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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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3210

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10924	PAPER	ISRAEL; NIGERIA; ALGERIA; USSR	2	10/4/1982	B1
10927	CABLE	SOVIET RADIO JAMMING <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	2	10/5/1982	B1
10928	CABLE	090438Z OCT 82 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	10/9/1982	B1
10931	PAPER	MOSCOW CAMPAIGNS AGAINST WAR PROPAGANDA <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	25	11/1/1982	B1
10925	MEMO	SOVIET WEAPONS DESIGNERS DENOUNCE PRESIDENT'S ABM INITIATIVE <b>PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</b>	1	5/5/1983	B1 B3
10926	PAPER	SOVIET WEAPONS DESIGNERS DENOUCE PRESIDENT'S ABM INITIATIVE <b>PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</b>	7	4/29/1983	B1 B3
10929	MEMO	SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SCIENTISTS MEETING ON DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGY <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	3	ND	B1
10930	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, JUNE 18, 1983 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	5	6/20/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10932	PAPER	COMMUNIST CLANDESTINE RADIO BROADCASTING TO TURKEY <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	12	6/20/1983	B1
10933	PAPER	USSR: CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN BROADCASTING <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	1	7/28/1983	B1
10934	PAPER	USSR: THE COUNTERPROPAGANDA APPARATUS IN THE UKRAINE <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	5	10/12/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Wheeler  
~~to~~ Lord  
Raymond  
Pipes



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4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1982 OCT 5 PM 3:15  
*[Signature]*

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S/S #

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3:31 PM

LDX MESSAGE NO. 985 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 2

FROM: Byron Morton (Officer name) EUR/SOV (Office symbol) 22248 (Extension) 4229 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Cable on Soviet Radio Jamming

LDX TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Carey Lord	395-4684	365

REMARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

Please call in comments to Mr. Morton on 632-2248.  
S/S Officer: *[Signature]*

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By CS NARA, Date 8/5/02

USSR  
media

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USIA:  
L/EUR:JCROOK

EUR/CE:  
T:WSALMON

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ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS ROUTINE

E.O. 12065: DECL: OADR

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TAGS:

NLRR E06-1419 #10927

BN

SUBJECT: SOVIET RADIO JAMMING

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

WS

2. THE USG IS CURRENTLY STUDYING MEANS TO MOVE AGGRESSIVELY AGAINST MASSIVE JAMMING BY THE SOVIETS OF VOA, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY AND OTHER MAJOR WESTERN RADIOS BROADCASTING IN SOVIET LANGUAGES. THIS EFFORT WILL ENCOMPASS DIPLOMATIC, PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITY. AS AN EARLY STEP WE WISH TO ENGAGE THE ALLIES MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY SOVIET JAMMING IN COOPERATING IN COORDINATED DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIETS. WE WILL ALSO WANT TO ELICIT THE VIEWS OF ALLIED EXPERTS ON POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE APPROACHES TO ENDING OR CIRCUMVENTING SOVIET JAMMING.

JC

3. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO APPROPRIATE SENIOR HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS: (A) THE SOVIETS RESUMED JAMMING THE BROADCASTS OF OUR RADIOS IN THE SOVIET LANGUAGES IN AUGUST 1980 AND HAVE CONTINUED TO DO SO ON A MASSIVE SCALE FOR OVER TWO YEARS. THEY ARE ALSO JAMMING TRANSMISSIONS TO POLAND. (B) WE CONSIDER THAT JAMMING VIOLATES THE SPIRIT OF THE

HELSINKI FINAL ACT, ARTICLE 35 OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 19 OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION, ALL OF WHICH THE USSR IS PARTY TO. (C) THE UNITED STATES HAS FORMALLY PROTESTED THE RESUMED JAMMING ON THREE OCCASIONS -- IN AUGUST AND DECEMBER 1980 AND IN JANUARY 1982 -- AND HAS BROUGHT IT UP IN THE CSCE CONTEXT IN MADRID. THE UK AND THE FRG MADE CONCURRENT PROTESTS IN AUGUST 1980. (D) THE USG CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE SOVIETS AWARE OF OUR CONTINUING STRONG OBJECTION TO JAMMING AND BELIEVES IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE ALLIES MOST AFFECTED AGAIN TO MAKE CONCURRENT DEMARCHES TO THE SOVIETS PROTESTING ITS CONTINUATION. WE HOPE ITALY WOULD JOIN THE US, UK AND FRG THIS TIME. (E) IF THE ALLIES AGREE TO THIS APPROACH, WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR VIEWS ON TIMING AND ON ANY NEW SUBSTANCE WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE PROTESTS. WE FAVOR ACTING AS SOON AS COORDINATION CAN BE COMPLETED.

4. ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT WE ARE LOOKING AT A RANGE OF POLITICAL MOVES TO ORGANIZE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST JAMMING AND OF TECHNICAL MEANS TO OVERCOME OR CIRCUMVENT JAMMING. IF THEY ARE INTERESTED, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOST OR SEND EXPERTS TO A MEETING TO SHARE IDEAS AND DEVELOP COOPERATIVE APPROACHES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS ON TIMING AND PARTICIPANTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE AT A SENIOR LEVEL (E.G. ROBINSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF USIA, PLUS SENIOR LEVEL STATE REP).

5. PLEASE REPORT HOST COUNTRY REACTION SOONEST.

6. FOR PARIS: FROM INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, IT APPEARS FRENCH BROADCASTS TO SOVIET UNION ARE NOT TARGETS OF DIRECTED JAMMING, ALTHOUGH IT IS AFFECTED BY SPILLOVER JAMMING. IF EMBASSY FINDS THIS INFORMATION IS OUTDATED AND FRENCH RADIO BEING JAMMED, IT IS REQUESTED TO SEEK GOF COOPERATION IN CONCURRENT DEMARCHES. 44

10928

RADIOS 7  
USSR-Media  
Comm

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

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TODEL 15 NAIROBI FOR ITU DELEGATION  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PROP, UR  
SUBJECT: SOVIET RADIO JAMMING

AGREE TO THIS APPROACH, WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR VIEWS ON  
TIMING AND ON ANY NEW SUBSTANCE WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED  
IN THE PROTESTS. WE FAVOR ACTING AS SOON AS COORDINATION  
CAN BE COMPLETED.

4. ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT WE ARE  
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APPROACHES. WE WOULD APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS ON TIMING  
AND PARTICIPANTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE AT A  
SENIOR LEVEL.

5. PLEASE REPORT HOST COUNTRY REACTION SOONEST.

6. FOR PARIS: FROM INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE, IT  
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BT

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT)

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011





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USSR-RADIOS  
P. D.

10931

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(U) MOSCOW CAMPAIGNS AGAINST WAR PROPAGANDA

Summary

On September 23, 1982, the USSR Supreme Soviet suddenly ratified the September 23, 1936, League of Nations International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. The convention essentially prohibits the transmission of "war propaganda" or any other information prejudicial to "good international understanding." The unexpected Soviet move, coming in the midst of a "peace" campaign against alleged US Cold War policies, may presage a new Soviet diplomatic offensive against Western radio broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The USSR signed the convention in 1936 with significant reservations relating to the fact that enforcement presupposed diplomatic relations between signatories, but the USSR had few diplomatic ties. The Soviets never moved to ratify the convention, although after World War II the war propaganda issue became a regular element in their arms control initiatives in UN disarmament bodies. These efforts were buttressed by 1951 Soviet domestic legislation defining the spreading of war propaganda as a "heinous crime."

Throughout the early post-war period, Moscow's definition of war propaganda, as used in the arms control context, remained relatively consistent with that expressed in the 1936 convention. By the late 1960s, however, with the emergence of politically active newly independent nations, Moscow began to expand the concept to subsume political and social issues of concern to the Third World. An alliance between the USSR and several developing nations subsequently emerged on certain communications issues. This alliance specifically

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Decontrol on February 1, 1983

Report 490-AR  
November 1, 1982

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challenged Western advocacy of the free flow of information and press freedom, particularly where "propaganda against peace" was concerned.

The Soviets may have ratified the 1936 convention to revive the war propaganda theme internationally. Their goal would be to target Western radio stations--Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in particular--as well as other "subversive" Western information media as violating the convention's basic principles. In any event, Soviet claims that ratification was "timely" seem consistent with Moscow's recent propaganda attacks on RFE/RL's alleged role in the Polish crisis and bitter denunciations of an alleged US "ideological offensive" against the USSR. Moreover, such claims implicitly provide the USSR with justification for the continued jamming of Western broadcasts.

Moscow presumably calculates that because of the convention's moral and symbolic significance, Soviet exploitation of the war propaganda theme will find receptivity among developing nations, which share the USSR's contention that the international flow of information is Western dominated and should be regulated to protect "national sovereignty." Having become a full party to the agreement, the Soviets nevertheless could find themselves vulnerable to charges of violating certain of the convention's articles, specifically those calling for the verification and correction of incorrect or inaccurate broadcasts.

\* \* \* \* \*

Recent Trends

Moscow's campaign to outlaw war propaganda had begun as a single-issue effort to insulate the USSR (and later its East European allies) from "hostile" radio transmissions from the West. By 1970, this campaign had evolved to encompass the prohibition of religious and racial hatred, respect for national sovereignty, and the protection of public order and health--all technically peripheral to the principle of free flow of information but of considerable political interest to developing nations just entering the realm of international politics.

During the 1970s, Moscow actively solicited support from Third World nations, which increasingly found it possible to set aside political and ideological differences in order to lobby jointly for their own interests. A coalition of nonaligned nations emerged, demanding changes in what was perceived as an imbalance in the international operation of communications networks and their programming and technical and administrative functioning. The coalition activists aimed in particular to:

- counter the influence of the international mass media on their domestic cultures and traditional values;
- eliminate both their dependence on Western information systems and the growing consumer expectations from exposure to Western media; and
- enhance their own ability to disseminate information internally and abroad.

These demands, along with various other Third World and Soviet proposals, sharply politicized the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) conferences of the 1970s. By 1976, a conference of nonaligned nations called for the establishment of a "new order" for communications. They formally summarized their demands in 1978 in a document titled "The New World Information Order" (NWIO)<sup>1/</sup>. At the 1980 UNESCO General Conference, the USSR, together with several Third World states:

<sup>1/</sup> See INR Report 1458, "The New World Information Order at UNESCO's Belgrade General Conference," September 15, 1980, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE, and Report 444-AR, "The ITU Confronts Its Future: The Politics of International Telecommunications at Nairobi," August 9, 1982, CONFIDENTIAL.

- proposed an assortment of NWIO initiatives calling for legal measures to ensure that international news agencies conform to local national laws and development policies (some of these initiatives were approved in a conference resolution), and
- advocated the right by all states to rebut "inaccurate" or "malicious" reporting.

Moscow has since promoted the NWIO concept vigorously, exploiting Third World grievances to the detriment of Western interests while soliciting Third World support for the principle of noninterference in internal affairs of states and the sovereignty of states over the free flow of information.

The Soviets may well choose to surface the war propaganda issue when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review conference opens in Madrid November 9, 1982, in responding to Western criticism of Soviet activities vis-a-vis Poland and Afghanistan. Indeed, an October 27, 1982, Moscow Radio commentary listing alleged US violations of the Helsinki Final Act specifically mentioned US "radio calls for the overthrow of legitimate governments."

#### Background to the 1936 Convention

As radio developed into a global medium and the major instrument for international dissemination of information, the Soviet Union turned increasingly to broadcasting in its propagandizing to Europe and Asia. Given the relatively small number of private radio receivers in the USSR, the effects of foreign broadcasting on the Soviet population was of little concern to the regime until the Nazi propaganda campaigns of the mid- to late-1930s. That development, together with sharpening Nazi-Soviet political rivalry, provided the impetus for the USSR to seek international restraints on the flow of information by radio into the Soviet Union.

In September 1931, the League of Nations Assembly requested member states to encourage the use of broadcasting to create better understanding between peoples; the Intellectual Cooperation Organization (ICO), an educational and humanitarian agency of the League, was designated to examine the issue. The ICO in turn established an International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), a body composed of eminent scholars whose task was to draft an appropriate international convention. By 1935, the ICIC twice had submitted a draft convention to League members and nonmember states and twice had revised it in accordance with their proffered amendments. In September 1935, the League Assembly approved a resolution to convene an Inter-Governmental Conference

for the conclusion of a "Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace." The conference was held in Geneva, September 17-23, 1936, under the presidency of Arnold Raestad, former Norwegian Foreign Minister. <sup>2/</sup>

The resultant convention was signed on September 23, 1936, by 27 nations including Albania, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Romania, and the USSR. It was registered with the League Secretariat and entered into force April 2, 1938.

### Provisions

The essential provisions of the convention prohibit the transmission of war propaganda or any broadcast likely to prejudice "good international understanding." In addition, Article 7 established an arbitration and conciliation procedure in the event of a dispute between the contracting parties as to the interpretation or application of the convention. This article provided for settlement by diplomatic negotiation or, failing that, by a reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to the Hague Arbitration Tribunal. The parties may also use a preliminary conciliation procedure involving recourse to the ICIC. For this purpose the ICIC would set up a special committee.

