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**Folder Title:** [President Address: US-Soviet Relations  
01/16/1984] Speech on US- Soviet Relations  
Background Material] (4)

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## MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Action Plan for President's Speech

*Please see notes*  
M

This is an action plan that we are employing in preparation for the President's speech on Soviet-American relations next Monday. There are three components of our action plan:

- Pre-Speech Treatment of Important Domestic Constituencies
- Diplomatic Notification
- Post-Speech Follow-Up

PRE-SPEECH PUBLIC TREATMENTDomestic

Press: Announcement on Wednesday, January 11

Backgrounder to be given by you at 12:00 Saturday. (State is preparing "Fact Sheet" for your use; due here Thursday January 12 at 12:00 noon). Steiner is coordinating with Sims.

Congress: Congressional leaders will be briefed simultaneously with compliance brief. We recommend that you not directly link compliance with the speech, but bring up the speech as a follow-on. Chris Lehman has the lead; State is arranging attendance for the compliance briefing. Since Congress is not in session it may be necessary to arrange further briefings for selected Senators and Congressmen.

Other: We have compiled a list of important individuals who should be notified and whom we recommend contact them. The list is at Tab A. Request that you approve or modify both the list and those charged with being the contact. The "Fact Sheet" will serve as the basis for these calls; individual touches will be added.

Foreign

Press in Washington: Mark Palmer (State) will brief at the Foreign Press Center Monday at 0900.

VOA/USIA: Steve Steiner is coordinating arrangements for translation and VOA transmission. He is also checking on possibility of carrying speech on EURONET.

Posts Abroad: State is sending a "Heads-Up" cable. Steiner will coordinate with State to ensure that a "talker" follows.

DIPLOMATIC TREATMENT

With Soviets: State will send cable to Moscow. DCM Zimmerman will brief Korniyenko Monday. Hartman may raise with Gromyko during discussion on compliance.

State will provide Dobrynin w/text and briefing Monday.

With West European/Others: State is drafting a Presidential letter to be sent to Trudeau, Kohl, Nakasone, Thatcher, Craxi and Mitterrand. Will be delivered Monday morning. Sigur will carry to Nakasone.

Shultz will write to selected other Foreign Ministers.

State will give background briefing to Allied Embassies in Washington.

POST-SPEECH FOLLOW-UP

Domestic: Appearances on Television (Dam, Eagleburger and Palmer to be available if asked)

Posts Abroad: Q&A's sent by Monday for use after speech.

Steiner will try to arrange a EURONET appearance for you on January 20, but there may be a problem with that date.

Press: Press backgrounder for selected columnists given by you. Bob Sims agrees and indicates that he is prepared to coordinate this follow-on briefing (Monday-Wednesday) after the speech.

A Day by day checklist of your actions is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the action plan as outlined above.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Steve Steiner, Bob Sims, Chris Lehman, Ron Lehman

*Sooner  
this should go  
out to  
T, K, M & C  
no later  
than Sat  
through  
our  
channel*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 10, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY/PETER SOMMER/TC COBB

SUBJECT: Public Handling of President's Speech

Following are suggested individuals who should be contacted prior to the President's delivery of the speech on U.S.-Soviet relations, and the person who should contact them:

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Contact Person</u>	
I. <u>Former Presidents:</u> President Carter President Ford President Nixon	Bud McFarlane	ok
II. <u>Former NSC Advisors:</u> William P. Clark Richard V. Allen Zbigniew Brzezinski Brent Scowcroft Henry Kissinger McGeorge Bundy Walter Rostow	Bud McFarlane	ok
III. <u>Renowned Soviet Foreign Policy Experts:</u> Richard Pipes William Hyland Helmut Sonnenfeldt Marshall Shulman	Jack Matlock	✓
IV. <u>Former Ambassadors to USSR:</u> Walter Stoessel Malcolm Toon Thomas Watson Jacob Beam Foy Kohler Averell Harriman	Jack Matlock	✓
V. <u>Former Secretaries of State:</u> Alexander Haig Cyrus Vance William Rogers Dean Rusk MUSKIE	Richard Burt	✓
VI. <u>Congress:</u> Senator Kennedy	<del>McFarlane/Messe</del>	

2, Ldrshp O'Neill, Byrd  
Baker, Wright, Michel  
Tom... 11... To... R...

