
MENT TO PREVENT DEFECTIONS OF SOVIET ARTISTS, WHILE
ON THE QUESTION OF USG APPROVAL, THEY APPEAR READY
TO SETTLE FOR USG APPROVAL OF U.S. TOURS BY SOVIET
PERFORMING ARTISTS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. IN JERRY
WEINTRAUB'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE HINCULT, (REF C), THE
SOVIETS EMPHASIZED THEIR CONCERN WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY
RATHER THAN WITH DEFECTIONS, AND THIS POSITION WAS
ECHOED BY BUTROVA IN HER MEETING WITH EMOFFS (REF B)
AND NOW AGAIN BY BODYUL. BODYUL'S REMARKS ABOUT U.S.
"SPECIAL SERVICES" MAY IN FACT REFLECT THE SAME OLD
CONCERNS IN A DIFFERENT GUISE, BUT AT LEAST WHEN TAKEN
AT FACE VALUE, THEY ADDRESS ONLY THE QUESTIONS OF
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND "PROVOCATIONS."

-- SIMILARLY ON THE QUESTION OF USG APPROVAL, THE
SOVIETS HAVE MOVED FROM REQUIRING A CULTURAL AGREE-
MENT TO REQUIRING AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES. IN DISCUSSIONS
WITH WEINTRAUB (REF C), THE SOVIETS MENTIONED A HOST

BT
#1743

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

TELETYPE
TELEGRAM

25

PAGE 01

015462 1CA416
10/1636Z

ACTION OFFICE EU-03
INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 D1S-01 PGMD-02 PDC-04 GC-02 PGMR-01 ECA-08
/024 A4 9

P 101815Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3468
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3288
INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0685
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 01743

OF EXCHANGES WITHOUT CITING THE NEED FOR A CULTURAL AGREEMENT. BUTROVA (REF B) THEN MENTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF ~~HAVING THE USG APPROVE SPECIFIC SOVIET PERFORMING ARTS TOURS VIA AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES.~~ BODYUL HAS NOW REITERATED THIS FORMULA BUT HAS SUBSTITUTED THE PASSIVE NOTION OF USG "ACCEPTANCE" FOR THE MORE ACTIVE "APPROVAL" SUGGESTED BY BUTROVA (WE REFER ONLY TO THEIR REMARKS IN CONVERSATION; THE SOVIET SIDE HAS SUGGESTED NO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN THIS REGARD). IN SHORT THE SOVIETS HAVE CONSISTENTLY INDICATED THEIR INTEREST IN PRIVATELY SPONSORED TOURS OF THE U. S. BY SOVIET PERFORMING ARTISTS, WHILE GRADUALLY REDUCING THEIR POSITION ON THE TWO QUESTIONS OF PARAMOUNT CONCERN TO THEM: SECURITY AND USG APPROVAL.

-- IT APPEARS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS EAGER TO UNDERTAKE THESE PRIVATE EXCHANGES AND IS WILLING TO SETTLE FOR MUCH LESS IN GUARANTEES THAN WAS THE CASE EARLIER. ~~OUR VIEW REMAINS THAT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THESE PRIVATE EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS WOULD FURTHER REDUCE OUR OWN LEVERAGE IN ATTEMPTING TO SECURE RECIPROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP.~~ END COMMENT.

HARTMAN

BT

*1743

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

February 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

THRU: C - The Counselor

FROM: EU - Leonard J. Baldyga *LB*

SUBJECT: Latest Soviet Position on Private Exchanges

REFERENCE: Moscow 01743 (C) [attached]

- When Soviet Ministry of Culture officials learned that Ambassador Hartman was planning to return to Washington in the near future for consultations, they asked the CAO for a meeting so that they could convey their "latest" position concerning what they would like the USG to do to facilitate (their) private exchanges. As the attached cable is relevant to your meeting this afternoon with Mark Palmer, I will summarize the details for you.
- Briefly, the Ministry of Culture is prepared to "reopen cultural relations" without an agreement with the U.S. by arranging cultural exchange of performing artists through private channels. They have modified their position on the role of the USG by indicating they no longer expect the USG to give them guarantees against defections by Soviet artists.
- What they say now is they they wish to have a note indicating "official acceptance" of a specific exchange and that the note could be from the Department or USIA or "any other appropriate USG agency." The note need not designate the Soviet artists as "official guests." But, when details are discussed, they continue to ask that such notes include some assurance that the USG would contact local authorities as a reassurance that physical protection would be provided for Soviet artists. Moreover, they continue to raise their ostensible concern that the "special services" of the USG "not lure Soviet artists away."
- As for the Moscow Circus, you will recall you asked me to call Sonny Werblin when you learned that the Soviets were trying to arrange shows for the Madison Square Garden. As you know, Mr. Werblin agreed with our position against the Circus and indicated the Soviets still owed him money for the "Holiday on Ice" tour of the USSR. The Soviets now say they are back to working through Hammer and Weintraub in trying to book the Circus tour.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY: BALDYGA, Leonard J.
 OFFICE SYMBOL: USIA/EU
 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #11083
 BY DL NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

-- The Embassy points out correctly that if the Soviets are successful in such private exchange agreements it would further reduce our leverage in obtaining reciprocity in the matter of bilateral cultural exchanges.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECIPROCAL
INCOMING
TELEGRAM 28

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4267 DTG: 081319Z APR 83 PSN: 047975
EOB164 AN006080 TOR: 098/1413Z CSN: HCE008

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 ROBN-01 /004 A2

DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 EE-00 /001 A2
WHSR COMMENT: NOTE

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT EOB
EOB:

PRIORITY
STU8923
DE RUEHMO #4267/01 0981329
P 081319Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3888

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5229
AMCONSUL Leningrad PRIORITY 1540
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 7046

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 04267
USIA FOR C, EU, P, VOA, VOA/B
MUNICH FOR VOA, RFE/RL
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN

AS 6/10/02

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN WHICH WAS SUBMITTED TO PRAVDA FOR PUBLICATION IN MID-FEBRUARY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT VOA USSR DIVISION AND WORLDWIDE ENGLISH USE EXCERPTS OF THE TEXT IN BROADCASTS TO THE USSR, EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. THERE IS AN EMBARGO ON USE OF THE TEXT: 0100 GMT APRIL 11. IT IS ALSO BEING RELEASED TO AMERICAN AND WEST EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENTS RESIDENT IN MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE WRITTEN BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, ARTHUR HARTMAN, AND SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION TO PRAVDA, THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER. IT WAS SENT TO PRAVDA IN MID-FEBRUARY, BUT PRAVDA HAS NOT AGREED TO PUBLISH IT. SEVERAL IMPORTANT EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED SINCE MID-FEBRUARY, INCLUDING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S NEW PROPOSAL OF MARCH 30 TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT IN THE INF TALKS IN GENEVA AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS, AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S ARTICLE IS STILL VERY MUCH RELEVANT TO THE CURRENT SITUATION.

(BEGIN TEXT)

-- THIS NOVEMBER THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL PASS A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE--THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE ANNIVERSARY WILL MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. BUT IF IT STANDS FOR ANYTHING, IT WILL STAND FOR FIFTY YEARS OF DIALOGUE. FOR HALF A CENTURY, MY GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES.

-- IN RECENT MONTHS IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO ME THAT THE SOVIET UNION--OR AT LEAST CERTAIN OF ITS MORE INFLUENTIAL SPOKESMEN--CONTINUES TO APPRECIATE THE VALUE OF SETTING ITS VIEWS BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IN THE UNITED STATES

PRESS AND OVER OUR RADIO AND TELEVISION, A VERITABLE PARADE OF SOME OF THE USSR'S BEST KNOWN COMMENTATORS, ACADEMICS AND OTHER SPOKESMEN HAVE DONE AN ADMIRABLE JOB OF PRESENTING SOVIET POSITIONS ON MAJOR BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

-- WE IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE LONG FELT THAT A WELL INFORMED PUBLIC IS A PRECONDITION FOR EFFECTIVE DEMOCRACY AND A WISE FOREIGN POLICY. THAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SUCH FREE ACCESS TO THE U.S. MEDIA IS PROOF OF THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO THE IDEAL OF A FREE EXCHANGE OF IDEAS.

-- IN A GENUINE DIALOGUE, OF COURSE, BOTH SIDES ARE TALKING, NOT JUST ONE. WITH THIS IN MIND, I HOPE YOU WILL PERMIT ME THROUGH THE PAGES OF YOUR NEWSPAPER TO ADDRESS SOME OF THE MAJOR ISSUES FACING OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND TO PROVIDE AN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW FOR YOUR SOVIET READERS, JUST AS OUR MEDIA HAVE WELCOMED THE EXPOSITION OF A SOVIET POINT OF VIEW TO AMERICAN AUDIENCES.

-- WHAT DO WE AMERICANS HEAR WHEN WE LISTEN TO SOVIET SPOKESMEN? MANY THINGS, MANY OF THEM CRITICAL, AND ON A RANGE OF ISSUES TOO BROAD TO ADDRESS IN ONE ARTICLE. I WILL THEREFORE FOCUS ON THREE MAJOR CONCERNS WE HEAR BEING VOICED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

-- FIRST, THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT ONLY HAS ABANDONED ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE BUT IS ACTIVELY PREPARING FOR WAR;

-- SECOND, THAT, TO JUSTIFY ITS MILITARY PREPARATIONS, THE U.S. IS ARTIFICIALLY EXACERBATING U.S.-SOVIET TENSIONS BY RAISING EXTRANEIOUS ISSUES;

-- THIRD, THAT U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS ARE NOT ONLY NOT SERIOUS, BUT DESIGNED UNILATERALLY TO DISARM THE SOVIET UNION.

-- WHEN WE HEAR SUCH VIEWS EXPRESSED, I CONFESS IT IS HARD TO AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT THOSE EXPRESSING THEM ARE NOT REALLY LISTENING TO US. LET US LOOK AT THE FACTS.

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING 29
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4267 DTG: 081319Z APR 83 PSN: 047977
EOB165 AN006081 TOR: 098/1415Z CSN: HCE010

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 ROBN-01 /004 A2

DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT EOB
EOB:

PRIORITY
STU8924
DE RUEHMO #4267/02 0981330
P 081319Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3889

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5230
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 1541
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 7047

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 04267
USIA FOR C, EU, P, VOA, VOA/B
MUNICH FOR VOA, RFE/RL
E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN

4. -- FIRST AS TO OUR COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING THE PEACE. AS INCONVENIENT AS IT MAY BE TO SOME, THE HISTORICAL RECORD SHOWS THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS. AS EARLY AS 1946, WHEN THE U.S. POSSESSED NOT THE FANCIFUL MILITARY SUPERIORITY WE ARE TODAY ACCUSED OF SEEKING, BUT AN ABSOLUTE MONOPOLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY, WE PROPOSED IN THE BARUCH PLAN THAT ALL ASPECTS OF ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT BE PLACED UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES. THE SOVIET UNION REJECTED THAT PROPOSAL, AND A GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO NIP THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE BUD WAS LOST. BUT OUR APPROACH HAS NOT CHANGED IN THE INTERVENING YEARS. IN GENEVA AND VIENNA THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS PROPOSED A RANGE OF INITIATIVES AIMED AT BRINGING TO A HALT SENSELESS COMPETITION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SHARPLY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONFLICT, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL.

... HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US, HOWEVER, THAT WE CANNOT RELY SOLELY ON NEGOTIATIONS TO PRESERVE THE PEACE. WE, LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, LEARNED IN 1941 THAT MILITARY WEAKNESS, OR PERCEPTIONS OF IT, CAN BE THE SHORTEST PATH TO WAR. THUS, THROUGHOUT THE POST-WAR PERIOD, WE HAVE TAKEN THE STEPS WE BELIEVED NECESSARY TO DETER ANY ATTACKS ON OURSELVES OR OUR ALLIES. THE CURRENT MODERNIZATION OF OUR ARMED FORCES, WHICH SEEMS SO TO TROUBLE SOVIET SPOKESMEN, IS AN OUTGROWTH OF THAT APPROACH AND, I MIGHT ADD, FOLLOWS OVER A DECADE OF U.S. RESTRAINT IN DEPLOYING NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS. OUR GOAL, AS IN THE PAST, IS DETERRENCE. WE DO NOT, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS MADE CLEAR, SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER NATION. BUT NEITHER CAN WE AFFORD TO BE SECOND BEST.

NEXT, AS TO CHARGES THAT THE U.S. IS ARTIFICIALLY AGGRAVATING TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT BILATERAL TENSIONS EXISTS AND IN RECENT YEARS HAVE GROWN MORE SERIOUS. THIS IS PARTIALLY A FUNCTION OF

THE FACT THAT THE U.S. AND USSR ARE, AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN, INTERNATIONAL RIVALS. THIS IS NOT A CHOICE WE HAVE MADE; IT IS LARGELY A REFLECTION OF THE DIVERSE BASIC PRINCIPLES ON WHICH OUR TWO SOCIETIES WERE FOUNDED. BUT IT DOES HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR HOW WE INTERRELATE TO ONE ANOTHER IN THE WORLD. FOR OUR PART, WE DO NOT EXPECT THE USSR, IN ITS APPROACH TO THE U.S., TO COMPROMISE ITS PRINCIPLES OR INTERESTS. BUT NEITHER DO WE EXPECT OR INTEND TO COMPROMISE OUR OWN.

... WITH RESPECT TO PRINCIPLES, ONE AREA WHERE THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT AS TO OUR COMMITMENT IS ON THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE OFTEN HEAR THAT OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY REPRESENTS INTERFERENCE IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WE CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH A CHARACTERIZATION, WHICH BETRAYS GROSS IGNORANCE OF WHAT MOTIVATES THE UNITED STATES AS A PEOPLE. BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO US OF THE BASIC RIGHTS OF MAN--ON WHICH OUR OWN REPUBLIC WAS FOUNDED IN 1776--WE NATURALLY SYMPATHIZE WITH AND SUPPORT THOSE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ELSEWHERE WHOSE RIGHTS ARE BEING DENIED. WE SHALL ALWAYS DO SO. BUT THERE IS AN EQUALLY FUNDAMENTAL--AND PERHAPS MORE PRAGMATIC--POINT AT ISSUE. WHEN A COUNTRY SYSTEMATICALLY DENIES ITS CITIZENS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO WHICH IT IS A PARTY, IT RAISES IN OUR MINDS SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO THAT COUNTRY'S RELIABILITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL PARTNER. WE ASK ONLY THAT THE USSR LIVE UP TO ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

... THE SITUATION IS SIMILAR WITH RESPECT TO OUR PERCEPTION OF INTERESTS. WE ARE OFTEN TOLD THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW MINOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS TO INTERFERE WITH BILATERAL EFFORTS IN SUCH VITAL AREAS AS ARMS CONTROL. AGAIN, WE CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH AN ARGUMENT. IF MODERN HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US ANYTHING IT IS THAT SECURITY ENCOMPASSES THE WHOLE WORLD SITUATION. WHEN WE SEE SOVIET FORCES OCCUPYING AFGHANISTAN TO SUPPORT A GOVERNMENT WHICH APPARENTLY CANNOT

SUSTAIN ITSELF, WHEN WE SEE VIETNAMESE PLAYING A SIMILAR ROLE IN KAMPUCHEA WITH SOVIET BACKING, WHEN WE SEE POLISH WORKERS DENIED RIGHTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO BY THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT, WHEN A LARGE ASIAN DEMOCRACY IS THREATENED
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

30

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4267 DTG: 081319Z APR 83 PSN: 047981
EOB167 AN006082 TOR: 098/1419Z CSN: HCE013

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 ROBN-01 /004 A2

DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT EOB
EOB:

PRIORITY
UTS3464
DE RUEHMO #4267/03 0981331
P 081319Z APR 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3890

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5231
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 1542
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 7048

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 04267
USIA FOR C, EU, P, VOA, VOA/B
MUNICH FOR VOA, RFE/RL
E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: ARTICLE BY AMBASSADOR ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH NUCLEAR RETALIATION FOR SEEKING
TO ASSURE ITS OWN SECURITY, WE CANNOT HELP BUT DRAW
CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH ACTIONS FOR OUR
OWN SECURITY, AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS IN RESPONSE.
IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO MAKE SUCH
QUESTIONS A PART OF THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE.

6. -- FINALLY, AS TO THE QUESTION OF THE SINCERITY OF OUR
APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. PORTRAYING THE U.S. APPROACH
AS A SCHEME FOR UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
MAY BE AN EFFECTIVE DEBATER'S TECHNIQUE, BUT IT DOES NOT
TAKE ONE VERY FAR IN GETTING AT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM.
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS IN GENEVA, ON THE OTHER HAND,
REPRESENT STRAIGHTFORWARD AND SENSIBLE APPROACHES DESIGNED
TO ACHIEVE TWO BASIC GOALS: TO DECREASE THE LIKELIHOOD
THAT EITHER SIDE WILL EVER BE TEMPTED TO USE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FIRST, AND TO REDUCE THE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS.
WE WOULD DO THIS IN THREE WAYS:

-- FIRST, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT BOTH SIDES REDUCE THE
NUMBER OF THEIR NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES
BY ONE-THIRD. THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BOTH HAVE
APPROXIMATELY 7,000 SUCH WARHEADS NOW (THE SOVIET
UNION ACTUALLY HAS SEVERAL HUNDRED MORE). THUS, THE
NEW CEILING WOULD BE 5,000 WEAPONS. WE CONCENTRATE
ON BALLISTIC MISSILES BECAUSE THEIR RAPID FLIGHT TIME
MAKES THEM WELL SUITED FOR SURPRISE ATTACKS.

-- SECOND, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT NO MORE THAN HALF OF
THE 5,000 WARHEADS REMAINING UNDER OUR PLAN BE PLACED
ON LAND BASED INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
(ICBM'S). AGAIN, THE RATIONALE IS TO REDUCE THE
TEMPTATION FOR ONE SIDE TO STRIKE FIRST. ICBM'S,
BECAUSE OF THEIR FIXED LOCATIONS, ARE VULNERABLE TO
DESTRUCTION IN A SURPRISE ATTACK. THUS, THE TEMPTATION
TO USE THEM IN THE EVENT OF WARNING OF AN ATTACK WOULD
BE STRONG, AND THE RISK OF AN ACCIDENTAL LAUNCH IS
INCREASED. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR ACCURACY AND HEAVY

PAYLOADS MAKE THEM IDEAL WEAPONS FOR A FIRST STRIKE.
BY REDUCING BOTH SIDES' RELIANCE ON SUCH SYSTEMS, OUR
PROPOSAL WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY
OF AN OUTBREAK OF WAR.

-- FINALLY, WE HAVE PROPOSED THE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE
CLASS OF WEAPONS -- LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
BALLISTIC MISSILES. AT PRESENT, ONLY THE SOVIET UNION
HAS SUCH SYSTEMS, THE SOLE PURPOSE OF WHICH, DESPITE
SOVIET CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY, IS TO POSE A NUCLEAR
THREAT TO A WHOLE SERIES OF NATIONS ALONG THE SOVIET
UNION'S BORDERS AND BEYOND. SINCE MANY OF THESE
STATES ARE U.S. ALLIES OR FRIENDS, THESE SYSTEMS CREATE
A SERIOUS THREAT OF ESCALATION TO A STRATEGIC LEVEL.
THE U.S. AND ITS NATO ALLIES HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR
INTENTION TO REDRESS THE BALANCE OF SUCH FORCES IN
EUROPE. IF NECESSARY, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO SO BY
DEPLOYING ANALAGOUS FORCES OF OUR OWN. BUT WE WOULD
PREFER, AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR, THAT THE PROBLEM BE
RESOLVED BY A BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE THESE
SYSTEMS FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.

-- A SOVIET COMMENTATOR IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED NOT TOO
LONG AGO IN AN AMERICAN PUBLICATION OBSERVED THAT, WHILE
HE WOULD LIKE TO BE PROVED WRONG, HE SAW LITTLE HOPE OF
DOING BUSINESS WITH THE UNITED STATES AT THIS TIME. AS I
NOTED EARLIER, I CANNOT HELP BUT THINK THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN
LISTENING TO WHAT WE ARE SAYING. WE ARE READY TO RESPOND
QUICKLY AND FAVORABLY TO POSITIVE MOVES BY THE SOVIET
UNION. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, AS IS SOMETIMES SUGGESTED, THAT
WE SEEK UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. IT DOES MEAN THAT WE SEEK
EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO JOIN WITH US
IN THE SEARCH FOR JUST, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO
THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US. GIVEN THAT EVIDENCE, THOSE INCLINED
TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY FOR BILATERAL
PROGRESS MAY BE SURPRISED HOW QUICKLY THEY ARE PROVEN WRONG.
(END TEXT)

7. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT. HARTMAN
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

H
Reciprocity
31

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1983

John Lenczowski,

Subject: Reciprocity in E-W exchanges

As you may know Arbatov has a pending request for a visa to visit the US for sessions at Grinnell College (April 16-21) and later at Dartmouth (April 27-May 2) with roving authority between the two conferences.

Larry Eagleburger proposes that he be authorized to come to either or both but without the stay in between.

