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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/19/2005

**File Folder** USSR-RECIPROCITY 1/8

**FOIA**

F06-114/10

**Box Number** 33

YARHI-MILO

3304

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10977	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE ARBATOV [ 5 - 5 ] <b>R 6/25/2009 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	3/16/1981	B1
10978	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE WEEKLY REPORT [ 6 - 6 ]	1	3/13/1981	B1
10980	MEMO	PIPES TO ALLEN RE U.S. CUSTOMS DETENTION AND SEARCH OF AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT [ 10 - 10 ] <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	5/18/1981	B1
10982	MEMO	BREMER TO ALLEN RE U.S. CUSTOMS DETENTION AND SEARCH OF AEROFLOT AIRCRAFT [ 11 - 11 ]	1	5/13/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10979	MEMO	PIPES TO STEARM [ 12 - 12 ] <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	6/22/1981	B1
10983	MEMO	EAGLEBURGER TO STOESSEL RE WHETHER TO CONTINUE LIMITED EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES WITH THE SOVIETS [ 13 - 14 ] <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	2	ND	B1
10981	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10980 [ 15 - 15 ] <b>R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10</b>	1	5/18/1981	B1
10984	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10982 [ 16 - 16 ]	1	5/13/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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File → Reciprocity

1979

July 31, 1979

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

11

included in wage surveys of the Department of State where the Department of Defense operates under indirect-hire arrangements;

(2) monitor the establishment of wage rates outside the United States more closely to insure that United States missions—

(A) operate under salary schedules that reflect private sector average pay or average pay ranges;

(B) include the cost of severance in making pay adjustments; and

(C) survey jobs in the private sector which represent as closely as possible the work force of the mission; and

(3) substitute, whenever possible, prevailing local retirement plans for civil service retirement with respect to the retirement of foreign nationals employed by the United States.

(b) Section 444(b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C. 889) is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: "and such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe".

UNITED STATES CONSULATES

SEC. 108. (a) The following United States consulates shall not be closed or, if closed on the date of enactment of this Act, shall be reopened as soon as possible after such date: Salzburg, Austria; Bremen, Germany; Nice, France; Turin, Italy; Goteborg, Sweden; Adana, Turkey; Tangier, Morocco; Mandalay, Burma; Brisbane, Australia; and Surabaya, Indonesia.

(b) Personnel assigned to the consulates described in subsection (a) shall not be counted toward any personnel ceiling for the Department of State established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

NONIMMIGRANT VISAS

SEC. 109. Section 21 of the Act entitled "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Department of State", approved August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2691), is amended—

(1) by inserting "(a)" immediately after "Sec. 21."; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(b) This section does not apply to representatives of purported labor organizations in countries where such organizations are in fact instruments of a totalitarian state.

"(c) This section does not apply with respect to any alien who is a member, officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

"(d) The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian affairs provisions."

UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

SEC. 110. Title I of the Department of State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1979 (Public Law 95-431; 92 Stat. 1021), is amended in the paragraph under the heading "Contributions to International Organizations" by striking out ", of which no part may be made available for the furnishing of technical assistance by the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies".

TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

SHORT TITLE

SEC. 201. This title may be cited as the "International Communication Agency Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981".

AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 202. There are authorized to be appropriated for the International Communication Agency \$432,547,000 for the fiscal year 1980 and \$465,944,000 for the fiscal year 1981 to carry out international communication,

educational, cultural, and exchange programs under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, and Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1977, and other purposes authorized by law.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

SEC. 203. (a) (1) Section 1001 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1434) and section 104(f) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2454(f)) are repealed.

(2) Section 1304(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "209a, and 1434" and inserting in lieu thereof "and 290a".

(b) (1) Section 801(5) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1471(5)) is amended to read as follows:

"(5) to employ persons on a temporary basis without regard to the civil service and classification laws, when such employment is provided for by the pertinent appropriation Act; and"

(2) Section 804(1) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1471(1)) is amended to read as follows:

"(1) employ, without regard to the civil service and classification laws, aliens within the United States and abroad for service in the United States relating to the translation or narration of colloquial speech in foreign languages or the preparation and production of foreign language programs when suitably qualified United States citizens are not available, and aliens so employed abroad may be admitted to the United States, if otherwise qualified, as nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) for such time and under such conditions and procedures as may be established by the Director of the International Communication Agency and the Attorney General."

(c) Section 602(d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 474) is amended—

(1) by striking out "or" at the end of paragraph (19);

(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (20) and inserting in lieu thereof "; or"; and

(3) by inserting immediately after paragraph (20) the following new paragraph:

"(21) the Director of the International Communication Agency with respect to the furnishing of facilities in foreign countries and reception centers within the United States."

(d) Section 108(a) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458(a)) is amended—

(1) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "Sec. 108. (a)"; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the International Communication Agency may provide, on a reimbursable basis, services within the United States in connection with exchange activities otherwise authorized by this Act when such services are requested by a department or executive agency. Reimbursements under this paragraph shall be credited to the applicable appropriation of the Agency."

(e) Section 801(3) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1471(3)) is amended to read as follows:

"(3) whenever necessary in carrying out title V of this Act, to purchase, rent, construct, improve, maintain, and operate facilities for radio transmission and reception, including the leasing of associated real property (either within or outside the United States) for periods not to exceed ten years,

or for longer periods if provided for by appropriations Act, and the alteration, improvement, and repair of such property without regard to section 322 of title 40 of the United States Code (40 U.S.C. 278) any such real property or interests which are outside the United States acquired without regard to section the Revised Statutes of the United States (40 U.S.C. 255) if the sufficiency of title to such real property or interests is approved by the Director of the International Communication Agency;"

(f) Title VI of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1466-1468) is amended by at the end thereof the following section:

"UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

"Sec. 604. (a) The United States Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs established by section 8 of Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1977, is hereby reorganized as the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (hereinafter this section referred to as the "Commission").

(b) The Commission shall have a Chairman who shall be appointed by the President. Such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Commission, the Chairman of the Commission may—

"(1) appoint such additional personnel as the staff of the Commission as the Chairman deems necessary; and

"(2) procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as is authorized by section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals which do not exceed the daily equivalent of the basic rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5305 of title 5, United States Code."

TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

SEC. 204. (a) Section 801(1) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1471(1)) is amended by striking out "within the limitation of such appropriations as the Commission may provide".

(b) Section 804 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1474) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (10) by striking "five" and inserting in lieu thereof "10";

(2) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (13);

(3) in paragraph (14) by striking out comma and all that follows thereafter inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; and

(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(15) hire passenger motor vehicles;

"(16) purchase passenger motor vehicle for use abroad, and right-hand drive vehicle may be so purchased without regard to the maximum price limitation established by law;

"(17) procure services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code;

"(18) make advances of funds; and

"(19) notwithstanding section 5946 of title 5 of the United States Code, pay dues and library membership in organizations which issue publications to members only, or members at a price lower than to other members."

(c) Section 806 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1475a) is amended by striking out "are authorized to be made" and inserting in lieu thereof "shall be".

(d) Section 108A(a)(2) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a(a)(2)) is amended by striking out "(E)" and "(F)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(F)" and "(G)", respectively.

(e) Title VII of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948

Labor Amendment

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Membership.

(b) The Board shall consist of 15 members appointed by the President from among representatives of groups in the Great Lakes area which would be affected most directly by increased tolls, including port directors, port authorities, maritime labor, shipping companies, shippers, and consumers.

Compensation.

(c) (1) Members of the Board shall each be entitled to receive the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule for each day (including traveltime) during which they are engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Board.

(2) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board, members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

Termination.

(d) The Board shall cease to exist on the date designated by the Secretary of State as the date on which the negotiations described in subsection (a) are completed or on September 30, 1978, whichever date occurs first.

LIABILITY OF CONSULAR OFFICERS

Repeals.

SEC. 111. (a) (1) Sections 1735 and 1736 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (22 U.S.C. 1199) are repealed.

(2) The section analysis of chapter two of title XVIII of the Revised Statutes of the United States is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 1735 and 1736.

22 USC 1199 note.

(b) The repeals made by subsection (a) shall not affect suits commenced before the date of enactment of this Act.

CERTAIN NONIMMIGRANT VISAS

Applications, recommendation of approval.  
22 USC 2691.

SEC. 112. The Act entitled "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Department of State", approved August 1, 1956, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section.

"SEC. 21. For purposes of achieving greater United States compliance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975) and for purposes of encouraging other signatory countries to comply with those provisions, the Secretary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludible from the United States by reason of membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to the United States, recommend that the Attorney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa to such alien, unless the Secretary determines that the admission of such alien would be contrary to the security interests of the United States and so certifies to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."

Certification to Speaker of the House and Senate committee.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN STATE DEPARTMENT PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 113. (a) The Act entitled "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Department of State", approved August 1, 1956, as amended by section 112 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

*McGovern Amend.*

July 31, 1979

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

11

included in wage surveys of the Department of State where the Department of Defense operates under indirect-hire arrangements;

(2) monitor the establishment of wage rates outside the United States more closely to insure that United States missions—

(A) operate under salary schedules that reflect private sector average pay or average pay ranges,

(B) include the cost of severance in making pay adjustments, and

(C) survey jobs in the private sector which represent as closely as possible the work force of the mission; and

(3) substitute, whenever possible, prevailing local retirement plans for civil service retirement with respect to the retirement of foreign nationals employed by the United States.

(b) Section 444(b) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (22 U.S.C. 839) is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof the following: "and such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe".

UNITED STATES CONSULATES

SEC. 108. (a) The following United States consulates shall not be closed or, if closed on the date of enactment of this Act, shall be reopened as soon as possible after such date: Salzburg, Austria; Bremen, Germany; Nice, France; Turin, Italy; Goteborg, Sweden; Adana, Turkey; Tangier, Morocco; Mandalay, Burma; Brisbane, Australia; and Surabaya, Indonesia.

(b) Personnel assigned to the consulates described in subsection (a) shall not be counted toward any personnel ceiling for the Department of State established by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

NONIMMIGRANT VISAS

SEC. 109. Section 21 of the Act entitled "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Department of State", approved August 1, 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2691), is amended—

(1) by inserting "(a)" immediately after "Sec. 21."; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(b) This section does not apply to representatives of purported labor organizations in countries where such organizations are in fact instruments of a totalitarian state.

"(c) This section does not apply with respect to any alien who is a member, officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

"(d) The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian affairs provisions."

UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

SEC. 110. Title I of the Department of State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1979 (Public Law 95-431; 92 Stat. 1021), is amended in the paragraph under the heading "Contributions to International Organizations" by striking out ", of which no part may be made available for the furnishing of technical assistance by the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies".

TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY

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AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 202. There are authorized to be appropriated for the International Communication Agency \$432,547,000 for the fiscal year 1980 and \$465,944,000 for the fiscal year 1981 to carry out international communication,

educational, cultural, and exchange programs under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, and Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1977, and other purposes authorized by law.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES

SEC. 203. (a) (1) Section 1001 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1434) and section 104(f) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2454(f)) are repealed.

(2) Section 1304(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "209a, and 1434" and inserting in lieu thereof "and 290a".

(b) (1) Section 801(5) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1471(5)) is amended to read as follows:

"(5) to employ persons on a temporary basis without regard to the civil service and classification laws, when such employment is provided for by the pertinent appropriation Act; and"

(2) Section 804(1) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1471(1)) is amended to read as follows:

"(1) employ, without regard to the civil service and classification laws, aliens within the United States and abroad for service in the United States relating to the translation or narration of colloquial speech in foreign languages or the preparation and production of foreign language programs when suitably qualified United States citizens are not available, and aliens so employed abroad may be admitted to the United States, if otherwise qualified, as nonimmigrants under section 101(a)(15) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)) for such time and under such conditions and procedures as may be established by the Director of the International Communication Agency and the Attorney General;"

(c) Section 602(d) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 474) is amended—

(1) by striking out "or" at the end of paragraph (19);

(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (20) and inserting in lieu thereof "; or"; and

(3) by inserting immediately after paragraph (20) the following new paragraph:

"(21) the Director of the International Communication Agency with respect to the furnishing of facilities in foreign countries and reception centers within the United States."

(d) Section 108(a) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458(a)) is amended—

(1) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "Sec. 108. (a)"; and

(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the International Communication Agency may provide, on a reimbursable basis, services within the United States in connection with exchange activities otherwise authorized by this Act when such services are requested by a department or executive agency. Reimbursements under this paragraph shall be credited to the applicable appropriation of the Agency."

(e) Section 801(3) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1471(3)) is amended to read as follows:

"(3) whenever necessary in carrying out title V of this Act, to purchase, rent, construct, improve, maintain, and operate facilities for radio transmission and reception, including the leasing of associated real property (either within or outside the United States) for periods not to exceed ten years,

or for longer periods if provided for by appropriations Act, and the alteration, improvement, and repair of such property without regard to section 322 of title 48, United States Code, of June 30, 1932 (40 U.S.C. 278); any such real property or interests which are outside the United States acquired without regard to section 101 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (40 U.S.C. 255) if the sufficiency of title to such real property or interests is approved by the Director of the International Communication Agency;"

(f) Title VI of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1466-1468) is amended by inserting at the end thereof the following section:

"UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

"SEC. 604. (a) The United States Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs established by section 8 of Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1977, is hereby reconstituted as the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission")

"(b) The Commission shall have a Chairman who shall be appointed by the President, and such rules and regulations as may be adopted by the Commission, the Chairman of the Commission may—

(1) appoint such additional personnel to the staff of the Commission as the Chairman deems necessary; and

(2) procure temporary and interim services to the same extent as is authorized by section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-16 of the General Schedule under section 5305 of title 5, United States Code."

TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

SEC. 204. (a) Section 801(1) of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. 1471(1)) is amended by striking out "within the limitation of such appropriations as the Commission may provide".

(b) Section 804 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1474) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (10) by striking "five" and inserting in lieu thereof "10";

(2) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (13);

(3) in paragraph (14) by striking out comma and all that follows thereafter inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; and

(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(15) hire passenger motor vehicles;

"(16) purchase passenger motor vehicle for use abroad, and right-hand drive vehicle may be so purchased without regard to the maximum price limitation established by law;

"(17) procure services of experts and consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code;

"(18) make advances of funds; and

"(19) notwithstanding section 5946 of title 5 of the United States Code, pay dues, library membership in organizations which issue publications to members only, or members at a price lower than to other members."

(c) Section 806 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 1475a) is amended by striking out "are authorized to be made" and inserting in lieu thereof "shall be".

(d) Section 108A(a)(2) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2458a(a)(2)) is amended by striking out "(E)" and "(F)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(F)" and "(G)", respectively.

(e) Title VII of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948

Order Amendment

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**Membership.** (b) The Board shall consist of 15 members appointed by the President from among representatives of groups in the Great Lakes area which would be affected most directly by increased tolls, including port directors, port authorities, maritime labor, shipping companies, shippers, and consumers.

**Compensation.** (c) (1) Members of the Board shall each be entitled to receive the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule for each day (including traveltime) during which they are engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Board.

(2) While away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Board, members of the Board shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

**Termination.** (d) The Board shall cease to exist on the date designated by the Secretary of State as the date on which the negotiations described in subsection (a) are completed or on September 30, 1978, whichever date occurs first.

LIABILITY OF CONSULAR OFFICERS

**Repeals.** SEC. 111. (a) (1) Sections 1735 and 1736 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (22 U.S.C. 1199) are repealed.

(2) The section analysis of chapter two of title XVIII of the Revised Statutes of the United States is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 1735 and 1736.

**22 USC 1199 note.** (b) The repeals made by subsection (a) shall not affect suits commenced before the date of enactment of this Act.

CERTAIN NONIMMIGRANT VISAS

**Applications, recommendation of approval.** SEC. 112. The Act entitled "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Department of State", approved August 1, 1956, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section.

**22 USC 2691.** "SEC. 21. For purposes of achieving greater United States compliance with the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975) and for purposes of encouraging other signatory countries to comply with those provisions, the Secretary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludible from the United States by reason of membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to the United States, recommend that the Attorney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa to such alien, unless the Secretary determines that the admission of such alien would be contrary to the security interests of the United States and so certifies to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate."

