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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/19/2005

File Folder USSR-RECIPROCITY 2/8

FOIA

F06-114/10

Box Number 33

YARHI-MILO

3305

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10985	MEMO	EAGLEBURGER TO PIPES RE EUR/IG WORKING GROUP FOR US-USSR SPECIALIZED BILATERALS: RENEWAL OF THE WORLD OCEAN AGREEMENT [1 - 3]	3	10/2/1981	B1
10986	MEMO	OSTENSO TO SIMONS RE REPORT ON US-USSR WORLD OCEAN AGREEMENT [4 - 4]	1	9/22/1981	B1
10987	PAPER	NOAA REPORT CONCERNING CONTINUATION OF THE US-USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN WORLD OCEAN STUDIES [5 - 12]	8	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10988	PAPER	US-USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN WORLD OCEAN STUDIES STATISTICAL SUMMARY JULY 1, 1981 TO JUNE 30, 1981 [13 - 16]	4	ND	B1
10989	PAPER	APPENDIX II AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN STUDIES OF THE WORLD OCEAN [17 - 18]	2	ND	B1
10990	PAPER	ATTACHMENT 4 WORLD OCEANS [19 - 22]	4	12/15/1978	B1
10991	MEMO	BAILEY TO ALLEN RE RENEGOTIATION OF US-USSR MARITIME AGREEMENT [23 - 24] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	10/6/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10992	PAPER	U.S. POSITION PAPER ON RENEGOTIATION OF THE U.S.-USSR MARITIME AGREEMENT [25 - 35] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	11	ND	B1
10993	CABLE	151715Z OCT 81 [37 - 37] PAR 5/8/2008 F06-114/10	1	10/15/1981	B1 B2 B3
10999	CABLE	261932Z OCT 81 [38 - 45] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	8	10/26/1981	B1
10994	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10985 [46 - 48]	3	11/3/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10995	CABLE	061753Z NOV 81 [63 - 67] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	5	11/6/1981	B1
10996	MEMO	RECIPROCITY MEETING RECIPROCITY ACTIONS WORKING GROUP [68 - 68] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	11/12/1981	B1
11000	CABLE	131431Z NOV 81 [69 - 72] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	11/13/1982	B1
11001	CABLE	231821Z NOV 81 [73 - 76] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	4	11/23/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
11002	CABLE	011520Z DEC 81 [77 - 78] D 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	2	12/1/1981	B1
11003	CABLE	022211Z FEB 82 [79 - 79] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	2/2/1982	B1
11004	MEMO	BURT TO PIPES RE SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN U.S. [80 - 80] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	ND	B1
10997	MEMO	WHEELER TO BREMER RE EXIT CONTROLS FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATS [81 - 81] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	10/20/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10998	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE EXIT CONTROLS FOR SOVIET DIPLOMATS [82 - 82] R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10	1	10/15/1982	B1
11005	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE EXIT CONTROLS ON SOVIET DIPLOMATS [83 - 83] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	10/14/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

October 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

DECLASSIFIED

THROUGH: NORMAN BAILEY *MB*

NLRR FOb-714/10 #10991

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS *RP*

BY CW NARADATE 1/2/08

SUBJECT: Renegotiation of US-USSR Maritime Agreement (U)

As I have reported in several Weekly Reports, an inter-agency task force chaired by the Maritime Administration (now in the Department of Transportation) has been drafting the US position for renewal of the 1975 agreement on commercial maritime relations with the USSR. Attached at Tab I is a virtually final position paper for use in negotiations proposed to begin on or about October 26. ~~(C)~~

The key elements of the US position are:

-- Renew the agreement for several years, rejecting an expected Soviet proposal to extend it for one year just as we proposed extending the grain agreement for one year;

-- retain its present provisions for sharing bulk cargoes and for liner access to US and Soviet ports for both direct and cross-trading;

-- strengthen the present agreement's assurance of reciprocity in cross-trading, so as to cure the disparity in benefits now greatly favoring Soviet liners;

-- delete from the list of 40 US ports which Soviet vessels may enter on the basis of a four-day advance notice (without case-by-case clearance) the following six ports judged by the Department of Defense to be sensitive from a security point of view at certain times: Seattle, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia, Tacoma and Honolulu, substituting six less sensitive ports;

-- preclude extensive layovers by Soviet ships for repairs in US ports. ~~(C)~~ *right*

We would retain an annex requiring mutually acceptable freight rates for the carriage of grain. This separate negotiation will seek rates sufficiently high to reduce substantially the operating subsidies that MARAD must pay to US ships carrying grain to the Soviet Union on a one-third US/one-third Soviet basis. ~~(C)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on
October 6, 1987

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24

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This package of proposals will preserve the benefits of the agreement and cure its two weaknesses -- disproportionate Soviet participation on cross-trading and occasionally inconvenient Soviet presence in security-sensitive US ports. (C)

~~If you have no question [redacted] with the proposed position paper, I plan to give it NSC staff concurrence by COB Thursday, October 8. (U)~~

no problem here.
[Signature]

Dick Pipes concurs. (U)

Attachment

Tab I US Position Paper on Renegotiation of the US-USSR Maritime Agreement

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U.S. POSITION PAPER ON RENEGOTIATION OF THE
U.S.-U.S.S.R. MARITIME AGREEMENT

- I. Introduction and Background
- II. General U.S. Objectives
- III. Possible Soviet Objectives
- IV. General Considerations
- V. Recommended Specific Changes
 - Ports Open on Notice
 - Port Entry of Training and Research Vessels
 - Crosstrading
 - Term of a New Agreement
 - Extension of Agreement
 - Implementation of Agreement
- VI. Steps Before Negotiation
- VII. Inter-agency Consultations

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOB 114/10 #10992

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY As NARA DATE 1/2/08

I. Introduction and Background

The U.S. entered into maritime negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1971 with the objectives of obtaining assurances of U.S. merchant marine participation in the developing trade between the two nations and facilitating the movement of that trade by increased port access. Both these objectives were met by the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement which was signed in 1972 and renegotiated with minor changes in 1975.

U.S. participation in the carriage of the bilateral trade is assured by the cargo sharing provisions of the Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Soviet Union, which in most cases controls the carriage of its trade, must offer U.S. carriers an equal and substantial share of all the controlled bilateral cargo. Substantial share is defined as not less than one-third of all bilateral cargoes moving in whole or in part by sea between the two nations; whether by direct movement or transshipment through third countries. In addition, movements of agricultural commodities effected by U.S. carriers must be at a mutually acceptable rate.

With respect to the carriage of cargoes in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral trade, the U.S.-Soviet maritime arrangement has operated essentially as it was intended by U.S. and Soviet negotiators.

In the liner trades, U.S. carriers have moved slightly more than the Soviets over the duration of the Maritime Agreements. They have carried nearly 40 percent of the liner cargoes. The only inhibition to greater U.S. participation in this trade has been overall poor bilateral trade performance.

While the Soviet grain trade is not the most lucrative business for U.S. carriers, it has successfully maintained a part of the U.S.-flag bulk fleet during periods of worldwide tanker surpluses. Just prior to the conclusion of the Agreement in 1972, 30 vessels totalling approximately 849,000 DWT were laid-up. By September 1973, virtually all of these vessels had gained employment as U.S. carriers entered the Soviet grain trade.

From 1972 to 1977, U.S.-flag vessels carried substantially more grain cargoes than Soviet-flag vessels, and in several years approached the one-third mark. In one year, 1974, U.S.-flag carriers lifted 47.7 percent of the grain shipped to the Soviet Union. However, beginning in 1978, U.S. carriers withdrew from the Soviet grain trade in order to participate in the more lucrative Alaskan oil trade.

The Maritime Administration estimates that due to projected diminishing alternative employment opportunities, U.S.-flag vessel operators are likely to again become interested in the Soviet bulk trades. MarAd estimates that a minimum of 300,000 metric tons of grain could be carried by U.S.-flag vessels in 1982, but that in 1983 and 1984 between two to three million metric tons could be carried on such vessels each year. It must be noted that these are minimum projections. They are based on a projected eight million tons per year grain sale to the U.S.S.R. and the continuation of Jones Act application to the Alaska oil trade. Changes in tanker market conditions as well as the

potential of grain sales to the U.S.S.R. in excess of eight million metric tons per annum would result in the carriage of significantly larger amounts of grain by U.S.-flag vessels.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement opens 40 ports in each country to vessels of the other country on a four days' advance notice basis. All geographical regions of the United States and the Soviet Union are represented on the list of ports open on this basis. Ports not on the list are accessible on a 14 day request basis. The opening of 40 ports on a four day notice basis has greatly facilitated the movement of the bilateral trade. However, it has also facilitated the entry of Soviet carriers into the U.S. crosstrades, i.e., the trade between the U.S. and a third country. This is a major issue the U.S. plans to address in maritime negotiations with the Soviets.

II. General U.S. Objectives

The present U.S.-U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement has resulted in an imbalance of benefits due to the Soviet Union's participation in the U.S. crosstrades. In a new Agreement, the U.S. will seek a more equitable arrangement either by obtaining greater Soviet adherence to operating practices in U.S. crosstrades and/or by securing cargoes for U.S.-flag vessels in Soviet crosstrades.

The U.S. will insist upon continued assurances of substantial and equitable participation in the bilateral trade by U.S. carriers and the continued movement of agricultural commodities at

a mutually acceptable rate. The U.S. will give renewed consideration to defense concerns as they relate to port access.

III. Possible Soviet Objectives

The Soviets will most likely seek the least restrictive regime for U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime relations, i.e., greater port access, little or no means of implementing cargo sharing principles, no rate setting mechanisms and possible MFN treatment of their vessels. It is possible that their initial draft agreement will be similar to the existing agreement between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China.

IV. General Considerations

It would be desirable to reach accord with the Soviets on a maritime Agreement prior to the expiration of the existing Agreement. The Soviets are likely to argue for the extension of the Agreement for one year on the grounds that insufficient time remains for renegotiation and/or that the Agreement should be coterminous with the Grain Agreement which has been extended through September 30, 1982.

We strongly disagree with both those arguments. In the past, negotiations have lasted as long as the time available. The three months remaining before expiration should be sufficient time to develop an acceptable Agreement. As the maritime Agreement relates to all bilateral cargoes, there is no reason to tie it to the grain agreement.

Extension of the Agreement would be disadvantageous to the United States, as it would simply extend for one year certain inequities which we hope to rectify in a new agreement.

The Soviets should be informed of the fact that the U.S. has no intention of extending the existing Agreement should a new accord not be reached prior to the end of the year, in which case port access procedures will revert to pre-Agreement arrangements.

V. Recommended Specific Changes

Ports Open on Notice

Present Agreement:

Article 2

The ports on the attached list of ports of each Party (Annexes I and II, which are a part of this Agreement) are open to access by all vessels of the other Party.

U.S. Position

The U.S. intends to exclude the ports of Seattle, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia and Tacoma, Washington, and Honolulu, Hawaii from the list of open U.S. ports. (Annex I) New Department of Defense concerns in the Puget Sound and Honolulu areas require greater control of Soviet vessel access to these ports. This change is expected to have a marginal impact on U.S.-Soviet bilateral trade. In the past three years, less than .5 percent of that trade moved through those ports. Normally, access to these ports would be

possible on a 14 day request basis. However, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. Government's position has been to deny all Soviet requests for access to ports not listed in Annex I. The U.S. will propose that six other less sensitive U.S. ports be substituted. The U.S. will seek inclusion of the port of Grigorevka to the Soviet list to facilitate the shipment of ammonia under the Occidental fertilizer contract.

While altering Soviet access to U.S. ports has been considered as a possible means of reducing Soviet access to U.S. crosstrades, we are reluctant to set a precedent of using other than national security requirements or a lack of quid pro quo in the number of open ports as a reason for restricting access to ports of either country.

Port Entry of Training and Scientific Vessels

Present Agreement:

Article 4

Entry of vessels referred to in subparagraphs a(ii) and a(iii) of Article 1 into the ports referred to in Article 2 will be to replenish ships' stores or fresh water, obtain bunkers, provide rest for or make changes in the personnel of such vessels, and obtain minor repairs and other services normally provided in such ports, in accordance with applicable rules and regulations.

U.S. Position

The U.S. will propose omitting the phrase "minor repairs" and adding an additional sentence which reads as follows:

"Vessels may obtain minor repairs required for seaworthiness and operational reliability but such repairs must be completed within seven calendar days."

Our objective is to provide the U.S. Government with a legal basis to deny any Soviet request for long-term repairs in U.S. ports.

Crosstrading

The current Agreement has no provisions applicable to U.S. crosstrades.

U.S. Position

The U.S. delegation may use either or both of the following approaches to dealing with the crosstrades problem in renegotiation of the Agreement. The first approach is to secure a Soviet commitment to a standard of behavior which is consistent with normal practices in these trades, i.e., a provision in the Agreement similar to the current related provision in the U.S.-Chinese maritime arrangement* and/or a satisfactory statement regarding

*Note: The U.S.-PRC Maritime Agreement includes the following provision on crosstrading:

"Each Party recognizes the interest of the other, through domestic legislation or policy, in regulating the conduct of crosstraders in their respective foreign ocean commerce and agrees to respect each other's laws and policies in this regard."

their intended behavior in the crosstrades. The second possibility is a new provision in the renegotiated Agreement that would commit the Soviets to granting U.S.-flag vessels participation in ~~U.S.~~ ^{SOVIET} crosstrades. In conjunction with this provision, the U.S. side could propose an additional provision which would enable both parties to take appropriate action if parity participation falls below an accepted level and consultations fail to remedy the disparity.

Term of a New Agreement

Present Agreement:

Article 9

The Agreement shall be in force from January 1, 1976 through December 31, 1981.

U.S. Position

The term of the Agreement will be determined at a later date based on an assessment of the Agreement which is negotiated.

Extension of Agreement

Present Agreement:

No provision

U.S. Position

U.S. supports inclusion of a provision for extension of the validity of the agreement if desired by both sides.

Implementation of Agreement

Present Agreement:

Annex III

Annex III sets forth the details for implementing the cargo sharing provisions of the Agreement. Terms are closely defined as are the operating procedures.

U.S. Position

The integrity of Annex III should be maintained. It has been a successful vehicle for ensuring that U.S. interests benefit from the Agreement. Minor modifications may be made to facilitate accounting procedures; however, the U.S. will resist any changes in the principles set forth in the document.

The United States will continue to insist on the negotiation of mutually acceptable rates for the carriage of grain. It will seek to obtain the most favorable rates, terms and conditions possible to ensure U.S.-flag vessel participation in this trade.

The U.S. side will seek such alteration in Annex III which may be necessary to the implementation of any agreement reached on crosstrading.

VI. Steps Before Negotiation

Prior to submitting any U.S. positions to the Soviets, appropriate Congressional authorities should be briefed as required by the Circular 175 procedure.

35

VII. Inter-agency Consultations

In accordance with Circular 175 procedures, all appropriate U.S. agencies will have clearance prior to signing of the Agreement.

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#5915

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81 OCT 7 A 7: 38

JANET COLSON	<u> </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u> </u>		
DICK ALLEN	<u> </u>		
IRENE DERUS	<u> </u>		
JANET COLSON	<u> </u>		
BUD NANCE	<u> </u>		
PETER	<u> </u>		
CY TO VP	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
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Comments:

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ROUTINE
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TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC
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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 14537

CITE 1077

SUBJECT: RECIPROCALITY (U)

REF: [REDACTED] MSG DTG 011347Z OCT 81, SUBJ: ADMIN MSG - ATTACHE TRAVEL

1. (U) ON 30 SEP 81, [REDACTED] NOTIFIED THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICE (UVS) OF ITS INTENTION TO SEND ROS TO NOVOSIBIRSK AND AKADEMGORODOK 15-19 OCT 81 AND REQUESTED BRIEFINGS BY GORISPOLKOM, A TOUR OF ANY LOCAL FACTORY, AND A VISIT TO ANY LOCAL INSTITUTE OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.
2. (U) ON 13 OCT 81, UVS CALLED TO REPLY THAT WHILE THE TRIP WAS ACCEPTABLE, NO SPECIAL TOURS OR VISITS COULD BE ARRANGED.
3. (U) THIS IS THE FIRST ATTEMPT IN SOME TIME TO OBTAIN SPECIAL BRIEFINGS OR VISITS DURING SCHEDULED ATTACHE TRAVEL AND THE UVS DENIAL IS NOT UNEXPECTED. IT IS REPORTED FOR RECIPROCALITY CONSIDERATIONS.



RF

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By [Signature], NARA, Date 5/8/08

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ACTION INFO IN(1) CVAI(2) FILE CY(1)

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RECIPROCITY -

38

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ACTIVE MEASURES

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USICA FOR EU
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
SHAPE FOR INTAFF
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/26/91 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W.) DR-M
TAGS: NATO, UR
SUBJECT: RECIPROCITY AND ACTIVE MEASURES: POLADS OCT. 23

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEGIN SUMMARY:
OCT. 23 REINFORCED POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING ON RECIPRO-
CITY AND "ACTIVE MEASURES" RESULTED IN AGREEMENT THAT:
(A) THE COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES WOULD
BE COMPLETED, WITH POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF FORMAT, TO BE
DISCUSSED BY POLADS;
(B) THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE DRAWN TO THE ATTENTION OF
PERMREPS, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS
ON WHETHER A COVERING STATEMENT WITH "CONCLUSIONS"
SHOULD ALSO GO TO THE NAC;
(C) AFTER REVIEWING THIS DOCUMENT, THE NAC WILL DECIDE
WHETHER TO DRAW IT TO THE ATTENTION OF MINISTERS IN
DECEMBER;
(D) POLADS WORK ON "ACTIVE MEASURES" WILL BE HELD IN
ABEYANCE PENDING SPECIAL COMMITTEE REVIEW OF AND COMMENTS
ON THE U.S. CLASSIFIED "ACTIVE MEASURES" STUDY, AND THE
SPECIAL COMMITTEE STUDY OF ANTI-TNF CAMPAIGN;
(E) FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S REPORT
IN THE NEW YEAR, THE NAC WILL DECIDE WHETHER AND HOW
THE ALLIANCE SHOULD FURTHER PURSUE THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND
POLITICAL (AS DISTINCT FROM COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE)
ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVE MEASURES QUESTION.