The remaining eight articles cover provisions for signature, ratification, accession, registration, entry into force, denunciation, application, and revision. (See Annex 1 for text of the convention's substantive articles.)

The Final Act of the conference included several recommendations for the extension of the scope of the convention. The conference noted that the convention itself involved no obligations "save as regards acts of manifest gravity" and did not expressly list all categories of broadcasts likely to be prejudicial to good international relations. It accordingly recommended that the contracting parties:

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<sup>2/</sup> All League member states were invited to attend, as were Brazil, Costa Rica, the Free City of Danzig, Egypt, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the United States (all nonmembers). In all, 37 countries sent representatives: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Estonia, Latvia, and Siam sent observers. (Italy subsequently withdrew from the conference.)

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- take into account the influence that may be exercised by transmissions calculated to harm the interests or offend the national, political, religious, or social sentiments of other peoples;
- show particular vigilance in regard to transmissions intended for foreign listeners in the latter's vernacular;
- reserve time in their broadcasting programs for items calculated to promote a better knowledge of the civilization and conditions of life of other peoples;
- take concerted action at times of international tension to broadcast appropriate transmissions calculated to lessen the strain and restore a peaceful atmosphere; and
- lend one another support, if occasion arises, in detecting and abolishing clandestine stations.

The Final Act was signed by 29 nations including Albania, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR.

#### Soviet Reservations to the 1936 Convention

Article 7 of the convention calls for the "satisfactory settlement through diplomatic channels" of disputes "regarding the interpretation or application" of its provisions. The USSR, an international pariah in the inter-war years, had formal diplomatic relations with few states and, therefore, made its signature to the convention conditional on two reservations:

- It reserved the right to apply "reciprocal measures" to any country carrying out "improper transmissions" against it, insofar as such a right existed under the general rules of international law.
- It stipulated that the convention "should be regarded as not creating formal obligations" between states that did not maintain diplomatic relations. The USSR contended that such states would be unable to enforce Article 7 of the convention.

When the USSR Supreme Soviet ratified the convention, it evidently did so with these original reservations intact. (See Annex 2 for the text of the reservations.)

#### Rationale for Ratification

Writing in Izvestiya September 27, 1982, Soviet Doctor of History Yuriy Kashlev discussed the 1936 convention under the

headline "A Timely Theme: Radio Broadcasting in the Service of the People." According to Kashlev, ratification was "timely" because "imperialist" propaganda, notably that of the United States, used radio broadcasting "as the main instrument of 'psychological warfare' and subversive interference in the internal affairs of other nations." The volume of RFE/RL, claimed Kashlev, "exceeds by many times the volume of radio propaganda of pre-World War II Germany and Italy." He argued that the convention was consistent with the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and in the "current international situation is more timely than at any point in the past."

Kashlev's explanation for the sudden Soviet ratification of a 46-year-old convention is consistent with recent Soviet propaganda on the alleged role of "subversive" US radio broadcasting. This has included vitriolic attacks on RFE/RL's alleged exploitation of the Polish crisis, severe criticism of the US Information Agency and "Project Truth," and repeated polemics on what Moscow alleges is a US "ideological offensive" against the USSR.

#### Soviet Domestic Legislation

The USSR "Law in Defense of Peace," published in Pravda on March 13, 1951, and applicable today--decrees that war propaganda is the "gravest crime against humanity" and that persons found guilty of spreading such propaganda shall be "tried as heinous criminals." Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, Moscow referred constantly to this legislation as evidence of the USSR's commitment to the cause of peace and understanding between peoples. Indeed, as late as 1961, Moscow submitted a memorandum to the UN in which it asserted that war propaganda was one of the most "heinous crimes" because it ultimately would bring death to millions. (See Annex 3 for the text of the Soviet Law.)

#### Postwar Initiatives

With the onset of the Cold War, the West intensified its broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe significantly and also succeeded in getting UN social and economic bodies as well as other international fora to enact a number of resolutions and conventions supporting the principle of free flow of information across international borders.

Moscow sought to counter these Western initiatives by:

- proposing in UN disarmament bodies prohibitions on the international transmission of "war propaganda," as defined in the 1936 convention, usually as part of broader peace and disarmament packages that ultimately were rejected; and by

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- promoting collateral action in UN social and economic bodies with somewhat more success. (Together with its allies, the USSR managed to have several UN documents drafted in these bodies include sections that it now cites in support of restricting the flow of information.)

### The Disarmament Context

On September 18, 1947, at the 84th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly (and the first UNGA session following enunciation of the Truman Doctrine), the Soviet delegation introduced a resolution on "Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War" as the agenda item of "greatest concern" to the USSR. The draft resolution alleged that criminal propaganda for a new war was being carried on in the US, Turkey, and Greece via the dissemination of "all types of fabrications" in the press, radio, cinema, and public speeches. It sought to have the UN declare that all governments should be called upon to prohibit war propaganda in any form "on pain of criminal penalties" and to take measures for its suppression as antisocial activity. In essence the Soviet resolution charged that:

- "reactionary circles" in a number of countries, "particularly in the United States, Greece and Turkey," were carrying on an organized campaign for war against the Soviet Union, using lies, slander, and incitement to aggression;
- this war propaganda was designed to support US military preparations; and
- US monopolies and cartels, closely linked to the German trusts before the war and subsequently engaged in reestablishing their connections, were resisting attempts to outlaw the manufacture of atomic weapons and reduce armaments generally.

After 20 days of debate over the Soviet draft, the UNGA at its 108th plenary (November 8, 1947) unanimously adopted Resolution 110 (II), which condemned "all forms of propaganda" that would "provoke or encourage" a "threat to peace" or an "act of aggression." The resolution also requested all UN members to take acts "within their constitutional limits" to "promote friendly relations among nations." (See Annex 4 for the text of Resolution 110 (II).)

On October 23, 1950, the Soviets introduced another draft resolution on the condemnation of war propaganda, this time combined with a prohibition on atomic weapons and one-third reduction of great-power forces. The resolution established what would become the standard Soviet peace and disarmament "package"



with the call for prohibiting war propaganda subsumed in a broader initiative. In contrast to the September 1947 Soviet draft resolution, this one was less bellicose in tone:

"The General Assembly condemns the propaganda in favor of a new war now being conducted in a number of countries and urges all states to prohibit such propaganda in their countries and calls those responsible to account."

The entire 1950 draft resolution was rejected by the General Assembly November 17, 1950. The UNGA did, however, pass a "Condemnation of Propaganda Against Peace" resolution that same day reaffirming previous resolutions (110 (II)) and declaring that propaganda against peace included incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression, measures tending to isolate peoples from any contact with the world, and measures tending to silence or distort UN activities in favor of peace or to prevent peoples from knowing the views of other member states.

On September 24, 1953, the Soviets introduced in the UNGA's eighth session a draft resolution titled "Measures to Avert the Threat of a New World War and to Reduce Tension in International Relations," apparently in response to Secretary of State Dulles' September 17 address to the General Assembly on limiting armaments. The Soviet resolution asked the Assembly to:

- declare atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction to be "unconditionally prohibited" (by force of the declaration alone);
- recommend to the five permanent members of the Security Council that they reduce their armed forces by one-third within a year; and
- recommend to the Security Council that it take steps to insure the elimination of military, air, and naval bases in the territories of other states.

The Soviet draft also included a provision condemning war propaganda:

"The General Assembly condemns the propaganda which is being conducted in a number of countries with the aim of inciting enmity and hatred among nations and preparing a new world war, and calls upon all governments to take measures to put a stop to such propaganda, which is incompatible with the fundamental purposes and principles of the United Nations."

In a paragraph-by-paragraph vote November 30, the General Assembly rejected all the operative paragraphs, and the resolution as a whole was not put to a vote.

On May 10, 1955, the USSR put forward a proposal titled "Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of Atomic Weapons, and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War." It abandoned previous Soviet insistence on one-third across-the-board reductions and called for cessation of nuclear weapons tests as part of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The proposal charged for the first time that the terms of Resolution 110 (II) were not being observed; that "open propaganda" for a new war was being carried on in a number of states; and that "calls to war," including atomic war, had become increasingly frequent in the press, on the radio, and in public statements with a view to "fanning" war hysteria. The first clause in the proposal dealt with war propaganda:

"The General Assembly recommends to all States to take the necessary measures to ensure scrupulous compliance with General Assembly resolution 110 (II), condemning all forms of propaganda for a new war and to put an end to all calls for war and for the kindling of hostility between peoples in the press, on the radio, in the cinema and in public statements. Non-compliance with this recommendation shall be regarded as a violation by a State of its international duty and of its obligations to the United Nations, namely, to abstain in its international relations from the threat or the use of force and not to permit violations of the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

The proposal as a whole was never voted on by the Disarmament Subcommittee. (Soviet Premier Bulganin, at the Warsaw Conference of the Eastern European States at which the Warsaw Pact was established, reiterated the substance of this latest war propaganda clause on May 11, 1955.)

On April 30, 1957, another Soviet memorandum on "Implementation of Partial Disarmament Measures" was submitted to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. This one called for a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and requested that all states concerned "make every effort" to agree to the complete prohibition of such weapons. The ninth proposed measure contained in the memorandum treated the issue of war propaganda:

"Propaganda for war and incitement to war, and especially the propaganda carried on in certain countries for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against certain States, are playing no small part in straining relations between States and kindling animosity and hatred between peoples.

"The resolution on the prohibition of propaganda for war, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947, is not being observed. Only the Soviet Union and some other

States have passed legislation against propaganda for war. The absence of such legislation in other countries creates a favorable soil for fanning militarist passions and war hysteria. To ease international tensions and lessen the danger of war, appropriate measures should be taken to put an end to propaganda for war.

"It is also inadmissible that in certain States the ideological struggle is being allowed to enter into relations between States. To end a situation in which ideological disputes and differences are used as a means for straining relations between States, there is urgent need for an agreement under which States would undertake not to allow their ideological differences to enter into relations between States."

A declaration on measures for "strengthening universal peace and the security of the peoples," was appended to the Soviet memorandum and reiterated its main points. Moscow's line on "peaceful coexistence," as enunciated by Khrushchev at the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, was reaffirmed by the declaration:

"THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS DECLARATION,

"Taking into account that, in spite of the General Assembly resolution adopted unanimously in 1947 condemning all forms of propaganda 'designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression', a number of States openly continue to conduct propaganda for a new war, and the incitement to war, so far from being halted, is even intensified in the press, in broadcasts, and in public statements, with a particular preponderance in recent times of appeals for atomic war,...

"Assume an obligation to take the necessary measures to put an end to incitement to war and to all forms of war propaganda intended or likely to provoke or encourage a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression; and

"To found their relations with all the countries of the world on the principle of peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their social systems, and to take in accordance with this principle appropriate measures to prevent ideological conflict from entering into relations between States."

On August 25, 1957, Soviet Ambassador to the UN Valerian Zorin again addressed the issue of war propaganda in a statement

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criticizing the UN Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for lack of progress on "ending" the arms race:

"The Soviet Government considers that attention must now be devoted to the implementation of measures which would contribute towards the easing of international tension, would promote cooperation among States and the development of economic and cultural links, and would help to do away with commercial discrimination. The prohibition of war propaganda, particularly of propaganda regarding the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against particular countries, could do much to improve relations among States. The resolution prohibiting war propaganda adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 is not being carried out. Laws prohibiting war propaganda have been passed only in the Soviet Union and in a few other countries. The absence of such laws in the other countries leaves the field clear for the dissemination of militaristic moods, enmity and hatred among peoples. Suitable measures to put a stop to war propaganda are called for in order to ease international tension and lessen the threat of war."

On September 20, 1957, just 10 days before the Disarmament Commission was to meet to prepare its annual report to the General Assembly and Security Council, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko submitted a new Soviet memorandum on "Partial Measures in the Field of Disarmament." Essentially a restatement of the April 30 proposals, the memorandum inter alia specifically called on "certain states" to enact legislation, as the USSR had done, to prohibit war propaganda:

"In the Soviet Government's proposals for partial measures in the field of disarmament submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, it was stated that the war propaganda and incitement to war conducted in certain countries, especially propaganda for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against any given State, plays an important part in aggravating international relations and spreading hostility and hatred among nations. In those proposals, the attention of countries represented in the Sub-Committee was drawn to the non-observance by certain States of the General Assembly resolution of 1947 on the prohibition of war propaganda and also to the fact that the absence of legislation against war propaganda in many countries creates favorable conditions for the fomenting of militaristic attitudes and a war psychosis.

"Unfortunately, the countries represented in the Sub-Committee disregarded the Soviet Government's proposals

on this subject, and unbridled war propaganda is still being conducted in those countries and in a number of others.

"And yet the cessation of war propaganda, including propaganda for atomic war, might play a considerable part in improving relations between States and relaxing international tensions.

"The Soviet Government considers that war propaganda must be brought to an end, by the enactment of appropriate legislation in certain States, as has been done in the Soviet Union and other countries, and by adopting other measures for the prevention of such propaganda."