**Certification to Speaker of the House and Senate committee.**

*McGovern Amend.*

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN STATE DEPARTMENT PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 113. (a) The Act entitled "An Act to provide certain basic authority for the Department of State", approved August 1, 1956, as amended by section 112 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

1293

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Pipes

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 16, 1981

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*  
 SUBJECT: Arbatov's Visa (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/10 #10977BY CW NARA DATE 6/25/09

Pursuing the question raised by you on my Weekly Report of March 13, I have asked Paula Dobriansky to check with State on the status of Arbatov's visa. It appears that he applied for a 27-day visa to attend the International Conference of Physicians (!) for the Prevention of Nuclear War (a Soviet-type propaganda exercise, in line with Brezhnev's recommendations to the 26th Party Congress). This Conference is to be held in Washington, D.C., March 19 - 25. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow refused him a 27-day visa and gave him instead a 16-day visa (March 17 - April 2), issued to all the other Conference participants. (C)

Even though his visa is for the purpose of attending the Conference and expires on April 2, Arbatov has had the temerity to accept speaking engagements in various parts of the country (Berkeley, Harvard, etc.), at least one of them after the expiration of his visa (Bill Moyer's Journal on April 10). (C)

## Questions:

1. Since when does Arbatov qualify as a physician?
2. Why is he allowed to travel around the country giving lectures?
3. What are his grounds for assuming that he will receive an extension of his visa? (C)

It seems to me that State should neither allow him to travel beyond Washington nor extend his visa. It is high time to put an end to this particular aspect of detente which allows Russians to travel freely around the United States while Americans cannot do so in the Soviet Union. No American of Arbatov's status has been given access to Soviet television or university audiences. (S)

I might add that in a recent conversation with a diplomat from a friendly country, Arbatov called the President the vilest of names, labelling him, among other things, a "Neanderthal man." Must we put up with this creep? (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That the Department of State be instructed not to extend Arbatov's visa. (C)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Review March 16, 1987.



*Dipes*

*file USSR-Dipes*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ *ajl*

SUBJECT: Access Reciprocity

William Stearman sent you a package on March 20 in which he explained that Soviet access to officials here is far greater than is our access to officials in Moscow and that, as part of our general effort to achieve more reciprocity in our relations with the USSR, we should try to bring access under control.

You agreed with him and approved a memo on Soviet access to government offices but indicated it should go to all Senior White House people, asking them to instruct their staffs of the need to control contacts with Soviet officials.

Given the addressees, it seems appropriate that the memo should come from Richard Darman.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo requesting Darman to distribute a memo to Senior White House Staff on Soviet access to U.S. government offices (Tab I).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Access Reciprocity

Soviet access to officials here is far greater than is our access to officials in Moscow. As part of our general effort to achieve more reciprocity on our relations with the USSR, we are trying to bring access more into balance. Keeping tabs on Soviet visits is an essential first step and should logically include all personnel in the Executive Office of the President.

To implement such an accounting, it is requested that you sign and dispatch the memo at Tab A to Senior White House officials. This memo explains the need to monitor Soviet contacts with U.S. official agencies in order to establish a basis for reciprocity and designates a member of my staff to receive contact reports.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT  
THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

FROM: RICHARD G. DARMAN

SUBJECT: Soviet Access to U.S. Government Offices

It is the Administration's intention to bring the access of the Soviet Ambassador and other Soviet officials to U.S. Government offices in Washington more nearly into balance with the access which we have to Soviet officials in the USSR.

The Department of State's Office of Soviet Union Affairs has been designated to monitor Soviet contacts with U.S. official agencies in order to establish a basis for reciprocity. To assist in this effort, it is requested that all personnel in the Executive Office of the President report contacts with Soviet officials to William Stearman, Room 365, OEOB, extension 6923.

The purpose of reporting such contacts is not to cut off these contacts but to monitor them in order to ensure that access is reciprocal.

Your cooperation and appropriate instructions to your staff would be very much appreciated.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 FROM: RICHARD PIPES  
 SUBJECT: U.S. Customs Detention and Search of  
 Aeroflot Aircraft

The State Department's point (Tab A) is well taken: such politically sensitive operations as entering and searching a Soviet airplane should be done in the presence of one of its representatives. (C)

Stearman, Lenz, Nau, Huberman and Baily had no comments. (U)

Tab A Memorandum from State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 18, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR # 06-114/10 # 10980

BY CN NARA DATE 1/2/08

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: BILL STEARMAN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES <sup>W</sup>

SUBJECT: Whether to Continue Limited Exchange  
Activities with the Soviets

I entirely agree with your preference, I should like to know more about the atomic energy, energy, science and technology, and space programs: my feeling is that here probably the Russians profit more than we do. If that should be the case, we might want to cut these exchange programs back even more severely or even eliminate them altogether, and compensate by increasing exchanges in the cultural or medical fields. One would really need more detail on these scientific programs before making any meaningful recommendation. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Derivative from State  
Review June 16, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR EOB-119/10 #10979

BY CU NARADATE 1/2/88



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR FOI-14/10 #10983

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Ambassador Stoessel

BY CW NARA DATE 1/2/85

FROM : EUR - Lawrence S. Eagleburger

SUBJECT: Whether to Continue Limited Exchange Activities with the Soviets

SUMMARY: Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan we made deep cuts in our exchange programs with the Soviet Union. We did not abrogate any agreements, however, and we have proceeded to carry out a limited number of selected activities. The various USG agencies which directly administer the exchange programs are now pressing us for a definitive statement on our exchanges policy so that they can plan for the future and allocate limited budget resources. Moreover, decisions have to be made before the end of this year whether to renew or let lapse four agreements in the S&T field. We recommend that, barring any deterioration in the political situation, we continue the current level and mix of exchange activities and be prepared to renew those agreements which are useful to us.

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES

We now have 11 agreements with the Soviet Union in the science and technology field (agriculture, artificial heart, atomic energy, energy, environment, health, housing, science and technology, space, transportation and world oceans). Activities under these agreements are currently running at about 25 percent of the pre-Afghanistan level. Only low-level exchanges which are of clear benefit to us or have a humanitarian content are being allowed to proceed.

In the cultural field, exchanges have come to a standstill, with the exception of the reciprocal distribution of each side's illustrated magazine (an exchange which is very much in our favor). We continue to refuse to negotiate a replacement for the general cultural agreement which expired at the end of 1979.

Academic exchanges are proceeding at basically unchanged levels (roughly 100 scholars each way annually). Over the years this program has enabled us to build a cadre of Soviet experts with unique on-the-ground experience.

All the above exchanges are closely monitored to minimize technology transfer problems and to maximize reciprocity.

While cutting back sharply on exchanges, our intention has been to keep the framework of cooperation intact in order to be able to resume a greater level of useful activity if the situation improves or, if it deteriorates (e.g. in Poland), to be able to drop the other shoe. Apart from using the exchange mechanism to send political signals to Moscow, we have been anxious to preserve some degree of cooperation for its own sake. It is only through the reciprocity afforded by official exchanges that the USG is able to gain access to many aspects of Soviet science and society.

EVALUATION OF OPTIONS

1. Continue the current reduced level and mix of exchanges and maintain the framework of cooperation basically intact. This would keep open the "window" on Soviet developments afforded by exchanges and would maintain their "carrot and stick" potential. A drawback of the current policy is that it might appear fuzzy and ambiguous to other USG agencies and the public.

2. Reduce exchanges further, to the point of eliminating them. This would satisfy domestic critics of exchanges who often charge that the Soviets benefit more from them than we do. It would also underline the substantially harder line this Administration is taking toward the USSR. It would, however, deprive us of the access we get from exchanges. Also, such a step -- taken without clear-cut provocation -- might be seen as a sign that we had given up any hope for improved relations in the future.

3. Begin now to increase exchange activities. This would enhance the access benefits we derive from exchanges. Given the absence of any movement on the Afghanistan issue, however, and the continuing tension in Poland, any significant increase in exchanges would be out of step with current political realities.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that we continue with the current level and mix of exchanges and be prepared to renew those agreements which are useful to us. (We would inform the other USG agencies of this policy through the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs.)

Approve Option 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer Option 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer Option 3 \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

~~Pipes~~

JC & BN have seen

5/20

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*[Handwritten initials]*

*file*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 18, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: U.S. Customs Detention and Search of  
Aeroflot Aircraft

The State Department's point (Tab A) is well taken: such politically sensitive operations as entering and searching a Soviet airplane should be done in the presence of one of its representatives. (C)

Stearman, Lenz, Nau, Huberman and Baily had no comments. (U)

Tab A Memorandum from State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 18, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 06-14/10 #10981

BY CA NARA DATE 1/2/08



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dr. De Puy

Dir,  
State passed this I me  
for comment.

I favor option one,  
but believe we should examine  
each exchange program on  
a case by case basis. We  
might want to cut some &  
increase others.

Bill  
Ate



BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT  
ANALYSES

## SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND REPRESENTATION

### Summary

This paper, intended as an informal research aid, lists those countries with which the USSR has diplomatic, consular, and/or commercial relations and includes the name and date of accreditation of each Soviet ambassador. Also listed are countries with which the USSR has not exchanged diplomatic representation but which it has recognized, either unilaterally or reciprocally. Unilateral Soviet recognition, indicated in the "Notes" column, is recognition generally extended to a new nation by an official statement without reciprocation from the recognized party. This is a relatively informal diplomatic category which does not necessarily indicate Soviet willingness to establish formal diplomatic relations.

Other aspects of representation that are included:

- Ambassadors accredited to another country, with which the USSR has diplomatic relations but where no diplomatic mission exists per se, are so indicated.
- Because an embassy generally includes a consular section, only consulates separate from the embassy are specifically listed.
- "Commercial Representation" indicates commercial or economic organs (e.g., Sovexport, Sovfrakht, and Aeroflot) that have their own commercial office, or a general Commercial Representatives Office separate from the embassy. In many cases, such offices were opened prior to the establishment of a diplomatic mission.

UNCLASSIFIED

Report 165-CA  
June 22, 1981

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND REPRESENTATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Afghanistan	Kabul		Kabul	Tabeyev, Fikryat A. (Nov. 5, 1979)	The USSR concluded a consular agreement with Afghanistan May 24, 1981.
Albania					USSR suspended diplomatic relations December 3, 1961.
Algeria	Algiers	Annaba, Oran	Algiers	Rykov, Vasiliy N. (Mar. 26, 1975)	
Andorra					Relations never established.
Angola	Luanda		Luanda	Loginov, Vadim P. (Mar. 7, 1978)	
Argentina	Buenos Aires		Buenos Aires	Striganov, Sergey R. (July 31, 1978)	
Australia	Canberra	Sydney, New South Wales	Canberra	Sudarikov, Nikolay G. (Sept. 17, 1979)	Ambassador also accredited to Fiji.
Austria	Vienna	Salzburg	Vienna	Yefremov, Mikhail T. (Mar. 6, 1975)	
Bahamas, The					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Bahrain					USSR extended recognition August 1972, but diplomatic relations not established.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Bangladesh	Dacca	Chittagong	Dacca	Stepanov, Valentin P. (Feb. 13, 1976)	
Barbados					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Belgium	Brussels	Antwerp	Brussels	Romanovskiy, Sergey K. (Apr. 14, 1975)	
Benin	Cotonou			Agapov, Vitaliy I. (Mar. 28, 1979)	
Bhutan					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Bolivia	La Paz		La Paz	Kovalev, Sergey I. (Mar. 21, 1981)	
Botswana	Gaborone			Petrov, Mikhail N. (Dec. 8, 1977)	
Brazil	Brasilia		Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo		Soviet Ambassador to Costa Rica Vladimir Chernyshev will be transferred to Brasilia in early July.
Bulgaria	Sofia	Sofia	Plovdiv, Varna	Tolubeyev, Nikita P. (Mar. 28, 1979)	
Burma	Rangoon		Rangoon	Kuznetsov, Vladimir N. (Aug. 6, 1980)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Burundi	Bujumbura			Levikov, Valeriy Z. (Dec. 26, 1979)	
Cameroon	Yaounde		Yaounde	Zykov, Spartak S. (Nov. 9, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Chad.
Canada	Ottawa	Montreal	Montreal	Yakovlev, Aleksandr N. (May 15, 1973)	
Cape Verde	Praia		Praia	Krylov, Lev V. (June 18, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Guinea-Bissau.
Central African Republic					Relations were severed in January 1980 at the initiative of the CAR.
Chad	N'Djamena			Zykov, Spartak S. (Nov. 9, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Cameroon.
Chile					Relations established December 11, 1944, broken off October 27, 1947; reestablished November 24, 1964, broken off October 21, 1973.
China, People's Republic of	Beijing		Beijing	Shcherbakov, Il'ya S. (July 19, 1978)	
Colombia	Bogota		Bogota	Romanov, Leonid M. (July 13, 1978)	Ambassador also accredited to Suriname.
Comoros	Moroni			Startsev, Aleksandr K. (Dec. 29, 1977)	Ambassador resides in the Seychelles.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Congo	Brazzaville			Kuznetsov, Sergey A. (Sept. 6, 1978)	
Costa Rica	San Jose		San Jose		Soviet Ambassador to Costa Rica Vladimir Chernyshev will be transferred to Brasilia in early July; his replacement has not been named.
Cuba	Havana	Santiago de Cuba	Havana	Vorotnikov, Vitaliy I. (Feb. 21, 1979)	
Cyprus	Nicosia		Nicosia	Astavin, Sergey T. (July 4, 1973)	
Czechoslovakia	Prague	Bratislava, Brno, Karlovy Vary	Prague	Botvin, Aleksandr P. (Jan. 16, 1980)	
Denmark	Copenhagen		Copenhagen	Yegorychev, Nikolay G. (Apr. 16, 1970)	
Djibouti	Djibouti			Peryshkin, Viktor A. (Nov. 15, 1978)	
Dominica					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Dominican Republic					Diplomatic relations maintained from March 8, 1945, until 1947. No missions have been exchanged since.
Ecuador	Quito		Quito	Kovalev, Feliks N. (Mar. 4, 1980)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Egypt	Cairo	Alexandria, Port Said	Cairo	Polyakov, Vladimir P. (Mar. 29, 1974)	
El Salvador					Relations never established.
Equatorial Guinea	Malabo			Krasnikov, Boris A. (Aug. 28, 1980)	
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa			Kirnasovskiy, Boris Ye. (Nov. 15, 1978)	
Fiji	Suva		Suva	Sudarikov, Nikolay G. (Nov. 30, 1979)	Ambassador resides in Australia.
Finland	Helsinki	Maarianhamina, Turku	Helsinki	Sobolev, Vladimir M. (May 24, 1979)	
France	Paris	Marseilles	Paris	Chervonenko, Stepan V. (Apr. 28, 1973)	
Gabon	Libreville			Uranov, Gennadiy V. (Nov. 3, 1978)	
Gambia, The	Banjul			Ter-Gazaryants, Georgiy A. (Apr. 6, 1973)	Ambassador resides in Senegal.
German Demo- cratic Republic	East Berlin	Leipzig, Rostock	East Berlin	Abrasimov, Petr A. (Mar. 6, 1975)	
Germany, Federal Republic of	Bonn	Hamburg, West Berlin	Bonn	Semenov, Vladimir S. (Nov. 3, 1978)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Ghana	Accra		Accra	Ivantsov, Anatoliy I. (Sept. 18, 1979)	
Greece	Athens		Athens	Kaboshkin, Vladimir F. (Sept. 7, 1979)	
Grenada	St. Georges			Musin, Dmitriy P. (Apr. 23, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Jamaica.
Guatemala					Relations established April 19, 1945. A Guatemalan Legation opened in Moscow but closed again in July 1946. No missions have been exchanged since.
Guinea	Conakry		Conakry	Minin, Viktor I. (Apr. 18, 1978)	
Guinea-Bissau	Bissau		Bissau	Krylov, Lev V. (June 18, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Cape Verde.
Guyana	Georgetown			Kharchev, Konstantin M. (Mar. 5, 1981)	
Haiti					Relations never established.
Honduras					Relations never established.
Hungary	Budapest		Budapest	Pavlov, Vladimir Ya. (Mar. 12, 1971)	
Iceland	Reykjavik			Streltsov, Mikhail N. (June 26, 1979)	
India	New Delhi	Bombay, Calcutta, Madras	Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi	Vorontsov, Yuliy M. (Dec. 19, 1977)	



<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Indonesia	Jakarta	Medan, Surabaya	Jakarta, Medan	Shpek'ko, Ivan F. (May 27, 1976)	
Iran	Tehran	Resht	Tehran	Vinogradov, Vladimir M. (Jan. 17, 1977)	
Iraq	Baghdad		Baghdad	Barkovskiy, Anatoliy A. (Dec. 17, 1973)	
Ireland	Dublin			Nesterenko, Aleksey Ye. (Mar. 20, 1980)	
Israel					Relations established May 18, 1948; severed February 11, 1953; re- established July 15, 1953. Legation raised to Embassy level May 13, 1954. The USSR severed relations again on June 9, 1967, as a result of the Six-Day War. (Finland represents Soviet interests in Israel.)
Italy	Rome	Genoa, Milan	Rome, Turin	Lun'kov, Nikolay M. (Nov. 5, 1980)	
Ivory Coast					Relations established January 23, 1967; severed May 30, 1969.