3. ALLIES GENERALLY WELCOMED THE U.S. INITIATIVE FOR A
DISCUSSION ON RECIPROCITY AND "ACTIVE MEASURES", ALTHOUGH
A NUMBER UNDERScoreD THEIR PREFERENCE THAT THE LATTER
SUBJECT BE HANDLED IN THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE. ALL
AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY,
BUT DANES, NORWEGIANS, FRENCH AND OTHERS POINTED
UP THE IMPORTANCE OF CSCE AND GENEVA CONVENTION
REQUIREMENTS AND WESTERN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AS SETTING
SHARP LIMITS ON ACCEPTABLE WESTERN ACTION. MOST

AGREED THAT STRICT AND UNIFORM RECIPROCITY WAS
UNDESIRABLE, SINCE IT NOT ONLY WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE
TRADITIONS OF OUR OPEN AND FREE SOCIETIES, BUT COULD
ALSO PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND DISADVANTAGEOUS IN
SOME INSTANCES. TO THIS END, MANY ARGUED THAT AIM SHOULD
BE TO OPEN UP SOVIET SOCIETY, RATHER THAN IMPOSING NEW
WESTERN RESTRICTIONS. UK AND CANADIAN DELEGATIONS
WERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF US OBJECTIVES; FRENCH REP
WAS THE MOST NOTABLY RELUCTANT, ON BOTH PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS.

4. COMMENT:
DESPITE THE FAIRLY SHARP DIVISION BETWEEN US, UK, AND
CANADA, ON THE ONE HAND, ALL ARGUING THE IMPORTANCE OF
RECIPROCITY AS A POLICY TOOL AND THE APPROPRIATENESS OF
FURTHER ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF ACTIVE MEASURES AND RECIPROCITY, AND THE FRENCH,
SCANDINAVIANS AND OTHERS ON THE OTHER HAND, WHO ARE
SKEPTICAL OF THE APPROACH AND SOMEWHAT RESISTANT TO A
NATO ROLE, THE RESULT OF THE OCT. 23 MEETING PROVIDES AN
ADEQUATE FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER WORK. ON RECIPROCITY,
WE WILL NEED TO PUSH FOR RAPID COMPLETION OF THE
COMPENDIUM AND ITS TRANSMITTAL TO THE PERMREPS WITH AN
APPROPRIATE COVERING TEXT. THE FRENCH HAVE SERVED
NOTICE THAT THEY WILL RESIST ITS FURTHER TRANSMISSION
TO THE MINISTERIAL, BUT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ISOLATE
THEM SINCE THE DOCUMENT WILL BE ESSENTIALLY FACTUAL.
ON ACTIVE MEASURES, WE WILL NEED TO COORDINATE WITH US
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, WHICH MEETS
NOV. 17-18, AND TO PREPARE A STRONG CASE FOR
CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS
WHEN THE NAC RECEIVES THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT. DAS
KUX WILL ALSO BE PURSUING THESE QUESTIONS IN SCHEDULED
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SELECTED ALLIES. END
SUMMARY.
BT

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5. DAS KUX OPENED THE DISCUSSION, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- US IS PLEASED TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE PROBLEMS OF RECIPROCITY IN OUR OFFICIAL DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE ON-GOING PROBLEM OF SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES. THE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS OF THE LATTER TOPIC ARE BEING ABLY DEALT WITH IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AND OUR EMPHASIS HERE IS ON THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS SIDE.
- THE BROAD PROBLEM WE FACE IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE BECAUSE OF THE CLOSED NATURE OF THEIR SOCIETY TO IMPOSE SUBSTANTIAL RESTRICTIONS ON OUR DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS, WHILE THEY HAVE A RELATIVELY FREE RUN IN OUR OPEN SOCIETIES.
- WE THINK THE LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE OFTEN TOO DIFFIDENT RESPONSE, ESPECIALLY IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA, TO SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES POSES A PROBLEM TO ALL OF US INDIVIDUALLY AND TO THE ALLIANCE.
- ONE ASPECT OF OUR MOVING TOWARD THE COMMON GOAL OF DURABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR IS TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON RECIPROCITY AND TO FOCUS MORE ATTENTION TO SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES, ESPECIALLY TO EGREGIOUS EXAMPLES OF FORGERIES OF DOCUMENTS AND FLAGRANT DISINFORMATION GAMBITS. WE EARLIER SHARED WITH YOU A CLASSIFIED STUDY ON ACTIVE MEASURES, AND HAVE SINCE RELEASED A PUBLIC DOCUMENT, WHICH BENEFITED FROM YOUR COMMENTS, THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY A SANITIZED VERSION OF THE CLASSIFIED PAPER.
- IN CONSIDERING THESE ISSUES INTERNALLY WE CONSIDERED SEVERAL COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER THESE HERE, SINCE PRESUMABLY WE ALL HAVE HEARD SIMILAR ARGUMENTS:
- SOME SAY THE SOVIETS WON'T CHANGE THEIR SPOTS, AND THAT THE DIFFERING NATURE OF OUR SOCIETIES MAKES THE EXERCISE USELESS. THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY SO; THERE IS EVOLUTION AND THE SOVIETS DO RESPOND TO PRESSURES AND ARE SENSITIVE.

- SOME SAY THE EXERCISE WILL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE OF A HIGHLY NEGATIVE SOVIET REACTION. THIS TOO IS NOT NECESSARILY SO; THE REACTION TO UK EXPULSIONS WAS LESS THAN ANTICIPATED. REACTION TO OUR TIGHTER RECIPROCITY HAS ALSO NOT BEEN NEGATIVE. SOVIETS ARE REALISTS; THEY WILL PUSH WHERE THEY CAN, BUT THEY RECOGNIZE WHEN THEY FACE A FIRM RESPONSE, ESPECIALLY WHERE THEIR POSITION IS WEAK.
- SOME SAY WE ARE ENGAGING IN THE POT CALLING THE KETTLE BLACK. THIS IS PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROBLEM. SOME ASK AREN'T ALLIED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DOING THE SAME THING? WE NEED TO DEAL WITH THIS FRONTALLY BY EXPLAINING THE BASIS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE IN FREE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND KGB.
- THE USG IS SEEKING TO ORGANIZE ITSELF TO DEAL MORE ENERGETICALLY WITH BOTH ACTIVE MEASURES AND RECIPROCITY.
- IN SUM, OUR VIEW IS THAT THE SOVS, IF THEY CAN MANIPULATE US WITH IMPUNITY, WILL DO SO; THEY HAVE DONE SO, TO OUR MUTUAL DAMAGE, MORE FROM THE CUMULATIVE NEGATIVE IMPACT THAN DAMAGE FROM ANY SINGLE DISINFORMATION EFFORT. THE US NO LONGER INTENDS, IN THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARENA, PASSIVELY TO ACCEPT ACTIVE MEASURES AS PART OF THE NORMAL LANDSCAPE. WE WILL MOVE TOWARD STRICTER RECIPROCITY IN CONDUCTING OUR BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IN THE LONG RUN THIS APPROACH WILL STRENGTHEN AND NOT DIMINISH THE PROSPECTS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS.

6. FRG POLAD ROSSBACH SAID FRG WELCOMED US INITIATIVE FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON RECIPROCITY AND ACTIVE MEASURES. HE NOTED THAT, DUE TO DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS, RECIPROCITY CANNOT BE APPLIKD

MECHANICALLY TO ALL SECTORS, ALTHOUGH FRG APPROVES BT

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THE PRINCIPLE. FURTHERMORE, FRG DOES NOT HAVE THE SYSTEM NEEDED TO CONTROL RECIPROCITY, AND IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THE STATE AND FREEDOM TO ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH SUCH A SYSTEM. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE FIELD OF ACCESS TO THE MEDIA.

7. ROSSBACH SAID THAT THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SECTORS IN WHICH STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF RECIPROCITY IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE FRG, INCLUDING MEASURES ON THE NOTIFICATION OF DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL; IN THESE AND OTHER FIELDS WHERE FRG INTERESTS ARE AFFECTED THE FRG WILL CONTINUE TO APPLY STRICT MEASURES.

8. FRENCH POLAD DE BELENET REITERATED THE FRENCH POSITION THAT ACTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED SOLELY IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. WITH REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, HE SAID THAT THE EXERCISE APPEARED USEFUL. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ALLIANCE IS LOOKING AT CURRENT PRACTICES. IN 1977-78 POLADS HAD CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENT CONTROL; AND MORE RECENTLY HAD CONSIDERED THE LEVEL OF SOVIET REPRESENTATION IN ALLIED COUNTRIES, IN THE PROCESS CONFIRMING A COMMON INTEREST IN MAINTAINING RESTRICTIONS. IT IS GOOD TO STUDY THE PROBLEM REGULARLY. THE US APPROACH IS, HOWEVER, BROADER THAN THE SPECIFIC STUDIES UNDERTAKEN EARLIER, AND THEREFORE MORE COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT, AND, HE SUGGESTED, WOULD TAKE A LOT OF TIME AND EFFORT.

9. DE BELENET NOTED THAT FRENCH PRACTICE IS BASED ON STRICT RECIPROCITY, NOT ONLY FOR THE SOVIETS BUT ALSO FOR THE EAST EUROPEANS AND THE CHINESE. IN THIS REGARD, HE COMMENTED, STRANGELY, THAT RECIPROCITY CANNOT SINGLE OUT SOME COUNTRIES AND NOT OTHERS. HE AGREED WITH FRG COMMENT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE TOTAL RECIPROCITY IN ALL SECTORS. IN SOME CASES, THE DIFFERENCES IN SOCIETIES PRECLUDE THIS; IT IS IMPOSSIBLE OR UNDESIRABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE AREA OF MEDIA AND PUBLIC CONTACTS. MOREOVER, THE EFFORT

TO OPEN SOVIET SOCIETY IS CENTRAL TO THE CSCE-PROCESS WHICH ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SUPPORT. HE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ALIGN OUR POSITIONS, BUT THAT IN CERTAIN SITUATIONS THE WEST SHOULD REACT, WITH FIRMLINESS. FURTHER STUDY WILL BE NEEDED TO IDENTIFY THOSE SPECIFIC CASES.

10. DANISH REP EGEBJERG ALSO WELCOMED US INITIATIVE. HE AGREED THAT ACTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, SINCE IT HAS THE RELEVANT EXPERTISE. THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WILL THEN BE AVAILABLE TO THE NAC. EGEBJERG NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH CURRENT DANISH PRACTICE FOLLOWED RECIPROCITY IN SOME CASES, THIS WAS NOT THE GENERAL DANISH GUIDELINE. RATHER, DANISH PRACTICE WAS ESTABLISHED WITH REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE CSCE FINAL ACT. RECIPROCITY WAS NOT, IN THE DANISH VIEW, THE ONLY SUITABLE BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. DANISH SOCIETY IS OPEN, AND IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INTRODUCE RESTRICTIONS ON SOVIET INFORMATION ACTIVITIES. RATHER, DENMARK WOULD PREFER TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING CONDITIONS FOR WESTERNERS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AS IS BEING SOUGHT AT MADRID. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE CSCE FINAL ACT CALLS ON STATES TO SIMPLIFY PROCEDURES FOR HUMAN CONTACTS.

11. NORWEGIAN POLAD RINDAHL ALSO WELCOMED CHANCE TO FOCUS ALLIANCE ATTENTION ON SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES. HE AGREED WITH FRENCH AND OTHERS THAT ACTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. WITH REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON EASING SOVIET RESTRICTIONS ON WESTERN CITIZENS; WE SHOULD NOT DO

ANYTHING WHICH WOULD DIMINISH THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER OPENING SOVIET SOCIETY. HE SUGGESTED THAT A CONCERTED WESTERN PROGRAM TO PRESS THE SOVIETS FOR MORE OPENNESS MIGHT BE MORE IN OUR INTEREST THAN GREATER RESTRICTIONS ON THE SOVIETS. RINDAHL AGREED THAT THE WEST NEEDED TO DO MORE IN THE INFORMATION FIELD CONCERNING SOVIET ACTIVITIES AND IN DEFENSE OF WESTERN VALUES. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT TAKE ACTIONS WHICH REPRESENTED A RETREAT FROM OUR OWN VALUES. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AS A CAUSE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE IN THE WEST. FINALLY, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THERE ARE SHARP DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL LAWS AND NATIONAL RELATIONS
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WITH THE SOVIETS.

12. NETHERLANDS POLAD SPEKENBRINK ARGUED THAT THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY AND ACTIVE MEASURES HAD NO RELATION TO THE CURRENT PUBLIC DEBATE IN EUROPE ON LRTNF. DEFENSE MINISTER VAN MIERLO HAD EXPLAINED THE DUTCH DOMESTIC DEBATE AT GLENEAGLES. THE DEBATE DID NOT DERIVE FROM SOVIET COVERT OR OVERT ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH IT WAS UNDENIABLE THAT SOVIET PROPAGANDA PLAYED ON IT.

13. SPEKENBRINK NOTED THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO APPLY RECIPROCITY ACROSS THE BOARD. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROTECT WESTERN RIGHTS THROUGH RESTRICTIONS ON THE SOVIETS, AND THUS WE SHOULD ONLY RESTRICT THEM WHERE WE ARE FORCED TO DO SO. IN THIS REGARD, THE NETHERLANDS DOES APPLY RECIPROCITY AS A GUIDE FOR RESTRICTING SOVIET DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL, MILITARY AND PRESS REPRESENTATIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN OUR DESIRE TO OPEN HUMAN CONTACTS, WE CANNOT APPLY RECIPROCITY ACROSS THE BOARD. MOREOVER, THERE ARE AREAS, SUCH AS VISAS, WHERE RECIPROCITY WOULD WORK AGAINST US. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GDR ISSUES VISAS ON WESTERN PASSPORTS AT THE BORDER, BUT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO THE SAME TO A GDR PASSPORT HOLDER.

14. WITH REGARD TO ACTIVE MEASURES, SPEKENBRINK COMMENTED THAT THESE WERE EITHER COVERT, AND THE PROVINCE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, OR THEY WERE OVERT AND PART OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE. IN THE LATTER CASE, WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO INFRINGE UPON THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE FINAL ACT AND OUR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH GREATER CONTACT WITH THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER DISCUSSION.

15. CANADIAN REP MCLAIN SAID OTTAWA CONSIDERED THE

MEETING VERY IMPORTANT, AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS CURRENT PRACTICES ON A NATIONAL AND ALLIANCE BASIS. CANADA VIEWS RECIPROCITY AS A PERFECT FORM OF "NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION", IDEALLY SUITED TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT IS NEUTRAL, WITHOUT POLITICAL CONNOTATIONS, FLEXIBLE, AND PRECISE. RECIPROCITY IS A REFLECTION OF MUTUAL RESPECT, AND ITS ABSENCE SIGNIFIES AN ACCEPTANCE OF INFERIORITY. IT IS THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF EVERY EQUAL TREATY, AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION, WHICH EXPLICITLY PROVIDES FOR TREATING SOME STATES DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHERS ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY.

16. MCLAIN SAID THAT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE SIMPLY TO DUPLICATE THE PRACTICES OF THE SOVIETS; WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS INTELLIGENCE AND IMAGINATION IN SELECTING AREAS WHERE APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE. HE NOTED THAT CANADA FORMERLY WAS GENEROUS IN GRANTING SOVIET REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION TREATMENT OF DIPLOMATS, BUT HAS RECENTLY TIGHTENED UP. THERE IS A BROAD FEELING IN CANADA, GOING BEYOND THE GOVERNMENT, THAT RELATIONS MUST BE BALANCED. HE NOTED THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MOVE ON ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES, IN PART BECAUSE OF A DESIRE TO SAVE SOME MOVES FOR THE CONTINGENCY OF, SAY, A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND, WHEN WE WOULD WANT TO HAVE MEASURES WE COULD TAKE. HE NOTED THAT OTTAWA HAS HAD SUCCESS IN FORCING THE SOVIETS TO TREAT CANADIAN DIPLOMATS BETTER BY ENFORCING RECIPROCITY, CITING THE EXAMPLE OF CANADIAN DENIAL OF ACCESS TO AIRPORT RUNWAYS UNTIL THE SOVIETS AGREED TO ACCORD SIMILAR PRIVILEGES IN MOSCOW.

17. UNITED KINGDOM REP JOHNSON WELCOMED THE DISCUSSION, NOTING THAT THIS HAD BEEN A UK CONCERN FOR YEARS. THE UK SHARES US VIEW THAT SOVIETS HAVE HAD THINGS TOO EASY FOR TOO LONG. REFERRING TO COMMENTS BY OTHERS ABOUT THE UNDESIRABILITY OF CLOSING THE OPEN WESTERN SOCIETIES, HE NOTED THAT WHILE THIS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT IT WAS UNDENIABLE THAT THE SOVIETS OBTAINED NON-RECIPROCAL ADVANTAGES FROM THE SITUATION. THERE IS NO NEED FOR ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS TO ADOPT IDENTICAL POLICIES, BUT TOO GREAT A DIVERSITY GIVES THE SOVIETS ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES. IT IS THEREFORE DESIRABLE THAT THERE BE SOME HARMONY IN THE ALLIANCE APPROACH.

