

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Propaganda, Communication, Media,  
etc – USSR (3)  
**Box:** 32

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/18/2005

**File Folder** USSR: PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA,  
ETC 3/6

**FOIA**

F06-114/9

**Box Number** 32

YARHI-MILO

3211

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10935	PAPER	SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON INF MARCH-DECEMBER 1983 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	4	ND	B1
10936	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10935 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	4	ND	B1
10937	PAPER	SOVIET STRATEGY TO DERAIL US INF DEPLOYMENT <b>PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</b>	<del>45</del> 46	ND	B1 B3
10938	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET PRESS AGENCY OFFICIALS <b>R 11/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	3/1/1984	B1
10939	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE VISIT OF SOVIET PRESS AGENCY OFFICIALS <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	ND	B1
10943	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET PRESS AGENCY OFFICIALS <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	2/24/1984	B1
10940	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE RE VISAS TO SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS <b>R 11/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	2	2/29/1984	B1
10941	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE VISAS FOR SOVIET OFFICIALS <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/18/2005

**File Folder** USSR: PROPAGANDA, COMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA,  
ETC 3/6

**FOIA**

F06-114/9

**Box Number** 32

YARHI-MILO

3211

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10944	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10943 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	2/24/1984	B1
10942	MEMO	SOVIET PROPAGANDA THEMES TO BE TARGETED AGAINST THE U.S. AND NATO <b>D 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</b>	1	5/21/1984	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED

by JJ

File Sov. propaganda

NLRR F06-114/9 #10935

SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON INF  
MARCH - DECEMBER 1983

10935

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

There will be essentially three elements to Soviet public diplomacy efforts between now and the beginning of our INF deployment at the end of this year. Although the elements will each be emphasized in consecutive phases (each phase representing a specific immediate objective), all three elements will be in play to a greater or lesser degree at least until the beginning of deployment. The fundamental Soviet objective is not to moderate the level or push back the timing of U.S. deployment but to stop it altogether

FIRST PHASE: NOW UNTIL JUNE OR JULY--"A NEW US PROPOSAL"

On the negotiating side, the Soviets will continue to put forth proposals that are entirely lacking in serious content. These proposals will center (as they have to the present) on the following points:

- a. The SS-20 is comparable to French and British systems.
- b. Rough equivalency already exists in Europe; introduction of new forces by a non-European power (us) will upset the balance.
- c. The Americans are stalling at the INF talks: everybody, including the Americans, knows that zero - zero was unrealistic from the start because the Soviets will not accept "unilateral disarmament."
- d. The Americans want to limit a future nuclear war to Europe.

The immediate purpose during this phase will be to force the United States to get off of a zero - zero position and put forth a new proposal. Such a move on our part would be (from a public diplomacy standpoint) a grave mistake as it would amount to an admission on our part of point c, above. Our public credibility in the INF negotiations would be severely damaged.

In pursuit of this objective, the Soviets will not rely primarily upon more radical anti-deployment elements, such as the Greens and the CND, who will keep a relatively low profile during this phase. Rather, they would hope that more moderate and responsible elements, both in Europe and in the U.S., would make it politically difficult for the USG not to come forward with a new proposal which gets us off zero - zero. The recent call by Chancellor Kohl for a new American INF initiative is the kind of thing they are hoping for more of during this phase. The Christian Science Monitor's editorial of March 18 is comparable.

If we do come in with a new proposal, the Soviets will not consider it "serious" and a basis for further negotiation unless it involves a postponement of deployment. For reasons



related to ultimate Soviet goals in the INF forum (see below), they see any decision to postpone deployment to be irreversible.

### SECOND PHASE: JUNE OR JULY THROUGH SEPTEMBER--"DELAY DEPLOYMENT"

Assuming that we had not come out with a new proposal during the previous phase, the Soviets will, for the first time, begin to make proposals that are "serious": that is, they will address in a realistic manner the questions of number, type, and location of the weapons which we wish to deploy in relation to Soviet weapons. However, all of their proposals will have one feature in common: a postponement of the beginning of U.S. deployment.

Public attention will move from the question of the U.S. negotiating position to what will take shape as a sort of "mini-freeze" issue. Now that the Soviets are at last seriously coming to the table to negotiate, it will be said, we have achieved our primary goal, and we should postpone our deployment to demonstrate our commitment to the negotiating process and to ease tensions. The apparent seriousness of the Soviet position will be, it should be emphasized, belied by their belief that once deployment is postponed it can never be carried out.

The radical elements will become more active in this phase, increasing their concentration upon the sites being prepared for the missiles, particularly in Germany, where the first missiles (Pershing IIs) will be deployed. In the coming months, the names of specific German Pershing II sites will trickle out into the press (no doubt from sympathetic elements in the German armed forces) in preparation for this phase. Increasingly, demonstrations will become violent (sitting down in front of military vehicles and so forth) in order to halt preparations for deployment.

Meanwhile, spurred on by the demonstrators, more moderate elements, both here and in Europe, and at least some European governments will also call for a deployment postponement under the general theme "give the negotiations a chance."

### THIRD PHASE: OCTOBER TO DECEMBER--"NAKED THREATS"

While there have already been some indications of what is to come during this phase (e.g., Ogarkov's statement that use of our missiles in Europe would lead to retaliation against the U.S. and Arbatov's and Zagladin's statements that U.S. INF deployment in Europe would cause similar Soviet deployment "in the vicinity of the U.S.," probably in Cuba), it is noteworthy that both categories of threat have to date been directed at us and not at Europe. This could be useful in refuting the line that INF deployment is part of a U.S. plan to limit a future nuclear war to Europe: we can point to these statements to



indicate that we and the Europeans will be in the same nuclear frying pan. Perhaps these threats are specifically directed at the "freeze" campaign here as a vehicle for derailing INF deployment.

The current function of the threat element is to serve as a low-key "reminder" of the consequences of "threatening" the USSR; but in order to accomplish the immediate goals of the first two phases, it will not become particularly prominent or specific until the end of September. At that time, if we have not agreed to delay deployment and it appears that the opposition is not strong enough to force the European governments (particularly Germany) to insist upon a delay, we can expect the Soviets to pull out the stops. Specifically, the focus of Soviet threats will move from the U.S. to Europe, particularly Germany, probably even to the extent of announcing specific German basing sites as target areas.

In addition, in a manner comparable to their recent threat to the Japanese, it should not be ruled out that the Soviets might (probably in October: an "October Surprise") do something along the lines of delivering a note to the appropriate European governments--"confidentially," but done in a way so as to become common knowledge--the content being roughly as follows:

"The Soviet Union lost twenty million people in the Great Patriotic War. Our government, party, and people are united in our firm determination that we will never again suffer such losses. The USSR regards the Pershing IIs and GLCMs scheduled for deployment in December of this year to be first-strike weapons designed for the launching of a nuclear war of aggression against the socialist countries. The USSR and its allies will respond in an appropriate manner to the placement of these weapons onto European soil."

The desired result of the October Surprise, other than possible demands on the part of European governments for a delay in deployment, would be massive demonstrations and the declaration of many "peace" groups that they will stop our weapons whatever the cost.