MCFARLANE SCHEDULE FOR SOVIET SPEECH

~~Thursday, January 12 and~~  
Friday, January 13 *and Saturday*

Initiate telephone briefings  
of selected individuals

Saturday, January 14

Backgrounder 12:00 noon

Date uncertain

Post-speech backgrounder for  
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Wednesday)

Friday, January 20

Possible EURONET speech

*Oh*

927

National Security Council  
The White House

CT

84 JAN 12 AIO: 58

System # I

Package # 0287

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>7</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Jack  
 Let's get letters over tomorrow (1/13/84)  
 we will send in the cabinet channel, so  
 we do not need in final green, but  
 double-spaced, cable format.

TO NSC/S

Please close out. No further  
action required. Provide  
copy to Peter Sumner

Thank you.

Peter Sumner

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January 12, 1984

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VI. <u>Congress:</u> Senator Kennedy	McFarlane/Meese

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*✓ OK*

*to be done*

*LYMA - OK ??*

*on Shultz*

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Jan 17 11

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

To Jack Meadlo  
Ty Cobb

Subject: Action Plan For  
President's Speech

I have closed this out. There  
is no further action other than  
the post-speech backgrounders  
that Sims is handling.

I suspect you would want to  
see Bud's notes. You will remark  
that we were able to turn  
him around and send the Presidential  
letters via State channels.

Peter Sonne

*Sommer*  
0287  
12  
*Please see notes*  
*M*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 12, 1984

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President Nixon

Bud McFarlane

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Henry Kissinger  
McGeorge Bundy  
Walter Rostow

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III. Renowned Soviet Foreign Policy Experts:  
Richard Pipes  
William Hyland  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt  
Marshall Shulman

Jack Matlock

✓

IV. Former Ambassadors to USSR:  
Walter Stoessel  
Malcolm Toon  
Thomas Watson  
Jacob Beam  
Foy Kohler  
Averell Harriman

Jack Matlock

✓

V. Former Secretaries of State:  
Alexander Haig  
Cyrus Vance  
William Rogers  
Dean Rusk  
MUSKIE

Richard Burt

✓

VI. Congress:  
Senator Kennedy

~~McFarlane/Messe~~

? Adrshp O'Neill, Byrd  
Baker, Wright, Mische  
Tower, Pines, Nease, Ford, ...

MCFARLANE SCHEDULE FOR SOVIET SPEECH .

~~Thursday, January 12 and~~  
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The White House

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System # I

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COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

Jack  
 Let's get letters over tomorrow (1/13/84)  
 we will send in the cabinet channel, so  
 we do not need in final green, but  
 double-spaced, cable format.

TO NSC/S

Please close out. No further  
action required. Provide  
copy to Peter Sommer

Thank you.

Peter Sommer

January 12, 1984

18

1:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

EAST ROOM

MONDAY, January 16, 1984

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and *vague?* [preserve peace.] We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for *nuclear* [genuine purposes.]

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace *nuclear* [that enhances dignity] for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self doubt and self reproach and

neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During this period, the USSR devoted twice as much of its gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. It deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States had no comparable weapons.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet <sup>global ambitions.</sup> [aggressive-ness.] From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies have tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate [from the American people] to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best <sup>performance</sup> [recovery] since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: Deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger now that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973 threat of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At no time in the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert. Yes, we are safer now.

*I'm  
checking  
validity*

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why I say that 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace which are at hand, we must do more to seek out areas of mutual interest and build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting totalitarian rule only exacerbate local conflicts, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Furthermore, such activity carries with it the risk of confrontations.

