Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: [President Address: US-Soviet Relations 01/16/1984] Speech on US- Soviet Relations Background Material] (3)
Box: 32

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	MATLOCK, JACK: FILES	***Withdrawer***	JET 5/18/2005
File Folder	[PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS 1/16/84] JAN 84 SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS-BACKGROUND MATERIAL 3/5	***FOIA***	F06-114/9
Box Number	32		YARHI-MILO 3205

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10883	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENT'S SOVIET SPEECH	1	1/6/1984	B1
10882	MEMO	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET SPEECH ***R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9***	3	1/7/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 6, 1984 — with President's notations
2:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. ~~But~~ THEY they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas ~~than~~ WE WERE 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We ~~do not~~ DON'T refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," WORSE or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we DO talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find ~~the United States~~ we ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. ~~It is~~ Soviet practices in this area, as

much as any other issue, ~~that~~ have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union ~~must~~ live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

share. If the people of the Soviet U. and the United States could visit together with no language barrier to hinder them would they debate the differences between govt. philosophies? 12

Well those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure & philosophy. The common interests would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Joan & ANYA found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim & Sally and there was no language barrier to help them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective govt's? Or would Anya & Sally find themselves comparing notes about their children, while Joan & Jim found out what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways Anya would be saying to Joan, "wasn't she nice, she gave me a meat recipe." Jim would be telling Sally what Joan didn't like about his looks. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war.

They want to have some of the good things over & above bare subsistance that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction

~~Once [illegible] simply could be Peace Love, Hand, [illegible]~~

If the Soviet Govt. wants peace then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes & dreams of ~~people~~ those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

SYSTEM II
90014

14

10883

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: The President's Soviet Speech

The latest draft (TAB I) does an excellent job compressing the text and enlivening the language while retaining the basic conceptual structure. I have only a few points which may deserve further consideration.

--The section on where we got where we are has been compressed to the point that the speech has an even more positive thrust than it did originally. I would recommend restoration of some of the examples used earlier to make it clear that the President has not revised his previous assessments. It would also help make it more obviously consistent with the compliance judgments still to come.

--Posing the abolition of nuclear weapons as a goal seems unwise since it is obviously impractical and is likely to be discounted. I have no problem with the reference on page 6 as a "dream," but believe the phrase on page 8 about "ridding the planet of the nuclear threat altogether" should be stated more modestly and practically.

--I am uncomfortable with the phrase "constructive competition." I am also not sure that "realistic engagement," used earlier is any better. Since the phrase used will be repeated often and far into the future, we should give it the most thoughtful consideration. How about something like "deterrence and realistic cooperation" or "deterrence, dialogue and cooperation." (I don't really like these very much either, but the deterrence aspect should be there, implicitly or explicitly.)

In sum, I think this draft is a good basis to get the President's reaction, but would argue for somewhat greater attention to the negative elements in the relationship and the problem of Soviet behavior in order to avoid seeming to go too far in the "soft" direction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

SYSTEM II PROFILE UNCLASSIFIED ID 8490014

RECEIVED 05 JAN 84 17

TO MCFARLANE FROM DARMAN, R DOCDATE 05 JAN 84 15

KEYWORDS USSR SPEECHES

SUBJECT: PRES SOVIET SPEECH

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 06 JAN 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
MATLOCK	FORTIER	LEHMAN, R	POINDEXTER
			KIMMITT

URGENT

COMMENTS ** URGENT / MEMO DUE TO MCFARLANE BY 0800 AM 6 JAN

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

Document No. SYSTEM II 90014

16

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/5/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --

SUBJECT: SOVIET SPEECH (1/5/84

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	JENKINS	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☑	McFARLANE	☐	☑
BAKER	☐	☑	McMANUS	☐	☐
DEAVER	☐	☑	MURPHY	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☑SS	ROGERS	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FULLER	☐	☐	VERSTANDIG	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☑	WHITTLESEY	☐	☐
HERRINGTON	☐	☐	KIMMITT	☐	☑
HICKEY	☐	☐	ELLIOTT	☐	☑

REMARKS:

This will be discussed with the President tomorrow. (Please hold close.)

Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702

(NSC/Myer/BE)
January 5, 1984
4:30 p.m.

17

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold our responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet

Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level

of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call "constructive competition."

Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and making the world a safer place.

The world is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom poses no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working

relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful

solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. In fact, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed

here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. But now is a time for opportunity -- a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

23

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. ~~This should~~ I don't know why this should come as ~~no~~ a surprise to the Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of

25

activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm conference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

~~Our approach is constructive, but little has come of it.~~ We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our ~~dialogue~~ relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive competition is a challenge for Americans; it will require patience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be

difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 6, 1984
2:00 p.m. RR

29

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as

much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 6, 1984
2:00 p.m.

40

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as

much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 6, 1984
2:00 p.m.

51

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

56

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as

much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 6, 1984 — With President's notations
2:00 p.m.

62

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. ~~But~~ THEY they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We ~~do not~~ DON'T refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," WORSE or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we DO talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find ~~the United States~~ we ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. ~~It is~~ Soviet practices in this area, as

much as any other issue, ~~that~~ have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union ~~must~~ live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

72

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

share. If the people of the Soviet U. and the United States could visit together with no language barrier to hinder them would they debate the differences between their philosophies? 73

Well those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure & philosophy. The common interests would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Joan & ANYA found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim & Sally and there was no language barrier to help them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective youth? Or would Anya & Sally find themselves comparing notes about their children, while Joan & Jim found out what each other did for a living

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways Anya would be saying to Joan, "wasn't she nice, she gave me a new recipe". Jim would be telling Sally what Joan did or didn't like about his looks. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war.

They Want to have some of the good things over & above bare subsistance that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisf-

~~Our [illegible] simply could be Peace, Love, Hope, [illegible]~~

If the Soviet Govt. wants peace then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes & dreams of ~~people~~ those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

Matlock URGENT ✓

75

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 0179

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	IC	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		A
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

Staff for immediate action to Matlock only.
New language due to RCM by COB 1/11/84.
Handcarry
Z

9215

URGENT 76

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 0179

RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	WFM	
Bob Kimmitt	~	IC	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4	✓	
Bud McFarlane	5	RCM HAS SEEN	
Bob Kimmitt	7		A
NSC Secretariat			D 9/21
Situation Room			
JP	6		

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

Don raises some very good points. Jack has a copy but is reluctant to make major changes in speech draft. I suggest we should make ch

77

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/10

Jack Watkins,

But think we should go ahead and make some changes in the speech. Rather than get the speech writers all worked up at this point, why don't you work on changes along the line that Don covers and then send over to us before it goes to speechwriters. Then we can help in brokering the changes through the system including the President.

J

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

January 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: President's Soviet Speech

Attached at TAB I is a clean copy of the text of the speech worked out yesterday in a meeting with Dick Darman, John Poindexter, Rick Burt and the speech writers.

State is still checking on the accuracy of the reference to a statement by Ustinov at the bottom of page 8.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the text for transmittal to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Text of speech

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 13, 1984
8:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
JANUARY 16, 1984

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, the United States will join the Soviet Union and 33 other nations at a European disarmament conference in Stockholm. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will be in Stockholm with the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through times of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

We have come a long way since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self-doubt and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During the last decade, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's,

five times as many tanks and twice as many combat aircraft. And they began deploying the SS-20 intermediate-range missile at a time when the United States had no comparable weapon.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is now in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. If so, I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: America's

deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve.

Yes, we are safer now. But to say that our restored deterrence has made the world safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as serious and constructive as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosophies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through

negotiations. That is why 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace, we must do more to find areas of mutual interest and then build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate -- the threat and use of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 100 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Today, there are armed conflicts in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their origins in local problems, but many have been exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting violence only exacerbate local tensions, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Further, such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations.