Soviet Premier Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on December 10, 1957, also picked up the war propaganda theme:

"The last ten years have been characterized by the policy of 'a position of strength' and 'cold war' proclaimed by certain circles in the West.

"During all these years the minds of men in the West have been poisoned by intensive propaganda, which, day after day, has implanted the thought of the inevitability of a new war and the necessity of intensified preparations for war. This propaganda for war, which contributed not a little toward aggravating the international situation and undermining confidence in the relations between states, is one of the chief elements of the policy of 'a position of strength.'

"Today the entire world is witness to the fact that this policy has not produced any positive results, even for those powers which have for such a long time and so insistently been following it, and which have confronted mankind with the threat of a new war, the terrible consequences of which would exceed anything that can be pictured by the human imagination.

"It is not by accident that the voices in the world which call for an end to propaganda for war, an end to the 'cold war', an end to the unrestrained armaments race and an entry upon the path of peaceful coexistence of all states are becoming louder and louder. The idea of peaceful coexistence is becoming more and more an imperative demand of the historical moment through which we are passing."

On May 5, 1958, the Soviet delegation to the UN introduced a memorandum titled "Proposals as to Questions to be Considered at the Conference with Participation of the Heads of Government." The document was a followup to a January 8, 1958, Soviet proposal

for a high-level conference of top government officials, together with the participation of heads of government, to "discuss issues the settlement of which would promote the easing of international tension and the creation of trust in relations between states." The May 5 memorandum reiterated the call for a summit meeting and proposed several topics of discussion, among them the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, creation in central Europe of an atomic-free zone, and the cessation of propaganda "for war, hostility and hatred between peoples."

"Notwithstanding the fact that ten years have already passed since the adoption in October 1947 of the resolution of the UN General Assembly on the banning of propaganda for war, this unanimous resolution of the Assembly is not being implemented in a number of countries. The idea of inevitability of a new war is being continually suggested to the peoples of these countries in the press, by radio and television, and by other means; the necessity of a race in nuclear armaments and of a further increase in military budgets and taxes on the population is being urged.

"There is no doubt that, with good will and a mutual desire on the part of all participants in the summit conference, it would not be difficult to reach an understanding on the question of ceasing propaganda for war and carrying on instead a propaganda for friendship among peoples.

"A settlement of this question could be achieved by means of the adoption of a joint declaration whereby the governments participating in the conference would confirm their intention to carry out faithfully the resolution of the UN General Assembly of October 1947 on the banning of all kinds of propaganda for war inimical to the cause of peace and mutual understanding and would undertake to adopt effective measures for the suppression of such propaganda in their own countries."

On September 18, 1958, the USSR published a detailed memorandum on "Measures in the Field of Disarmament" transmitted to the President of the UN General Assembly by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. It urged inter alia the banning of the use of outer space for military purposes, the reduction of foreign troops stationed in Germany and in other European states, and the prohibition of war propaganda:

"The propaganda of war and incitement to war conducted in certain countries, especially agitation for the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons against certain States, poisons relations between States and helps to spread enmity and hatred among the nations. The cessation of war propaganda,

including agitation for atomic war, would play an important part in improving relations between States and in clearing the international atmosphere.

"The Soviet Government believes that war propaganda and the fomenting of hostility among nations must be brought to an end both through the enactment of appropriate legislation by States, as has been done in the Soviet Union and some other countries, and through the adoption of other measures for the cessation of such propaganda."

On September 18, 1959, Soviet Premier Khrushchev outlined to the UN General Assembly the "most important" measures to be taken to strengthen international security and asserted that the USSR's disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955, constituted a "sound basis" for agreement on the subject.

The following day, September 19, 1959, a "Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament" was submitted for consideration by the UN General Assembly. It outlined a three-stage disarmament program that ultimately would result in the "destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles." Also included as an element of this general disarmament initiative was a proposal calling for:

"The prohibition by law of war propaganda and the military education of young people, and the enactment of legislation prescribing severe penalties for the infringement of any of the measures enumerated above."

On the evening of August 30, 1961, the USSR announced its resumption of nuclear weapons tests, alleging that the measures taken by the Western powers after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis had raised the danger of war. (Testing resumed September 1.) It was against this backdrop that on September 26, 1961, one day after President Kennedy's presentation before the UN General Assembly of a new set of US disarmament proposals, the USSR submitted to the UN a memorandum on "Measures to Ease International Tension, Strengthen Confidence Among States, and Contribute to General and Complete Disarmament." The proposed measures included a freeze on military budgets, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and the prohibition of war propaganda:

"All States could make an important contribution towards improving the international atmosphere by jointly advocating the cessation of all types of propaganda for war or enmity and hatred among nations."

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"Although as far back as 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution banning war propaganda, that resolution is still not being observed in many countries. It is no secret that in the press, on radio and television, and in the public statements by prominent personalities in certain countries the idea of the inevitability of war is being systematically propounded, the nuclear arms race is being justified, and feelings of hatred and enmity towards other nations are being kindled.

"As we know, various attitudes are taken towards such propaganda. In some countries it is regarded virtually as an expression of freedom of speech. We, on the other hand, call a spade a spade and regard incitement to war, even when it takes a disguised form, as one of the most heinous crimes, since it seriously undermines confidence in relations among States, contributes to the acceleration of military preparations and increases the danger of war, which would bring death to millions upon millions of humans beings.

"But whatever view one may take of war propaganda, one fact remains clear, namely, that such propaganda impedes the establishment of peaceful relations among States. If steps were taken everywhere to put an end to such propaganda not just one country, but all countries and all peoples would benefit.

"Various steps might be taken to prevent such propaganda. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have enacted special legislation prohibiting war propaganda. Similar action might be taken in other countries as well. The adoption of a joint declaration or statement calling for the cessation of war propaganda, which is inimical to the cause of peace and understanding among peoples, would be of great political importance."

On October 31, 1961, the Soviets released in advance extracts from the CPSU program that eventually were adopted at the 22nd CPSU Party Congress the following year. They included a call for the "discontinuance of the 'cold war' and the propaganda of enmity and hatred among the nations."

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) meeting in Geneva in 1962 selected a Soviet proposal on the cessation of war propaganda as the first item to be deliberated by its Committee of the Whole (set up to consider collateral measures for the reduction of international tension). By May 25, 1962, the Committee had unanimously approved ad referendum a draft declaration against war propaganda on which the US and USSR delegates,



taking into consideration the views of other ENDC members, had agreed. According to the pertinent portion of that draft:

"The Governments of the States participating in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva:

"...Recognizing that war propaganda, meaning propaganda in whatsoever form or country conducted which can provoke or encourage a threat to or breach of the peace, is incompatible with the United Nations Charter and can lead to acts of aggression and war;

"Recognizing that an end to such propaganda could facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament;

"(1) Solemnly affirm their support for the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (110 (II)) which condemned 'all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression';

"(2) Condemn appeals for war and for the settlement of disputes between states by the use of force, and also statements to the effect that war is necessary or inevitable;

"(3) Affirm their conviction that in our day war can no longer serve as a method of settling international disputes, and their desire to educate the younger generation in this conviction and to promote the ideas of peace, mutual respect and understanding among peoples;

"(4) Undertake to promote by every means at their disposal the widest possible circulation of news, ideas and opinions conducive to the strengthening of peace and friendship among peoples, and to extend cultural, scientific and educational relations with a view to better dissemination of the ideas of peaceful and friendly cooperation among states, and general and complete disarmament;

"(5) Call upon all states to adopt, within the limits of their constitutional systems, appropriate practical measures, including measures in a legislative form in the case of states which consider such form appropriate, with a view to giving effect to this declaration against war propaganda;

"(6) Call upon all other states to support this declaration."

Four days later, however, on May 29, the USSR representative at a plenary session of the conference sharply reversed the Soviet position and refused to approve the draft declaration. Ambassador Zorin's rejection of the agreed draft was in the form of a Soviet Government statement proposing highly propagandistic amendments that obviously would be unacceptable to the West. The Soviet Union proposed inter alia that statements expressing advocacy of preventive nuclear war be branded as war propaganda and indicated that it regarded a remark ascribed to President Kennedy by Stewart Alsop in the March 31 Saturday Evening Post as being in this category. (The Soviet interpretation of this article ignored its context--i.e., possible first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a massive Soviet attack with conventional forces--as well as the White House clarification on that point issued a few days after the article appeared.)

The USSR also proposed an amendment condemning alleged West German "revanchism" and advocacy of revision of European frontiers, another amendment branding as war propaganda statements urging the use of force against national liberation movements, and still another calling on parties to the declaration to take legislative action within six months. (The Soviet Union and other bloc states that already had pro forma laws against war propaganda on their books would have been exempt from this requirement.) The Soviet amendments were rejected and the entire initiative eventually was dropped from discussion.

The Soviet turnabout apparently was directed by high-level party officials in Moscow who overruled Foreign Ministry acceptance of the May 25 agreement in Geneva. The immediate reason for the party's decision was domestic: Moscow was preparing to explain to the Soviet population a rise in the price of meat and butter slated for June 1. Because of the threat of nuclear war, the Soviets claimed that spending for defense could not be reduced and the consumers would therefore have to bear the burden of increased investments in agriculture. Announcement of a formal agreement with the West which implied progress at the disarmament talks and improved relations with the US would have undercut the party's case.

#### Collateral Soviet Efforts

Throughout the post-war years, the USSR and its allies were significantly more successful in the social, economic, and specialized bodies of the UN than in its political and disarmament organs in their efforts to restrict the flow of "hostile" information. They were able to insert into many resolutions and documents produced by these bodies passages barring, condemning, or otherwise restricting information that incited to war; advocated national, racial, and religious hatred or violence; or infringed

on national sovereignty. Similarly, Moscow succeeded on occasion in having documents couched in terms of intent rather than obligation and on having them include requirements that information from a foreign source be subject to national laws and customs.

The USSR was able to accept the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights--whose Article 19 asserts the right of everyone "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"--by maintaining that this article referred only to personal freedom and the right to express an individual opinion, not to the spreading of "mass information" that could harm relations between countries and peoples.

The alleged evils of capitalist control over the international mass media emerged early as a major Soviet theme in UN consultations. During the 1946 debates on the UN Declaration on Freedom of Information and those in 1947 on the UN resolution condemning all forms of propaganda, the Soviets argued that true freedom of information could not exist as long as the international media were controlled by what Moscow described as small groups of capitalists.

Moscow used this theme at the 1948 UN Conference on Freedom of Information, insisting that the concept of freedom of the press was an unrealistic abstraction. Uncontrolled freedom of information only led to a concentration of power over the mass media in the hands of a few, and the abuse of such freedom worked to the detriment of the majority. The conference adopted a document containing language on controlling those flows of information considered in violation of national security (and only those). The Soviets subsequently used that formula to justify their censorship of foreign press and radio, even though the UN never officially adopted the conference document. 3/

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3/ During these early postwar years the USSR increased its international broadcasting nearly threefold while the United States--through the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty--and Britain--through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)--expanded their own broadcasting to Soviet and East European audiences. In the competition for control over the allotment of international frequencies, Moscow proposed at the 1948 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Conference that frequencies be allocated on a basis that took into account a country's area, population, and number of official languages. The formula would have given Moscow the greatest allotment and greatly reduced the West's share. When its plan was not accepted, Moscow in 1949 began a massive jamming of all British and US broadcasts which lasted, with a few sporadic interruptions, until 1963 following signature of the US-Soviet "hotline" agreement and the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

During the 1960s, the UN adopted several documents that the Soviets have since cited to support their position for controls over the international information flow. (They have also insisted on inserting reference to these documents in various international agreements involving communication issues.)

- The 1965 International Convention on Liquidating All Forms of Racial Discrimination declares illegal any propaganda based on ideas or theories of racial superiority.
- The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which the Soviets did not sign until 1973) provides in Article 19 for limitations by a country of the individual's right to express freely his opinion when that is necessary to guarantee "respect of the rights and reputation of others" and "the protection of national security or of public order... or of public health." Article 20 of the Covenant also condemns incitement to war, the advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred and any form of discrimination, hostility, or violence.
- The 1963 UN Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space include references to the November 8, 1947, UN Resolution condemning propaganda against peace.

Prepared by David Hertzberg  
x29120

Approved by Martha Mautner  
x29536

Annex 1

The substantive articles of the 1936 Convention read as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their respective territories of any transmission which to the detriment of good international understanding is of such a character as to incite the population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order or the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure that transmissions from stations within their respective territories shall not constitute an incitement either to war against another High Contracting Party or to acts likely to lead thereto.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if occasion arises, to stop without delay within their respective territories any transmission likely to harm good international understanding by statements the incorrectness of which is or ought to be known to the persons responsible for the broadcast.

They further mutually undertake to ensure that any transmission likely to harm good international understanding by incorrect statements shall be rectified at the earliest possible moment by the most effective means, even if the incorrectness has become apparent only after the broadcast has taken place.

