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01/16/1984] Speech on US- Soviet Relations
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/18/2005

File Folder [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
1/16/84] JAN 84 SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS-
BACKGROUND MATERIAL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO

3207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10884	CABLE	GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	4	ND	B1
10885	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THATCHER RE USSR R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1983	B1
10886	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KOHL RE USSR R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1984	B1
10887	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO MITTERRAND RE USSR R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1983	B1
10888	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO NAKASONE OF JAPAN RE USSR R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1983	B1
10889	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO TRUDEAU RE USSR R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1983	B1
10890	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO FRASER RE USSR R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1983	B1
10891	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE BRIEFING SCENARIO FOR PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	2	1/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/18/2005

File Folder [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
1/16/84] JAN 84 SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS-
BACKGROUND MATERIAL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO

3207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10892	CABLE	LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ON HIS SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	2	ND	B1
10893	CABLE	PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS: BRIEFING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	4	1/12/1984	B1
10894	MEMO	TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	2	ND	B1
10895	CABLE	PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS: BRIEFING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	1	ND	B1
10896	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10894 <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	3	ND	B1
10897	MEMO	BRIEFING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	1	1/11/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

JET 5/18/2005

File Folder [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
1/16/84] JAN 84 SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS-
BACKGROUND MATERIAL 5/5

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO

3207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10898	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN ON HIS JANUARY 16 SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS (FOR UK, FRANCE, FRG, JAPAN, ITALY, CANADA) <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	1	ND	B1
10899	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER FROM SECRETARY ON PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 16 SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

10884

Jack - State's
revised packet
just picked
it up.
Steve

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/SOV/MULTI: AVERSHBOW:AV
°/°2/84 EXT.8040, 2907M
EUR:RBURT

EUR/SOV:TWSIMONS, JR.
S/S:BMCKINLEY
NSC:SESTEINER

EUR:MPALMER
NSC:JMATLOCK

IMMEDIATE ALDAC
IMMEDIATE USIA WASHDC

INFORM CONSULS/PASS PAO'S

DECL: °/°7/84

PREL, UR, US

GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS

RB
AV
TWS
MP
BMCK
JM
SES

°. [C] AS HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, THE PRESIDENT WILL DELIVER A MAJOR ADDRESS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS ON MONDAY, JANUARY °6 AT °0:00 A.M. EST, AT THE WHITE HOUSE. THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH WILL BE CABLED TO ALL POSTS WHEN AVAILABLE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THEMES ON THE SPEECH, TOGETHER WITH CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FOR POSTS' USE ON AN UNCLASSIFIED BASIS FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF THE SPEECH. MATERIAL BELOW IS THEREFORE EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY OF THE SPEECH.

2. [C] FOR POSTS' INFORMATION ONLY:

-- THE PRESIDENT FELT IT IMPORTANT TO DELIVER THIS ADDRESS BECAUSE OF HIS CONCERN THAT ASPECTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION WERE NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY PUBLICS AND POLITICAL LEADERS, BOTH IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD. WHILE THE MAIN POINTS IN THE SPEECH HAVE BEEN ARTICULATED BY U.S. SPOKESMEN BEFORE, THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT MADE SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR F06-114/9 #10884

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

-- THE SPEECH IS SPECIFICALLY INTENDED TO COUNTER SUCH MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S. POLICY AS: °] AN ALLEGED EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON MILITARY POWER IN OUR POLICY TOWARD SOVIET UNION; 2] A SUPPOSED TENDENCY TO ATTRIBUTE ALL PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD TO THE SOVIET UNION; 3] A PURPORTED DESIRE FOR AN ALL-OUT ARMS RACE; AND 4] AN ALLEGEDLY DELIBERATE STRATEGY OF UNDERMINING IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS THROUGH RESORT TO UNWARRANTED, HARSH RHETORIC ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION.

3. [U] IN COUNTERING THESE MISPERCEPTIONS, POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING:

-- THE SPEECH DEMONSTRATES THAT AMERICA'S POLICY IS BUILT ON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SPIRITUAL STRENGTH, AS WELL AS A CREDIBLE DETERRENT, AND THAT OUR PREFERENCE IS TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THROUGH NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE. STRENGTHENED MILITARY CAPABILITIES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE A SOUND BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND BECAUSE IT IS THE SOVIET UNION THAT RELIES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON MILITARY POWER IN ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

-- THE PRESIDENT MAKES CLEAR IN HIS SPEECH THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT MOST REGIONAL CONFLICTS HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN LOCAL PROBLEMS. OUR CONCERN IS THE FACT OF SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF SUCH CONFLICTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY OF THE NATIONS INVOLVED. THE PRESIDENT ASKS THE SOVIET UNION TO JOIN WITH US TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL DISPUTES.

-- THE RECORD SHOWS THAT IT IS THE SOVIET UNION THAT HAS STEADILY INCREASED ITS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES' EXPENDITURES WERE DECLINING IN REAL TERMS; OUR PRESENT DEFENSE PROGRAMS ARE A LONG OVERDUE EFFORTS TO REDRESS DANGEROUS IMBALANCES. MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT CITES FACTS WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT THE NATO NUCLEAR STOCKPILE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED IN RECENT YEARS.

-- THE PRESIDENT MAKES CLEAR IN HIS SPEECH THAT A REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION MEANS BEING FRANK ABOUT OUR DIFFERENCES IN VALUES AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE CANNOT NEGOTIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER. INDEED, IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MANAGE US-SOVIET RIVALRY THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION.

4. [U] GENERAL THEMES:

-- ON MONDAY, JANUARY '66, AT THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED A MAJOR ADDRESS ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE POINTING OUT THE MANY PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP, HIS PRIMARY MESSAGE WAS TO REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF THE U.S. TO PURSUE A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE PRODUCTIVE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP.

-- THE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP -- INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL PROBLEMS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL COOPERATION -- STRESSING HIS DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD IN ALL THESE AREAS. HE EMPHASIZED HIS COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN ARMS LEVELS AND DIMINISHING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT, NOTING HIS READINESS TO MEET THE SOVIETS HALFWAY IF THEY ARE WILLING TO DO LIKEWISE. HE CALLED UPON THE USSR TO JOIN WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS. AND HE URGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION LIVE UP TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE ASSUMED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

-- THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS:

- -- THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF RECENT YEARS TO REVITALIZE U.S. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND SPIRITUAL STRENGTH. AS A RESULT, THE U.S. IS NOW IN A FAR BETTER POSITION FROM WHICH TO ESTABLISH A PRODUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

- -- THE PRESIDENT CITED THE PROFOUND AND OBVIOUS DIFFERENCES IN VALUES AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS THAT DIVIDE THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, BUT STRESSED THE VITAL COMMON INTEREST THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHARE IN THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR AND REDUCTION OF EXISTING LEVELS OF ARMS AND TENSIONS -- BOTH IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. IT IS THIS NEED TO PRESERVE THE PEACE THAT IS AT THE HEART OF U.S. DETERRENT POLICY. THE U.S. WILL DEFEND ITS INTERESTS, BUT DOES NOT SEEK TO THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION.

- -- THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO A POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION CONSISTING OF BOTH CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND PEACEFUL

COMPETITION. THIS IS A BALANCED POLICY THAT WILL PROTECT WESTERN INTERESTS, BUT IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

- -- THE PRESIDENT SET FORTH THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT CONCENTRATES ON TRYING TO ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THREE BROAD AREAS: DEVELOPING WAYS TO ELIMINATE THE USE AND THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE VAST ARMS STOCKPILES IN THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND ESTABLISHING A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING AND BASED ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND RESPECT. THE U.S. WILL BE GUIDED IN ITS EFFORTS TO THOSE ENDS BY REALISM, STRENGTH AND WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL DIALOGUE.

- -- THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THAT DIALOGUE IS FIRM. WE WILL INSIST THAT U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS SEEK PROGRESS IN SUBSTANCE AND NOT MERELY ATMOSPHERICS. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED OUR STRONG DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE FULL RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, NOTING U.S. INTEREST NOT ONLY IN REDUCING FORCE LEVELS THROUGH START, INF AND MBFR, BUT ALSO IN DIMINISHING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT THROUGH THE CDE AS WELL. WE ARE PREPARED TO GO HALFWAY TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS, IF THEY ARE WILLING TO DO LIKEWISE. THE PRESIDENT ALSO CALLED FOR SOVIET COOPERATION IN EFFORTS TO REDUCE REGIONAL TERROR, PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

- -- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, NOTING THAT IT IS SOVIET PRACTICES IN THIS AREA, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER ISSUE, THAT HAVE CREATED THE MISTRUST AND ILL WILL THAT HANGS OVER THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS.

- -- THE PRESIDENT RESTATED HIS CONVICTION THAT, DESPITE SERIOUS U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES, CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS NOT INEVITABLE. MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS ARE NOT MERELY POSSIBLE BUT NECESSARY. HE CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO THAT END.

END THEMES

5. [U] BEGIN CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

Dear Margaret:

When you and I met at the end of September we had a useful talk on how to deal with the Soviet Union over the longer term. I greatly value the advice and counsel you shared with me. At that time, the Korean Airlines tragedy was very much on our minds. With Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms control negotiations, East-West relations have entered an even more difficult period.