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Jamaica	Kingston		Kingston	Musin, Dmitriy P. (Mar. 3, 1978)	Ambassador also accredited to Grenada.
Japan	Tokyo	Osaka, Sapporo	Tokyo	Polyanskiy, Dmitriy S. (Apr. 15, 1976)	
Jordan	Amman		Amman	Nishanov, Rafik N. (Apr. 28, 1978)	
Kampuchea				Bostorin, Oleg V. (May 10, 1979)	USSR recognized the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council headed by Heng Samrin January 9, 1980. (The UN recognizes Democratic Kampuchea.)
Kenya	Nairobi		Nairobi	Miroshnichenko, Boris P. (Nov. 11, 1973)	
Kiribati					USSR extended recognition July 12, 1979, but diplomatic relations not established.
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	Pyongyang		Pyongyang	Kriulin, Gleb A. (Aug. 6, 1974)	
Korea, Republic of					Relations never established.
Kuwait	Kuwait			Sikachev, Nikolay N. (Feb. 18, 1975)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Laos	Vientiane		Vientiane	Sobchenko, Vladimir F. (Sept. 16, 1980)	
Lebanon	Beirut		Beirut	Soldatov, Aleksandr A. (Oct. 10, 1974)	
Lesotho					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Liberia	Monrovia		Monrovia	Ulanov, Anatoliy A. (Oct. 27, 1977)	On May 12, 1981, Liberian Head of State Doe ordered the Soviets to reduce their diplomatic staff from 15 to 6, according to a Liberian press report.
Libya	Tripoli			Anisimov, Anatoliy V. (Aug. 15, 1977)	
Liechtenstein					Relations never established.
Luxembourg	Luxembourg		Luxembourg	Udum'yan, Kamo B. (Sept. 13, 1979)	
Madagascar	Antananarivo		Antananarivo	Musatov, Leonid N. (May 15, 1980)	
Malawi					USSR extended recognition July 6, 1964, but diplomatic relations not established.
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur		Kuala Lumpur	Kulik, Boris T. (Apr. 20, 1978)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Maldives	Male			Pasyutin, Aleksey S. (Aug. 25, 1978)	Ambassador resides in Sri Lanka.
Mali	Bamako		Bamako	Fazylov, Malik S. (July 5, 1976)	
Malta	Valletta		Valletta	Popov, Viktor I. (Nov. 30, 1980)	Ambassador resides in the United Kingdom.
Mauritania	Nouakchott			Startsev, Vladimir I. (Feb. 7, 1975)	
Mauritius	Port Louis			Safronov, Il'ya I. (Jan. 13, 1976)	
Mexico	Mexico City		Mexico City	Sergeyev, Rostislav A. (Apr. 7, 1980)	
Monaco					Relations never established.
Mongolia	Ulaanbaatar		Ulaanbaatar	Smirnov, Alexkandr I. (June 29, 1973)	
Morocco	Rabat	Casablanca	Rabat	Nersesov, Yevgeniy V. (Sept. 27, 1978)	
Mozambique	Maputo		Maputo	Vdovin, Valentin P. (May 22, 1980)	
Nauru					The USSR extended recognition February 1, 1968, but diplomatic relations not established.
Nepal	Kathmandu			Vezirov, Abul-Rakhman K. (Sept. 7, 1979)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Netherlands	The Hague		The Hague	Tolstikov, Vasiliy S. (Dec. 29, 1978)	
New Zealand	Wellington				Vladimir Azarushkin, Chargé d'Affaires, also accredited to Tonga and Western Samoa. Former Soviet Ambassador to Wellington, Vsevolod Sofinsky, was expelled January 1980.
Nicaragua	Managua			Shlyapnikov, German Ye. (Jan. 9, 1980)	
Niger	Niamey			Kudashkin, Vladimir N. (Aug. 8, 1978)	
Nigeria	Lagos			Snegirev, Vladimir V. (May 25, 1978)	
Norway	Oslo	Svalbard	Oslo	Kirichenko, Yuriy A. (Mar. 14, 1975)	
Oman					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Pakistan	Islamabad	Karachi	Islamabad, Karachi	Smirnov, Vitaliy S. (June 30, 1980)	
Panama					Relations never established.
Papua New Guinea					USSR extended recognition September 16, 1975, but diplomatic relations not established.

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Paraguay					Relations never established.
Peru	Lima		Lima	Kuz'min, Leonid F. (Feb. 4, 1975)	
Philippines	Manila		Manila	Mikhaylov, Valerian V. (Oct. 20, 1977)	
Poland	Warsaw	Danzig, Gdansk, Krakow, Poznan, Szczecin	Warsaw	Aristov, Boris I. (Apr. 24, 1978)	
Portugal	Lisbon		Lisbon	Kalinin, Arnol'd I. (July 23, 1974)	
Qatar					USSR extended recognition September 10, 1971, but diplomatic relations not established.
Romania	Bucharest	Constanta	Bucharest	Drozdenko, Vasiliy I. (Mar. 9, 1971)	
Rwanda	Kigali			Rykov, Gennadiy V. (Apr. 12, 1978)	
Saint Lucia					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
San Marino					Relations established at consular level April 29, 1956, but have since lapsed.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Sao Tome and Principe	Sao Tome			D'Yakonov, Dmitriy A. (Sept. 27, 1978)	
Saudi Arabia					Relations established February 19, 1926; relations have lapsed since the closing of the legation in 1938.
Senegal	Dakar			Ter-Gazaryants, Georgiy A. (Apr. 6, 1973)	Ambassador also accredited to The Gambia.
Seychelles	Victoria			Startsev, Aleksandr K. (Apr. 1, 1977)	Ambassador also accredited to Comoros.
Sierra Leone	Freetown			Vorozhtsov, Aleksandr P. (Aug. 2, 1979)	
Singapore	Singapore		Singapore	Potapenko, Fedor I. (Apr. 14, 1980)	
Solomon Islands					USSR extended recognition July 6, 1978, but diplomatic relations not established.
Somalia	Mogadishu		Mogadishu	Aldoshin, Vladimir V. (Nov. 15, 1978)	
South Africa					Consular relations established with Union of South Africa February 21, 1942; severed February 1, 1956.
Spain	Madrid		Madrid	Dubinina, Yuriy V. (Sept. 6, 1978)	
Sri Lanka	Colombo		Colombo	Pasyutin, Aleksey S. (Aug. 25, 1978)	Ambassador also accredited to Maldives.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Sudan	Khartoum		Khartoum	Zhukov, Vladislav P. (Dec. 28, 1978)	
Suriname	Paramaribo			Romanov, Leonid M. (Aug. 18, 1978)	Ambassador resides in Colombia.
Swaziland					USSR extended recognition September 5, 1968, but diplomatic relations not established.
Sweden	Stockholm	Gothenburg	Stockholm	Yakovlev, Mikhail D. (May 20, 1971)	
Switzerland	Bern	Bern, Geneva	Bern	Lavrov, Vladimir S. (Oct. 12, 1977)	
Syria	Damascus	Aleppo	Damascus	Yukhin, Vladimir S. (Apr. 13, 1979)	
Taiwan					Relations never established.
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	Zanzibar		Yukalov, Yuriy A. (Feb. 25, 1980)	
Thailand	Bangkok		Bangkok	Kuznetsov, Yuriy I. (June 14, 1978)	
Togo	Lome		Lome	Ilyukhin, Ivan A. (Aug. 31, 1978)	
Tonga	Nuku'alofa				Vladimir Azarushkin, Chargé d'Affaires, resides in New Zealand.
Trinidad and Tobago	Port-of-Spain			Vyalyas, Vayno I. (Oct. 4, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Venezuela.



<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Tunisia	Tunis			Kizichenko, Vsevolod (May 19, 1981)	
Turkey	Ankara	Istanbul	Ankara, Istanbul	Rodionov, Aleksey A. (Dec. 13, 1974)	
Tuvalu					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Uganda	Kampala		Kampala	Bukin, Sergey A. (June 28, 1979)	
United Arab Emirates					USSR extended recognition December 8, 1971, but diplomatic relations not established.
United Kingdom	London		London	Popov, Victor I. (Nov. 20, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Malta.
United States	Washington, D.C.	New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.	Milwaukee, New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.	Dobrynin, Anatoliy F. (Dec. 30, 1961)	
Upper Volta	Ouagadougou			Kazanskiy, Arkadiy N. (Sept. 27, 1978)	
Uruguay	Montevideo			Lebedev, Yuriy V. (June 22, 1978)	
Vanuatu					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Vatican City					Relations never established.
Venezuela	Caracas		Caracas	Vyalyas, Vayno I. (May 20, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Trinidad and Tobago.
Vietnam	Hanoi	Ho Chi Minh City	Hanoi, Haiphong, Danang	Chaplin, Boris N. (Oct. 11, 1974)	
Western Samoa	Apia				Vladimir Azarushkin, Chargé d'Affaires, resides in New Zealand.
Yemen (Aden)	Aden		Aden	Fedotov, Feliks N. (Nov. 15, 1980)	
Yemen (Sanaa)		Hodeida, Taiz		Peresyppkin, Oleg G. (July 13, 1980)	
Yugoslavia	Belgrade	Zagreb	Belgrade	Rodionov, Nikolay N. (Apr. 24, 1978)	
Zaire	Kinshasa			Marchuk, Ivan I. (Aug. 13, 1979)	
Zambia	Lusaka			Solodovnikov, Vasiliy G. (June 23, 1976)	
Zimbabwe					Diplomatic relations established February 18, 1981. Zimbabwe Foreign Minister formalized relations at the ambassadorial level February 21, 1981. As of early June, 12 Soviet diplomats had arrived in Salisbury to set up the new Soviet Embassy.

RECIPROCITY: U.S.-SOVIET EMBASSY COMPOUNDS

FILE -  
RECIP.

34

1. May 16, 1969: First written agreement between the U.S. and the USSR. Conditions set forth in this agreement include: 85-year lease hold of property; the construction of both projects must begin simultaneously.
2. December 4, 1972: Second agreement. This agreement designated the conditions for construction of both projects -- the maximum height of complex, the need to exchange design plans, the chanceries would be occupied simultaneously, but all other buildings (residencies) could be occupied at any time.
3. 1975: The U.S. released an environmental impact statement on the Soviet Embassy complex (completed by General Services).
4. July 31, 1975: The National Capital Planning Commission approved the final site for the Soviet Embassy complex and their building plans. Our site in Moscow had not been approved and the design plans had not been reviewed.
5. Fall 1975: The U.S. gave the Soviets permission to construct their residencies before ours would be built.
6. March 26, 1977: A Protocol was signed in Moscow on the terms that we permit them to construct their residencies before ours.

NOTE: Soviet approval of U.S. design plans still had not been received, even though their plans had been approved in 1975! They had not even reviewed our construction plans so as to provide any necessary changes they deemed necessary.

7. March 30, 1977: Exchange of Notes (re: Formal exchange of sites).
8. August 30, 1977: Soviet Embassy signed the construction contract for their complex in Washington, D.C.
9. October 1977: Soviets started preparatory work for our site.
10. July 1979: The U.S. signed the construction contract for the Embassy complex in Moscow (which entails 51 months of construction).

Other Considerations

- a. Recreational centers were to be built on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets have a recreational center in Maryland; at present, we have nothing comparable in Moscow. Reportedly, this is being negotiated.
- b. The Soviets already occupy their residencies; our complex in Moscow is only 15 percent completed.

c. Our chancery and residencies are being built together. The Soviets have not put out a bid to U.S. construction firms to build their chancery.

d. Some of the present difficulties which we face in constructing our complex in Moscow include: (1) Construction materials are held up for weeks in customs. (2) Some materials are placed in warehouses outside of Moscow. Thus, there are even further delays since these goods have to be picked up and brought into Moscow.

*Handwritten notes in the left margin, including the word "chancery" written vertically.*



written?  
1st Agreement - conditions:

May 16, 1969 - 85 year lease hold of property; free use of charge of plots of land (not leasing); determined there would be simultaneous construction of projects.

Dec. 4, 1972 - second agreement: provided for conditions for construction of both projects - maximum height, design plans, - exchanged chanceries would be occupied simultaneously and all other buildings could be occupied at any time. - residences.

1975- US - environmental impact statement released on Soviet Embassy complex. (by General Services); National Capital Planning Commission on July 31, 1975 approved final cite for Soviet Embassy complex and building plans. US not approved.

Fall 1975 - Soviets given permission to construct residences before ours would be built.

1976 - negotiations ensued on the above issue.

March 26, 1977 - Protocol signed in Moscow on terms that we permit them to construct residencey before ours. Note: formal Soviet approval of U.S. design plans were not received, even though their design plans had been approved.

They had not even reviews our construction plans and provided those changes they deemed necessary.

-- declined in desing fees that Soviets charged; elimination of 10% administrative charge - services to Embassies

-- immediate occupancy of U.S. cite (did not occur unti 1 1979 Sept. /Oct. - with ground breaking ceremony.)

-- accept of our construction costs.

--Soviets started preparatory work for our cite Oct. 1, 1977 and initiated full construction by May 15, 1978, completed by July 1, 1982

Who's doing our construction?

// -- Make available certain property - schools, apartments, warehouse, recreational center ✓

March 30, 1977 - Exchange of Notes - formal exchange of cites.

August 30, 1977 - Soviet Embassy signed the construction contract for their complex in Washington D.C.

1977-78

???? 1977 - U.S. condicuted in Moscow on technical details meetings of u.s. projects.

// July 1979 - final signing - 51 mnths constw. projected const. time = 543.  
Construction - began fall/winter 1979.

Reciprocity - provision that chancery must be const4ructed simultaneously

REcreation property simultaneously

sovis Have standing building but not occupied.  
Our building is 15% completed

chancery/consultate - 2 year construction period  
Haven't put out bid for u.s. consturciton firms

Obstacles: (1) we are importing our materials - held up at customs  
- w/ no warehouse - labor in picking up.

(2)

37

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Org. <sup>A.</sup> May 16, 1969 - - 85 yr. leasehold  
of property  
free use of charge of plots of  
land (not leasing)

- Simultaneously  
construct. of projects

B.) Dec. 4, 1972 - 2nd agreement.

provided for condit. for construct.  
of both projects -

maximum height

design plans

chancery occupied simult.

& all other bldgs can be  
occupied any at time

(residencies).

C) 1975 - (G Services) - environmental st. -  
impact on Sov. Embassy  
complex.

- Nat'l Capital Planning Commis.  
July 31, 75 - approved  
federal site  
& bldg. plans.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

fall 1975 - <sup>Sov.</sup> permis. to construct,  
residencies - before ours

76 - negotiations on above  
Jan-March - 77 -

↓  
26 1977 - Protocol signed <sup>in Moscow</sup>  
in Moscow on terms  
that we permit them to  
construct residency. -

- 1) formal <sup>Soviet</sup> approval of US design plans  
(not received)
- 2) immediate  
Sovs had not had drawings -  
not even  
to provide as they felt  
necessary -  
in our construction
- 3) ↓ in design fees that Sovs  
charge to



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- elimination of 10% administrative  
 charge - services to Embassy
- immediate occupancy of  
 US site. !! (not occur  
 → until ~~not~~ 1979)  
 - Sept/Oct.)  
<sup>and</sup> breaking ceremony
  - accept. of our construction  
 costs.
  - SAs start prep. work for our  
 site Oct. 1 77, & initiate  
 full construction by May 15 1978
  - Complete by July 1, 1982.
  - make avail. certain  
 property ~~at~~ schools, apts.  
 warehouse,  
 recreational

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 30 1977

Exchange of notes - formal  
of sites.

July 30 '77 - Sov. Emb. signed  
the construction <sup>contract</sup> for their  
complex in Wash. D.C.

Summer 77 - on technical details <sup>in Moscow</sup> w/pt.  
of US projects

> Construction - until <sup>fall/winter</sup> 1979

Recipr. - provis<sup>on</sup> that chancery  
must be constructed  
simultaneously.

→ Recreation property (US/Sov.)  
- <sup>simultaneously</sup> ~~have~~ standing bldg - but not  
occupied.

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1)

projected construction time : 5413,  
4(3 months)  
final signing - July 1979 → 51 months  
construction time allotted

- Jim van (armenling) <sup>ham</sup> → COMPOUND 43

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1962-64: 10 yrs.

projected construction: 5 yrs.