The Judge prefers that we also add that we want congruent treatment for a specific individual who we would state currently plans to make a trip to USSR in the near future. The trouble is that we can't find anyone planning to go. We have tried Seweryn Bialer who is going but doesn't want to get involved and several others. The Judge suggests that we try Dick Pipes to see if he might be interested or otherwise planning to go anyway. This would be a trip within the next six weeks or so but it would clearly be identified as a "reciprocity" trip. Dick might or might not want that connotation. Could you consider this promptly (the visa decision must be made by cob Wednesday) and get back to me with Dick's views and yours? It is my sense that we ought to turn the whole thing down. I acknowledge however, that to do so right now would have a disastrous effect on Ken Adelman's nomination, the freeze vote etc. So I am willing to go along but would like to find a reciprocal visit we can pin down.


Many thanks

Bud
Bud

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR FO6 714/10 #11062

BY CS NARA DATE 1/2/08



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1983

John Lenczowski,

Subject: Reciprocity in E-W exchanges

As you may know Arbatov has a pending request for a visa to visit the US for sessions at Grinnell College (April 16-21) and later at Dartmouth (April 27-May 2) with roving authority between the two conferences.

Larry Eagleburger proposes that he be authorized to come to either or both but without the stay in between.

The Judge prefers that we also add that we want congruent treatment for a specific individual who we would state currently plans to make a trip to USSR in the near future. The trouble is that we can't find anyone planning to go. We have tried Seweryn Bialer who is going but doesn't want to get involved and several others. The Judge suggests that we try Dick Pipes to see if he might be interested or otherwise planning to go anyway. This would be a trip within the next six weeks or so but it would clearly be identified as a "reciprocity" trip. Dick might or might not want that connotation. Could you consider this promptly (the visa decision must be made by cob Wednesday) and get back to me with Dick's views and yours? It is my sense that we ought to turn the whole thing down. I acknowledge however, that to do so right now would have a disastrous effect on Ken Adelman's nomination, the freeze vote etc. So I am willing to go along but would like to find a reciprocal visit we can pin down.

Many thanks

Bud
Bud

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED)
NLRR FOIA 11/4/10 #11064
BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~SECRET~~

File Reciprocity

33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 4533
SIT820 AN009203

DTG: 132030Z APR 83 PSN: 056402
TOR: 103/2127Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF /001

N
O
D
I
S

OP IMMED
UTS9896
DE RUEHMO #4533 1032030
O 132030Z APR 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5452

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 04533

N
O
D
I
S

NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY AND JUDGE CLARK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR
SUBJECT: ARBATOV VISA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #11084

BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

N
O
D
I
S

1. (~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

N
O
D
I
S

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO CONDITIONING ARBATOV'S VISA. WHILE I AM THE FIRST ONE TO WISH FOR STRICT RECIPROCITY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS AND INDEED HAVE APPLIED THIS POLICY WITH SUCCESS IN RECENT VISA CASES--PRIMAKOV FOR HARVARD PROFESSOR MARSHALL GOLDMAN WHO HAD TWICE BEEN TURNED DOWN BY SOVIETS--I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WISE AT THIS TIME TO MAKE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER ARBATOV INTO A CAUSE CELEBRE. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES OUTSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS AT THIS TIME, ONE OF WHICH HAS THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT. I SEE NO PARTICULAR GAIN FROM A GRATUITOUS RAISING OF THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME. WE WILL HAVE AMPLE OCCASIONS IN THE FUTURE WITH A MUCH MORE CAREFULLY PREPARED AND RATIONAL CASE TO PRESENT.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

34

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 4533

DTG: 132030Z APR 83 PSN: 056402

N
O
D
I
S

3. JUST TONIGHT I RECEIVED WORD THAT THE HANDLING OF THE
PENTECOSTALIST CASE HAS BEEN FAVORABLY VIEWED AND THE AFFAIR
SEEMS TO BE ON TRACK. TO INSERT THIS ILL-PREPARED PLOY
IN THE MIDST OF MORE SERIOUS MOVES SEEMS TO ME TO BE THE
HEIGHT OF FOLLY. HARTMAN
BT

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Rec'd 4/15/83
Reciprocity 35*


April 14, 1983

John Lenczowski

The Judge talked to Secretary Shultz and agreed that Arbatov could come for Grinnell and Dartmouth but not in between. (and without access to media

As a separate but related matter he also agreed that we would seek reciprocal treatment and access for Art Hartman. I have asked Charlie Hill to let me know how this is to be carried out.

Bud



DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLRR FOI-114/10 ⁷² 11066

BY CV NARA DATE 1/2/08

UNCLASSIFIED

CA/VO: EJMARRIS: EJM
4/24/83 EXT: 22949
CA: REFRITTS

EUR/SOV: TSIMONS
CA/VO: LPGOELZ
CA/VO/L/C: DEMORRIS

S/S: CMCHANAWAY
CA/VO/L: CDSCULLY

CIA, FBI, INS, USI, NSA, INS, EUR, DOD, CA

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

VISAS

E.O. 12958 N/A

PER REQUEST

COMMENT:

for
EJE
TE
CA
LPG
CDS
DEM

TAGS: CYIS-UR (ARBATOV, GEORGIY A.)

SUBJECT: VISAS SPLEX: VISIT TO GRINNELL COLLEGE AND ATTENDANCE AT DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE

REF: MOSCOW 3151

1. VISAS FOUR GEORGIY A. ARBATOV (28). SINGLE ENTRY AUTHORIZED DURING APR 83 FOR STAY OF 20 DAYS.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM MFA IN WHATEVER MANNER EMBASSY DEEMS APPROPRIATE, THAT ANY CONTACT WITH MEDIA BY ARBATOV WILL BE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH HIS VISA HAS BEEN ISSUED. YY

CROSSMATCH

RETURN TIME STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S

File J.L. Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1983

*passed
to Charlie 37
Bud
4/13
KCM*

Judge Clark

Subject: Arbatov Visa

Per your guidance, I have had John Lenczowski contact Dick Pipes with respect to Dick's making a visit to the Soviet Union in the next two months or so in which he would accorded reciprocal treatment to Arbatov's coming here.

Dick was very supportive and would love to go.

John concurs in our proposing that Arbatov be allowed to come for either college visit or both but not to stay for the period in between and that this was subject to Soviet agreement to receive Professor Pipes for a like period and with reciprocal access and treatment.

OK _____ ✓

Other _____

Bud
Bud

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR EO 11652 #11068

BY C.V. NARA DATE 1/2/08

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1983

Judge Clark

Subject: Arbatov Affair

I conveyed your guidance to State on how to respond to the Arbatov visa request ("He may come to either or both colleges but not stay over between them and that in a future visit by Prof Pipes we would expect reciprocal access and treatment.")

Secretary Shultz called. Art Hartman believes that this will perhaps complicate and derail the Pentacostals matter. In addition, Art, who is seeking better access himself, believes that he rather than another private citizen ought to be accorded better access as a matter of high priority.

Secretary Shultz would like to discuss this with you. He proposes a formulation under which we would agree to the Arbatov visit under the same terms (i.e. either or both but not staying over) with the additional proviso that any media exposure would be on a reciprocal basis (that is, if he gets it here, we (Hartman) would get it there).

Shultz will be in his office late tonight and would appreciate your giving him a call.

Bud


DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR FOI-114/10 #11069

BY 015 NARA DATE 1/2/08

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13

Wil,

Further on the Arbatov matter.

RCM typed a note to WPC and gave it to me for the Judge. Before I had made a copy, Judge Clark spoke to RCM by phone.

RCM still has the note on his desk -- Judge Clark to call Shultz; note is RCM's reminder to follow up tomorrow.

klm

UNCLASSIFIED

No. Page

CA/VO: E J HARRIS: E J H
4/14/83 EXT. 22949
CA: REFRITTS

EUR/SOV: T SIMONS
CA/VO: L P GOELZ
CA/VO/L/C: B MORRIS

(Room number)
VISA Entry Visit to Grinnell

S/S: C M CHANAWAY
CA/VO/L: C D SCULLY

CIA, FBI, INS, OSI, NSA, INS, EUR, DOD, CA

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

VISAS

E.O. 12065: N/A

PER REQUEST

COMMENT

for
EJE
TE
CN
LPG
CDS
DEN

TAGS: CYIS: UR (ARBATOV, GEORGIY A.)

SUBJECT: VISAS SPLEX: VISIT TO GRINNELL COLLEGE AND ATTENDANCE AT DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE

REF: MOSCOW 3151

1. VISAS FOUR GEORGIY A. ARBATOV (28). SINGLE ENTRY AUTHORIZED DURING APR 83 FOR STAY OF 20 DAYS.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM MFA IN WHATEVER MANNER EMBASSY DEEMS APPROPRIATE, THAT ANY CONTACT WITH MEDIA BY ARBATOV WILL BE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH HIS VISA HAS BEEN ISSUED. YY

CROSSMATCH

RETURN TIME STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S

UNCLASSIFIED



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1983

John Lenczowski,

Subject: Reciprocity in E-W exchanges

As you may know Arbatov has a pending request for a visa to visit the US for sessions at Grinnell College (April 16-21) and later at Dartmouth (April 27-May 2) with roving authority between the two conferences.

Larry Eagleburger proposes that he be authorized to come to either or both but without the stay in between.

The Judge prefers that we also add that we want congruent treatment for a specific individual who we would state currently plans to make a trip to USSR in the near future. The trouble is that we can't find anyone planning to go. We have tried Seweryn Bialer who is going but doesn't want to get involved and several others. The Judge suggests that we try Dick Pipes to see if he might be interested or otherwise planning to go anyway. This would be a trip within the next six weeks or so but it would clearly be identified as a "reciprocity" trip. Dick might or might not want that connotation. Could you consider this promptly (the visa decision must be made by cob Wednesday) and get back to me with Dick's views and yours? It is my sense that we ought to turn the whole thing down. I acknowledge however, that to do so right now would have a disastrous effect on Ken Adelman's nomination, the freeze vote etc. So I am willing to go along but would like to find a reciprocal visit we can pin down.

Many thanks

Bud
Bud

DECLASSIFIED/RE/DA/SC/1
NLRR F06-114/10 # 11072
BY CN NARA DATE 1/2/08

ARBATOV WANTS U.S., USSR TO RETURN TO 'SENSIBLE RELATIONS'

LD141613. MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1550 GMT 14 APR 83

(TEXT) MOSCOW APRIL 14 TASS -- THERE CAN BE NO WINNER IN NUCLEAR WAR; ANY LIMITED NUCLEAR CONFLICT WILL INEVITABLY ESCALATE INTO A GLOBAL ONE, WREAKING CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES; ACADEMICIAN GEORGIY ARBATOV, AN EMINENT SOVIET SCIENTIST, WRITES IN AN ARTICLE HEADLINED "SECURITY INSTEAD OF FEAR," WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNAL NAUKA V SSSR (SCIENCE IN THE USSR).