It would be better and safer if we could work together to assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our ultimate goal.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be

necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed. 23

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control progress.

I will soon submit to the Congress <sup>a</sup> the report on these Soviet activities <sup>as Congress has requested</sup> [which it requested from me.] I will, of course, see to it that our modernization program takes <sup>Soviet</sup> them into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. **But** I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it

behavior



is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, <sup>a process</sup> which offers us the means to improve the security of both our countries and to create a safer world.

The examples I have cited illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to <sup>persevere</sup> try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we can negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak we can do neither. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are

Not clear. what is it they get in return?

prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. 25

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from <sup>candidly</sup> expressing their <sup>opinions</sup> view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that <sup>we are in continuous communication,</sup> [we do talk.]

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed over two years ago, a zero solution for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero <sup>outcome</sup> ~~option~~ for all nuclear <sup>weapons</sup> ~~arms~~. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words, but the Soviets should back them up with concrete proposals that would lead to this nuclear-free world.

The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it.

We have undertaken a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation by providing greater stability. In the most recent round of negotiations on strategic arms we proposed -- with strong Congressional support -- a novel concept to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals on both sides by removing more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This proposal was not intended to disadvantage the Soviet Union. But it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these horrendous weapons and to make deterrence <sup>more viable</sup> [safer] by moving to fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the [negotiating] table to work toward agreements in INF, START and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of

communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing thousands of its military personnel and countless sophisticated weapons into Syria during the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. The Soviets have announced to the world time and again that they have important interests in the Middle East. So do we. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in that region. I call upon the Soviets to use their influence to limit tensions and to contribute to security in the Middle East. The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet

Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. ~~But~~ we can [and [must]] keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition and constructive cooperation [that] will serve both nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than <sup>competition</sup> [deterrence]; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. As I have said, we will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be

*and unavoidable. But we should also keep in mind that, despite our differences, we have not ever had an armed conflict between our two countries. This next meeting and the visit to our relationship I would emphasize in so doing.*

followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved.

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their

Is this  
repetitive?

Don't  
understand  
this

children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she also teaches music." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine purposes.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self doubt and self reproach and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During this period, the USSR devoted twice as much of its gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. It deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20



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intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States had no comparable weapons.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies have tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: Deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger now that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973 threat of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At no time in the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert. Yes, we are safer now.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why I say that 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace which are at hand, we must do more to seek out areas of mutual interest and build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting totalitarian rule only exacerbate local conflicts, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Furthermore, such activity carries with it the risk of confrontations.

It would be better and safer if we could work together to assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our ultimate goal.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

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It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the

rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes them into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, which offers us the means to improve the security of both our countries and to create a safe world.

The examples I have cited illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

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Strength means we can negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak we can do neither. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear

confrontation could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed over two years ago, a zero solution for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words, but the Soviets should back them up with concrete proposals that would lead to this nuclear-free world.

The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it.

We have undertaken a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation by providing greater stability. In the most recent round of negotiations on strategic arms we proposed -- with strong Congressional support -- a novel concept to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals on both sides by removing more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This proposal was not intended to disadvantage the Soviet Union. But it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these horrendous weapons and to make deterrence safer by moving to fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START and MBFR. We will negotiate

in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing thousands of its military personnel and countless sophisticated weapons into Syria during the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. The Soviets have announced to the world time and again that they have important interests in the Middle East. So do we. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in that region. I



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The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

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any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, <sup>and constructive cooperation</sup> and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere. <sup>It is a policy, not just for this year, but for the long term.</sup> ~~for the long haul.~~ It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting <sup>this week</sup> with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. ~~No one~~ <sup>We can't</sup> can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating ~~these~~ <sup>risks</sup> is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we ~~have~~ fought ~~alongside one another in two world wars.~~ <sup>Common enemies in World War II.</sup> Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ~~ignorance~~ and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as ~~realistic and hopeful~~ <sup>valid</sup> today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments?

Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

## Soviet speech

~~Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group.~~ I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine purposes.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

January, 1984 offers good opportunities for peace, and these opportunities extend most importantly to the US-Soviet relationship. On the eve of the Stockholm conference I would like to issue a challenge to the leaders of the Soviet Union. I challenge them to join us in a new, historic attempt to move away from sterile confrontation to constructive engagement, from bellicose rhetoric to reasoned dialogue, from threats and use of force to peaceful competition.

My challenge would demand the best in us and benefit all the peoples of the world. It would take the example of postwar Europe and apply it across the globe. It would lessen the tensions that exist in the world today and do much to eliminate the risks of major war. My challenge would bring us together in the search of a better life for all of us.



The American people can take up this challenge with confidence, because it reflects their highest aspirations for peace. Just a few year ago, perhaps, this would not have been so. During the 1970's, many Americans--and many others--questioned our purposes and our role in the world. This questioning eroded our self-confidence and raised doubts about our commitment to a strong defense. During these same years the Soviet Union continued inexorably to build up its forces and increasingly to use its military power and that of its surrogates beyond its own borders. During the past three years much has changed. We Americans have reaffirmed our commitment to a strong military, and moved to restore a military balance. Our economy is enjoying a strong recovery. We have regained confidence in ourselves, our values and our purposes.

Our relationship with the Soviet Union cannot ignore the very real differences that exist between us. I have spoken frankly of these differences in the belief that we must recognize them before we can resolve them. Yet speaking of these differences does not negate the fact that we share with the Soviet Union certain common interests, the first of which is, as John Kennedy said so many years ago, that we live on the same planet.

The United States has long been dedicated to the cause of peace; the stability of Europe today--and the peace that

continent has known for almost four decades--is in large part a result of this dedication. In spite of the harsh rhetoric that emanates from the Kremlin I sincerely believe that the Soviet leadership also realizes that there is absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose from reckless and dangerous confrontation. Let us work, then, to identify areas in which we can take initial steps to make the world safer.

One such area is arms control. We, the United States, have negotiated sincerely with the Soviet Union over the size of our conventional forces in Europe, our intermediate nuclear forces, and our strategic nuclear forces. While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what was needed to establish a stable nuclear balance and to maintain effective deterrence. In fact, America's nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago, and our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just two months ago we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This follows the removal of one thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate nuclear range missiles have to be deployed in Europe--and we hope this will not be necessary--we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new one deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It is with this goal in mind that I first proposed in November 1981 the "zero option" for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words, but the Soviets must back them up with concrete proposals that would lead to this nuclear-free world. The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviets must take advantage of it. I challenge the Soviet leadership to move from words to deeds. If they do so, they will find the United States ready to work hard, and fast, to move as far down the road toward a non-nuclear world as the realities of our over-armed and excessively suspicious times will permit.

We have noted the Soviet proposal last week to eliminate chemical weapons from Europe. We and our allies will want to discuss this proposal among ourselves before responding formally, but on the face of it we believe any proposal should be studied carefully. There are some obvious problems: For example, chemical weapons can be easily transported, and a

regional ban would not, in our view, be sufficient. Our goal is to ban all chemical weapons everywhere, and we and our allies have been negotiating at the Conference on Disarmament toward this end. Vice President Bush presented a major proposal to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last February. The most essential component of any such agreement -- the only sure means of providing adequate assurances -- is effective procedures for verification, and our efforts in Geneva have been aimed at reaching agreement on verification. As a further stimulus to the work of the Geneva negotiations, I will be instructing our negotiators to present a draft treaty for the complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons on a global basis, in the upcoming round of the Conference on Disarmament.

We could extend our efforts to reduce the superpower arsenals to an effort to rein in the arms race in the Third World. It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion per year on arms--a sum equal to almost 20 percent of their national budgets. The Soviet Union and its East bloc allies have played an important and very unhealthy role in escalating the arms race in the Third World.