Against this background, I have decided that it is important to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the key element in East-West relations -- the Soviet-American relationship. I will do this in a major address from the East Room at the White House on Monday, January 16.

My address, which is a comprehensive articulation of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, will reaffirm our willingness to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. While, I will not be announcing any specific new initiatives, I will clarify a number of misperceptions about U.S. policy. I will also be setting a framework for future U.S.-Soviet relations.

Given our close relationship and the special significance that I attach to this statement of U.S. policy, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objective of setting a positive tone both for the opening of the CDE meeting in Stockholm and for George Shultz's bilateral meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. I am particularly pleased that George will have an opportunity to give you a personal preview prior to his meetings in Stockholm

With warm regards,

Ron

2917m

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E06-114/a # 10885

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/13/84

FRG

10886

6

S

Dear Helmut:

You and I have often discussed and corresponded on the overriding need to improve East-West relations. I also pay close attention to your public statement on this crucial matter. In this connection, there is no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I have decided to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future.

In my address, which I will deliver at the White House on January 16, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will as well call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response.

While I will not announce any specific new initiatives in my speech, it is also aimed at clarifying certain misperceptions about U.S. policy. In short, it sets forth a framework for improving East-West relations and make clear my sincere desire to negotiate with the Soviets.

Because of our close relationship and the special significance I attach to this statement, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives by setting a positive tone both for the opening of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, and for George Shultz's bilateral meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. I am pleased that George will have an opportunity in Stockholm to discuss this subject in more detail with Foreign Minister Genscher.

With Warm Regards,

Ron

2919m

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10886

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

Dear Francois:

There can be no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I have decided to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future. This statement will take the form of a major address on Monday, January 16 at the White House.

I know from our personal conversations and correspondence how deeply concerned you are that the climate of East-West relations is deteriorating. You have repeatedly stressed to me the necessity of maintaining a dialogue with the Soviet Union. I was struck by your recent comment to the effect that we who are responsible for making decisions affecting world security must make every effort to ensure that the situation does not go beyond our control.

In my address, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. I will make abundantly clear my sincere desire to improve East-West relations.

Because of our close relationship and the special significance I attach to this statement, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives by setting a positive tone both for the opening of the Stockholm CDE meeting and for George Shultz's initial meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. I have asked George to expand on our thinking about East-West relations in his meeting with Claude Cheysson.

With warm regards,

Ron

2920m

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/9 #10887

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

10888

8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/13/83

JAPAN

Dear Yasu:

In meetings during the past year you and I have discussed in some detail the global security environment, and I know you share my view concerning the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations to world peace and stability. The United States and Japan shared in the horror and grief of the Korean Airlines tragedy, and this incident, along with Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms control negotiations, have brought U.S.-Soviet relations to an especially troubling point. For this reason, I have decided to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future.

In my address from the White House on January 16, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will as well call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. While I will not be announcing specific new initiatives, I will be clarifying certain misperceptions about U.S. policy. I will also set forth a framework for future our dialogue with the Soviet Union, making clear my sincere desire to improve East-West relations.

Because of the special significance I attach to my statement, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives by setting a positive tone both for the opening of the CDE meeting in Stockholm, and for George Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

With warm personal regards,
Ron

2927m

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR 66-1149 #10888
 BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/13/83 CANADA

Dear Pierre:

As you and I discussed last month, there is no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I have decided to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future.

In my address from the White House on January 16, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will as well call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. While I will not be announcing specific new initiatives, I will be clarifying certain misperceptions about U.S. policy. I will also set forth a framework for future our dialogue with the Soviet Union, making clear my sincere desire to improve East-West relations.

Because of the special significance I attach to my statement, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives by setting a positive tone both for the opening of the CDE meeting in Stockholm, and for George Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

With best wishes,

Ron

2921m

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 # 10889BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/13/83 AUSTRALIA

Dear Bob:

There is no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I have decided to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future.

In my address from the White House on January 16, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will as well call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. While I will not be announcing specific new initiatives, I will be clarifying certain misperceptions about U.S. policy. I will also set forth a framework for future our dialogue with the Soviet Union, making clear my sincere desire to improve East-West relations.

Because of the special significance I attach to my statement, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives by setting a positive tone both for the opening of the CDE meeting in Stockholm, and for George Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

On a separate subject, I wish you all luck and success in your forthcoming Asian visits. Our own meetings with Premier Zhao went well, and we will be in further touch on his visit to Washington prior to your trip to China.

Warm regards,
Ron

2925m

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/9 # 10890
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

1/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jack,

Here is a new cut of the proposed handout, reflecting our last conversation. 1st 3 paras are fixed up a bit, and the 4th added.

I gave Kimmitt a copy of the Q/As; a copy of this draft statement (pointing out that you haven't cleared); and a copy of the two page summary of speech -- noting that Sims said it could be drawn on for backgrounding, but not handed out.

Steve

EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 P.M., SUNDAY, JANUARY 15, 1984

President's Address on U.S.-Soviet Relations

On Monday, January 16, in the East Room of the White House, the President will give a major address on United States relations with the Soviet Union. The President will take this occasion to reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union, a dialogue designed to establish a stable and mutually beneficial long-term relationship.

The fundamental purpose of the President's address will be to present in a clear and comprehensive manner his objectives for improving this crucial relationship. The address comes on the eve of the opening in Stockholm of a promising new East-West arms control conference, the CDE, the objectives of which are to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe and to inhibit using arms for war or intimidation.

The address is also timed to help establish the framework for the resumption, in Stockholm on January 17, of the dialogue between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, which we also hope will help to move the U.S.-Soviet relationship forward.

It is also important to note in this context that the measures taken by the Administration to restore the credibility of our military deterrent, along with our policies to reestablish America's political and economic strength, have put us in the best position in years to achieve now the improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relationship which we all seek.

RECEIVED 16 JAN 84 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 14 JAN 84

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CJS NARA, Date 8/5/02

KEYWORDS USSR CONGRESSIONAL
SPEECHES USIA

SUBJECT. BRIEFING SCENARIO FOR PRES SPEECH RE US - SOVIET RELATIONS

ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

THOMPSON

LEHMAN, C

RAYMOND

SIMS

COMMENTS LOGGED PER KIMMITT INSTRUCTIONS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE//EYES ONLY

January 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Briefing Scenario for the President's
Speech on US-Soviet Relations

In order to ensure the maximum diplomatic and public impact for the President's speech on US-Soviet relations, we propose the following approach to briefing the Allies, Congressional leaders, and the press. We will also inform the Soviets before the speech is delivered.

Soviets: With the Soviets, we will want to emphasize the importance of this speech as a signal of the President's seriousness in moving our relationship forward and improving the public atmosphere to promote private dialogue. Acting Secretary Dam will call in Dobrynin the morning before delivery to hand over a copy, review its highlights, and underline the importance we attach to it. In Moscow, our charge will deliver a copy to Acting Foreign Minister Korniyenko the same morning (eight hours earlier Moscow time). We will also pass a copy to Gromyko's party in Stockholm in order to encourage a more positive approach by Gromyko in Stockholm.

Allies: We recommend the President send messages and the speech before delivery to Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Craxi, Nakasone, and Trudeau highlighting the positive tone of the speech and his desire to signal the Soviets we want an improved dialogue and atmosphere. The Secretary will send messages (without copies) to the Foreign Ministers of our other European and Asian allies, China, possibly Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania, and other selected countries. In all of the briefings, we will want to use talking points and Q's & A's designed to encourage a strongly positive international reaction.

Congress and the Press: We will want to brief key Congressional leaders beforehand on the speech. Our preference would be to inform the leadership and key members of the Senate and House foreign affairs committees the afternoon of the speech. We should elicit public statements of support from friendly members of Congress immediately following the speech and over the

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10891

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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days to follow. To ensure complete press coverage, we recommend a background briefing at the White House an hour or so before the speech. We will also brief selected columnists.

Other Countries: We will work with USIA to ensure they have materials, including the speech to translate, ahead of time to maximize international publicity. The speech and Q's & A's will be telegraphed immediately to all diplomatic posts at the time it is delivered for provision to governments around the world.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

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National Security Council The White House

System # I
Package # DN43

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>Staff for</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>record</u>
_____	_____	_____	<u>purposes</u>
_____	_____	_____	<u>only</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

X 360

Matlock

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National Security Council
The White House

System # II
Package # 90055

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>IC</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

① LDX copies to Hill, Stanford, and Carmack

② Staff info copies to Matlock, Kimmitt, Skull, McFarlane, ~~Kimmitt~~ Poindexter.

PRESIDENT'S BACKUP COPY:
ADDRESS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

DURING THESE FIRST DAYS OF 1984, I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU -- AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD -- MY THOUGHTS ON A SUBJECT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE -- RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

TOMORROW, THE UNITED STATES WILL JOIN THE SOVIET UNION AND 33 OTHER NATIONS AT A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM. THE CONFERENCE WILL SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL AND MEANINGFUL WAYS TO INCREASE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND PRESERVE PEACE. WE WILL BE IN STOCKHOLM WITH THE HEARTFELT WISHES OF OUR PEOPLE FOR GENUINE PROGRESS.