"WE ARE FACING A DILEMMA: WE HAVE EITHER TO CHANGE HABITS, APPROACHES, TRADITIONS AND THE MODE OF CONDUCT, OR TO TREAT AS A REALITY THE POSSIBILITY OF MANKIND SUFFERING THE WORST IMAGINABLE CATASTROPHE," HE DECLARES.

GEORGIY ARBATOV SEES THE ARMS RACE AS THE MAIN THREAT TO PEACE. "TODAY IT IS A GENERATOR OF MISTRUST AND SUSPICIONS, I WOULD SAY, A STIMULUS TO ADVENTURIST CONDUCT AND, FOR THIS REASON, THE MAIN FACTOR IMPAIRING POLITICAL RELATIONS," HE BELIEVES. "SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, ALAS, BEAR THIS OUT GRAPHICALLY," THE SCIENTIST ADDS.

"WE DO NOT HAVE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES WITH THE UNITED STATES. BUT THE STOCKPILING BY THE AMERICANS OF HUGE WEAPONS ARSENALS MAKES ME, AS WELL AS ALL SOVIET PEOPLE, WONDER. AND NOT ONLY WONDER BUT HAVE NATURAL SUSPICIONS, SINCE THESE WEAPONS ARE TRAINED, NOT ON FRANCE OR SWEDEN, BUT ON THE SOVIET UNION.

"I AM AFRAID OF USING STRONG WORDS, BUT IF THE TALKS ON LIMITING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, THE EFFORTS TO TERMINATE THE ARMS RACE END IN FAILURE, THE CONSEQUENCES, IN MY VIEW, WILL BE CATASTROPHIC," ACADEMICIAN ARBATOV WRITES. "WE HAVE NOT YET HAD A RUNAWAY ARMS RACE IN THE CONDITIONS OF PARITY! BUT IF WE FAIL TO THROW UP AN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF ITS ANOTHER SPIRAL, WE SHALL FACE WHAT WE HAVE NEVER FACED IN HISTORY." THE SCIENTIST SAYS HE BELIEVES THAT THE ARMS RACE HAS A VERY ADVERSE, DESTABILISING EFFECT ON THE SITUATION AND THAT IT INCREASES THE RISK OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

"IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT OUR COUNTRIES (THE U.S.S.R. AND THE U.S.A.) RETURN TO THE PATH OF SENSIBLE RELATIONS. WE ARE NOT ASKING AMERICANS TO LIKE US, AND THE AMERICANS, AS FAR AS I KNOW, AREN'T ASKING US TO LIKE THEM EITHER. THE MATTER IS SOMETHING ELSE. IT IS THAT WE HAVE TO REALISE THE COMMUNITY OF OUR INTEREST FOR PRESERVING PEACE," GEORGIY ARBATOV EXPLAINS.

ARBATOV -
US-USSR
contacts.
Reciprocity
42

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

May 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Decisions on New
Consulates, Cultural Exchange Agreement
and Reciprocity

In several memos in the past month, the State Department has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. State then sent such a memo to me. Unfortunately, it did not include the views of other agencies.

Specifically, Defense and the Intelligence Community are concerned with the hostile intelligence presence. As I understand it, however, views of both sides do not appear to be irreconcilable -- especially on the cultural exchange agreement -- as certain steps are taken, such as visa control, to help ensure strict reciprocity.

I have, therefore, requested State to produce an interagency approved paper taking all views into account, in preparation for an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10 to present these issues to you in the presence of your National Security Council.

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

~~US USSR~~
~~Sub-Diplo~~

File Reciprocity
44

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 7186 DTG: 081409Z JUN 83 PSN: 067279
EOB283 AN010010 TOR: 159/1424Z CSN: HCE338

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 LENC-01 /004 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS2775
DE RUEHMO #7186/01 1591412
O 081409Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4363
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7459
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 6145

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2505

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 07186

USIA FOR EU
FRANKFURT PASS AMBASSADOR HARTMAN IN AIR FORCE HOSPITAL
WIESBADEN
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR
SUBJECT: ARBATOV COMMENTARY ON AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND
STATE DEPARTMENT

1. SUMMARY: USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR GEORGIY ARBATOV TAKES POT SHOTS AT AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND STATE DEPARTMENT IN LENGTHY PIECE IN JUNE 8 ISSUE OF LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. ARBATOV CLAIMS THAT THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON HIS ACCESS TO THE PRESS BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT DURING HIS LAST TRIP TO THE U.S. WERE THE RESULT OF "PRAVDA" REFUSING TO PUBLISH THE AMBASSADOR'S PREFERRED ARTICLE. ARBATOV PORTRAYS THE PRESENTATION OF THE ARTICLE TO PRAVDA AS A "DEMAND" THAT IT BE PUBLISHED. THE TRUE REASON FOR THE RESTRICTIONS, HE SAYS, WAS THE USG'S FEAR OF THE TRUTH. POST WILL RESPOND TO JOURNALISTS' INQUIRIES BY STATING THAT THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE HARTMAN ARTICLE AND THE ACTIONS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO ARBATOV'S STAY IN THE U.S. AND THAT ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS ON ARBATOV'S VISA RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THE JUNE 8 ISSUE OF LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, ACADEMICIAN GEORGIY ARBATOV, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA, PRESENTS EXCERPTS FROM THE PREFACE TO A BOOK SOON TO BE PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW ENTITLED "ENTERING THE 1980'S." THE BOOK, ALREADY PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. ACCORDING TO ARBATOV, IS IN THE FORM OF AN INTERVIEW WITH DUTCH CORRESPONDENT V. OLTMANS. THE SECTION DIRECTLY CONCERNING AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND ARBATOV'S TRIP TO THE STATES FOLLOWS IN ITS ENTIRETY (IT IS APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD OF THE ENTIRE PIECE).

TEXT

WHO IS AFRAID OF DIALOGUE?

ACADEMICIAN G. ARBATOV
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, JUNE 8, 1983
A BOOK INTERVIEW ENTITLED "ENTERING THE 1980'S" WILL BE PUBLISHED THIS YEAR IN MOSCOW (BY NOVOSTI). THE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED BY DUTCH JOURNALIST V. OLTMANS. I ANSWERED

THEM. THE BOOK WAS PUBLISHED IN 1981 IN THE FRG AND HOLLAND AND AT THE START OF THIS YEAR IN THE U.S. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EVENTS FORCE THE AUTHORS TO CONSTANTLY REVISE THE CONTENTS. I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PUT SOME RECENT OBSERVATIONS IN THE PREFACE TO THE SOVIET EDITION. THE PREFACE SPEAKS OF THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL, ON THE WEST'S REACTION, ON THE POLITICAL MANEUVERS OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION DESIGNED TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION. THE PREFACE ALSO CONTAINS SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MY RECENT TRIP TO AMERICA...

... IN THE SPRING OF 1983 I MANAGED ONCE AGAIN TO VISIT AMERICA. I MUST SAY THAT WITH THE COMING TO POWER OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SUCH TRIPS HAVE BECOME RARE-- THIS WAS IN FACT MY FIRST TRIP AFTER A TWO-YEAR BREAK. MOREOVER, THIS TIME, LIKE LAST TIME, I DID NOT NEED TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE HOSPITALITY OF THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. THE VISA WAS NOT ONLY ISSUED ON THE DAY I WAS TO DEPART, BUT WITH THE WARNING THAT I WAS FORBIDDEN TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MASS MEDIA.

THIS MEASURE, DICTATED APPARENTLY BY A TOUCHING CONCERN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INNOCENCE OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND, PRIMARILY, OF COURSE, THEIR READERS, WAS DISCUSSED IN THE U.S. AND EVOKED NO SMALL AMOUNT OF CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION (SOMEONE EVEN SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH ACT IN ALL OF AMERICAN HISTORY). I WAS OFTEN ASKED IN AMERICA HOW I EXPLAINED SUCH "REPRESSION."

I HAVE ONLY ONE ANSWER: THE CURRENT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT THE TRUE POLITICAL POSITIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION MADE KNOWN TO BROAD CIRCLES OF SOCIETY. THEREFORE, NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE SURROUNDED BY A WALL OF SILENCE. THEREFORE, SLANDER AGAINST THE

SOVIET UNION INCREASES. THEREFORE, BARRIERS ARE ERECTED TO THE APPEARANCES OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
BT

John - Did you see this?
Paula

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

45

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 7186 DTG: 081409Z JUN 83 PSN: 067282
EOB284 AN010011 TOR: 159/1426Z CSN: HCE339

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 LENC-01 /004 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS2777
DE RUEHMO #7186/02 1591413
O 081409Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4364
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7460
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 6146

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2506

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 07186

USIA FOR EU
FRANKFURT PASS AMBASSADOR HARTMAN IN AIR FORCE HOSPITAL
WIESBADEN
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, US, UR
SUBJECT: ARBATOV COMMENTARY ON AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND

TO THE READERS OF "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA" I WOULD LIKE TO RELATE THAT, OFFICIALLY, THIS BAN WAS EXPLAINED AS A "RECIPROCAL MEASURE." REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE REFERRING TO TWO CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FIRST--THAT IN THE U.S. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE THE OPTION OF BEING PRINTED AND APPEARING ON TELEVISION AND AMERICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION DO NOT. THIS IS A DELIBERATE FALSEHOOD. I DO NOT EVEN NEED TO MENTION THE HUGE NUMBER OF COPIES PUBLISHED OF "ZA RUBEZHOM," WHERE SEVERAL ARTICLES AND ADDRESSES BY LEADING AMERICAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FIGURES AND JOURNALISTS ARE PUBLISHED IN EVERY ISSUE. OR ABOUT THE JOURNAL "USA--ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY," WHICH CONSTANTLY PRINTS LARGE SECTIONS FROM NEW AMERICAN BOOKS, ESPECIALLY POLITICAL ONES. IN ANY OF OUR NEWSPAPERS, ON THE MAIN POLITICAL TV PROGRAMS, ONE CAN SYSTEMATICALLY SEE AMERICANS, HEAR THEIR OPINIONS, AND CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM. SECONDLY--THE SPECIFIC EVENT WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT RELIED ON FOR THIS LIMITATION WAS THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR, A. HARTMAN, WROTE A LETTER TO "PRAVDA" AND THEY DID NOT PRINT IT. THIS IS LUDICROUS. FIRST OF ALL I AM NOT A DEFENDENT/RESPONDENT FOR THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SERVE AS AN OBJECT FOR "RECIPROCITY," AND I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHETHER THE JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITY OF AN AMBASSADOR CAN BE SUCH AN OBJECT. ON U.S. NATIONAL DAY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH TRADITION, HE HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF APPEARING ON TELEVISION. AS FAR AS OTHER APPEARANCES IN THE SOVIET PRESS ARE CONCERNED, THEY, OF COURSE--AS WITH ANY AUTHOR--ARE PRINTED AT THE INVITATION OR WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ONE OR ANOTHER NEWSPAPER, JOURNAL OR TELEVISION. THIS IS THE SITUATION WITH ME OR ANY OTHER SOVIET AUTHOR BOTH IN THE USSR AND IN AMERICA. FURTHERMORE, I HAVE NEVER ONCE TURNED TO THE AMERICAN MASS MEDIA WITH A REQUEST TO PUBLISH SOMETHING, I HAVE NOT PRESSED ON THEM MY ARTICLES OR INTERVIEWS. THEY ARE THE ONES WHO ALWAYS ASK, ALTHOUGH THEY DON'T ALWAYS PUBLISH AND OFTEN, WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH ME, "EDIT" THEM SEVERELY. BESIDES, WE ARE TALKING, AS A RULE, NOT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SIMPLY

EXPRESSING ONE'S POINT OF VIEW, BUT ABOUT A DIFFICULT, OFTEN SHARP ARGUMENT WITH SOMEONE, AND SOMETIMES SEVERAL AGGRESSIVELY DISPOSED OPPONENTS, WHO, IT TURNS OUT, TRY TO KEEP ME FROM EVEN OPENING MY MOUTH. HOWEVER, I AM NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT ALL THIS. THERE ARE, AS THEY SAY, "THE RULES OF THE GAME."