#### OVERALL SOVIET GOALS IN INF

As Zagladin commented in an interview in La Repubblica of March 9, the Soviet goal here is not to decrease the level of U.S. INF deployment but to stop it:

"As far as we are concerned, 'intermediate solutions' cannot be valid: If, instead of deploying the envisaged 108 Pershing missiles, the Americans deployed 30 or 40 or however many, it would be the same for the USSR. We would have to take countermeasures."



In the Soviet view, the important thing is not (as the classic "arms race" model would have it) that we are seeking to deploy weapons systems solely as a military response to the Soviet SS-20s, which they, feeling "threatened," will then counter with another new system. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility of the Soviets taking the military "countermeasures" as threatened even if our missiles are not deployed.

As the following passage from an article by Willi Gerns of the German CP in the November, 1982, issue of the authoritative review Problems of Peace and Socialism illustrates, the problem is political in nature and is of greater importance than the military significance of the various weapons systems in question:

The threat of war tends to push into the background the differences of approach on individual issues. The primary task in our day is to organise joint action by all the peace forces to safeguard the life of the present and coming generations, and the responsibility for doing so falls both on the Communists and the pacifists. We are united by a common goal, which is to make the deployment of new US nuclear missiles in Europe politically impossible. (emphasis added)

Consequently, our purpose here is to forcefully demonstrate that we are not writing Europe off by conceding to the Soviets a permanent superiority in nuclear forces in Europe to match their conventional superiority. Conversely, the Soviet aim is to demonstrate the exact opposite. An Allied decision to forgo deployment would be taken as evidence that the third--decisive--shift in the systemic correlation of forces (of which military power is only one component) had indeed occurred. The Soviets would conclude that the "imperialist" powers, most importantly the United States, no longer had the political will to defend even vital interests. The Europeans would perceive this in an equally clear way; far from seeing a decline in European neutralist and pacifist sentiment if we delay deployment, a decision to delay would soon become irreversible due to the Europeans' heightened sense of having been left vulnerable.

U.S. NUCLEAR WITHDRAWAL 'PROPAGANDA PLOY'

LD190640 Moscow TASS in English 0632 GMT 19 Mar 83

[Text] Moscow March 19 TASS -- "The main aim of the opponents of peace today is to force new American nuclear weapons on Western Europe at any cost. And for the sake of this criminal striving they do not stop at any deception," the newspaper PRAVDA points out today.

Commenting on reports in a number of Western press media to the effect that the U.S. Administration is allegedly preparing to withdraw a certain number of nuclear warheads from the West European countries, the newspaper writes: "But in fact it has proved to be a fresh propaganda ploy."

In the first place, PRAVDA notes, it is planned to withdraw, as newspapers report, only "obsolete warheads, which even without that are to be phased out." Secondly, it has been learnt that new systems of weapons are now being shipped to Europe to replace those which are being taken out of there. But the point at issue proves to be not simply a replacement. As British journalist Peter Pringle, who stays in Washington, writes, according to the plans in effect for the production of nuclear warheads, there will be more warheads by the late eighties in Europe than early in this decade. The following fact has been learnt: Instead of eight-inch artillery shells, which were deployed in Western Europe way back in 1956, the Pentagon is planning to bring there.... American neutron weapons!

As the newspaper PRAVDA goes on to note, the press reports reveal another aspect of that operation of deception. As the London OBSERVER declares, this venture is aimed at "cushioning the blow" (against the West European public) as a result of the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, whose start, as is known, has been planned for December this year. The planned action, the newspaper explains, will be carried out in order to cut the ground from under the feet of the participants in the anti-nuclear movement.

"The nuclear war planners see that a powerful anti-war, anti-missile movement capable of destroying their plans is mounting in various countries, on all continents. 'The military party' is feverishly looking for a way of lulling the vigilance of the peoples," the newspaper PRAVDA stresses.

DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE HELD IN GENEVA

LD182237 Moscow TASS in English 2114 GMT 18 Mar 83

[Text] Geneva March 18 TASS -- An enlarged two-day meeting of the Coordination Committee on Disarmament has opened today at the building of the League of Red Cross Societies. Taking part in the work of the committee are more than 40 delegates from organisations, making the Coordination Committee -- the European Conference of War Veterans, the International Confederation of Former Prisoners of War, the International Federation of Resistance Movements, the World Federation of War Veterans. Among the participants in the meeting -- delegates from USA, France, Italy, USSR, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary and a number of other countries.

The Coordination Committee will discuss the course of negotiations on questions of disarmament. The delegates also intend to adopt an appeal to the delegations of the USA and USSR, conducting negotiations on Euromissiles and on limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, to prepare convocation of a symposium of war veterans on disarmament, security and cooperation in Europe.



SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ON INF  
MARCH - DECEMBER 1983

*after revision  
by GBH.*

There will be essentially three elements to Soviet public diplomacy efforts between now and the beginning of our INF deployment at the end of this year. Although the elements will each be emphasized in consecutive phases (each phase representing a specific immediate objective), all three elements will be in play to a greater or lesser degree at least until the beginning of deployment. The fundamental Soviet objective is not to moderate the level or push back the timing of US deployment but to stop it altogether.

FIRST PHASE: NOW UNTIL JUNE OR JULY -- "A NEW US PROPOSAL"

On the negotiating side, the Soviets will continue to put forth proposals that are entirely lacking in serious content. These proposals will center (as they have to the present) on the following points:

- a. The SS-20 is comparable to French and British systems.
- b. Rough equivalency already exists in Europe; introduction of new forces by a non-European power (us) will upset the balance.
- c. The Americans are stalling at the INF talks: everybody, including the Americans, knows that zero-zero was unrealistic from the start because the Soviets will not accept "unilateral disarmament."
- d. The Americans want to limit a future nuclear war to Europe.

The immediate purpose during this phase will be to force the United States to get off of a zero-zero position and put forth a new proposal and to signal that actual deployment will be very expensive politically to the European governments concerned.

In pursuit of this objective, the Soviets will not rely only upon more radical anti-deployment elements, such as the Greens and the CND. They would hope that more moderate and responsible elements, both in Europe and in the US, would urge a new US proposal and criticize any prospective deployment.

If we do come in with a new proposal, the Soviets will not consider it "serious" and a basis for further negotiation unless it involves a postponement of deployment. For reasons related to ultimate Soviet goals in the INF forum (see below), they see any decision to postpone deployment to be irreversible.

**DECLASSIFIED**

**NLRRF06-114/9 #10936**

**BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011**

SECOND PHASE: JUNE OR JULY THROUGH SEPTEMBER -- "DELAY DEPLOYMENT"

Whether or not we have come forward with an interim proposal, the Soviets may begin to make proposals that are "serious": that is, they will address in a realistic manner the questions of number, type, and location of the weapons which we wish to deploy in relation to Soviet weapons. However, all of their proposals will have one feature in common: a postponement of the beginning of US deployment.

Public attention will move from the question of the US negotiating position to what will take shape as a sort of "mini-freeze" issue. Now that the Soviets are at last seriously coming to the table to negotiate, it will be said, we have achieved our primary goal, and we should postpone our deployment to demonstrate our commitment to the negotiating process and to ease tensions. The apparent seriousness of the Soviet position will in fact be directed at translating a postponement of deployment into a freeze.

The radical elements will become more active in this phase, increasing their concentration upon the sites being prepared for the missiles, particularly in Germany. In the coming months, the names of specific German Pershing II sites will trickle out into the press. Increasingly, demonstrations will become violent (sitting down in front of military vehicles and so forth) in order to halt preparations for deployment.