July 1979 - 51 months  
(final signing) construction

632-2071

44

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

> Our bldg is 15% completed

chancery / consulate - 2 yrs.

Construction period

→ have<sup>4</sup> put out bid for US construction firms

Sovs. have less time - than ours.

— (simultaneously)

↓  
Obstacles - we are importing our materials (bricks)

12- > Noon Discussion

Noon  
→ Commentator

— Noon Discussion

RECIPROCITY: U.S.-SOVIET EMBASSY COMPOUNDS

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could  
would be occupied simultaneously, but all other buildings (residencies) could be occupied at any time.

their  
terms that we permit them to construct their residencies  
negotiated.

b. The Soviets already occupy their residencies; our complex in Moscow is only 15 percent completed.



BUREAU OF  
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CURRENT  
ANALYSES

## SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND REPRESENTATION

### Summary

This paper, intended as an informal research aid, lists those countries with which the USSR has diplomatic, consular, and/or commercial relations and includes the name and date of accreditation of each Soviet ambassador. Also listed are countries with which the USSR has not exchanged diplomatic representation but which it has recognized, either unilaterally or reciprocally. Unilateral Soviet recognition, indicated in the "Notes" column, is recognition generally extended to a new nation by an official statement without reciprocation from the recognized party. This is a relatively informal diplomatic category which does not necessarily indicate Soviet willingness to establish formal diplomatic relations.

Other aspects of representation that are included:

- Ambassadors accredited to another country, with which the USSR has diplomatic relations but where no diplomatic mission exists per se, are so indicated.
- Because an embassy generally includes a consular section, only consulates separate from the embassy are specifically listed.
- "Commercial Representation" indicates commercial or economic organs (e.g., Sovexport, Sovfrakht, and Aeroflot) that have their own commercial office, or a general Commercial Representatives Office separate from the embassy. In many cases, such offices were opened prior to the establishment of a diplomatic mission.

UNCLASSIFIED

Report 165-CA  
June 22, 1981



## SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND REPRESENTATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Afghanistan	Kabul		Kabul	Tabeyev, Fikryat A. (Nov. 5, 1979)	The USSR concluded a consular agreement with Afghanistan May 24, 1981.
Albania					USSR suspended diplomatic relations December 3, 1961.
Algeria	Algiers	Annaba, Oran	Algiers	Rykov, Vasiliy N. (Mar. 26, 1975)	
Andorra					Relations never established.
Angola	Luanda		Luanda	Loginov, Vadim P. (Mar. 7, 1978)	
Argentina	Buenos Aires		Buenos Aires	Striganov, Sergey R. (July 31, 1978)	
Australia	Canberra	Sydney, New South Wales	Canberra	Sudarikov, Nikolay G. (Sept. 17, 1979)	Ambassador also accredited to Fiji.
Austria	Vienna	Salzburg	Vienna	Yefremov, Mikhail T. (Mar. 6, 1975)	
Bahamas, The					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Bahrain					USSR extended recognition August 1972, but diplo- matic relations not established.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Bangladesh	Dacca	Chittagong	Dacca	Stepanov, Valentin P. (Feb. 13, 1976)	
Barbados					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Belgium	Brussels	Antwerp	Brussels	Romanovskiy, Sergey K. (Apr. 14, 1975)	
Benin	Cotonou			Agapov, Vitaliy I. (Mar. 28, 1979)	
Bhutan					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Bolivia	La Paz		La Paz	Kovalev, Sergey I. (Mar. 21, 1981)	
Botswana	Gaborone			Petrov, Mikhail N. (Dec. 8, 1977)	
Brazil	Brasilia		Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo		Soviet Ambassador to Costa Rica Vladimir Chernyshev will be transferred to Brasilia in early July.
Bulgaria	Sofia	Sofia	Plovdiv, Varna	Tolubeyev, Nikita P. (Mar. 28, 1979)	
Burma	Rangoon		Rangoon	Kuznetsov, Vladimir N. (Aug. 6, 1980)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Burundi	Bujumbura			Levikov, Valeriy Z. (Dec. 26, 1979)	
Cameroon	Yaounde		Yaounde	Zykov, Spartak S. (Nov. 9, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Chad.
Canada	Ottawa	Montreal	Montreal	Yakovlev, Aleksandr N. (May 15, 1973)	
Cape Verde	Praia		Praia	Krylov, Lev V. (June 18, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Guinea-Bissau.
Central African Republic					Relations were severed in January 1980 at the initiative of the CAR.
Chad	N'Djamena			Zykov, Spartak S. (Nov. 9, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Cameroon.
Chile					Relations established December 11, 1944, broken off October 27, 1947; reestablished November 24, 1964, broken off October 21, 1973.
China, People's Republic of	Beijing		Beijing	Shcherbakov, Il'ya S. (July 19, 1978)	
Colombia	Bogota		Bogota	Romanov, Leonid M. (July 13, 1978)	Ambassador also accredited to Suriname.
Comoros	Moroni			Startsev, Aleksandr K. (Dec. 29, 1977)	Ambassador resides in the Seychelles.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Congo	Brazzaville			Kuznetsov, Sergey A. (Sept. 6, 1978)	
Costa Rica	San Jose		San Jose		Soviet Ambassador to Costa Rica Vladimir Chernyshev will be transferred to Brasilia in early July; his replacement has not been named.
Cuba	Havana	Santiago de Cuba	Havana	Vorotnikov, Vitaliy I. (Feb. 21, 1979)	
Cyprus	Nicosia		Nicosia	Astavin, Sergey T. (July 4, 1973)	
Czechoslovakia	Prague	Bratislava, Brno, Karlovy Vary	Prague	Botvin, Aleksandr P. (Jan. 16, 1980)	
Denmark	Copenhagen		Copenhagen	Yegorychev, Nikolay G. (Apr. 16, 1970)	
Djibouti	Djibouti			Peryshkin, Viktor A. (Nov. 15, 1978)	
Dominica					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Dominican Republic					Diplomatic relations maintained from March 8, 1945, until 1947. No missions have been exchanged since.
Ecuador	Quito		Quito	Kovalev, Feliks N. (Mar. 4, 1980)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Egypt	Cairo	Alexandria, Port Said	Cairo	Polyakov, Vladimir P. (Mar. 29, 1974)	
El Salvador					Relations never established.
Equatorial Guinea	Malabo			Krasnikov, Boris A. (Aug. 28, 1980)	
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa			Kirnasovskiy, Boris Ye. (Nov. 15, 1978)	
Fiji	Suva		Suva	Sudarikov, Nikolay G. (Nov. 30, 1979)	Ambassador resides in Australia.
Finland	Helsinki	Maarianhamina, Turku	Helsinki	Sobolev, Vladimir M. (May 24, 1979)	
France	Paris	Marseilles	Paris	Chervonenko, Stepan V. (Apr. 28, 1973)	
Gabon	Libreville			Uranov, Gennadiy V. (Nov. 3, 1978)	
Gambia, The	Banjul			Ter-Gazaryants, Georgiy A. (Apr. 6, 1973)	Ambassador resides in Senegal.
German Demo- cratic Republic	East Berlin	Leipzig, Rostock	East Berlin	Abrasimov, Petr A. (Mar. 6, 1975)	
Germany, Federal Republic of	Bonn	Hamburg, West Berlin	Bonn	Semenov, Vladimir S. (Nov. 3, 1978)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Ghana	Accra		Accra	Ivantsov, Anatoliy I. (Sept. 18, 1979)	
Greece	Athens		Athens	Kaboshkin, Vladimir F. (Sept. 7, 1979)	
Grenada	St. Georges			Musin, Dmitriy P. (Apr. 23, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Jamaica.
Guatemala					Relations established April 19, 1945. A Guatemalan Legation opened in Moscow but closed again in July 1946. No missions have been exchanged since.
Guinea	Conakry		Conakry	Minin, Viktor I. (Apr. 18, 1978)	
Guinea-Bissau	Bissau		Bissau	Krylov, Lev V. (June 18, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Cape Verde.
Guyana	Georgetown			Kharchev, Konstantin M. (Mar. 5, 1981)	
Haiti					Relations never established.
Honduras					Relations never established.
Hungary	Budapest		Budapest	Pavlov, Vladimir Ya. (Mar. 12, 1971)	
Iceland	Reykjavik			Streltsov, Mikhail N. (June 26, 1979)	
India	New Delhi	Bombay, Calcutta, Madras	Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi	Vorontsov, Yuliy M. (Dec. 19, 1977)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Indonesia	Jakarta	Medan, Surabaya	Jakarta, Medan	Shpek'ko, Ivan F. (May 27, 1976)	
Iran	Tehran	Resht	Tehran	Vinogradov, Vladimir M. (Jan. 17, 1977)	
Iraq	Baghdad		Baghdad	Barkovskiy, Anatoliy A. (Dec. 17, 1973)	
Ireland	Dublin			Nesterenko, Aleksey Ye. (Mar. 20, 1980)	
Israel					Relations established May 18, 1948; severed February 11, 1953; re- established July 15, 1953. Legation raised to Embassy level May 13, 1954. The USSR severed relations again on June 9, 1967, as a result of the Six-Day War. (Finland represents Soviet interests in Israel.)
Italy	Rome	Genoa, Milan	Rome, Turin	Lun'kov, Nikolay M. (Nov. 5, 1980)	
Ivory Coast					Relations established January 23, 1967; severed May 30, 1969.

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Jamaica	Kingston		Kingston	Musin, Dmitriy P. (Mar. 3, 1978)	Ambassador also accredited to Grenada.
Japan	Tokyo	Osaka, Sapporo	Tokyo	Polyanskiy, Dmitriy S. (Apr. 15, 1976)	
Jordan	Amman		Amman	Nishanov, Rafik N. (Apr. 28, 1978)	
Kampuchea				Bostorin, Oleg V. (May 10, 1979)	USSR recognized the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council headed by Heng Samrin January 9, 1980. (The UN recognizes Democratic Kampuchea.)
Kenya	Nairobi		Nairobi	Miroshnichenko, Boris P. (Nov. 11, 1973)	
Kiribati					USSR extended recognition July 12, 1979, but diplomatic relations not established.
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	Pyongyang		Pyongyang	Kriulin, Gleb A. (Aug. 6, 1974)	
Korea, Republic of					Relations never established.
Kuwait	Kuwait			Sikachev, Nikolay N. (Feb. 18, 1975)	



<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Laos	Vientiane		Vientiane	Sobchenko, Vladimir F. (Sept. 16, 1980)	
Lebanon	Beirut		Beirut	Soldatov, Aleksandr A. (Oct. 10, 1974)	
Lesotho					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Liberia	Monrovia		Monrovia	Ulanov, Anatoliy A. (Oct. 27, 1977)	On May 12, 1981, Liberian Head of State Doe ordered the Soviets to reduce their diplomatic staff from 15 to 6, according to a Liberian press report.
Libya	Tripoli			Anisimov, Anatoliy V. (Aug. 15, 1977)	
Liechtenstein					Relations never established.
Luxembourg	Luxembourg		Luxembourg	Udum'yan, Kamo B. (Sept. 13, 1979)	
Madagascar	Antananarivo		Antananarivo	Musatov, Leonid N. (May 15, 1980)	
Malawi					USSR extended recognition July 6, 1964, but diplomatic relations not established.
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur		Kuala Lumpur	Kulik, Boris T. (Apr. 20, 1978)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Maldives	Male			Pasyutin, Aleksey S. (Aug. 25, 1978)	Ambassador resides in Sri Lanka.
Mali	Bamako		Bamako	Fazylov, Malik S. (July 5, 1976)	
Malta	Valletta		Valletta	Popov, Viktor I. (Nov. 30, 1980)	Ambassador resides in the United Kingdom.
Mauritania	Nouakchott			Startsev, Vladimir I. (Feb. 7, 1975)	
Mauritius	Port Louis			Safronov, Il'ya I. (Jan. 13, 1976)	
Mexico	Mexico City		Mexico City	Sergeyev, Rostislav A. (Apr. 7, 1980)	
Monaco					Relations never established.
Mongolia	Ulaanbaatar		Ulaanbaatar	Smirnov, Alexkandr I. (June 29, 1973)	
Morocco	Rabat	Casablanca	Rabat	Nersesov, Yevgeniy V. (Sept. 27, 1978)	
Mozambique	Maputo		Maputo	Vdovin, Valentin P. (May 22, 1980)	
Nauru					The USSR extended recognition February 1, 1968, but diplomatic relations not established.
Nepal	Kathmandu			Vezirov, Abul-Rakhman K. (Sept. 7, 1979)	

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Netherlands	The Hague		The Hague	Tolstikov, Vasilii S. (Dec. 29, 1978)	
New Zealand	Wellington				Vladimir Azarushkin, Chargé d'Affaires, also accredited to Tonga and Western Samoa. Former Soviet Ambassador to Wellington, Vsevolod Sofinsky, was expelled January 1980.
Nicaragua	Managua			Shlyapnikov, German Ye. (Jan. 9, 1980)	
Niger	Niamey			Kudashkin, Vladimir N. (Aug. 8, 1978)	
Nigeria	Lagos			Snegirev, Vladimir V. (May 25, 1978)	
Norway	Oslo	Svalbard	Oslo	Kirichenko, Yuriy A. (Mar. 14, 1975)	
Oman					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Pakistan	Islamabad	Karachi	Islamabad, Karachi	Smirnov, Vitaliy S. (June 30, 1980)	
Panama					Relations never established.
Papua New Guinea					USSR extended recognition September 16, 1975, but diplomatic relations not established.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Paraguay					Relations never established.
Peru	Lima		Lima	Kuz'min, Leonid F. (Feb. 4, 1975)	
Philippines	Manila		Manila	Mikhaylov, Valerian V. (Oct. 20, 1977)	
Poland	Warsaw	Danzig, Gdansk, Krakow, Poznan, Szczecin	Warsaw	Aristov, Boris I. (Apr. 24, 1978)	
Portugal	Lisbon		Lisbon	Kalinin, Arnol'd I. (July 23, 1974)	
Qatar					USSR extended recognition September 10, 1971, but diplomatic relations not established.
Romania	Bucharest	Constanta	Bucharest	Drozdenko, Vasiliy I. (Mar. 9, 1971)	
Rwanda	Kigali			Rykov, Gennadiy V. (Apr. 12, 1978)	
Saint Lucia					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
San Marino					Relations established at consular level April 29, 1956, but have since lapsed.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Sao Tome and Principe	Sao Tome			D'Yakonov, Dmitriy A. (Sept. 27, 1978)	
Saudi Arabia					Relations established February 19, 1926; relations have lapsed since the closing of the legation in 1938.
Senegal	Dakar			Ter-Gazaryants, Georgiy A. (Apr. 6, 1973)	Ambassador also accredited to The Gambia.
Seychelles	Victoria			Startsev, Aleksandr K. (Apr. 1, 1977)	Ambassador also accredited to Comoros.
Sierra Leone	Freetown			Vorozhtsov, Aleksandr P. (Aug. 2, 1979)	
Singapore	Singapore		Singapore	Potapenko, Fedor I. (Apr. 14, 1980)	
Solomon Islands					USSR extended recognition July 6, 1978, but diplomatic relations not established.
Somalia	Mogadishu		Mogadishu	Aldoshin, Vladimir V. (Nov. 15, 1978)	
South Africa					Consular relations established with Union of South Africa February 21, 1942; severed February 1, 1956.
Spain	Madrid		Madrid	Dubinina, Yuriy V. (Sept. 6, 1978)	
Sri Lanka	Colombo		Colombo	Pasyutin, Aleksey S. (Aug. 25, 1978)	Ambassador also accredited to Maldives.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Sudan	Khartoum		Khartoum	Zhukov, Vladislav P. (Dec. 28, 1978)	
Suriname	Paramaribo			Romanov, Leonid M. (Aug. 18, 1978)	Ambassador resides in Colombia.
Swaziland					USSR extended recognition September 5, 1968, but diplomatic relations not established.
Sweden	Stockholm	Gothenburg	Stockholm	Yakovlev, Mikhail D. (May 20, 1971)	
Switzerland	Bern	Bern, Geneva	Bern	Lavrov, Vladimir S. (Oct. 12, 1977)	
Syria	Damascus	Aleppo	Damascus	Yukhin, Vladimir S. (Apr. 13, 1979)	
Taiwan					Relations never established.
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	Zanzibar		Yukalov, Yuriy A. (Feb. 25, 1980)	
Thailand	Bangkok		Bangkok	Kuznetsov, Yuriy I. (June 14, 1978)	
Togo	Lome		Lome	Ilyukhin, Ivan A. (Aug. 31, 1978)	
Tonga	Nuku'alofa				Vladimir Azarushkin, Chargé d'Affaires, resides in New Zealand.
Trinidad and Tobago	Port-of-Spain			Vyalyas, Vayno I. (Oct. 4, 1980)	Ambassador resides in Venezuela.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Tunisia	Tunis			Kizichenko, Vsevolod (May 19, 1981)	
Turkey	Ankara	Istanbul	Ankara, Istanbul	Rodionov, Aleksey A. (Dec. 13, 1974)	
Tuvalu					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.
Uganda	Kampala		Kampala	Bukin, Sergey A. (June 28, 1979)	
United Arab Emirates					USSR extended recognition December 8, 1971, but diplomatic relations not established.
United Kingdom	London		London	Popov, Victor I. (Nov. 20, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Malta.
United States	Washington, D.C.	New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.	Milwaukee, New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.	Dobrynin, Anatoliy F. (Dec. 30, 1961)	
Upper Volta	Ouagadougou			Kazanskiy, Arkadiy N. (Sept. 27, 1978)	
Uruguay	Montevideo			Lebedev, Yuriy V. (June 22, 1978)	
Vanuatu					USSR extended recognition, but diplomatic relations not established.

