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File Folder USSR: PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA ETC.
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FOIA

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3302

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10966	MEMO	ARMACOST TO RAYMOND RE SOVIET COUNTERPROPAGANDA SYSTEM [1 - 1] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	2/13/1985	B1
10967	PAPER	THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPAGANDA SYSTEM [2 - 13] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	12	2/4/1985	B1
10968	MEMO	WICK TO MCFARLANE [42 - 42] R 1/2/2008 NLRRF06-114/10	1	7/2/1985	B1

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United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 13, 1985

cc - Lenczowski
DeLoach
Stein
Meyer
Gordon (hdd)LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dear Walt:

I thought you might be interested in reading the enclosed analysis by our Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Soviet counterpropaganda system. The study concludes that, to "neutralize" the effects of foreign influence on key groups in Soviet society, Soviet leaders have vastly expanded their counterpropaganda efforts during the past year. The Soviets appear most worried about non-Russian nationalities, youth, and those who might encounter foreigners.

The counterpropaganda effort is apparently not very successful, and in some instances may have backfired. But its persistence suggests that Soviet leaders view foreign broadcasts and other channels for the influx of foreign materials into the USSR as a growing threat to their authority. This Soviet reaction, in my opinion, testifies eloquently to the value of VOA and RFE/RL as a long-term investment in supporting American interests.

I have sent this study also to a number of Senators and Congressmen who are interested in the radios.

Sincerely yours,

Mike

Michael H. Armacost

Enclosure:

As stated.

Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.,
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director,
International Communications
and Information,
National Security Council.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 10966
FOI 7-14/10 #10984BY Out NARA DATE 1/2/08~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS
AND
RESEARCH

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NLRR F06-114/10# 10967

BY CJ NARADATE 1/2/08

(U) THE SOVIET COUNTERPROPAGANDA SYSTEM

Summary

To "neutralize" the effects of foreign influence on key groups in Soviet society, Moscow has vastly expanded its counterpropaganda efforts during the past year. Using both existing propaganda channels and a new set of institutions created specifically for this purpose, Soviet authorities have targeted those sections of the population they believe most susceptible: the non-Russian nationalities, youth, and those who for one reason or another might have contacts with foreigners.

There is no indication the program has achieved any remarkable success. Indeed, in some respects it appears to have backfired. But the persistence of the effort suggests that the Soviet leadership views foreign broadcasts and other channels for the influx of foreign materials into the USSR as an increasingly serious threat to its authority.

* * * * *

Foreign Influence and the Call for Counterpropaganda

Counterpropaganda has been an integral part of Soviet ideological work since the October Revolution--Lenin introduced the term itself in 1920--but until recently, it was seldom a major preoccupation of propagandists or policymakers. Through the 1950s, Soviet society was largely sealed off from contacts with foreigners. Given this isolation, Soviet ideological workers viewed their primary task as promoting Soviet views rather than countering and refuting anti-Soviet ones.

The conditions on which this assumption was based altered significantly beginning in the 1960s. As a result of political and economic changes, some

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sponsored by Moscow and others opposed by it, more Soviet citizens gained access to foreign sources of information. More foreigners visited the Soviet Union, and an increasing number of Soviets traveled abroad--nearly 15 million people crossed USSR borders in 1982, according to Soviet sources. And as social pressure against listening to foreign radio stations declined and jamming was reduced or in some cases eliminated, more people began to listen, discuss, and act on what they had heard.

Each of these developments contributed to a general loosening of Soviet ideological control, but apparently none of them seemed especially threatening to the leadership. Events in Poland and Iran and the end of detente combined, however, to throw into relief the possible consequences of outside influence. The Soviet authorities then moved to reimpose greater ideological discipline:

- They sought to plug the most obvious channels of outside influence by resuming or intensifying jamming, by tightening border checks, and by cutting back on Soviet tourism.
- They cracked down on public flaunting of foreign goods and manners.
- They launched the largest and most comprehensive counterpropaganda campaign in Soviet history.

The decision to expand the counterpropaganda effort was particularly noteworthy, because it represented both a grudging recognition of how extensive foreign influence had become and an implicit confession of inability and/or unwillingness to suffer the consequences of reverting to Stalinist control methods.

Preliminary Steps

The shift to tighter control was signaled in the April 1979 CPSU Central Committee resolution calling for a restructuring of the party's ideological work. It was not, however, until the November 1981 Central Committee plenum that counterpropaganda was described as "one of the most important spheres" of party work, and party organizations were directed to give more attention to it. Even then little specific guidance was provided; the first articles on the subject reflected confusion over just how this type of propaganda would differ from the norm. To define it more precisely, Soviet ideological authorities organized three "scientific-practical" conferences--at Riga in June 1982, Tallinn in October 1982, and Kishinev in April 1983.

In contrast to earlier sessions of this type, these meetings attracted numerous high-level party, government, and military officials--an obvious indicator of leadership concern. In

addition, the meetings made a series of specific policy recommendations for the counterpropaganda campaign. They called on ideological workers to:

- analyze more carefully the various forms of foreign propaganda and prepare specific materials to "neutralize" their impact;
- acknowledge and deal with current problems in Soviet society rather than simply rehash old successes;
- improve propaganda publications to make them more readable and convincing and simultaneously tighten control over materials selected for translations;
- improve the quality of Soviet media reporting on domestic affairs so that citizens will not turn to Western broadcasts for information; and
- target specific audiences and meet the specific requirements of each, just as the foreign ideological opponents of the USSR do.

But they provided little guidance on setting up new institutions to carry out this work.

Current Campaign Gets Under Way

Although the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum reendorsed the effort, the current counterpropaganda campaign did not take off until 1984:

- In March, the CPSU Central Committee convened a special session devoted to dealing with foreign contacts.
- In June, the Ukrainian ideological authorities held a conference on the same subject.
- In August, Moscow ordered the Estonian Republic party organization (by implication, all republic party organizations) to take a more active role in counterpropaganda work.
- In September, the Politburo called attention "to the need for a well-argued exposure" of Western propaganda directed at the Soviet Union.
- Most recently, on December 10, Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin, at an all-union conference on ideological work, called for the creation of a "unified system" of counterpropaganda.

Although the "unified system" does not yet exist formally, its outlines are becoming clear. As might be expected, the party's central ideological establishment remains firmly in control of the counterpropaganda effort and runs it largely through its own familiar institutions. The most important innovation at the center has not been institutional; rather, it has been the creation of a remarkable series of special publications that set both the tone and direction of the campaign. What institutional changes have occurred have generally taken place at a lower level and been designed to deal with target groups identified by the central authorities as most vulnerable to foreign influences.

Special Publications

The new central publications demonstrate how different the current counterpropaganda campaign is from usual Soviet ideological work. They also reflect the difficulties many ideological workers have in adapting to the new requirements and how seriously Moscow takes this problem. The most important of these publications are a weekly paper, an almanac, and several new pamphlet series.

The weekly Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts) was established in late 1980. Published by the Znaniye Society in an edition of 600,000-700,000 copies, this eight-page tabloid is directed at lecturers, agitators, and propagandists. According to its editor, the paper carries articles that generalize on questions Soviet citizens have asked at Znaniye sessions and in other meetings. As such, it is an accurate barometer of the concerns of the Soviet public. One recent issue carried remarkably factual articles on the number of foreign students in the USSR, lags in Soviet highway and housing construction, employment possibilities in the UN Secretariat, and whether it is possible to have "two native languages." Other issues have defined dissent, detailed Soviet grain imports from the West, and discussed health problems in the USSR.

These topics are not new to the Soviet press, but their handling in Argumenty i fakty is: The paper presents what its name implies, with only a minimum of ideological hype. The amount of detail is necessary because often these articles are designed to respond to what Soviet citizens have heard from Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, or Radio Liberty.

The almanac Argumenty (Arguments) also was set up in 1980. Issued annually in 200,000 copies, these 160-page books focus more narrowly on religion and religious-nationality linkages, but often in a fresh way. The most recent issue (1984) features detailed articles on the relationship of Islam and politics in the Middle East, the World Council of Churches meeting in Vancouver, American

efforts to promote and exploit religious-nationality links in the USSR, the Jesuits, Islamic socialism, and the underground church ("catacomb church"). Somewhat more ideologically strident and broad gauge than Argumenty i fakty, this publication nevertheless explicitly responds to programs carried on foreign radio stations and often provides its readers with detailed information available nowhere else in the Soviet media.

In addition to these serials and articles elsewhere in the Soviet press, the counterpropaganda campaign has generated new pamphlet series at both the central and regional publishing houses. "Sovetskaya Rossiya," for example, has already issued more than 40 pamphlets in its "On That Side" series; "Moskovskiy rabochiy" has a series called "Imperialism Without Masks"; and "Lenizdat" publishes one called "Soviet Reality and the Myths of Bourgeois Propaganda."

Despite their somewhat bombastic titles, these pamphlets are often strikingly objective in their presentation. A recent one carefully analyzed the notion broadcast by Radio Liberty's Russian-language service that Stolypin's reforms, if carried through, could have made the 1917 revolutions unnecessary, if not impossible. This "objectivist" stance may give such publications greater public credibility, but it has already drawn the fire of some Soviet critics. One critic commented, "it is difficult and at times impossible" to know whether the author of a pamphlet on German philosopher Husserl believes that Husserl's views are "true or false."

Specific Targets

The main feature of the current campaign is its careful targeting of audiences. Soviet ideologists have always maintained that the success of propaganda work depends in large measure on establishing close ties with the intended audience, but their own work has seldom conformed to this principle. Now, under the impact of public opinion surveys, letters to the editor, and sharper questions at Znaniye lectures, this evidently is changing. The most immediate effects can be seen in the counterpropaganda area. Not surprisingly, Soviet authorities are directing their greatest efforts here at those groups Moscow believes most susceptible to foreign influences: the non-Russian nationalities, youth, and those who have direct contacts with foreigners.

✓ Non-Russian Nationalities. Moscow has always been especially sensitive to any foreign propaganda aimed at non-Russians. As one commentator put it, the Western powers "have always resorted to attempts to revive nationalistic prejudices, to provoke chauvinist moods and inflame mistrust among our peoples with the aim of weakening our unity, especially in complex periods of history."

That such concern is not misplaced is suggested by E. A. Bagramov's remark to the 1982 Riga conference. Discussing Western broadcasts to the USSR's non-Russian republics, he noted that "sometimes even relatively small forces can awake old nationalistic prejudices" there. Previously, Soviet authorities sought simply to block out this influence. Now that this has become more difficult, Moscow has begun major counterpropaganda drives in the republics, specially tailored to the nationalities involved.