WE LIVE IN A TIME OF CHALLENGES TO PEACE, BUT ALSO OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE. THROUGH TIMES OF DIFFICULTY AND FRUSTRATION, AMERICA'S HIGHEST ASPIRATION HAS NEVER WAVERED: WE HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE FOR A LASTING PEACE THAT ENHANCES DIGNITY FOR MEN AND WOMEN EVERYWHERE. I BELIEVE 1984 FINDS THE UNITED STATES IN ITS STRONGEST POSITION IN YEARS TO ESTABLISH A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY SINCE THE DECADE OF THE SEVENTIES -- YEARS WHEN THE UNITED STATES SEEMED FILLED WITH SELF-DOUBT AND NEGLECTED ITS DEFENSES, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION INCREASED ITS MILITARY MIGHT AND SOUGHT TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE BY ARMED FORCE AND THREATS.

OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS, THE SOVIETS DEVOTED TWICE AS MUCH OF THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS THE UNITED STATES, PRODUCED SIX TIMES AS MANY I.C.B.M.'s, FOUR TIMES AS MANY TANKS, AND TWICE AS MANY COMBAT AIRCRAFT. AND THEY BEGAN DEPLOYING THE SS-20 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD NO COMPARABLE WEAPON.

HISTORY TEACHES THAT WARS BEGIN WHEN GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE THE PRICE OF AGGRESSION IS CHEAP. TO KEEP THE PEACE, WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONVINCe ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THAT WAR COULD BRING NO BENEFIT, ONLY DISASTER. SO WHEN WE NEGLECTED OUR DEFENSES, THE RISKS OF SERIOUS CONFRONTATION GREW.

THREE YEARS AGO WE EMBRACED A MANDATE FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO CHANGE COURSE, AND WE HAVE. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE CONGRESS, WE HALTED AMERICA'S DECLINE. OUR ECONOMY IS NOW IN THE MIDST OF THE BEST RECOVERY SINCE THE SIXTIES. OUR DEFENSES ARE BEING REBUILT. OUR ALLIANCES ARE SOLID AND OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR VALUES HAS NEVER BEEN MORE CLEAR.

AMERICA'S RECOVERY MAY HAVE TAKEN SOVIET LEADERS BY SURPRISE. THEY MAY HAVE COUNTED ON US TO KEEP WEAKENING OURSELVES. THEY HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR YEARS THAT OUR DEMISE WAS INEVITABLE. THEY SAID IT SO OFTEN THEY PROBABLY STARTED BELIEVING IT. IF SO, I THINK THEY CAN SEE NOW THEY WERE WRONG.

THIS MAY BE THE REASON WE'VE BEEN HEARING SUCH STRIDENT RHETORIC FROM THE KREMLIN RECENTLY. THESE HARSH WORDS HAVE LED SOME TO SPEAK OF HEIGHTENED UNCERTAINTY AND AN INCREASED DANGER OF CONFLICT. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT PROFOUNDLY MISTAKEN. LOOK BEYOND THE WORDS, AND ONE FACT STANDS OUT: AMERICA'S DETERRENCE IS MORE CREDIBLE AND IT IS MAKING THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE; SAFER BECAUSE NOW THERE IS LESS DANGER THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL UNDERESTIMATE OUR STRENGTH OR QUESTION OUR RESOLVE.

YES, WE ARE SAFER NOW. BUT TO SAY THAT OUR RESTORED DETERRENCE HAS MADE THE WORLD SAFER IS NOT TO SAY THAT IT IS SAFE ENOUGH. WE ARE WITNESSING TRAGIC CONFLICTS IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. NUCLEAR ARSENALS ARE FAR TOO HIGH. AND OUR WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT WHAT IT MUST BE. THESE ARE CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED AND IMPROVED.

DETERRENCE IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE PEACE AND PROTECT OUR WAY OF LIFE, BUT DETERRENCE IS NOT THE BEGINNING AND END OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE MUST AND WILL ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A DIALOGUE AS SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE, A DIALOGUE THAT WILL SERVE TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE TROUBLED REGIONS OF THE WORLD, REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS, AND BUILD A CONSTRUCTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIET UNION CAN WISH AWAY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO SOCIETIES AND OUR PHILOSOPHIES. BUT WE SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. AND THE FOREMOST AMONG THEM IS TO AVOID WAR AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS.

THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STEER A COURSE WHICH I WOULD CALL CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION; AND IF WE DO SO, WE MIGHT FIND AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

OUR STRENGTH AND VISION OF PROGRESS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR DEMONSTRATING, WITH EQUAL CONVICTION, OUR COMMITMENT TO STAY SECURE AND TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS WHY 1984 IS A YEAR OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE.

BUT IF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE TO RISE TO THE CHALLENGES FACING US AND SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE, WE MUST DO MORE TO FIND AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND THEN BUILD ON THEM. I PROPOSE THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO SEE IF WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS IN THREE BROAD PROBLEM AREAS.

FIRST, WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE -- AND EVENTUALLY TO ELIMINATE -- THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.

THE WORLD HAS WITNESSED MORE THAN 100 MAJOR CONFLICTS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II ALONE. TODAY, THERE ARE ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND AFRICA. IN OTHER REGIONS, INDEPENDENT NATIONS ARE CONFRONTED BY HEAVILY ARMED NEIGHBORS SEEKING TO DOMINATE BY THREATENING ATTACK OR SUBVERSION.

MOST OF THESE CONFLICTS HAVE THEIR ORIGINS IN LOCAL PROBLEMS, BUT MANY HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES -- AND, OF COURSE, AFGHANISTAN HAS SUFFERED AN OUTRIGHT SOVIET INVASION.

FUELING REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND EXPORTING VIOLENCE ONLY EXACERBATE LOCAL TENSIONS, INCREASE SUFFERING, AND MAKE SOLUTIONS TO REAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS MORE DIFFICULT. FURTHER, SUCH ACTIVITY CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF LARGER CONFRONTATIONS.

WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER AND SAFER IF WE COULD WORK TOGETHER TO ASSIST PEOPLE IN AREAS OF CONFLICT IN FINDING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS? THAT SHOULD BE OUR MUTUAL GOAL. BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE GAP IN AMERICAN AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS AND POLICY IS SO GREAT THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE MUST BE MORE MODEST. AS A FIRST STEP, OUR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD JOINTLY EXAMINE CONCRETE ACTIONS WE BOTH CAN TAKE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF U.S.-SOVIET CONFRONTATION IN THESE AREAS. AND IF WE SUCCEED, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE.

OUR SECOND TASK SHOULD BE TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE VAST STOCKPILES OF ARMAMENTS IN THE WORLD.

IT IS TRAGIC TO SEE THE WORLD'S DEVELOPING NATIONS SPENDING MORE THAN \$150 BILLION A YEAR ON ARMED FORCES -- SOME 20 PERCENT OF THEIR NATIONAL BUDGETS. WE MUST FIND WAYS TO REVERSE THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF THREAT AND RESPONSE WHICH DRIVES ARMS RACES EVERYWHERE IT OCCURS.

WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE SIMPLE TRUTH IS, AMERICA'S TOTAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILE HAS DECLINED. TODAY, WE HAVE FAR FEWER NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAN WE HAD 20 YEARS AGO. AND IN TERMS OF ITS TOTAL DESTRUCTIVE POWER, OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IS AT THE LOWEST LEVEL IN 25 YEARS.

JUST 3 MONTHS AGO, WE AND OUR ALLIES AGREED TO WITHDRAW 1,400 NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM WESTERN EUROPE. THIS COMES AFTER THE REMOVAL OF A THOUSAND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM EUROPE 3 YEARS AGO, EVEN IF ALL OUR PLANNED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS -- AND WE HOPE THIS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY -- WE WILL HAVE ELIMINATED FIVE EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR EACH NEW WEAPON DEPLOYED.

BUT THIS IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT WILL GREATLY REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, PROVIDE GREATER STABILITY, AND BUILD CONFIDENCE.

OUR THIRD TASK IS TO ESTABLISH A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER, ONE MARKED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ARE BUILT ON DEEDS, NOT WORDS. COMPLYING WITH AGREEMENTS HELPS; VIOLATING THEM HURTS. RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS BOLSTERS THE RELATIONSHIP; DENYING THESE RIGHTS HARMS IT. EXPANDING CONTACTS ACROSS BORDERS AND PERMITTING A FREE INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND IDEAS INCREASE CONFIDENCE; SEALING OFF ONE'S PEOPLE FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD REDUCES IT. PEACEFUL TRADE HELPS, WHILE ORGANIZED THEFT OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS CERTAINLY HURTS.

COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO ARMS CONTROL. IN RECENT YEARS, WE HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES. COMPLIANCE IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE SEEK TRULY EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN MOUNTING EVIDENCE THAT PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED AND THAT ADVANTAGE HAS BEEN TAKEN OF AMBIGUITIES IN OUR AGREEMENTS.

IN RESPONSE TO A CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST, A REPORT ON THIS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT SIMPLY ASSUME THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED WILL BE FULFILLED. WE MUST TAKE THE SOVIET COMPLIANCE RECORD INTO ACCOUNT, BOTH IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR DEFENSE PROGRAM AND IN OUR APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE WILL WORK TO REMOVE THE OBSTACLES WHICH THREATEN TO UNDERMINE EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND THE BROADER ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.