I WOULD ONLY LIKE TO SAY THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS OFFENDED ON BEHALF OF AMBASSADOR HARTMAN FOR NOTHING AND IMPOSES "SANCTIONS" FOR "THE PURPOSES OF RECIPROCITY" WHICH ARE STRANGE, SPEAKING HONESTLY, AND EXTREMELY AMUSING TO ME AND MANY AMERICANS. THE AMERICAN SIDE, IN THIS CASE, IS MAKING AMAZING DEMANDS. SOMEONE SITS DOWN AND WRITES AN ARTICLE FOR "PRAVDA" AND DEMANDS THAT IT BE PUBLISHED--THAT, INDEED, IS NOT DONE ANYWHERE. PERHAPS TOMORROW HE WILL COMPOSE VERSE AND DEMAND THAT SOVIET PUBLISHING HOUSES ISSUE IT IN MILLIONS OF COPIES? OR WILL HE DRAW A PICTURE AND ADD THAT IT SHOULD BE HUNG IN THE "HERMITAGE?" I DON'T KNOW WHAT AUTHORS FROM AN EMBASSY HOPE TO ADVANCE WITH SUCH PRACTICES. BUT FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT "RECIPROCITY" IS JUST A PRETEXT FOR CREATING YET ANOTHER PROBLEM WHERE THERE WAS NONE. A PROBLEM THAT ITSELF IS PETTY, BUT NOT WITHOUT SYMBOLIC MEANING.

(END TEXT)

3. THE REMAINDER OF THE ARTICLE IS A GENERAL ATTACK ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND ITS POLICIES, IN WHICH ARBATOV MAKES SOME OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT "FEARS TRUTH" AND RELIES ON "DISTORTED, PERVERTED REPRESENTATIONS OF REALITY;"
-- THERE IS MORE SHAMELESS LYING GOING ON IN WASHINGTON NOW THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT MEMORY;
-- THIS IS A SIGN OF "DEEP MORAL DEGRADATION;"
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

46

PAGE 01
EOB285

MOSCOW 7186
AN010012

DTG: 081409Z JUN 83 PSN: 067283
TOR: 159/1427Z CSN: HCE340

DISTRIBUTION: STER-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 LENC-01 /004 A3

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS2778
DE RUEHMO #7186/03 1591414
O 081409Z JUN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4365
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7461
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 6147

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 2507

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 07186

USIA FOR EU
FRANKFURT PASS AMBASSADOR HARTMAN IN AIR FORCE HOSPITAL
WIESBADEN

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PEPR, US, UR

SUBJECT: ARBATOV COMMENTARY ON AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND
-- SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE TAKING PART IN THE CAM-
PAIGN OF SLANDER AGAINST THE USSR;
-- THE ADMINISTRATION'S REFERENCES TO RELIGION AND "GOOD"
AND "EVIL" ARE COMPLETELY OUT OF PLACE, ESPECIALLY SINCE
RELIGION HAS GIVEN US SUCH THINGS AS THE INQUISITION,
HENRY VIII, IVAN THE TERRIBLE, AND RODORIGO BORGIA;
-- AMERICANS ARE MORE CONCERNED AND DISTRESSED OVER
FOREIGN POLICY THAN HE HAS EVER SEEN THEM;
-- FINALLY, IF THE U.S. WANTS GOOD RELATIONS, THE SOVIET
UNION WILL BE A "SERIOUS AND CONSCIENTIOUS PARTNER."

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM REPORTERS, WE WILL STATE
THAT THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE HARTMAN LETTER
AND ANY RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON MR. ARBATOV DURING HIS
STAY IN THE U. S. FURTHER QUESTIONS ON USG VISA POLICY
WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT. BEYOND THAT,
WE WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT THE
AMBASSADOR'S LETTER TO PRAVDA, WHICH WAS IN NO WAY A
DEMAND, WAS ANOTHER STEP IN A LONG EFFORT TO MAKE SOME
ADJUSTMENTS IN THE IMBALANCE WHICH EXISTS WITH REGARD TO
ACCESS TO THE MEDIA. MOREOVER, THERE IS AN IMBALANCE
IN ALL FORMS OF ACCESS, WITH ONLY A FEW AMERICANS, CARE-
FULLY CHOSEN BY THE SOVIET SIDE, HAVING ANY ACCESS TO
SOVIET DECISION-MAKERS. WE SHALL STATE THAT IT IS THESE
GREAT BARRIERS ERECTED BY THE SOVIETS TO PREVENT FREE
COMMUNICATION THAT LED TO WASHINGTON'S CONCERN AND THENCE
TO THE RESTRICTIONS ON MR. ARBATOV AND THAT THERE WAS
NO QUESTION OF THE AMBASSADOR'S LETTER PRECIPITATING
ANY DIRECT RECIPROCAL ACTION. ZIMMERMANN
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

File Reciprocity INCOMING
TELEGRAM

47

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 9081 DTG: 191621Z JUL 83 PSN: 054336
EO8830 AN00905 TOR: 200/1643Z CSN: HCE027

DISTRIBUTION: MYER-01 DOBR-01 LENG-01 /003 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU4370
DE RUEMO #9081/01 2001624
O 191621Z JUL 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8836

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 3083

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 09081

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KREC, UR, US, CVIS
SUBJECT: MFA PROPOSES SHARP RESTRICTIONS ON EMBASSY
- VISAS, PARKING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. MFA DEMARCHE LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A MAJOR VISA WAR AND SHARPENED BILATERAL CONFLICT WITH A THREAT TO IMPOSE NEW RESTRICTIONS ON EMBASSY. NEW MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION INCLUDE: ELIMINATION OF "GUEST OF EMBASSY" VISA STATUS; SHARP CUTBACKS IN "GUEST OF AMBASSADOR" VISAS; DENIAL OF NON-OFFICIAL VISAS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL; AND INSTITUTION OF "RECIPROCAL" PARKING RESTRICTIONS IN FRONT OF THE EMBASSY. MFA HINTED THAT FINAL DECISION ON IMPLEMENTING THESE PROPOSED MEASURES WOULD HINGE ON CONCRETE U.S. STEPS TO AMELIORATE "PREJUDICIAL CONDITIONS" AND THREATS TO THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES.
END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 19 ACDM KAMMAN WAS CALLED TO THE MFA BY DEPUTY USA DEPARTMENT CHIEF MIKOL'CHAK WHO READ BUT DID NOT PROVIDE COPY OF AN ORAL STATEMENT. GIST OF STATEMENT BASED ON NOTES BY ACCOMPANYING EMBOFF IS AS FOLLOWS.

--THE USSR CALLS THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA TO THE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS THE UNITED STATES HAS CREATED, OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, HINDERING THE ABILITY OF SOVIET CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS TO CARRY OUT THEIR LEGAL FUNCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

--THESE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS PERSIST DESPITE REPEATED APPEALS FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES TAKE ACTION TO SEE THAT THEY ARE STOPPED. IN REFUSING TO TAKE SUCH ACTION, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPORTED THE CREATION OF A HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE TOWARD SOVIETS IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS HOSTILITY IS EXPRESSED REPEATEDLY IN THE AMERICAN MASS MEDIA, AND RESULTS IN A GENUINE THREAT TO THE PERSONAL SECURITY OF SOVIET CITIZENS LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES.

--PROTESTS FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT LED TO CONCRETE ACTIONS FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE TO AMELIORATE

THIS SERIOUS SITUATION. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS SINGLED OUT FOR TREATMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT APPLY TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS OR MISSIONS, PUTTING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AT A PRACTICAL DISADVANTAGE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

--THE RESULTS OF THIS AMERICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY MEAN THAT SOVIET CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS SUFFER UNFAIR CONSEQUENCES. TWO RECENT EXAMPLES, ALREADY PROTESTED MORE THAN ONCE BY THE SOVIET SIDE, WERE THE VISA REFUSALS FOR GUESTS OF U.N. AMBASSADOR TROYANOVSKY, AND THE DENIAL OF PERMISSION TO VISIT THE U.S. BY A GROUP OF SOVIET LABOR UNION MEMBERS.

--IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE CONDITIONS FOR AMERICANS WORKING IN THE USSR EQUAL TO THOSE UNDER WHICH SOVIET PERSONNEL WORK IN THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

--VISA APPLICATIONS FOR GUESTS OF THE AMBASSADOR, THE CHARGE A.I., AND EMBASSY COUNSELORS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONSIDERED AS BEFORE FOR RELATIVES OR U.S. OFFICIALS COMING AS GUESTS OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED; APPLICATIONS IN THIS CATEGORY FROM ALL OTHER PERSONS WILL BE GRANTED IN RELATION TO THE NUMBER OF ANALOGOUS REQUESTS GRANTED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE;

--THE SOVIET SIDE WILL NO LONGER ACCEPT VISA APPLICATIONS FOR "GUEST OF EMBASSY" STATUS;

--VISAS WILL NOT BE GRANTED FOR NON-OFFICIAL TRAVEL TO THE USSR, INCLUDING TOURIST TRAVEL, BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THOSE PERSONS PREVIOUSLY ADMITTED FOR SUCH TRAVEL;

--NEW POLICIES WILL BE INSTITUTED REGARDING THE PARKING OF VEHICLES IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW WHICH EQUAL THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON SOVIET VEHICLES IN THE UNITED STATES.

--THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, AS IT UNDERTAKES TO IMPLEMENT THESE MEASURES, WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CORRESPONDING ACTIONS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN BY THE AMERICAN SIDE TO AMELIORATE STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH THE U.S. ITSELF HAS
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #11085

BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Missing

48

① Cut back on Soviet
access to US society
unless Soviets are
more forthcoming

② ensure access to
unofficial groups:
12. insist on some
uncontrolled structure.
eg. sci. exch.

Receiving side should invite,
not sending side to
nominate exchanges

DECLASSIFIED/~~RE/~~ERASED

NLRR FOI-114/10 #11074

BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/08

File Reciprocity

7/26/83 49

7/26/83

~~SECRET~~

Strategy for US-USSR Exchanges Agreement Negotiations

The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union negotiations leading toward a new US-USSR General Agreement on Exchanges. On July 15 the Soviet Union accepted our proposal. Our strategy for this negotiation, outlined below, proceeds from the general objective of promoting change in the USSR set forth in NSDD-75, which called for an official framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity with the Soviets in this field. We seek to negotiate a new exchanges agreement that would facilitate our efforts to penetrate the USSR with our ideology, while giving us a framework to control Soviet cultural, academic and media activities in the United States.

Our Specific Objectives

1. Access to Soviet nation-wide television. We want to introduce this as a means to reach the Soviet population with statements of US policy. We are proposing that annually each side select six government representatives (the Head of State plus five others) to appear individually on separate programs on the television of the receiving state. This would in some measure correct the imbalance of the recurring Soviet media "blitz" in the US, and could have an important impact on the Soviet population. Because of the differences in media structures, the two sides would have to accept differently-formulated obligations in this regard.
2. Access to the Soviet population through travelling thematic exhibits. These highly effective exhibits, viewed by millions of Soviet citizens throughout the USSR, have great ideological impact among the Soviet populace. They also provide us with insights into the attitudes of Soviet citizens and workings of Soviet society in areas of the USSR seldom visited by Embassy officers. Finally, they have historically been an exceptionally effective means of training Americans to later work on and in the Soviet Union.
3. Increase access to Academy of Sciences institutes. Among the most valuable contacts of our Embassy and Consulate General are those with social and natural sciences specialists of the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Implementation of a new agreement would result in improved access to leading scientists and specialists who are among the least ideologically-minded elements of the Soviet nomenklatura.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

NLRR 606-114/10 #11080

BY CU NARADATE 1/2/08

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

4. Re-institute US performing arts group tours in the USSR and better control their quality. The Soviets continue to send performing arts groups here, and there are numerous signs of a resurgence of interest by US sponsors. Programs by American performing artists have had demonstrated impact on Soviet elites, but no American performers have appeared in public in the USSR since 1979. We will seek language in the new agreement that guarantees reciprocity, reinstates a US performing arts presence on the Soviet scene, gives us better control of Soviet groups coming to the US, and allows us to keep the nature and level of these activities consistent with the overall state of political relations at a given time.

5. Reduce and monitor the S & T component of Soviet exchanges. There is no doubt that S & T research at American universities is one of the elements of the agreement most attractive to the Soviets. Soviet junior researchers have continued to be placed by IREX in the absence of an official agreement, but the implementation of COMEX controls has reduced the threat of sensitive S & T drain to an manageable, regulated level. A new agreement can reduce it still further by stipulating that no more than 50 percent of Soviet participants should come from S & T fields.

6. Reintroduce US film weeks and other cultural presentations of appeal to Soviet elites. General language in the agreement will again make possible a variety of cultural contacts with Soviet elites in film and other art forms where US creativity and excellence has a strong ideological message in a closed society.

7. Restore formal Soviet agreement to distribution of America Illustrated magazine in the USSR. Distribution of our magazine in the USSR has been an important, ongoing ideological weapon, but its distribution level has been tied to that of Soviet Life in the US. We will wish to retain the language of the last agreement concerning this exchange, unless there is some prospect of an increase in Soviet Life sales in the US. The current distribution on each side is 62,000.

Negotiating Precepts

Our two top-priority objectives are Soviet acceptance of our proposal for TV access (including an annual appearance by each Head of State on the other's television) and of our travelling thematic exhibits (two exhibits in three years, in a total of nine cities). Unless we achieve these objectives in the negotiations, the overall value of an agreement to us will be in doubt. We should in any event be prepared to dispense with an agreement entirely if we judge that the balance of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

benefit is inadequate in relation to our objectives.

In other areas, certain trade-offs may come into play. The Soviets might, for instance, accept balance of fields in scholarly exchanges if the number of exchange participants is increased. Our agreement draft thus takes the possibility of some upward adjustment in participation into account. Under such a plan, the number of Soviet exchangees might increase somewhat, but only in the social sciences or humanities, while the proportion of natural scientists would fall.

Problem: The "Security" Issue

Among the issues unresolved from the last round of agreement negotiations in 1979 is the Soviet demand for "security" assurances. The Soviets opened the 1979 negotiations by submitting a draft that would have obligated signatories "to create proper conditions...guaranteeing the security of stay and normal work" for exchangees. Soviet fear of defections and to a certain degree Soviet unease at the possibility of political protests by Americans against Soviet entertainers is still an issue the Soviets are certain to address in negotiations for a new agreement. (Most recently, the Soviets lost two musicians who, having fled from Finland to Sweden, are now seeking political asylum in the US. Also, a group of Soviet variety performers in the US on private invitation was recently picketed by emigres. A performance in New York was cancelled after threats to disrupt the event were received.)

As in 1979, we must reject the suggested Soviet language out of hand and hold firm against commitments concerning defection. Under our Constitution and laws, there is no way we can commit ourselves to return refugees to Soviet custody. The Soviets can be expected to press for a defectors' return guarantee in negotiations at least initially, and they will press hard on physical security throughout. For bona fide physical security issues, we expect to repeat the oral assurances given the Soviets in the past about our concern for the actual safety of their performers, with some chance that, as in the past, the Soviets will ultimately accept these assurances. Thus, our strategy should be to separate these two aspects of "security" -- physical security and defections -- and negotiate only on the first.

Venue of Negotiations

The first round of negotiations should be held in Moscow. This would balance the consulate talks to be held in Washington for political reasons, but, more importantly, it would also be

~~SECRET~~

52

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

of practical help in exchanges talks. Ambassador Hartman would be protocolary head of the American team, with Embassy Counselor for Press and Culture Ray Benson actually conducting the talks on the American side. Benson has long experience with the Soviets and is on his second Moscow tour as Counselor for Press and Culture.

Signatories

If need be, Director Wick can authorize Ambassador Hartman to sign the agreement for the US. Otherwise, we would expect Mr. Wick to sign.

Form of the Agreement

The agreement would be in two parts: the first the overall agreement, valid for six years, and containing some general language referring to bilateral cooperative exchanges and describing major aspects of the cultural, media and scholarly exchanges covered; the second a program document detailing the specific exchanges to be undertaken in the first three years of the accord.

Ancillary Effects of Agreement

Many of USIA's exhibits and other cultural presentations have become more economically feasible as their acceptance in several countries was assured. In the case of the USSR and Eastern Europe, having exhibits and entertainers going to the USSR will enable us to expand their tours to Eastern Europe. This "spin-off" effect would be of important benefit to our missions in Eastern Europe in reaching their respective publics.

1791m

~~SECRET~~



00 JUL 97 A 1: 26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: New Map of Areas Closed to Travel by Soviet Diplomats

As part of the Administration's effort to enforce reciprocity with the Soviet Union, the Department of State has for some time been engaged in revising the list of areas closed to travel by Soviet diplomats in the United States. This map of closed areas was last revised in 1967. Since then, the Soviets themselves have revised their map. Moreover, there have been substantial changes in the areas to which we deny access to Soviet travelers. A prime example of this is the Silicon Valley area of California, which we have closed de facto for some time and which will now be formally closed.

The new map will match the reductions in percentage of closed territory made by the Soviets in 1978. It will also add Alaska and Hawaii -- areas excluded from the 1967 map. By closing all points in Hawaii, and the five major cities in Alaska, we will be able to reduce the percentage of closed area with only a modest reduction in the actual square mileage of closed areas in the 48 contiguous states, and at the same time meet all the major security concerns of the Department of Defense.

Attached at Tab 1 is a draft diplomatic note to the Soviet Embassy announcing these changes, at Tab 2 a list of areas proposed for closing, at Tab 3 a list of open cities in closed areas, and at Tab 4 a list of approved transit routes through closed areas. There are, of course, substantial changes in the lists of closed areas, open cities, and approved transit routes. The draft note, which sets forth the framework of our travel control program and delineates the note-free travel zones, does not incorporate any procedural changes in the system. The only major change in the draft note from the 1967 version is a complete revision of the accessible area for Soviets assigned to the Consulate General in San Francisco. The note also re-states existing regulations and reduces to writing some practices long-followed, but not previously included in any formal notification to the Soviet Embassy.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 1211087

BY CV NARA DATE 1/2/08~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

55

Attached at Tab 5 is a list of significant cities and areas that will be newly opened or closed. We anticipate presenting this package to the Soviets in a positive spirit, noting its reciprocal nature but also indicating that a number of previously closed cities and areas will now be open to them. As has been our practice since 1952, and in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy, we intend to re-state our offer to abolish travel controls on a mutual basis.

This proposal has been fully discussed with the Army, Air Force and Navy to ensure that all areas of military sensitivity have been included in closed areas. This project has also been fully discussed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All areas of concern have been fully worked out at the working level with each of the services and the Bureau. In addition, we have also consulted the National Security Agency and, to the extent possible, have met their concerns as well. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Burt will be transmitting copies of the proposed closed areas to members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA), which is comprised of all agencies concerned with US-Soviet affairs, for their comment. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research will be transmitting this material to intelligence community agencies not represented on ICCUSA.

The new maps will enter their final stage of production about August 15. Any proposals for changes received after that date would, naturally, present nearly insurmountable problems to incorporate.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED 30 JUL 83 10

TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 29 JUL 83

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By JS NARA, Date 7/31/02

File Receipt

KEYWORDS: USSR CRISIS MANAGEMENT
INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NEW MAP OF AREAS CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET DIPLOMATS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 04 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK	LENCZOWSKI	ROBINSON
	NORTH	FORTIER
		THOMPSON
		<i>Kinnitt</i>

COMMENTS

REF# 8322974 LOG NSCIFID (V /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

The Department of State refers to its note of July 26, 1967, to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning regulations applicable to certain Soviet citizens traveling in the United States.

The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel restrictions for foreigners in 1941. After attempts to secure the abolition of travel controls and closed areas in the Soviet Union, the United States reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on January 3, 1955. Since then, the United States has on many occasions proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions. The United States avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its offer to abolish or reduce travel restrictions or closed areas on the basis of reciprocity.