18. JOHNSON AGREED WITH KUX THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT UNRESPONSIVE TO PRESSURE AT THE RIGHT PLACE AND TIME. THE BT

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APPLY RECIPROCITY, E.G., ON THE SIZE OF SOVIET-REP-RESENTATION.

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SOVIETS INSIST ON RECIPROCITY WHEN IT IS IN THEIR OWN INTEREST, AND WILL RESPECT WESTERN INSISTANCE. HE ALSO AGREED WITH KUX THAT THE SOVIETS ARE REALISTS AND WILL NOT NECESSARILY OVER-REACT; THEY TOO HAVE AN INTEREST IN ON-GOING RELATIONS. WITH REGARD TO THE ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY SOME OTHERS THAT CSCE OBLIGATIONS HINDERED WESTERN APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY, JOHNSON NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS SIMPLY HAVE NOT OBSERVED FINAL ACT OBLIGATIONS TO DATE, AND IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME TO BRING THEM TO DO SO. IT WILL ONLY BE WHEN THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT THEY HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN COMPLIANCE THAT THEY WILL DO SO. THUS, THERE IS NO CONFLICT, AND IN FACT COMPLEMENTARITY, BETWEEN OUR PRESSING FOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH CSCE AND ENFORCING RECIPROCITY ON THE SOVIETS.

19. ITALIAN POLAD PUCCI WELCOMED THE OVERALL US INITIATIVE OF SEPT. 16 ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OF WHICH RECIPROCITY AND ACTIVE MEASURES ARE A PART. THE PROBLEM OF COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON LRTNF IS MOST DELICATE, SINCE THE DEBATE IS NOT SIMPLY THE RESULT OF SOVIET INITIATIVE. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD THAT THE ALLIANCE COMPLETE ITS DOCUMENT ON THE MILITARY BALANCE. PUCCI COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NO HOMOGENITY IN THE DEGREE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE ON PUBLICS IN ALLIANCE COUNTRIES, NOTING THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ITALY HAD DECLINED SHARPLY IN COMPARISON WITH THE 1950'S, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE DIFFERENCES IN ALLIANCE COUNTRIES THUS MEANT THAT THE RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAD TO BE DIFFERENTIATED.

20. ON RECIPROCITY, PUCCI NOTED THAT IN SOME CASES WE WERE DEALING WITH STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS, IN OTHERS WITH SOCIETY-TO-SOCIETY RELATIONS. IN THE LATTER CASE, E.G., WITH THE MEDIA, THE WESTERN SITUATION IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE SOVIET. MOREOVER, ITALIAN EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN WESTERN MEDIA DEBATES. ON THE LEVEL OF STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS, HOWEVER, ITALY CAN AND DOES

21. GREEK REP VASSILAKIS NOTED THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO APPLY RECIPROCITY ON A SOCIETY-TO-SOCIETY BASIS, BUT THAT GREECE WAS VERY STRICT ON GOVERNMENTAL ASPECTS, SUCH AS VISAS FOR SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL. IN THE LATTER CASE, GREECE HAD RESISTED SOVIET PRESSURE FOR SHORTER DELAYS IN ISSUANCE, INSISTING THAT A MINIMUM OF 15 DAYS WAS REQUIRED. COMMENTING ON CANADIAN REP'S ARGUMENT THAT RECIPROCITY WAS EXCELLENT BASIS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS, VASSILAKIS ARGUED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY ALSO TO CONSIDER THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND PARTICULAR BILATERAL INTERESTS. GREECE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD TO AGREE TO THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TOBACCO BUYERS, TO BE ABLE TO SELL TOBACCO, WHICH WAS NOT RECIPROCAL BUT NEVERTHELESS BENEFICIAL.

22. IN RESPONSE TO ALLIED REPS COMMENTS, DAS KUX AGREED THAT RECIPROCITY WAS USEFUL AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, BUT THAT IT ALSO HAD TO BE APPLIED FLEXIBLY WITH REGARD TO NATIONAL SITUATIONS. HE ALSO AGREED WITH THE DUTCH COMMENT THAT THE DOMESTIC DEBATE IS NOT ORIGINATED BY THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH THEY OBVIOUSLY BENEFIT FROM IT AND ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT IT. WITH REGARD TO FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF ACTIVE MEASURES, HE NOTED THAT THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WAS WORKING PRIMARILY ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ASPECTS, WHEREAS IT IS OUR DESIRE ALSO TO FOCUS ON POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM.

COMPENDIUM ON RECIPROCITY PRACTICES

REPS REVIEWED AND PROVIDED FURTHER UPDATES ON NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS ON RECIPROCITY PRACTICES. (WE WILL TRANSMIT IS COMPENDIUM ONCE REVISION WITH ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND UPDATES IS ISSUED.)

24. CANADIAN AND UK REPS NOTED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WERE REVIEWING EXISTING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, TO DETERMINE WHETHER CERTAIN WORKING-GROUP AND ACADEMIC AND OTHER EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES TRULY SERVED NATIONAL INTERESTS. THERE IS A GENERAL FEELING IN BOTH COUNTRIES THAT SUCH

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ACTIVITIES HAVE ASSUMED A LIFE OF THEIR OWN AND NEED TO BE REASSESSED IN PRAGMATIC TERMS. UK REP NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT OBJECTED STRONGLY TO BRITISH MOVES TO TERMINATE SOME BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS. NORWEGIAN REP NOTED THAT, CONTRARY TO DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION IN U.S. PAPER ON NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES, NORWEGIANS HAVE NOT EXPERIENCED ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS, EITHER WITH MFA OR OTHER DEPARTMENTS. IN FACT, NORWEGIANS SEE SLIGHT TENDENCY TOWARDS EASIER ACCESS IN MOSCOW THAN IN PAST. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE MAY NOT BE TYPICAL, ADDING THAT SMALL SIZE OF EMBASSY MAY BE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DIFFERING ASSESSMENT ON THIS QUESTION.

25. IN REVIEWING US PRACTICES AND ADDRESSING COMMENTS OF OTHERS, US REP (FARRAND) AGREED THAT GOAL WE SHOULD BE STRIVING FOR IS TO OPEN UP SOVIET SOCIETY, BUT ARGUED THAT RECIPROCITY OFFERED US ONE OF THE BEST LEVERS TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. HE FURTHER OBSERVED THAT SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE AND GENEVA CONVENTION OBLIGATIONS LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED AND THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECT RECIPROCITY AND ARE SURPRISED IF WE DO NOT USE THIS LEVER. SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF RECIPROCITY, CONSISTENT OVER TIME, REMAINS ONE OF THE BEST WAYS OF NUDGING THE SOVIETS INTO MODIFYING THEIR BEHAVIOR.

26. UK REP PICKED UP ON THE EARLIER CANADIAN ARGUMENT FOR HOLDING SOME "RECIPROCITY SHOTS" IN ABEYANCE FOR USE IN PARTICULAR SITUATIONS, SUCH AS A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND. ON THIS SCORE, HE NOTED THAT HMG HAS BEEN CONSIDERING BRINGING THE SOVIET TRAVEL-FREE AREA AROUND LONDON MORE IN LINE WITH THE CORRESPONDING ZONE AROUND MOSCOW. NO DECISION ON THIS HAD BEEN MADE, BUT HE INDICATED SUCH A MOVE WOULD PROBABLY BE RESERVED TO IMPOSE DURING A POLISH OR SIMILAR CONTINGENCY.

27. SUMMING UP DISCUSSION ON NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES, CHAIRMAN NOTED (1) THE SUGGESTION TO EXPAND

THE IS COMPENDIUM TO INCLUDE OTHER WP COUNTRIES;
(2) POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING REFERENCE TO SOVIET PRACTICES;
(3) SUGGESTION TO INCLUDE COMMENTS ON NATIONAL MONITORING METHODS; AND (4) POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING ADDITIONAL TOPICS, E.G., BILATERAL COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS AND SHIP VISITS, PARTICULARLY SOVIET OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSELS.

28. CANADIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT CURRENT DATA ON NATIONAL PRACTICES ALSO BE UPDATED WITH AN EYE TOWARDS MAKING THE INFORMATION MORE COMPARABLE. IN PARTICULAR, HE CITED NEED TO SPELL OUT ACTUAL TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AND TO NOTE VISA PROCESSING TIMES, AS WELL AS CATEGORIES OF ISSUANCE. NOTING THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET COUNTER-MEASURES TO THE IMPOSITION OF RECIPROCITY, CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, DESPITE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, THE SOVIETS DO NOT ALWAYS RESPOND IN A TIT-FOR-TAT MANNER, ALTHOUGH THEY USUALLY DO SEEK TO RETALIATE FOR WESTERN ACTIONS. ALSO, GIVEN DISCREPANCIES IN SIZE OF EMBASSIES AND OF TRAINED PERSONNEL, SOVIETS IN MANY INSTANCES HAVE AN ADVANTAGE WHEN THE QUESTION OF RETALIATION ARISES SINCE EQUAL REDUCTIONS OF STAFF OR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE-TRAINED OFFICERS USUALLY WILL WEIGH MORE HEAVILY ON WESTERN COUNTRIES THAN THEY WILL ON THE SOVIETS. UK REP AGREED WITH CANADIAN REP THAT SOVIETS DO NOT ALWAYS RESPOND IN KIND. HE CITED CASE OF EXPULSION OF SOVIET SECOND SECRETARY FROM LONDON THIS YEAR WHICH WAS ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY REDUCTION OF SOVIET PERSONNEL CEILING BY ONE SLOT. WHILE THE SOVIETS, IN RESPONSE, REFUSED TO ALLOW THE UK'S VACATIONING CULTURAL ATTACHE TO RETURN TO THE USSR, MOSCOW HAS SINCE AGREED TO ACCEPTING A NEW ATTACHE AND HAS NOT CUT THE UK PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

ACTIVE MEASURES

29. US REP (MALZAHN) OPENED BRIEF DISCUSSION OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" BY STRESSING THAT THE US DID NOT WISH TO INFRINGE UPON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE IN THIS FIELD. HOWEVER, IN ADDITION TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ASPECT, THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" NEED TO BE EXAMINED AND THIS FALLS OUTSIDE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S PURVIEW. MALZAHN NOTED THAT WE HAVE SEEN AN INCREASE IN SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" ACTIVITIES IN RECENT YEARS, ESPECIALLY FORGERIES. THE INCREASED PATTERN OF ACTIVITY, BT

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COUPLED WITH SCOPE AND MORE GENERALLY POLITICIZED NATURE, SUGGESTS THAT THE ISSUE IS MORE THAN MERELY AN INTELLIGENCE MATTER. HE NOTED RECENT FORGERIES AFFECTING NATO -- THE LUNS-HAIG LETTER AND A RECENTLY DISCOVERED FORGERY OF NATIS LETTERS SENT TO SPANISH JOURNALISTS WHICH TRANSMITTED DOCTORED NATO INFORMATION MATERIALS SHOWING SPAIN AS A MEMBER OF NATO. MALZAHN OBSERVED THAT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE "ACTIVE MEASURES" FIELD HAVE INCREASED DURING A PERIOD OF DETENTE IN WHICH THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO PAY A POLITICAL PRICE FOR THEIR EFFORTS.

30. UK REP CONCURRED WITH MALZAHN THAT SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" NEED TO BE COUNTERED, BUT NOTED THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON HOW TO GO ABOUT THIS. USEFUL AS IT IS TO GATHER EVIDENCE IN ONE UNCLASSIFIED COMPENDIUM, IN GENERAL IT IS MORE EFFECTIVE FROM A PUBLIC AFFAIRS VIEW POINT TO EXPOSE SUCH ACTIVITIES AS THEY COME TO LIGHT, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THE COMPENDIUM APPROACH, PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN, LEAVES LITTLE LASTING IMPACT. THE UK BELIEVES THAT TO EXTENT POSSIBLE ALL CASES SHOULD BE EXPOSED AND EXPLOITED IN THE TIMELIEST FASHION POSSIBLE. ON THIS SCORE, UK REP EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE FAILURE TO EXPLOIT THE LUNS-HAIG FORGERY ON TNF. WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE MANNER WE EXPOSE "ACTIVE MEASURES". WE DO NOT WANT TO LEND CREDIBILITY TO DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES BY REPEATING THEM. ALSO, IT IS NOT ALWAYS BEST TO UTILIZE OFFICIAL RELEASES TO EXPOSE ACTIVITIES. CYNICISM ABOUT "GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA" IS LIKELY TO DEVALUE EXPOSURES OF THIS SORT; BETTER TO RELY ON SURFACING THE MATERIAL THROUGH RELIABLE JOURNALISTIC CONTACTS AND SELECTIVE BACKGROUNDEES. FINALLY, IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY THAT THE SOVIETS' HAND IS BEHIND AN OPERATION; WE MUST SHOW HOW OUR PUBLICS HAVE BEEN DECEIVED AND THUS SENSITIZE THEM SO THEY WILL IN THE FUTURE EXAMINE MORE SERIOUSLY DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS.

31. CANADIAN REP SECONDED UK COMMENTS REGARDING EXPOSING

"ACTIVE MEASURES" IN TIMELY FASHION, ADDING THAT OTTAWA ALSO WAS LESS ENTHUSIASTIC WITH AN HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ISSUE. HE NOTED THAT "ACTIVE MEASURES" REALLY HAVE NOT BEEN MAJOR PROBLEM IN CANADA. THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION SEEMS TO ENSURE A GOOD PUBLIC MONITORING AND AWARENESS OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES. ANTI-CANADIAN FORGERIES HAVE NOT APPEARED IN CANADA FOR OVER 12 YEARS AND THE LAST ANTI-US FORGERY APPEARED NEARLY 10 YEARS AGO. NONETHELESS, CANADA WOULD SUPPORT NATO CONSIDERATION OF A MECHANISM FOR EXAMINING AND EXPOSING FORGERIES ON A TIMELY BASIS.

32. FRG POLAD SAID BONN TAKES THE QUESTION OF SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" VERY SERIOUSLY AND SEES ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA AS A MAJOR INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH MATTERS HAVE POLITICAL CONNOTATIONS AND AGREED THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THE OCT. 10 BONN DEMONSTRATION, HE NOTED, COULD NOT BE TRACED SOLELY TO SOVIET ORGANS OF INFLUENCE, ALTHOUGH THE FRG KNEW THAT HARD-CORE ORGANIZATION FOR THE EVENT WAS DONE BY COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST-INFLUENCED GROUPS IN COOPERATION WITH CHURCH AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. AS THE DUTCH REP AND OTHERS NOTED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS GARNERED A GREAT DEAL FROM THE DEMONSTRATION. IN SPITE OF THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE, THE QUESTION OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" REQUIRES SOME SPECIAL AND DETAILED KNOWLEDGE, FRG REP ARGUED. THEREFORE, HE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY THAT THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE "HAVE A FIRST GO" AT THE SUBJECT. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE COULD THEN REVIEW THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS' FINDINGS.

THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE PREPARE A SHORT, COVERING STATEMENT FOR THE COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES; THE STATEMENT WOULD NOTE THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY, WHILE GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS DOCUMENT COULD BE REFERRED TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRANSMISSION TO MINISTERS AND COULD ALSO BE THE BASIS FOR MENTION OF THE SUBJECT IN THE DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE. WHILE THE DOCUMENT MIGHT INCUDE THE SUBJECT OF "ACTIVE MEASURES", KUX SUGGESTED THAT, IN VIEW BT

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OF OTHERS' COMMENTS, THE BEST COURSE PROBABLY WOULD BE TO HOLD POLITICAL CONSIDERATION OF THE "ACTIVE MEASURES" ISSUE IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE COMPLETES ITS WORK.

34. FRENCH REP NOTED THAT, WHILE EACH MINISTER HAD THE RIGHT TO RAISE ANY SUBJECT HE DESIRED IN THE RESTRICTED MINISTERIAL SESSION, THE FORMAL AGENDA FOR THE MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED BY PERMREPS, NOT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. SIMILARLY, COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED IN ANOTHER FORUM. OTHERWISE, HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE US PROPOSAL, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SEE A NEED FOR A "COVERING STATEMENT" ON THE COMPENDIUM.

35. UK REP SUPPORTED IDEA OF "COVERING STATEMENT", NOTING THAT PERMREPS AND MINISTERS PROBABLY WOULD APPRECIATE AND EXPECT SOME CONCLUSIONS. AS FRENCH REP NOTED, HOWEVER, IN LAST ANALYSIS IT WOULD BE UP TO NAC TO DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND THE DOCUMENT TO MINISTERS. ON THE QUESTION OF "ACTIVE MEASURES", UK REP SUPPORTED THE IDEA THAT POLITICAL COMMITTEE FOLLOW-UP ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THIS SUBJECT IN LIGHT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE WORK. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS MEANT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COMPLETE ITS WORK IN THE "ACTIVE MEASURES" AREA IN TIME FOR THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL.