So far, its greatest counterpropaganda effort is concentrated on the western borderlands of the USSR--particularly in what the Soviet authorities describe as the "extremely exposed" Ukrainian SSR. Authorities there, responding to events in Poland, Western broadcasts in local languages, and indigenous religious and nationalist activities, have reorganized local agitation and propaganda work, established new coordinating bodies at both republic and local levels, and provided these bodies with new guidance. These innovations have stimulated significant changes at the grassroots and in the process have highlighted the areas of greatest regime concern in the region: ideological disaffection among youth and a convergence of religious and national identities within many strata of the population.

Both Kiev and Moscow judge the counterpropaganda task to be a large one. According to the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee department responsible for propaganda and agitation, the Ukrainian Republic is now "extremely exposed to the sources of enemy propaganda" for the following reasons:

- The location of the republic on the western border of the Soviet Union makes it an easy target for Ukrainian broadcasting from abroad. In addition, many of its citizens--as a result of political and border changes over the last 50 years--know foreign languages well and therefore have additional opportunities to obtain information from non-Soviet sources.
- The population of the Ukraine includes a remarkably large number of religious believers. At present, "more than half" of all the USSR's Orthodox and denominational associations (congregations) are in the Ukraine. Many believers are followers of the suppressed Uniate Catholic Church, which considers its supreme authority to be the Vatican rather than the Moscow patriarchate and which sees itself as a Ukrainian national church.
- The republic must contend with a number of emigre organizations abroad which maintain extensive ties to relatives and others still living in the Ukraine. Ukrainian emigres, who now number more than 3 million, include numerous active

anti-Soviet elements, maintain close ties with the Vatican and various Western governments, and represent a continuing source of support for Ukrainian-language broadcasting abroad.

Each of these factors, the Soviet authorities insist, gives a special form and urgency to ideological work in the republic.

Counterpropaganda work in the Ukraine currently is conducted according to a plan developed jointly by two departments of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus: the Department for Propaganda and Agitation, headed by Leonid M. Kravchuk; and the Department for Foreign Relations, headed by Anatoliy V. Merkulov. The first department has primary responsibility for domestic propaganda, although Kravchuk has said that his agency also includes a sector for foreign policy information. The second apparently is responsible for programs concerning Ukrainian communities abroad. Given the key role played by emigres in the foreign propaganda which the Soviets seek to counter, the importance of this department probably is much greater in the Ukraine than in other republics.

To support counterpropaganda work, the Ukrainian authorities have expanded the responsibilities of the Kiev Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries. Over the last five years, this body has published more than 70 monographs and four issues of Zarubezhnyy mir (The Foreign World), many of which focus on the Ukrainian emigre community. Perhaps its most influential work to date has been the 1983 volume National Minorities and Immigrants in the Contemporary Capitalist World, a collective study explicitly designed to support the Ukrainian counterpropaganda effort.

The main counterpropaganda effort is carried out at the oblast level and below. Special coordinating councils on counterpropaganda have been established in the oblasts, and additional staff positions for their directors have been created in oblast party committee apparatuses. Analogous groups are being established at the city and rayon levels, at least in the western oblasts. At all three levels, these groups oversee sociological research on the current attitudes of the local population, prepare information on major events of domestic and international life, and provide "daily help" to party, Soviet, and other organizations on counterpropaganda questions.

The situation in the three Baltic republics is similar. In Lithuania, for example, the counterpropaganda effort now dominates the republic's regular agitation and propaganda operation. Following the 1982 Riga conference, Vilnius had set up a special council for the coordination of counterpropaganda work. But because this group lacked line authority and therefore could not

give orders to party and government bodies, it proved ineffective and was replaced in early 1984 by the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Commission on Foreign Policy Propaganda and Counterpropaganda. So far, this new group has:

- conducted regular panel public opinion polls to track changes in popular reaction to foreign broadcasts;
- expanded research on Lithuanian anticommunist emigre centers;
- provided special training facilities for counterpropaganda workers; and
- directed the republic foreign ministry to provide regular briefings on foreign policy questions to the republic's journalists.

In addition, the republic party organization ordered party committees at all levels to make one of their members responsible for counterpropaganda work. The Estonian and Latvian authorities have made similar arrangements.

The Muslim republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia are the other major focus of the current counterpropaganda effort in the nationalities area. To date, the major changes in that region have been in the content of propaganda rather than in the institutions involved, a pattern suggesting that both Moscow and republic officials view the problem of foreign influence there as less serious than in the Ukraine and the Baltic states. Nevertheless, the Azerbaijani party journal recently warned that in these republics, too, "Ideological workers must keep in mind that questions which go unanswered open the door to imperialist propaganda for the dissemination of lying rumors and subversive information."

The two Muslim republics with the largest counterpropaganda efforts are Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Both border Iran, and Moscow's decision to upgrade counterpropaganda work there undoubtedly reflects this fact. In Azerbaijan, a special counterpropaganda council was established in early 1984 under the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Agitprop Department; filials of this body are being organized in oblast, rayon, and city party organizations throughout the republic. The central council has called for better public opinion tracking, an expansion of Znaniye Society lectures on Islam, and the translation into Azerbaijani of selected articles from Argumenty i fakty. One indication of the difficulties Baku faces is provided by the results of a study of Islamic practices in the republic which appeared in Sotsiologicheskkiye issledovaniya (No. 4, 1984). It showed that in some cases young people are more attached than their parents to Islamic customs, a pattern that may

reflect Khomeini's influence on the largely Shia Azerbaijani Muslim community.

In Turkmenistan, the increased counterpropaganda campaign has been combined with an expanded campaign against ideologically harmful contraband--including cassette recordings of Islamic services. According to the December 1983 Sotsialisticheskaya zakonnost', Turkmenistan and the Ukraine are the two republics in which the struggle against illegal importation of such materials is most intense.

Youth. Soviet authorities have always devoted particular attention to the ideological molding of the young, especially those at the point of entering either the military or the civilian work force. They now view this group as requiring special counter-propaganda attention. As the April 1984 Agitator put it:

"It is no secret that sometimes the level of education or factual knowledge among a certain part of our young people lives side by side with political naivete. A disturbing phenomenon is tardy civic development, a striving to stand out from others not because of one's knowledge or industriousness, but because of imaginary originality, or by the imitation of Western 'culture.' Some young people, when tuning in on a foreign broadcast think approximately this way: I've watched television, and now I'll listen to what 'they' are saying. I'll compare the two, and that way I'll get an objective picture.... But that 'approach' is precisely a manifestation of political naivete and immaturity: it is impossible to make falsehood match up with the truth. Not a single word on the air waves 'from the other side' is spoken without a purpose that has a class definition, as a rule slyly camouflaged. Not a single word is spoken without counting on the production of a demoralizing effort upon anyone who even accidentally tunes into the hostile wave length. Voice of America and Radio Liberty do not spend tens and hundreds of millions for the purpose of entertaining Soviet citizens, informing them about various events, or raising their cultural level."

The counterpropaganda effort designed to reverse this trend among people born since the mid-1950s has two parts: one directed at students and young workers, and the other at those performing their military service. In general, the civilian effort has been conducted through normal ideological channels. In schools, teachers have been ordered to "immunize" their students to foreign ideas by pointing out the direct linkages between rock music, jeans, and Western films on the one hand, and anti-Soviet values of "individualism, the cult of money and power, force and sexual promiscuity" on the other. Such values, Soviet students are told, promote anti-Soviet behavior up to and including political dissent. One Moscow radio commentator stated that "there is no

doubt" that dissidents in Soviet society exist only because of foreign influences. In support of such school and Komsomol-based lectures, the ideological authorities have expanded the number of counterpropaganda articles placed in Soviet publications directed at young audiences--e.g., Komsomol'skaya pravda and Sobesednik.

In response to events in Poland and to in-house studies that show high levels of dissatisfaction among some Soviet workers, the ideological apparatus has given particular emphasis to counterpropaganda work with new labor-force entrants. Special lecture programs for them have been set up in factories throughout the USSR; in the western border republics, the "labor" theme dominates much of the local counterpropaganda effort. Most striking in this regard are numerous republic-level books on the history of the Soviet working class and its national "detachments." Each of these books gives particular attention to the patriotism and internationalism of young workers.

As might be expected, the counterpropaganda effort in the military is more systematically organized. Responding to what Gen. A. Yepishev, chief of the army's Main Political Directorate, has called an "unprecedented psychological war" against the USSR's armed forces, the military authorities have moved to create an entire new structure for counterpropaganda work. By the end of 1983, most military districts had established special counterpropaganda councils to direct lecture and publication programs in this area.

By now, these organs have been extended downward to the battalion level, and even below. Their major concern appears to be the high incidence of enlisted personnel listening to foreign radio broadcasts. As the April 18, 1984, Krasnaya zvezda put it, the military's counterpropaganda councils must ensure a timely flow of information about both foreign and domestic developments, and about what foreign radio stations are doing, so that agitprop workers will know "what current lies Western radio stations are cooking up" and be in a position to "keep such slander from getting off the ground."

Other Groups. Three other groups, which have more direct contact with foreigners, are also the objects of special counterpropaganda attention. These are Soviet merchant seamen who may visit foreign ports, Soviet citizens who come into contact with foreign tourists, and Soviet citizens who travel abroad.

The program for sailors is the largest. Directed by special counterpropaganda councils attached to party committees in Soviet home ports, this effort now involves some 10,000 people on land and nearly 1,200 on Soviet ships. These ideological workers have two main responsibilities: first, to block any efforts to smuggle

ideologically harmful materials into the Soviet Union; second, to counter the direct influence of exposure to foreign life and ideas.

The programs for the other two groups are much smaller in scope. In the past year, the Soviet authorities have become especially concerned about contacts between Soviet citizens and foreign tourists, particularly in the Baltic republics. There the local authorities have launched a campaign to counter the influence of such tourists, many of whom are personally or ethnically related to local residents. Some visitors have been harassed and many Soviet citizens publicly warned on the dangers involved in dealing with foreigners. So far, these operations have been conducted by security officials or normal agitprop functionaries rather than through a special counterpropaganda organ. The republic counterpropaganda apparatus, however, is clearly involved in the preparation of lecture materials and articles on this subject.

The third target group, Soviet citizens who travel abroad, has always been carefully screened for political loyalty, but recently Soviet authorities have elaborated a special counterpropaganda program for them: The ideological apparatus has produced lectures on the dangers of traveling abroad and the error of trying to smuggle back into the USSR any ideological contraband. It also includes this group in the intended target audience of the rapidly growing category of Soviet literature devoted to the unhappy fate of Soviet citizens who have emigrated or defected-- lumping them with the Soviet Jews, Germans, and Armenians who might wish to emigrate.