The United States Government, taking into account Note. No. 1/Pr of January 4, 1978, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has reduced the percentage of United States territory closed to Soviet travelers. The areas closed to Soviet travelers are listed in enclosure 1. Open cities in closed areas are listed in enclosure 2. Open transit routes through closed areas are listed in enclosure 3. Special permission is required for travel to United States possessions, territories and areas under United States administration.

These regulations apply to travel in the fifty United States by all Soviet citizens possessing valid passports issued by the Government of the USSR, except for Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations while their conduct is the responsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Soviet tourists on private visits to the United States. Soviet citizens who are visiting the United States within the framework of US-USSR exchanges agreements may visit closed areas in accordance with the particular exchange program and itinerary as approved by the Department of State.

Except as otherwise provided herein, all Soviet citizens to whom these regulations apply who have not declared their itinerary for travel in the United States at the time of application for a United States visa must submit official notification at least forty-eight hours in advance of any travel to any point outside the free-movement zones of New York, Washington, or San Francisco as defined herein. In the case of Soviet citizens assigned permanently or temporarily to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, or to Soviet commercial organizations in the United States, this notification must be addressed in writing to the Department of State, the Army, Navy or Air Force Foreign Liaison Offices, or the United States Mission to the United Nations, as appropriate. In the case of Soviet correspondents temporarily or permanently assigned in the United States, written notification is to be addressed to the Department of State. In the case of persons present in the United States in the framework of US-USSR exchange agreements notification is to be made to the Department of State. Notifications will include the names of all travelers, description of their itinerary, identification of means of transportation used, route numbers of all roads traveled by car listed in the order in which the roads are taken, and the location of each overnight stop. Listing of any city by name in the itinerary shall be deemed to include only such areas as are within the city limits unless specifically stated otherwise. (In the case of diplomats and journalists the listing of San Francisco, New York or Washington shall be deemed to include all areas within the respective free-movement zones.)

Travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed areas is permitted when necessary to reach open areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. During such transit travel Soviet citizens may not leave the immediate vicinity of rail or

air terminals within closed areas. Transit travel by automobile is permitted only on the designated transit routes listed in enclosure 2. While utilizing these transit routes, no stops or deviations are permitted except at public facilities (i.e., restaurants, gas stations and roadside rests) in the immediate vicinity of the transit route.

Soviet citizens subject to these regulations may not hire unchauffered motor vehicles nor may they charter helicopters, ships or aircraft. Boat travel through closed areas or within United States territorial waters bordering closed areas is also prohibited. Unless specifically authorized, entry into or stopping in the vicinity of identifiable military installations is prohibited.

The zone of free movement in the Washington, D.C. area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in Washington, D.C., is defined as follows. First, all open areas within 25 miles of the White House. Second, King's Dominion amusement park in Doswell, Virginia via route I-95. Third, Front Royal, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fourth, Luray, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fifth, Annapolis, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Sixth, Colonial Williamsburg and William and Mary College at Williamsburg, Virginia via routes I-95, I-295 and I-64. Sixth, Ocean City, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Seventh, the Soviet recreational property at Pioneer Point, Maryland via routes U.S. 50, U.S. 301 and Maryland 18.

The zone of free movement in the New York City area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in New York City, is defined as all open areas in the States of New York and Connecticut within 25 miles of Columbus Circle, and in the State of New Jersey those portions of the counties of Bergen, Essex (except for the City of Nutley), Hudson (except for the City of Bayonne),

Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Passaic, and Union within 25 miles of Columbus Circle.

The zone of free movement in the San Francisco area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in San Francisco, is defined as follows. First, the City and County of San Francisco. Second, San Francisco International Airport via route U.S. 101 from and to the City and County of San Francisco. Third, in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties (via the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge) an area bounded by California Route 17 from the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge to its intersection with route I-580, thence east on route I-580 to route I-680, thence north on route I-680 to California Route 24, thence west on California Route 24 to the point where California Route 24 intersects an arc of 18.5 statute miles radius centered at the intersection of the roads Skyview Way and City View Way (southwest of Twin Peaks Park) in San Francisco, thence northwest along the arc to the Contra Costa County/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay. Fourth, in Marin County (via the Golden Gate Bridge) an area bounded by a continuation of the 18.5 mile radius arc from its intersection with the Contra Costa/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay to its intersection with route U.S. 101 in Marin County, thence north on U.S. 101 to Lucas Valley Road, thence west on Lucas Valley Road to Nicasio Valley Road, west on Nicasio Valley Road to Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road, and west on Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road to its intersection with California Route 1 (Shoreline Highway), and thence north on California Route 1 for two statute miles, thence by a line due west to the low water line in Tomales Bay, thence, following the low water line, along the west side of Tomales Bay to the Pacific Ocean and south to the Golden Gate Bridge. Drake's Estero, Estero de Limatour and Bolinas Lagoon are included within the free movement zone. In Marin County, only those portions of San

Francisco Bay within one kilometer of the low water line are included in the free movement zone. Angel Island is included in the free movement zone and may be reached by any commercial means of transport.

The Chief of Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the Principal Representative of the USSR to the United Nations in New York may travel without prior notification by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein to open areas and cities in the United States accompanied by members of his or her immediate family, an interpreter, and personal chauffeur. Family members unaccompanied by the Chief of Mission may also travel without prior notification and may be accompanied by a chauffeur if travel is by automobile.

Embassy and Consulate General personnel, and Soviet journalists, may travel by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein, on the basis of notification in writing at least 24 hours in advance (eight hours of which correspond to one working day), between Washington and San Francisco and between Washington and New York, and to cities and towns otherwise open to travel by Soviet official personnel which are located either on the interstate highway network in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, or in the State of California on interstate route 80 and on interstate route 5 north of Kern County.

This note does not modify or supersede the provisions of the Department's note of March 18, 1983, regarding the furnishing of travel services by the Office of Foreign Missions.

The United States Government wishes to emphasize again that its firm preference is to abolish all restrictions on free travel, and repeats its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any proposal to this end.

Enclosures:

1. Areas closed to Soviet citizens subject to US travel regulations.
2. Open cities in closed areas.
3. Open transit routes through closed areas.

Department of State,
Washington, _____, 1983.

Enclosure 1

AREAS CLOSED TO SOVIET CITIZENS
SUBJECT TO US TRAVEL REGULATIONSNames listed under each State are names of
counties, unless otherwise indicated.

Mississippi River (entire length)

ALABAMABlount
Calhoun
Coffee
De Kalb
Dale
Etowah
Fayette
Geneva
Henry
Jackson
Jefferson
Lamar
Marion
Marshall
Madison
Russell
St. Clair
Talladega
Walker
WinstonALASKACity of Anchorage
City of Fairbanks
City of Juneau
City of Ketchikan
City of NomeARIZONAApache
Cochise
Coconino
Maricopa
Mohave
Navaho
Pima
Pinal
Santa CruzARKANSASCleburne
Conway
Crittenden
Cross
Faulkner
Jefferson
Lee
Mississippi
Monroe
Ouachita
Pulaski
St. Francis
Van Buren
White
WoodruffCALIFORNIA#Alameda
#Contra Costa
Fresno
Humboldt
Inyo
Kern
*Los Angeles
Merced
Monterey
Napa
Orange
Riverside
Sacramento
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Joaquin
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Solano
Sonoma
YubaCOLORADOAdams
Arapahoe
Bent
Boulder
City of Denver
Douglas
Elbert
El Paso
Jefferson
Las Animas
Logan
Prowers
Pueblo
Teller
WeldCONNECTICUTFairfield
Hartford
New LondonDELAWARE

Kent

FLORIDA

Alachua
Baker
Bay
Bradford
Brevard
Columbia
Dade
Duval
Franklin
Gulf
Hillsborough
Holmes
Monroe
Nassau
Orange
Osceola
Okaloosa
Polk
Pinellas
Santa Rosa
Seminole
Union
Walton

GEORGIA

Bibb
Bryan
Bullock
Burke
Camden
Cobb
Chattahouchee
Columbia
Crawford
Dawson
DeKalb
Fanin
Forsyth
Fulton
Houston
Jefferson
Jenkins
Lincoln
Lumpkin
Marion
McDuffie
Muscogee
Quitman
Richmond
Stewart
Talbot
Taylor
Union
White

HAWAII

All points

IDAHO

Butte
Canyon
Elmore
Fremont
Owyhee
Payette

ILLINOIS

Carroll
Cook
De Kalb
Du Page
Henry
Kane
Lake
Lee
Mercer
Ogle
Rock Island
Scott
St. Clair
Whiteside
Will

INDIANA

Allen
Bartholomew
Boone
Brown
Clark
Daviess
Decatur
Dearborn
Floyd
Franklin
Greene
Hamilton
Hancock
Jackson
Jefferson
Jennings
Johnson
Lawrence
Marion
Martin
Miami
Morgan
Ohio
Ripley
Scott
Shelby
Switzerland
Vermilion

IOWA

Clinton
Des Moines
Louisa
Mills
Muscatine
Pottawatamie
Scott

KANSAS

Butler
Chatauqua
Cherokee
Crawford
Cowley
Douglas
Elk
Harvey
Jefferson
Johnson
Kingman
Labette
Leavenworth
Meosho
Montgomery
Reno
Sedgwick
Shawnee
Sumner
Wilson

KENTUCKY

Bourbon
Bullitt
Calloway
Carlisle
Christian
Clark
Fulton
Graves
Hickman
Hardin
Jefferson
Lyon
Marshall
Madison
McCracken
Meade
Oldham
Todd
Trigg
Trimble

LOUISIANA

Beauregard
Bossier
Caddo
De Soto
Jefferson
Natchitoches
Plaquemines
Rapides
Sabine
St. Bernard
St. Charles
Vernon
Webster

MAINE

Androscoggin
Aroostook
Cumberland
Kennebec
Lincoln
Penobscot
Sagadahoc
Somerset
Washington
York

MARYLAND

Allegany
**Anne Arundel
Baltimore
Charles
Frederick
Harford
Howard
Kent
Washington

MASSACHUSETTS

Barnstable
Essex
Middlesex
Norfolk
Plymouth
Suffolk
Worcester

MICHIGAN

Arenac
Charlevoix
Emmett
Iosco
Macomb
Marquette

MINNESOTA

City of Minneapolis
City of St. Paul
Hennepin
Ramsey

MISSISSIPPI

Hancock
Harrison
Jackson
Lowndes

MISSOURI

Benton
 Baxton
 Bates
 Boone
 Camden
 Cass
 Cedar
 Cooper
 Dallas
 Dent
 Henry
 Hickory
 Howard
 Iron
 Jackson
 Jasper
 Jefferson
 Laclede
 Madison
 Moniteau
 Morgan
 Pettis
 Pulaski
 Reynolds
 Shannon
 Sr. Francois
 St. Genieve
 Saline
 St. Clair
 St. Louis
 Texas
 Vernon