Article IV

The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to ensure, especially in times of crisis, that stations within their respective territories shall broadcast information concerning international relations the accuracy of which shall have been verified--and that by all means in their power--by the persons responsible for broadcasting the information.

Article V

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to place at the disposal of the other High Contracting Parties, should they so

request, any information that, in his opinion, is of such a character as to facilitate the broadcasting, by the various broadcasting services, of items calculated to promote a better knowledge of the civilization and the conditions of life of his own country as well as the essential features of the development of his relations with other peoples and of his contribution to the organization of peace.

Article VI

In order to give full effect to the obligations assumed under the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to issue, for the guidance of governmental broadcasting services, appropriate instructions and regulations, and to secure their application by these services.

With the same end in view the High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to include appropriate clauses for the guidance of any autonomous broadcasting organizations, either in the constitutive charter of a national institution, or in the conditions imposed upon a concessionary company or in the rules applicable to other private concerns, and to take the necessary measures to ensure the application of these clauses.

Article VII

Should a dispute arise between the High Contracting Parties regarding the interpretation or application of the present Convention for which it has been found impossible to arrive at a satisfactory settlement through the diplomatic channel, it shall be settled in conformity with the provisions in force between the Parties concerning the settlement of international disputes.

In the absence of any such provisions between the Parties to the dispute, the said Parties shall submit it to arbitration or to judicial settlement. Failing agreement concerning the choice of another tribunal, they shall submit the dispute, at the request of one of them, to the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided they are all Parties to the Protocol of December 16th, 1920, regarding the Statute of the Court; or if they are not all Parties to the above Protocol, they shall submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal, constituted in conformity with the Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Before having recourse to the procedures specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the High Contracting Parties may, by common consent, appeal to the good offices of the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, which would be in a position to constitute a special committee for this purpose.

- III -

Annex 2

The USSR's reservations to the Convention read as follows:

"The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that, pending the conclusion of the procedure contemplated in Article 7 of the Convention, it considers that the right to apply reciprocal measures to a country carrying out improper transmissions against it, in so far as such a right exists under the general rules of international law and with the Conventions in force, is in no way affected by the Convention.

"The Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that its Government, while prepared to apply the principles of the Convention on a basis of reciprocity to all the Contracting States, is nevertheless of the opinion that certain of the provisions of the Convention presuppose the existence of diplomatic relations between the Contracting Parties, particularly in connection with the verification of information and the forms of procedure proposed for the settlement of disputes. Accordingly, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of the opinion that, in order to avoid the occurrence of differences or misunderstandings between the States Parties to the Convention which do not maintain diplomatic relations with one another, the Convention should be regarded as not creating formal obligations between such States."

Annex 3

Law in Defense of Peace

March 12, 1951

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the high principles of Soviet peace-loving policy which pursues the aims of strengthening the peace and of friendly relations between nations.

Recognizes that the conscience and sense of justice of the peoples, who suffered the calamities of two world wars in the course of one generation, cannot reconcile themselves to the impunity with which war propaganda is being conducted by aggressive circles of some states, and is in solidarity with the appeal of the Second World Peace Congress, which expressed the will of all mankind in regard to the prohibition and condemnation of criminal war propaganda.

The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees:

1. To consider that propaganda for war, regardless of the form in which it is carried out, undermines the cause of peace, creates a threat of a new war and because of this constitutes the gravest crime against humanity.
2. Persons guilty of propaganda for war shall be brought to trial and tried as heinous criminals.

President of the Presidium of the USSR  
Supreme Soviet, N. Shvernik.

Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR  
Supreme Soviet, A. Gorkin.

(Printed in Pravda, March 13, 1951, p. 1.

#### Annex 4

UN General Assembly Resolution 110 (II) adopted November 8, 1947,  
reads as follows:

"Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the people express their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

"Whereas the Charter also calls for the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of fundamental freedoms which include freedom of expression, all Members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate action for such observance of fundamental freedoms,

#### "The General Assembly

"1. Condemns all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

"2. Requests the Government of each member to take appropriate steps within its constitutional limits:



"(a) To promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes and Principles of the Charter;

"(b) To encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace;

"3. Directs that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information."

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File Soviet  
Propaganda

# Special Memorandum

Moscow on the Western Antinuclear Movement:  
Candor About the Battle for Public Opinion

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MOSCOW ON THE WESTERN ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT:  
CANDOR ABOUT THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION

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*Comments or questions on this memorandum may be directed to the  
Chief, Soviet Foreign Policy Branch, FBIS Analysis Group.*

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MOSCOW ON THE WESTERN ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT:

CANDOR ABOUT THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION

"There is not only a purely political East-West confrontation going on but also a battle for the hearts and minds of an enormous number of people, a propaganda battle as it is called."

--Aleksandr Bovin, Moscow Radio, 10 January 1983

I N T R O D U C T I O N

By Moscow's own admission, appeals to popular sentiment against nuclear weapons in the West are a central feature of current Soviet arms control strategy. Soviet officials view the growth of the antinuclear movement in the last two years as a major new development in East-West relations, serving to counterbalance what they see as a threatening shift in U.S. arms control and defense policies.\*

Soviet spokesmen have become increasingly bold in recent weeks in depicting the antinuclear movement in the West as a significant and enduring factor in East-West arms control issues. They openly concede that current Soviet policies have been calculated to promote this movement in Europe and, particularly, to influence the political climate in West Germany. An IZVESTIYA political observer predicted in early January, for example, that recent Soviet initiatives on intermediate-range missiles would give an "impetus to the already powerful antimissile movement" on the Continent. Aleksandr Bovin, who reportedly serves as a foreign policy adviser to Andropov, spoke candidly about a "battle for the hearts and minds of an enormous number of people" in a January radio broadcast, claiming that NATO leaders were losing the contest.

ANDROPOV'S ROLE

Moscow's recent candor about appealing to public sentiment in the West follows Yuriy Andropov's assumption of power last November and the new Soviet initiative on intermediate-range nuclear forces

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\* An earlier report on Soviet views of the antinuclear movement was published as FBIS Special Memorandum FB 82-10028, "The Soviet Posture on the Nuclear Freeze Movement," 23 November 1982.

- 2 -

(INF) that he announced on 21 December. Andropov alluded to the growing role of public sentiment on nuclear issues in a speech in April 1982 and again in his first major address following Brezhnev's death in November. His sensitivity to the battle for public opinion may have been reflected in the speed with which Moscow responded to President Reagan's open letter on INF after it was revealed by Vice President Bush during his 31 January speech in West Berlin. Within 24 hours of the speech Soviet media publicized Andropov's reaction to the letter in a PRAVDA "interview."

## FOCUS ON WEST GERMANY

Foreign Minister Gromyko's recent activities have highlighted Moscow's attention to West German opinion. His 16-19 January trip to Bonn featured an unusually open appeal for the West Germans to distance themselves from the United States: The FRG, he said in a press conference statement, should "display its own 'self,' be guided by its own interests, and not yield to foreign influences if they do not meet these interests. . . ." In a 24 February PRAVDA "interview" widely publicized abroad, Gromyko again sought to bolster European independence on the eve of the 6 March FRG elections. Soviet commentaries after the election claimed that the Kohl government would not be able to ignore forces in the country opposing missile deployment.

## U.S. ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT

While its attention is currently focused on the battle for European opinion, Moscow has been following the development of popular anti-nuclear sentiment in the United States as well. Openly pessimistic about the prospects for arms control agreements with the Reagan Administration, Soviet officials appear to believe that popular sentiment in the United States is building against U.S. foreign and defense policies, opening the prospect of favorable changes in the months ahead. Influential Soviet spokesmen have claimed that the November 1982 midterm elections demonstrated the strength of the antinuclear movement and predicted that the new Congress will be more dovish on defense and arms control issues. Vitaliy Kobysh, a prominent member of the Central Committee's International Information Department, asserted in late January that the Reagan Administration was "showing signs of movement" and would eventually respond to the antiwar feelings of the "overwhelming majority" of Americans in an effort to retain control of the White House.

- 3 -

SELECTED SOVIET COMMENT ON THE ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT  
(NOVEMBER 1982 - MARCH 1983)

## LEADERSHIP STATEMENTS

General Secretary Andropov, 22 November speech to CPSU Central Committee plenum (PRAVDA, 23 November 1982):

Today, as never before, the peoples come to the forefront of history. They have gained the right to have their say, and their voice will not be muffled by anyone. They are capable of removing, by vigorous and purposeful actions, the threat of nuclear war, safeguarding peace and hence life on this planet. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state will do everything possible that this should be so.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, article on Soviet foreign policy (KOMMUNIST, No. 18, December 1982):

The high tide of the antiwar movement is mounting everywhere today. This movement, represented both by broad spontaneous actions by the popular masses and conscious activities of various political parties and organizations, has become so weighty a factor and assumed so wide a scale as to be producing a telling effect on the international situation. And even those capitals in which militaristic trends still dominate in official circles and which wager on a "position of strength" policy cannot help but take this into account.

Warsaw Pact Political Declaration (PRAVDA, 7 January 1983):

Political parties, organizations, and movements of different ideological persuasions in the west and east and north and south are raising their voices against the arms race and the incitement of armed conflicts. Millions of ordinary people on all continents stage massive antiwar demonstrations to express their desire for peace.

The forces of peace are stronger than the forces of war. Everything depends on their cohesion and the purposefulness of their actions.

Andropov, response to President Reagan's "open letter" (PRAVDA, 2 February 1983):

First of all, I must say quite definitely that there is nothing new in President R. Reagan's proposal. What it is all about--and this all the world's news agencies have immediately taken note of--is the same "zero option." That it is patently unacceptable to the Soviet Union now is already generally recognized. Really, can one seriously speak about a proposal according to which the Soviet Union would have to scrap unilaterally all its medium-range missiles, while the United States and its NATO allies would retain all their nuclear weapons of this category.

Gromyko, answers to questions (PRAVDA, 24 February 1983):

One should think West European states have no right to play the role of outside observers, even less that of popularizers of the present U.S. stand. West Europe can have its say in favor of a just solution to the problem of medium-range nuclear means, in favor of peace. And this would be an indicator of the political maturity of the stands of these countries.

#### MEDIA COMMENTARY

Political observer Aleksandr Bovin (IZVESTIYA, 1 January 1983):

Obviously, the scale of the antiwar movement that seized first West Europe and then the United States was bound to affect the situation in Washington. The November midterm elections showed a decline in the Administration's authority and influence. Congress is becoming more and more obstinate, as the MX missile story shows. . . .

All in all, I would venture the following conclusion: The isolation of Reagan and his policy is growing inside America itself and abroad.

Political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov (PRAVDA, 3 January 1983):

In the United States, West Europe, Japan--throughout the world--the past year was marked by the truly unprecedented upsurge of the antiwar, antinuclear movement. It united the



- 5 -

broadest social strata--trade union, women's, youth, and religious organizations, representatives of the political and business worlds, and figures of science and culture. U.S. history had never known mass demonstrations as imposing as the one staged last summer by the peace champions in New York, just as there had been no precedent for the demonstrations held in a number of West European capitals.

The growing awareness that the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe has become truly a life and death matter for mankind is becoming increasingly apparent not only in the feelings of the public but also in the positions of official circles.

Political observer Stanislav Kondrashov (IZVESTIYA, 8 January 1983):

The new Soviet initiative is one of those political actions whose impact is of a long-term nature. It can boldly be suggested that it will have a great influence on the shaping of the political climate in West Europe. . . . This initiative will lend a beneficial impetus to the already powerful anti-missile movement not least in West Germany, which is moreover entering a period of keen election struggle. . . .

Dishonest people allege that by its initiative Moscow is "maliciously" kindling the antimissile movement in West Europe. These are not new fabrications. . . . Of course Moscow is in favor of the antimissile movement developing, but surely this is not a malicious intention?!

Bovin (Moscow domestic radio, 10 January 1983):

There is not only a purely political East-West confrontation going on but also a battle for the hearts and minds of an enormous number of people, a propaganda battle, as it is called. This largely determines the nature of the reaction by the government, official statements by foreign ministers and other figures. It determines them, and they are very well aware that they are losing this battle for people's minds, that they have nothing with which to counter the logic and clarity of exposition that is to be found in the [Warsaw Pact's political] declaration.

Commentator Sergey Vishnevskiy (PRAVDA, 22 January 1983):

It is paradoxical but a fact that the current U.S. Administration's bellicose statements and militarist activeness have considerably helped the broad public circles on both sides of the Atlantic to acquire insight and to realize the need to suppress the growing danger of war. . . . Over 10 million Americans voted in referendums last November for a reciprocal freeze on the USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals. More opponents of militarization have been elected to the current Congress than to the previous one.

Pressure from the peace-loving forces has compelled U.S. diplomats to sit down at nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks.