Unintended Consequences

The most remarkable feature of the current counterpropaganda campaign is its content. In contrast to traditional Soviet agitprop material, this counterpropaganda is usually lively, timely, detailed, and often ostensibly--and surprisingly--non-ideological. These characteristics, the Soviets themselves admit, are imperative if the counterpropaganda is to be successful.

In normal agitprop work, a foreign idea simply will be denounced and treated with scorn; in counterpropaganda work, it typically will be examined in detail and carefully critiqued. But precisely here is the Soviets' dilemma: If they fail to conduct a counterpropaganda campaign, they risk even greater popular alienation; but in conducting one, they can unwittingly subvert their own stated goals--block unwelcome foreign influence and tighten ideological discipline.

One Soviet ideological specialist explained, "to meet every provocation means willy-nilly to propagandize it, to adopt a

defensive position." Neither he nor any other Soviet propagandist has yet indicated a way out. Consequently, the current counter-propaganda campaign is certain to generate opposition among, and ultimately may be closed down by, conservative party officials who prefer more brutal--and probably less effective--methods of cutting off the sources of foreign influence on Soviet society.

Prepared by Paul Goble
632-3230

Approved by Martha Mautner
632-9536

RECEIVED 08 JUN 85 10

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MCKINLEY, B

DOCDATE 07 JUN 85

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By GS NARA, Date 7/21/02

KEYWORDS: GERMANY EAST

POLAND

MICKELSON, ALICE

ZEHE, ALFRED

ZACHARSKI, MARIAN

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON PRISONER EXCHANGE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 10 JUN 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~DE GRAEFENREID~~

~~MATLOCK~~

SIMS, B

MCFARLANE

Coninistrato

DOBRYNISKY

concur

6/10/85

(Please return)

Called 6/10/85

(via Stella) TO Paula for concurrence. Peter

COMMENTS ** ORIGINAL W/ POINDEXTER

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

SYSTEM II
90636

7 June

NSC - Mr Pearson,

Bob,

you asked to see
what State had prepared.
We are holding this
very closely.

Bonnson

PRESS GUIDANCE FOR PRISONER EXCHANGEStatement to be Released by US Mission Berlin

At 1800 Central European Summer Time on Tuesday, June 11, 1985, representatives of the United States and the German Democratic Republic met in Berlin to complete an exchange of persons who had been held in custody by the authorities of the United States, the German Democratic Republic and Poland respectively.

The United States released to the custody of the German Democratic Republic four persons convicted of or indicted for espionage activities in the United States. They were: Alice Mickelson (GDR), Alfred Zehe (GDR), Marian Zacharski (Poland) and Penyu Kostadinov (Bulgaria).

The German Democratic Republic released to the custody of the United States 25 persons who had been imprisoned in the GDR and Poland.

It has also been agreed that family members of the 25 persons who had been imprisoned by the GDR and Poland who wish to do so will be allowed to join them within a short time. We estimate that as many as 15 to 20 family members may take advantage of this possibility.

All 25 persons released by the GDR and Poland departed from Berlin shortly after completion of the exchange.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1985

PRESS GUIDANCE FOR PRISONER EXCHANGE

By CLS NARA, Date 7/31/02

17

Questions and Answers

QUESTION: What charges had been placed against the four persons released by the United States?

ANSWER: The charges were as follows:

Marian W. Zacharski was convicted in the Central District of California on November 16, 1981 on one count of conspiracy to transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on December 14, 1981.

Alfred Zehe. On February 21, 1985, Alfred Zehe pleaded guilty in the District of Massachusetts to one count of conspiracy to transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States to aid foreign government; three counts of delivering information relating to the national defense of the United States to an agent of a foreign government; and four counts of gathering information relating to the national defense of the United States. He was sentenced to 8 years confinement and a \$5,000 fine on April 4, 1985.

Penyu Baychev Kostadinov was indicted in the Southern District of New York on September 30, 1983 on one count of conspiracy to transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States; one count of delivering information relating to the national defense of the United States to an agent of a foreign government.

~~SECRET~~

Alice Michelson was indicted in the Eastern District of New York on October 11, 1984. She was charged with one count of conspiracy to transmit information relating to the national defense of the United States; one count of aiding and abetting agents of a foreign country to obtain classified documents from an employee of the United States Department of Defense; and one count of failing to register as an agent of a foreign country. On May 31, 1985, Alice Michelson entered a guilty plea to one count of aiding and abetting agents of a foreign country to obtain classified documents from an employee of the United States Department of Defense and was sentenced to 10 years confinement.

QUESTION: Who were the persons released by the GDR and what were the charges against them?

ANSWER: I am not able to release a list of names or of the charges against these persons?

QUESTION: :Were they American intelligence agents?

ANSWER: In order to protect the interests of the persons concerned, I cannot comment on details of their cases.

~~SECRET~~

QUESTION: You said in your statement that the persons released by the GDR and Poland have left Berlin. Where are they now?

ANSWER: In the interest of the privacy of these people, who have gone through quite a lot and need some rest, I am not going to reveal their current whereabouts.

QUESTION: Why did the US release four spies, three of whom had been convicted by American courts?

ANSWER: During discussions with a representative of the German Democratic Republic, it was determined that the desire of several Eastern countries to obtain release of four espionage agents held in the United States could result in release of a substantially larger number of persons of interest to the United States held in the GDR and Poland. After considerable negotiation, the exchange was arranged.

We believe that obtaining release of twenty five persons, who could be joined by a substantial number of family members was more than sufficient to justify a decision to return these four to the East.

QUESTION: Kostadinov claimed diplomatic immunity. Did his inclusion in exchange signify US acceptance of his claim?

ANSWER: Not at all. Kostadinov's claims to diplomatic immunity were opposed by the United States and the US position was sustained by the US courts.

QUESTION: Even so, isn't such an exchange inconsistent with our efforts to combat East Bloc espionage in the United States?

ANSWER: No. The four persons were imprisoned as a result of successful FBI investigations which demonstrated the efficacy of our counter-intelligence operations. Once their activities were revealed and they were imprisoned, the four persons were no longer of espionage value to the East.

On the other hand, the East's interest in obtaining their return made it possible for us to have 25 persons and family members released. Humanitarian considerations clearly outweighed any advantage we might have gained by keeping these four persons in prison. This arrangement in no way alters our strong efforts to combat espionage in the United States. We remain determined to block such efforts and to punish espionage agents to the full extent provided by law.

QUESTION: What is the impact on current prosecutions?

ANSWER: None. We consider espionage as serious crime. We will handle prosecutions accordingly.

QUESTION: If the East did wish to arrange return of these four agents, why didn't the US hold out for release of dissidents such as Sakharov or Shcharanskiy?

ANSWER: Our efforts to obtain release of dissidents in the Soviet Union and elsewhere are well known and continuing. We did raise the cases of persons such as Sakharov and Shcharanskiy during discussions with the representative of the German Democratic Republic; we were told that the Soviet Union would not consider their release. After it became clear that the Soviets would not change their position, we decided that obtaining the release of 25 persons and family members was an important humanitarian step which justified the agreement.

QUESTION: How many family members will be involved?

ANSWER: I do not wish to provide a specific number, but I believe it will be in the range of 15-20.

QUESTION: What is the citizenship of the twenty five persons?

ANSWER: They are citizens of various European nations.

QUESTION: Were some of them political prisoners?

ANSWER: As stated earlier, I cannot comment on details of these cases.

QUESTION: Were West German or West Berlin authorities involved in the deal?

ANSWER: The exchange was arranged solely between the United States and the German Democratic Republic. Both the Berlin Senat and the Federal German Government were informed before the exchange took place.

QUESTION: Under what authority did the US release prisoners who had either been convicted or were being held on the basis of valid warrants?

ANSWER: The United States arranged for the appropriate executive and judicial actions necessary for the release of the involved prisoners in anticipation of the exchange.

Marian Zacharski was granted executive clemency and his sentence of imprisonment was commuted to time already served.

Alice Michelson pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting agents of a foreign country to obtain classified documents from an employee of the United States Department of Defense and was sentenced to 10 years confinement. Thereafter, her sentence of imprisonment was reduced by the Court to time already served for the purpose of effectuating the exchange.

Penyu Baychev Kostadinov was released on bail, pursuant to a court order, in order to allow him to travel to West Berlin in anticipation of the exchange. The United States then moved to dismiss the pending charges against him in order to effectuate the exchange.

Alfred Zehe was released, pursuant to a court order, to the custody of United States Marshals for the purpose of traveling to West Berlin. His sentence of imprisonment was reduced by the Court to time already served in order to effectuate the exchange.

QUESTION: Do you see this event as a new breakthrough in US-GDR relations?

ANSWER: We were of course pleased by the success of the discussions. Gaining release of persons who wish to leave the GDR and other Eastern countries is a major goal of American policy. I would not, however, draw conclusions for other aspects of US-GDR relations from the success of this effort. Since establishment of relations in 1974, our bilateral relations with the GDR have been based on a careful calculation of American interests. We will continue to follow this approach in the future.

QUESTION: Does the fact that prisoners held in Poland were part of the exchange signify a warming of US-Polish relations?

ANSWER: No.

~~SECRET~~

QUESTION: Are any of the persons being released by Poland members of the Solidarity Trade Union?

ANSWER: I don't know, but as I said earlier, I cannot release the names of the persons released by the East and I will not comment on details of their imprisonment.

QUESTION: Do you believe that success of this negotiation was facilitated by the installation of new leadership in Moscow?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: Do you see this as providing an impulse for US-Soviet relations?

ANSWER: No.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D. C. 20547

→ *McClack*

2511
Office of the Director



USIA

JUL 03 1985

*File USSR
Propaganda*

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *(Zu)*
Director

SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 26"

Attached is the latest "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research.

During the period April 11 - June 14:

- o Moscow continued to stress the aggressive character of American foreign policy and to blame the U.S. for lack of progress in the Geneva arms limitation talks.
- o Party chief Mikhail Gorbachev called U.S. foreign policy "a constant negative factor in international relations." He also charged that the U.S. had violated the January agreement that the Geneva talks would deal with nuclear arms and space weapons "in their interrelationship."
- o Soviet Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov and other high-level military officials assailed the Strategic Defense Initiative and warned of Soviet "counter-measures."
- o Soviet commentators described President Reagan's trip to Western Europe as a dismal failure which elicited widespread public opposition and sharpened divisions within the Western alliance.
- o Soviet spokesmen also attacked U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and denounced Radio Marti as subversive.

Attachment:
"Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 26"

== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 26

June 21, 1985

SUMMARY

This report discusses Soviet propaganda on arms control and other issues for the period April 11 - June 14.