36. AS A POINT OF CLARIFICATION, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATO OFFICE OF SECURITY (JOCE) NOTED THAT THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AT PRESENT, IS NOT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" AS AN INDEPENDENT SUBJECT. AT ITS NOV. 17-18 MEETING, THE COMMITTEE IS SLATED TO REVIEW ITS ANNUAL REPORT ON SUBVERSIVE ESPIONAGE, AS WELL AS A SPECIAL STUDY ON CAMPAIGNS AGAINST ALLIANCE MILITARY PLANS (I.E., ANTI-ERW AND ANTI-TNF CAMPAIGNS IN ALLIED COUNTRIES). IS REP ADDED THAT WHILE THE SUBJECT OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" FALLS WITHIN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S COMPETENCE AND WHILE THE GROUP WILL TAKE UP U.S. PAPER

ON THIS SUBJECT AT ITS NOV. 17-18 MEETING, POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS ASPECTS OF "ACTIVE MEASURES" WERE NOT WITHIN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S COMPETENCE. JOCE SAID THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE COMMENTS ON U.S. PAPER, WHICH IN TURN COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION. FRENCH POLAD NOTED THAT ANY SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT WOULD FIRST HAVE TO GO TO COUNCIL, WHICH COULD, IF IT WISHED, REFER THE SUBJECT TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OR OTHER BODY THEREAFTER.

37. IN CONCLUSION, CHAIRMAN NOTED:

- A) AGREEMENT THAT THE COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROCITY PRACTICES SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WHICH WILL FURTHER DISCUSS FORMAT ISSUES SUCH AS ADDITIONAL CATEGORIES AND COUNTRIES FOR INCLUSION IN THE DOCUMENT;
 - B) THE COMPENDIUM WILL BE DRAWN TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PERMREPS, POSSIBLY WITH A COVER STATEMENT WHICH WOULD CITE CONCLUSIONS DERIVED FROM THE RECIPROCITY STUDY; THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL DISCUSS FURTHER THE ISSUE OF A COVER STATEMENT;
 - C) THE COUNCIL WILL DECIDE WHETHER THE DOCUMENT ON RECIPROCITY SHOULD BE REFERRED TO MINISTERS; AND
 - D) AS FOR "ACTIVE MEASURES", FURTHER WORK BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING SPECIAL COMMITTEE REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE U.S. CLASSIFIED "ACTIVE MEASURES" PAPER AND COMPLETION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S OWN WORK, ON WHICH IT WILL REPORT TO THE COUNCIL.
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Report of the
Department of Health and Human Services
Concerning Continuation of the US-USSR Agreement for Cooperation
in Medical Science and Public Health

Background

This report covers exchanges and cooperative activities between the US and the USSR in the areas of cancer, cardiovascular disease, environmental health, arthritis, influenza and acute respiratory diseases, mental health, eye diseases, and biomedical communications.

Exchanges in some of these areas occurred prior to the signing of the Agreement in May 1972 although irregularly and at a lower level of activity. The Agreement initially included only the areas of cancer, cardiovascular disease, and environmental health. Cooperative relationships were developed subsequently in the other areas mentioned.

In the first two years after the signing of the Agreement, scientific delegations were exchanged in nearly all areas resulting in the development and initiation of joint work plans and other forms of cooperative activities. Assessment of progress and achievements in each area was accomplished through annual meetings of the Joint Committee headed by the US Assistant Secretary for Health and a Soviet Deputy Minister of Health. The Agreement was renewed for a second five-year term in 1977. The last time the Joint Committee met was in October 1978.

The willingness of the Soviet side to cooperate in making these exchanges beneficial to the US side has varied depending upon the particular area of the Agreement. Overall, Soviet authorities in the Ministry of Public Health and the Academy of Medical Sciences have made efforts to be cooperative. The major deficiency in these efforts has been the failure of the Soviet side to include some of their best basic research scientists and institutes. In particular, the US side has been largely stymied in its efforts to establish cooperative relationships with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, some of whose institutes are heavily involved in the type of basic biological research of considerable interest to the US side. In one area, mental health, political complications have affected relations to the point where cooperation has effectively ceased. Plans to initiate cooperation in occupational health had to be suspended, by direction of the State Department, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Benefits

An assessment of the benefits which have accrued to the US side as a result of cooperative activities under the Health Agreement is summarized for each of the cooperative areas as follows:

Cancer

The US coordinators for the cancer area feel that, in general, the Agreement has provided opportunities for US cancer specialists to view and appraise the Soviet modus operandi in health care delivery and

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research. Reciprocal exchange visits have enabled scientists from both nations to evaluate the potential for successful collaboration in many areas of cancer research. The most rewarding feature of this Agreement has been the establishment of person-to-person communications and interactions between individual cancer specialists from both sides.

A number of collaborative studies dealing with cancer treatment, viral oncology, genetics, and epidemiology have yielded useful scientific information which has been published jointly in monographs and in scientific journals. While a number of benefits have resulted from the collaborative efforts, none can be viewed as significant scientific innovations or breakthroughs. In the cancer area overall, the US side appears to have given more than it has received in return from the Soviet side. There have been some useful gains for the US, even though there has not been balance in an absolutely reciprocal sense.

The following have been identified as specific benefits to the US side:

- o American scientists have had the opportunity, on a continuing basis, to evaluate Soviet clinical anticancer drugs and pre-clinical compounds which otherwise would not have been available to the US side for screening and testing for their antitumor efficacy. Of the 110 preparations provided by the Soviet side, 4 are currently viewed with favor for further study in the US.
- o The Agreement has enabled US researchers to have access to a large colony of captive baboons at Sukhumi in the USSR. Teams of

American and Soviet scientists studying these and other primates have made a number of findings, which have been published, relating to the role of viruses in the possible causation and transmission of cancer.

- o There is a type of electronic x-ray mammography equipment in the USSR that is unique and of particular interest to American scientists working to improve technology in this area.

Cardiovascular Diseases

The US Coordinators for the cardiovascular disease area feel that scientific accomplishments are substantial. They are beginning to see significant benefits as the result of collaborative relationships painstakingly developed over the years of exchange. Because of the effort made by both sides to focus attention on scientific issues rather than political differences or ideologies, trust and confidence have grown between the participating US and Soviet scientists and administrators. It has now reached the stage where long-term, high grade professional relationships have developed in all areas of cooperation. These working relationships are smooth and open, according to the US coordinators, and conducive to the steady and orderly expansion of scientific activities and free exchange of scientific information and data, even in the midst of political tensions.

In addition to the scientific relationship and benefits deriving from cooperation in this area, it should also be pointed out that the Soviet coordinator for the cardiovascular area, Academician Chazov, is a Deputy Minister of Health and personal physician to President Brezhnev.

Regarding specific accomplishments, the US side points to the following:

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- o Through joint collaboration between nine US and two Soviet lipid research clinics, vital information on the risk factors contributing to cardiovascular disease has been collected in populations that the US would not have had access to without the exchange program. As a result of these studies, significant differences have been discovered between populations studied in the US and the USSR, which raise new scientific questions now being pursued by both sides in an effort to lower the risk of developing arteriolosclerosis.

- o A joint clinical study comparing the treatment of patients suffering from advanced coronary heart disease should yield data on the relative efficacy of various treatment modalities practiced in the US and the USSR.

- o Taking advantage of the well-developed Soviet emergency ambulance system, US and Soviet physicians were able to carry out a series of highly complex studies on a number of well-characterized cardiac patients within a much shorter period of time following a heart attack than would have been the case had the studies been carried out in the US.

- o As a result of cooperation in the area of arrhythmia and sudden cardiac death, US scientists learned about the Soviet use of nitrous oxide for patients having heart attacks, the effectiveness of which was subsequently established. Cooperation between the US and Soviet

side established the efficacy of a Soviet-developed drug in treating life-threatening arrhythmias, and a US pharmaceutical company has purchased this drug from the USSR for distribution in the US. 54

Environmental Health

The US coordinator for the environmental health area feels, overall, that the benefits to the US side have been minimal, but significant in one or two areas of the cooperation:

- o In extensive joint studies of the biological effects caused by microwave radiation, for which the Soviets have established exposure standards which are 1000 times more stringent than comparable US standards, US scientists have gained considerable insight into the basis for the Soviet standards and have had access to data and publications which otherwise would not have been available. Collaboration is continuing to resolve differences in the basis for US and Soviet standards.

- o In several cooperative studies looking at the biological effects of chemical environmental factors, the US side has gained a better understanding of the Soviet approach to protecting public health and the environment from these agents. In particular, the role of neurophysiologic and behavior studies in the establishment of Soviet standards for protecting against environmental agents has greatly stimulated US efforts in this area. However, due to diminishing interest on the part of both sides, progress in this

area has been slow and, in light of this and current budget constraints, no future collaborative activities are planned at present.

Arthritis

The US coordinators for the arthritis area report that they have had success in cooperating with the Soviets in clinical studies and trials, but have not been productive in collaboration in more basic science areas. Both sides are well into an important study on the treatment of juvenile rheumatoid arthritis. In addition, useful information from collaborative activities in orthopedics is progressing toward publication. These projects will be completed in 1984 and their results will be broadly applicable.

In summary, the US coordinators for this area feel that, although communication and collaboration with their Soviet counterparts has not been getting easier (especially post-Afghanistan), they do want to complete the work which has begun. Their enthusiasm for collaboration with the Soviets has diminished somewhat over the past two years. Thus, while the US coordinators want to continue with the arthritis program in progress, they do not want to undertake any new initiatives.

Influenza and Acute Respiratory Diseases

The coordinators for the US side note that the chief benefit of the Agreement has been to establish personal and official channels for timely exchange of epidemiologic and laboratory data on influenza. Because of the epidemic nature of influenza viruses, worldwide communication, particularly with a nation as large as the Soviet Union, is essential. As an example, one of the most

significant activities in this regard was the Soviet report to the US side in early 1978 of the identification of the new epidemic influenza virus strain. Continued flow of information and virus isolates, as well as the opportunity for US scientists to observe at first hand various aspects of the Soviet flu epidemic, made possible both an accurate assessment of the disease's probable epidemic impact in the US and also simplified the consequent planning of preventive health measures in the US, including incorporation of a Soviet viral influenza strain into the 1978-79 trivalent influenza vaccine. Such exchanges have continued regularly on a smaller scale. Collaboration in other areas of the Agreement, such as vaccine production, basic serology, acute respiratory diseases, and hepatitis, while useful, have been less beneficial to the US side.

Mental Health

Development of a satisfactory cooperative effort in this area has been impaired by the intervention of political and human rights considerations associated with the alleged Soviet abuse of psychiatry in treating dissidents (the Soviet coordinator has been linked by the international scientific community with these abuses). It was only in 1979 that the US side was able to move plans for cooperation in this area to a more promising footing. In the aftermath of Afghanistan, however, no exchanges have taken place in this area by explicit direction of the Department of State.

From a strictly scientific point of view, the US coordinators for this area anticipate there could be significant benefits to the US side from renewed cooperation with the Soviets in the following areas:

- 1) immunology of schizophrenia,

- 2) early diagnosis and treatment of mental health problems among children and adolescents,
- 3) biochemical and clinical research in depression,
- 4) biomedical research in alcoholism, and
- 5) mental health and the aging (senility).

Eye Diseases

The US coordinators for the eye diseases area point out that eye research has only been a part of the Agreement for a few years and that much remains to be accomplished under existing projects. The US coordinators reaffirm their desire to continue with the Agreement, basing future activity on current progress. Regarding benefits to the US side, the coordinators point to the following:

- o A joint clinical trial to test the use of a new Soviet-developed instrument, the Q-switched laser, in the treatment of glaucoma, is in progress with patients being recruited in both countries. With advice and consultation from Soviet collaborators, a laser has been constructed in the US and is being used in these studies.
- o Soviet investigators have discussed in detail their new drug treatment for retinitis pigmentosa and seem to be willing to provide additional information to the US side.

Biomedical Communications

The US coordinators for this area believe that there is no need for a specially organized activity in biomedical information to be included in the Agreement. The one implemented activity is an exchange of biomedical publications. This

activity existed before the Agreement, has continued during the Agreement, and would be able to continue outside of the Agreement. A US-Soviet working group developed implementation plans for this area two years ago and while the US side followed up as agreed upon, the Soviet side has been unresponsive in this area.

Recommendation

The Department of Health and Human Services notes that there have been benefits to the US side as a result of the US-Soviet Health Agreement, substantial in some areas of the Agreement, modest in others. On balance, the Department would assess the benefits to each side to be reciprocal, especially as recent political and budgetary developments have necessitated a reduction or elimination of those activities which yielded little benefit to the US side.

The Department recommends that the Agreement be renewed for an additional five-year term, that modifications be made in several of the cooperative areas as proposed by the coordinators, and that consideration be given to deletion of the Biomedical Communications area from the Program. It is also recommended that, when budget constraints and diplomatic conditions permit, DHHS be permitted to reopen contacts with the Soviet side in the areas of mental health and occupational health, and explore possible cooperative arrangements with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which would give US scientists access to Soviet scientists who are involved in more basic research.

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AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF
MEDICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Realizing the significance which medical science and public
health have for mankind today;

Recognizing the desirability of joining in a common effort
to promote their further development;

Desiring to promote the broadening of coöperation in this
field, and by so doing to promote a general improvement of health;

Desiring to reaffirm the understanding reached in the Letters
of Agreement between the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare of the United States of America and the Ministry of
Health of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed
February 11, 1972;

And in accordance with the Agreement between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical,
Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake to develop and extend mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of medical science and public health. By mutual agreement and on the basis of reciprocity, they will determine the various directions of this cooperation, proceeding from the experience acquired by the Parties in the course of previous contacts, visits, and exchanges.

The Parties agree to direct their initial joint efforts toward combating the most widespread and serious diseases, such as cardio-vascular and oncological diseases, because of the major threat they pose to man's health, toward solving the problems associated with the effects of the environment on man's health, as well as toward the resolution of other important health problems.

ARTICLE 2

The cooperation provided for in the preceding article may be implemented specifically in the following ways:

- Coordinated scientific research programs and other activities in health fields of mutual interest;
- Exchanges of specialists and delegations;
- Organization of colloquia, scientific conferences and lectures;
- Exchange of information;
- Familiarization with technical aids and equipment.

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ARTICLE 3

The Parties will encourage and facilitate the establishment of direct and regular contacts between United States and Soviet medical institutions and organizations.

The Parties will also encourage and facilitate exchanges of equipment, pharmaceutical products, and technological developments related to medicine and public health.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will continue to provide assistance to international medical organizations, specifically the World Health Organization, and will afford these organizations the opportunity of drawing on the knowledge gained by the Parties, including knowledge gained in the course of their joint efforts.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties will delegate the practical implementation of this Agreement to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee for Health Cooperation. The Joint Committee shall periodically work out specific programs of cooperation, creating working subgroups whenever necessary, and shall be responsible for supervising implementation of these programs.

ARTICLE 6

Cooperation shall be financed on the basis of reciprocal agreements worked out by the Joint Committee, using the resources of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the United States of America and the Ministry of Health of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the resources

of institutions participating in direct inter-institutional cooperation.

ARTICLE 7

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years, after which it will be extended for successive five-year periods unless one Party notifies the other of the termination thereof not less than six months prior to its expiration.

DONE on May 23, 1972 in Moscow in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Wm. P. Rogers

F. I. Tsvetkov

Secretary of State

Minister of Health

RECIPROCALITY
INCOMING
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 15543

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/6/91 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, UR, PINT, PEPR
SUBJECT: (C) NATO COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROcity
- PRACTICES: U. S. CONTRIBUTION TO
- CANADIAN STUDY ON SOVIET PRACTICES

REF: USNATO 06809

1. AS NOTED REFTEL, PARA 5, THE CANADIAN DEL AT NATO HAS AGREED TO GATHER A COMPENDIUM OF INFORMATION ON SOVIET CONSTRAINTS ON TRAVEL BY NATO MISSIONS IN MOSCOW, LIMITS ON STAFFING LEVELS, VISA PRACTICES, AND OTHER TOPICS LISTED REFTEL. CANADIAN EMBASSY HERE HAS ALREADY TURNED TO US FOR OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR STUDY, WHICH WE GAVE THEM NOVEMBER 4. WE BELIEVE THAT THE DEPARTMENT AND USMISSION NATO MAY FIND OUR STUDY USEFUL FOR FUTURE REFERENCE. THE TOPICS ADDRESSED IN THE STUDY CORRESPOND TO THOSE LISTED REFTEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

A. SOVIET INTERNAL TRAVEL CONTROLS
U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL:

THERE ARE THREE DIMENSIONS TO THE LIMITS GOVERNING OUR TRAVEL WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. THE FIRST IS INDEPENDENT OF POLITICS: SOME 40 PERCENT OF THE USSR (ISOLATED ARCTIC, FOREST, DESERT, AND MOUNTAIN AREAS) IS PHYSICALLY INACCESSIBLE. THE SECOND IS THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL CONTROL STRUCTURE EMBODIED IN MFA INSTRUCTIONS THAT DEFINE CERTAIN AREAS AS CLOSED AND REQUIRE PRIOR REGISTRATION OF TRAVEL TO OPEN AREAS. THE THIRD IS THE DE FACTO TRAVEL CONTROL STRUCTURE, I.E., CERTAIN MFA PRACTICES IN IMPLEMENTING THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL REGULATIONS, AND CONTROL BY UPDK OVER OUR ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION AND HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS. THESE RESTRICTIONS COMBINE TO LIMIT AREAS WE CAN ACTUALLY SEE TO A VERY SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE COUNTRY.