<u>Country</u>	<u>Embassy</u>	<u>Consulate</u>	<u>Commercial Rep.</u>	<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Vatican City					Relations never established.
Venezuela	Caracas		Caracas	Vyalyas, Vayno I. (May 20, 1980)	Ambassador also accredited to Trinidad and Tobago.
Vietnam	Hanoi	Ho Chi Minh City	Hanoi, Haiphong, Danang	Chaplin, Boris N. (Oct. 11, 1974)	
Western Samoa	Apia				Vladimir Azarushkin, Chargé d'Affaires, resides in New Zealand.
Yemen (Aden)	Aden		Aden	Fedotov, Feliks N. (Nov. 15, 1980)	
Yemen (Sanaa)		Hodeida, Taiz		Peresyarkin, Oleg G. (July 13, 1980)	
Yugoslavia	Belgrade	Zagreb	Belgrade	Rodionov, Nikolay N. (Apr. 24, 1978)	
Zaire	Kinshasa			Marchuk, Ivan I. (Aug. 13, 1979)	
Zambia	Lusaka			Solodovnikov, Vasiliy G. (June 23, 1976)	
Zimbabwe					Diplomatic relations established February 18, 1981. Zimbabwe Foreign Minister formalized relations at the ambassadorial level February 21, 1981. As of early June, 12 Soviet diplomats had arrived in Salisbury to set up the new Soviet Embassy.



# NEW WEST

## THE SPIES AMONG US

"Hi. I'm, uh, Jeff. I used to work in Silicon Valley, but now I live at the Marina and I'm into aerospace. So what's happening?"



# OPERATION CALIFORNIA

## How We Became Russia's Secret Weapon

**T**O MOST OF THE world, California is the source of nothing more deadly than navel oranges, network sit-coms, and Jerry Brown. But the Russians know better. They have discovered

the state to be a treasure trove of strategic hardware—most of it easy pickings. Through both espionage and illegal business dealings with California companies, they have helped themselves to technology they could not develop on their own. Innocently, unwittingly, we have become the Soviet Union's secret weapon in the global arms race.

California is now the mother lode of American defense technology, a tempting target indeed. Fifty-six percent of America's guided missiles and space vehicles are manufactured here. So are 40 percent of all semiconductors, 25 percent of all computer equipment, and 21 percent of all optical instruments. In fact, a single county in California—Santa Clara, home of the storied Silicon Valley—produces one-quarter of the United States' supply of semiconductors, those tiny wafers of technological genius that are as important to intercontinental ballistic missiles as to electronic pinball games.

The deceptive innocence of the silicon chip suggests the crucial misperception that turned California's defense industry into a kind of military shopping mall: we took it for granted while our enemies did not. The fact that the guy next door wore a security clearance badge on his shirt pocket was utterly unremarkable. My own stepfather is an aerospace engineer, and more than one dinner conversation at our house ended with the familiar phrase,



*East meets West Coast: in Red Square parades, the Soviet military struts our stuff.*

“That’s classified.” But his role in designing the Minuteman missile or the B-1 bomber seemed no more exotic to me than, say, the erupting volcano that I used to see on the MGM back lot be-

hind our house. It was all part of growing up in California.

Indeed, the transfer of military technology to the Soviet Union reflects some of the very best qualities of the American spirit and the California way of life: energy, exuberance, optimism, and a mangled sort of innocence. At some point we stopped fearing the Russians; the thought of a Soviet spy in a trench coat and fedora under the sunny California skies seemed laughable. Anyway, the spirit of détente was abroad in the land, and the prevailing backlash against the Red scare of the fifties made it unfashionable to distrust our partners in peaceful coexistence. We were exchanging students, but it was not a fair trade—a literature major from Van Nuys, maybe, in exchange for a computer expert from Vladivostok. Only now are we discovering how deeply the Soviet Union has penetrated our defense technology through the open door of California.

On the following pages we take a close look at the Soviets' California connection. On page 78, Rian Malan explores the curious activities of the Soviet consulate in San Francisco—an example of Russian intrigue, California style. And on page 86, Ehud Yonay exposes the dangerous implications of what is known euphemistically as “technology transfer”—an act of commerce that may send one California entrepreneur to prison for selling laser mirrors to the Russians. —Jonathan Kirsch



# THE SPIES AMONG US

**C**ARVED INTO THE shoulder of one of San Francisco's steeper hills, Pacific Heights is a place of deep tranquility—sedate, expensive, blessed with a heart-stopping view of the Bay and the western fringes of the city's high-rise financial district. The view is no doubt particularly spectacular from the top floor of the seven-story brick building at 2790 Green Street, but the current tenant may have another reason for liking the vantage point. The building also commands an unobstructed line of sight to Pacific Telephone's Oakland transmission tower, and that can be very useful for a Soviet consulate.

The Russians behind the consulate's screened windows are using sophisticated microwave-intercept equipment to snatch telephone calls out of the ether, or so say the FBI agents who keep constant watch on the consulate from a command post on the upper floor of a nearby house. They say they are certain that the Soviets are eavesdropping on San Francisco's telephone conversations, but they don't know who the targets are—a fairly common predicament for the tiny band of American lawmen who shadowbox their Soviet adversaries up and down the San Francisco peninsula. "The question," says one FBI special agent, "is, whose calls are they monitoring? Hewlett-Packard's? Bechtel's?"

Until recently, San Francisco's espionage war was cool, circumspect, and invisible, its skirmishes marked only by sudden

The Russians didn't open a consulate in San Francisco for the sourdough.

BY  
RIAN  
MALAN

revisions of the Soviet diplomatic roster as the Kremlin eased out its compromised agents. In June, however, the FBI launched a campaign to alert the public to the problem of white-collar crime. Included was an antiespionage TV and radio commercial so unusual in peacetime and so redolent of World War II's "loose lips sink ships" propaganda that it is hard to shake the feeling the bureau fears it is losing the day.

The FBI's mouthpiece for this campaign is Efrem Zimbalist, Jr., square-jawed star of its old television series, and he narrates his media spots with a Cold War earnestness that would have made J. Edgar Hoover swell with pride. "Hostile foreign intelligence services," he intones, "continue to be vitally interested in illegally acquiring U.S. advanced technology." He warns that "unscrupulous Americans" are helping them and finally exhorts the citizenry to dial 55-CRIME "if you see this happening in your area." The mere fact that the FBI is breaking the silence that normally surrounds this subject is remarkable, a measure of the Reagan administration's alarm at the ease with which the Russians are circumventing the 21-month-old embargo on high-technology trade with the Soviet Union. The urgency of Zimbalist's message, the bizarre appeal to the public to keep its eyes peeled for Reds, underscores the difficulty the FBI faces: plugging the high-tech export conduits linking California and Moscow will be no easy task.

That job, according to FBI sources, has now become the top priority of the agency's San Francisco station, along with

*Outside the consulate Soviets come and go, speaking of high-tech men they know.*

*Rian Malan is coauthor of last month's "Life on the Fault Lines."*



monitoring organized crime. But the FBI push comes after years of neglect, and at the moment, as far as it's possible to gauge these things, the bureau is still coming to grips with the problem. "We're trying to ascertain if what I'm about to describe to you is true," says one FBI source, a counterintelligence specialist. "We believe the Soviets have set up business fronts in Europe, and sometimes the United States, that act as contacts and purchasing agents for them. Often the people who deal with these fronts are totally unwitting accomplices. They're told their products are going to Europe or Scandinavia, but they're being rerouted to the Soviet Union. And what we're trying to do is find the American connections."

At least some of those connections, the FBI surmises, will lead back to Green Street, to the bland consular building that merges so easily into its quiet surroundings. Neighbors hardly notice that the Russians are around—except for the occasionally poor TV reception, which supposedly coincides with the consulate's daily "dump" of encoded data into a satellite somewhere overhead. The people of Pacific Heights get along quite well with the stolid Russians who walk their children to the nearby park on summer evenings. If anything, the Soviets are a welcome presence. With crime soaring elsewhere in the city, neighbors are grateful for the FBI agents the Russians attract to Green Street. San Francisco as a whole seems equally comfortable with the Soviet delegation, with local newspapers devoting more space to the consul general's exploits on the cocktail party circuit than to the consulate's less visible but more important function.

That function is intelligence gathering, an activity that may occupy the staff of the U.S. consulate in Leningrad as well. Both missions were opened in 1973 under a reciprocal deal in which the Soviets, as usual in the halcyon days of détente, got more than they gave. For example, they were allowed to station three employees in San Francisco for every two Americans in Leningrad. FBI analysts insist there was never enough work to justify such a swollen Soviet roster. Most of the consulate's 100 employees, in fact, have little to do but process 6,000 visa applications and a dwindling number of trade deals each year. That leaves plenty of time, and staff, for intelligence work. The FBI has identified at least fourteen members of the Russian contingent as agents of the KGB or GRU (Soviet military intelligence), five to eight of whom are "S and T" men—science and technology specialists, the sophisticated new breed of Soviet intelligence operative. FBI sources presume other staffers are "wearing two hats," as one agent puts it—that is, performing legitimate consular chores while snooping on the side. And unlike Leningrad, which is fallow ground for American spies, San Francisco is within striking distance of a

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## "Although Silicon Valley's advanced technology seemed headed for the Soviet Union, local sheriffs at first couldn't interest the FBI."

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snooper's paradise: Santa Clara's Silicon Valley, 40 miles to the south.

Over the past decade the Valley has developed and refined a remarkable product: the microprocessor, a fingernail-size sliver of silicon capable of performing tasks that would have defeated a roomful of machinery twenty years ago. These devices are transforming the way we live—and, potentially, the way we will die in wars. Over the next decade the Pentagon will invest at least \$245 billion in its electronic warfare arsenal—"smart" bombs, laser and particle-beam weapons, lightning-swift communications networks, omniscient radar and jamming devices—all dependent on Silicon Valley's tiny stock-in-trade. "The revolution in microtechnology," says William Perry, undersecretary of defense in the Carter administration, "is the most significant advance in weaponry since the atom bomb."

The bomb was developed under watertight security of the kind that exists in Silicon Valley only on the premises of defense contractors. Meanwhile, the real high-technology action has shifted to the Valley's loosely policed civilian sector, the computer chip cowboys who left the Pentagon's research and development men standing flat-footed at least a decade ago. By 1979 an electronic warfare industry trade journal reported that the microprocessors in video games were five years more advanced than those generally used by the American military.

For the technologically backward Soviets, especially, the devices spinning off Silicon Valley's assembly lines represent an important new technology with devastating military applications. Americans, on

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the other hand, tend to regard these advanced microprocessors as the means to swifter business computers or better Space Invaders games and guard them accordingly. Security, such as it exists outside classified projects, is designed to thwart thieves and unscrupulous competitors, not defend the national interest. "The last thing we worry about," says Roger Borovoy, Intel Corporation's general counsel, "is things leaking to the Russians."

But for at least ten years, according to FBI Director William Webster, Silicon Valley's microprocessor technology and its offshoots have been a prime target for the Soviets. Nobody knows for sure how successful they have been, but the San Francisco connection is apparently paying off: plants in Zelenograd, the Soviet's mysterious fortress of high technology, are now turning out silicon chips based very closely on recent U.S. designs. Much of the manufacturing technology making this possible leaves California in the form of apparently legitimate exports to middlemen and distributors in Europe or the Third World, who in turn ship it eastward. The posse of San Francisco lawmen working to stop these diversions was painfully small until very recently—just one customs investigator, an FBI agent, occasional commerce investigators (none of whom were permanently based in San Francisco), and local police forces that often lacked the resources or expertise to solve complex high-technology cases. "It was at least as far back as 1973 that I first noticed Soviet attempts to get Silicon Valley technology," says veteran San Francisco customs investigator Chuck McLeod. "That's eight years now that there's been little to stop them."

The famous Boyce/Lee spy caper (see box on page 85) was coordinated out of the Green Street consulate, according to FBI sources, but San Francisco's Soviet agents usually rely on less dramatic means to siphon knowledge out of Silicon Valley. Intelligence sources say that consulate personnel pore over technical publications, attend trade and scientific conventions, call experts quoted in the media, arrange tête-à-têtes between Soviet scientists and their American counterparts, and dangle contracts in front of computer firms—pumping them for information in the negotiating process. The basic strategy, as the FBI sees it, is to win friends and influence people in Silicon Valley, then use them as witting or unwitting collaborators in schemes to beat the Commerce Department's embargo on high-technology trade with the Soviet Union.

One such scheme, hatched in 1975, was spectacularly successful—a Soviet intermediary talked cash-poor I.I. Industries of Sunnyvale into helping the Soviets export semiconductor manufacturing equipment (see box on page 85). It is not clear what involvement the consulate had in this case—the planning may have occurred abroad. But the consulate was involved in

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(continued from page 80)

a more recent attempt to cultivate two microprocessor experts who were not, as it happened, ripe for the picking. The men will talk about their experience only with anonymity, so we will call them Mike Burns and Cliff Inger. Their story provides a rare glimpse of San Francisco's Russian agents at work.

**T**HE MAN FROM THE CONSULATE who visited Mike Burns at his Bay Area-based microcomputer consulting firm in 1979 stood every American preconception about Russian style on its head. Yevgeniy G. Zhvakin was fiftyish, witty, cultured, sincere, and so well-tailored, Burns says, that you wouldn't have picked him out of a crowd of homeward-bound stockbrokers in San Francisco's financial district. He was also inscrutable. To this day, Burns is not quite sure what the Russian wanted from him. "It was a fishing expedition," he says. "Every now and then he'd drop low-key hints about possible favors. Was the company doing well? Did we need money? Lord knows, if he'd turned up two or three years earlier, I might very possibly have said yes."

Zhvakin, whose business card identified him as a Soviet vice consul, simply appeared on Burns's doorstep and announced that he wanted Burns's firm to evaluate a line of specialized microcomputers for him. Though this particular approach was a bit unusual, Burns was accustomed to being sought out by customers. After all, he was a major star in the microcomputer firmament, a consultant whose client list was laced with big Silicon Valley firms—which is probably why the Soviets found him interesting in the first place. The contract Zhvakin offered seemed innocuous, so Burns turned the Russian over to one of his engineers, Cliff Inger. No sooner were Inger and Zhvakin alone than the Russian offered him a handsome under-the-table fee (\$40 an hour) and asked him to complete the contract privately. It was a peculiar overture, and Inger felt the hairs prickling on the nape of his neck. The Russian requested a meeting outside the office. Inger agreed but called the FBI as soon as Zhvakin left.

Inger started negotiating with Zhvakin under FBI instructions, and as the weeks went by he began to see himself in the vortex of a hidden spy-versus-spy game. The Soviet would appear in his office like a wraith. "I have no idea what sort of car he drove," Inger says. "I never saw him come or go. It was like he walked in from the swamp."