Central Committee International Information Department official Vitaliy Kobysh (SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 27 January 1983):

I proceed from the premise that the current U.S. Administration is probably the most rightwing and reactionary one that America has known in the postwar years. But even it is showing signs of movement. R. Reagan has begun to talk of peace. Even given that it is merely a case of rhetoric, it is still interesting. But it seems to me that there is not only rhetoric here but also the desire to remain "afloat." The overwhelming majority of Americans are now against war. They are horrified at the mere idea of a possible nuclear catastrophe. To ignore that means to concede the White House to someone else, and that does not seem to form part of the plans of R. Reagan and his comrades in arms. In their blind anticommunism they have lost their reason but not their appetite. Regardless of their convictions, these people will have to take the voice of America into account.

Central Committee International Department official Vadim Zagladin (MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No. 2, 1983):

All the USSR's new ideas and proposals put forward to develop the peace program for the 1980's take full account of the position of the European public and of that section of the European and U.S. ruling circles that advocates peaceful development and relations built on principles of peaceful coexistence between states belonging to different social systems.

- 7 -

Kobysch (Soviet television, 26 February 1983):

I would particularly stress . . . the unprecedentedly extensive and influential antiwar and antinuclear movement that has developed in the world. This is a new phenomenon that we have not yet completely understood and that will manifest itself in the future. It is having an enormous influence on world affairs and particularly on the policies of Washington, the NATO countries, and generally all aggressive and reactionary circles.

Political observer Valentin Zorin (Soviet television, 26 February 1983):

We often talk about the peace movement. I think that at present it has reached a completely new stage throughout the world, particularly in the United States.

APN political observer Spartak Beglov (ARBEITER-ZEITUNG [Vienna], 10 March 1983):

The results of the election, however, by no means move the factor of antiwar sentiments in the West German political scene into the background; they are by no means an indication of any weakening of the mass opposition to the plans to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles. All public opinion polls conducted in the FRG during the past few months have shown that the number of those who agree to these plans is constantly declining.

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*File Sov propaganda*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FOIA(b)(1), (b)(3)

5 MAY 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Soviet Weapon Designers Denounce President's  
ABM Initiative

The attached memorandum

prominent Soviet scientists who denounced the President's ABM initiative in a letter to the New York Times. Many of the signatories of the letter are deeply involved in development of strategic weapons.

E. Wayne Boring

Director

Scientific and Weapons Research

Attachment:  
As stated


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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D. C. 20505

FOIA(b)(1), (b)(3)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

29 April 1983


SOVIET WEAPON DESIGNERS DENOUNCE PRESIDENT'S ABM INITIATIVE

Summary


A group of more than two hundred Soviet scientists signed a letter denouncing the President's ABM initiative of 23 March. The scientists denied that an effective ABM system could be created and declared themselves convinced that nuclear disarmament is the only way to attain true security. It is unlikely that this represents the true feelings of many of the scientists, since the list of signatories is an extraordinarily complete "rogues gallery" of Soviet designers and scientists doing advanced weapons research. The scientists are decrying the very kinds of activity for which they are responsible in the USSR; indeed, several are involved in developing precisely the types of BMD systems they denounce the President for advocating. In light of these facts, it is difficult to see the letter as other than a particularly hypocritical and self-serving example of Soviet propaganda.

*This memorandum was internally initiated in the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research (OSWR). It was prepared by  OSWR. This paper has been coordinated with the Office of Soviet Analysis, NIO/SP and NIO/USSR. Comments and enquiries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Development Programs Branch, OSWR,*

SW M #83-10029




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In a letter in the New York Times of 22 April, a large group of Soviet scientists denounced the creation of new ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems as called for in President Reagan's televised speech of 23 March. The Soviets, "basing ourselves on the knowledge which we as scientists have, and proceeding from our understanding of the very nature of nuclear weapons, ... declare in all responsibility that there are no effective defensive means in nuclear war, and their creation is practically impossible." Moreover, the scientists assert that the purpose of a BMD system cannot be truly defensive, because "Such a 'defensive' weapon offers practically nothing to a country that is the target of a sudden massive attack, as it is apparently unable to protect the overwhelming majority of its population."

They conclude by stating that "every scientist should honestly and clearly, guided by his knowledge and his conscience, declare where the world should go -- in the direction of creating new types of strategic weapons, which increase the danger of a mutually destructive conflict, or along the path of curbing the arms race and, subsequently, leading to disarmament. This is the historical moral duty of scientists to humankind. On our part, we are firmly convinced, and this conclusion has been made on the basis of a strict scientific analysis of all aspects of the problem that nuclear disarmament is the only way in which the states and peoples can ensure true security."


it is doubtless true that many of the signatories have considerable "understanding of the very nature of nuclear weapons." What is less apparent, however, is their commitment to turning away from creating new types of strategic weapons and onto the "path of curbing the arms race."




Given the occupations and interests of many of the letter's signatories, they obviously are not as committed to disarmament as their joint statement implies. Currently, the organizations headed by these scientists are expanding development efforts in strategic offensive and defensive weaponry.








SUBJECT: Soviet Weapon Designers Denounce President's ABM Initiative



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


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- 1 - P&PD
- 2 - OCR/SSG/DB
- 1 - OSWR Chrono
- 1 - OSD Chrono
- 1 - DPB Chrono
- 1 - C/BMB

DDI/OSWR/OSD/DPB [redacted] (2 May 83)

## SOVIET SCIENTISTS APPEAL TO ALL SCIENTISTS OF THE WORLD

"We are addressing this letter to all people of goodwill, above all to scientists, since never before has the task of preserving life and peace on Earth been given so high a priority. All who are clearly aware of the realities of our time understand the implications of the incessant stockpiling of death-carrying weapons and the creation of ever new, increasingly monstrous means of mass annihilation. The security of all peoples can be safeguarded by way of nuclear disarmament, through a series of purposeful agreements based on the undeniable principle of equality and equal security.

"In his speech on March 23, 1983, however, the U.S. President offered the American people another option — the creation of a new, gigantic anti-ballistic missile weapons system, allegedly of a purely defensive nature, placed on Earth and in outer space, which would allegedly ensure for the United States absolute security in the event of a world wide nuclear conflict.

"Basing ourselves on the knowledge which we as scientists have, and proceeding from our understanding of the very nature of nuclear weapons, we declare in all responsibility that there are no effective defensive means in nuclear war, and their creation is practically impossible.

"This option of ours fully accords with the authoritative and responsible statement by the presidents and representatives of 36 academies of sciences in various countries of the world, which was signed by, among others, representatives of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, the British Royal Society, Academie Francaise and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

"In actual fact, the attempt to create so-called 'defensive weapons' to counter the strategic nuclear force of the other side, which the U.S. President mentioned, will inevitably lead to the emergence of a new element strengthening the American first strike potential. It is not fortuitous that the practical actions by the U.S. administration are centered now on a crash

V.S. Avdeyevsky, A.G. Aganbeyan, N.V. Ageyev, M.I. Agonkov, A.D. Alexandrov, A.F. Alexandrov, I.P. Ailmam, Zh.I. Alterov, O.K. Antonov, V.A. Ambartsumyan, G.A. Arbatov, B.A. Arduzov, V.G. Afanasyev, Kh.S. Bagdasaryan, A.A. Baev, A.M. Baldin, V.P. Barmin, N.G. Basov, A.F. Belov, O.M. Belotserkovsky, D.K. Belyaev, S.T. Belyaev, R.A. Belyakov, N.P. Bekhtereva, N.N. Bloknin, N.M. Bogolyubov, O.T. Bogomolov, G.K. Borekov, N.A. Borisevich, A.S. Borovik-Romanov, A.A. Bochvar, A.E. Braunstein, L.M. Brekhovskikh, Yu.V. Bromlei, N.G. Bruevich, B.V. Bunkin, G.S. Byushgens, B.K. Vainshtein, N.A. Vatolin, E.P. Velikhov, V.S. Vladimirov, S.V. Vonsovsky, A.A. Voronov, B.M. Vul, O.G. Gazenko, A.V. Gaponov-Grekhov, D.M. Gvishiani, M.S. Gilyarov, V.L. Ginzburg, I.A. Glebov, V.P. Glusko, V.I. Goldansky, P.D. Grushin, N.D. Devyatkov, G.G. Devyatyn, B.A. Dolgoplosk, N.A. Dollezhal, A.A. Dorodnitsyn, N.M. Druzhinin, M.M. Dubinin, N.P. Dubinin, A.G. Yegorov, N.S. Yenikolopov, A.M. Yefimov, N.M. Zhavoronkov, B.P. Zhukov, S.N. Zhurkov, T.I. Zaslavskaya, G.T. Zatselin, Ya.B. Zeldovich, V.E. Zuev, A.V. Ivanov, L.F. Ilyichev, A.A. Imshenetsky, N.N. Isanin, A.Yu. Ishlinsky, M.I. Kabachnik, B.B. Kadomtsev, L.V. Kantorovich, P.L. Kapitza, B.M. Kedrov, L.V. Keldysh, I.K. Kikoin, M.P. Kim, V.A. Kirilin, S.T. Kishkin, I.L. Knunyants, Yu.B. Kobzarev, S.N. Kovalev, A.N. Kolmogorov, M.N. Kolosov, Ya.M. Kolotyrkin, A.N. Kononov, F.V. Konstantinov, V.A. Koptiyug, D.S. Korzhinsky, V.V. Korshak, P.G. Kostyuk, Yu.A. Kosygin, V.A. Kotelnikov, N.K. Kochetkov, P.Ya. Kochina, N.N. Krasovskiy, A.A. Krasnovskiy, E.M. Kreps, V.A. Kuznetsov, V.I. Kuznetsov, N.D. Kuznetsov, A.M. Kunaev, G.V. Kurdyumov, S.S. Kutateladze, E.M. Lavrenko, M.M. Lavrentyev, B.N. Laskorin, V.A. Legasov, L.M. Leonov, M.N. Livanov, V.P. Linnik, E.M. Lifshits, D.S. Likhachev, A.A. Logunov, A.M. Lyulka, V.A. Magnitsky, V.P. Makeyev, M.A. Markov, G.I. Marchuk, L.A. Melentyev, V.A. Mechnikov, P.I. Mechnikov, V.V. Manner, A.B. Migdal, A.A. Mikulin, A.G. Mileikovsky, Kh.M. Minachev, I.I. Mints, M.B. Mitin, A.A. Mikhailov, V.P. Mishin, E.N. Mishustin, Yu.N. Molin, A.D. Nadiradze, A.L. Narochnitsky, E.A. Negin, N.N. Nekrasov, Yu.E. Nesterikhin, M.V. Nechkina, G.A. Nikolaev, B.P. Nikolsky, S.M. Nikolsky, S.P. Novikov, V.V. Novozhilov, A.V. Novosylova, I.E. Obratsov, A.M. Obukhov, Yu.A. Ovchinnikov, T.I. Oizerman, Yu.A. Osipyan, B.E. Paton, A.V. Peive, G.I. Petrov, B.V. Petrovskiy, I.V. Petryanov-Sokolov, B.B. Piotrovskiy, A.V. Pogorelov, B.N. Ponomaryov, B.M. Pontecorvo, L.S. Poryagin, V.I. Popkov, E.M. Primakov, A.M. Prokhorov, Yu.V. Prokhorov, V.S. Pugachev, Yu.N. Rabotnov, G.A. Razuvaev, N.N. Remes-

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File Sov. propaganda

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TO: The Acting Secretary  
FROM: PM - Jonathan T. Howe  
SUBJECT: Soviet Proposal for Scientists' Meeting  
on Defensive Technology

Issue for Decision

How to respond to a Soviet proposal for a meeting of scientists to discuss the arms control implications of new defensive technology.

Background

Ambassador Dobrynin met with you on April 26, and presented a proposal for a meeting between Soviet and U.S. scientists to "discuss the consequences of creating a large-scale anti-ballistic defense system." Dobrynin indicated concern that plans to create an ABM system would be destabilizing and would stimulate the arms race, and suggested a meeting in late May or early June in Stockholm. A copy of the Soviet non-paper conveying their proposal is attached at Tab A.

Analysis of Options

The Soviet proposal appears to mark the beginning of a major propaganda campaign against the President's initiative on defense against ballistic missiles. U.S. newspapers recently carried an open letter from Soviet scientists appealing for the support of their Western colleagues in opposing development

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

of defensive strategic technology, and Andropov suggested a meeting between scientists during his Der Spiegel interview this weekend. The Soviets presumably hope to take advantage of scepticism within the U.S. scientific community about the feasibility of some schemes for defensive weapons in order to build opposition to the President's initiative. They most likely anticipate U.S. rejection of their proposal for a scientists' meeting, and will probably advertise any such rejection as further evidence of U.S. unwillingness to engage in serious arms control negotiations. Whether or not the U.S. concurs in a meeting the Soviets are likely to convene a conference of scientists, probably including U.S. critics of development of defensive systems, in order to focus opposition to our long-term effort in this area.