OUR EMBASSY IS CURRENTLY GOVERNED BY A 1978 MFA DIPLOMATIC NOTE WHICH CLOSES SOME 20 PERCENT OF SOVIET TERRITORY TO FOREIGN TRAVEL, AND BY 1974 AND 1975 MFA NOTES WHICH DESCRIBE PROCEDURES FOR FILING TRAVEL PLANS (IN EFFECT REQUESTS FOR PERMISSION TO TRAVEL) WITH THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICE (MFA PROTOCOL FOR DIPLOMATS, MINISTRY OF DEFENSE UVS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL). TRAVEL IS FURTHER RESTRICTED BY THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF CLOSED AREAS, WHICH SEEMS CONTRIVED TO LIMIT ACCESS TO LARGER NOMINALLY OPEN AREAS (E.G., IDENTIFICATION OF A UNIQUE URBAN TRANSIT HUB AS A CLOSED CITY); AND BY MINISTERIAL OBSTRUCTION OF TRAVEL BY LAST-MINUTE INJECTION OF INSTRUCTIONS

ALTERING ITINERARY OR MEANS OF TRAVEL.

TRIPS TO NOMINALLY OPEN AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED IN 28 EMBASSY TRAVEL NOTES SO FAR IN 1981 HAVE BEEN DENIED OFFICIALLY (FOR "REASONS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE"), OR DE FACTO. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TRAVEL INVOLVED SUGGEST A NUMBER OF SOVIET MOTIVES FOR THESE DENIALS: BARRING FOREIGN CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC DISSIDENT GROUPS (RELIGIOUS ACTIVISTS IN SIBERIA, NATIONALISTIC ACTIVISTS IN THE BALTIC); BARRING FOREIGN TRAVEL TO AREAS OF POTENTIAL NATIONALIST UNREST (THE BALTIC; CAUCASUS, AND CENTRAL ASIA); BARRING OBSERVATION OF CROP-PRODUCING AREAS BY EMBASSY AGRICULTURAL ATTACHES, OR OF MAJOR ECONOMIC CENTERS (PARTICULARLY IN SIBERIA) BY EMBASSY ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES; DENIALS DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUAL TRAVELLERS WHO HAVE EARNED SOVIET HOSTILITY; AND DENIALS IN RETALIATION FOR DENIALS OF TRAVEL TO SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES (IN EFFECT, RETALIATION FOR RETALIATION).

NON-EMBASSY U. S. PERSONNEL:

AMERICAN RESIDENT AND VISITING JOURNALISTS MUST FILE TRAVEL PLANS WITH THE MFA PRESS SECTION. RESIDENT BUSINESSMEN, EXCHANGE SCIENTISTS AND OTHERS APPLY TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS -- DEPARTMENT OF VISAS AND REGISTRATION FOR PERSONAL TRIPS; THEIR BUSINESS TRIPS ARE USUALLY ORGANIZED

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AND CONTROLLED BY THEIR SPONSORING ORGANIZATION, E.G., THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, OTHER MINISTRIES, OR THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. THESE CATEGORIES ARE GENERALLY NOT ALLOWED TO TRAVEL IN AREAS DEFINED AS CLOSED BY THE 1978 MFA NOTE, THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN RARE EXCEPTIONS.

AMERICAN TOURISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE OFFERED ACCESS ONLY TO THE SMALL NUMBER OF MAJOR CITIES AND ROAD, RAIL, AND AIR ROUTES WHICH MAKE UP THE "INTOURIST NETWORK."

B. DIPLOMATIC/NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFFING LEVELS

NO CEILING LEVELS EXIST ON U. S. STAFF. DE FACTO SOVIET CONTROL OVER STAFF SIZE IS HOWEVER IMPOSED THROUGH LIMITS ON HOUSING MADE AVAILABLE TO US BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES. WE HAVE A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT ACCORDS FULL DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES TO ALL OUR STAFF. LOCAL (SOVIET) STAFF IS AVAILABLE THROUGH UPDK, WHICH HAS FULL CONTROL OVER QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF PERSONNEL IT PRESENTS TO US FOR HIRE.

C. VISA PRACTICES

ALL APPLICATIONS BY U. S. CITIZENS FOR A SOVIET VISA MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A SOVIET ORGANIZATION OR INSTITUTION BEFORE THE VISA CAN BE ISSUED. FOR EMBASSY PERSONNEL, VISA SUPPORT IS OBTAINED THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. FOR TOURISTS, INTOURIST VOUCHERS MUST BE PRESENTED. FOR BUSINESS OR EXCHANGE VISITORS, THE SOVIET INSTITUTION INVITING THE VISITOR PROVIDES THE NECESSARY APPROVAL (UKAZANIE) TO ISSUE THE VISA. THE SOVIETS REQUIRE PARTICULARLY CUMBERSOME APPLICATION PROCEDURES, INVOLVING LETTERS OF INVITATION AND NOTES OF SUPPORT FROM THE EMBASSY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, FOR GUESTS OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND FOR PERSONAL EMPLOYEES

SUCH AS NANNIES AND MAIDS. DIPLOMATIC AND SERVICE PERSONNEL RECEIVE MULTIPLE ENTRY VISAS VALID FOR ONE YEAR. SELECTED BUSINESSMEN AND JOURNALISTS ALSO RECEIVE MULTIPLE ENTRY/EXIT VISAS. MOST OTHERS -- EXCHANGE VISITORS, TOURISTS, BUSINESSMEN ON BUYING OR SELLING TRIPS -- RECEIVE A SINGLE ENTRY/SINGLE EXIT VISA. LONG TERM EXCHANGE VISITORS RECEIVE AN ENTRY VISA, AND THEN RECEIVE AN EXIT VISA WHEN THE TIME OF THEIR DEPARTURE GROWS NEAR. BUSINESS OR EXCHANGE VISITORS ON SINGLE ENTRY/EXIT VISAS WHO HAVE TO LEAVE THE USSR AND RETURN CAN OBTAIN EXIT/ENTRY VISAS FROM THEIR LOCAL OVIR THROUGH THE FOREIGN DIVISION OF WHATEVER SOVIET INSTITUTION THEY ARE VISITING.

THE TIME FOR PROCESSING VARIES WIDELY. APPLICATIONS

MADE IN WASHINGTON FOR PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED EMBASSY PERSONNEL MUST BY BILATERAL AGREEMENT BE CONSIDERED IN THREE TO FIVE DAYS. ALL OTHER APPLICATIONS GENERALLY TAKE AT LEAST TWO TO THREE WEEKS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CAN AND DO MAKE EXCEPTIONS WHEN THEY DECIDE THAT RAPID APPROVAL AND ISSUANCE IS IN THEIR INTEREST.

DENIAL OR DELAY IN THE ISSUANCE OF VISAS IS FREQUENT IN CASES INVOLVING GUESTS OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOT BLOOD RELATIVES, THIRD-COUNTRY (I.E., NOT U. S. CITIZEN) NANNIES, AND TDY AND PERMANENT EMBASSY PERSONNEL APPLYING IN THIRD COUNTRY POSTS.

MANY MORE AMERICANS COME TO THE USSR AS TOURISTS THAN SOVIETS GO TO THE U. S. AS TOURISTS. EXCHANGE AND BUSINESS VISITORS ARE GENERALLY MANAGED ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXERCISES A FAR GREATER DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE TRAVEL AND CONTACTS OF ITS BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES. FEWER AMERICANS RECEIVE INVITATIONS OR VISAS TO SOVIET SCIENTIFIC OR ACADEMIC CONFERENCES THAN DO SOVIETS TO U. S. CONFERENCES.

D. EMBASSY/CONSULAR OPERATIONS

ACCESS:

ACCESS TO THE CHANCERY HAS IN THE PAST BEEN CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET MILITIA. WE HAVE RECENTLY INSTALLED

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A MARINE SECURITY GUARD POST AT OUR ENTRANCE AND LIMIT ACCESS TO INDIVIDUALS CARRYING DIPLOMATIC ID'S (EXCEPT THOSE FROM THE EASTERN BLOC) AND SOVIET CITIZENS WHO HAVE THE PROPER SOVIET DOCUMENTATION FOR VISAS.

RESTRICTIONS ON MISSION PUBLICATION ACTIVITIES:

UNDER A RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS WE PUBLISH A RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE MAGAZINE, AMERIKA, FOR DISTRIBUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN FEBRUARY 1980, FOLLOWING USG CONDEMNATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIET PUBLICATIONS AGENCY, SOYUZPECHAT, BEGAN RETURNING TO US 10,000 OF THE 60,000 COPIES OF THE MAGAZINE WE PROVIDE TO THEM EACH MONTH FOR DISTRIBUTION. RETURNS HAVE CONTINUED AT THAT LEVEL SINCE THAT TIME. KIOSK CHECKS BY EMBASSY OFFICERS INDICATE THAT SOYUZPECHAT HAS ARTIFICIALLY CURTAILED DISTRIBUTION WHILE MAINTAINING THAT THE ISSUES ARE UNSOLD BECAUSE READERS HAVE LOST INTEREST IN THE MAGAZINE.

WE ALSO REPRODUCE AN EMBASSY NEWS BULLETIN AND TEXTS OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS FOR DISTRIBUTION TO SOVIET AND DIPLOMATIC RECIPIENTS. IN THE WEEKS FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LODGED A PROTEST WITH US ON THE CONTENT OF THE EMBASSY BULLETINS AND TEXTS, AND 26 SOVIET RECIPIENTS (OF A TOTAL OF 152) ASKED THAT THEY BE TAKEN OFF DISTRIBUTION. ONLY ONE OTHER PROTEST ON THE CONTENTS OF THE BULLETIN HAS BEEN LODGED SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED OTHE SOVIET RECIPIENTS TO OUR LIST FOR A PRESENT TOTAL OF 135.

E. CUSTOMS PRACTICES

ALL IN-COMING AND OUT-GOING OFFICIAL OR DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS FOR THE EMBASSY MUST PASS THROUGH CUSTOMS FOR CLEARANCE. OVERLAND SHIPMENTS ARE CLEARED AT BUTOVA (APPROXIMATELY 30 MILES FROM MOSCOW), WHILE AIR AND RAIL SHIPMENTS ARE CLEARED AT MOSCOW CENTRAL CUSTOMS IN MOSCOW CITY. AIR SHIPMENTS ARE DELIVERED TO CUSTOMS FROM THE AIRPORT BY UPDK. DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED FOR CLEARANCE INCLUDES PACKING LISTS, MANIFESTS, (ISSUED BY SOVIET BORDER CUSTOMS ON OVERLAND SHIPMENTS), WAY BILLS, AND PROOF OF PAYMENT OF ALL HANDLING/ WAREHOUSE CHARGES. CUSTOMS INSPECTIONS OF IN-COMING SHIPMENTS ARE CARRIED OUT IN THE PRESENCE OF AN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE.

ON PERSONAL SHIPMENTS/BAGGAGE, A CUSTOMS DECLARATION IS REQUIRED DESCRIBING CONTENTS OF VALUE SUCH AS CURRENCY AND ITEMS OF ANTIQUE OR ART VALUE. IN ADDITION, A CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY

OF CULTURE IS REQUIRED VERIFYING THAT ITEMS OF ARTISTIC/ANTIQUE VALUE BEING EXPORTED WERE A PART OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S PERSONAL BELONGINGS AT THE TIME OF ORIGINAL IMPORT INTO THE SOVIET UNION.

CLEARANCE OF SHIPMENTS OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS FOR THE NEW EMBASSY OFFICE BUILDING ARE COVERED UNDER A SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN UPDK AND THE EMBASSY WHICH PROVIDES FOR EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING; HOWEVER, THESE SHIPMENTS, MOST OF WHICH ARRIVE IN MOSCOW OVERLAND, MUST STILL BE ROUTED THROUGH THE BUTOVA CUSTOMS CENTER.

F. UNOFFICIAL RESIDENT PRESENCE AND RESTRICTIONS

JOURNALISTS:

THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 20 AMERICAN NEWS ORGANIZATIONS WITH ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES IN MOSCOW. MOST OFFICES ARE STAFFED BY A SINGLE CORRESPONDENT, OTHERS HAVE AS MANY AS FIVE (I.E., UPI AND AP).

OBTAINING VISAS AND ACCREDITATION HAS NOT BEEN A PROBLEM FOR U. S. CORRESPONDENTS RECENTLY, BUT THERE ARE CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES WITH INTERNAL TRAVEL, PERMISSION TO FILM, AND ACCESS TO SOVIETS. PARTICULARLY CHILLING IN ITS EFFECT ON A JOURNALIST'S ACCESS TO SOVIET CITIZENS IS THE DETAINMENT OF CITIZENS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEIR CONVERSATION WITH AN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT. EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE CORRESPONDENT HAS ESCORTED THE SOVIET OUT OF HIS COMPOUND AND SEVERAL BLOCKS DOWN

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THE STREET, THEY HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE MILITIA AND THE SOVIET CITIZEN HAS, ON OCCASION, BEEN DETAINED AS SOON AS HE AND THE AMERICAN PARTED COMPANY.

STUDENTS:

AMERICAN LANGUAGE STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS IN THE USSR NUMBER ABOUT 110. THE NUMBER FOR THE ENTIRE YEAR, INCLUDING SUMMER LANGUAGE STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS, IS 4-500. FIRST ON THE LIST OF PROBLEMS THESE SCHOLARS FACE IS ACCESS TO INFORMATION, I.E., ACCESS TO ARCHIVES AND INDIVIDUALS, AS WELL AS RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRAVEL THAT IS NECESSARY FOR THOROUGH RESEARCH. SECOND, LIVING CONDITIONS ARE HARSH, THOUGH SELDOM WORSE THAN THOSE FACED BY SOVIET STUDENTS. BUT THESE CONDITIONS DO DISCOURAGE FAMILIES OF OUR SCHOLARS FROM COMING; IN ADDITION, DEPENDENTS SOMETIMES HAVE DIFFICULTY OBTAINING VISAS.

BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES:

COMPANY OFFICES HERE ARE CALLED REPRESENTATION OFFICES BECAUSE THEY PERFORM MAINLY A REPRESENTATIVE FUNCTION; THEIR RANGE OF PERMITTED ACTIVITIES IS MUCH NARROWER THAN IT IS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. FOR EXAMPLE: THEY CANNOT TAKE IN MONEY HERE; THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH FTO'S AND NOT WITH ULTIMATE END-USER OF THEIR PRODUCT. AND THEY DO NOT HAVE FREE CHOICE IN HIRING SOVIET EMPLOYEES, BUT MUST PICK FROM WHOMEVER UPDK SENDS TO THEM; INDEED, THEY DO NOT EVEN PAY THEIR SOVIET EMPLOYEES DIRECTLY; BUT INSTEAD HAVE TO PAY THEM THROUGH UPDK.

U. S. FIRMS MAY OBTAIN ONLY ONE MULTIPLE ENTRY VISA PER OFFICE; IF THE COMPANY HAS MORE THAN ONE REPRESENTATIVE, OTHERS MUST GO THROUGH THE VISA PROCESS EACH TIME THEY LEAVE THE COUNTRY. SOVIET INTERNAL TRAVEL CONTROLS APPLY TO BUSINESSMEN AS TO OTHER U. S. PERSONNEL, THOUGH AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN MORE LENIENT IN ALLOWING TRAVEL TO CLOSED AREAS IF CONTRACTED WORK REQUIRES THEIR PRESENCE THERE. APARTMENTS FOR BUSINESSMEN (AS WELL AS FOR OTHER U. S. NON-EMBASSY PERSONNEL) ARE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN AND EXPENSIVE; E.G., APARTMENTS IN NEW APARTMENT BUILDING AT OKTYABRSKAYA SQUARE COST 144 RUBLES PER SQUARE METER PER YEAR. FINALLY, BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES CAN NO LONGER BUY D-COUPONS AND NOW ARE DEPENDENT PRIMARILY UPON THE HARD CURRENCY GASTRONOMES, WHICH ARE NOT WELL STOCKED.

G. ACCESS TO PUBLIC, PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS, MEDIA, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

THE SOVIETS AT PRESENT PROVIDE ONLY EXTREMELY

LIMITED ACCESS FOR US TO GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OFFICIALS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MFA, WHERE WE GENERALLY HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING APPOINTMENTS. (EVEN HERE, HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT AT THE MFA POLISH DESK FOR QUITE SOME TIME.) OUR ACCESS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE IS GENERALLY ALSO FAIRLY GOOD. APPOINTMENTS WITH PARTY OFFICIALS ARE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE. THE AMBASSADOR NORMALLY CAN OBTAIN APPOINTMENTS WITH HIGH-LEVEL DECISION-MAKERS OTHER THAN AT THE MFA OR MFT ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY. OTHER EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE FACED CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLES IN SEEING SOVIET OFFICIALS AT ANY LEVELS IN THE SUPREME SOVIET, MINISTRIES, THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INSTITUTES, AND THE NEWS MEDIA. AN EXCEPTION IS THE USA INSTITUTE, TO WHICH WE HAVE GOOD ACCESS. OFTEN REQUESTS TO SEE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS IN SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS ARE FRUSTRATED BY SOVIET INSISTENCE THAT THE EMBASSY OFFICER MEET INSTEAD WITH AN OFFICIAL OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION.

OCCASIONALLY OFFICIALS WILL AGREE TO A MEETING IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WILL ASK THE EMBASSY TO REQUEST MFA APPROVAL. SUCH REQUESTS FOR MFA APPROVAL HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED IN EARLY 1980. OUR DEFENSE ATTACHES ARE DENIED ALL CONTACT OTHER THAN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE'S AUTHORIZED OFFICE, UVS. AMERICAN SCHOLARS

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AND HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS ARE GENERALLY NOT GIVEN THE SAME LEVEL OF ACCESS EXTENDED TO THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS VISITING THE U. S., THOUGH VISITING SCIENTISTS, ESPECIALLY PROMINENT ONES, USUALLY ARE ABLE TO SEE THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS.

H. DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

SOVIET PRACTICE ON DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES HAS GENERALLY CONFORMED TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. A BILATERAL AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN 1968, AS REAFFIRMED IN AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES IN 1978, EXTENDS DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES TO ALL U. S. CITIZENS AMONG THE EMBASSY'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES. A 1972 AGREEMENT ON THE NEW OFFICE BUILDING EXTENDS THESE PRIVILEGES TO UP TO 50 PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECT. EXCEPT FOR A FEW INSTANCES OF CUSTOMS SEARCHES, SOVIET PRACTICE HAS CONFORMED TO THE INTENT OF THE AGREEMENTS. THESE AGREEMENTS DO NOT COVER CONSULATE GENERALPERSONNEL, WHO ARE COVERED BY A BILATERAL CONSULAR CONVENTION SIGNED IN 1965 WHICH EXTENDS TO THEM THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES PROVIDED DIPLOMATS BY THE VIENNA CONVENTION.

I. MARITIME ACTIVITIES

MARITIME ACTIVITIES ARE GOVERNED BY THE U. S.-SOVIET TREATY ON MARITIME MATTERS. (THIS TREATY IS SCHEDULED TO EXPIRE DECEMBER 31, 1981, BUT INITIAL CONTACTS TOWARD RENEGOTIATION HAVE BEEN MADE.) THE TREATY LISTS 40 PORTS IN EACH COUNTRY, ACCESS TO WHICH IS OPEN TO ALL COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME TRAINING AND RESEARCH VESSELS OF THE OTHER COUNTRY SUBJECT TO FOUR DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE. CALLS BY THE LATTER ARE RESTRICTED TO PROVISIONING, REPAIRS, REST OR REPLACEMENT OF CREWS, AND BUNKERING. VISAS ARE REQUIRED FOR GOING ASHORE AND MUST BE REQUESTED 7 DAYS IN ADVANCE. CREW MEMBERS NOT ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS MUST RETURN TO SHIP BY 2400.
HARTMAN

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11/13/81 - "Reciprocity MTC."

(Reciprocal Actions Working Group) - FICE
UNDER

↓
(Get Map pertaining to closed travel)
Reciprocity 68

a) "Closed Area Map" -

b) Sov. Request to Travel to Seattle (Nov. 15)

Events correlated w/ travel to particular areas

(That is, travelling to those areas & vicinity of sig. mil. maneuvers, tests, etc.)

- (i) Limitation of time frame notification (Delay our notif. time) / in USSR (2 day)

(seeking to prioritize those areas interested in closing off / seeking authorization to close off)

(item - req. to getting out guy related to fisheries in Seattle) - / have concerns w/ request to travel to Seattle

Coordinated

① Press Statements - on Aid to Poland / Pres.'s concurrence

② Romania - visit of mil. man

③ (Fisheries Agreement) - check.

④ Seattle / Los Angeles - seeking to close the map.

⑤ Rear Admiral Williams (1 star) - Kracmer

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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E.O. 12065: RDS 11/1-/01 (SCANLAN, JOHN D.)
TAGS NATO, PEPR, PDIP, UR, US

SUBJECT: NATO COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROCIITY
PRACTICES.

REF: USNATO 6809.

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL, FOLLOWING AMPLIFICATIONS ON
U.S. RECIPROCIITY POLICY ARE PROVIDED:

(A) INTERNAL TRAVEL CONTROLS.

THE FREE TRAVEL ZONE FOR SOVIET OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSISTS OF AN AREA CIRCUMSCRIBED BY
A CIRCLE TWENTY-FIVE MILES IN RADIUS FROM A CENTRAL
DOWNTOWN POINT. IN NEW YORK, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CIRCLE
IS CENTERED ON COLUMBUS CIRCLE, AND IN WASHINGTON, ON
THE ELLIPSE. BECAUSE OF CLOSED AREAS WHICH INTRUDE
INSIDE THE CIRCLES AND EXTENSIVE AREAS OF WATER WHICH
ARE INCORPORATED, NONE OF THE FREE TRAVEL ZONES ARE AS
LARGE AS A PERFECT CIRCLE WITH A 25-MILE RADIUS WOULD
BE. AROUND WASHINGTON, FOR EXAMPLE, PORTIONS OF THE
MARYLAND COUNTIES OF HOWARD, ANNE ARUNDEL AND CALVERT

AND THE VIRGINIA COUNTIES OF CHARLES AND PRINCE WILLIAM
ARE CLOSED, EVEN THOUGH THEY LIE WITHIN THE 25 MILE
RADIUS. IN SAN FRANCISCO, THE PROBLEM IS SO SEVERE
BECAUSE OF CLOSED AREAS AND VAST WATER AREAS WITHIN THE
CIRCLE THAT THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL FREE TRAVEL ZONE TO
THE SOUTH OF THE CITY BEYOND THE 25-MILE CIRCLE.

--NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO TRAVEL TO OPEN AREAS
OUTSIDE THE FREE TRAVEL ZONE IS MADE BY DIPLOMATIC
NOTE. IN NEW YORK, NOTES MUST BE FILED 48 HOURS IN
ADVANCE. IN SAN FRANCISCO AND WASHINGTON, NOTES MUST
BE FILED 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE IF THE TRAVEL IS TO THE
STATES OF NEW JERSEY, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND, WEST
VIRGINIA, VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA,
GEORGIA, ALABAMA, TENNESSEE, AND CALIFORNIA. THERE IS
ALSO A 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR TRAVEL
BETWEEN THE CITIES OF WASHINGTON, SAN FRANCISCO, AND
NEW YORK. OTHERWISE, NOTIFICATION MUST BE MADE 48
HOURS IN ADVANCE.

BY CAJ NARA DATE 1/2/08
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--TRAVEL TO CLOSED AREAS IS BY SPECIAL PERMISSION ONLY,
AND MUST BE REQUESTED BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE 48 HOURS IN
ADVANCE.

--THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, HIS FAMILY, CHAUFFEUR, AND
INTERPRETER MAY TRAVEL TO ANY OPEN AREAS IN THE U.S.
WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION.

--TRAVEL TO OPEN AREAS IS GENERALLY PERMITTED AS A
MATTER OF COURSE, BUT MAY BE DENIED FOR APPROPRIATE
REASONS, OR IF SIMILAR TRAVEL BY U.S. OFFICIALS IN THE
SOVIET UNION HAS RECENTLY BEEN DENIED. THE REASON FOR
SUCH DENIAL IS NEARLY ALWAYS GIVEN (AS IN THE SOVIET
UNION) AS "DENIED FOR REASONS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE."
TRAVEL TO CLOSED AREAS IS GENERALLY DENIED UNLESS AN
EMERGENCY EXISTS, OR UNLESS PERMISSION HAS BEEN
RECENTLY GRANTED TO A U.S. OFFICIAL IN THE SOVIET UNION
TO VISIT A CLOSED AREA.

--WHEN SPEAKING OF A 24- (OR 48-) HOUR ADVANCE
NOTIFICATION, WE REQUIRE A FULL WORKING DAY (OR TWO) TO
INTERVENE BETWEEN THE DAY THE NOTE IS RECEIVED AND THE
DATE THE TRAVEL IS SUPPOSED TO BEGIN. THUS,
NOTIFICATION OF ROUTINE TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON
FREE ZONE TO AN OPEN AREA IN VIRGINIA MUST BE RECEIVED
BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON MONDAY IF THE TRAVEL IS TO BE
MADE ON WEDNESDAY. IF THE TRAVEL WERE TO THE MIDWEST
OR TO A CLOSED AREA, THE NOTIFICATION WOULD HAD TO HAVE
BEEN RECEIVED ON FRIDAY SO THAT TWO

FULL WORKING DAYS (MONDAY AND TUESDAY) COULD INTERVENE
BEFORE WEDNESDAY.

--THE SAME TRAVEL REGULATIONS APPLY TO DIPLOMATS

ACCREDITED TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THOSE ACCREDITED
TO THE UNITED NATIONS. TRAVEL REGULATIONS DO NOT APPLY
TO SOVIETS EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT,
DUE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

--STUDENTS, BUSINESSMEN, OR TOURISTS ARE LIMITED TO THE
ITINERARY OUTLINED IN THEIR ORIGINAL VISA APPLICATION
AND MAY NOT GO MORE THAN 25 MILES OUTSIDE THE CITY OR
CITIES OF DESTINATION. ANY ALTERATION MUST BE APPROVED
IN ADVANCE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

--THE SAME REGULATIONS APPLY TO MILITARY ATTACHE TRAVEL
AS APPLY TO SOVIET DIPLOMATS. THE REGULATIONS HAVE
BEEN WORKED OUT IN JOINT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET
MILITARY ATTACHES FILE THEIR TRAVEL NOTES WITH THE DOD
OFFICE THAT HANDLES LIAISON WITH THE FOREIGN ATTACHES,
NOT WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THAT SAME DOD OFFICE
APPROVES OR DISAPPROVES THEIR TRAVEL. THE SAME METHOD
OF FILING APPLIES IN THE SOVIET UNION. WE KNOW OF NO
SIGNIFICANT INSTANCES WHERE THE TWO DEPARTMENTS HAVE
INTERPRETED THE TRAVEL REGULATIONS IN A DIFFERENT
MANNER.

B. DIPLOMATIC AND NON-DIPLOMATIC STAFFING LEVELS

THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE APPROXIMATE, SINCE THEY
CHANGE FROM DAY TO DAY.

--THERE IS A CEILING OF 320 ON ALL SOVIET DIPLOMATS,
CONSULS, AND ASSOCIATED STAFF EMPLOYEES IN DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENTS ACCREDITED TO THE UNITED
STATES. THE CEILING DOES NOT IMPOSE ANY SUBCEILING ON
THE NUMBER OF CATEGORIES THAT CAN FALL WITHIN THAT
GROUP. THE ONLY LIMITATION WITHIN THE 320 IS THAT

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THERE MAY BE NO MORE THAN 40 POSITIONS AT THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN SAN FRANCISCO. THIS FIGURE IS BASED ON AN AGREED RATIO OF 1.5 SOVIET POSITIONS IN SAN FRANCISCO TO ONE AMERICAN POSITION IN LENINGRAD. THIS STAFFING DIFFERENCE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN POLICY OF HIRING LOCAL EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING SOVIETS, IN NON-SENSITIVE JOBS, WHEREAS THE SOVIETS HIRE ONLY SOVIETS FOR JOBS WITHIN THEIR EMBASSY.

--THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IS BASED ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY SOVIETS TO THE PROTOCOL OFFICE:

. --DIPLOMATS (GENERAL AND MISC)	77
. --DIPLOMATS (TRADE REPS)	2
. --DIPLOMATS (PRESS)	5
. --DIPLOMATS (INFORMATION)	4
. --DIPLOMATS (CULTURAL)	5
. --DIPLOMATS (SCIENCE AND TECH)	7
. --DIPLOMATS (FISHERIES)	2
. --CONSULS (WASHINGTON)	11
. --CONSULS (SAN FRANCISCO)	21
. --MILITARY ATTACHES	20
. --EMPLOYEES (WASHINGTON)	125
. --EMPLOYEES (SAN FRANCISCO)	15

THE TOTAL OF ALL EMPLOYEES AND DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED TO THE U.S. IS WELL UNDER THE 320 CEILING, AND HAS NOT BEEN CLOSE TO THAT NUMBER SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF 1980.

--THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS ACCREDITED TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK:

. --DIPLOMATS	105
. --EMPLOYEES	110

--IN ADDITION, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 240 SOVIETS EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT IN NEW YORK.

--THE FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE FOR U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE SOVIET UNION:

DIPLOMATS	48		
FS STAFF	36		
MARINE GUARDS	26		
SEABEES	2		
NON-GOV'T CONTRACTORS	6		
COMMERCE	1	SECRETARY	1
ICA	8	SECRETARY	5
AGRICULTURE	3	SECRETARY	1
DEFENSE ATTACHES	30		
	---	--	
	160	7	167

LENINGRAD			
FSO	7		
FS STAFF	8		
MARINE GUARDS	6		
SEABEE	1		
ICA	1	SECRETARY	1
	---	--	
	23	1	24

(C) VISA PRACTICES

--PROCESSING TIME FOR NON-DIPLOMATIC VISAS VARIES DEPENDING ON THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP, THE NUMBER OF TRAVELLERS, THE ITINERARY, ETC., AND ON THE TIME TO

OBTAIN CLEARANCES FROM OTHER AGENCIES. UNDER THE MCGOVERN AMENDMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE-MUST-SEEK A WAIVER UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT WITHIN 30 DAYS FOR INELIGIBILITIES DUE TO COMMUNIST AFFILIATION.

--PROCESSING TIME FOR BUSINESS VISAS IS 3 WEEKS, ALTHOUGH US WILL TRY TO EXPEDITE ISSUANCE IF-US COMMERCIAL INTERESTS SO REQUEST. --

--VALIDITY PERIODS:

- . DIPLOMATS/STAFF (A-1/A-2) - 12 MOS, MULTIPLE ENTRY
- . JOURNALISTS - 12 MONTHS, MULTIPLE ENTRY - -
- . COMMERCIAL REPS - 3 MONTHS
- . SAILORS - 2 YEARS, MULTIPLE ENTRY

IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE VALIDITY PERIOD OF THE VISA IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PROPOSED LENGTH OFSTAY. THE VISA REPRESENTS THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE HOLDER CAN PRESENT HIMSELF AT THE U.S. BORDER TO APPLY FOR - ADMISSION INTO THE COUNTRY. THE LENGTH OF ACTUAL STY IS DETERMINED BY THE I.N.S. UPON ARRIVAL. THUS - DIPLOMATS MUST APPLY TO ENTER WITHIN THE 12-MONTH VALIDITY PERIOD, BUT ONCE HERE ARE GRANTED-A STAY FOR THE DURATION OF THEIR TOUR. THEY MAY LEAVE AND RETURN AS OFTEN AS THEY WISH DURING THAT 12 MONTHS, BUT AFTER THE VISA EXPIRES, IT MUST BE REVALIDATED BEFORE THEY-CAN REENTER. - - -

(F) UNOFFICIAL RESIDENCE PRESENCE AND RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON PERSONAL AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES:

--THERE ARE 36 SOVIET NEWSMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THE SOVIETS HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A SIMILAR NUMBER OF AMERICAN NEWSMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION. - IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE U.S. HAS BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ENOUGH NEWS ORGANIZATIONS WHO ARE WILLING TO PUT;UP WITH THE EXPENSE AND BOTHER OF MAINTAINING A RESIDENT CORRESPONDENT IN MOSCOW. SEVERAL NEWS ORGANIZATIONS PREFER MULTIPLE ENTRY/EXIT VISAS FOR CORRESPONDENTS BASED OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. SO IN FACT, THE U.S.

HAS ONLY ABOUT 20 NEWSMEN ACTUALLY RESIDENT IN THE USSR, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE PROVISIONS FOR 36.

--THERE ARE 82 REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMERCIAL SOVIET ENTERPRISES IN THE U.S. (INCLUDING BELARUS TRACTOR, AMTORG, AEROFLOT, INTOURIST).

--THERE IS NO OVERALL LIMIT ON STUDENTS, BUT IN SOME PROGRAMS NUMBERS ARE LIMITED BY RECIPROCITY TO REQUIRE THAT THERE BE NO MORE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS THAN AMERICAN.

(H) DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES:

--BY RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT, EMBASSY STAFF MEMBERS, CONSULS, AND CONSULAR EMPLOYEES OF BOTH COUNTRIES ARE ENTITLED TO PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES EQUIVALENT TO THOSE ACCORDED DIPLOMATS UNDER THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

(I) MARITIME ACTIVITIES

A. US PORT ACCESS

OVERVIEW

(1) PORT ACCESS BY SOVIET COMMERCIAL MARITIME, MERCHANT MARINE TRAINING, AND NON-FISHERY RESEARCH VESSELS (OCEANOGRAPHIC, HYDROGRAPHIC, ETC.) IS GOVERNED BY THE 1975 MARITIME AGREEMENT (MA).

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. (2) PORT ACCESS BY SOVIET FISHERIES VESSELS (FISHING, FISHERY SUPPORT, AND FISHERIES RESEARCH) IS GOVERNED BY THE 1976 FISHERIES AGREEMENT (GIFA) WHICH EXPIRES IN 1982.

. (3) PORT ACCESS BY SOVIET FISHERIES RESEARCH VESSELS IS HANDLED ON A 14-DAY ADVANCE REQUEST BASIS.

. (4) PORT ACCESS BY SOVIET WARSHIPS IS NOT GOVERNED BY A SPECIFIC BILATERAL AGREEMENT. ACCESS TO ALL US PORTS BY SOVIET WARSHIPS IS SUBJECT TO 14-DAY ADVANCE NOTICE REQUEST, BASED ON RELEVANT US LAW.

. DETAIL

. (1A) SOVIET MERCHANT AND NON-FISHERY RESEARCH VESSELS -- SOVIET REQUESTS FOR PORT CALLS BY MERCHANT VESSELS ARE ADDRESSED TO THE US COAST GUARD. 40 US PORTS LISTED IN ANNEX I OF THE MA ARE OPEN TO SOVIET VESSEL TYPES NOTED ABOVE ON A 4-DAY ADVANCE NOTICE BASIS. THE SOLE BASIS

FOR US DENIAL OF SUCH A SOVIET PORT CALL REQUEST IS FAILURE TO RESPECT THE 4-DAY ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENT.