Inger and Zhvakin's first clandestine meeting took place at a popular Berkeley lunch spot. Inger was so nervous about dealing with a man he had been told was

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# THE HIGH-TECH HUSTLERS

## A California rogues' gallery

**Christopher John Boyce** was a 23-year-old clerk at TRW's top-secret "black vault" room, where he handled some of the country's most sensitive spy



Boyce, the Falcon, has flown the coop.

satellite data. **Andrew Daulton Lee**, 25, was a dope dealer. In 1977 the two childhood friends from wealthy Palos Verdes were convicted on espionage charges for selling secrets to the Russians—a case Robert Lindsey later chronicled in his 1979 book *The Falcon and the Snowman*. The grateful Soviets never even had to make an approach. It was Boyce and Lee who wanted to cut a deal—Lee for money and Boyce to protest CIA dirty tricks. Lee is still in prison, but Boyce escaped last year and may have sold a manual on the supersecret KH-11 spy satellite to a Soviet agent in Lima, Peru. He recently boasted to a prison friend that he had stashed in the Arizona desert many other secret documents



... while Lee, the Snowman, remains in jail.

from his TRW days, which he intended to sell to the Russians.

It was a local case in a local court, so Santa Clara County prosecutors didn't concern themselves with international intrigue. They settled last July for convicting **Peter K. Gopal**, 42, of bribery, conspiracy, and receiving stolen prop-

erty. His case involved the \$10 million theft in 1978 of circuit memory devices from Intel and microprocessor designs from both National Semiconductor, Inc., and Zilog, Inc. The microprocessors can be used in everything from electronic toys to guided missiles, but a hint about their possible destination turned up among Gopal's papers. There, investigators found the business cards of Polish and Soviet trade officials.

**Marian Zacharski**, 29, a suspected Polish spy allegedly masquerading as a machinery company executive, reportedly used the oldest bait in the annals of espionage to hook **William Holden Bell**, 61, a Hughes Aircraft radar engineer. The bait was money, the setting was a poolside chat at their Playa del Rey apartment complex, and allegedly the debt-ridden Bell bit. Last July the two were indicted in federal court in Los Angeles on espionage charges related to the sale of secret defense information to the



Zacharski (left) and Bell: just poolside pals?

Polish government—specifically, the details of various weapons and radar systems. Bell's only consolation is that the notoriety may help him find a publisher for his unsold novel about a James Bond-like American agent.

Export documents indicated that the containers were filled with commercial washing machines, ovens, and used air conditioners. Not quite. The shipment, which in 1975 went from San Francisco to Russia, via Kansas, actually consisted of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and wafer scrubbers—the "washing machines," in industry parlance, that are used to clean silicon chips. In October 1979, **Gerald Starek**, 40, and **Carl Storey**, 48, pleaded guilty to exporting prohibited goods. They each received a five-year suspended sentence, three years probation, and a \$25,000 fine. Starek is already back in business, running a microcomputer equipment operation at a company called the Silicon Valley Group.

—Ehud Yonay

WIDE WORLD PHOTO

## MIRRORS FOR MOSCOW

(continued from page 85)

probably a KGB agent that he had to fight not to show it, but the suave Russian spent most of the meal talking about art and real estate. There was one odd thing about Zhvakin's behavior, though, something so subtle and discreet that Inger didn't realize it until the FBI brought it up later at a debriefing session. Zhvakin had maneuvered himself into a table from which he could watch everyone entering and leaving the teak-paneled dining room, and from time to time his eyes would dart to the door. He also made a phone call immediately after dessert, a snippet of information received with a knowing nod by the tall, blonde FBI agent on the case. The agent had Inger recall in painstaking detail every conversation he had with the Russian and wrote it all down on his yellow scratch pad. "He said he fed his information to someone in Washington who pieced together the whole picture," Inger says.

Things seemed to be going well until Inger, overworked, missed the deadline for completing the contract. From that point on Zhvakin seemed wary, although he and a senior colleague continued to pay regular visits to Burns and Inger's office, sometimes to bring gifts (such as a bottle of vodka), other times just to ask how the business was doing. Inger wonders if the Russian somehow discovered that the FBI was onto him—the blonde agent, also a regular visitor to the office, told Inger he had been trailing Zhvakin for two years and that they knew each other by sight. Inger will never find out because his Soviet connection was recalled to Moscow about nine months ago. Now Inger looks back on the affair more than a little wistfully.

"It was like an exciting dream that just went away," he says. "Very unusual for someone in my line."

**D**EALING WITH FOREIGN intrigue was unusual for someone in Wayne Brown's line, too. Until last July, when he left to take a job with a private security firm, Brown was a member of the organized crime unit of the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department. His specialty was undercover narcotics investigation, work that he approached with street-tough gusto. "There's nothing in this world like putting a punk in jail," Brown says. "I love it."

But in July 1979 he set out after a new kind of punk—the high-technology thief, whom the sheriff's department saw as a growing threat in Silicon Valley. And that's when he stumbled upon it: the Valley was being looted, Brown says, by a vast smuggling ring with Soviet connections. When he first tried to warn the FBI and

other federal agencies, he says, "nobody listened, nobody cared."

Brown penetrated the Valley's high-tech black market in a characteristically direct way. He would walk into a suspect electronics dealership, drop a microprocessor "insect" on the counter, and say, "It's hot. Want more?"

He found no shortage of takers. As Silicon Valley's computer chip trade boomed in the late seventies, it spawned a \$20-million-a-year black market almost as brazen and vigorous as its legitimate counterpart. The corruption reached clear into the industry's laboratories and assembly plants—as Intel discovered in 1979, when a black marketer in Europe began selling small batches of the company's revolutionary 2764 memory chip while the device was still undergoing tests in California. The man who allegedly pulled off this criminal coup was a dashing West German whose real name was Werner Bruchhausen, although he first cropped up in Brown's investigation under the alias Brendt Werner.

As Brown moved deeper into Silicon Valley's underground, he found that some of the stolen devices were allegedly being snapped up by a group of Los Angeles-based companies controlled by "Werner." There were whispered indications from informants that some of these components were finding their way to the Soviet Union, but Brown was skeptical—initially. If this was happening, he thought, the FBI would certainly know about it. "The Podunk Sheriff's Department should be the last to discover this sort of thing," he says. Instead, it was the first.

The evidence kept coming in, and by April 1980 Brown and his commanding officer, Lieutenant Bob McDiarmid, had pieced together a fragmentary picture of the startling whole: Bruchhausen and his Los Angeles associates were allegedly scouring Silicon Valley for high-technology components and exporting them through a maze of shell corporations in California, Europe, and Canada—40 in all. In addition to dipping into the black market, Santa Clara sheriffs say, the ring was openly shopping for microwave devices and radar filters—all legal purchases, gadgetry one can often order cash-on-delivery in Silicon Valley but not export without a Commerce Department license. And certainly not to Russia, which was allegedly the ultimate destination of the missile guidance system a Palo Alto defense contractor sold to Bruchhausen's Continental Technology Corporation.

Even more startling, Brown says, none of the federal agencies into whose export control territory his investigation had strayed seemed particularly interested in his discovery—commerce wasn't, nor was customs, nor even the FBI, which told McDiarmid that black-marketing was nothing more than "property crime." The sheriffs were reduced to tracing Bruch-

hausen's etiolated conduit by telephone.

It was only five months later, in September 1980, that federal authorities realized the significance of what was happening in Silicon Valley, and then it was simply by accident. Brown and McDiarmid were telling a law enforcement meeting in Los Angeles about "Brendt Werner" when stony-faced FBI and customs men suddenly whisked them off to Terminal Island, in Los Angeles Harbor, where they received a secret briefing. The federal agents were investigating Bruchhausen in connection with a major case of their own, which is now before a federal grand jury in Los Angeles.

But even with the FBI finally on the track, the federal bumbling didn't stop. Last October a top-secret scheme to trace a shipment of stolen microprocessors through Bruchhausen's paper maze turned into a fiasco. At the last minute somebody in Washington ordered U.S. Customs to enforce the letter of the law and impound the outward-bound shipment at Lufthansa's air freight office in San Francisco, undercover operation or not. It took 72 hours and a flurry of cross-country phone calls to straighten out the resulting snarl of cross-purposes, by which time anyone would have known better than to collect the contraband in Munich. A plan intended to lure Bruchhausen back to the United States from Monte Carlo, where he was allegedly hiding, also fizzled when someone in the federal bureaucracy leaked to the San Francisco press the news of the arrest of Roger Pitkin, Bruchhausen's alleged California connection in this case.

His Los Angeles attorney could not be reached for comment, but it is known that Bruchhausen vehemently denies any wrongdoing. Presumably he will defend his innocence if the grand jury returns an indictment against him.

FBI officials in San Francisco absolutely refuse to comment on the Soviet consulate's relationship, if any, with Bruchhausen and other alleged black market figures, but potential clues continue to pop out of the shadows. For example, Peter Gopal, a San Francisco designer of integrated circuits, found guilty last July of dealing in material stolen from three Silicon Valley firms (see box, page 85), had the business cards of Soviet and Polish attachés in his files. Another suspected black marketer reportedly was observed entering the consulate—which the FBI will neither confirm nor deny. Though law enforcement sources say Bruchhausen allegedly moved \$10 million worth of high technology out of the country in 1979 and 1980, they refuse to discuss his links with the Soviets. Will it turn out that he was furnished with a Silicon Valley shopping list by San Francisco's KGB contingent?

An answer, presumably, lies behind the screened windows at 2970 Green Street.

# MIRRORS FOR MOSCOW

**T**HE THREE MEN BLENDED easily into the lunchtime crowd at the Choo-Choo Restaurant, a railroad-car diner sidetracked amid dusty vacant lots on the industrial outskirts of Corona, near Riverside. Sitting casually around their brown Formica table, they could have been discussing the shipment of some laboratory odds and ends to a Kansas City showroom.

They weren't. Walter Spawr, a slight, boyish-looking man in his late thirties, made only one product at his modest plant nearby: exquisitely polished laser mirrors, which he sold to the top-secret weapons laboratories of the three armed services. Wolfgang Weber, the tall, neatly dressed West German who sat across the table, was Spawr's European distributor. Calmly, they were discussing a business scheme that could seriously affect the course of the global arms race.

The United States and the Soviet Union are scrambling to develop laser "death rays"—weapons that would use devastatingly powerful beams of light to destroy enemy targets, on earth and in space. Laser mirrors are vital components of these experimental devices, and the mirrors Spawr made, polished to near perfection with a process he jealously guarded, were considered the finest in the world.

Spawr had been making his mirrors for American military agencies. Why not sell to both sides? Weber wondered. Spawr Optical Research, Inc. (SORI) had just been invited to display its wares at a trade

The Russian cultivation of Walter Spawr, family man and patriot, began with what seemed like a routine business proposition.

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show in Moscow, and Spawr had only to send off a selection of his coveted mirrors. Weber would take care of the rest. He was sure he could make some sales right there at the exhibition, but that would be just the beginning, the cracking of the enormous Russian market.

There were just two small problems: selling components for high-powered lasers to the Soviet Union without a license is illegal, and the Russians could use Spawr's larger mirrors to develop their own laser weapons. But that was never discussed.

Instead, the men talked about "how can we get this thing done," as Stanley Truitt, SORI's executive director and the third man at the table, recalls. He remembers the meeting as "rather happy and enjoyable." The three men "were sitting around lunch and ideas would pop up," he says. Truitt himself suggested returning chunks of copper in place of any mirrors sold in Moscow so customs inspectors would think all the pieces that went to the show had come back. In any event, logistics would be no problem. They could figure something out. It would, in fact, be easy.

And it was. Over the next fifteen months, from November 1975 to February 1977, Spawr supplied the Soviets with dozens of sophisticated laser mirrors in at least six separate shipments. Only through a strange fluke, as we will see later, was he finally caught. Last December, along with his wife, Frances, he was convicted of selling the Russians high-technology laser hardware "with the knowledge that such mirrors would be used for the benefit of a Communist-dominated nation." (Weber

Contributing Editor Ehud Yonay last wrote "The Nematode Chronicles."

Walter Spawr (left) polished laser mirrors better than anyone else—as the Soviets knew.



was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. Truitt was not charged.) Walter Spawr received a six-month jail sentence (in addition to a ten-year suspended sentence), the stiffest ever in a case involving "technology transfer" to the Soviet bloc. He and Frances were also placed on probation for five years, ordered to perform 500 hours each of community work, and stripped of their security clearance. SORI was hit with an unprecedented \$100,000 fine. The Spawrs are now appealing their convictions and the suspension of their security clearance.

Meanwhile, the Central Intelligence Agency and other American intelligence sources say they have information indicating that Walter Spawr's mirrors are already being used to develop Russian laser weapons. It may seem incongruous that the world's strategic balance could be affected by a small optical shop operator in an obscure industrial park in Riverside County, but that is the nature of the arms race today. Advances in strategic research and development come not only from the giant aerospace companies but from mom-and-pop operations as well—small companies where an entrepreneur like Walter Spawr discovers how to polish mirrors or make memory chips or design advanced circuitry better than anybody else. There are scores of such companies in Santa Clara County's Silicon Valley and along that dense industrial belt near the ocean south of Los Angeles International Airport. These companies are small enough, and often in such tentative financial shape, that they make fat targets for Soviet espionage, theft, or illegal purchases. And, as the Spawr case shows, smuggling high-tech hardware to the Soviet Union is a simple matter, especially with the trade relaxations enacted under détente.

Nearly 25 percent of the nation's strategically important industry is based on the West Coast. Illegal traffic in everything from semiconductors to missile guidance components is rising so fast that the Commerce Department's export control compliance division, which has prime jurisdiction over such illicit trade, will soon open offices in San Francisco and Los Angeles. This will relieve some of the pressure on U.S. Customs Service agents, who had been carrying the burden of export law enforcement along the Pacific coast. Last year alone, customs agents at Los Angeles Harbor and Los Angeles International Airport intercepted 40 shipments of contraband high-technology hardware about to leave the country. But such busts are sporadic; officials can only guess how many shipments they do not stop. "My feeling," says a customs officer in San Francisco, "is that we are barely scratching the surface." Much of this smuggling is simply black market profiteering with no security implications. Other material undoubtedly finds its way to Soviet-bloc countries.

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"Spawr was not a spy, so why did some people call him a traitor and threaten to 'take care' of him?"

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What makes this technology drain so remarkable is the widespread involvement of men who are neither crooks nor spies, but ordinary businessmen with otherwise impeccable records. Men such as Walter Spawr—a Reagan Republican, father of three, pillar of his church, and former president of the Corona Little League. Even the trial judge said of the Spawrs, "You can't help but wish they weren't here. . . . They are good community people."

But there they were.

**W**ALTER SPAWR always liked making things with his hands. It was what he could do better than anybody else.

Growing up in Compton, a sleepy satellite community halfway between downtown Los Angeles and Long Beach, he built model airplanes from his own designs (and broke a world airspeed record with one of them by the time he was eleven). At fourteen, he constructed a telescope from scratch, casting bearings in hot lead, grinding and polishing mirrors from raw chunks of glass. "I found this old 55-gallon steel drum in a vacant lot, so I brought it home, put water in it so it wouldn't tip over, and put a batch of grinding compound on top," he says. "I then started to push the glass back and forth on the compound, walking round and round until the glass was ground to the right curvature and smoothness." He was patient. The mirror alone took six months to finish, and

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it was a year before the telescope was ready.

But Spawr had only limited use for what schools wanted to teach him. He was graduated from Downey High in 1960 but flunked out of Cerritos College, where he was a physics major, after his freshman year. His father, a mechanic at North American Aviation, helped Walter get a job there as a lab technician. He stayed two years.

On April 1, 1963, six months after President Kennedy forced the Russians to back down in the Cuban missile crisis, Walter Spawr joined the U.S. Air Force. Although he liked the service and was eventually promoted to sergeant, he left after four years. "There was just too much politics involved, and it was affecting performance and efficiency," he says. "People were getting promotions because they were so bad nobody wanted to keep them or because they were friends of certain other people." It was in the air force that he discovered he was not an organization man, that he worked best when given a job to do and left alone to do it.

In 1967 Spawr went back to North American, where his work in an electro-optical laboratory exposed him to the most secret, exotic frontier of the era—space technology. After a year at the company, Spawr met Frances Liddle, a determined, dark-haired, quietly attractive woman who worked as a secretary in his division. They were married a year later. From the beginning of their relationship they talked of someday leaving North American and starting their own business.

In part, Spawr's desire to leave the company had to do, once again, with "politics." "There were too many government contracts," he says. "People were essentially paid to do bad work. Under the cost-plus-fixed-fee system, the more you charged the government the more money you made."

He plotted his move with characteristic thoroughness. For three years, while continuing to work at North American, he studied federal procurement regulations (he wanted to sell only to the government). Then, in his spare time, he set up a precision optics shop in his garage and began bidding on small government jobs. His first contract, which came from the air force, was for eight "optical flats," blocks of clear glass polished so perfectly flat on one side (tolerance of one-millionth of an inch over the six-inch surface) they could be used to gauge the flatness of other precision components. He cleared \$800 on that order, which took him three months to complete.