Armed conflicts are currently raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems; but many

are fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. These local conflicts in turn threaten superpower confrontation which we do not seek and from which neither of us has anything to gain and potentially much to lose.

I challenge the Soviet leadership to join us in ending the Third World arms race. Let us begin by breaking the vicious cycle of threat and response that has driven the arms race in the developing world.

Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbate local disputes, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict to negotiate peaceful solutions? I challenge the Soviet leaders to join us in cooperative efforts to seek such solutions.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing thousands of its military personnel and countless sophisticated weapons into Syria during the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. The Soviets have announced to the world time and again that they have important interests in the Middle East. So do we. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in that region. I challenge the Soviets to use their influence to limit tensions and to contribute to

security in the Middle East. The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

In Southeast Asia, Moscow's ally, Vietnam, continues to occupy neighboring Kampuchea despite the repeated calls from the U.N. and Kampuchea's neighbors for a complete withdrawal and arrangements that would permit the people of that conflict-torn country to choose their own leaders. As the dry season in that area begins, Vietnamese forces are poised for new attacks near the Thai border, and tensions remain high. I challenge the Soviet leaders and their Vietnamese allies to reduce their forces in Kampuchea, to begin a serious dialogue with Thailand and the other ASEAN countries, and to move away from this interminable conflict.

In August 1982, South Africa informed the UN Secretary General that it was prepared to proceed to a Namibia settlement if an agreement on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola could be reached. What needs to be done is clear. I challenge the Soviet Union to contribute constructively to the achievement of peace in the region and Namibian independence.

Most importantly, I challenge the Soviet leadership to step back from their ideology and rhetoric and coolly assess the present opportunity to improve our bilateral relations. They could demonstrate their sincerity by lowering the temperature of the overheated rhetoric which has come lately from the

Kremlin. Their harsh words have frightened much of the world with their suggestions of heightened international uncertainty and their scarcely veiled warnings of the increased danger of conflict. Such rhetoric should not obscure the fact that the restoration of a political-military balance has opened the way for true progress to be made in improving our bilateral relations, as well as providing the opportunity for us to further the cause of global peace.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Proof of our commitment to peace is evident in our historic behavior. Thirty-five years ago we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. We could have used them to dominate the world, but we did not. Instead, we dedicated ourselves to the restoration of the war-ravaged economies of Europe. We have built a strong system of alliances and we value these ties above all others. But these are solely defensive relationships and we have no intention of attacking others. Likewise our relations with friendly non-allies like China are aimed at improving global stability and prosperity; they do not threaten the USSR or any other country. With the Soviets, our approach was articulated more than 20 years ago by President Kennedy when he said, "So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved." We look to engage the

Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and as cooperative as they are prepared to make it.

~~Let us review the several areas of our bilateral dialogue.~~

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We have proposed a comprehensive set of initiatives that would

reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and, ~~we~~ *hope,* reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation, *by providing greater stability.* In the most

*negotiations on strategic arms*

recent round of talks, we proposed--with strong Congressional support--a novel concept to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals

on both sides by removing more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This proposal was not intended to disadvantage

the Soviet Union. But it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these horrendous weapons and to make deterrence

safer by moving to fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on

intermediate-range nuclear forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of talks on strategic arms. Our

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*and on conventional forces in Europe.*

negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to *work toward* conclude agreements in INF, *and MBFR,* and START. We will negotiate in

good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

In addition to reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, we hope to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. We have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures," which would cover a wide range of activities. We have proposed, for example, that the United



States and the Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we have suggested a number of ways to improve direct lines of communications with the Soviets.