Against the backdrop of the 40th anniversary of the allied victory in World War II and the end of the first round of the Geneva arms control talks, Soviet spokesmen continued to stress the aggressive, militarist character of U.S. foreign policy. Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev sharply criticized the U.S. Calling U.S. policy "a constant negative factor in international relations," Gorbachev asserted (May 8) that "American imperialism is the cutting edge of the war menace to mankind." At times, however, Gorbachev tempered his criticism with recollections of wartime cooperation and calls for improved Soviet-American relations.

Soviet Commentary on Arms ControlSee pp. 1-8

Soviet commentators continued to maintain that the U.S. seeks military superiority and has not been serious in the Geneva talks. As evidence, they claimed that:

- o The United States had refused to comply with the January 8 agreement that the Geneva talks would deal with nuclear arms and space weapons "in their interrelationship."
- o The Reagan Administration had rejected the April 7 Soviet proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, a freeze on nuclear arsenals, and a halt to the testing, development, and deployment of space weapons.
- o The American commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) entails a clear violation of the provisions of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
- o The U.S. has violated key provisions of the SALT II Treaty and is preparing to scrap it altogether.

Other Current Propaganda ThemesSee pp. 8-11

Soviet commentators described President Reagan's trip to Western Europe as a dismal failure which elicited widespread opposition and sharpened divisions within the Western alliance. They also scored U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and denounced Radio Marti as a subversive "pirate" radio station.

SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ARMS CONTROL

Between April 11 and June 14, Soviet spokesmen continually emphasized the USSR's devotion to arms control. Authoritative statements by Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and by USSR Minister of Defense Sergei Sokolov and other high-level military officials set the tone, contrasting the USSR's principled commitment to peace with the aggressive, militarist course pursued by the U.S.

Soviet propagandists tried to maintain momentum in their "peace campaign" by repeatedly citing Moscow's "peace initiatives." Much publicity was given to Gorbachev's April 7 call for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, a freeze on nuclear arsenals, and an end to the testing, development, and deployment of space-based weapons.

Various other proposals were floated as well. On April 17, TASS reported that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had replied positively to a message from the U.S. Center for Defense Information that called for a moratorium on all nuclear weapons tests. "The Soviet Union agrees that the moratorium should go into effect on 6 August 1985, the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." It was reported that the USSR was prepared for the "immediate resumption of talks on a total ban on nuclear weapons tests and wanted the unratified Soviet-U.S. partial nuclear test-ban treaties of 1974 and 1976 to be put into effect." These measures, TASS noted, "would provide more favorable conditions for the fruitful progress of the Geneva talks."

In order to lend credibility to their claims, Soviet commentators often cited selectively from well-regarded U.S. media, such as The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor. For example, a TASS report published in Pravda on May 5 stated:

Hiding behind demagogic verbiage about the allegedly "defensive" nature of U.S. military programs, the Reagan Administration is building up its strategic arsenals for a first nuclear strike. Particular attention is being devoted to the "Star Wars" program. As an article published in The New Yorker notes, the Pentagon sees a "preventive" nuclear strike against the Soviet Union as its main action scenario.... In order to win new orders, according to The Washington Post, the corporations of the military-industrial complex intend to use any means to achieve the implementation of the "Star Wars" program....

Two days later, in a statement on the 40th anniversary of the meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe, Gorbachev again suggested the possibility of cooperation with the U.S. After paying tribute to the "significant contribution that was made for the achievement of the common goal by the peoples and the armed forces of the United States" and other members of the alliance, Gorbachev stated:

Our combat union...demonstrated the potential of cooperation that is created by joint work for peace and a better future for humanity. Similarly, the handshake of the Soviet and American soldiers who met in the spring of 1945 on the Elbe River has been forever recorded in history as a symbol of hope and friendship [TASS, in English].

Yet, in a May 8 speech marking the anniversary of the Soviet victory in "the Great Patriotic War" (World War II), Gorbachev once again adopted a confrontational tone:

American imperialism is at the cutting edge of the war menace to mankind. The policy of the USA is growing more bellicose in character and has become a constant negative factor in international relations.... The aggressive intentions of the ruling elite of that country are seen in the attempts to undermine the military-strategic balance, ... in stepping up the arms race, ... and in the dangerous plans for the militarization of space [TASS, in English].

Gorbachev nonetheless stated that "we believe that there are quite realistic opportunities for curbing the forces of militarism.... We firmly believe that the process of detente should be revived."

Defense Minister Sokolov Assails SDI

On May 4, in his first major statement on arms control, USSR Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov provided the most extensive official commentary on the issues covered in the Geneva talks since they began on March 13. (His interview, carried by TASS on May 4, was published in the Soviet military newspaper Krasnaia zvezda on May 5 and in Pravda on May 6.) For the most part, the defense minister repeated points made by other Soviet spokesmen in recent months.

Sokolov said that the U.S. was attempting to "upset the balance" in strategic and medium-range nuclear arms and gain a first-strike capability in space. He dismissed as "deliberate and malicious disinformation" claims that the USSR was not observing the moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles

Gorbachev Takes the Lead in Criticizing the U.S.

The new party chief, Mikhail Gorbachev, played a leading role in expounding the official Soviet view on Soviet-American relations and arms control. Often, Gorbachev was confrontational, blaming U.S. "imperialism" for world tensions and the Reagan Administration for lack of progress at the Geneva talks. Occasionally, however, in a more conciliatory tone, he alluded to wartime cooperation and expressed a desire for improved relations with the U.S.

Only hours after the first round of the Geneva arms limitation talks had concluded, Gorbachev gave his first full-scale policy review as party general secretary. His speech, delivered at the plenary meeting of the party Central Committee, was released by TASS on April 23 and published in Pravda the next day. Appearing to anticipate the next week's meeting of the Warsaw Pact states, it provided a hard-hitting critique of the U.S. posture in the Geneva talks.

Repeating a charge previously made by other Soviet spokesmen, Gorbachev asserted that the U.S. had "violated" the January 8 agreement on the talks' scope and objectives. According to the text released by TASS, Gorbachev stated that the first round of talks in Geneva "indicates that Washington does not seek agreement with the Soviet Union." The U.S., he asserted, was violating "the agreement reached in January on the interconnection of the three subjects -- prevention of an arms race in space, nuclear strategic arms reduction, and reduction of medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe." Gorbachev further criticized the U.S. response to his April 7 proposals. "One cannot help but find surprising," he said, "the haste with which the American Administration responds with its standard and customary 'No' to our proposals."

After noting that "the international situation remains troubled and dangerous through the fault of imperialism," Gorbachev said that the "responsibility for the present situation rests, in the first place, with the ruling circles of the USA." These circles, he said, "continue to come out as initiators of the arms race and continue to sabotage disarmament. It is at their initiative that new types of mass destruction weapons are continually being developed."

While attacking the U.S., however, Gorbachev also expressed a "readiness" to improve relations, "for mutual benefit and without any attempts to infringe on each other's legitimate rights and interests." "There is no fatal inevitability of confrontation between the two countries," he stated.

in Europe that had been announced by Gorbachev on April 7.

As in most recent statements by high-level Soviet officials, Sokolov directed his sharpest criticism at SDI. He said that the Reagan Administration's depiction of SDI as a defensive system was "camouflage" and "outright demagoguery" designed to conceal plans for building "space strike weapons" and achieving a "first, disarming nuclear strike" capability. He dismissed as "not serious" U.S. assurances that research might not lead to development or deployment of a ballistic-missile defense system and repeated familiar Soviet accusations that SDI research is inconsistent with the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Sokolov warned that SDI would entail serious consequences for the U.S. The Soviet Union, he said, "would have have no choice but to take countermeasures to restore the balance." It would, he added, choose measures "in the sphere of both defensive and offensive arms" that "would correspond most to the interests of its defense capability, and not those towards which the leaders in Washington would like to incline it."

The defense minister emphasized that the "the creation of space strike weapons will bring about, [and] is sure to bring about, a lessening of the security of the U.S. itself and its allies. Such an outcome should not be forgotten by the initiators of 'Star Wars' and those who are being inclined to complicity in that provocative program."

In subsequent weeks, other high-level Soviet military officials reiterated these themes. On June 4, Pravda carried a lengthy article by Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, chief of the Soviet general staff, who stressed the importance of the ABM Treaty for arms control. (The timing of the article appeared to be linked with the upcoming NATO ministerial discussion of strategic issues and with the congressional debate over SDI funding.) In a sober, measured tone, Akhromeev asserted that SDI is "incompatible with the principles forming the foundation of the ABM Treaty." By pursuing SDI, he wrote, "Washington is effectively working directly to undermine the treaty."

A few days later, in an unusual departure from standard practice, Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, a member of the general staff, was interviewed by two American journalists. Chervov's pessimistic assessment was reported in the Western press, but not in the Soviet domestic media. Chervov suggested that the Soviet leadership had concluded that the Soviet-American arms control process is on the verge of collapse because of the U.S. policy on SDI. According to The Washington Post (June 9), Chervov said that the Soviet Union "demands a complete ban on attack weapons in space." "We are not going to take the path

that the U.S. administration is trying to force us onto," he asserted, echoing Sokolov's words of May 4. He was quoted as saying that to counter U.S. efforts in space, "we will have... an increase in offensive strategic weapons, and correspondingly we will take certain defensive measures." Additional offensive weapons, he said, would be "more economical" than investments in new defensive technology.

Pessimism Expressed Regarding the Geneva Talks

Soviet commentary on Foreign Minister Gromyko's May 14 meeting with Secretary of State Shultz reflected Moscow's increased public pessimism about the prospects for progress at the Geneva talks. According to TASS, Gromyko reiterated Moscow's concern about the United States' "unconstructive stance" and reminded Secretary Shultz of the "need to abide" by the January 8 agreement to deal with nuclear and space weapons "in their inter-relationship." Gromyko also emphasized that Washington's attitude toward the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on the creation and deployment of nuclear and space arms would "serve as an indicator" of U.S. intentions. Though critical of the U.S. stance, Gromyko was cited by TASS as urging "energetic efforts" to achieve a "change for the better" in Soviet-American relations.

In the days preceding the May 30 resumption of the Geneva negotiations, Soviet commentators continued to stress that it was up to the U.S. to show good faith if any progress were to be made. In a TASS English dispatch on May 29, military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev stated:

The stand of the USA in the first round of talks had no elements of constructiveness whatsoever. Washington's "flexibility"...was manifested in its departure from the January agreement on the subject and objectives of the talks.... As the first round showed, the U.S. side limited itself to the repetition of its proposals made at earlier talks, the proposals running counter to the principle of equality and equal security. They in Washington now talk constantly about the intention to speed up the development of attack space arms. Washington does not answer the Soviet Union's proposals for a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms, for a moratorium on the creation of space arms, and a freeze of nuclear arms. By its talk about readiness for reduction, the U.S. Administration would like to continue to camouflage its military preparations.