It was then that Spawr developed the key to his future success—a polishing technique so exquisite that it surpassed anything in existence at the time. It was an important innovation. Lasers, especially high-powered ones, are bulky and difficult to manipulate, which makes them difficult weapons to aim. That is where laser mir-



# STICKY SHOES AND OTHER STORIES

## How the Russians get what they want - legally

**T**HE LASER MIRRORS Walter Spawr illegally sold to the Soviet Union seem almost trivial compared to what the Russians have been able to buy—or pick up free—with the blessing of the U.S. government. In this way, as in others, much of the United States/Soviet Union arms race is America racing against itself.

In 1973, for example, a Soviet technical delegation toured the hangars in Palmdale where Lockheed assembles its L-1011 wide-body jets. The more questions the Russian visitors asked, the more valuable information they got from the beaming sales people. It was the same at Douglas Aircraft in Long Beach (a McDonnell-Douglas subsidiary) and at the Boeing plant near Seattle. Aeroflot had announced it was considering building wide-body jets under a license arrangement with an American company. Now those three aerospace giants were tripping over each other to make the sale.

But the Soviets never intended to do business; they simply wanted to learn how to make their own jumbo jets. At Boeing, the Russian visitors even wore special shoes that picked up metal filings for analysis back home. (Soviet aircraft manufacturers needed to know more about the lightweight but strong alloys a wide-body jet requires.) In the end, their IL-86 came out looking pretty much like a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 and a Lockheed L-1011.

Technology transfer is not always so amusing. In 1972 the détente-minded Nixon administration let the Soviet Union buy 164 Centalign-B grinders, made by a company in Vermont. They were among the few machines capable of producing the tiny, precision-ground ball bearings used in the gyroscopes that guide intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to targets thousands of miles away. The machines enabled Russia to build its superaccurate SS-18 ICBM, which can deliver ten warheads to within a few hundred feet of their targets. Now the Pentagon proposes to invest at least \$50 billion in an MX system—a movable ICBM that won't be wiped out in a surprise SS-18 attack.

The irony is that détente, which was intended to reduce East/West tensions, triggered the most intense Soviet military buildup in recent memory by giving the Russians unprecedented access to American technology. They took full advantage of the opportunity. Under student exchange programs, they sent middle-aged scientists to study computer systems design at UCLA or space navigation at MIT, while young Americans in Russia studied Pushkin or "the problem of the person in Soviet philosophy of social science." Scientific cooperation agreements similarly became one-way conduits for western technology.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided a striking example of how Russia used the détente decade. Only eleven years earlier, the Russians had to scrounge around for vehicles in which to invade Czechoslovakia, even using Mos-

cow street buses. Three years later, with Richard Nixon in office, the Soviets quickly obtained permission to buy \$1.5 billion worth of sophisticated assembly lines, automated foundries, and computer control systems, with which they built a giant truck factory. In 1979 the Carter administration approved the sale of additional equipment to Russia, even after intelligence reports revealed that the Soviets were producing military trucks, troop carriers, and missile launchers with their American machines. Lawrence Brady, then acting director of the Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration (OEA), complained publicly that the United States was helping strengthen the Soviet army. He eventually resigned in January 1980.

When Ronald Reagan assumed office, he promised to tighten the controls over high-technology exports to the Soviet bloc. (As a first step, he brought Brady back to the Commerce Department in a job that included supervision of the OEA.) But Reagan may find it easier to talk about controls than enforce them. Keeping the lid on technology exports is meaningless without the cooperation of the other industrial powers, especially France, Germany, and Japan. Reagan may not get the help he wants, in part because Germany now depends on Russia for its natural gas supply.

So the Pentagon will spend billions of dollars on military hardware to counter a growing Soviet technological edge that the United States and its allies themselves helped create. —E.Y.

rors come in. By bouncing the light beam off a reflective surface that can be rotated to face the target, lasers can quickly achieve pinpoint accuracy. But a laser mirror must be absolutely smooth or it will diffuse the beam, however minutely, and reduce its effectiveness. A laser is only as good as its mirrors, in the same way a stereo is only as good as its speakers. Before Spawr's innovation, the weapons laboratories felt they simply weren't getting a good enough polish.

Spawr's new process came so easily that it still embarrasses him to refer to it as a technical breakthrough. "Anybody could have done it. It took me maybe two weeks and \$200 to come up with it. All I did was try different materials as polishing compounds until I found one that did the job better than anything else. It is such a commonplace material I can't figure out why nobody had come up with it before." Toothpaste? Shoe polish? "Something like that," he says. In any case, the success of

his first job gave him the boost he needed. In 1969 he left North American Aviation, followed by Frances a year later. With their combined savings, a grand total of \$2,000, the Spawrs bought additional polishing machines and went into business. They divided the work: Frances ran the office while Walter concentrated on the shop. It was a good arrangement, since Frances knew nothing about machines and Walter had always hated paperwork.

The first two years were a disaster. The Spawrs barely made enough to keep up the payments on their house, and each time money came in there was a new machine to buy. But in 1971 things suddenly shaped up. Spawr had never advertised his business. Since he wanted to work only for the government, he subscribed to the *Commerce Business Daily*, a government publication that lists all jobs open for bidding, and went after those he felt he could handle. "One day I saw an ad that the air force was looking for someone to make

polished metal mirrors," he says. "I had always thought that someday there'd be a big market for metal mirrors because they are lighter than glass, less expensive to make, don't break, and you can do many things to them, like drill holes and mount pieces of equipment right on the mirror surface." Spawr answered the ad. A few months later he had a visitor: Captain Dale Holmes from Kirtland Air Force Base, near Albuquerque, home of the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, where high-powered laser experiments were under way.

Holmes toured the small facility, then left a piece of molybdenum, a hard, brittle metal, for Spawr to polish—just to see what he could do. "They called back to say it was the best they'd ever seen, that they had no idea anybody could polish metal to such a degree," Spawr says. He received a \$30,000-per-year contract to improve the mirrors made by other manu-

(continued on page 145)

# MIRRORS FOR MOSCOW

(continued from page 89)

facturers who couldn't polish as well. Suddenly, business took off. Over the next three years, Spawr's client list came to include the most hush-hush strategic research facilities in the country—TRW, Rocketdyne, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Naval Research Laboratory, Red Stone Arsenal, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Sandia, Bell Aerospace, and Rockwell International. In 1973 he applied for and received a government security clearance.

Walter Spawr was 32 and sitting on top of the world. "Ever since I was a little boy, I had had two goals—to contribute to my country and to contribute to science—and now I could do both," he says. "As long as I could do my work, I was happy." He and Frances continued to work hard, but the hunger was gone. Walter found time to coach his kids' teams in track, baseball, and soccer, and Frances sat on the board of directors of the Corona Little League, where she helped raise funds. She taught Sunday school as well. Life was good. The Spawrs were, in fact, living the American Dream.

Then things suddenly began to slip. Spawr may have made the best mirrors, but he apparently did not fit in with the smug, sleek crowd of government contractors and top-level technology executives. For one thing, he kept saying that the government was being overcharged on defense work. And then there was Spawr's personal style. He tends to wear open-neck work shirts, or hopelessly out-of-date suits and ties, and heavy horn-rim glasses. And he has difficulty with small talk. It probably did not matter that Walter Spawr was the best in his field; he didn't look or act successful.

Before long, Spawr began to suspect that perhaps he was indeed out of tune. "I would never pay anybody to get a contract," he says, "or go out and 'loan' them a new car, which is one of the things people do." But he didn't feel like changing.

Another apparent problem was the military's uneasiness about depending on a small, backwater metal polisher who used a secret concoction (Spawr even refused to patent his polishing process for fear someone would steal it). If the government was going into the laser weapon business, it wanted to control the entire operation. In 1974 the air force asked Congress for money to develop its own polishing process. "They have already spent \$50 million, and they are still trying to prove they can do it," Spawr scoffs today. "The mirrors they now make cost this country 10 to 100 times what I would have charged. When I told them it was wrong for the government to build that facility because the law prohibits them from competing with private industry, the air force

canceled my contract... Then they started making mirrors for other government agencies. In effect, they were going after my clients."

Spawr never cared much for government bureaucracies, and now he had new reason for bitterness. The government was not only incompetent and bungling—it was out to destroy his livelihood. As his government business dropped, Spawr took his mirror-making talent to the civilian market, where lasers were being used widely in such areas as farming, medicine, and manufacturing. Soon there were new names on his client list—General Motors, Ford, Caterpillar.

But the civilian market required more advertising, promotion, and overhead in general. Suddenly the pinch was on, and Spawr began scrounging for work. He had never considered foreign sales, but when, in 1973, Wolfgang Weber wrote from Germany, introduced himself as a hustling distributor of scientific hardware, and offered to handle Spawr's laser mirror line, Spawr checked his references and agreed. Soon Spawr's mirrors had reached a Fiat plant in Italy, a Tel Aviv hospital, and scores of laboratories and universities in Europe. Foreign sales looked promising, so in January 1974 Spawr sent one of his employees, Walter Becker, to Los Angeles for an International Customs Service seminar on export regulations. Becker came back dumbfounded by the amount of red tape involved. He brought with him a few pages from the commodity control list, distributed by the Commerce Department, which listed items that could not be exported without a government license. Becker showed Spawr entry number 8611(1)A: components for high-powered CO<sub>2</sub> lasers (the kind of components Spawr often made) would require a license for export to "all destinations" outside the United States and Canada.

**U**P TO THAT POINT, Walter Spawr's story was a classic tale of American enterprise. How was it, then, that within a few years he would fall prey to the insidious gossip that he had sold out to the Russians for money? That he would start getting letters and late-night phone calls accusing him of being a traitor and threatening to "take care" of him? That the government would suspend his security clearance? That Spawr would feel obligated to insist before a federal judge, "My wife, Fran, and I love our country. We would never do anything to harm it. I was brought up to love our country, our flag, and our heritage"?

It began with what seemed like a routine business proposition.

On February 28, 1975, Spawr received a letter from an organization called Welt

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East European Exhibit Management, inviting him to display his mirrors that fall at the Physics 75 trade show in Moscow. The letter said the exhibit, organized with help from the Russian Chamber of Commerce, would attract "leading scientists, engineers, planners, administrators, and ministers from throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." In case Spawr didn't catch the message, the letter added that "the exhibition will affect planning/purchasing attitudes in Eastern Europe for the remainder of the decade."

Spawr didn't bother to answer the Welt letter, but a month later, on March 27, Weber drew his attention to the tremendous sales potential of the Moscow exhibit and urged him to provide sample laser mirrors for the show. Spawr agreed. On April 23 he wrote to Weber, listed the kinds of mirrors he would provide, and added that he would be sending them "on a sale or return basis."

Spawr was not convinced that the Russian market would ever amount to much, but selling the Soviets a few mirrors didn't seem like trouble, either. It was a time of détente, of joint Soviet-American space projects, of huge grain shipments eastward. Sperry, Control Data, and IBM were selling sophisticated computers to the Soviet Union. Why should Spawr lose out?

"I've grown up with the stigma of [the Russians] being the enemy, and then they come over to this country and they go through all the top-secret laboratories," Spawr says. "I never could understand that. . . . For example, this fellow from the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories came in and said, 'Oh, we're bringing the Russians through our place all the time.' And that's where they make the atomic bombs. The Russians have been in the air force laser weapon laboratory. We've been to their facilities. . . . I attended [government] conferences on how to make better mirrors. The Russians were there. The latest, state-of-the-art military advancements on how to make mirrors that will take the most tremendous amounts of energy you'd ever heard of were all presented. So what's the big deal about exporting laser mirrors?"

Sometime after their correspondence, perhaps sensing that Spawr was not sufficiently enthusiastic about the Russian prospects, Weber flew to Southern California. Spawr took him and Stanley Truitt, who was in charge of sales, to lunch at the Choo-Choo Restaurant, and the Russian deal began to take shape.

As Truitt later testified, both he and Spawr knew the Russians were quite likely to use the mirrors to develop laser beam weapons: "When you are talking of mirrors of the sizes of those . . . [and] of that good a polish, you don't need that good a polish unless you are dealing with extremely high powers. It is my opinion that Mr. Spawr fully well knew, and I fully

well knew." In the fall of 1975, Spawr shipped about twenty laser mirrors of various sizes to Weber, who took them to Moscow and, according to Spawr, sold about half of them.

But no prosecution resulted from those sales; federal authorities could not find sufficient documentation to make a case. Spawr's legal troubles stemmed from what happened next—specifically, from two separate orders that the enthusiastic Russians placed for his mirrors after the Moscow exhibit. To simplify matters, we will refer to them as the first Russian order and the second Russian order.

On December 12, 1975, less than two weeks after the exhibit closed, Weber sent Spawr a request for a price quote on several mirrors he said were destined for the University of Moscow. Some of them were unusually large—about ten to sixteen inches in diameter—and were equipped with a water-cooling system, which indicated probable use with extremely high-powered lasers. (If a laser beam is very intense, it heats the mirror, and the resulting expansion of the metal distorts the reflective surface. To remove the excess heat a maze of channels is drilled through the mirror's base, and water is pumped through.) In late January 1976, after providing the Russians with the prices, Spawr received the first Russian order: no fewer than 45 laser mirrors, approximately half of them the expensive water-cooled variety. His decision to go international was paying off—and Weber assured him of more Russian orders.

Because the first Russian order did not list the Soviet Union anywhere on the document and gave Weber's company, Oriel Optik, in Darmstadt, West Germany, as the shipment's ultimate destination, Spawr decided that he didn't have to apply for an export license. He was wrong: a license was required to export those mirrors anywhere except to Canada.

Once Spawr received the order, job cards were typed up for each mirror, and the work began. In the shop, machinists began to slice copper rods of the appropriate diameter into flat, round plates, grinding their surfaces to a rough smoothness. The round slices then moved to machines that drilled water channels through them, then onto machines that braised thinner plates of fine copper on top of the channels, then to grinders that worked the proper curvature into the face plates, and finally to the polishers' benches, where Spawr's unique system was put to work. Before long, people at SORI were routinely talking about "the Russian order."

The Russians must have been impressed with the Spawr mirrors they saw at the show, because sometime in April 1976, before the first Russian order was even finished, Weber was invited to fly to Russia for a "technical conference" about another order. A Professor Pismenny of the University of Moscow apparently

wanted several mirrors for research projects that included isotope separation (a process involving uranium fuel enrichment and a laser beam). He provided Weber with a list of specifications. Since none of the mirrors was a standard item, Weber went back to his hotel, called Spawr in Corona, and asked for prices. Spawr needed some time to figure it out, so he hung up and called Weber back later with the figures. Later that month Spawr received the second Russian order: 29 mirrors, all of them water-cooled and most quite large. The total value of the order was about \$44,000. Things were getting better and better for Spawr—and even bigger orders lay ahead.

Still, Spawr felt uneasy. Weber remembers talking to Spawr "after I placed the second order, [and] he mentioned that he thought it would be better to ask for an export license for at least a part of the second order." The portion of the order Spawr had in mind consisted of very large water-cooled mirrors, ranging in size from ten to sixteen inches in diameter—mirrors clearly intended for use with high-powered lasers. But Spawr may have suspected that the government would not grant him a license to ship those mirrors, and he broached that possibility with Weber.

Weber exuded confidence. He knew all the tricks and shortcuts. As Weber later testified, he assured Spawr "that there were different ways . . . that any shipment that was declared to be valued at less than \$500 would not require a license." He told Spawr that getting the mirrors out of the United States was Spawr's problem. "I mentioned that I knew how to pass them on to Russia if he gets them out of the United States."

On May 4, 1976, Frances Spawr asked her secretary, Jackie Lackey, to type up an application for a Commerce Department export license. The application covered only fourteen mirrors in the second Russian order, ignoring the other fifteen, which were generally the smaller ones. Lackey later testified that she asked Frances Spawr if she thought the application would be approved. Frances replied, "Probably not." When Lackey asked what she would do if the application were rejected, "she said that we would still send the mirrors." After the application was typed up, Walter Spawr signed it. The Soviet Union was listed as the mirrors' ultimate destination.

Later, in court, Spawr identified his signature but said he had not read the application and had no idea what was in it. He said he didn't know why only fourteen mirrors were listed. (The application also failed to mention the first Russian order, which was almost ready for shipment.)

Spawr didn't wait for the Commerce Department to reply. He immediately got his crews busy fabricating the mirrors in the second order, even though they were of

such unusual size and configuration that to Germany with eight mirrors and was never stopped or questioned.