We will follow up with other initiatives during the Stockholm conference. We are currently working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

It is unfortunately true that the Soviet Union has at times abused our confidence. Cooperation and understanding are especially important in the field of arms control. Yet in recent years we have seen a growing number of instances in which the Soviet Union has breached elements of important arms control agreements, or stretched ambiguous aspects of agreements to the limit. We take these actions very seriously, not only because of what they permit the Soviets to accomplish, militarily, but also because of the grave doubts they raise about the Soviet Union's adherence to signed agreements. They thus jeopardize the arms control process which has been an integral part of our national security equation for over two decades. I am soon going to send the Congress a report on these activities. We are continuing our discussions with the Soviets on these actions and I challenge them to take concrete steps to remedy the problems.

Cooperation and understanding are also important in improving our perceptions of each other. We are more than willing to compete peacefully with the Soviet Union in the marketplace of ideas. We are willing to test our views by permitting the widest possible range of contacts between our peoples. I challenge the Soviet leadership to join me in inaugurating a broad expansion of official and unofficial exchanges in order to encourage such contacts.

I also challenge the Soviet leaders to demonstrate their respect for the rights of their own people. No other aspect of Soviet official behavior so clouds our ability to work together, because it demonstrates so vividly the profound differences in our values. Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

My challenge is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it freely assumed under international covenants--in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Nothing requires that our relationship be a hostile one. Our two countries have never fought each other. There is no reason that we ever should. The United States does not seek conflict; it does not seek unilateral advantages; it does not seek the humiliation of our adversaries. Americans would welcome the peaceful challenge that I have outlined today--the challenges to reduce the arms race, to resolve regional conflicts, and, not last, to encourage the broadest possible contacts between the peoples of our two great nations.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally and there were no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, finding out what each did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, and what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. [And as they went their separate way Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice, she also teaches music." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss.] They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

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Above all they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war.

They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that makes life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction.

If the Soviet Government wants peace there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so that we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. That is the ultimate challenge, to us and to our Soviet counterparts--that we begin now.

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aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. ~~A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.~~

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The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on ~~strategic arms~~. *reducing* ~~Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table and to conclude agreements in INF and START.~~ *and conventional arms in Europe* We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union

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exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. *The situation in the Middle East, for example, has been made more dangerous.* ~~We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.~~

~~We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.~~

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

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Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self doubt and self reproach and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During this period, the USSR devoted twice as much of its gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. It deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States had no comparable weapons.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies have tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was



inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: Deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger now that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973 threat of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At no time in the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert. Yes, we are safer now.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why I say that 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace which are at hand, we must do more to seek out areas of mutual interest and build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting totalitarian rule only exacerbate local conflicts, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Furthermore, such activity carries with it the risk of confrontations.

It would be better and safer if we could work together to assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful

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solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our ultimate goal.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes them into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, which offers us the means to improve the security of both our countries and to create a safe world.

The examples I have cited illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we can negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak we can do neither. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were ~~two~~ *three* years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist



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January 12, 1984

1:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS  
EAST ROOM

MONDAY, January 16, 1984

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine purposes.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States

seemed filled with self doubt and self reproach and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During this period, the USSR devoted twice as much of its gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. It deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States had no comparable weapons.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies have tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise



was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: Deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger now that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973 threat of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At no time in the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert. Yes, we are safer now.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative

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but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why I say that 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace which are at hand, we must do more to seek out areas of mutual interest and build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting totalitarian rule only exacerbate local conflicts, increase suffering, and

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make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Furthermore, such activity carries with it the risk of confrontations.

It would be better and safer if we could work together to assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our ultimate goal.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

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This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes them into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, which offers us the means to improve the security of both our countries and to create a safe world.

The examples I have cited illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we can negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak we can do neither. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed over two years ago, a zero solution for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words, but the Soviets should back them up with concrete proposals that would lead to this nuclear-free world.

The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it.

We have undertaken a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation by providing greater stability. In the most recent round of negotiations on strategic arms we proposed -- with strong Congressional support -- a novel concept to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals on both sides by removing more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This proposal was not intended to disadvantage the Soviet Union. But it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these horrendous weapons and to make deterrence safer by moving to fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the