In responding to the proposal for a meeting of scientists, we should seek to minimize potential Soviet propaganda advantages. We should therefore not accept the Soviet suggestion as it was made, since the proposed meeting would lend respectability to Soviet criticisms of our publicly announced programs without any corresponding benefit to the U.S. Nor should we reject it out of hand and allow the Soviets to claim publicly that we are unwilling to discuss an important arms control issue. Instead, we believe that Ambassador Hartman should tell the Soviets that the implications of the development of defensive strategic technology extend beyond strictly scientific or technical issues. We would therefore be prepared to send a team, led by State

Department officials and including appropriate scientific and military experts, to Moscow or to host a meeting here to discuss the implications of defense against ballistic missiles. Such a meeting would be brief (1-2 days), confidential, and not result in communique in order to insure the seriousness of purpose of both sides. If the Soviets accept this proposal, we would anticipate that the team's talking points would follow guidance prepared following the President's recent speech.

In a cable from Moscow, Ambassador Hartman reports that the Soviets have stepped up their propaganda efforts by raising U.S. failure to respond to the Andropov invitation for a meeting of scientists in a press conference at the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He agreed that we should neither accept the Soviet offer as proposed, nor flatly reject it, and suggests the START negotiations as an appropriate forum for U.S.-Soviet discussions of this issue. We do not believe, however, that ballistic missile defense should be linked to START. We are not prepared to include limits on the development of defensive technology within our START proposals, and do not want to encourage Soviet initiatives along this line. Moreover, once raised at START, we would be obligated to accept an ongoing discussion which the Soviets would be free to manipulate in parallel with their propaganda.

We believe a proposal for an independent political consultation on the implications of defensive strategic technology offers the best hope of minimizing Soviet opportunities to mount an effective propaganda campaign against the President's initiative.



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MESSAGE NO. 600 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 5

FROM: Chill S/S 22540 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Memorandum to the President: My Meeting with Dobrynin June 18

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin, June 18, 1983

I met with Dobrynin for two-and-a-half hours Saturday, June 18, beginning and ending with private sessions, with a larger meeting in between.

My main point in the opening private session was that you continue to be willing to engage the Soviets in serious dialogue aimed at solving problems, and that the individual items we wished to discuss should be seen in that context. I would therefore be making various proposals designed to determine whether the Soviets are also prepared for such dialogue, but I wanted Dobrynin to understand that, from the point of view of U.S. policy, the whole is larger than the sum of these parts.

I also laid down two markers on regional issues:

-- As you had instructed, I emphasized that Soviet/Cuban activities in Central America, and in particular their support for Nicaragua and Nicaraguan activities and their arms shipments to the area were in our view "unfriendly acts." Dobrynin replied that Nicaragua is a small country that does not pose a threat to the U.S. I informed him that we thought otherwise, that I was not going to argue the point, but that the Soviet Union should understand our view.

-- On Lebanon, I reiterated that we wanted to see all foreign forces out of that country, and that the sooner they left, the sooner our MNF forces could also leave. I pointed out that there is a relationship between the role the MNF would have to play and the role of UNIFIL, thus making the point that if they are worried about the MNF they can help by extending the UNIFIL mandate. Dobrynin did not respond directly to this point, but did relate it in the third phase of our meeting to the Soviet view that we should have a genuine dialogue on developments in the Middle East.

In the larger meeting where Ken Dam, Larry Eagleburger, Rick Burt and Dobrynin's aides joined us, we discussed a number of specific points:

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On human rights, I touched on three issues:

-- I said we were following the progress of the Pentecostal families with their emigration applications very closely, and asked whether Dobrynin had any specific information; he replied that he had nothing official to say;

-- I said the Madrid conference is at a critical point, and we want a satisfactory conclusion. I noted that Max Kampelman's earlier discussions with the Soviets seemed to make progress, but more recently the Soviets had become intransigent, and improvements on human rights in the draft concluding document were needed.

-- I then raised the issues of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy, and Jewish emigration, noting I had seen a number of Jewish leaders this past week. Dobrynin responded merely that these were "internal matters."

I next went over the series of meetings the Western Allies have just completed -- the OECD Ministerial, the Williamsburg Summit, the NATO Defense and Foreign Ministerials. Here I stressed that these meetings demonstrated not only Western economic recovery and renewed growth that would be advantageous to other economies too, but also Western determination to maintain cohesion and unity on issues of security and East-West economic relations. Specifically on INF, they showed that behind our resolve to deploy, there is also a genuine desire to negotiate. The main point is that the West is strong and cohesive, on the one hand, and ready to negotiate, on the other.

Dobrynin said the Soviets had followed these meetings and read my Senate testimony last week, and the situation looks different to them. Economically, they see us as doing everything possible to cut off East-West trade (I said our objective relates to the security aspects of trade and in no sense implies a trade war with the Soviets). On the security side, the U.S. seems to want military power not for defense but for foreign policy, to impose its views on others. In reply, I repeated the main point that the West is determined to maintain its defenses, but also to lessen tensions and reduce armaments. That provided the context for further discussion of specific issues:

-- Ambassador Abramowitz joined us on MBFR, and I said we wished to respond to Andropov's answer to you in March. We agree that we should seek reductions through a process leading to parity as the ultimate outcome. This will mean asymmetrical reductions. We think the principal task is verifying reductions to equal levels, putting in place a verification system that

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will result in the capacity to ensure correct data. In other words, I said, we are prepared to defer the problem of prior agreement on data if we can agree on adequate verification procedures. If the Soviets agree to this approach, our Vienna negotiators can explore it privately.

Dobrynin said he would report back, but urged the small symbolic step of small U.S.-Soviet reductions first.

-- Ambassador Rowny joined us on START. Here I said we had made new decisions and would be putting our new proposal on the table, but the basic point is your desire for real give-and-take in Geneva. We now need a sharper focus and a more dynamic process, and we would like the Soviets to be more explicit and precise than they have been. On confidence-building measures, I noted that both sides had proposals on the table, and urged agreement to set up a working group in START to discuss them.

Dobrynin said that he did not have detailed instructions, but could make several general points. If the U.S. approach continued to single out Soviet land-based missiles, or sought direct throw-weight limits or highly restrictive sublimits like the 110 ceiling on heavy missiles, there would not be much progress. The Soviets are prepared to look at warhead limitations, but not to make substantial cuts in the major leg of their strategic forces. I replied that if the talks are to get anywhere there must be cuts in heavy missiles. The largest cuts would come through warhead limitations, but it is important for the Soviets to understand that reductions in destructive potential, where there is a huge disparity in their favor, are important.

On bilateral issues, I informed Dobrynin that you are prepared to renew discussions leading toward openings of consulates in Kiev and New York, and to negotiate a new cultural agreement. If the Soviets respond positively, I said, we can work out the modalities for discussion. Dobrynin responded that he would report this back to Moscow.

In our concluding private meeting, I reiterated that while each individual issue has its own importance, we have a broad agenda, and the overall signal we wish to make is that we are prepared to discuss that whole agenda seriously. Dobrynin finished with three broad points:

-- Gromyko's speech at the Supreme Soviet June 16 dealt with U.S.-Soviet relations to an "unprecedented" extent. (I took this to indicate intense preoccupation with the current state of relations.)

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-- Chernenko's speech at the Central Committee Plenum June 14 laid heavy emphasis on the need to combat the American democracy initiative, as well as our statements about yellow rain and other objectionable Soviet activities: the Soviets view all this as an attempt to discredit the USSR. (I took this to mean that our public diplomacy program has grabbed their attention.)

-- Dobrynin dwelt at great length on the Soviet perspective on INF, and especially on the Pershing II "threat." He made it sound as if this is the almost overwhelming Soviet preoccupation of the moment, and almost pleaded for us to put ourselves in their shoes, and see the situation as they see it. He concluded by suggesting that we need a kind of philosophical discussion on how the world looks to the two sides.

While Dobrynin and I were talking, Rick Burt took up the following issues with Embassy Minister-Counselors Sokolov and Isakov:

-- He gave them a short statement that the first launch of the Peacekeeper, a new type of "light" intercontinental ballistic missile (under SALT II criteria) took place June 17, and pointed out that this notification parallels their notification of a new-type test last October.

-- He urged the Soviets to take another look at Cap Weinberger's communications confidence-building measures; proposed that State and Defense experts join Art Hartman in Moscow for further discussion of these measures plus the idea of a multilateral convention against nuclear terrorism; and said we would be getting back soon with a proposal on timing.

-- In responding to the Soviet proposal for meetings of scientists on ballistic missile defense, Burt said we believe such discussion must be on a government-to-government basis, given its policy and strategy implications, and proposed that it take place between official representatives in the established fora of START and SCC, augmented by experts as necessary.

-- Burt informed the Soviets that the U.S. has approved extension of the Transportation Agreement for a six-month period, and would be proposing an exchange of notes that would register extension before the expiration date next week.

In conclusion, I told Dobrynin I would be back and available for discussions and for Soviet responses to our proposals in early July.

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As I see it, by your decision we have now taken the initiative to move our dialogue forward on the basis of our agenda, and the ball is truly in the Soviet court. We cannot at this point predict how they will respond, but we are at least in a position to say we have undertaken a major effort.

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(U) COMMUNIST CLANDESTINE RADIO  
BROADCASTING TO TURKEY

Summary

Clandestine radio broadcasting--broadcasting in the language of the target audience from a station which does not admit its origin of transmission or which attempts to mislead listeners about that origin--continues to play an important role in Soviet propoganda and disinformation operations in Turkey. Two Turkish-language clandestine stations--Our Radio and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party--currently broadcast to Turkey and to Turkish emigrant workers in Western Europe from facilities in the German Democratic Republic. (See broadcast schedule appended.) The two stations portray themselves as indigenous voices of the Turkish people and working class; broadcasts always refer to "our" struggle for peace or "our" liberation of Turkey.

The clandestine stations nevertheless are avid defenders of Soviet foreign policy. Their broadcasts strike at Turkey's commitment to NATO, US-Turkish relations, and Ankara's ties to the West in general; they advocate greater political and economic ties to the "socialist community" and try to stimulate political and ethnic opposition within Turkey to the Evren regime and to Turkish political and economic institutions. They also seek to recruit listeners from both inside and outside Turkey for the illegal Turkish Communist Party (TCP), currently based in East Germany. Further evidence of the two stations' devotion to the USSR was their unswerving approval of the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981.

The stations are also outspoken and vitriolic on certain issues where conventional Soviet media

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011



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tend to be cautious and circumspect, e.g., the September 12, 1980, military takeover in Turkey; the 1982 trials of Turkish "peace" activists; the 1982 constitutional referendum; and the August 10, 1982, Soviet-Turkish border shootings. Furthermore, the stations avoid commentary on issues of great Soviet sensitivity (e.g., Soviet transit rights through the Turkish straits) and do not report on democratic political developments within Turkey (e.g., the April 23, 1983, law allowing for the formation of political parties).

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## Background

At the behest of the USSR, various East European countries have over the years made broadcasting facilities available to a number of Western communist movements. As early as 1950, the Italian-language Oggi Italia (Today in Italy) began broadcasting the views of the Italian Communist Party (CPI), including speeches of CPI leaders, from Prague. Several other East European transmitters--Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian--subsequently were added. Oggi Italia ceased operation in 1971. Other East European-based stations have included:

- Deutscher Freiheitssender Neun Hundert Vier (German Freedom Station 904), broadcasting from East Germany in German, Greek, Spanish, Turkish, and Italian to foreign workers in West Germany. The station operated from 1956 until 1972; its programming reflected the views of the West German Community Party.
- Radio Peyke-e Iran (Radio Iran Courier), the voice of the outlawed Tudeh Party, broadcast in Persian to Iran from transmitters located first in East Germany and then Bulgaria, 1957-76.
- Radiofonikos Stathmos i Foni tis Alithias (Voice of Truth), the mouthpiece of the formerly exiled Greek Communist Party, broadcast in Greece and Cyprus from transmitters in East Germany, 1958-75.
- Deutscher Soldatensender (German Soldiers' Station), a German-language propaganda station in East Germany aimed at West German military personnel, 1960-72.
- Radio Portugal Livre (Radio Free Portugal), the voice of the exiled Portuguese Communist Party, broadcast from three transmitters believed to have been located in Romania, 1962-74.
- La Voce degli Operai Italiani Emigrati al Estero (Voice of the Italian Emigre Workers), aimed at Italian workers in West Germany, broadcast from East Germany, 1971-78.

## Our Radio and VOTCP

The only clandestine stations still operating from Eastern Europe are two that broadcast in Turkish. Technical observations indicate that both use facilities in Magdeburg, East Germany. Our

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Radio (Bizim Radyo) was established in 1958, one year after clandestine broadcasts to Greece and Iran were initiated; the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party (VOTCP) was inaugurated in 1968 with broadcasts to Turkish emigrant workers in West Germany and began broadcasting to Turkey itself in late 1974.

The importance Moscow and East Berlin attach to the TCP and its clandestine broadcasting operations was underscored last November on the occasion of TCP General Secretary Ismail Bilen's 80th birthday. On November 4, GDR President Erich Honecker presented Bilen with the "Great Star of International Friendship" in recognition of his "outstanding services for friendship and cooperation between nations and for the preservation of peace." Honecker expressed his "great admiration for the courage and steadfastness of the Turkish comrades" operating illegally under conditions which Honecker described as "difficult and hard." He also praised the TCP's campaigns against the "reactionary constitution of the military junta" which, he said, were being successfully implemented. According to Honecker, every TCP success benefited the joint struggle against the "confrontation and arms buildup policy of the US and NATO."