In early June the first batch of mirrors in the first Russian order was ready for shipment. Weber happened to be in the United States at the time and came to pick them up himself. He boarded a plane to Germany with all eight mirrors and was never stopped or questioned.

A month later the rest of the first Russian order was ready to ship, and the Spawrs put Weber's scheme to work. According to courtroom testimony, Frances asked her secretary to type up a double set of invoices. One set accompanied the mirrors in small envelopes pasted to the side of the shipping cartons. The invoices valued the mirrors at \$500 each or less.

The second set of invoices, listing the full value of the mirrors, was mailed directly to Weber. The first set would effectively get the mirrors out of the country. The second set was to collect payment. Frances Spawr admitted putting the low values on the shipping documents but said that she did it on Weber's instructions for reasons she believed had to do with "his insurance purposes and relating to German regulations." Weber testified that the only reason for the falsification was to take advantage of a loophole in export regulations: items valued under \$500 do not require a license for shipment.

On July 9 and again on July 16, the mirrors were delivered to Los Angeles International Airport, where they cleared customs without trouble. In Germany, Weber simply had to tear off the envelopes containing the shipping documents, replace them with his own envelopes, place new shipping labels on the boxes, and send them on to Russia. The first Russian order, approximately \$25,000 worth of the best mirrors in the world, was now out of the way. Nobody suspected anything. Nobody was stopped for questioning. Smuggling sophisticated pieces of high optics to Russia turned out to be easier than bringing a case of tequila across the Mexican border.

**T**HE SECOND RUSSIAN order was not faring so well. While Spawr's staff was busy fashioning the mirrors, the government was taking its time processing the license application. It took three months of unexplained delay before anybody got around to looking it over. In August 1976, John Boidock of the Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration finally examined Spawr's application and concluded that it didn't provide enough data. On August 16 he phoned Walter Spawr for more details. "I told him from my limited knowledge of this particular field . . . that I thought . . . it was going to have to be reviewed by the Department of Defense and Department

of Energy and the intelligence community and other agencies," Boidock testified later.

Spawr suspected that his application would be rejected and attempted to head it off. On August 25 he sent Boidock a letter arguing that it was capricious and unjustified to prevent him from selling laser mirrors to Russia when the Soviets could get the same mirrors from other sources—and he listed several companies that he said sold laser mirrors to Russia. (The Commerce Department subsequently promised to look into the charges, but so far there has been no investigation.)

On October 14, 1976, Spawr's assumptions were confirmed: the Commerce Department rejected his export license application, finding that the shipment of those mirrors to "Eastern European destinations could contribute significantly to the military capabilities as to constitute a potential threat to our national security."

Spawr was furious. Once again the government was interfering with his livelihood. Kenneth Chalmers, a SORI machinist, remembers Spawr saying that "if he couldn't ship the mirrors . . . he would go and show the Russians how to polish mirrors." A few days earlier Weber had been taking part in Radiophysics 76, another Moscow exhibition staged by Welt International, and had reported to Spawr that "we had quite a number of visitors inquiring about those mirrors." More Russian business was clearly on the way, and Spawr had no intention of giving it up on the say-so of a Washington bureaucrat who couldn't tell a laser from a vanity mirror. Frances Spawr apparently felt the same way. When the license rejection form arrived, Jackie Lackey asked Frances "what we were going to do, and she said they still intended to sell the mirrors. . . . I asked her where we would ship them to, and she wasn't sure at that time." She soon found out. Shortly after returning from Moscow and receiving Spawr's cable about the license rejection, Weber called Spawr, and a scheme to save the second Russian order was set in motion. It, too, would be easy.

As pieced together from court documents, it was a two-stage plan. The first part was to convince the government that SORI was obeying its ruling. Weber would have to cancel the order his company had issued to SORI, and Spawr would acknowledge the cancellation. Spawr asked Weber to put it all in writing—to mention that he had several pending orders and, as Weber later testified, "also to mention that I knew other U.S. companies had been offering and selling metal mirrors." Weber testified that Spawr "wanted to use that letter to see what he could do to reverse that decision by the Commerce Department." In fact, the order was still very much alive. Weber merely took his company out of the picture to protect it from any future trouble

should the scheme backfire. But he told Spawr he would handle the order "personally."

Stage one was carried out. Weber did his bit, providing Spawr with a letter noting that the license application denial "forces me, of course, to cancel this order with you and inform our customer accordingly. I am sorry to report that I have in my hands several orders that I will have to return now because we cannot get an export license and that I have been promised several more orders. The total of these orders amounts to well over \$250,000, and \$180,000 have already been placed with us."

The Spawrs did their part, too. When Weber's letter arrived, Frances wrote the word "canceled" across the Oriol Optik order. When Jackie Lackey asked her if the order was really canceled, "she replied no, it wasn't, but . . . the paperwork should reflect that it was." On November 24 Spawr wrote to Boidock, protesting the rejection of the license application. On December 6 Boidock called to tell Spawr how he should go about appealing the ruling. Boidock later testified that Spawr never filed an appeal. As far as commerce officials were concerned, Spawr's Russian deal was dead.

That was exactly what Weber and Spawr wanted them to think. Now it was time for stage two. Weber phoned Frances Spawr and dictated a "new" order, which just happened to contain mirrors identical to the second Russian order. He also gave her a new shipping address. She jotted it down in her telephone diary: "Ship to Fracht AG, Zurich, Switzerland . . . Attention Mr. Peier, Zurich, Switzerland, for deposition to Mr. W. Weber." The new order was typed up, and Fracht AG in Zurich was given as the "ultimate destination." *Fracht* means "freight" in German, and freight companies, of course, have no use for high-powered laser mirrors.

The scheme worked beautifully. In February 1977, SORI shipped the mirrors to the Switzerland address. Once again, according to court documents, Frances Spawr had prepared a double set of invoices, and the mirrors left the country without attracting attention. Weber made good on his boast that he could get the mirrors to Russia if only Spawr managed to smuggle them out of the United States. The second Russian order had been filled. But it wasn't clean. It left too many ragged edges. Smuggling mirrors to Russia was not the sort of thing a person wanted to do for a living.

Still, the Russian market was too good to give up. Neither side wanted to see the relationship end. The Russians needed more and more mirrors, and Spawr could certainly use the business. Eventually the Soviets came up with an idea. They approached Weber, complained that the mirrors were very expensive, and asked if Spawr would be willing to sell his polish-

ing process. Weber said he would ask. When he did, he testified, "Spawr came up with a price of, I think, \$1 million for the license and half a million for the equipment or something." Weber went back to the Russians, who immediately agreed to the terms.

**S**PAWR WAS GETTING IN deeper and deeper. Selling mirrors for high-powered lasers was risky enough, even though the Russians couldn't "reverse engineer" them to discover the polishing secret. Once he taught them the process, though, the Soviets could instantly catch up with the United States in the production of high-quality laser mirrors. Spawr now says he floated the \$1.5 million price as a "joke," never believing the Russians would go for it. He must have realized how badly the Soviets needed his technology when, strapped as they are for foreign currency, they grabbed his offer without even trying to bargain him down.

In a puzzling move, Spawr then tried to go through channels. He called one of his contacts at Kirtland and asked if the air force wanted to buy his polishing process. When the officer said no, Spawr asked if he could sell it to the Russians. The officer said no again. Spawr got angry and fired off a letter to his congressman, George E. Brown, Jr. (Democrat, Colton), complaining that not only was the government stopping him from selling Russia the same laser mirrors other companies were trading freely, but now he couldn't even sell the Soviets his polishing process. Brown replied that he was "especially concerned about the difficulty your company and other small businesses encounter when they have to compete with the federal government." His office asked Boaddock of the Commerce Department to look into Spawr's complaints. On January 10, 1977—as Spawr was preparing to ship the second Russian order, despite the government restriction—another Commerce Department official wrote to Brown. Spawr's frustration notwithstanding, the letter said, "the techniques utilized [in the polishing process] are important from a strategic standpoint, and it would not be in the interest of our own national security to transfer them to the Soviets, since it would give them a capability they do not now possess."

Again the government had blocked his move, and again Spawr dropped all references to the proposed deal from his official correspondence and quietly went ahead. Now Weber was working frantically to cement a deal from which he stood to make a cool \$250,000 commission. In the summer of 1977 he flew into Los Angeles International Airport with his traveling secretary, an efficient-looking woman named Monica. Spawr picked them up and drove south to the Imperial Terminal, where he

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and Weber sat down in the passengers' lounge to talk business. Weber had typed up a three-page proposal to present to the Russians, which he wanted Spawr to approve. It said that Spawr would give the Russians a manual explaining the details of his secret process, provide the machinery necessary to produce the mirrors, and train Russian technicians in metal polishing. Spawr read the document carefully, then crossed out a reference to molybdenum laser mirrors. (Mirrors in American laser weapon prototypes were made of molybdenum, and he felt uneasy about letting the Russians catch up quite so fast.)

Weber, too, had a problem with the proposed deal. The pay was good, but what if, for whatever reason, the process didn't work? He didn't want the Russians to hold him responsible for any problems. "So I said [to Spawr], 'You go, and you sign the contract, and I will handle the rest for you.' All it required was a trip from Spawr to Moscow to cosign with me."

Spawr was being reeled in faster and faster. His early reluctance to send even a few mirrors to a trade show in Moscow had now avalanched into a willingness to sell the Soviets his secret polishing process.

And then, just as he was about to conclude the biggest deal of his life, everything came to an abrupt end. On March 9, 1978, an investigator from the Commerce Department and one from the Customs Service walked into SORI's office in Corona to serve a subpoena for the company's business records. They told the Spawrs that they were under federal grand jury investigation for allegedly falsifying customs declarations and shipping laser mirrors to the Soviet Union. The Russian seduction of Walter and Frances Spawr was now over.

**T**HE CRACKING OF THE Spawr case owed nothing to the effectiveness of the United States' export control system. The government simply got lucky. In early 1977, according to court documents, several SORI employees quit or were fired in the wake of a dispute with Spawr over marijuana smoking. One of them was Michael Topping, a mirror polisher who shortly thereafter married Jackie Lackey, Frances Spawr's secretary. With Topping out of work, the couple moved to the San Jose area, where Michael got a job polishing laser mirrors at a company called Design Optics. Jackie became a secretary at Stanford University. Spawr suspected that Topping had given SORI's secret polishing process to his new employers and threatened to sue. Shortly thereafter, Spawr says, Jackie Lackey told the story of the Russian orders to a friend, who carried the story to

another friend, an FBI agent. He typed up a report and passed it on to the Commerce Department.

The Carter Commerce Department, however, simply sat on the evidence. By 1977 various congressional committees were expressing concern over reports of inadvertent and even deliberate cases of critical-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. Hearings uncovered serious lapses in the Department of Commerce's ability to control such exports, and the charge was increasingly made that a government agency whose prime task was to promote trade should not be trusted to regulate it. Pressure was mounting to transfer export-control authority to the Department of Defense by amending the Export Administration Act of 1979, which was due for renewal at the end of the year. Commerce fought the proposal tooth and nail, as though the Pentagon, not the Soviets, posed the greater threat. Just how seriously the Commerce Department took the issue was revealed only last year, when Congressman John M. Ashbrook (Republican, Ohio) angrily documented a Commerce Department cover-up of at least sixteen allegations of illegal diversions of critical technology to the Soviet Union. One of those cases was Spawr's, which was gathering dust even after the government uncovered the full details of the scheme.

In the spring of 1979 the Spawr file was finally dumped on the desk of Assistant U.S. Attorney Theodore Wai Wu in Los Angeles. He was probably the only federal prosecutor capable of plowing through the technical paraphernalia of the case and making some sense of it. Wu was graduated from Annapolis in 1959 and served six years in the navy before beginning law school. He joined the U.S. Attorney's Office in 1974 and found that his navy background made him the resident expert on science-related cases. In 1976 Wu prosecuted one of the first technology transfer cases in the country, winning the conviction of Vernon Edler, Jr., and Edler Industries of Newport Beach. (Edler was convicted of selling the French the process for making a graphite-like compound used in rocket nozzles.) Wu is now conducting a grand jury investigation into a major international high-technology smuggling operation based in California.

Theodore Wu brought more than technical proclivity to the case. At age nine, he came to the United States from China with his sister and mother, their home and possessions having been confiscated by the Japanese in World War II. "We came here poor and got breaks we would've never got in any other country," Wu says. "I owe a lot to America." He was not likely to treat a trading-with-the-enemy case lightly, and in the grand jury hearing that preceded the trial he bore down hard on Spawr. "He is a very, very good, thorough prosecutor," Spawr says, recalling that encounter. "He

had me so turned around I didn't know what my name was." Spawr eventually came to regard Wu as "overzealous." Wu, for his part, thought Spawr "self-righteous."

The Spawrs' defense was essentially a string of denials that Wu was able to challenge. They claimed they didn't know the mirrors were going to Russia (Weber and Jackie Lackey testified that they did), that the mirrors in question were for low-powered lasers and therefore didn't require a license (expert witnesses from the Defense Department and Kirtland Air Force Base testified that the mirrors were definitely designed for high-powered lasers far exceeding the 1,200-watt limit), that the government was wrong when it determined the mirrors could benefit the Communist bloc militarily (the judge noted that even if this were true, it was not grounds for violating the ruling).

Spawr's low-key, boyish, aw-shucks earnestness may have convinced the jury of his innocence were Wu not able to display on a projection screen copies of documents refuting those denials. The verdict was almost anticlimactic. On December 12, 1980, the jury found Walter and Frances Spawr guilty on one count of conspiracy and four counts of trading-with-the-enemy-act violations. Frances Spawr was also convicted on six counts of falsifying export documents. Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr., went out of his way to note during the sentencing hearing that he thought the Spawrs were lying. "I find that the testimony of the defendants was less than credible," he said. "If I had been the finder of fact I would have found in the same way."

**A**S HE APPEALS HIS conviction, Walter Spawr continues to make laser mirrors for clients that still include the United States military, though his lack of a security clearance prevents him from working on top-secret projects. And he continues to maintain that he broke no law and should be exonerated, pressing the point with anybody who will listen. "I am a very patient man," he says. "I can spend hours working on one little problem or discussing an issue without giving up or getting excited." He says that each time he received a threatening or abusive phone call after his conviction, he managed to involve the callers in a conversation that left them believing him innocent. He is a good negotiator, and he knows it. "I am not accustomed to courtroom procedures," he told the judge at the conclusion of his trial. "I feel much more at ease sitting down to a conference table. I believe that I could show anyone that those mirrors indeed didn't need to be licensed."

The trouble is, Spawr keeps contradict-

ing himself. One example is his attitude toward the proposed sale of his polishing process to the Soviet Union. During one interview he said off-handedly that he was merely leading the Russians on during the negotiations, that once they showed "seriousness" about the order he would have applied for an export license. Another time he said that his process would not have benefited the Soviet laser research program all that much. Still later he had a different version: "If the Russians ever learned to polish mirrors as well as I, I would worry about it."

But wasn't he about to sell them his process?

"Yeah, but in that case I would've given it to the air force for free."

At other times, confronted with contradictions, he will smile disarmingly and shrug, or complain of a bad memory. He then finds a way to blame the government. In Spawr's recounting of events, the government is almost invariably the villain. Bureaucracy, he says, will destroy America "before the Russians will ever get a shot off."

Ten years ago Spawr started his own business, wanting to produce only for the government. Now he had been convicted for helping the Russians, even though—or perhaps because—the government told him he couldn't. What happened along the way, most likely, is that Walter Spawr had adopted the almost anarchistic streak that runs through our business and scientific ethos alike, where government restrictions appear to be annoying impediments in the generation of money or knowledge.

"Has the government ever made any type of technological breakthrough?" Spawr asks. "The government fought the Wright brothers for years. Alexander Graham Bell—the government fought him for years." Throughout his denials and contradictions, Spawr constantly returns to the same point. No matter what the government says, he has done nothing wrong. In fact, he appears intent on proving not only that he was innocent, in a narrow legal sense, but that he was *right*.

"There is a certain arrogance . . . in Mr. Spawr, a certain belief that the government interpretations are wrong, and therefore compliance with them is not really required," Judge Byrne noted at the end of the case.

But Spawr, whose postage meter prints the slogan "Optical technology for peace in the world," would put it a different way. He apparently prefers the picture his attorney painted for the jury: that Walter and Frances Spawr were simply "honest, hardworking business people, people that started off in their garage working in the evening and by virtue of hard work, good reputation for a good product, honesty, and fair dealing they built up a reputation as people who were good business people, [who] produced a good mirror." ■



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
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