Appeals to the Western Europeans

Since the beginning of the year, when it was announced that the U.S. and the USSR would resume arms negotiations, Moscow has intensified its efforts to gain support for its position among the Western Europeans. Soviet spokesmen have attempted to convince Western Europeans of SDI's offensive character and destabilizing consequences and to discourage their participation in SDI-related research with the U.S. The Soviet media's treatment of President Reagan's recent trip to Western Europe highlighted differences that emerged among the allies (see below).

Soviet spokesmen also expressed the expectation that cleavages within the Western alliance will widen. In an interview published in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica (May 21), Aleksandr Iakovlev, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, observed that "essential disagreements are emerging" between the U.S. and its allies. Iakovlev suggested that these differences are likely to become more pronounced as "the West European countries and Japan come to realize that Soviet military might is designed exclusively for its own defense and to face up to U.S. imperial aspirations." "In other words," he said, "[the possibility] that Western Europe, Japan, and other capitalist countries will distance themselves from U.S. strategic military plans in the near future is neither an excessively rash fantasy nor a nebulous prospect."

When West German Social Democratic Party chairman Willy Brandt and Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi visited Moscow in late May, Soviet leaders made every effort to impress them with their reasonableness and peace-loving intentions. In his May 27 speech for Brandt, Gorbachev proclaimed Moscow's desire for "peace, for averting war, and for reducing armaments to the point of the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons." Gorbachev favorably noted the positions taken by the West German Social Democratic Party and by Brandt himself "against the 'Star Wars' plans and in favor of containing the arms race."

Similarly, in his May 29 dinner speech for Prime Minister Craxi, the Soviet leader asserted that the USSR wants to "revive the spirit, the atmosphere, and the essence of detente." He contrasted the USSR's approach with what he described as a U.S. failure to display "an adequate readiness" to seek "mutually acceptable solutions" at the Geneva talks. The USSR's desire to foster improved relations with Western Europe was also underscored by Gorbachev's proposal to Craxi that a political dialogue be initiated between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the European Economic Community.

Soviets Claim That the U.S. Is Preparing to Scrap SALT II

In May, Soviet commentators increasingly focused on the question of whether the U.S. would exceed the limits of the SALT II agreement that both governments had agreed observe (though the treaty was never ratified by the U.S. Senate).

In the May 28 issue of Pravda, Vitalii Gan stated: "The U.S. course toward sabotaging the agreements on arms limitation and reduction is acquiring increasingly sinister outlines." The same ominous note was sounded in a June 4 TASS dispatch by Vladimir Bogachev (in English):

The Reagan administration is preparing to undermine the remaining obstacles put by the treaties to the unrestrained build-up of the U.S. arms. Sea trials of the new U.S. Alaska atomic submarine carrying 24 Trident missiles with MIRVed warheads will start in accordance with the Pentagon's plans next August. By having phased in the new submarine complex, the United States will surpass the ceiling of 1,200 MIRVed strategic missiles imposed by the Soviet-U.S. strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II).

Like "other arms limitation agreements undermined by Washington in the past four years," Bogachev said, the Reagan Administration would adhere to this one only "until the Pentagon's military programs entered into contradiction with it."

More authoritative sources continued to develop this line of argument. An editorial in Pravda on June 10 said: "The only point at issue is what methods of scrapping the treaty would be less painful to the United States from the point of view of the world's public reaction: whether the commitments assumed by the United States under the treaty should be abrogated openly and in full or whether this should be done incrementally, step by step."

This public posture was maintained after President Reagan's June 10 announcement that the U.S. would "go the extra mile" in arms control negotiations with the USSR and that it would continue to abide by the SALT II Treaty. On June 11, TASS responded by saying (in English):

What the President said confirms in all obviousness that the U.S. Administration...has decided to continue to steer matters toward destroying the treaty system which curbs the nuclear arms race.... Behind the present decision of President Reagan to depart from the SALT II Treaty, there is a long trail of most flagrant violations of international arms limitation agreements and accords by the United States.

A TASS report published in Pravda on June 12 said that the President had merely engaged in a "publicity gesture" by declaring "with much pomp that...one of the currently operational Poseidon submarines will be phased out." "However, it immediately became known that the Poseidon will not be dismantled: Responding to journalists' questions, [National Security Advisor] R. McFarlane made it clear that this submarine would be converted into a sea-based cruise missile carrier."

OTHER CURRENT PROPAGANDA THEMES

President Reagan's Visit to Western Europe

Soviet commentary on the President's trip to Western Europe was uniformly negative. It emphasized the President's failure to achieve his objectives, the deep divisions within the Western alliance, and the widespread popular opposition to the U.S.

Bonn Economic Summit. As the meeting of the seven Western allies got underway on May 2, TASS reported (in English):

Under the flag of a community of "Western ideals and values," Washington intends to use the Bonn summit above all for thrusting its militarist, adventurist course on its partners, drawing them deeper into the policy of confrontation with the socialist countries and curbing mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation with them, and heightening international tensions. At the same time, the acute contradictions between the USA and its allies will invariably become the object of bargaining.

The President, according to TASS, was planning to pressure the allies into joining the "Star Wars" program so that they would become "subcontractors of the U.S. military-industrial complex."

Visit to the Bitburg Cemetery. President Reagan's May 5 visit to the German military cemetery in Bitburg was severely criticized by the Soviet media. Anticipating the visit, TASS commentator Stanislav Bychkov asserted that "Reagan's bow to the Third Reich...will go down in history as an insult to the memory of millions of people who died at the hand of fascists."

In much the same vein, a May 6 Izvestia article described the visit as a "sacrilegious spectacle," which confirmed the "thesis of the U.S. reactionaries to the effect that during the Second World War, the USA allegedly acted 'on the wrong side.' Reagan's bow to the 'Third Reich' is none other than reconciliation with fascism." The article added that "to the White

House, 'reconciliation' means...blessing those who again rake up the mad ideas of Hitlerism, dream of 'revenge' and of a revision of the postwar borders in Europe." The visit also allegedly served to support "a new anti-communist 'crusade' in which all means are declared to be 'morally justified.'"

Subsequent Soviet commentary emphasized that the President's trip elicited widespread public opposition and failed to achieve its major objectives. On May 11, for example, TASS news analyst Ivan Ablamov wrote: "There were few overseas trips of U.S. presidents which ended in such failure as the just-ended tour of President Ronald Reagan." Pravda, that same day, carried another TASS dispatch, which summed up the visit as follows:

President Reagan's 10-day trip to West European countries is over. The visit showed how deep and acute the contradictions between the United States and its allies are and how strong the alarm and indignation are in Western Europe at the U.S. administration's hegemonistic course....

As for the results of the conference of the "Seven" in Bonn, as The Washington Post admits, Reagan's efforts to get its participants to approve Washington's course...were unproductive. Reagan, the newspaper points out, ran up against "exceptional difficulties" during the conference: The West European participants refused point-blank to approve Washington's policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua.... The majority of the meeting's participants expressed the most serious doubts about Reagan's "Star Wars" program, and France rejected practically all economic and foreign policy aspects of the administration's course.

Address to the European Parliament. Pravda (May 11) likewise stressed the negative reaction to the address that the President delivered in Strasbourg:

Reagan's speech...is assessed here [in Washington] as an ignominious failure. Shamelessly falsifying history, the U.S. President, saying not a word about the Soviet Union's decisive role in routing Hitler's Reich, set about "overturning" the results of the postwar structure in Europe and lauded his administration's militarist, hegemonistic policy as being aimed...at strengthening peace, democracy, and freedom and even...reducing the threat of nuclear war. As a sign of protest, many parliamentarians ostentatiously left the hall, and those who remained repeatedly interrupted Reagan's speech with shouts of "Hands off Nicaragua!" and "Down with the 'Star Wars' Program!"

U.S. "Aggression" Against Nicaragua Scored

In his April 23 speech, party leader Gorbachev maintained that the U.S. "is threatening the heroic people of Nicaragua militarily in an effort to deprive them of freedom and sovereignty, as was the case in Grenada." The Soviet media gave prominent coverage to the visit to Moscow of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega the following week. While emphasizing the USSR's continued support for the Sandinista regime, Soviet leaders warned of U.S. plans to subvert it.

Soviet spokesmen scathingly denounced the trade embargo that the U.S. had imposed. On May 1, TASS commentator Sergei Starosel'skii wrote that the embargo is another stage in America's "undeclared war" against Nicaragua, a "massive offensive" on the economic front designed to "break the will" of the Nicaraguan people by "starvation and privation." The next day, TASS writer Sergei Kulik said that "Ronald Reagan decided to vent his pathological hatred of the Sandinist revolution.... In demonstratively escalating its dispute with the Nicaraguan government, Washington is preparing the ground for an open armed invasion in Central America, as it did before in Indochina."

In early June, the Soviet media riveted attention on the joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises ("Cabanas-85") that were getting underway near the Nicaraguan border. As Moscow domestic radio reported on June 7:

It is almost openly stated in official Washington circles that Cabanas-85 may be considered as one more rehearsal, perhaps a dress rehearsal, on the eve of the Pentagon's planned invasion of Nicaragua by U.S. troops. It is no accident that a few days before the start of these exercises, the White House began new propaganda attacks, fiercer than ever, against the young republic.

Radio Marti Denounced as "Slanderous" and "Subversive"

The inauguration of broadcasting by the new USIA station, Radio Marti, elicited a caustic reaction from the Soviet media. On May 19, TASS international service stated (in Russian):

Cubans have been building a new life for more than 25 years now, and throughout this period they have had to live and work amid hostile acts by official Washington. ... A major role in these aggressive actions has always been assigned by the White House to psychological warfare against socialist Cuba. The establishment of the subver-

sive radio center in Florida marks the beginning of a new stage in this war.... The traitors to the Cuban people who have been sheltered on American soil by the CIA are to receive a new mouthpiece for their subversive activities. Moreover, the slanderers are not fastidious about the methods they employ; thus, the pirate radio station has blasphemously been named after Jose Marti, a name that is sacred to every upright Cuban.

Writing in Pravda on May 22, Pavel Bogomolov asserted that Radio Marti's "first programs have reaffirmed...the crude, slanderous nature of the U.S. provocateurs' new mouthpiece." He added:

In this respect, it is a close relative of other subversive centers such as the CIA-controlled Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. The aggressive nature of Radio Marti is admitted even in Congress, where Representative H. Gonzalez bluntly termed this subversion the "electronic equivalent of the U.S. armed invasion of the Bay of Pigs."

The "psychological warfare" unleashed against Cuba and the other socialist states is part of the general U.S. propaganda offensive against all bastions of freedom and social progress which refuse to submit to Washington's diktat.