After the award ceremony, Bilen praised the TCP's close cooperation with the GDR and asserted that the TCP eventually would "liberate" Turkey. "We are so convinced of this not least because we always have strong friends at our side--strong friends, who help us at every moment."

Official Turkish Acknowledgment of the Clandestine Stations

The November 7, 1982, referendum on a new Turkish Constitution provided the vehicle for a revealing exchange of polemics between the Turkish Government and the two clandestine stations. Head of state Evren, in an August 29, 1982, speech to the citizens of Afyon, charged the two "communist radio stations" with an extensive campaign to secure the rejection of a new Turkish Constitution. Evren read numerous excerpts from their broadcasts and charged that they aimed to "divide [Turkey] into classes and win through a class struggle." He asserted that Turkish Communists received "directives" by means of the clandestine broadcasts.

The two stations were quick to respond to the criticism. Our Radio on August 31, 1982, said its broadcasts:

"...made the junta uneasy.... Every administration based on oppression and brute force which conceals the truth from the people has been uneasy about Our Radio.... It is impossible for the people's enemies to be pleased about our broadcasts.... Our people have been listening to Our Radio for the past 22 years. Make your friends and relatives listen to Our Radio."

And on September 1, 1982, VOTCP asserted that its broadcasts:

"...scared the reactionaries and tyrannical military junta. That is why the reactionaries are doing their utmost to obstruct the voice of the TCP.... The latest example is Evren's speech in Afyon.... It is a duty to further increase the number of VOTCP listeners."

As the November 7 referendum on the new Constitution neared, both stations increased their appeals for more listeners.

On October 2, 1982, VOTCP announced plans for improved broadcasts, including "qualitative" and organizational changes. On October 22, Our Radio asserted that:

"On the eve of the referendum, Our Radio will continue to pierce the censorship and bans of the junta heads.... Report and spread what you have heard over Our Radio in factories, villages, districts, coffeehouses, schools, offices and the barracks. The realities concealed by the mouthpiece of the junta, namely the Turkish radio and television, the unspoken and unrevealed realities will be broadcast by Our Radio."

#### Foreign Affairs

Our Radio and VOTCP commentary on and coverage of foreign affairs are designed to discredit and stimulate opposition to Turkish foreign policy, undermine Turkey's relations with the US and ties to NATO, and foster closer relations with the Soviet Union and the "socialist community."

Turkish-US Relations. Ties to the US are depicted as the root of every conceivable evil allegedly afflicting Turkish society. Clandestine broadcasts have sought continuously to engender opposition to US military bases in the country. Terming their dismantling a "priority task" for the Turkish people, the broadcasts portray the US military presence in Turkey as aimed "first and foremost" against Turkey's national independence as well as against the USSR and other countries in the region: US plans for INF deployment "generate dangers" for Turkey; the Turkish Government's purchase of US "warplanes" will exacerbate "our ailing economy"; Rapid Deployment Force basing in Turkey will "drag our country into the fire" and threaten the Islamic countries and the USSR.

Turkish-Soviet Relations. Turkish officials are characterized as not serious about improving ties with the USSR. The USSR, in contrast, has always pursued a "healthy, trustful, consistent and honest" policy toward Turkey; "our northern borders are our safest and friendliest." Clandestine coverage of Soviet

foreign policy also is effusive. Listeners are urged to support the "peaceful" and "constructive" policies of the Warsaw Pact, acceptance of which will free Turkey from its obligations to the US and NATO, peace being the nature of socialism. Closer Turkish-Soviet cooperation is said to contribute to the Turkish people's "struggle for national and social liberation."

Turkish-Greek Relations. Bilateral strains and tensions are blamed on the US, "NATOism, pro-Americanism, and anti-Sovietism." Listeners are cautioned that "secret NATO plans" for conflict among Greece, Turkey, and Italy have been drawn up, despite the fact that Greek and Turkish "progressive forces" desire peace. "Chauvinism" in both countries should not be allowed to stimulate conflict and thus work to the advantage of the US and NATO.

Middle East. Israel and the US are blamed for "plots" and "bloody slaughters" in the region; the Turkish "junta" is characterized as uninterested in an Arab-Israeli settlement. Broadcasts warn listeners that Rapid Deployment Force basing on Turkish soil will involve Turkey in imperialism's dangerous exploits and result in the deaths of Turkish soldiers.

Communist Parties. Listeners are urged to support the world communist movement; communist party members who are imprisoned anywhere are hailed as "heroes of national and social liberation." According to a recent VOTCP broadcast, the TCP and the Greek Communist Party (KKE) have proclaimed their determination to "promote and intensify their relationship within the framework of the struggle for peace, disarmament and social progress." Calls by Communist parties in NATO states for an end to the arms race and a strengthening of the peace movement are regularly aired, as are support for Nicaragua and other "progressive" causes.

Turkish Workers in the FRG. Turkish migrant workers in the Federal Republic of Germany are urged to participate in the "peaceful struggle" to prevent NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces deployment. The Turkish "junta" is depicted as indifferent to the problems of migrant workers, FRG Chancellor Kohl as openly hostile toward them.

Cyprus. The Turkish "occupation" of Cyprus is said to weaken Turkey's economy and threaten the security of the Turkish people. Both stations endorse the Soviet call for a "representative" conference to discuss international guarantees of Cyprus' independence as well as the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. The radio stations go further than Moscow, however, notably in their open criticism of Turkey for the current stalemate.

Afghanistan. The December 25, 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan elicited almost immediate approval from VOTCP. On

December 30, the station broadcast the text of a congratulatory message from TCP General Secretary Bilen to Babrak Karmal (dated December 29) patterned on one Brezhnev sent Karmal the same day. Bilen added his conviction that "with the help of the Soviet Union--which always supports internationalist solidarity and the liberation of peoples--the rightful struggle of the brotherly Afghan people against imperialism...will be victorious."

Subsequent VOTCP reporting on the Afghan situation:

- labeled former Afghan Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin an "agent of US imperialism" whose "aggressions" against the Afghan revolution and people had gained "dangerous dimensions" (December 29, 1979);
- claimed that the new Afghan Government headed by Babrak had requested immediate "political, moral, economic as well as military" aid from the USSR in an effort to "safeguard the gains of the April 1 revolution" and called that aid a "brilliant sign of proletarian internationalism" (December 29, 1979);
- condemned the Turkish Government for approving "imperialist interference" in Afghanistan's internal affairs and joining the "slander campaign" against the USSR and the "legal" Afghan Government (January 1 and 2, 1980);
- accused various political parties in Turkey of cooperating with CIA and Maoist agents in supplying weapons to Afghan anti-communists (January 1, 1980);
- recalled the "extremely valuable aid" extended by the USSR to Turkey during its 1921-23 national liberation war (January 1, 1980);
- warned that Turkish cancellation of the 1978 Soviet-Turkish "political document"--containing the provision in which both sides renounced the granting of their territory for the perpetration of aggression and subversive actions against other states--might be interpreted as a sign that Turkey was preparing for war with the USSR (January 20, 1980);
- attacked US efforts to persuade Ankara to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics as "interference in our domestic affairs" (January 25, 1980).

In sharp contrast, Our Radio commentary during the Afghan invasion was limited to a January 22, 1980, broadcast criticizing the Olympics boycott and the US grain embargo against the USSR.

Poland. VOTCP waited 16 days before endorsing the declaration of martial law in Poland. On December 29, 1981, it finally reported that the Polish Government had "taken the necessary measures against the antisocialist forces" and that the plans of "counterrevolutionary forces" had been "foiled." The situation in Poland was reported to be "returning to normal." VOTCP called on the "Turkish working class...toiling people...and all peace forces" to support the measures taken in Poland.

In a transparent effort to link events in Poland with the fate of Turkish independence, VOTCP on January 8 decried Ankara's approval of economic sanctions against Poland and the USSR as submission to the US and NATO. According to VOTCP, Turkey's national interests would be better served by siding with the "Polish working class" in its struggle against the adventures of imperialism.

### Internal Affairs

Clandestine radio commentary on domestic Turkish affairs is designed to undermine popular support for the government, promote ethnic strife, and strengthen opposition elements in the country.

- Our Radio and VOTCP assert that the "oppressive Constitution" does not permit the Turkish "working class, the toilers, the progressive and democratic forces" to take part in politics. The stations frequently call on those forces to unite in opposition to the "junta." Alleged regime human rights violations, including torture and arbitrary imprisonment, are reported regularly. Clandestine broadcasts also label the court system in the country "one of the dictatorship's anti-democratic tools of oppression and brute force...a continuation of the torture chambers and dungeons." Judges are accused of forcing defendants to agree to confessions previously made under duress and of sentencing innocent people to prison.
- The regime's economic policies are alleged to be designed to "exploit and crush" the Turkish working class. The broadcasts claim that ties to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other international financial institutions threaten to make Turkey "more dependent on imperialism" and "drag the Turkish economy to destruction."
- According to the broadcasts, the Evren regime neglects the rights of workers: the dominating "monopolies," collaborating with the government, do not seek to prevent labor accidents and are unconcerned about safety conditions and workers' health. (The regime was to blame for a mining accident in which more than 100 miners were killed--"outright

murder," according to VOTCP.) VOTCP also excoriated the January 1982 trial of 52 officials of the Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions (DISK) but then fell silent on the subject after claiming that there existed no organizational link between DISK and the TCP. (The official indictment against DISK subsequently charged DISK inter alia with recording VOTCP broadcasts and distributing TCP literature.)

--The clandestine stations traditionally have accused Turkish administrations of following a policy of "forced assimilation" against Turkish Kurds and have supported the Kurds' "democratic rights and freedoms." With national attention more sharply focused on the problem since the 1978 Iranian revolution, the stations have sought to exploit Kurdish grievances and enlist the Kurds in the TCP's campaign against the Evren regime, claiming that to be a Kurd in Turkey is to be "doubly exploited." A recent VOTCP broadcast claimed that US troops may be used by "Turkish reactionary forces" to suppress the Kurdish people's demand for "freedom and equality."

#### Turkish Communist Party Statements

VOTCP frequently, and Our Radio to a lesser extent, broadcasts official TCP statements, communiques, and proceedings, apparently to keep Turkish Communists within and outside Turkey apprised of the party's activities and its stands on particular issues. Such broadcasts monitored during the last two years have included May Day statements; statements endorsing major Soviet-bloc "peace and disarmament" proposals; appeals to Turkish citizens to join the TCP; texts of TCP leaders' speeches to TCP gatherings and international communist conferences; TCP plenum resolutions, politburo reports, and annual "action programs"; greetings to foreign Communist parties and national liberation movements; and interviews with TCP officials.

#### Clandestine Commentary vs. Official Propaganda

Our Radio and VOTCP, like other clandestine radio stations operated under the auspices of the USSR, are outspoken and vitriolic on certain issues where conventional Soviet media take a more cautious position. This flexibility permits the USSR (and the GDR) to disclaim responsibility for particularly inaccurate and inflammatory propaganda which, if dispensed by official communist media, might adversely affect bilateral relations. Several major instances of this media divergence have occurred within the past three years:

The September 12, 1980, Military Takeover. Before the military takeover in Ankara, VOTCP and Our Radio had been unremitting in their hostility toward Turkey's civilian governments,



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particularly those led by the "reactionary and fascist" Justice Party (JP). Both stations broadcast calls for insurgency, acts of terrorism, and the overthrow of JP-led coalitions.

Coverage by VOTCP and Our Radio of the takeover was similar. Both stations promptly denounced the military intervention and called for unity of domestic forces in opposition to the "pro-American junta." A TCP statement broadcast the next day urged all patriotic elements, including soldiers and "anti-American religious masses," to resist the new regime. This and other commentary contended that the takeover was inspired by the United States.

Official Soviet reaction to the military intervention, by contrast, was sparse and circumspect. Indeed, Moscow appeared to welcome the prospect that the Evren regime would restore a measure of stability to a country that official Soviet media had been describing as on the verge of civil war. (The Soviet Union had been similarly moderate following the 1971 military action in Turkey.)

Turkish Peace Committee Trials. On February 26, 1982, 16 members of the Turkish Peace Committee (TPC, an affiliate of the Soviet-backed World Peace Council) were arrested under a martial law court warrant on charges of "indulging in communist propaganda." On February 27, March 14 and 17, and April 3, TASS reported factually on the arrests and avoided any independent comment. Only in its April 3 dispatch did TASS acknowledge a link between the TPC and the WPC, and since then Soviet media have reported nothing further on the matter. The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace has remained silent throughout, as has the WPC itself.