The Soviet tactic is that, spurred on by the demonstrators, more moderate elements, both here and in Europe, and at least some European governments will also call for a deployment postponement under the general theme "give the negotiations a chance."

THIRD PHASE: OCTOBER TO DECEMBER -- "NAKED THREATS"

While there have already been some indications of what is to come during this phase (e.g., Ogarkov's statement that use of our missiles in Europe would lead to retaliation against the US and Arbatov's and Zagladin's statements that US INF deployment in Europe would cause similar Soviet deployment "in the vicinity of the US," probably in Cuba), it is noteworthy that both categories of threat have to date been directed at us and not at Europe. Perhaps these threats are specifically directed at the "freeze" campaign here as a vehicle for derailing INF deployment.



The current function of the threat element is to serve as a low-key "reminder" of the consequences of "threatening" the USSR; but in order to accomplish the immediate goals of the first two phases, it will not become particularly prominent or specific until the end of September. At that time, if we have not agreed to delay deployment and it appears that the opposition is not strong enough to force the European governments (particularly Germany) to insist upon a delay, we can expect the Soviets to pull out the stops. Specifically, the focus of Soviet threats will move from the US to Europe, particularly Germany, probably even to the extent of announcing specific German basing sites as targets for Soviet nuclear weapons.

In addition, in a manner comparable to their recent threat to the Japanese, it should not be ruled out that the Soviets might (probably in October: an "October Surprise") do something along the lines of delivering a note to the appropriate European governments -- "confidentially," but done in a way so as to become common knowledge -- the content being roughly as follows:

"The Soviet Union lost twenty million people in the Great Patriotic War. Our government, party, and people are united in our firm determination that we will never again suffer such losses. The USSR regards the Pershing IIs and GLCMs scheduled for deployment in December of this year to be first-strike weapons designed for the launching of a nuclear war of aggression against the socialist countries. The USSR and its allies will respond in an appropriate manner to the placement of these weapons onto European soil."

The desired result of the "October Surprise," other than possible demands on the part of European governments for a delay in deployment, would be massive demonstrations and the declaration of many "peace" groups that they will stop our weapons whatever the cost.

#### OVERALL SOVIET GOALS IN INF

As Zagladin commented in an interview in La Repubblica of March 9, the Soviet goal here is not to decrease the level of US INF deployment but to stop it:

"As far as we are concerned, 'intermediate solutions' cannot be valid: If, instead of deploying the envisaged 108 Pershing missiles, the Americans deployed 30 or 40 or however many, it would be the same for the USSR. We would have to take countermeasures."

In the Soviet view, the important thing is not (as the classic "arms race" model would have it) that we are seeking to

deploy weapons systems solely as a military response to the Soviet SS-20s, which they, feeling "threatened," will then counter with another new system. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility of the Soviets taking the military "counter-measures" as threatened even if our missiles are not deployed.

As the following passage from an article by Willi Gerns of the German CP in the November, 1982, issue of the authoritative review Problems of Peace and Socialism illustrates, the problem is political in nature and is of greater importance than the military significance of the various weapons systems in question:

The threat of war tends to push into the background the differences of approach on individual issues. The primary task in our day is to organize joint action by all the peace forces to safeguard the life of the present and coming generations, and the responsibility for doing so falls both on the Communists and the pacifists. We are united by a common goal, which is to make the deployment of new US nuclear missiles in Europe politically impossible. (emphasis added)



Walt Rye and [redacted]

MT-892-83

10

File Sov Propaganda

FOIA(b)(1), (b)(3)

Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment [redacted]

An Intelligence Assessment

This assessment was prepared by [redacted] Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from the Office of European Analysis, the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to [redacted] SOVA, [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR E06-114/9#10937

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

[redacted]

REVIEW OADR DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE



## Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment [REDACTED]

## Key Judgments

In attempting to forestall US deployments of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, scheduled to begin late this year, the Soviets will continue a complex strategy of inducements and threats designed to influence NATO governments, particularly West Germany before its March elections. With time growing short, their near-term objective evidently is to pressure NATO to delay the deployments and to move from its zero option proposal. [REDACTED]

Moscow has begun an intensive effort to brief West European governments on the new Soviet proposal for a subceiling on missile launchers in Europe. The subceiling would result in substantial reductions in the number of Soviet medium-range ballistic missile launchers opposite NATO but would be linked to the number of French and British ballistic missile launchers and would preclude the deployment in Europe of US INF missiles. The Soviets have argued that their new proposal demonstrates



"flexibility," in sharp contrast to US "intractability" in adhering to its zero option proposal. They also have hinted in vague terms to West European governments of certain "concessions" they might adopt at the INF negotiations in return for greater US flexibility. [redacted]

At the same time, Moscow has warned NATO of the serious consequences should the US position remain unchanged in Geneva and the United States proceed with its deployments. Such consequences probably include: the lifting of their unilateral SS-20 moratorium, deployment of additional SS-20s in Europe, and the development of new cruise and ballistic missiles for deployment opposite NATO. Thus Moscow is trying to persuade the Europeans that their security would be better served by its proposal for a missile subceiling than by US INF deployments offset by corresponding Soviet counterdeployments. [redacted]

Along with these diplomatic moves, the Soviets have actively promoted the European "peace movement" through aggressive propaganda and covert activities. They have focused their efforts primarily on those countries scheduled to base the new NATO missiles, with the chief emphasis on West Germany. Their campaign covers a whole spectrum of activities from overt efforts to create a fear of nuclear war to covert measures including forgeries and disinformation to put NATO governments in the worst possible light. [redacted]



Should US deployments begin without "acceptable" progress in the talks, the Soviets probably would continue to negotiate, but on a different basis--the Soviet side then would offer to trade off its "new" systems in exchange for US INF systems. Nevertheless the Soviets probably hope that the situation will not deteriorate to the point where they would find it necessary to counter NATO's deployments with hundreds of their own missiles. Having acknowledged in Geneva that they expect NATO to proceed with its plans, they must have seriously contemplated a negotiated outcome in which NATO is allowed some level of deployment. For example, they might see considerable merit in reaching a "first phase" agreement that banned the Pershing II but permitted some sharply reduced level of deployment for the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). In return, they might offer their missile subceiling proposal and insist that any US GLCM deployment above the number of French and British missile launchers should be offset by deployments of additional Soviet missile launchers. [REDACTED]

By late 1983 Moscow should be able to assess whether an INF agreement is possible. If it sees little prospect for one and is convinced that the NATO deployments will begin as scheduled in December 1983, it probably will begin implementing the military countermeasures foreshadowed last March by Brezhnev and more recently by Andropov. In his 21 December address, the new



General Secretary pledged to deploy a new long-range cruise missile if Washington proceeds with cruise missile deployment. This response could be in the form of sea-launched cruise missile deployment off US shores as well as ground-launched cruise missile deployment opposite NATO. The Soviets also could choose to develop a new IRBM more capable than the SS-20 for deployment against Western Europe. [redacted]