THE EXAMPLES I HAVE CITED ILLUSTRATE WHY OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE. WE HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO TRY AND TRY AGAIN. WE MAY HAVE TO START IN SMALL WAYS, BUT START WE MUST.

IN WORKING ON THESE TASKS, OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON THREE GUIDING PRINCIPLES: REALISM, STRENGTH, AND DIALOGUE.

REALISM MEANS WE MUST START WITH A CLEAR-EYED UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD WE LIVE IN. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A LONG-TERM COMPETITION WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT SHARE OUR NOTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AT HOME AND PEACEFUL CHANGE ABROAD. WE MUST BE FRANK IN ACKNOWLEDGING OUR DIFFERENCES AND UNAFRAID TO PROMOTE OUR VALUES.

STRENGTH IS ESSENTIAL TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY AND PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. IF WE ARE WEAK, WE CAN DO NEITHER. STRENGTH IS MORE THAN MILITARY POWER. ECONOMIC STRENGTH IS CRUCIAL AND AMERICA'S ECONOMY IS LEADING THE WORLD INTO RECOVERY. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS OUR STRENGTH OF SPIRIT, AND UNITY AMONG OUR PEOPLE AT HOME AND WITH OUR ALLIES ABROAD. WE ARE STRONGER IN ALL THESE AREAS THAN WE WERE 3 YEARS AGO.

OUR STRENGTH IS NECESSARY TO DETER WAR AND TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS. SOVIET LEADERS KNOW IT MAKES SENSE TO COMPROMISE ONLY IF THEY CAN GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. AMERICA CAN NOW OFFER SOMETHING IN RETURN.

STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE GO HAND-IN-HAND. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH OUR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US, AND TO WORK FOR PRACTICAL, FAIR SOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL COMPROMISE. WE WILL NEVER RETREAT FROM NEGOTIATIONS.

I HAVE OPENLY EXPRESSED MY VIEW OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. I DON'T KNOW WHY THIS SHOULD COME AS A SURPRISE TO SOVIET LEADERS, WHO HAVE NEVER SHIED FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEW OF OUR SYSTEM. BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE CAN'T DEAL WITH EACH OTHER. WE DON'T REFUSE TO TALK WHEN THE SOVIETS CALL US "IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS" AND WORSE, OR BECAUSE THEY CLING TO THE FANTASY OF A COMMUNIST TRIUMPH OVER DEMOCRACY. THE FACT THAT NEITHER OF US LIKES THE OTHER'S SYSTEM IS NO REASON TO REFUSE TO TALK. LIVING IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE DO TALK.

OUR COMMITMENT TO DIALOGUE IS FIRM AND UNSHAKABLE. BUT WE INSIST THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH REAL PROBLEMS, NOT ATMOSPHERICS.

IN OUR APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS, REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR -- AND ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WAR -- IS PRIORITY NUMBER ONE. A NUCLEAR CONFLICT COULD WELL BE MANKIND'S LAST. THAT IS WHY I PROPOSED, OVER 2 YEARS AGO, THE "ZERO OPTION" FOR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. OUR AIM WAS AND CONTINUES TO BE TO ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

INDEED, I SUPPORT A ZERO OPTION FOR ALL NUCLEAR ARMS. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, MY DREAM IS TO SEE THE DAY WHEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE BANISHED FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH.

LAST MONTH, THE SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER STATED THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO AVERT THE THREAT OF WAR. THESE ARE ENCOURAGING WORDS. BUT NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE FROM WORDS TO DEEDS.

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL EXISTS; THE SOVIET LEADERS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. WE HAVE PROPOSED A SET OF INITIATIVES THAT WOULD REDUCE SUBSTANTIALLY NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION.

THE WORLD REGRETS -- CERTAINLY WE DO -- THAT THE SOVIET UNION BROKE OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, AND HAS NOT SET A DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS ON STRATEGIC ARMS AND ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE READY TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENTS IN I.N.F., START, AND M.B.F.R. WE WILL NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. WHENEVER THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO DO LIKEWISE, WE WILL MEET THEM HALFWAY.

WE SEEK TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND TO REDUCE THE CHANCES FOR DANGEROUS MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION. SO WE HAVE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS FOR WHAT WE CALL "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES." THEY COVER A WIDE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES. IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAVE PROPOSED TO EXCHANGE ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS OF MISSILE TESTS AND MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES. FOLLOWING UP ON CONGRESSIONAL SUGGESTIONS, WE ALSO PROPOSED A NUMBER OF WAYS TO IMPROVE DIRECT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. LAST WEEK, WE HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HERE IN WASHINGTON ON IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING THE "HOTLINE."

THESE BILATERAL PROPOSALS WILL BE BROADENED AT THE CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM. WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES TO DEVELOP PRACTICAL, MEANINGFUL WAYS TO REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTY AND POTENTIAL FOR MISINTERPRETATION SURROUNDING MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND TO DIMINISH THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK.

ARMS CONTROL HAS LONG BEEN THE MOST VISIBLE AREA OF U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE. BUT A DURABLE PEACE ALSO REQUIRES BOTH OF US TO DEFUSE TENSIONS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS.

TAKE THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE. EVERYONE'S INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY STABILITY IN THE REGION, AND OUR EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TOWARD THAT GOAL. THE SOVIETS COULD HELP REDUCE TENSIONS THERE INSTEAD OF INTRODUCING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS INTO THE AREA. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY HELP US TO DEAL MORE POSITIVELY WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

ANOTHER MAJOR PROBLEM IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS HUMAN RIGHTS. SOVIET PRACTICES IN THIS AREA, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER ISSUE, HAVE CREATED THE MISTRUST AND ILL WILL THAT HANGS OVER OUR RELATIONSHIP.

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS ALONE COMPEL US TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONCERN OVER PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OVER THE VIRTUAL HALT IN THE EMIGRATION OF JEWS, ARMENIANS, AND OTHERS WHO WISH TO JOIN THEIR FAMILIES ABROAD.

OUR REQUEST IS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD: THAT THE SOVIET UNION LIVE UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS IT HAS FREELY ASSUMED UNDER INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS -- IN PARTICULAR, ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE REAL. BUT WE CAN AND MUST KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS AND MAKE IT A BETTER AND MORE PEACEFUL WORLD FOR ALL MANKIND.

OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, A POLICY OF CREDIBLE DETERRENCE, PEACEFUL COMPETITION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION, WILL SERVE OUR TWO NATIONS AND PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. IT IS A POLICY NOT JUST FOR THIS YEAR, BUT FOR THE LONG TERM. IT IS A CHALLENGE FOR AMERICANS. IT IS ALSO A CHALLENGE FOR THE SOVIETS. IF THEY CANNOT MEET US HALFWAY, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS, AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. BUT WE WANT MORE THAN DETERRENCE; WE SEEK GENUINE COOPERATION; WE SEEK PROGRESS FOR PEACE.

COOPERATION BEGINS WITH COMMUNICATION. WE SEEK SUCH COMMUNICATION. AS I HAVE SAID, WE WILL STAY AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLES IN GENEVA AND VIENNA. FURTHERMORE, SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL BE MEETING THIS WEEK WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN STOCKHOLM. THIS MEETING SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS, SO THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS BECOME A REGULAR AND NORMAL COMPONENT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

OUR CHALLENGE IS PEACEFUL. IT WILL BRING OUT THE BEST IN US. IT ALSO CALLS FOR THE BEST FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

WE DO NOT THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION. FREEDOM POSES NO THREAT, IT IS THE LANGUAGE OF PROGRESS. WE PROVED THIS 35 YEARS AGO WHEN WE HAD A MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND COULD HAVE TRIED TO DOMINATE THE WORLD. BUT WE DIDN'T. INSTEAD WE USED OUR POWER TO WRITE A NEW CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND.

WE HELPED REBUILD WAR-RAVAGED ECONOMIES IN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST, INCLUDING THOSE OF NATIONS WHO HAD BEEN OUR ENEMIES. INDEED, THOSE FORMER ENEMIES ARE NOW NUMBERED AMONG OUR STAUNCHEST FRIENDS.

WE CAN'T PREDICT HOW THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL RESPOND TO OUR CHALLENGE. BUT THE PEOPLE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARE WITH ALL MANKIND THE DREAM OF ELIMINATING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. IT IS NOT AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM, BECAUSE ELIMINATING THESE RISKS IS SO CLEARLY A VITAL INTEREST FOR ALL OF US. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE NEVER FOUGHT EACH OTHER; THERE IS NO REASON WE EVER SHOULD. INDEED, WE FOUGHT COMMON ENEMIES IN WORLD WAR II. TODAY OUR COMMON ENEMIES ARE POVERTY, DISEASE AND, ABOVE ALL, WAR.

MORE THAN 20 YEARS AGO, PRESIDENT KENNEDY DEFINED AN APPROACH THAT IS AS VALID TODAY AS WHEN HE ANNOUNCED IT: "SO, LET US NOT BE BLIND TO OUR DIFFERENCES," HE SAID, "BUT LET US ALSO DIRECT ATTENTION TO OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND TO THE MEANS BY WHICH THOSE DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED."