Soviet Propaganda Highlights

SOVIET PROPAGANDA HIGHLIGHTS

July 19 - 25

6305

USSR - 38
Propaganda

U.S. Backing for South Africa

The White House grumbled for the sake of decency against its racist friends, but at the same time expressed "understanding" of the emergency measures taken by it. It has again openly reaffirmed its intention to strengthen the alliance with Pretoria and prevent the imposition of sanctions against it. Washington's encouragement of the racists is also the reason behind the restrained reaction in the other Western powers against the massacre in the RSA. (TASS, July 24)

U.S. "Policy" of Terrorism

The United States, to the drumbeat of declarations about putting an end to international terrorism, commits plunder wherever possible. The notions "terrorism" and "American policy" are becoming synonymous in the international lexicon for ever more people. (TASS, July 23)

Visit of Pakistani Foreign Minister to Washington

Military cooperation will be the central issue in the Pakistani foreign minister's talks with American leaders. American aid worth billions of dollars naturally raises questions as to why Washington is displaying such generosity. The Washington politicians are happy that Pakistan has been turned into a base for direct aggression against Afghanistan. Therefore, it is not astonishing that Washington is ready to reward the Pakistani leadership so generously for its services. (Radio Moscow Urdu, July 18)

Nairobi Women's Conference

The women's conference was keynoted by criticism of Washington's imperialist policy and Washington-supported criminal regimes of Zionist Israel and the racist Republic of South Africa. The women from the U.S. who represent millions of rank-and-file American women denounced the domestic policy of the Reagan manipulation and disclosed the cynical and propaganda character of activities of the official U.S. delegation. The delegation lead by Maureen Reagan represents the American monopolies, but not millions of working women. (TASS, July 20)

U.S. Pressure on Japan To Increase Military Spending

The U.S. House of Representatives has approved a revised military bill calling on Japan to further increase its spending. Observers in Tokyo call the bill not only undisguised pressure on Japan, but also an outrageous intervention in Japan's internal affairs. The most significant goal of the bill is to shift the role of gendarme of the Pacific to Japan. Japan's ruling clique is making efforts to play up to its partner across the ocean even in violation of previous pledges. This cannot but arouse apprehension among Japan's neighbor's in the region. (Radio Moscow Japanese, July 17)

ITEM RETURNED

TO NSC

SECRETARIAT

IN APRIL 1987

Log # 507
add-on 5540
orig. 5851
Aug 1585

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


5400

August 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK
Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Soviet Propaganda

I appreciate having received a copy of your latest product - the weekly summary of Soviet propaganda themes. I think that this is a very useful document which, because of its concise format and more frequent publication, will be of considerable value to all those who participate in the public affairs operations of our government. I recommend that you regularly send copies to the appropriate policy and public affairs officials at State and Defense so that they can benefit from its contents.



Robert C. McFarlane

Senyowski File USSR Propaganda

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

July 17, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*

SUBJECT: Soviet Propaganda

SIGNED

Charlie Wick has sent you a memo forwarding an issue of USIA's new weekly summary of Soviet propaganda themes (Tab II). The summary, which is accompanied by samples of actual propaganda, is no more than one page in length. Wick's idea is to circulate it to several senior officials at the White House to sensitize those who deal with public affairs to the various propaganda themes we must deal with on a regular basis. *ll/ok*

I think this summary is an excellent idea and is of greater operational public affairs value than USIA's monthly "Soviet Propaganda Alert" which is too comprehensive for the practical purposes of quick reaction in the public arena.

At Tab I is a memo from you to Wick commending him for this initiative and recommending that he send it to the appropriate officials at State and Defense.

wk Raymond, *lc* Cannistraro, *ls* Sestanovich and *jm* Matlock concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Wick at Tab I

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Charles Wick

Tab II USIA's new weekly summary of Soviet propaganda themes


**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

→ Matlock
Ack?

Office of the Director

5400



USIA

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RCM HAS SEEN

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July 2, 1985

Dear Bud:

As you know, one of my major concerns has been Soviet propaganda and disinformation activities worldwide. I've directed my staff to attack this problem, but -- while there has been some significant progress -- we are still far from turning the situation around.

I'm convinced that one of the difficulties is that people at policy levels in Washington are simply too busy to pay much attention to the enormous volume of propaganda and disinformation generated by the Soviets which criticizes every aspect of our society as well as the policies of this and every other Administration.

In an attempt to sensitize our own people first, for the past few months I've had my staff prepare and circulate a weekly summary of the most significant Soviet propaganda themes. The summary is highly selective and brief -- no more than one page -- with a compressed description of the main Soviet allegations. It is sent to every policy level office at USIA.

I believe that this report deserves wider distribution. I plan on sending it to you, Don Regan, and Pat Buchanan for background as well as action, if you deem it appropriate. I've attached a copy of the latest report as well as a brief description of how the report is compiled and the purposes for which it might be appropriate.

I would appreciate your thoughts on the report's utility.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

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NLRR F06-114/10 #10968
BY CK NARA DATE 1/2/08

USIA WEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT
SOVIET PROPAGANDA HIGHLIGHTS

The USIA weekly report on significant Soviet propaganda highlights was initiated at the Director's request in order to better inform policy-level officers of the most significant current themes and allegations in Soviet propaganda and disinformation.

Space constraints (one-page maximum) require a very high level of selectivity and that the Soviet arguments be presented in a highly compressed, very blunt form. Space constraints also mean that no analysis can be offered. (Trend analysis is provided by the Agency's bimonthly Soviet Propaganda Alert)

Topics for the report concern topical international issues, with occasional items on less transitory themes. The report is mainly a "how current Soviet propaganda is playing the issue" summary. The FBIS Daily Report for the Soviet Union is the source for the report.

The report also distinguishes between domestic Soviet propaganda and that designed for external consumption. With few exceptions, external propaganda is the focus, meaning that TASS and Radio Moscow foreign services generate the bulk of the source material. Occasional items are taken from Pravda and Izvestia on the assumption that these important Soviet newspapers have a wide foreign audience also.

Not all the items in the weekly propaganda report require or are amenable to action on the part of USIA. Some arguments are so absurd that commentary on the part of the U.S. Government would merely draw attention to them and give credibility where none would otherwise be granted. Other arguments are so nonspecific that they cannot be decisively refuted. Finally, the information required to refute some charges would compromise U.S. intelligence or military activities. Nonetheless, recipients of the report should be alert to charges that can be effectively refuted.

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SOVIET PROPAGANDA HIGHLIGHTS

June 21 - 27

Bush Trip to Europe

Vice President Bush leaves for Europe later this week to make another go at ramming Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" program down the West Europeans' throats. Another bid will be made to dupe people who continue to doubt the need to extend the arms race to outer space, to dupe them into seeing SDI as defensive in nature, and to try and twist the arms of those who criticize Washington's plans. (TASS, June 20)

Space Shuttle Laser Test

The experiment was actually a test of space weapons. The space flight graphically demonstrated how theoretical research is gradually taking the form of practical experiments. The testing of the laser weapon in space annuls all the statements the U.S. has made claiming that it is restricting itself in this field to theoretical research. It shows that these statements have been made to mislead the public. (Radio Moscow English, June 20)

U.S. Uses International Terrorism

One cannot but be amazed at the image of innocence the U.S. confers upon itself and the vociferous tone it is adopting while denouncing the TWA highjacking. The U.S. shelters air pirates, it has shelled Lebanese towns and villages, it has sent Marines into Lebanon, it has attacked Libyan airplanes, and it is responsible for the acts of terror undertaken by Israel such as the mass killings in Lebanon, the piratic raid against the Iraqi nuclear research center, the shooting-down of a Libyan airliner and more. Is this not international terrorism? (Radio Moscow Arabic, June 20)

TWA Highjacking

It goes without saying that the hijacking and other forms of terrorism are unacceptable to all sincere and consistent supporters of international law, but every new incident of this kind has revealed its direct and close relationship with the global policy of the U.S. and the methods official Washington has adopted in its crusade against the legitimate rights of other peoples. Violence breeds violence. (Radio Moscow English, June 22)

Marine Slayings in El Salvador

The U.S. Administration, exploiting the incident in El Salvador in which a group of unidentified attackers opened fire at a cafe and killed 13 people including four American Marines and two civilians, is going to expand military aid to the Duarte regime. The steps show that the U.S. is using any pretext to expand American military presence in different parts of the world, to bolster regimes friendly to it and to seek the overthrow of governments of sovereign countries that are not to its liking. (TASS, June 21)

L. PONOMAREV ON LASER RESEARCH, SDI, BUSH TRIP

LD201908 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 20 Jun 85

[Text] Moscow June 20 TASS -- TASS commentator Leonid Ponomarev writes: U.S. Vice-President George Bush leaves for Western Europe later this week to make another go at ramming Ronald Reagan's "star wars" program, officially known as "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), down the West Europeans' throat. THE LONDON TIMES said Bush would try to dispel the NATO allies' misgivings over "star wars" and drum up support for the program. In short, another bid will be made to dupe people, who continue doubting the need to extend the arms race to outer space, into seeing SDI as defensive in nature and to try and twist the arms of those who criticize Washington's plans.



Preoccupation with U.S. preparations for space warfare, in the meantime, is being voiced both in Europe and elsewhere in the world as people realize that the United States wants to subordinate all near-earth and remote space to its military purposes and the statements that SDI is limited to "research" alone are a cover-up effort.

These statements do not square with reality as laser weapons testing is proceeding at full tilt even today, in particular, with the help of the space shuttle Discovery now in orbit. James Abrahamson, the general in charge of the "star wars" scheme, bluntly admitted the special significance of the Discovery crew's experiments. What is under way thus are trials of weapons intended for deployment both on earth and in space. THE NEW YORK TIMES said all indications were that Ronald Reagan was reluctant to forgo the "star wars" concept. And this judgement is borne out by facts. The Pentagon does not make a secret out of the fact that its scientists are looking into ways of making gas laser and beam weapons, rail guns and the like. The deployment of such weapons is merely a matter of time, depending on the state of their readiness.

According to an admission by selfsame Abrahamson, it will take not more than two or three years to deploy the SDI system in full. The admission is important since it reveals as hypocrites the Washington spokesmen claiming that SDI is confined to "research". As the proverb goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The same principle applies to space weapons as well: To be able to deploy them in space in such a short time, one should have them ready. This is why the Washington spokesmens' contentions about "pure research" sound false and unconvincing. Moreover, they are disproved by official announcements of the Pentagon itself such as its report that it has already tested laser and neutron irradiation systems which can be used in Western Europe as part of the "star wars" project.

U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle told a recent congressional hearing that the "star wars" program was the cornerstone of U.S. military policy. And Washington is pulling all the stops out to make the West European accept SDI not at all of course for the sake of the latter's security but for the sake of committing them to its practical preparations for war, including a war in space.