MONTANA

Cascade
 Chouteau
 Fergus
 Judith Basin
 Liberty
 Pondera
 Teton
 Toole
 Wheatland

NEBRASKA

Adams
 Banner
 Burt
 Cheyenne
 Douglas
 Hall
 Kimball
 Sarpy

NEVADA

Clark
 Lincoln
 Mineral
 Nye

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Hillsborough
 Rockingham

NEW JERSEY

Atlantic
 #Bergen
 Burlington
 Camden
 #Essex
 #Hudson
 Mercer
 #Monmouth
 #Morris
 Ocean
 #Passaic
 Salem
 #Union

NEW MEXICO

Bernalillo
 Curry
 Dona Ana
 Lincoln
 Los Alamos
 McKinley
 Mora
 Otero
 Roosevelt
 Santa Fe
 Sierra
 Socorro
 Taos
 Torrance

NEW YORK

Albany
 Broome
 Cayuga
 Clinton
 Erie
 Jefferson
 Lewis
 Madison
 Niagara
 Oneida
 Onondaga
 St. Lawrence
 Saratoga
 Schenectady
 Seneca
 Suffolk
 Tioga

NORTH CAROLINA

Brunswick
 Buncombe
 Cumberland
 Dare
 Harnett
 Hoke
 Hyde
 Johnston
 Madison
 Moore
 Sampson
 Scotland
 Transylvania
 Wayne

DRAFT

66

NORTH DAKOTA

Bottineau
Burke
Burleigh
Cass
Cavalier
Emmons
Grant
Grand Forks
Griggs
McHenry
McLean
Mercer
Morton
Mountrail
Nelson
Oliver
Pembina
Ramsey
Renville
Sioux
Sheridan
Steele
Walsh
Ward

OHIO

Ashland
Ashtabula
Auglaize
Allen
Butler
Champaign
Clark
Delaware
Franklin
Greene
Hardin
Logan
Madison
Marion
Miami
Morrow
Medina
Montgomery
Pike
Preble
Portage
Richland
Shelby
Summit
Union

OKLAHOMA

Comanche
Jackson
Oklahoma
Pittsburg

OREGON

Coos
Douglas
Morrow
Multnomah
Umatilla
Washington

PENNSYLVANIA

Adams
Allegheny
Beaver
Centre
Cumberland
Dauphin
Franklin
Lackawanna
Lebanon
Monroe
Montgomery
York

SOUTH CAROLINA

Aiken
Barnwell
Beaufort
Berkeley
Calhoun
Charleston
Colleton
Dorchester
Edgefield
Horry
Lexington
McCormick
Orangeburg
Richland
Sumter

SOUTH DAKOTA

Butte
Corson
Haakon
Jackson
Lawrence
Meade
Pennington
Ziebach

TENNESSEE

Anderson
Blount
Bradley
Benton
Cocke
Carroll
Cheatham
Coffee
Crockett
Dyer
Decatur
Dickson
Franklin
Greene
Grundy
Hamblen
Hamilton
Hawkins
Henry
Houston
Humphreys
Jefferson
Knox
Loudon
Lauderdale
Lincoln
Marion
Meigs
Monroe
McMinn
Montgomery
Moore
Obion
Polk
Perry
Rhea
Roane
Sequatchie
Sevier
Stewart
Sullivan
Unicoi
Washington
Weakley

TEXAS

Bell
Bexar
Bowie
Coryell
Dallas
El Paso
Harris
Harrison
Hunt
Lampasas
McLennan
Potter
Randall
Tarrant
Taylor
Tom Green
Travis

UTAH

Davis
Salt Lake
Tooele
Weber

VERMONT
ChittendenVIRGINIA

Albermarle
Campbell
Clarke
Craig
Gloucester
Isle Of Wight
King George
#Loudon
Matthews
Montgomery
Northampton
Prince William
Pulaski
Surry
York
City of James
City of
Chesapeake
City of Newport
News
City of
Virginia Beach
City of Norfolk
City of
Portsmouth
City of Hampton

WASHINGTON

Benton
Clark
Cowlitz
Franklin
Jefferson
King
Kitsap
Kittitas
Lewis
Mason
Pierce
Spokane
Thurston
Yakima

WEST VIRGINIA

Mineral
Pendleton

WISCONSIN

Brown
Kenosha
Milwaukee
Racine

WYOMING

Big Horn
Campbell
Converse
Goshen
Laramie
Natrona
Platte
Sweetwater
Weston

Except for those portions within the New York, San Francisco or Washington free-movement zones.

* Except for the open city of Los Angeles, as defined in Enclosure No. 2.

** Only those portions north of route 50.

)

o

3

Faint, illegible text at the bottom of the page, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side.

Enclosure 2

OPEN CITIES IN CLOSED AREAS

Albany, New York
Anaheim, California
Atlanta, Georgia
Austin, Texas
Baltimore, Maryland
Birmingham, Alabama
Boston, Massachusetts
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Brookline, Massachusetts
Buffalo, New York
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Camden, New Jersey
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Chicago, Illinois (incl O'Hare Airport)
Columbia, South Carolina
Columbus, Ohio
Great Adventure Amusement Park, New Jersey
Hartford, Connecticut
Independence, Missouri
Indianapolis, Indiana (incl all enclaves)
Kansas City, Kansas
Kansas City, Missouri
Kenner, Louisiana
Knoxville, Tennessee
Lawrence, Kansas
Little Rock, Arkansas
*Los Angeles, California
Louisville, Kentucky
Macon, Georgia
Metairie, Louisiana
Miami Beach, Florida
Miami, Florida
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
New Orleans, Louisiana
Omaha, Nebraska
Phoenix, Arizona
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Portland, Oregon
Savannah, Georgia
Shreveport, Louisiana
Somerville, Massachusetts
Spokane, Washington
Stamford, Connecticut
Stockton, California
Topeka, Kansas
Trenton, New Jersey
Tucson, Arizona
Worcester, Massachusetts

* Only those portions of the County of Los Angeles within the following boundaries are open: the Pacific Ocean coast from route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway) northwest to California route 27 (Topanga Canyon Road) thence north on California route 27 to route US 101 (the Ventura Freeway), east on U.S. 101 to California route 2, and north and east on California route 2 to the area of "Little Jimmy Spring" in Angeles National Forest (34° 20' 43" N., 117° 49' 42" W), then south along a straight line bearing 183.5° East of North to California route 39, thence south on California route 39 to route I-10 (the San Bernardino Freeway), west on route I-10 to California route 19 (Rosemead Blvd.), south on California route 19 to route I-5 (the Santa Ana Freeway), north on route I-5 to Slauson Avenue, west on Slauson Avenue to route I-465 (the San Diego Freeway), north on route I-465 to route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway), and west on I-10 to the Pacific Coast. Off shore, along the Pacific Coast between I-10 and California route 29, the open area is limited to an area within 100 meters of the low water line.

71

4

Enclosure 3

OPEN TRANSIT ROUTES
THROUGH CLOSED AREAS

California

- I-5 Entire length north of Anaheim
- I-80 Entire length
- I-580 between Castro Valley and junction of I-5
- Cal.152 between intersection of I-5 and Santa Cruz County line.

Connecticut

- I-95 Entire length
- I-91 Entire length

Georgia

- I-75 between Macon and Monroe County line
- I-16,I-95 between Savannah and Candler County line

Illinois

- I-190 between O'Hare Airport and Chicago

Kansas

- I-70 between Kansas City and Lawrence

Maine

- Maine 202 between Rochester and Augusta
- Maine 105 between Augusta and Knox County line

Maryland

- I-95 entire length
- US 301 between Pioneer Pt. and Delaware State line
- I-270 between Rockville and junction of I-70
- I-70 between junction of I-270 and Pennsylvania State line

Massachusetts

I-90 entire length

I-95 between Rhode Island State line and junction of I-90

New Jersey

N.J. Turnpike entire length

N.J. 33, 571 between NJT exit 8 and Princeton

US 206 between NJT and Trenton

NJ 73 between Philadelphia and NJT exit 4

I-195 between NJT and Great Adventure

NJ 38 between Camden and NJT exit 4

New York

I-87 between Albany county line and Glens Falls

I-87 between exit 34 and exit 41

US 9, 9B between I-87 and Rouse's Point through Chazy and Coopersville (transit to and from Canada only)

I-90 entire length

I-190 between Buffalo and Niagara Falls

Pennsylvania

Pa. Turnpike entire length

South Carolina

I-26 between Columbia and exit 85 (Little Mountain)

Tennessee

I-75 between Knoxville and Caryville

Virginia

I-95 between Alexandria and Fredricksburg

I-66 between Fairfax and Front Royal

Washington

I-90 between Spokane and Coeur d'Alene

Wisconsin

I-94 between Milwaukee and Waukesha County line

74

5

MAJOR CHANGES FROM 1967 MAP

CITIES NEWLY CLOSED

Denver, Colo.
Fremont, Calif.
Houston, Texas
Minneapolis, Minn
Oklahoma City, Okla.
San Antonio, Texas
San Jose, Calif.
Seattle, Washington
St. Paul, Minn.

CITIES NEWLY OPENED - 100,000+

Birmingham, Alabama
Cedar Rapids, Iowa
Cleveland, Ohio
Columbia, S.C.
Duluth, Minn.
Indianapolis, Ind.
Little Rock, Ark.
Livonia, Mich.
Louisville, Ky.
Lubbock, Texas
Memphis, Tenn.
Metairie, Louisiana
Mobile, Alabama
Montgomery, Alabama
New Bedford, Mass.
Parma, Ohio
Peoria, Ill.
Phoenix, Ariz.
Raleigh, N.C.
Rochester, N.Y.
Rockford, Ill.
Savannah, Georgia
Shreveport, Louisiana
Spokane, Wash.
Springfield, Mass.
Stockton, Calif.
Topeka, Kansas
Tucson, Ariz.
Warren, Mich.
Winston-Salem, N.C.

NEWLY OPENED - UNDER 100,000

Adirondack Mtn. Area, N.Y.
Boise, Idaho
Carson City, Nevada
Decatur, Alabama
Eugene, Ore.
Helena, Mont.
Lake Tahoe Area, Calif./Nev.
Newport, R.I.
Oxnard, Calif.
Port Huron, Mich.
Provo, Utah
Reno, Nevada
Saginaw, Mich.
Salem, Ore.
Salina, Kansas
Sioux City, Iowa
Springfield, Ill.
Terre Haute, Ind.
Twin Falls, Idaho
Ventura, Calif.