WELL, THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE AND PHILOSOPHY. THE COMMON INTERESTS HAVE TO DO WITH THE THINGS OF EVERYDAY LIFE FOR PEOPLE EVERYWHERE.

SUPPOSE, FOR A MOMENT, IVAN AND ANYA FOUND THEMSELVES IN A WAITING ROOM, OR SHARING A SHELTER FROM THE RAIN WITH JIM AND SALLY, AND THERE WAS NO LANGUAGE BARRIER TO KEEP THEM FROM GETTING ACQUAINTED. WOULD THEY DEBATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS? OR, WOULD THEY FIND THEMSELVES COMPARING NOTES ABOUT THEIR CHILDREN, AND WHAT EACH OTHER DID FOR A LIVING?

BEFORE THEY PARTED COMPANY THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TOUCHED ON AMBITIONS, HOBBIES, WHAT THEY WANTED FOR THEIR CHILDREN AND THE PROBLEMS OF MAKING ENDS MEET. AND AS THEY WENT THEIR SEPARATE WAYS, ANYA WOULD BE SAYING TO IVAN, "WASN'T SHE NICE, SHE ALSO TEACHES MUSIC." JIM WOULD BE TELLING SALLY WHAT IVAN DID OR DIDN'T LIKE ABOUT HIS BOSS. THEY MIGHT EVEN HAVE DECIDED THAT THEY WERE ALL GOING TO GET TOGETHER FOR DINNER SOME EVENING SOON.

ABOVE ALL, THEY WOULD HAVE PROVEN THAT PEOPLE DON'T MAKE WARS. PEOPLE WANT TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN IN A WORLD WITHOUT FEAR, AND WITHOUT WAR. THEY WANT TO HAVE SOME OF THE GOOD THINGS OVER AND ABOVE BARE SUBSISTENCE THAT MAKE LIFE WORTH LIVING. THEY WANT TO WORK AT SOME CRAFT, TRADE, OR PROFESSION THAT GIVES THEM SATISFACTION AND A SENSE OF WORTH. THEIR COMMON INTERESTS CROSS ALL BORDERS.

IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTS PEACE, THEN THERE WILL BE PEACE. TOGETHER WE CAN STRENGTHEN PEACE, REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS, AND KNOW IN DOING SO WE HAVE HELPED FULFILL THE HOPES AND DREAMS OF THOSE WE REPRESENT AND INDEED OF PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. LET US BEGIN NOW.

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The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

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EUR/SOV/MULTI: AVERSHBOW:MLS
°/°3/84 EXT.632-8040, 2930M
THE SECRETARY

EUR:RBURT
NSC:JMATLOCK
S/S:BMCKINLEY

EUR/SOV:BLPASCOE
NSC:PSOMMER

IMMEDIATE LONDON

PRIORITY MOSCOW

EXDIS

DECL:OADR
PREL, UR, US, UK

GPS
AV
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PS
BMCK

- - - LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT ON HIS SPEECH ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS

°. § - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON JANUARY °6 AT °0:00 A.M. EST, THE PRESIDENT WILL
DELIVER A MAJOR ADDRESS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS.
AMBASSADOR SHOULD PROVIDE LETTER IN PARA 3 TO PRIME
MINISTER THATCHER ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON JANUARY °5 OR, IF
NECESSARY, OPENING OF BUSINESS MONDAY JANUARY °6. YOU
SHOULD ENCLOSE TEXT OF SPEECH [PROVIDED SEPTTEL]. THERE
WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

- WHEN YOU AND I MET AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER WE HAD A
USEFUL TALK ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE
LONGER TERM. I GREATLY VALUE THE ADVICE AND COUNSEL YOU
SHARED WITH ME. AT THAT TIME, THE KOREAN AIRLINES
TRAGEDY WAS VERY MUCH ON OUR MINDS. WITH MOSCOW'S
UNFORTUNATE DECISION TO SUSPEND THE MAJOR ARMS CONTROL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/9 #10892
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

NEGOTIATIONS, EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAVE ENTERED AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT PERIOD.

- AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I HAVE DECIDED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO PRESENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND TO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF MY APPROACH TO THE KEY ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS -- THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. I WILL DO THIS IN A MAJOR ADDRESS FROM THE EAST ROOM AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON MONDAY, JANUARY '6.

- MY ADDRESS, WHICH IS A COMPREHENSIVE ARTICULATION OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, WILL REAFFIRM OUR WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE POSITIVE AND STABLE LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP. I WILL CALL UPON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A COMPARABLE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE. WHILE, I WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCING ANY SPECIFIC NEW INITIATIVES; I WILL CLARIFY A NUMBER OF MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S. POLICY. I WILL ALSO BE SETTING A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

- GIVEN OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND THE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE THAT I ATTACH TO THIS STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY, I WANTED TO SHARE THE TEXT WITH YOU BEFOREHAND. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT MEETS OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF SETTING A POSITIVE TONE BOTH FOR THE OPENING OF THE CDE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM AND FOR GEORGE SHULTZ'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. I AM PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT GEORGE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE YOU A PERSONAL PREVIEW PRIOR TO HIS MEETINGS IN STOCKHOLM.

- WITH WARM REGARDS,

- - RON

END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EUR/SOV/MULTI: AVERSHBOW:AV
°/°2/84 EXT.8040, 2907M
EUR:RBURT

EUR/SOV:TWSIMONS, JR.
S/S:BMCKINLEY
NSC:SESTEINER

EUR:MPALMER
NSC:JMATLOCK

IMMEDIATE ALDAC
IMMEDIATE USIA WASHDC

INFORM CONSULS/PASS PAO'S
DECL: °/°7/84
PREL, UR, US

- - - GUIDANCE ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON
- - - US-SOVIET RELATIONS

°. [c] AS HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED, THE PRESIDENT WILL DELIVER
A MAJOR ADDRESS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS ON MONDAY, JANUARY
°6 AT °0:00 A.M. EST, AT THE WHITE HOUSE. THE TEXT OF
THE SPEECH WILL BE CABLED TO ALL POSTS WHEN AVAILABLE.
THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THEMES ON THE SPEECH, TOGETHER WITH
CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, FOR POSTS' USE ON AN
UNCLASSIFIED BASIS FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF THE SPEECH.
MATERIAL BELOW IS THEREFORE EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY OF
THE SPEECH.

2. [U] GENERAL THEMES:

-- ON MONDAY, JANUARY °6, AT THE EAST ROOM OF THE WHITE
HOUSE, THE PRESIDENT DELIVERED A MAJOR ADDRESS ON U.S.
RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE POINTING OUT THE
MANY PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONSHIP, HIS PRIMARY MESSAGE
WAS TO REAFFIRM THE READINESS OF THE U.S. TO PURSUE A
CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION
AIMED AT BUILDING A MORE PRODUCTIVE AND STABLE
RELATIONSHIP.

RB
AV
TWS
MP
BMCK
JM
SES

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By OW NARA, Date 8/5/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35

-- THE PRESIDENT DISCUSSED THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP -- INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL PROBLEMS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL COOPERATION -- STRESSING HIS DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD IN ALL THESE AREAS. HE EMPHASIZED HIS COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN ARMS LEVELS AND DIMINISHING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT, NOTING HIS READINESS TO MEET THE SOVIETS HALFWAY IF THEY ARE WILLING TO DO LIKEWISE. HE CALLED UPON THE USSR TO JOIN WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS. AND HE URGED THAT THE SOVIET UNION LIVE UP TO ITS HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE ASSUMED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.

-- THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS:

- -- THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF RECENT YEARS TO REVITALIZE U.S. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE STRENGTH. AS A RESULT, THE U.S. IS NOW IN A FAR BETTER POSITION FROM WHICH TO ESTABLISH A PRODUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

- -- THE PRESIDENT CITED THE PROFOUND AND OBVIOUS DIFFERENCES IN VALUES AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS THAT DIVIDE THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, BUT STRESSED THE VITAL COMMON INTEREST THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHARE IN THE AVOIDANCE OF WAR AND REDUCTION OF EXISTING LEVELS OF ARMS AND TENSIONS -- BOTH IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. IT IS THIS NEED TO PRESERVE THE PEACE THAT IS AT THE HEART OF U.S. DETERRENT POLICY. THE U.S. WILL DEFEND ITS INTERESTS, BUT DOES NOT SEEK TO THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION.

- -- THE PRESIDENT STATED THAT THERE IS NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO A POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION CONSISTING OF BOTH CREDIBLE DETERRENCE AND REALISTIC ENGAGEMENT. THIS IS A BALANCED POLICY THAT WILL PROTECT WESTERN INTERESTS, BUT IT IS ALSO DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

- -- THE PRESIDENT ELABORATED ON THE BASIC AIMS OF THE U.S. IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION: DEVELOPING WAYS TO ELIMINATE THE USE AND THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCING THE VAST ARMS STOCKPILES IN THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND ESTABLISHING A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP

WITH THE SOVIET UNION CHARACTERIZED BY GREATER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING AND BASED ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND RESPECT. THE U.S. WILL BE GUIDED IN ITS EFFORTS TO THOSE ENDS BY REALISM, STRENGTH AND WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND PRACTICAL DIALOGUE.