✓ LASER TEST FAILS, UNDERMINES GENEVA TALKS

LD202234 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 20 Jun 85

[Text] During the current flight of the American shuttle spaceship "Discovery" an attempt was made to test the components of a laser weapon. The experiment failed but it will be repeated this Saturday [22 June]. Dmitiriy (Zakharov) of our staff writes the following on this subject:

The experiment with a reflection of a laser beam by a mirror on "Discovery" was actually a test of space weapons. Spokesmen of the American Government have made a number of assuring statements about its research into space weapons being restricted to pure theory and that there is no question at all of any practical implementation of the "star wars" program. And Washington has asserted that the Geneva Soviet and American talks cannot suffer because of abstract theoretical research.

However, the shuttle flight has graphically demonstrated how this theoretical research is gradually taking the form of practical experiments. Last January Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko already posed the question: Who can guarantee that following the conclusion of this research work, nothing more will be done? Andrey Gromyko said that there would be people who will want to go over to the next stage, to the testing and implementation of this weapon. Evidently the shuttle flight must be regarded in this light.

It's quite obvious that the American delegation sitting at the Geneva conference table knew that these tests were in the pipeline, knew that steps would be taken aimed at undermining the very basis of the talks, for the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed that the negotiations would deal with the whole issue, both of nuclear and space weapons. The latest shuttle experiment makes it doubtful whether the Americans really want the Geneva talks to succeed. If the White House is taking steps aimed against the very substance of one of the two issues to be debated at Geneva, then what kind of an agreement can be reached?

The testing of the laser weapon in space annuls all the statements the United States has made claiming it is restricting itself in this field to theoretical research. It shows that these statements have been made to mislead the public. And in the same way, all (?its) statements about space weapons being meant for defense alone are also aimed at camouflaging other plans. As President Reagan's scientific adviser George Keyworth said, the space system can give the United States military superiority over the Soviet Union, and moreover a nuclear advantage. In plain English this means that Washington views the space weapon as a means of achieving military superiority and such intentions make one recall the conceptions of the Reagan administration that speak of the possibility of winning a nuclear war if the United States has the necessary superiority and possibility of inflicting the first nuclear strike. And this doctrine remains in force today, too.

The current experiments make one think seriously about the role of space weapons in American nuclear strategy.

✓ U.S. ADOPTS 'IMAGE OF INNOCENCE' OVER HIJACKING

LD202052 Moscow International Service in Arabid 1600 GMT 20 Jun 85

[From the "Window on the Arab World" program presented by Aleksey Zlatorunskiy]

[Text] The American Administration is presently voicing at all levels angry indignation against international terrorism. This campaign is due to the hijacking of the American aircraft and American citizens being taken hostage. Here one cannot but be amazed by the image of innocence which the United States confers upon itself and the vociferous tune it is adopting while denouncing the incident.

III. 21 Jun 85

A 2

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES & CANADA

How can one describe this? Is not the United States, together with its strategic ally Israel, and some of their agents, the one that is using international terrorism as one of the means of implementing its imperialist policy? It is making efforts so that its acts against other countries and peoples are not labelled as terrorism, but there are fully tangible and inescapable facts: As the Greek Government has rightly noted in its communique the United States always violates international agreements. The communique says: Suffice it to recall that the American authorities are now sheltering the air pirates (Brazinska) who some time ago hijacked a Soviet airplane and killed (?an air hostess) [words indistinct].

There is also the shelling of Lebanese towns and villages with long-range guns, the sending of the Marines to Lebanon and the unjustified [word indistinct] against the Libyan airplane. Is not this international terrorism?

Furthermore, Washington bears full responsibility for the acts of terror undertaken by Israel, its strategic ally in the Middle East, its mass killing of populations in Lebanon, the piratic raid against the Iraqi nuclear research center, the shooting down of a Libyan airliner with its passengers in the Mediterranean, and more.

OF FOREIGN POLICY

BEGLOV: HIJACK UNACCEPTABLE, TIED TO U.S. POLICY

LD222211 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 22 Jun 85

[Text] When an American naval task force, headed by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Nimitz, set out for Lebanese shores one couldn't help remembering the bombardment of Lebanese communities by the American battleship New Jersey in 1983, the Carter administration's operation in Iran in 1979 to free American Embassy hostages in Tehran, and many such incidents. Here is a commentary by Spartak Beglov, an observer of the NOVOSTI press agency, and this is what he writes:

It goes without saying that the hijacking of aircraft and other forms of terrorism are unacceptable to all sincere and consistent supporters of observing international law, but every new incident of this kind has increasingly revealed its direct and close relationship with the global policy of the United States and the methods official Washington has adopted in its crusade against the legitimate rights of other peoples. Violence breeds violence. This is a truism. Strange as it may seem, civilized America thinks itself exempt of following this rule and free to overlook the dire consequences that [word indistinct] (?law) causes to other nations and boomerangs against individual, often innocent, Americans.

The American leadership has resorted to [word indistinct] (?law) to overturn the choice made by other peoples and deprive them of their homelands. Dictionaries call this aggression or annexation, but Washington's political parlance describes it as aid to freedom-fighters or defense of vital United States interests. Not that the name changes the essence of its policy. This is full of violence and seeks support among other worshippers of violence. By declaring Israel its strategic ally in the Middle East, Washington in effect gave it a blank check to seize Arab territories and conduct terrorist operations in order to prevent the Arab people of Palestine from acquiring their national home. The massacres in the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila will forever go down in history as acts of state-sponsored terrorism.

Washington has declared constructive engagement with the racist regime in South Africa. Pretoria took this for encouragement to commit more acts of aggression and annexation against its neighbors. Last week it installed a puppet regime in Namibia in order to eliminate the lawful representatives of the Namibian people from government, in violation of United Nations resolutions. This is how the policy of state terrorism is denying yet another people the right to an independent homeland. Force and aggression generate despair, and despair leads to protest and violence to which Washington responds with aircraft carriers and invasions. It appears those who make this policy have the least right to call for humanity, justice, and civilized behavior.

TASS: U.S. SHARES RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEATHS

LD211925 Moscow TASS in English 1838 GMT 21 Jun 85

[Text] New York June 21 TASS -- The U.S. Administration, exploiting an incident in El Salvador in which a group of unidentified attackers opened fire at a cafe and killed 13 people, including four American Marines and two civilians, is going to expand U.S. military aid to the Duarte regime. The Congress appropriated 128.2 million dollars for the purpose in the current fiscal year and the administration requested 132.6 million dollars for fiscal 1986.

Now, after American nationals were killed in El Salvador, the President has instructed the Pentagon, the Department of State and the CIA "immediately to give every possible assistance" to the Salvadoran regime in apprehending and punishing the parties guilty of the crime. That is why observers do not rule out that already during this fiscal year the White House, bypassing the Congress, will increase military aid to El Salvador under the pretext of struggle against "international terrorism".

The steps taken by the Washington administration show that the USA is using any pretext or incident to expand American military presence in different parts of the world, to bolster regimes friendly to it and to seek the overthrow of the governments of sovereign countries that are not to its liking.

III. 24 Jun 85

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES & CANADA

That was the case in Chile, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Grenada. Today the White House, whipping up war psychosis in Central America, is trying to suppress the struggle of the Salvadoran people for genuine independence and to overthrow the Sandinist government in Nicaragua.

The act of terrorism in El Salvador is deplorable, of course. But the White House does not shed tears over the 8,000 defenceless women, children and old people killed by CIA mercenaries in Nicaragua or over tens of thousands of Salvadoran civilians shot by the troops of the pro-American Duarte regime. Meanwhile, the Washington administration, giving generous military aid to undemocratic regimes and to the Nicaraguan contras, fully shares responsibility for the death of those people.

Lenczowski 55
File USSR
Propaganda

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 13, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Time Interview: What Pravda Left Out

The version of Gorbachev's Time interview published in Pravda (September 2) has a number of omissions, some of which are significant, but also has parts, in both questions and answers, which Pravda either added or (which is more likely) Time edited out. There were also some discrepancies which could probably be attributed to the FBIS translation back into English. The following are the notable omissions (parts not omitted by Pravda but cited to provide context are bracketed):

- ["This situation is] highly [complex and] very [tense]... [the least of my intentions is to] over [dramatize the situation"].
- The anecdote about the Russian Minister of Finance: "This reminds me...'No money, there's no money'."
- ["We must not allow things to go so far as confrontation between our two countries."] "This is a reflection of the interests of our two peoples and of the politicians who represent them. It is after all the people of the two countries who put the politicians into the positions they hold today."
- "Surely God on high has not refused to give us enough wisdom to bring an improvement in our relations, an improvement in relations between two great nations on earth, nations on whom depends the very destiny of civilization. We for our part are ready to take that role."
- ["...regardless of what some of Reagan's advisors to the right] or the left--if I am correct he does not have any advisors on the left--regardless of what any of his advisors try to sell him."
- ["...our attitude toward President Reagan is prompted by our feeling of respect for the people of the U.S. We are, therefore, prepared to do business with him] and to treat him with the respect that is befitting him."

- ["If all this work were to stop at this stage, then no one would have any more interest in going over to the next stage in the process of designing and developing,] because nobody would think of appropriating any more money for these purposes if it were known that money could not subsequently be used."
- "But, if the other side displays readiness to seek solutions to these problems, we will be equally prepared, come what may, to leave no stone unturned to seek accommodation. I firmly believe our position is humane. It is not selfish, it meets the interests of the U.S. as it does the interests of the Soviet Union and indeed all nations."
- "I recall still further back in 1961 [Pravda said: "Recall the 1960's] the meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy... There was the Caribbean crisis [yet in 1963 we saw the partial test-ban treaty.] Even though that was a time of crisis..."
- "We are now in a new phase in our economic development, qualitatively in a new phase, new plans, new problems. We do have problems, some serious big problems to resolve. We have for the past several years been making a thorough going analysis of our development of all the problems at hand, and we feel that there is a need to familiarize the working people generally with the conclusions that we are arriving at, to test those conclusions and the peoples' reactions so that when those analyses have been tried and tested we can come out with them at the forthcoming Party Congress early next year."
- Time version: "We feel that everyone, everywhere in the Soviet Union must change all of their work styles; that goes for all of us here and down at the regional levels and down at the worker-collective level. Everyone has got to restructure things, restyle his whole way at working and thinking."

Pravda version: "We believe that readjustment is required from everyone and everywhere--from us in the republics, in the regions, in every work collective."

Since the Pravda version is not appreciably shorter than the Time version, policy considerations, not space limitations, probably account for most of what Pravda left out.