. (1B) ALL OTHER US PORTS ARE HANDLED ON A 14-DAY ADVANCE REQUEST OR US DISCRETIONARY BASIS, I.E., THE SOVIETS ARE OBLIGED TO MAKE A PORT CALL REQUEST AT LEAST 14 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE DESIRED ENTRY DATE AND THE US RESERVES THE RIGHT TO REJECT THE REQUEST. STATE DECIDES WHETHER TO APPROVE THE REQUEST IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES BELONGING TO THE PORT SECURITY COMMITTEE (DEFENSE, TRANSPORTATION, COAST GUARD). A REQUESTED PORT CALL MAY BE REJECTED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, POLITICAL, OR LOGISTICAL REASONS.

. (1C) SOVIET REQUESTS FOR PORT CALLS BY RESEARCH VESSELS (NON-FISHERY AND FISHERY) ARE ADDRESSED TO STATE. NON-FISHERY RESEARCH VESSELS ARE GOVERNED BY MA PROVISIONS NOTED ABOVE. THOUGH AN ANOMOLY, WE REQUIRE THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE 14 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE FOR ALL RESEARCH VESSEL PORT CALL REQUESTS. WHEN USG RESEARCH INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY A SOVIET PORT CALL OR IF THE PORT REQUESTED IS AN ANNEX I PORT, THE PORT CALL REQUEST IS APPROVED. SINCE AFGHANISTAN, PORT CALL REQUESTS TO REQUEST PORTS THAT WOULD SOLELY BENEFIT THE USSR HAVE BEEN REJECTED.

. (1D) THE US WILL SHORTLY ENTER INTO RENEGOTIATION OF THE MA WHICH EXPIRES 12/31/81. THE US INTENDS TO CHANGE SEVERAL MILITARILY-SENSITIVE PORTS FROM "NOTICE" TO "REQUEST" STATUS, POSSIBLY TREATING THEM AS DE FACTO "CLOSED." SOME REQUEST PORTS ALREADY HAVE CLOSED STATUS, I.E., THE COAST GUARD ROUTINELY DENIES SOVIET REQUESTS TO CALL AT SUCH PORTS.

. (2A) SOVIET FISHERIES VESSELS -- DESIGNATED PORTS, I.E., 7 US PORTS LISTED IN ANNEX III OF THE GIFA, ARE OPEN ON A 4-DAY ADVANCE NOTICE BASIS TO SOVIET FISHING OR FISHERIES SUPPORT VESSELS THAT HAVE A US PERMIT TO OPERATE IN THE US FISHERIES CONSERVATION ZONE OF 200 MILES. ACCESS TO OTHER PORTS IS ON A 14-DAY REQUEST BASIS FOR SUCH VESSELS.

. (2B) PORT CALLS BY SOVIET FISHERIES VESSELS HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY LESS FREQUENT SINCE 1980. FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE USSR HAS NOT RECEIVED A US FISHING ALLOCATION. PORT ACCESS HAS BEEN

LIMITED TO A SMALL NUMBER OF SOVIET FISH PROCESSING SHIPS LEASED TO A SOVIET-AMERICAN PRIVATE JOINT VENTURE WHICH HAVE RECEIVED US FISHING PERMITS, AS WELL AS TO A

FEW SOVIET FISHERIES RESEARCH VESSELS ENGAGED IN COOPERATIVE RESEARCH WITH US AGENCIES.

. B. PORT FACILITIES

. (1A) SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE TRAINING AND NON-FISHERIES RESEARCH VESSELS, AS DEFINED IN THE MA, CAN ENTER US PORTS TO "REPLENISH SHIPS' STORES OR FRESH WATER, OBTAIN BUNKERS, PROVIDE REST FOR OR MAKE CHANGES IN THE PERSONNEL OF SUCH VESSELS, AND OBTAIN MINOR REPAIRS AND OTHER SERVICES NORMALLY PROVIDED IN SUCH PORTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS."

. (1B) THE US INTENDS TO RENEGOTIATE THIS PROVISION OF THE MA AND LIMIT A GIVEN SOVIET PORT CALL TO 7 CALENDAR DAYS, AS WELL AS LIMIT PERMISSIBLE REPAIRS TO THOSE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE SEAWORTHINESS AND OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY OF A VESSEL. THIS IS DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE ANY FURTHER SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO INITIATE LONG-TERM CONTRACTUAL REPAIR CONTRACTS WITH US FIRMS. SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ENHANCE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES.

. (2A) THE MA DOES NOT DELIMIT, AS ABOVE, THE PORT FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO SOVIET COMMERCIAL VESSELS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS INHIBIT THE SOVIETS FROM MISUSING MERCHANT MARINE ACCESS TO US PORT FACILITIES.

. (2B) A MEMO ON US PORT PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN SHIPS IN GENERAL ADVISES THE SOVIETS THAT ITS COMMERCIAL VESSELS CAN "NORMALLY OBTAIN BUNKERS, FOOD, MEDICAL GOODS, OTHER CONSUMABLE SUPPLIES, AND SPARE AND REPLACEMENT PARTS NECESSARY FOR MAINTAINING AND OPERATING A VESSEL."

. (2C) BUNKERING AT US PORTS IS DENIED TO VESSELS THAT HAVE CALLED AT NORTH KOREAN, VIETNAMESE, OR CAMBODIAN PORTS WITHIN 180 DAYS.

. (2D) VALIDATED EXPORT LICENSES ARE REQUIRED FOR THE SALE OF SPARE AND REPLACEMENT PARTS TO VISITING SOVIET VESSELS AND FOR THE SERVICING OF US-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT ABOARD THESE VESSELS.

. (3) SOVIET VESSELS GOVERNED BY THE GIFA CAN ENTER "DESIGNATED PORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH US LAWS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASING BAIT, SUPPLIES, OR OUTFITS, OR EFFECTING REPAIRS, ..."

. C. US CONTROL

. (1) ANNEX III TO THE MA REFERS TO THE RIGHT OF THE US COAST GUARD TO BOARD AND SEARCH "EACH SOVIET VESSEL, EXCEPT STATE-OWNED VESSELS, NOT IN COMMERCIAL SERVICE AND EXCEPT VESSELS INVOLVED IN INNOCENT PASSAGE, ENTERING US TERRITORIAL WATERS."

. (2) WHILE THE GIFA DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE ON THIS POINT, US COAST GUARD INSPECTION AUTHORITY DERIVES FROM THE MAGNUSON ACT OF 1950.

. D. OFFICER & CREW PORT MOVEMENT

. (1) IF A US CREW LIST VISA HAS BEEN OBTAINED FOR THE SOVIET VESSEL (ROUTINE FOR MERCHANT SHIPS), THE

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OFFICERS AND CREW ARE PERMITTED ASHORE. THE VISA REQUIRES THEM TO LEAVE THE US BY THE SAME SHIP. THERE ARE NO PARTICULAR RESTRICTIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CREW AND OFFICERS ONCE ASHORE. IF NO CREW LIST VISA HAS BEEN OBTAINED (TYPICAL WITH RESEARCH VESSELS), THEN A MAXIMUM OF 5 OFFICERS WILL BE ALLOWED ASHORE TO CONDUCT OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

5. NSWP RECIPROCITY.

WITH REGARD TO SUGGESTION PARA 5 REFTEL THAT SUBMISSIONS ALSO BE MADE CONCERNING RECIPROCITY AND NSWP COUNTRIES, DEPARTMENT IS STILL CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION AND WILL ADVISE YOU OF ITS VIEWS SEPTEL.
CLARK
BT

3. BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

FOLLOWING THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, THE U.S. MADE DEEP CUTS IN OUR EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE DID NOT ABROGATE ANY AGREEMENTS HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE CONTINUED A LIMITED NUMBER OF LOW-LEVEL ROUTINE EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES.

THERE ARE NOW 11 AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FIELD (AGRICULTURE, ARTIFICIAL HEART, ATOMIC ENERGY, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, HOUSING, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SPACE, TRANSPORTATION AND WORLD OCEANS). ACTIVITIES UNDER THESE AGREEMENTS ARE CURRENTLY RUNNING AT ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF THE PRE-AFGHANISTAN LEVEL.

CURRENT POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT LEVEL AND MIX OF EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES, PROCEEDING WITH THOSE PROGRAMS WHICH ARE BENEFICIAL TO US OR WHICH HAVE A CLEARLY HUMANITARIAN CONTENT. WE FAVOR KEEPING THE MACHINERY BASICALLY INTACT AND ARE PREPARED TO RENEW THOSE AGREEMENTS IN THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FIELD WHICH

HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO US. HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS AND HIGHLY VISIBLE ACTIVITIES ARE BEING AVOIDED.

IN THE CULTURAL FIELD, EXCHANGES HAVE COME TO A STANDSTILL, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RECIPROCAL DISTRIBUTION OF EACH COUNTRY'S ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE (AN EXCHANGE WHICH IS VERY MUCH IN OUR FAVOR). WE CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE GENERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT WHICH EXPIRED AT THE END OF 1979. (MOST ACTIVITIES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT -- SUCH AS OUR EXHIBITS IN THE U.S.S.R. -- WERE IN OUR FAVOR.)

4. ENFORCEMENT

CLEARLY, MUCH OF OUR ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY OF THE ABOVE-LISTED RESTRICTIONS CONSISTS OF CAREFUL AND CONTINUOUS RECORD-KEEPING. FOR INSTANCE, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR CEILING AT 320, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE KEEPS AN ACCURATE DAY-TO-DAY COUNT OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN THIS COUNTRY AND OF VISAS ISSUED TO NEW ARRIVALS. WE CEASE ISSUING VISAS TO NEW SOVIET EMBASSY EMPLOYEES WHEN THE NUMBER OF ISSUED VISAS PLUS SOVIETS ALREADY ON STATION REACHES 320, UNLESS THE SOVIETS PROVIDE, AT THE TIME OF THE ADDITIONAL VISA APPLICATION, THE NAME OF A PERSON WHO IS DUE TO LEAVE.

HOWEVER, CERTAIN OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE ASPECTS OF OUR ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES INVOLVE OTHER PROCEDURES AND OTHER AGENCIES WHICH, WHILE THEY MIGHT BE GUESSED AT BY OUR ALLIES, NEED NOT BE CONFIRMED. IN EACH CASE WHERE A RESTRICTION IS PLACED ON THE SOVIETS, AT LEAST ONE, IF NOT SEVERAL, SOLUTIONS COME TO MIND AS MEANS OF ENFORCING THAT RESTRICTION. WE FEEL THAT THE ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE INDIVIDUAL ALLIES AND WE WOULD PREFER THAT ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES (OTHER THAN RECORD KEEPING) NOT BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2042
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 07300
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/23/91 (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY) OR-M
TAGS: NATO, GW, UR, PEPR, CSCE
SUBJECT: (C) NATO COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROcity
- PRACTICES -- SUPPLEMENTARY FRG CONTRIBUTIONS

REF: USNATO 6578 (NOTAL)

1. (C) - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THERE FOLLOWS TEXTS OF PAPERS RECENTLY
CIRCULATED BY FRG DEL, SUPPLEMENTING EARLIER GERMAN
SUBMISSION FOR NATO COMPENDIUM ON NATIONAL RECIPROcity
PRACTICES (REFTEL). INTER ALIA, PAPERS NOTE (A)
PROBLEMS FRG HAS EXPERIENCED IN CUSTOMS CLEARANCE AREA
AND GERMAN PLANS TO TAKE COUNTER MEASURES; (B)
THE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE
USSR FOR GERMAN JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN, STUDENTS
AND SCIENTISTS; AND (C) BONN'S CRITICISM OF
MOSCOW'S IMPLEMENTATION OF VIENNA CONVENTION OBLIGA-
TIONS, PARTICULARLY ARTICLES 25 AND 26 (PROVISION
OF FULL FACILITIES FOR PERFORMANCE OF THE FUNCTIONS
OF A DIPLOMATIC MISSION; FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND
TRAVEL). END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT: GENERAL, SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER ON
RECIPROcity

SUBJECT: RECIPROcity IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

COMPLICATIONS IN THE CUSTOMS CLEARANCE PROCEDURE OF
REMOVAL ITEMS AND OFFICIAL CONSIGNMENTS FOR THE
GERMAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND ITS STAFF MEMBERS -
THE CORRESPONDING PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY.

1. FOR 25 YEARS, REMOVAL ITEMS AND FREIGHT
CONSIGNMENTS FOR OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN
CLEARED BY THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW WITH-
OUT ANY MAJOR PROBLEM. SINCE MID-1980, CUSTOMS
CLEARANCE HAS NOW TAKEN PLACE IN A TOWN ABOUT 30
KMS OUTSIDE OF MOSCOW; THE PROCEDURE IS IN MANY
CASES VEXATIOUS, TIME-CONSUMING AND COSTLY.
ESPECIALLY, IT IS NOW NECESSARY FOR THE CONSIGNMENTS
TO BE UNLOADED, STORED AGAINST PAYMENT AND
SUBJECTED TO THOROUGH INSPECTION; ONLY THEN ARE
THEY RELEASED FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION. IN ADDITION,
THE MEMBERS OF OUR EMBASSY NOW HAVE TO PRODUCE
HIGHLY DETAILED INVENTORY LISTS IN RUSSIAN,
INDICATING THE VALUES OF EACH INDIVIDUAL ITEM AS
THESE ARE OTHERWISE LIABLE TO CONFISCATION ON
RE-EXPORT.

2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS NEW PRACTICE CONSIST
IN A MAJOR COST INCREASE, SECURITY PROBLEMS
(POSSIBILITY OF ACCESS AND MANIPULATION IN THE CASE
OF OFFICIAL ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT)
AS WELL AS CONSIDERABLE ANNOYANCE AMONG EMBASSY
STAFF MEMBERS. AS A RESULT OF INTERVENTIONS
AT STATE SECRETARY AND MINISTERIAL LEVEL, THE SOVIET
AUTHORITIES AT FIRST MODIFIED THEIR PRACTICE AT
THE BEGINNING OF 1981, PROBABLY FEARING THAT
THE EMBASSY MIGHT ADOPT GO-SLOW PRACTICES IN THE
GRANTING OF THE 18,000 VISAS ANNUALLY FOR SOVIET
EXPORTS BY LORRY.

3. HOWEVER, SINCE THE BEGINNING OF MAY 1981, THE
SOVIET CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES HAVE AGAIN INSISTED
THAT THE REMOVAL AND SUPPLY ITEMS OF THE GERMAN
EMBASSY SHOULD BE STORED. REPEATED DEMARCHES
BY THE EMBASSY AGAINST THIS RENEWED HARASSMENT
HAVE SO FAR ONLY HAD THE RESULT THAT THE
STORAGE PERIOD WAS REDUCED TO 24 HOURS. HOWEVER,
WE CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE THAT THIS PERIOD WILL
AGAIN BE EXTENDED STEP BY STEP TO SEVERAL DAYS.
IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED COST, THE DANGER OF
PILFERAGE AND DAMAGE AND ESPECIALLY UNDER
SECURITY ASPECTS, THE STORAGE OF THESE CONSIGNMENTS
EVEN FOR SHORT PERIODS IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE
SOVIET STATEMENT THAT THIS PROCEDURE APPLIES TO
ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS DOES NOT SATISFY US.

4. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO TAKE
ADEQUATE AND SPECIFIC COUNTERMEASURES; IT SHOULD,

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BY Cid NARA DATE 1/2/05

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SAL-01 ACDA-12 ICAE-00 SP-02 SPRS-02 /069 W

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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2043
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 07300

HOWEVER, BE BORNE IN MIND THAT, COMPARED WITH THE SOVIET POSSIBILITIES, OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IS RELATIVELY LIMITED. MOREOVER, THESE MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN IN A GRADUATED MANNER. WE ARE CONSIDERING TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTION:

- WORK TO RULE,
 - DETAILED INSPECTION OF GOODS TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
 - CUSTOMS CLEARANCE AT A MORE REMOTE PLACE, WHICH WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHIN THE AREA OF THE COLOGNE CUSTOMS DISTRICT.
- STORAGE FOR CONTROL PURPOSES, WHICH WOULD BE AN EXACT RETALIATION TO THE SOVIET PRACTICE, IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER GERMAN CUSTOMS LEGISLATION.

5. THE FIRST OF THE MEASURES LISTED ABOVE HAS MEANWHILE BEEN TAKEN. WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, THE DOCUMENTS ACCOMPANYING CONSIGNMENTS FOR SOVIET MISSIONS AND THEIR MEMBERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (COMMODITY LISTS, CUSTOMS DECLARATION FORMS, AUTHORITY TO SIGN CUSTOMS DOCUMENTS ETC.) ARE SUBJECTED TO DETAILED VERIFICATION. THE RESULTING DELAYS HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED. MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET MISSIONS WHO WISH TO BE INFORMED OF THE REASON FOR THE DETAILED VERIFICATION ARE TOLD TO APPROACH THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. NO USE IS BEING MADE FOR THE TIME BEING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF INTENSIFIED CONTROLS OF THE COMMODITIES AS SUCH.

6. THE RESPONSIBLE GERMAN CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SUBMIT REPORTS BY MID-OCTOBER 1981 SHOWING THE AMOUNT OF GOODS CLEARED FOR FREE USE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND WHAT HAS BEEN THE REACTION TO THE MORE DETAILED VERIFICATION OF THE ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS. A COMPREHENSIVE INTERIM REPORT BY THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF FINANCE WILL SHORTLY BE AVAILABLE.