- -- THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THAT DIALOGUE IS FIRM. WE WILL INSIST THAT U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS SEEK PROGRESS IN SUBSTANCE AND NOT MERELY ATMOSPHERICS. IN PARTICULAR, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED OUR STRONG DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE FULL RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, NOTING U.S. INTEREST NOT ONLY IN REDUCING FORCE LEVELS THROUGH START, INF AND MBFR, BUT ALSO IN DIMINISHING THE RISKS OF CONFLICT THROUGH THE CDE AS WELL. WE ARE PREPARED TO GO HALFWAY TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS, IF THEY ARE WILLING TO DO LIKEWISE.

- -- THE PRESIDENT ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, NOTING THAT IT IS SOVIET PRACTICES IN THIS AREA, AS MUCH AS ANY OTHER ISSUE, THAT HAVE CREATED THE MISTRUST AND ILL WILL THAT HANGS OVER THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS.

- -- THE PRESIDENT RESTATED HIS CONVICTION THAT, DESPITE SERIOUS U.S.-SOVIET DIFFERENCES, CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS NOT INEVITABLE. MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS ARE NOT MERELY POSSIBLE BUT NECESSARY. HE CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTIONS TO THAT END.

END THEMES

3. ~~[U]~~ BEGIN CONTINGENCY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

A. SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

QUESTION

- IS SECRETARY SHULTZ DELIVERING TO GROMYKO IN STOCKHOLM A SPECIAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FOLLOW UP ON THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH?

ANSWER

- -- ALTHOUGH AS A MATTER OF COURSE WE DO NOT PROVIDE DETAILS OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Embargoed Until 10:00 EST 1/16

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

On Monday, January 16, in the East Room of the White House, the President will deliver a major address on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. While he will point out to the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable long-term relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response.

The following are the main points of the President's speech:

-- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic and defense strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a far better position from which to establish a productive and mutually beneficial long-term relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in values and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions -- both in bilateral relations and in other areas of the world. It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

-- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and realistic engagement. This is a balanced policy that will protect Western interests, but it is also designed to establish a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will elaborate on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 27, 1987
By CS NARA, Date 8/5/02 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

-- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm. We will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on the full range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing force levels through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise.

-- The President will also stress the importance of human rights, noting that it is Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over the US-Soviet relationship. The President will urge the Soviet Union to live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act and other international covenants.

-- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable. More positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end.

2896m/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For Immediate Release 1/14

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

On Monday, January 16, in the East Room of the White House, the President will deliver a major address on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. While he will point out the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable long-term relationship.

The President will discuss the full range of issues in the US-Soviet relationship -- including arms control, regional problems, human rights and bilateral cooperation -- stressing his desire to move forward in all these areas. The President will emphasize his commitment to achieving significant reductions in arms levels and diminishing the risks of conflict, noting his readiness to meet the Soviets halfway if they are willing to do likewise. And he will also urge that the Soviet Union live up to its human rights obligations, including those assumed under the Helsinki Final Act.

The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable, and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end.

2896m/1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 22, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 8/5/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~secret~~

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1/12/84 EXT.28040, 2887m
the secretary

eur:rburt
eur:mpalmer
eap/j:danderson
s/s:bmckinley

eur/sov:twsimons, jr
eap/c:danderson
eap/anz:jdorrance
nsc:jmatlock

immediate aledp, tokyo immediate, beijing immediate, canberra
immediate, wellington immediate
leningrad priority

exdis

decl: oadr

prel, ur, us

- - - president's speech on US-Soviet relations:
- - - briefing foreign governments

1. - entire text

2. On January 16 at 1000 a.m. EST, the President will
deliver a major address on US-Soviet relations. This
message contains instructions for briefing foreign
governments on the President's speech.

3. For London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Ottawa, Tokyo,
Canberra and Wellington: Ambassador should deliver
letter in para 7 from President Reagan to the Prime
Minister, enclosing complete text of the speech [provided
septel]. There will be no signed original. For Ottawa:
You should add at beginning of text, QUOTE: As you and I
discussed on December 15, UNQUOTE.

4. For All other NATO capitals, Stockholm, Vienna, Bern,
Helsinki, Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest and Beijing:
Ambassador should deliver letter in para 8 from Secretary
to Foreign Minister. There will be no signed original.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10893

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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5. For Moscow: instructions for briefing Soviets will be provided septel.

6. For All Addressees. We do not wish to brief countries other than those listed above prior to the speech. However, you may draw on the substance of the Secretary's letter in responding on a strictly if-asked basis to host government inquiries. We will be providing general themes and contingency q's and a's to all posts for public affairs purposes.

5. Begin Text of Letter from President to: Prime Ministers of UK, Italy, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand; FRG Chancellor; and French President:

Dear ----- [First name]:

- There can be no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I decided that it was important to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future. This statement will take the form of a major address on Monday, January 16 at the White House.

- In my address, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable relationship, and I will call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. Because this statement of U.S. policy will be of special significance, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand.

- I think you will agree that this will be an important speech, and that it should set a positive tone both for the opening of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and for Secretary of State Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

- Sincerely,

- - Ronald Reagan

~~secret~~

end text

6. Begin Text of letter from Secretary to Foreign Ministers.

Dear ----- [First Name or Mr. Minister, as appropriate]

- In the wake of Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations and the Korean Air Lines tragedy, the United States' relations with the Soviet Union have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, the President decided that it was important to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a statement of his approach to the Soviet-American relationship and his hopes for the future. This statement will take the form of a major address on Monday, January 16 at the White House.

- In that address, the President will reaffirm in explicit and authoritative terms the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response. Because this statement of U.S. policy will be of special significance, I wanted to share its central points with you beforehand.

- -- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic and defense strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a stronger position from which to deal effectively and realistically with the Soviet Union.

- -- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries nonetheless share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions -- both in direct relations and in third areas. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

- -- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and realistic engagement. This policy goes beyond simple containment.

~~secret~~

It is a balanced policy that can protect Western interests, but can also lead to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

- -- The President will elaborate on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

- -- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm, but we will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on a range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing the levels of weaponry through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise. He will urge that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act in regard to human rights.

- -- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end, pledging that they will find the U.S. equal in response.

- I believe that this will be an important speech and that it should set a good tone for the opening of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. [IF APPROPRIATE: I look forward to seeing you in Stockholm.]

- Sincerely

- - George P, Shultz

END TEXT

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~~SECRET~~

Talking Points for Briefing Congressional Leaders
on the President's Speech on US-Soviet Relations

-- On Monday, the President will deliver a major address on our relations with the Soviet Union.

-- While he will point to the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response.

-- The speech was under active consideration throughout the fall. In the wake of the KAL tragedy and Moscow's suspension of the major arms talks in response to NATO INF deployments, we felt it wise to give the Soviets time to let off steam before making such a high-level signal of our readiness to reinvigorate our bilateral dialogue.

-- With the CDE opening in Stockholm next week, with Secretary Shultz slated to meet Gromyko there, and with our report on compliance now completed, the President felt it was important to provide the American people and governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of his approach to the Soviet-American relationship and his hopes for the future.

-- Because this statement of U.S. policy will be of special significance, I wanted to share its central points with you beforehand.

-- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic and defense strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a stronger position from which to deal effectively and realistically with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR EO6-114/9 # 10894

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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-- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and realistic engagement. This policy goes beyond simple containment. It is a balanced policy that can protect Western interests, but can also lead to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will elaborate on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

-- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm, but we will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on a range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing the levels of weaponry through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise. He will urge that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act in regard to human rights.

-- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end, pledging that they will find the U.S. equal in response.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For Immediate Release 1/14

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

On Monday, January 16, the President will deliver a major address on our relations with the Soviet Union at the White House's East Room. While he will point to the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship.

The President will touch on full range of issues in the US-Soviet relationship, including arms control, regional security, human rights, and bilateral cooperation. In particular, he will stress his desire to move forward in reducing arms levels and diminishing the risks of conflict, noting his readiness to meet the Soviets halfway if they are willing to do likewise. He will also urge that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act on human rights.

The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable, and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end, pledging that they will find the U.S. equal in response.

2896m/1

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CW NARA, Date 8/5/82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Embargoed Until 10:00 EST 1/16

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

On Monday, January 16, the President will deliver a major address on our relations with the Soviet Union at the White House's East Room. While he will point to the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response.

The following are the main points of the President's speech:

-- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic and defense strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a stronger position from which to deal effectively and realistically with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries nonetheless share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions -- both in direct relations and in third areas. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

-- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and realistic engagement. This policy goes beyond simple containment. It is a balanced policy that can protect Western interests, but can also lead to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will elaborate on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significant reduction of the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CW NARA, Date 8/5/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 2 -

-- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm, but we will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on a range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing the levels of weaponry through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise. He will urge that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act in regard to human rights.

-- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end, pledging that they will find the U.S. equal in response.

2896m/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION ITEMS FOR PRESIDENT'S SPEECH
10:00 a.m. 1/16/84

Diplomatic:

(Burt meeting with Sokolov on compliance, 1630 Friday)

Call in Dobrynin: morning 1/14, briefing memo by COB 1/13.