Moscow almost certainly would accompany such military moves with a sharply increased effort in covert activities in the five INF-basing countries. It probably would feel less constrained than before in promoting demonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, including some which might engage in sabotage against NATO facilities. Moscow also will use propaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist Party and front groups to increase the political pain of the governments in the INF-basing countries. It will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to pressure the United States to accede to an agreement that caps NATO deployment at a low level and minimizes reductions in Soviet forces. Nevertheless, the Soviets realize that their overt "peace" campaign in Western Europe has been their most effective tactic. They also recognize that the peace movement there has indigenous roots and has acquired a momentum of its own. They will do what they can to nurture it without appearing too heavyhanded. [redacted]



General Secretary pledged to deploy a new long-range cruise missile if Washington proceeds with cruise missile deployment. This response could be in the form of sea-launched cruise missile deployment off US shores as well as ground-launched cruise missile deployment opposite NATO. The Soviets also could choose to develop a new IRBM more capable than the SS-20 for deployment against Western Europe. [REDACTED]

Moscow almost certainly would accompany such military moves with a sharply increased effort in covert activities in the five INF-basing countries. It probably would feel less constrained than before in promoting demonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, including some which might engage in sabotage against NATO facilities. Moscow also will use propaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist Party and front groups to increase the political pain of the governments in the INF-basing countries. It will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to pressure the United States to accede to an agreement that caps NATO deployment at a low level and minimizes reductions in Soviet forces. Nevertheless, the Soviets realize that their overt "peace" campaign in Western Europe has been their most effective tactic. They also recognize that the peace movement there has indigenous roots and has acquired a momentum of its own. They will do what they can to nurture it without appearing too heavyhanded. [REDACTED]



Table of Contents

Key Judgments.....1

Introduction.....1

I. Moscow's View of NATO Deployment Plans.....1

II. Soviet Negotiating and Overt Political  
 Strategy Until Now.....3  
 Negotiating Strategy.....5  
 Overt Political Strategy.....7

III. Soviet "Active Measures" Against INF:  
 The Covert Campaign.....9  
 Use of Communist Parties  
 and Front Organizations.....10  
 Financial Support.....13  
 Propaganda Guidelines.....16  
 Direct Involvement in Peace Groups.....17  
 Influence Through Foreign Media  
 and Disinformation.....18  
 Effectiveness of Soviet Efforts.....19

IV. Soviet Negotiating Options  
 in Mid-to-Late 1983.....21  
 Tradeoff.....22  
 Suspension.....23  
 Walkout.....24  
 Merger.....25  
 Broader Context.....26



V. Future Soviet Political Moves.....27

VI. What Type of Agreement Might Moscow Accept?.....28

VII. Possible Soviet Plans if Negotiations  
and Political Moves Fail.....30

    Military Options .....30

    Covert Measures.....32

Appendix

Significant INF-Related Events.....35

Map

Potential Capabilities of the Pershing II  
Missile and GLCM to Strike Soviet  
Intercontinental Attack Forces  
and Support Systems.....1A

Table

The Missile Balance in Europe.....6A



Soviet Strategy to Derail US INF Deployment [redacted]

A key goal in Moscow's security policy since 1979 has been to derail NATO's plans to deploy the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). By blocking these deployments, scheduled to begin in late 1983, the USSR would retain its current predominance in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) as well as further its long-term objective of weakening NATO and dividing Western Europe from the United States. [redacted]

I. Moscow's View of NATO Deployment Plans

The Soviets see US deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM not only as an effort to upset the theater nuclear balance, but as an attempt to skew the global nuclear balance in favor of the United States. In their view, the deployment of these systems--with the range and accuracy to strike hardened targets deep in the USSR--would change the linkage between theater and intercontinental war to the advantage of the United States. Without resorting to use of its central systems, the United States would be able to threaten the Soviet homeland, including a portion of the USSR's strategic forces and its command, control, and communications network (see map). [redacted]





~~SECRET~~





[redacted]

The Soviets see the new US systems as an effective counter to their SS-20 IRBM force and may believe that the scale of NATO's deployments would nullify the advantage in escalation control that they had planned to secure with that force. For example, Moscow would have to consider that NATO, if confronted with a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact, would be tempted to use its new INF systems before they were destroyed. If the Soviets believed NATO would use these systems, they might feel even more compelled to launch a theater-wide preemptive strike.

[redacted]

The Soviets probably would expect that Pershing IIs and GLCMs would be used concurrently and in conjunction with air- and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs and SLCMs) and strikes by tactical and strategic aircraft in a full-scale nuclear attack. They see the Pershing II as particularly dangerous because its short flight time and accuracy would make it a threat to major elements of their command structure and some of their strategic forces, which would not have adequate warning time to react. In December [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] that Moscow perceives the Pershing II as the most serious threat to its security, even more than the Minuteman III ICBM, because of the flight time factor. [redacted]



The Soviets probably regard the GLCM as an effective complement to the Pershing II in that it could be used against strategic and tactical targets that are not time urgent and, when used with sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, would severely complicate Soviet air defense strategy. The deployment of both the Pershing II and the GLCM would seriously strain Soviet capabilities to locate and attack NATO's nuclear means in Europe early in a war. From a Soviet targeting standpoint, the GLCM would pose the greater problem because it would be dispersed among five countries, four of them deep in NATO's rear and behind NATO's air defense belt. [REDACTED]

## II. Soviet Negotiating and Overt Political Strategy Until Now

The Soviets have employed a multifaceted strategy to achieve their INF arms control objectives. They clearly view the West European governments as the key to blocking US INF deployments. While negotiating with the United States in Geneva, they have carried out a propaganda and covert action offensive--primarily focused on the peace movement in Western Europe--similar to the one they waged in 1977-78 to stop NATO from deploying enhanced radiation weapons. In this campaign they have tried both overt and covert means, inducements as well as threats, to exploit anti-INF sentiment in West European governments. Perhaps the most heavyhanded threat intended for these governments was




contained in an interview Brezhnev had with Der Spiegel in November 1981. He said that "in order to neutralize [NATO's] mobile missiles it would be necessary [for Moscow] to deal retaliatory strikes of great yield at the supposed areas of their deployment." [redacted]

Later that same month President Reagan announced his zero option proposal, which to the Soviets' dismay was eagerly embraced by Western Europe. The tenacity with which Washington adhered to this proposal during the last negotiating round probably convinced Moscow that a new Soviet initiative was needed to bring further pressure on the United States and NATO. Previous initiatives--for example, the unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployment in the western USSR and the threat to put the United States and Western Europe in an "analogous" position if NATO deploys new INF systems--have not yielded measurable results in the negotiations or in West European capitals. [redacted]

One of Moscow's recent threats was a warning that NATO's INF deployment would necessitate the adoption of a Soviet launch-on-warning policy. This was implied in a statement issued by the Novosti press agency on 30 November that apparently was aimed at intimidating the West Europeans. This threat, like the others, probably was counterproductive because many West European governments saw it as a rather crude and clumsy attempt to pressure them to forgo INF deployment. [redacted]




Negotiating Strategy. Although Brezhnev had hinted in an address last October that the SS-20 deployment moratorium might be lifted soon, Defense Minister Ustinov, in a 6 December interview, implied that it was still in effect. Whatever the fate of the moratorium, Moscow has other diplomatic options to explore, particularly with the West Europeans, in the hope that they will exert pressure on the United States to change its bargaining position. [REDACTED]