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TREATMENT OF GERMAN JOURNALISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

7. THE LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF GERMAN JOURNALISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE COMPARED WITH THOSE ENJOYED BY SOVIET CORRESPONDENTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. IT SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE REALIZED THAT SOME OF THE COMPLICATIONS RESULT FROM THE GENERAL LIVING CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN THE SOVIET UNION. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY TO THE TIME-CONSUMING PROBLEM OF FINDING ACCOMMODATION, WHERE SOVIET HELP IS STRICTLY LIMITED, AS WELL AS TO THE SATISFACTORY SUPPLY OF FOOD AND CONSUMER GOODS. THE DIPLOMATIC PURCHASING FACILITIES SO

FAR ALSO ENJOYED BY JOURNALISTS WERE WITHDRAWN THIS SUMMER; THE SEARCH FOR SUBSTITUTE SOLUTIONS HAS SO FAR NOT LED TO A SATISFACTORY RESULT.

8. WORKING CONDITIONS ARE RENDERED VERY DIFFICULT BY FAR-REACHING RESTRICTIONS ON THE PROCUREMENT OF INFORMATION WHICH IS NORMALLY LIMITED TO GENERALLY ACCESSIBLE PUBLICATIONS, THE COMPLICATED PROCEDURES FOR THE GRANTING OF THE NECESSARY FILM PERMITS AND BY THE LIMITATIONS ON PERSONAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. VISITS TO PLACES OUTSIDE MOSCOW HAVE TO BE REGISTERED WEEKS IN ADVANCE, AND IT REMAINS UNCERTAIN FOR LONG PERIODS WHETHER AUTHORIZATION WILL BE GRANTED. THE ENTRANCES TO THE MOSCOW STUDIOS OF ARD AND ZDF (FIRST AND SECOND GERMAN TV PROGRAMMES) ARE GUARDED. THE USE OF SOVIET TELEVISION CIRCUITS BY ZDF AND ARD HAS BEEN REFUSED IN SOME CASES ON THE BASIS OF MORE OR LESS CREDIBLE "TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES".

9. SOVIET PRESS ATTACKS ON GERMAN CORRESPONDENTS IN MOSCOW LIKE THOSE WHICH OCCURRED BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN OCTOBER 1980 HAVE NOT BEEN REPEATED. THE REFUSAL OF ENTRY VISAS TO GERMAN JOURNALISTS WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE SOVIET SIDE BY THEIR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THEIR DUTY - LAID DOWN IN THE CSCE FINAL ACT - TO PROMOTE PEACE AND COOPERATION.

111

ACCESS BY SOVIET CITIZENS TO PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PERSONNEL OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW ON THE SAME LEVEL AS DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AS FAR AS THEIR PRIVILEGES ARE CONCERNED, PROVIDED THAT WE GRANT THEM RECIPROCITY. SINCE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD COMMIT US TO GRANT DIPLOMATIC STATUS TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BONN AND SINCE WE DO NOT WISH TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT, THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES ARE AT PRESENT EXAMINING HOW WE CAN DEAL WITH THE SOVIET OFFER.

V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 07300

TREATMENT OF GERMAN BUSINESSMEN IN THE SOVIET UNION

MEDIA AND CORPORATIONS AT PUBLIC LAW IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY COMPARED WITH THE SITUATION OF GERMAN CITIZENS IN THE SOVIET UNION

10. SOVIET CITIZENS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO ANY RESTRICTIONS ON FREE ACCESS TO PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS ETC. IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

IV

SOVIET RESPECT OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

15. THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES ACCREDITED IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE NOTICEABLY WORSENERED IN THE COURSE OF 1981, AND IT WAS ESPECIALLY THE POSSIBILITIES OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS WHICH DECLINED OWING TO RISING BUSINESS EXPENDITURES. THUS, SINCE 1 APRIL 1981, THE SOVIET PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY GERMAN COMMERCIAL AGENCIES IN MOSCOW HAS HAD TO BE PAID VIA AN ACCOUNT HELD BY THE AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE FOR SERVICES TO FOREIGNERS. AS PART OF THIS CHANGE, AN INCREASE OF 10 PERCENT FOR "SOCIAL NECESSITIES OF LIFE" HAS TO BE PAID, AND A "GUARANTEE" AMOUNTING TO ONE MONTH'S SALARY IS BEING DEMANDED.

11. LIKE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE SOVIET UNION IS A PARTY TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION OF 18 APRIL 1961. IN OUR OPINION, THE SOVIET PRACTICE IS IN SOME RESPECTS NOT IN LINE WITH THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION. THUS, ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION, THE RECEIVING STATE SHALL ENSURE TO ALL MEMBERS OF A MISSION FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OF TRAVEL IN ITS TERRITORY, SUBJECT TO ITS LAWS AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING ZONES ENTRY INTO WHICH IS PROHIBITED OR REGULATED FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THE SOVIETS HAVE IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OF TRAVEL FOR THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A PERIMETER OF 40 KM AROUND MOSCOW. WE HAVE MADE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS BY WAY OF RECIPROCITY.

16. SINCE 1 JULY 1981, THE ACCREDITED COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NO LONGER RECEIVED FOREIGN EXCHANGE COUPONS ENTITLING THEM TO MAKE THEIR PURCHASES IN DUTY-FREE SHOPS. THEY ARE NOW COMPELLED

12. ARTICLE 25 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION LAYS DOWN THAT THE RECEIVING STATE SHALL ACCORD FULL FACILITIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MISSION. THE SOVIET UNION IS COMPLICATING THE WORK OF OUR EMBASSY TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT (SEE CHAPTER I OF THIS PAPER). THE ACHIEVEMENT OF RECIPROCITY ON OUR SIDE IS MEETING WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BONN GENERALLY DO NOT CARRY OUT REMOVALS ON THE OCCASION OF THEIR FIRST POSTING TO BONN SINCE THEY MOVE INTO FULLY FURNISHED OFFICIAL FLATS.

13. IN PRACTICE, THE VAST MAJORITY OF STATES GRANT THE FOREIGN MISSIONS ON THEIR TERRITORY THE UNHINDERED RIGHT TO RECEIVE VISITORS. IN OUR OPINION, RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO FOREIGN MISSIONS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION. WE THEREFORE REGARD THE CONTROL OF ACCESS IN FRONT OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AS BEING INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE MEANING OF THE CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

14. THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE THE OFFER TO PLACE THE MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 07300

TO MAKE USE - AT HIGHER PRICES AND A MUCH REDUCED SUPPLY OF GOODS - OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHOPS WHICH ARE ACCESSIBLE TO FOREIGNERS IN GENERAL OR OF THE SOVIET MARKET.

17. IN 1981 ALONE, SEVERAL GERMAN FIRMS HAD TO ACCEPT RENT INCREASES FOR THEIR BUSINESS PREMISES AND PRIVATE DWELLINGS OF BETWEEN 40 AND 100 PERCENT; SOME OF THEM SAID THAT THEY WERE COMPELLED TO CLOSE THEIR OFFICES IN MOSCOW IF THIS WENT ON MUCH LONGER. THE PRICES FOR HOTEL ROOMS HAVE REACHED TOP LEVEL BY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, ALTHOUGH THE STANDARD OF SERVICE PROVIDED IS BY NO MEANS UP TO THOSE STANDARDS. THE COST OF TELEPHONE CALLS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES WAS DOUBLED.

18. MANY COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES COMPLAIN OF GROWING FORMALITIES CONNECTED WITH THE CUSTOMS CLEARANCE ESPECIALLY OF THEIR REMOVAL ITEMS. SECOND CARS ARE NOT LICENSED FOR COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES.

19. THE EFFORTS SO FAR MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES THEMSELVES AND BY THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAVE HAD NO RESULT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PARTIAL CANCELLATION OF THE GUARANTEE PAYMENT FOR THE SALARIES OF SOVIET EMPLOYEES FROM INITIALLY 2 1/2 MONTHS TO ONE MONTH.

END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT: SUPPLEMENTARY PAPER ON TREATMENT OF STUDENTS AND SCIENTISTS.

SUBJECT: RECIPROCITY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS;
- TREATMENT OF GERMAN STUDENTS AND SCIENTISTS
- IN THE SOVIET UNION

STUDENTS

1. THE ONLY STUDENTS ATTENDING SOVIET UNIVERSITIES ARE POST-GRADUATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE STUDYING SLAVIC LANGUAGES. THE DIFFICULTIES ARE MAINLY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE NATURE. THE AGREEMENT OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY FOR THE UNIVERSITIES IS GIVEN NOT ONLY MONTHS BUT SOMETIMES YEARS AFTER THE APPLICATION HAS BEEN MADE, ALTHOUGH SOME IMPROVEMENT HAS BEEN NOTED IN RECENT MONTHS. THE GRANTING OF THE REQUIRED VISAS ALSO TAKES A LONG TIME.

2. GERMAN APPLICANTS OFTEN COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO GO TO THE UNIVERSITY OF THEIR CHOICE. IN THE SOVIET UNION HERSELF, ONE IS NOT ALLOWED TO MOVE FREELY. PROBLEMS ARISE IN THE CONSULTING OF ARCHIVES AND IN MAKING PHOTOCOPIES - DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARE UNKNOWN IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, STUDENTS OF

HISTORY WANT TO LOOK AT ARCHIVES OF THE 20TH CENTURY, THEIR REQUEST IS HARDLY EVER GRANTED.

3. SUMMING UP, IT CAN BE SAID THAT POSSIBILITIES FOR ATTENDING SOVIET UNIVERSITIES EXIST. THE DIFFICULTIES ARE MOSTLY INHERENT IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ACT AS A DETERRENT TO GERMAN STUDENTS. THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD ADMIT A LARGER NUMBER OF GERMAN STUDENTS THAN ARE INTERESTED.

SCIENTISTS

4. ON THE WHOLE, GERMAN SCIENTISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION CAN WORK WITHOUT ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS. THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS CORRESPOND TO THOSE OF THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES. DIFFICULTIES ARISE FOR THOSE WHO HAD NOT MET THEIR SOVIET COLLEAGUES BEFORE. THEY COMPLAIN THAT THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OFTEN REFUSES PERMISSION TO VISIT COLLEAGUES AT OTHER INSTITUTES OR IN OTHER TOWNS AND THAT THEY ARE OFTEN REFUSED PERMISSION TO USE ARCHIVES.

5. AS A RESULT, THOSE SCIENTISTS WHO DO NOT INTENSIFY FORMER RELATIONS BUT WHO COME TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME ARE MEETING WITH MAJOR - MOSTLY BUREAUCRATIC - DIFFICULTIES AND ARE EXPOSED TO THE BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES OF THE ACADEMY ADMINISTRATION.
END TEXT.
BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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RECIPROCAL
SOV GENERAL / 25

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 027582

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/2/02 (SCANLAN; JOHN D.)

TAGS: PDIP, PINR, UR (SHITOV, VASILY I) (CHITOV, VASILY I)

SUBJECT: EXPULSION OF SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).~~

2. ACTING DIRECTOR OF EUR/SOV FEBRUARY 1 CALLED IN ACTING DCM SOKOLOV OF SOVIET EMBASSY TO PRESENT DIPLOMATIC NOTE DECLARING SOVIET EMBASSY MILITARY ATTACHE MAJ. GENERAL V. I. SHITOV PERSONA NON GRATA.

3. TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE FOLLOWS

BEGIN TEXT:

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CALLS THE ATTENTION OF THE EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE FACT THAT ON JANUARY 30, 1982, THE MILITARY ATTACHE OF THE EMBASSY, MAJOR GENERAL VASILY I. IVANOVICH CHITOV, WAS APPREHENDED BY THE APPROPRIATE U.S. AUTHORITIES WHILE ENGAGED IN AN ACT OF ESPIONAGE. INVESTIGATION HAS REVEALED THAT MAJOR GENERAL CHITOV CONSPIRED WITH OTHERS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO OBTAIN STATE SECRETS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROTESTS THE ESPIONAGE ACTS OF MAJOR GENERAL CHITOV, WHICH ARE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF HIS STATUS AS MILITARY ATTACHE. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEREBY DECLARES MAJOR GENERAL CHITOV TO BE PERSONA NON GRATA AND REQUESTS THAT THE EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS INFORM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE STEPS THAT ARE TAKEN TO EFFECT HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXPRESSES ITS DEEP AND CONTINUING CONCERN OVER SUCH ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES, WHICH CALL INTO QUESTION THE MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. THE DEPARTMENT DEMANDS THAT THESE ACTIVITIES, WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY.

END TEXT.

4. SOKOLOV RESPONDED IN LOW-KEY MANNER, STATING THAT HE REJECTED THE LAST PART OF THE NOTE DEALING WITH ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND THE EFFECT ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO WISH TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE MATTER. DEPT. OFF. REPLIED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GO INTO THE DETAILS IF THE SOVIET SIDE WISHED AND MADE CLEAR HE HAD THE FACTS AT HAND TO PRESENT.

5. SOKOLOV REITERATED THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS OHVIOUS TO HIM THAT THE INCIDENT HAD BEEN PLANNED IN ADVANCE FOR CERTAIN PURPOSES, WHICH WERE ALSO CONTRARY TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE SAID HE HOPED THE MATTER WOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED, BUT IF IT WERE, THE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER THAT TO BE EVIDENCE THAT THEIR PRESUMPTION AS TO THE INTENTIONS BEHIND THE U.S. SIDE'S ACTIONS WAS TRUE.

6. DEPT. OFF. REPLIED THAT IT WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT SHITOV HAD ABUSED HIS STATUS AS A DIPLOMAT IN THIS COUNTRY AND WAS DECLARED PNG FOR THAT REASON.

7. SOKOLOV RESPONDED THAT MAJ. GEN. SHITOV HAD BEEN SUMMONED TO THE PENTAGON THAT MORNING AND THAT SHITOV WAS TOLD THAT THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH SHITOV'S SOCIAL CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON AND THE ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA HE DISSEMINATED AT RECEPTIONS.

8. DEPT. OFF. REPLIED THAT THE PENTAGON IS A DIFFERENT BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS SOKOLOV MADE CONCERNING WHAT SHITOV MAY HAVE BEEN TOLD. DEPT. OFF. STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN THE STEP OF DECLARING MAJ. GEN. SHITOV PERSONA NON GRATA AND REQUIRING HIS DEPARTURE FROM THIS COUNTRY FOR THE REASONS STATED IN THE DIPLOMATIC NOTE AND FOR THOSE REASONS ALONE.

9. SOKOLOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE NOTE AND THAT HE WOULD INFORM EUR/SOV CONCERNING SHITOV'S DEPARTURE.

10. NOTE: ALTHOUGH "SHITOV" IS THE CORRECT TRANSLITERATION OF SUBJECT'S NAME, HE PREFERRED TO USE "CHITOV" DURING HIS U.S. TOUR, AND WAS SO LISTED ON THE DIPLOMATIC LIST. OUR NOTE USED THE OFFICIAL VERSION ON THE DIPLIST.

HAIG
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #11003
BY ON NARA DATE 1/2/08

~~SECRET~~



USSR/Dypl
Pipes
80
United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Richard Pipes
National Security Council
The White House

Dear ~~Richard~~ **Dick**:

I would like to let you know about a new step we are taking to round out the travel control regime we impose on Soviet diplomats assigned to the United States.

For a number of years, both we and the Soviets have restricted the entry of the other country's diplomats to three specified ports of entry. However, only the Soviets have restricted exit as well. We have now redressed that imbalance. Effective October 15, Soviet diplomats will be permitted to depart the country only via Washington, New York City and Rouse's Point, N.Y. Soviets assigned to the United Nations and the Soviet missions to the U.N. will be allowed to exit the U.S. only at New York City.

This will establish reciprocity and may give us useful leverage in cases where our diplomats seek to depart the Soviet Union by an exit point other than one of the three normally authorized.

Sincerely,

Rick

Richard Burt, Designate

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: 10/13/88

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 106-114/10 #11004

BY Cv NARA DATE 1/2/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Exit Controls for Soviet Diplomats

This is to advise that we concur with the State Department's recommendation regarding exit controls for Soviet diplomats and that State intends to notify the Soviet embassy that it shall be subject to the same restrictions on departure points from the U.S., as American diplomats are in the Soviet Union.

Domas Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

DECLASSIFIED (REF ID: A5123)
NLRR 106-114/10 #10997
BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/88

MW

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MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Exit Controls for Soviet Diplomats

The Department of State intends to notify the Soviet embassy that it shall be subject to the same restrictions on departure points from the U.S., as American diplomats are in the Soviet Union. This seems fair and politically sound, and I recommend you concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Wheeler to Bremer memo at Tab A

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab A Wheeler to Bremer
- Tab B Bremer to Clark memo

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/10 #10998
BY Cel NARA DATE 6/25/09

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 14, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Exit Controls on Soviet Diplomats

The Department of State intends to inform the Soviet Embassy on October 14, 1982 that, effective immediately, departure from the United States of Soviet diplomats assigned to Washington and San Francisco (visa classes A-1 and A-2) is restricted to Washington, New York City, and Rouse's Point, N.Y. Soviet diplomats assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (visa classes G-1 and G-2) and Soviet citizen officers and employees of the United Nations Secretariat (visa class G-4) are restricted to departure via New York City only. These departure controls are intended to achieve reciprocity with Soviet practice, which restricts American diplomats to entry and departure at Moscow, Leningrad and Vyborg, a land crossing on the Finnish border. We have long imposed entry restrictions; this move restricts departures to the same three points at which Soviet diplomats must now enter the United States.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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NLRR F06-114/10 #11005

BY CU NARA DATE 1/2/08

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: 09/28/88