Distribution:

Jack Matlock
Walt Raymond

John Lenczowski
Judy Mandel

Steve Steiner

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8508911

RECEIVED 04 NOV 85 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 01 NOV 85

KEYWORDS: USIA

USSR

SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALERT # 28 RE TASS & PRAVDA REACTIONS ON SDI

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RAYMOND

LENZOWSKI

STEINER

SMALL

MATLOCK

Sestanovich
mandel

File Soviet Propaganda

COMMENTS

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



NOV 1 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CW*
Director

SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 28"

Attached is the latest "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research.

During the period August 15 - September 30:

- o In preparing for the November meeting with President Reagan, the new Soviet leadership has become more sophisticated in publicizing its foreign policy positions.
- o General Secretary Gorbachev has attempted to seize the public relations initiative through his interview with Time magazine and other contacts with the press.
- o Foreign Minister Shevardnadze sought to put the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) at a disadvantage by emphasizing the Soviet "Star Peace" proposal at the UN.
- o Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesmen repeated the charge that SDI was an attempt by the U.S. to achieve a first-strike capability against the USSR.
- o Soviet media warned that the U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) tests constitute the beginning of the "practical implementation" of "Star Wars" and are intended to destabilize the military balance and achieve U.S. military superiority.
- o TASS propagandists denounced U.S. plans to produce "nerve-paralyzing" binary chemical weapons and portrayed them as offensive weapons intended for a sudden first-strike.
- o Soviet commentators also labelled President Reagan's economic sanctions against South Africa as "purely cosmetic" and accompanied by so many reservations that Pretoria will simply be able to ignore them.

Attachment:
"Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 28"

== Soviet Propaganda Alert ==

No. 28

October 9, 1985

SUMMARY

This report covers Soviet propaganda on the forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, arms control issues, and regional developments from August 15 to September 30.

The new Soviet leadership has become more sophisticated in publicizing its foreign policy positions. Through his interviews with Time magazine and French TV reporters, and his official visit to Paris, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has attempted to seize the public relations initiative in preparing for the November meeting with President Reagan. A more genial Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has succeeded the grim Gromyko at the UN, and his emphasis there on "Star Peace" had the makings of a propaganda coup against "Star Wars."

Moreover, Soviet foreign ministry spokesmen appeared more open at press conferences and in mingling informally with Western journalists. Soviet foreign policy objectives and propaganda themes have changed little; what has really changed is the approach -- seemingly more open, reasonable, and potentially more convincing by media-savvy spokesmen.

Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting in NovemberSee pp. 1-3

- o The Soviet propaganda machine is gearing up to blame the U.S. if the meeting fails to produce what Moscow wants in an arms control accord. The challenge for the U.S.: Clearly tell the world what the U.S. expects at the meeting for maintaining peace and urge Moscow to accept reasonable counterproposals.

Soviet Commentary on Arms ControlSee pp. 3-7

- o SDI and ASAT continue to be among Moscow's major concerns. The Soviets have proposed "Star Peace" and a moratorium on "space strike systems." The challenge: reiterate the defensive purpose of SDI and ASAT; stress that no first-strike capability is sought; and emphasize that the popular term "Star Wars" is a misnomer.

Other Current Propaganda ThemesSee pp. 7-8

U.S. economic sanctions against South Africa termed "cosmetic"; Moscow raps humanitarian aid for Nicaraguan "Contras" and Afghan refugees; Murphy's Middle East mission criticized.

NOVEMBER REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

Rocky Road to the Meeting

In anticipation of the upcoming meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November, the Soviets unleashed a plethora of propaganda charges against the U.S. The charges, which covered a wide range of subjects and events -- from chemical dusting of U.S. diplomats in Moscow to resumption of the arms control talks in Geneva, did little to smooth the troubled waters between the two superpowers.

In criticizing the U.S., Moscow sought to discredit the Reagan Administration among West Europeans and to keep expectations low among the Soviet population. Should the meeting with President Reagan fail, the Soviets do not want to be blamed; instead, audiences were being conditioned by Soviet propaganda to blame the U.S. Examples:

- o The Soviets dismissed as "absurd" U.S. charges about Soviet chemical dusting of American diplomats in Moscow for surveillance purposes. These charges, Moscow alleged, were intended to fan Washington's latest anti-Soviet campaign and divert attention from the USSR's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and its efforts against the militarization of space (TASS, August 23 and 24).
- o Moscow TV commentator Valentin Zorin (August 24) called the U.S. nuclear test in Nevada a "deliberately provocative" response to the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. Zorin charged that this activity was "premeditated sabotage" of the soon-to-be-resumed arms control talks in Geneva, and wondered about the kind of political setting Washington was creating for the November meeting.
- o Washington's preparations for the meeting were "very peculiar," according to Aleksandr Bovin in Izvestiia (September 7). He saw the U.S. weapons tests as a test of Soviet patience and intentions. "The Americans' self-importance, their arrogance, their intoxication with their own strength could let them down badly," he warned.
- o The successful U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) test was seen by TASS (September 14) as "a step leading directly to the beginning of the deployment of a new class of dangerous weapons, space strike systems," which will "hamper constructive preparations for the Soviet-U.S. talks." Moscow TV commentator Boris Kalyagin charged (September 14) that the U.S. is trying "to score as many points as possible before the forthcoming summit

Geneva negotiations...will lose all sense" if the present U.S. position on SDI (the Strategic Defense Initiative), including research, "is its last word." But he also indicated some basic scientific research might be allowed, and he was somewhat respectful of President Reagan, citing his election by the American people, "whom our people respect, and we are prepared to do business with him."

At a meeting with U.S. senators in Moscow on September 3, Gorbachev reiterated that the Soviet side is going to the meeting in November "with sincere good will and the desire to do everything possible to strengthen peace" (Radio Moscow). TASS (September 4) quoted Senator Robert Byrd to the effect that Gorbachev told the senators the Soviets would make "radical proposals in arms reduction" if an agreement regarding "Star Wars" (SDI) satisfactory to the Russians could be reached.

ARMS CONTROL: GENEVA TALKS RESUME

Soviets Charge Americans Lack New Arms Control Proposals

On the eve of the resumption of the Geneva arms control talks on September 18, Soviet propagandists announced that the Soviet delegation had arrived with instructions "to press for substantive, mutually acceptable solutions that would accord with the task of preventing an arms race in space and stopping it on earth" (TASS, September 17). According to Radio Moscow (September 19), progress would depend upon the Americans, but the U.S. delegation had come with "no new proposals," and President Reagan had made it clear at a news conference in Washington that SDI "is not a subject for bargaining."

U.S. "Intransigence" Condemned

A series of articles in Pravda (September 21, 23, and 29) criticized intransigence in the U.S. approach to arms control negotiations. The writers charged that the U.S. had shown no "serious intention of adopting a truly constructive, really flexible stance" at the Geneva talks. After a long reiteration of past Soviet arms control proposals at Geneva, Pravda's Geneva correspondent, B. Dubrovin, charged in a September 20 dispatch that "not a single businesslike, practical, constructive proposal has been forthcoming from the American side."

ARMS CONTROL: SDI

According to Pravda's Dubrovin, the U.S. is being purposefully intransigent in the negotiations in order to win time for the implementation of its "Star Wars" program and thereby to achieve military superiority over the USSR.

ARMS CONTROL: ASAT

Moscow Warns Against U.S. ASAT Testing

In much the same vein, Radio Moscow commentator Aleksandr Druzhinin said (August 21) the tests constitute the beginning of the "practical implementation" of "Star Wars" and "were evidently timed to coincide" with the third round of the Geneva arms control talks so as to give the U.S. "a position of strength." TASS (September 4) warned that the USSR "will consider itself free of its unilateral commitment not to place anti-satellite systems in space" if the U.S. holds such a test, and charged that "the entire responsibility for the further development of events will rest entirely on the American side."

After the U.S. ASAT test on September 13, Pravda (September 17) noted that the test illustrated U.S. intentions to destabilize the military balance and achieve military superiority. Radio Moscow (September 21) said the ASAT test reveals Washington's "aggressive intentions," notably "to deliver the first nuclear strike and guarantee the U.S. from retribution."

ARMS CONTROL: SOVIET MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS

Soviets Rap U.S. Nuclear Testing

Moscow continued to praise its unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and to criticize the U.S. for testing nuclear devices despite the moratorium. Pravda (August 24) described the moratorium as a "bold step" which was "designed to persuade other nuclear nations, and above all the United States, to follow our example." U.S. insistence on continuing testing, however, shows Washington's "flagrant contempt" for mankind and its "illusory hope of achieving military superiority" (TASS, August 19; Radio Moscow, August 20). Genrikh Borovik on Moscow TV (August 20) pointed out that the USSR had marked the Hiroshima anniversary with a moratorium and the Americans with their latest bomb test.

Gorbachev Favors Soviet-U.S. Moratorium

In a message to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty review conference in Geneva (reported by Pravda, August 28), Gorbachev said that a mutual Soviet-U.S. moratorium on nuclear explosions could lead to an international treaty banning nuclear weapons tests and help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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efforts to achieve a global ban. Radio Moscow (September 15) replied that "such inverted logic only shows the absurd nature of Washington's arguments, which in fact is not even thinking of global chemical disarmament, while intensively mounting up its stocks of chemical death."

OTHER CURRENT PROPAGANDA THEMES

U.S. Economic Sanctions Against South Africa Termed "Cosmetic"

TASS (September 9) charged that President Reagan's economic sanctions against South Africa are "purely of a cosmetic nature" and are accompanied by so many reservations that Pretoria will simply be able to ignore them. According to TASS Washington correspondent Aleksandr Shalnev, the sanctions are really a "political maneuver" to weaken the "powerful wave of protests in the United States against the participation of official Washington in the crimes of the Pretoria regime."

Shalnev also alleged that the White House hopes "to save the [South African] racists from more concrete, hard sanctions that the U.S. public wants introduced." He added that "the head of the White House" has confirmed that there will be no changes in the U.S. policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa, a policy which "allows racists to carry out more and more new bloody misdeeds" and which exposes the Reagan Administration as "accomplices and abettors of racist butchers."

Earlier (August 15), Pravda commentator Vladimir Korochantsev characterized the constructive engagement policy as "tantamount to an anti-African military-political alliance between the United States and South Africa." He charged that Washington is guided by "its selfish strategic and economic interests" in South Africa and is therefore unwilling to force the South African authorities to abandon apartheid despite "unprecedentedly sharp criticism" from the American and international publics.

Moscow Raps Humanitarian Aid for Nicaraguan "Contras" and Afghan Refugees

TASS (August 20) viewed President Reagan's signing of legislation allocating \$27 million in "so-called" humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan "Contras," or "Somocistas" as Moscow calls them, as evidence that the U.S. intends to increase pressure on the Nicaraguan government. The legislation also included humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which Radio Moscow (August 27) saw as a "cover" for aiding the Afghan rebels.