In an address on 21 December, General Secretary Andropov officially announced the missile subcelling proposal and



emphasized the reductions that would be made, including "tens of the latest missiles, known in the West as SS-20s." The Soviets could reduce their missile launchers to 162 by retiring 250 SS-4s and SS-5s and 81 SS-20s (see table). This cutback in SS-20s would amount to one-third of the force in the European USSR. Although the Soviets have the option, under their proposal, of either dismantling their excess SS-20 launchers or removing them to the eastern USSR, they have hinted [redacted] at a willingness to destroy at least some of them. [redacted]





The Missile Balance in Europe

<u>Soviet</u>	<u>Present</u>		<u>Andropov's Sub-ceiling Offer</u>		<u>US Zero-Option Proposal</u>	
	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>Missiles</u>	<u>Warheads</u>
SS-20 IRBM	243	729	162	486	0	0
SS-4 MRBM and SS-5 IRBM	250	250	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>493</b>	<b>979</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
 <u>NATO</u>						
Pershing II MRBM (US)	0	0	0	0	0	0
GLCM (US)	0	0	0	0	0	0
SS-3 IRBM (Fr)	18	18	18	18	18	18
M-20 SLBM (Fr)	80	80	80	80	80	80
A-3 SLBM (UK)	64	64	64	64	64	64
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>162</b>



[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]

Overt Political Strategy. The Soviets have begun a campaign to highlight their new INF initiative and are intensifying their efforts to undermine the NATO deployment plan as the West German national elections approach in March.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



[Redacted]

[Redacted] Andropov also has involved himself in the campaign, as was demonstrated by his meeting in January with Hans-Jochen Vogel, the West German Social Democratic Party candidate for Chancellor. In addition to these high-level meetings, the Soviets have sent briefing memoranda on their view of the INF negotiations to most of the major West European capitals. They probably believe they will have their best shot at influencing Allied positions if they appear to be flexible in the negotiations. [Redacted]

Vadim Zagladin, a senior Soviet party official, implied to a Dutch interviewer in September 1982 that a postponement of NATO's INF deployment would satisfy Moscow for the present. This goal became more evident in early November, when Brezhnev sent a letter to West German Chancellor Kohl requesting that such deployment not proceed automatically because more time was needed to achieve results at the INF negotiations. After the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov made a similar request in a meeting with West German President Carstens. [Redacted]



[redacted]

The outcome of the West German election, scheduled for 6 March, will have a major impact on future Soviet moves. The Soviets are lobbying hard to influence West German opinion against INF. They are attempting to increase public pressure on the ruling Christian Democrats to weaken their commitment to the zero option and on the opposition Social Democrats to endorse a delay in INF deployment so that arms control negotiations will have more time to succeed in Geneva. [redacted]

The Soviets are directing their efforts primarily toward public diplomacy--to avoid risking the adverse public reaction that would result if covert operations were exposed. They are emphasizing the carrot of Moscow's negotiating flexibility rather than the stick of threatening retaliation to NATO deployments. Gromyko's recent visit to Bonn demonstrates, Moscow is seeking to present a cautious and reasonable image, presumably to leave the door open for future cooperation with the Christian Democrats if they win the elections, and to avoid discrediting the Social Democratic Party's attempts to broker an agreement on INF between the United States and the USSR. [redacted]

III. Soviet "Active Measures" Against INF: The Covert Campaign

In the past three years, in support of its direct diplomatic efforts to block deployment of US INF on West European soil, Moscow has conducted an ambitious campaign to infiltrate,




manipulate, and exploit the European peace movement. To conduct such a campaign, the Soviets rely on a full range of so-called "active measures"--a term they use to refer to activities worldwide that are intended to promote Soviet foreign policy goals but which go beyond traditional diplomatic, propaganda, and military means. Many of the active measures currently being employed in the anti-INF campaign are adaptations of those that proved effective in the 1977-78 campaign against the "neutron bomb." The scope and intensity of the USSR's public and covert campaigns can be expected to grow as scheduled deployment dates approach. It has already surpassed the scale of the anti-neutron bomb campaign. [REDACTED]

Use of Communist Parties and Front Organizations. Moscow has instructed West European Communists and the leaders of pro-Soviet international organizations to make the anti-INF campaign their foremost concern and has provided funding and political guidance for their peace movement activity. [REDACTED]


The Soviets have directed West European Communist parties specifically to assume a leading role in organizing antinuclear demonstrations and meetings and to coordinate their efforts with non-Communist peace activities. Moscow has been most active with regard to the INF-basing countries, particularly West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.



~~SECRET~~



29





11


~~SECRET~~










The Soviets also are utilizing their international front organizations to initiate and direct some of the antinuclear activities in Western Europe and to try to attract non-Communist participants to lend credibility to Soviet objectives.








Financial Support. The USSR and its East European allies contribute considerable financial and material support covertly





to the West European peace movement through Communist parties and front organizations.

-- The West German government publicly charged early last month that the East Germans secretly provide more than \$2 million a month to the West German Communist Party (DKP). [REDACTED]





The Soviets also fund the peace movement openly.

-- In an interview last May in the Austrian press, Soviet Central Committee official Vadim Zagladin provided details about the "Soviet Peace Fund" and its support to Western peace groups, including the WPC and its affiliates in various West European countries.

-- A former Soviet Peace Fund chairman asserted in the English-language Moscow News in the spring of 1981 that his clients included "leaders of the international democratic organizations working for peace" and cooperated with another ostensibly "public" Soviet organization, the Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP) to "render



financial aid to organizations, movements, and personalities." [redacted]


Propaganda Guidelines. The Soviets have sought to direct the focus of the West European peace movement by providing Communist parties and front organizations with propaganda themes keyed to local concerns and to US and NATO policies. [redacted]

[redacted]

Soviet propaganda guidance also has reflected concern about the growing tendency among West European peace activists to blame the USSR as well as the United States for the arms race.



[redacted]





Direct Involvement in Peace Groups. Because of the urgency of their anti-INF campaign, the Soviets have risked discrediting some West European peace groups through the covert involvement in peace movement activity of diplomats and other Soviet officials abroad.

- On 19 November, the Dutch press reported that representatives of the Soviet Embassy and trade mission in the Netherlands had violated diplomatic rules by getting directly involved in the peace movement.
  
- Soviet officials in West Germany reportedly have been stepping up their contacts with politicians, church leaders, and student group representatives in order to propagandize Soviet positions on major security issues.





Influence Through Foreign Media and Disinformation. The Soviets routinely try to exploit the Western press to advance the USSR's peace movement objectives.

-- The left-leaning West German magazine Der Spiegel, for example, is a leader in publishing interviews with the Soviets, particularly on arms control issues.

-- The KGB, usually through front organizations, provides funding for West European media sympathetic to Soviet interests. For example, late last year it provided, via a Luxembourg-based East German front organization, the funding to finance the new printing installations of the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party.

-- The press organs of pro-Soviet European Communist parties, although they have limited circulation, provide sympathetic coverage of the USSR's policies and activities regarding antinuclear issues. This prevails even on the lowest level, as in the case of the local Communist party newspaper that reported daily on a Soviet peace delegation touring Denmark last November. [REDACTED]



Disinformation and forgeries are other "active measures" the Soviet and their allies are using in the campaign against INF-basing.

- Last May, a forged letter purportedly from former Secretary of State Haig to NATO Secretary General Luns regarding nuclear arms issues was circulated in Belgium and Luxembourg. It distorted NATO nuclear strategy and played on the fear of NATO use of nuclear weapons in a limited war situation.
  