Our Radio and VOTCP were much more explicit, immediately denouncing the arrests. On February 27, VOTCP accused the "reactionary military dictatorship" of taking "another crazy and very dangerous step" by launching a "new direct attack against the forces of peace, freedom and democracy in our country." The station also accused "US imperialism" of collaborating in the arrests of the "progressives" and asserted that the "junta's fascist prosecutors...who are trying to portray the Turkish Peace Committee as a communist organization because it is a member of the World Peace Council are exerting efforts in vain." Our Radio on February 27 noted that one of the arrestees, former TPC chairman Mahmut Dikerdem, was a member of the WPC's Presidential Committee and that he had participated in the WPC's World Parliament of Peoples for Peace in Sofia in September 1980.

In contrast to official Soviet media, the clandestine radio stations reported on the trials of the TPC members as well. VOTCP issued a statement on June 22, 1982, two days before the trial was

to open, ridiculing the charge that the TPC "worked for the Soviet Union." The "junta generals" were reported to have based their "gross anticommunist and anti-Soviet allegations on the primitive lie that the Soviet Union threatens our country." On September 16, 1982, VOTCP accused the "junta" of prosecuting the TPC members because "the presence of a peace movement...is not in the interests of the junta and its supporter, US imperialism."

The Campaign Against the Constitution. The 1982 drafting of and subsequent referendum on the new Turkish Constitution triggered the most striking divergences between official Soviet media and clandestine radio commentary.

On July 22, 1982, Pravda noted that a "distinctive feature" of the new draft constitution was the "granting of unlimited powers to the President," that the "working people's democratic rights and freedoms [were] severely restricted," and that "many public organizations with liberal tendencies have expressed a negative attitude toward it." That was the extent of official Soviet commentary until November 8, when TASS reported after the referendum that more than 90 percent of Turkish voters had approved of the new Constitution.

Our Radio and VOTCP in contrast waged acrimonious campaigns against approval of the Constitution. Their efforts appear to have begun in July 1982 when the decision to hold a constitutional referendum was approved by Turkey's Consultative Assembly. Clandestine broadcasts from July through early November attacked the "undemocratic" nature of the planned referendum; condemned the "junta's black, obscure constitution" and accused the junta of "seeking to institutionalize the reactionary and military police state"; and charged that the Constitution would "eliminate" the Kurdish people's right to self-determination. The stations said the Constitution would foster "dictatorship and slavery to imperialism" and claimed that if accepted it would benefit only "the employers, the bosses, the collaborationist monopolists and the landlords."

VOTCP charged that the referendum voting was "held under the junta's intense oppression and terror," that citizens who voted against the Constitution were arrested and jailed, and that "fraud took place in almost every village." On November 9, a VOTCP statement declared that the "junta generals who assumed power through the bayonets" had achieved an "Evren dictatorship" in the constitutional referendum. The "generals" were reported to have "allowed" 6-7 percent of no-votes.

The August 10, 1982, Border Shootings. Two Turkish border guards were shot and killed by Soviet frontier guards after allegedly crossing into Soviet territory. TASS on August 13

published the text of a low-key Soviet Foreign Ministry statement that accused the two of "unprovoked fire" at the Soviet guard detachment and attributed their deaths to "unlawful actions on Soviet territory." This was the only mention of the incident in official Soviet media.

Our Radio on August 19 in reporting the shooting accused the Turkish Government of "distorting the incident in a bid to deceive the public, to fan chauvinism and to instill hostility against our neighbor, the Soviet Union." It accused "reactionary newspapers" in Turkey of initiating an "anti-Soviet campaign.... Though the military junta knows that the Soviet side is not guilty, it closes an eye to this campaign...." The two Turkish guards involved were condemned for firing upon the soldiers of a country "which for 10 years has not missed an occasion to express its friendship." And the border incident was reported to have assumed "special significance, since it coincided with innumerable plots being hatched by US imperialism in order to poison the international atmosphere and to further strain world relations."

Prepared by David Hertzberg  
632-9120

Approved by Martha M. Mautner  
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APPENDIX

Broadcast Times and Frequencies

VOTCP

Broadcast Time: GMT 0400-0450, 0600-0650, 0800-0850,  
1000-1050, 1200-1250, 1400-1450, 1600-1650, 1800-1850,  
2000-2050, 2200-2250

Frequency Usage: 9585 and 6200 KHz

Our Radio

Broadcast Time: GMT 0300-0350, 0500-0550, 0500-0530,  
0700-0750, 0900-0950, 1015-1045, 1100-1150, 1300-1350,  
1445-1515, 1500-1550, 1700-1750, 1740-1810, 1900-1950,  
2000-2150

Frequency Usage: 11820, 9585, 9500, and 6200 KHz

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3. USSR: CAMPAIGN AGAINST WESTERN BROADCASTING

Moscow has intensified its propaganda offensive against Western radio broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Current rhetoric suggests the Soviets will make an effort to justify and perhaps legalize jamming at the High Frequency World Administrative Radio Conference (HF WARC) to be held in Geneva early next year.

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Recent Soviet media commentary reflects growing concern over what Moscow perceives to be a Western ideological offensive aimed at the socialist bloc. Pravda on July 14 attacked the "unprecedented psychological war" being waged against the East, and asserted that Western radio and television were being used to mount a "veritable information-propaganda intervention." Pravda advocated a "well-conceived, unified, dynamic and effective system of counterpropaganda" to expose the subversive nature of "imperialist propaganda."

Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL), longtime targets of Soviet propaganda, have come under especially intense attack over the past year. Last August Pravda implicitly charged RFE with conducting a campaign of aggression against Poland from West Germany. Recent Soviet commentary has resurrected this theme: TASS on July 14 called RFE and RL broadcasts "psychological Pershing IIs," and it blamed the West Germans for carrying out aggression against their Eastern neighbors on behalf of the US.

Other Soviet media attacks in recent weeks have condemned budget hikes for the two radio services and the appointment of "arch-hawk" James Buckley as their director. RFE and RL have also been accused of poisoning the air with slander and sowing distrust among nations. Izvestiya recently compared RFE and RL broadcasts to "hysterical Nazi propaganda" and reminded readers that ideological preparation for war was a crime against mankind.

Behind much of this rhetoric is the careful construction of legal argumentation which Moscow will probably use against the United States at next year's HF WARC. The Soviets are likely to cite several international declarations and agreements to buttress their claims that US broadcasting, particularly the operations of RFE and RL, violate basic norms of international law and justify the USSR's right to jam hostile radio transmissions. Moreover, Moscow will be preaching to Third World nations who are already concerned over alleged Western domination of the dissemination of news.

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(U) USSR: THE COUNTERPROPAGANDA APPARATUS IN  
THE UKRAINE

Summary

The Soviet authorities have expanded their counterpropaganda work in the western borderlands of the USSR--particularly in what they describe as the "extremely exposed" Ukrainian SSR. In response to events in Poland, Western broadcasts in local languages, and indigenous religious and nationalist activities, the authorities have reorganized local agitation and propaganda work, established new coordinating bodies at both republic and local levels, and provided these bodies with new guidance.

These developments in themselves do not represent a significant change in grassroots propaganda work. They do, however, highlight the areas of greatest Soviet concern in this region: ideological disaffection among the young and a convergence of religious and national identities within many strata of the population.

\* \* \* \* \*

Counterpropaganda has been an integral part of Soviet ideological work since the 1917 revolution, but the current upsurge and greater focus on nationality issues date from the November 1981 Central Committee plenum. That meeting described counterpropaganda as "one of the important spheres" of party work and called on party committees across the Soviet Union to devote more attention to it. Moscow has organized three major conferences since then to discuss ways and means of improving counterpropaganda effectiveness on nationality issues--at Riga in June 1982, Tallinn in October 1982, and Kishinev in April 1983. In addition, the party organizations of the western republics have developed a variety of new institutional forms for such

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work. Those in the Ukraine appear to have undergone the fullest elaboration and certainly have received the greatest attention in the press. They presumably are to serve as a model for counter-propaganda work throughout the Soviet west, but at the same time they reflect the special ideological problems of that republic and region.

### The Challenge

Both Kiev and Moscow obviously judge those problems to be serious. According to the head of the Ukrainian Central Committee department responsible for propaganda and agitation, the Ukrainian Republic is now "extremely exposed to the sources of enemy propaganda" for the following reasons:

- The location of the republic on the western border of the Soviet Union makes it an easy target for Ukrainian-language broadcasting from abroad. In addition, many of its citizens--as a result of political and border changes over the last 50 years--know foreign languages well and therefore have additional opportunities to obtain information from non-Soviet sources.
- The population of the Ukraine includes a remarkably large number of religious believers. At present, according to the same official, "more than one half" of all the USSR's Orthodox and denominational associations (congregations) are in the Ukraine. Many believers are in fact followers of the suppressed Uniate Catholic Church, which considers its authority to be the Vatican rather than the Moscow Patriarchate and which sees itself as a Ukrainian national church.
- The republic must contend with a group of emigrés from the Ukraine with extensive personal ties to relatives and others still living there. Ukrainian emigrés, who now number more than 3 million including numerous anti-Soviet elements, maintain close ties with the Vatican and various Western governments and represent a continuing source of support for Ukrainian-language broadcasting abroad.

Each of these factors, the Soviet authorities insist, gives a special form and urgency to ideological work in this area.

Counterpropaganda work in the Ukraine currently is conducted according to a plan developed jointly by two departments of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus: the Department for Propaganda and Agitation, headed by Leonid M. Kravchuk, and the Department for Foreign Relations, headed by Anatolii V. Merkulov. The first department has primary responsibility for domestic propaganda, although Kravchuk did say at the Riga

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conference that his agency also has a sector for foreign policy information. The second apparently is responsible for programs concerning Ukrainian communities abroad. Given the key role played by emigrés in the foreign propaganda which the Soviets seek to counter, the importance of this department probably is much greater in the Ukraine than in other republics.

### The Response

The Ukrainian counterpropaganda plan, according to press reports, coordinates the work of the following institutions in Kiev: the Ukrainian filiation of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, the Ukrainian Council on Religious Affairs, a special journalists group at the Ukrainian Radio and Television Committee, the Ukrainian SSR Scientific Coordinating Council for Problems of the Atheistic Indoctrination of the Population, special offices in the judicial and police agencies, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute for the Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries, the republic's Znaniye Society, and regular party and Komsomol propaganda units. These institutions are directed to "analyze systematically the context, areas, and new trends in clerical nationalist propaganda," to study "the degree of influence of foreign propaganda on believers and priests," to assist in the preparation of media materials in these areas, and to provide direction to oblast and local groups working in these areas.

The main counterpropaganda effort is carried out at the oblast level and below. Special coordinating councils on counterpropaganda have been established in the oblasts, and additional staff positions have been created in the oblast party committee apparatuses for their directors. These commissions, one oblast party secretary has reported, include representatives from party, Soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations, as well as journalists and academics. They are responsible for:

- overseeing sociological research on the current attitudes of the local population;
- preparing "up-to-date" information on major events of domestic and international life to guide local propagandists; and
- providing "daily help" to party, Soviet, and other organizations on counterpropaganda questions.

Analogous commissions are being established at the city and rayon levels, at least in the western oblasts. These bodies reportedly include a similar mix of representatives, have the same functions, and are chaired by the local party secretary responsible for ideological work. Counterpropaganda work at the



primary party organization level is carried out directly by the committee's information bureaus or groups.

### Soviet Concerns

These changes do not represent a radical break with the past as far as ideological work is concerned; nor does the limited quantity of counterpropaganda material which has reached the West appear to promise any greater successes for agitprop officials. Nevertheless, the attention given to the counterpropaganda network and the messages it should carry do highlight current Soviet concerns in the Ukraine. These include, first, a rise in "clerical nationalism" and, second, growing ideological disaffection among the young. The first concern refers to the conjunction and mutual reinforcement of religion and national identity in the minds of many Ukrainians. According to one Ukrainian official:

"The process of the politicizing of religion itself is intensifying, religious organizations are taking an active part in political activity, and political clericalism is more and more assuming an anti-communist nature...a new variety of nationalism--religious nationalism--has appeared."

In the Ukrainian case, the chief symbol of this fusion is the Uniate Catholic Church, which was forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church following World War II but which, even Soviet sources concede, still has significant support among Ukrainian believers as a symbol of Ukrainian identity. At present, its emigré contingent enjoys the patronage of Pope John Paul II and supports extensive radio broadcasting on religious and social questions to the Ukraine. As a result, Kiev officials warn, the fight against this kind of nationalism must be directed against emigrés as well as against the domestic audience and must deal simultaneously with religious and nationality issues.

The second problem--a growing disaffection among the young--is one that concerns Soviet officials throughout the USSR. It pervades many recent Ukrainian party pronouncements. In his speech to the June 1983 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum, for example, Ukrainian First Secretary V. V. Shcherbitskiy pointedly noted that:

"...it is impossible to overlook the fact that a proportion of young people have an unconscientious attitude toward learning, and evince moral immaturity and a consumerist attitude toward life. Such phenomena--and this came to light during the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee discussion on the report by the Lvov University party committee--are largely explained by grave omissions in teaching and the educational process."

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Later in his speech, Shcherbitskiy called for an increased use of "public opinion in labor collectives" to counter what he termed "ideological subversion," clearly another task for his republic's counterpropagandists.

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