Brief Gromyko (in Moscow 1/14 or in Stockholm morning 1/16).

Brief MFA morning 1/16, cable to Moscow/Stockholm by COB 1/13.

Brief majors: cables to Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand, Craxi, Nakasone, & Trudeau with message from President (NSC clearance), cables out by COB 1/14 for Monday morning delivery.

Brief other allies: cables from Secretary to other European and Asian Allies, Chinese (handover in NY?), EE's, others out 1/14. Brief morning 1/16.

Brief of embassies here morning 1/16 (?).

All-posts cable with speech text and Q & A's to go out 1/16, one hour before the speech.

Q & A's for use in capitals, with Congress, and with press.

Congress:

Congressional Briefing: Dam brief of Byrd/Baker 1/11. Compliance briefing on 1/13 by McFarlane, Howe, & George. Selected telephone calls.

Briefing Kennedy (call by President). *Probably meet on Bud*

Press:

(Burt backgrounder on 1500 Friday on compliance. Separate backgrounder on speech, CDE, and Shultz-Gromyko).

McFarlane briefing at White House, noon Saturday (compliance and speech).. Handout for Sunday papers. Embargoed fact sheet.

Palmer briefing at Foreign Press Center at 9:00 a.m. 1/16.

TV: Availability ??

Allies: *Briefing for 12:00 Monday*

Ty - informal
+ preliminary from
State. Appreciate
Your
Thoughts
Steve

Contingency Qs and As for President's Speech on US-Soviet Relations

1. Is Secretary Shultz delivering to Gromyko in Stockholm a special message from the President to follow up on the speech?
2. Have there been any recent direct communications between the President and Andropov?
3. How does positive tone of President's speech square with his earlier characterization of the USSR as the "focus of evil?"
4. Will the speech affect the Soviet decision to suspend the major arms control negotiations?
5. Is it realistic to expect progress in US-Soviet relations during an election year? Don't you think the Soviets will consider the speech a political ploy?
6. Why didn't the President offer any concrete proposals if he was really serious?
7. Do we expect a favorable Soviet response in view of the leadership uncertainties in Moscow?
8. How is the President's expressed willingness to "meet the Soviets half way" reflected in U.S. arms control proposals?
9. How does the Administration reconcile its forthcoming charges of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements with the positive message contained in the President's speech?
10. How do the President's defense budget and, in particular, the strategic defense initiative square with the conciliatory themes of the speech?
11. What is the current U.S. stance on the KAL shoot down? Has the issue been swept under the rug?
12. Which regional issues have been the subject of formal US-Soviet discussions? What have been the results?
13. What is the U.S. approach to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?
14. What is the U.S. approach to Soviet involvement in the Mideast?
15. What is the U.S. approach to the Soviet role in southern Africa?
16. What is the U.S. approach to Soviet support for left-wing forces in Central America?

17. Does the President's speech indicate an increased desire for a US-Soviet summit? Are there preparations underway for a summit? Is this a subject for discussion between Shultz and Gromyko at Stockholm?

18. Does the speech mean that the U.S. is going to reinitiate talks with the Soviets on new consulates and/or a new exchanges agreement, as had been under discussion prior to the KAL affair?

19. Is the U.S. downgrading the importance of increased Soviet respect for human rights as a prerequisite to improved bilateral relations?

20. Does the speech represent any change in U.S. policy on East-West trade and technology transfers?

2856m

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EUR/SOV/MULTI: AVERSHBOW: AV
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THE SECRETARY

EUR: RBURT
EUR: MPALMER
EAP/J: DANDERSON
S/S: BMCKINLEY

EUR/SOV: TWSIMONS, JR
EAP/C: DANDERSON
EAP/ANZ: JDORRANCE
NSC: JMATLOCK

IMMEDIATE ANATO, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, BEIJING IMMEDIATE, CANBERRA
IMMEDIATE, WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE, STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE, VIENNA IMMEDIATE,
PRIORITY MOSCOW, LENINGRAD PRIORITY, WARSAW PRIORITY, SOFIA PRIORITY,
BERLIN PRIORITY, PRAGUE PRIORITY

EXDIS

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PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS:
- - - BRIEFING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

°. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON JANUARY 16 AT 1000 A.M. EST, THE PRESIDENT WILL
DELIVER A MAJOR ADDRESS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS BEFORE THE
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB IN WASHINGTON. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS
INSTRUCTIONS FOR BRIEFING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON THE
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

3. FOR LONDON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, OTTAWA, TOKYO,
CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER
LETTER IN PARA 5 FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE PRIME
MINISTER, ENCLOSING COMPLETE TEXT OF THE SPEECH [PROVIDED
SEPTEL]. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. FOR OTTAWA:
YOU SHOULD ADD AT BEGINNING OF TEXT, QUOTE: AS YOU AND I
DISCUSSED ON DECEMBER 05, UNQUOTE.

4. FOR ALL OTHER NATO CAPITALS, STOCKHOLM, VIENNA, BERN,
BELGRADE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST AND BEIJING: AMBASSADOR
SHOULD DELIVER LETTER IN PARA 6 FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN
MINISTER. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

GPS
AV
RB
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MP
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BMCK
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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 # 10895

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~SECRET~~

Talking Points for Briefing Congressional Leaders
on the President's Speech on US-Soviet Relations

-- On Monday, the President will deliver a major address on our relations with the Soviet Union.

-- While he will point to the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response.

-- The speech was under active consideration throughout the fall. In the wake of the KAL tragedy and Moscow's suspension of the major arms talks in response to NATO INF deployments, we felt it wise to give the Soviets time to let off steam before making such a high-level signal of our readiness to reinvigorate our bilateral dialogue.

-- With the CDE opening in Stockholm next week, with Secretary Shultz slated to meet Gromyko there, and with our report on compliance now completed, the President felt it was important to provide the American people and governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of his approach to the Soviet-American relationship and his hopes for the future.

[-- Because this statement of U.S. policy will be of special significance, I wanted to share its central points with you beforehand.

-- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic and defense strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a stronger position from which to deal effectively and realistically with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

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NLRR F06-114/a #10876

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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-- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and realistic engagement. This policy goes beyond simple containment. It is a balanced policy that can protect Western interests, but can also lead to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will elaborate on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

-- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm, but we will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on a range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing the levels of weaponry through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise. He will urge that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act in regard to human rights.

-- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end, pledging that they will find the U.S. equal in response.

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- 2 -

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Washington, D.C. 20520

January 11 1984

*Files to Aust
+ NZ
1st name basis
Cheap gesture
NZ coming*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: EUR - All country desk officers
 EAP/C - Mr. Anderson
 EAP/J - Mr. Anderson
 EAP/ANZ - Mr. Dorrance

FROM: EUR/SOV - Thomas W. Simons, Jr.

SUBJECT: Briefing Foreign Governments on President's
 Speech on US-Soviet Relations

As you probably know, the President will be giving a speech on US-Soviet relations on Monday, January 16. The White House will be announcing the speech shortly.

Based on discussions with the NSC, it has been agreed that the President will send letters a few days ahead of time, enclosing the full text of the speech, to the Prime Ministers of the UK, France, FRG, Italy, Japan, and Canada. The Secretary will at the same time send letters summarizing the main points of the speech to Foreign Ministers of other NATO countries, as well as those of Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, and China.

Attached are drafts of the President's and Secretary's letters. Please provide comments and, if deemed absolutely essential, any special language to be added for your country of responsibility, to Sandy Vershbow (room 4225, 632-8040 or 1671) by 5:00 pm today in the case of the Presidential letter, and 10:00 am Thursday, in the case of the Secretary's letter.

AV/2874m

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/9 #10897

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
ON HIS JANUARY 16 SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS
(For UK, France, FRG, Japan, Italy, Canada)

Dear :

There can be no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I decided that it was important to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future. This statement will take the form of a major address on Monday, January 16 before the National Press Club of Washington.

In my address, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable relationship, and I will call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. Because this statement of U.S. policy will be of special significance, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand.

I think you will agree that this will be an important speech, and that it should set a positive tone both for the opening of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and for Secretary of State Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

2871m

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NLRRF06-114/9 #10898

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY ON THE
PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 16 SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Dear :

In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, the United States' relations with the Soviet Union have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, the President decided that it was important to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a statement of his approach to the Soviet-American relationship and his hopes for the future. This statement will take the form of a major address on Monday, January 16 before the National Press Club of Washington.

In that address, the President will reaffirm in explicit and authoritative terms the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable relationship. He will call upon the Soviets for a comparable and substantive response. Because this statement of U.S. policy will be of special significance, I wanted to share its central points with you beforehand.

-- The President will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic and defense strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a stronger position from which to deal effectively and realistically with the Soviet Union.

-- The President will cite the profound and obvious differences in policies and political systems that divide the U.S. and Soviet Union, but will also stress the vital common interest that the two countries nonetheless share in the avoidance of war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions -- both in direct relations and in third areas. It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.