- The West German Communist Party may have been involved in fabricating or disseminating a purported official notice that was posted in several areas of Bonn in mid-November alerting citizens to measures concerning the transport of nuclear and conventional weapons through the city. The forgery clearly was intended to aggravate public concern about a recent accident involving a Pershing I transporter and had no basis in fact. [REDACTED]

Effectiveness of Soviet Efforts. It is difficult to evaluate the real effect of Soviet active measures in the West European peace movement. Clearly, not all opposition to NATO nuclear forces modernization is Soviet-inspired. There is good



[redacted]

evidence, however, that the Soviets have sought to exploit and manipulate the movement and that Soviet covert support has enabled it to grow beyond its own capabilities. The more successful tactic employed by the Soviets to date, however, probably is the incessant emphasis in public and private meetings with West Europeans on the USSR's ostensible commitment to detente and arms control in contrast to the US' alleged drive toward "military supremacy." This type of "political influence operation" is difficult to counter because many West Europeans consider meetings with Soviet officials and local Communists to be a legitimate means of obtaining information. [redacted]

There has, however, been a perceptible change recently in the attitude of some non-Communist peace groups toward Soviet and other Communist support.

-- In the past six to eight months the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) has distanced itself from the Soviet position and called more strongly for mutual disarmament by East and West.

-- In June 1982 the West German "Greens" broke with the Communist Party over the issues of the need for disarmament by both superpowers, support for the peace movement in East Germany, and criticism of Soviet actions in Poland and Afghanistan.



-- The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) reportedly will not support the WPC's "World Peace Assembly" scheduled to be held in Prague this June.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

IV. Soviet Negotiating Options in Mid-to-Late 1983

Moscow will continue to assess NATO's deployment plans and the US stance in the current round of negotiations, which will probably last until late March. Although site preparation has been under way for some time, the first deliveries of INF equipment are scheduled to arrive in West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy between April and October. If by that time the Soviets conclude there has been insufficient movement in the NATO negotiating position and they are convinced that the INF equipment deliveries will be made, they probably will announce an end to the SS-20 moratorium.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

During the summer round of the INF talks several options would be open to the Soviets. They could:

[Redacted]



- Shift their tactics at the INF talks by expressing a willingness to trade off cruise and ballistic missiles currently under development against the GLCM and Pershing II.
- Call for a long suspension of the talks, blaming the United States for the stalemate.
- Walk out of the talks indefinitely, with no date set for resumption.
- Call for merging the INF talks with START.
- Propose to the West Europeans that they join the talks or suggest another venue for the talks, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

[Redacted]

Tradeoff. Probably the Soviets' most likely option (and one that they have suggested [Redacted] is a proposal to trade off their future cruise and ballistic missiles against NATO's new systems. They currently have a number of such programs in development, some of which could be ready for deployment by late 1983. In his address on 21 December, Andropov stated that the

[Redacted]



USSR was testing a long-range cruise missile and would deploy it if the United States proceeded with plans for cruise missile deployment. [REDACTED]

By matching their new systems against NATO's, the Soviets might seek to change the whole focus of the negotiations, so that the emphasis would be on limiting the new systems of both sides-- while protecting their substantially deployed SS-20 force. That tactical shift could keep on the table their missile subceiling proposal, with its enticement of substantial reductions in the SS-20 force. They might argue then to NATO governments that European security would be better served by the missile subceiling proposal than by US INF deployments matched by Soviet counterdeployments. [REDACTED]

The threat of such Soviet deployments, however, would not be well received in European capitals and might even increase Allied support for INF deployments. INF proponents would characterize the threat as a Soviet effort to divide Western Europe from the United States and would urge their governments to follow through with deployments. At the same time, however, the West European governments would urge the United States to persevere at the INF talks so that a deal might still be negotiated. [REDACTED]

Suspension. Of the above options, the second seems least likely, because the Soviets probably would feel that it would not



be "tough" enough. With time running out before NATO deployment, they almost certainly would believe that more definitive measures were required to impress NATO with the gravity of the situation. [redacted]

Walkout. If they chose to walk out, the Soviets could argue that until the United States is interested in bargaining seriously, there is no need to continue INF talks. In November they indicated [redacted] that the next round of negotiations would be a watershed. They also seemed to be laying the groundwork for an eventual public accounting of their "flexibility" throughout the negotiations, in contrast to US "intractability." At various times last fall Soviet INF delegates and party officials hinted at a walkout if the US position remained unchanged and Washington began INF deployments; but at the same time, [redacted] they indicated that they would continue negotiations even after the United States began such deployments. Leaving the talks clearly would be risky to the Soviets: Western public opinion might blame them for the collapse of the negotiations. If they feared this possibility, they could stress their willingness to continue to negotiate at START but make it clear that no progress would be possible in that forum until INF questions were resolved. [redacted]



Merger. The idea of negotiating INF in the START framework might be an option open to the Soviets, as Colonel General Chervov of the General Staff recently indicated in an interview with a West German newspaper. At present, Chervov opposes the idea, because of the need to reach an INF settlement quickly and the likelihood that combining INF talks with START would delay an INF solution for many years. Nevertheless, the Soviets might consider this approach if they believed that it had West European support and could delay NATO's deployment plans. [redacted]

Moscow would be in a good position if the talks were merged, because it has already linked the two in its negotiating approach. Its reduction proposal in START is contingent on no US deployment of new INF systems. The call to ban long-range cruise missiles and air-to-surface ballistic missiles is found in both its INF and its START proposals. Its objection to US proposals in both the INF talks and START is that Washington is not looking at the whole panoply of weapon systems comprehensively, but is interested in selectively limiting only Moscow's strengths, such as ICBMs and the SS-20. [redacted]

The Soviets might well see an advantage if all systems with a "strategic" mission--including US "forward-based" systems and British and French nuclear forces--were on the negotiating table. In their view this could open up opportunities for horse trading, such as occurred during SALT II, and could make more



44

[REDACTED]

credible the Soviet argument that there is overall strategic parity between East and West. If by late 1983 Moscow saw NATO deployment as a certainty and was still interested in a negotiated outcome, it might believe that this advantage would outweigh any disadvantage there might be in losing a separate forum for INF (the separate forum has been useful in exerting leverage on the West Europeans, particularly the Germans). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Broader Context. Another option open to the Soviets would be to invite the West Europeans to join the INF talks or propose that the talks take place within a broader European framework, such as the CSCE. They could argue that the negotiations are of paramount importance to Europe and that all major powers should be involved. There is no evidence to suggest such a move, but it would be consistent with the long-term Soviet strategy of capitalizing on differences of view among NATO countries. The



Soviets would clearly recognize, however, the low likelihood of acceptance by the West Europeans, particularly the French and British, for the reason cited above. [REDACTED]

V. Future Soviet Political Moves

The Soviets will continue vigorous efforts to influence the West German position, regardless of whether the elections result in a CDU victory or return the SPD to power. They may be more willing after the elections to offer specific inducements, such as eased emigration for ethnic Germans in the East, since they will no longer be constrained by reluctance to help the CDU in its campaign. At the same time, they may resort more openly to intimidation, particularly if the CDU is victorious. They might stress that West Germany would be more exposed than other West European countries to Soviet retaliation in the event of a nuclear exchange, because only West Germany would base Pershing IIs. [REDACTED]

Throughout Western Europe the Soviets will intensify their public campaign against US INF deployment. These efforts are likely to include:

- Stepping up contact with a broad spectrum of European politicians, media representatives, church leaders, and student groups, with the intention of purveying as widely as



possible an image of Soviet reasonableness and a commitment to a negotiated INF solution.

-- Employing propaganda to arouse public alarm over alleged US intentions of making Europe the "nuclear battlefield" of a US-Soviet conflict.

-- Introducing new "peace" initiatives such as their latest proposal for a tactical nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. [redacted]

VI. What Type of Agreement Might Moscow Accept?

Throughout the negotiations the Soviets have insisted that the United States forgo deployment of its new systems in an INF agreement. Privately, however, they have indicated that they expect Washington to proceed with deployment. While they have not provided any clues as to what level of NATO deployment they might ultimately accept, [redacted]

[redacted] has probed his US counterparts on several occasions for a figure, lower than the planned number, to which NATO would actually agree. [redacted]

Clearly the Soviets would like NATO's plan to fall through on its own, but they cannot be confident that this will happen. They probably would not welcome a situation in which NATO fully



[redacted]

deployed its systems and they found it necessary to respond with hundreds of their own missiles. Between these extreme outcomes, they must have given considerable thought to an agreement in which NATO is permitted some level of deployment. Given their particular concern over the Pershing II, they might continue to call for a ban on it, while grudgingly accepting some level of GLCM deployment--albeit sharply reduced from the planned 464 launchers. In return, the Soviets probably would merely reiterate their missile subceiling proposal. In fact, they could insist that any US GLCM deployment (augmenting the French and British missile launchers) be offset by deployments of additional Soviet missile launchers. [redacted]

Moscow would view a negotiating outcome that killed the Pershing II program as a favorable initial step, but it still would be greatly concerned about limiting the US cruise missile threat. It could propose additional arms control measures that would severely limit air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. It might demand that ALCMs be quantitatively limited on heavy bombers (as they were in SALT II) and might call for a continuation of the ban on SLCM deployment that was negotiated in the now-expired SALT II Protocol. To get Washington more interested in such measures, Moscow might want to heighten the visibility of its own cruise missile systems (as Andropov did in his 21 December address), particularly as those systems approach



operational capability, perhaps as early as late this year. The Soviets probably would be willing to use either the INF talks or START to negotiate these measures. [REDACTED]

VII. Possible Soviet Plans if Negotiations and Political Moves Fail

By late 1983 Moscow probably will be able to judge whether an agreement is possible and whether any of the negotiating options and political moves outlined above would be effective in postponing or derailing NATO's deployment plans. If the Soviets are convinced that the initial deployment will occur as scheduled in December, they almost certainly will take steps--for internal as well as foreign policy reasons--to implement whatever military response they have planned to make once NATO's deployment actually begins. This response was foreshadowed in Andropov's 21 December address and in March 1982, when Brezhnev threatened retaliatory measures that would put the United States and its allies "in an analogous position" if NATO deployed its new INF systems. [REDACTED]

Military Options. As described in the recently published SNIE 11/20-3-82 (INF: The Prospects for West European Deployment and the USSR's Reactions), the Soviets could, inter alia:

- Field new cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles opposite Europe and deploy a larger SS-20 force.



-- Station submarines with sea-launched cruise missiles near US coasts.

-- Install nuclear-capable offensive weapon systems in Cuba, either overtly or covertly. [REDACTED]

Last fall the Soviets hinted at the INF talks that they might respond with deployment of a long-range cruise missile or a new ballistic missile, or both. In his 21 December speech, Andropov highlighted the Soviet long-range cruise missile program as a counter to NATO's INF deployments, probably because the system is already at the flight test stage. The Soviets recently have modified a Y-class submarine and a number of Bear bombers, apparently to serve as platforms for a long-range cruise missile, which could be targeted against US territory. If they choose to develop a new IRBM for deployment opposite Europe, it probably will be a system more capable than the SS-20 in terms of payload and accuracy. Another Soviet option could be deployment of the SS-20 in the northeastern USSR, where it could target the northwestern United States. A [REDACTED] Foreign Ministry official mentioned this possibility last August, and a Soviet

[REDACTED] discussed it in October [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]





The above options seem more plausible than the emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Moscow no doubt understands that such an action could bring the superpowers to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. It probably would calculate that the political costs in Europe and the potential risk of military confrontation with the US Administration--which has made initiatives in the Caribbean Basin a major element of its foreign policy--as not worth whatever increase in military or political leverage they think such a move might provide. Moscow probably also would believe that such an action would result not only in the collapse of the INF negotiations, but of START as well. Nonetheless, the threat of such an action--which has been hinted at [REDACTED] probably is part of an overall Soviet strategy to bring as much pressure as possible to bear on the United States and Europe to move off the zero option position. [REDACTED]

Covert Measures. If the current Soviet strategy fails, they probably will shift the focus of their active measures campaign. They will attempt to use covert means to complement military, diplomatic, and political moves in an effort to slow the pace of deployment and to keep it at the lowest possible level. With the East-West atmosphere probably souring by that time, they might feel even less constraint against pursuing riskier measures--such as



encouraging demonstrations and supporting radical peace groups, some of which might engage in sabotage at NATO facilities.



The Soviets also will use propaganda, disinformation, and support to Communist Party and front groups to increase the political pain of the governments of the basing countries. They will hope that this, in turn, will cause those countries to pressure the United States to accede to an agreement that caps NATO deployments at a low level and minimizes reductions in Soviet forces. 

In the Netherlands, the Soviets can be expected to intensify their active measures with the Communist Party and its fronts in the period leading up to a Dutch decision in late 1983 on INF deployment. Soviet pressure on the Italian Communist Party to intensify support of the peace movement undoubtedly will increase as the initial GLCM equipment deliveries to Italy in October draw near. (The Soviets are currently operating under a liability,



however, since their public image in Italy has suffered badly as a result of allegations of Soviet involvement in the attempted assassination of the Pope.) The chief peace group in the United Kingdom--the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament--has been gaining political clout; however, Soviet ability to influence it appears to be extremely limited. Nevertheless, they will do what they can to support the CND, particularly as the projected GLCM deployment date (December) approaches. The Soviets can also be expected to attempt to persuade leftist groups to throw their support behind the CND. [redacted]

The Soviets probably will be careful, however, not to go too far with their active measures campaign. They are aware that strong antinuclear movements exist in all the INF-basing countries (except Italy), even without Soviet or Communist involvement. They also realize that, by treading carefully, they can profit from these movements that have been aroused by heightened East-West tensions and greater public awareness of nuclear weapons programs affecting West European countries. For these reasons the Soviets probably will continue to rely more on overt political measures, which have proved to be their most effective tactic. [redacted]




APPENDIX

Significant INF-Related Events


1983

- 27 January INF (Round IV) resumes
- 30 January - 10 February Vice President Bush's European trip begins in Bonn; includes a visit to INF and START negotiations
- 1 February Session of the UN Committee on Disarmament begins in Geneva
- 14 February Meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG)
- 6 March Elections in West Germany
- March NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Portugal
- March Williamsburg summit
- Late March INF (Round IV) ends
- March-April CPSU Central Committee meets
- April (?) Votes on INF infrastructure funding to be held in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands
- April First GLCM equipment arrives in United Kingdom





9-10 June	NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris
June	INF (Round V) resumes
June	First Pershing II equipment arrives in West Germany
August	INF (Round V) ends
October	First GLCM equipment arrives in Italy
November	NATO Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Canada
4 December	SPD party congress in West Germany
December	NATO ministerial meetings
December	Scheduled initial operational capability for Pershing II in West Germany and GLCM in the United Kingdom





MEMORANDUM

10938

1578

Press

55

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials

State reports that two Soviet press agency officials have applied for visas to tape an interview with the Cable News Network and to contact two American publishers regarding some translation agreements with Novosti Press Agency. Although State is disturbed by the lack of reciprocity in TV appearances, it recommends that we allow the visit to proceed. Otherwise, the U.S. media may create a stir, and the Department is already involved in lawsuits challenging past visa refusals.