-- The President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and realistic engagement. This policy goes beyond simple containment. It is a balanced policy that can protect Western interests, but can also lead to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/9 #10899

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

-- The President will elaborate on the basic aims of the U.S. in its relations with the Soviet Union: developing ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in international disputes; significant reduction of the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect. The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

-- The U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm, but we will insist that U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek progress in substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on a range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing the levels of weaponry through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risks of conflict through the CDE as well. We are prepared to go halfway to meet Soviet concerns, if they are willing to do likewise. He will urge that the Soviet Union live up to its obligations assumed under the Helsinki Final Act in regard to human rights.

-- The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end, pledging that they will find the U.S. equal in response.

I believe that this will be an important speech and that it should set a good tone for the opening of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. [I look forward to seeing you in Stockholm.]

2853

~~SECRET~~

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8400415

RECEIVED 17 JAN 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM DARMAN, R

DOCDATE 16 JAN 84



KEYWORDS USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SPEECHES

DARMAN REFERRAL

SUBJECT. PRES SOVIET SPEECH RE EXCERPTS FM MCFARLANE BRIEFING

ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

ROBINSON

FORTIER

KRAEMER

Lehman, R

Sommer

Sims

Martin

Kimmitt (CL CL)

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

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WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/16/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: FYI

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH: EXERPTS FROM MCFARLANE'S BRIEFING

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCFARLANE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McMANUS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FELDSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	VERSTANDIG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
			WHITTLESEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HERRINGTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Attached are selected pages of interest from Bub McFarlane's background briefing on the President's Soviet Speech.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702

62

Our assistance package in the Jackson Plan will stress this recognition. We also note that while the Commission was developing its long-range recommendations, it also emphasized the urgent nature of the situation in El Salvador specifically.

We thus will include in our proposals to the Congress specific requests which will enable that country to persevere in its effort to improve democratic institutions, human rights, and to resist the threat of externally supported guerrillas.

Please note, in particular, that the President meant exactly what he said about the so-called controversy over military assistance to El Salvador and human rights. We will continue to work closely with the Congress on this issue. We will, for example, on the 16th of this month, send forward a full report on the situation in El Salvador, despite the fact that much was made of his pocket veto of the certification bill.

The Jackson Plan will encompass, as I've said, the recommendations of the Commission with regard to political reform, economic assistance, development measures, security assistance, human rights conditions, and with regard to how democracy can best be promoted throughout the area.

That's the conclusion of what I have to say on that subject, and that's available now. And we'll proceed now to a shorter statement on the speech which was usable tomorrow.

On Monday, in the East Room of the White House, the President will give a major address on United States relations with the Soviet Union. The President will take this occasion to reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union -- dialogue designed to establish a stable and mutually beneficial long-term relationship.

The fundamental purpose of the President's address will be to present in a clear and comprehensive manner his objective which is to solve problems with the Soviet Union and to improve the state of this crucial relationship.

The address comes on the eve of the opening, in Stockholm, of a promising new East-West arms control conference, the CDE, the objectives of which are to reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe and to inhibit using arms for war or intimidation.

The President's address is also timed to help establish the framework for the resumption, in Stockholm on January 17th, of a dialogue between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko -- which we also hope will help to move the U.S.-Soviet relationship forward.

It's also important to note in this context that the measures taken by the administration to restore the credibility of our military deterrent along with our efforts to reestablish America's political and economic strength have put us, in the President's judgment, have put us in the best position, in perhaps a generation, to achieve now the improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relationship which all of us seek.

That is the end of that.

Q That's releasable tomorrow?

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- P.M.?

MR. SIMS: Six p.m. tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And now I propose a treat in a little greater detail, for about two minutes, the speech itself. That's -- this being useable -- 3 o'clock Monday morning, or --

MR. SIMS: At the time of the delivery -- 10 o'clock.

Q Ten o'clock?

MR. SIMS: Ten o'clock.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay.

MORE

The following are the main points in the President's speech.

First, he will describe the successful efforts of recent years to revitalize U.S. political, economic, military and spiritual strength. As a result, the U.S. is now in a far better position, in his judgment, to establish a productive and beneficial long-term, stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the President will cite the profound and obvious differences in values and political systems that divide the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but will also stress the common interests that the two countries share in the avoidance of war and the reduction of existing levels of arms and of tensions generally both in bilateral relations and in other fora.

It is this need to preserve and strengthen the peace that is at the heart of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its interests; but it does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union or to alter its system.

Thirdly, the President will state that there is no rational alternative to a policy toward the Soviet Union consisting of both credible deterrence and peaceful competition. Credible deterrence and peaceful competition. This is a balanced policy that will protect Western interests. But it is also designed to establish the basis for constructive cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Fourth, the President will set forth a framework for U.S. relations with the Soviet Union that concentrates on trying to achieve improvements in three broad areas.

First, to develop ways to eliminate the use and the threat of force in the resolution of international disputes.

Secondly, significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

Third, establishing a better working relationship with the Soviet Union characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and based on mutual restraint and respect.

The U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and practical dialogue.

Fifth, the U.S. commitment to that dialogue is firm; but we will insist that in our talks with the Soviet Union we achieve substance and not merely atmospherics. In particular, the President will stress our strong desire to move forward on the full range of arms control issues, noting U.S. interest not only in reducing force levels through START, INF and MBFR, but also in diminishing the risk of conflict through the CDE Conference as well and through other fora, such as in Geneva, the Committee on Disarmament, now engaged in discussions upon chemical weapons.

Next, the President will also stress the importance of human rights, noting that it is the Soviet practices in this area as much as on any other issue that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The President will urge the Soviet Union to live up to its obligations, assumed under the Helsinki Pact, and other international covenants.

The President will also call for Soviet cooperation in efforts to reduce regional tension and terrorism, particularly in the Middle East.

Finally, the President will restate our conviction that despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable. More constructive relations are not merely possible, but necessary. We will call on the Soviet Union for positive steps to that end.

To kind of punctuate what I've said, I would offer three quotations that seem relevant thematically to the central purpose of the speech. The President in the opening paragraphs of his speech notes that "I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union."

About one minute into the speech, the President notes as well that "America's deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve."

And further, on the same page, "Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests and the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation."

Finally, this is, I suppose, only relative in the context of its history, and it is a quote from President Kennedy. But the context, in my judgment, is probably as important as the quote. You recall that after the Cuban Missile Crisis that President Kennedy gave a speech and after this period of crisis, that speech, expressing his conviction on what ought to be possible in U.S.-Soviet relationships, led ultimately to the conclusion of -- well, an improved climate, an improved relationship and some tangible manifestations of that improvement. And the President in his speech states, "More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it. 'So let us not be blind to our differences,' he said. 'But let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved.'"

Be glad to take your questions now.

Q Do you have any concern that the conciliatory gesture --

Q -- what basis --

Q -- and the things that are concluded in the speech are going to be underlined by the report on Soviet violations of arms agreements now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. The spectrum of the relationship includes arms control. And arms control to live up to, its potential has to be based on confidence and trust and where that confidence and trust is called into question, as it has been, it must be restored or we risk undermining the process of arms control itself.

It's the President's commitment to the resolution of these disagreements and his concern that the arms control process be preserved that's led him to treat the issue as he has and what will be a confidential report to the Congress and follow-up efforts to resolve these areas of disagreement at the SAC in Geneva. And surely, if we're going to do better in the future, we have to learn from the past.

MR. SIMS: I think that I want to restate that the Q&A is also embargoed until the time of delivery.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Andrea.

Q To follow up on that, is he going to mention the violations in his recapitulation of the current state of the relationship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will --

Q In this speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, he will. And he'll -- it occupies a paragraph and it acknowledges that we have finished review and -- in the terms that I've just used -- stresses that if arms control is to be -- to realize its potential, it has to be based on trust and it's that -- that's what we're after.

Q Will he cite the specific instances that we've been briefed upon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Chris.

Q What practical impact do you think this speech will have on the three audiences it's directed at: The Soviets and the opportunity of trying to get them back to the table; the Europeans, in trying to continue to maintain the confidence and unity of the alliance; and then, thirdly, the American audience and concerns they may have that the President's getting us into a cold war?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I just can't prejudge how any of those audiences is going to answer.

Obviously, the President hopes that it will remove any ambiguity, if it exists, about his personal commitment to the resolution of problems with the Soviet Union. Decisions to return to arms control is a matter for their decision.

It would seem to me that his remarks will be well received in -- among allies and they are entirely consistent with their own attitudes exchanged with the President in recent weeks.

Q Does the President have any specific suggestions on how to get the arms talks back together in this speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President makes clear the high priority that he places on the reduction of arms and our readiness to engage in talks with flexibility and openness to any suggestion. That commitment, that expression of flexibility, while not new, is, in his judgment, all that is required to make real progress. And if the Soviet Union is interested in any respect, they will find us certainly willing to meet them half way.

Q Well, following up on that, as you know, the Soviets have said in a variety of ways that the only way they'll go back to the talks is if we go back to withdrawing the deploy-
ment of nuclear missiles in Europe. That would seem to give us

a situation in which there's no possibility, unless the Americans are willing to come forth with some new suggestions. What's your assessment of that situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To interpret what the Soviets have said is that they would return if they are guaranteed a monopoly and if there is zero on the Western side of corresponding systems.

Now, we've devoted three years as a cohesive, allied common effort to make clear that that proposition is unacceptable. And so we don't

MORE