I consider State's judgment correct in this instance, particularly since visa refusal would not prevent CNN from taping them in another country.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the attached Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
- Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/a #10938

BY KPL NARA DATE 11/28/11



10939

1578

56

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials (U)

The recommended course of action regarding the proposed visit of Gennady Gerasimov and Sergei Ivanko is approved. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Excutive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10939

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011



Washington, D.C. 20520

February 24, 1984

57

10943

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials

Cable News Network (CNN) has invited Gennadiy Gerasimov, a journalist for the Soviet press agency Novosti, and Sergei Ivan'ko, First Deputy Chairman of the Novosti Board, to come to the US March 12 to appear on CNN programs to be taped March 14. The two Soviets also want to talk to officials of two publishing houses with which Novosti has translation agreements or other business: Praeger and International Universities Press Publishers.

While this visit raises questions of allowing Soviet propagandists to appear live on American TV without reciprocity for American spokesmen in Soviet media, we have concluded that it is less costly to allow the visit to proceed. We cannot prevent appearance by the Soviets on the programs by direct feed from Moscow. Refusing them entry would arouse a wave of criticism from US media on press freedoms grounds and inspire Soviet retaliation, possibly against programs of special interest to us. Refusal would have to be based on a finding on foreign policy grounds that their presence here would endanger national security. This would come at a particularly sensitive time in view of the recent filing of four lawsuits, three against the Secretary of State and one against the President, challenging the legality and constitutionality of several visa refusals on the same grounds in 1983.

*Corey*Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/9 #10943

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011



*Sov Propaganda*

58

1578 add-on

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

March 5, 1984

TO: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

Bob,

As you can see by the date, this memo was ready last week. I waited for Ambassador Matlock to send the original action on this through me for my concurrence. He failed to do so which explains the delay of this memo. I hope that my views can still be considered.

*John L.*  
John Lenczowski



10940

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

59

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Visas to Soviet Propagandists

I do not concur with the State Department's memo which recommends that visas be granted to a couple of Soviet "journalists" from Novosti (Tab III). Novosti is nothing more than a disinformation operation whose personnel disguise themselves as journalists. To admit such people is no different than admitting disinformation agents disguised as trade unionists.

State's position on these matters treats the reciprocity and national security issues involved here as trivial. Before, it was ready to deny visas to others on the grounds that reciprocity -- especially with regard to access to media -- is something the U.S. takes seriously in relations with the USSR. Implicit here was a recognition that disinformation and propaganda indeed do have national security consequences. Now, however, because national security grounds for visa denials are being challenged in court and because State does not want to be criticized by the media, it is ready to capitulate on a matter of principle and national security.

This situation illustrates the continued unacceptability of the current visa granting policy which compels us to deal with this issue every few months. I believe it calls for serious consideration of the Baker Amendment.

The Baker Amendment would simply restore the same visa granting process that existed before we signed the Helsinki accords. At that time instead of automatically granting visas to anyone from communist countries, it automatically denied them, and then, to grant a visa, it was necessary to seek waivers on a case-by-case basis. National security grounds for denying visas were already built into the system.

After signing Helsinki and committing ourselves to free movement of peoples, the McGovern Amendment was passed so that waivers would automatically be recommended and therefore visas granted. The Baker Amendment, however, was then passed, and it says that if we find a signatory in violation of Helsinki, the Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10940

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/11



of State does not automatically have to grant visas if he does not want to.

Since we have just declared the Soviets to be in violation of Helsinki in the President's recent report to Congress, we would be fully within the law to invoke the Baker Amendment and solve this visa question once and for all. A not inconsequential benefit from doing so would be to utilize one of the principal mechanisms at our disposal to control the hostile intelligence presence in our country.

I believe that there are so many problems with the current visa regime that proponents of the status quo should have to answer one question to the satisfaction of the NSC: "What is wrong with the pre-Helsinki visa system, and if it were reintroduced, why would it not serve the interest of the United States?"

At Tab I is a memo from you to Charles Hill recommending that the two Novosti officials be given visas only on the condition that the Soviets permit two advocates of Administration policy to appear for equal lengths of time on Soviet TV.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you sign the memo to Charles Hill at Tab I requesting that we seek reciprocity as a condition for granting visas to the Novosti officials.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize Ken deGraffenreid to add to the agenda of the SIG-Intelligence the reexamination of the pre-Helsinki visa system as an option in dealing with the hostile intelligence presence.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I        McFarlane - Hill Memo
- Tab II      State Department Memo

cc: Ken deGraffenreid



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

10941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visas for Soviet Officials (U)

The visa applications of two Novosti officials, whose purpose is to appear on American TV, raises once again the question of reciprocity and equal access. Because we are interested that the process of dialogue between our two countries be a two-way street and that we should be able to conduct dialogue with the people of the Soviet Union just as Soviets are able to reach our people through the mass media, we should grant visas to the Novosti officials on the condition that the Soviets agree to permit advocates of Administration policy to appear for equal lengths of time on Soviet television. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/9 #10941

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011



TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 24 FEB 84

62

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 8/5/02

KEYWORDS . USSR MEDIA GERASIMOV, GENNADIY  
IVAN'KO, SERCEI

SUBJECT: VISIT OF SOVIET PRESS AGENCY OFFICIALS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 28 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
MATLOCK	<u>LENCZOWSKI</u> <del>BRAZIL</del>	ROBINSON
		FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF# 8405568 LOG NSCIFID ( CB )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



February 24, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials

Cable News Network (CNN) has invited Gennadiy Gerasimov, a journalist for the Soviet press agency Novosti, and Sergei Ivan'ko, First Deputy Chairman of the Novosti Board, to come to the US March 12 to appear on CNN programs to be taped March 14. The two Soviets also want to talk to officials of two publishing houses with which Novosti has translation agreements or other business: Praeger and International Universities Press Publishers.

While this visit raises questions of allowing Soviet propagandists to appear live on American TV without reciprocity for American spokesmen in Soviet media, we have concluded that it is less costly to allow the visit to proceed. We cannot prevent appearance by the Soviets on the programs by direct feed from Moscow. Refusing them entry would arouse a wave of criticism from US media on press freedoms grounds and inspire Soviet retaliation, possibly against programs of special interest to us. Refusal would have to be based on a finding on foreign policy grounds that their presence here would endanger national security. This would come at a particularly sensitive time in view of the recent filing of four lawsuits, three against the Secretary of State and one against the President, challenging the legality and constitutionality of several visa refusals on the same grounds in 1983.

*Ch. Hill*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/9 #10944

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011