Would it not be better and safer if we could work together to assist people in areas of conflict in finding peaceful solutions to their problems? That should be our mutual goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet

perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed, we should be able to move beyond this immediate objective.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on armed forces -- some 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

With regard to nuclear weapons, the simple truth is, American's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 3 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have had serious concerns about Soviet compliance with agreements and treaties. Compliance is important because we seek truly effective arms control. Unfortunately, there has been mounting evidence that provisions of agreements have been breached and that the Soviet Union takes advantage of any ambiguity in an agreement.

In response to a congressional request, a report to the Congress on these Soviet activities will be submitted in the next few days. It is clear that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated will be fulfilled. We must take the Soviet compliance record into account, both in the development of our defense program and in our approach to arms control. In our discussions with the Soviet Union, we will work to remove the obstacles which threaten to undermine existing agreements and the broader arms control process.

The examples I have cited illustrate why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working on these tasks, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we must start with a clear-eyed understanding of the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak, we can do neither. Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is our strength of spirit, and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Our strength is necessary to deter war and to facilitate negotiated solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America can now offer something in return.

Strength and dialogue go hand-in-hand. We are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiations. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders, who have never shied from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed, over 2 years ago, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is the time to move from words to deeds.

The opportunity for progress in arms control exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it. We have proposed a

set of initiatives that would reduce substantially nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has not set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START, and MBFR. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

We seek to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed to exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct channels of communication. Last week, we had productive discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires both of us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing sophisticated weapons and thousands of its military personnel into Syria. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in the region. Our efforts are directed toward that goal. The Soviets should use their influence to reduce tensions in the Middle East. The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union and over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad. We cannot remain silent to the tragic plight of such courageous people as Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Scharansky and Yosuf Begun.

Our request is simple and straightforward: that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace

between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, peaceful competition, and constructive cooperation will serve our two nations and people everywhere. It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. As I have said, we will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild war-ravaged economies in Europe and the Far East, including those of nations who had been our enemies. Indeed,

those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we fought common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are poverty, disease and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as valid today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences --" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose, for a moment, Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments? Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, Anya would be saying to Ivan, "Wasn't she nice,

she also teaches music." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided that they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so we have helped fulfill the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

92

10882

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION January 7, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER DF (dictated and signed in his absence) ss.

SUBJECT: Soviet Speech

In preparing for my trip to Turkey I have not had as much time as I would have liked to devote to the Soviet speech. I am concerned about the present draft, however, and wanted to pass on my basic thoughts to you.

All of us agree that the time has come to demonstrate to a broader Western audience that we are not guided by a blind and uncomprehending form of anti-Sovietism. We have to send a message of reassurance, in part to resolidify support for the inevitable competition that we will continue to face and in part to rebut the Soviet argument that the world is becoming a more dangerous place.

The speech does convey a sense of reassurance, but it does so in a rather simple way. The speech will not impress either domestic or foreign audiences with its thoughtfulness, and it fails to send a very concrete message to the Soviets--a fact that will only help to contribute to the impression that we are aiming at an electoral audience rather than trying to achieve more durable substantive gains.

The emptiness of the message to the Soviets is particularly apparent, I think, in the presentation of "our goals" in the first half of the speech. Instead of anything concrete, these include vague appeals to let the Third World focus on economic development, or to abolish nuclear weapons, or to stop stealing Western industrial secrets. I doubt these are appeals with much meaning for the Soviets, who speak a more sober language of power, security, and interest.

Just to take two obvious examples, the point about the Third World that Moscow would best understand (but which is not made in the current draft) is a statement that we are concerned about the risk of confrontations that are in neither side's interest. Similarly, the Soviets will not know what to make of the off-handed way compliance is treated in the section of the speech on establishing a better working relationship. They know this

problem is coming and want to see how the President deals with it. In light of where we're likely to be by the time of the speech, we run a major risk of being misunderstood if we don't say more to indicate the gravity of our concern on this issue.

The speech, in my view, also needs to be more direct and candid about some of the difficulties that we face in trying to solve problems between us. If the President discusses these difficulties, his main message--the expression of a forthcoming desire to work on disagreements or conflicts--may in fact be taken even more seriously.

Having said this, I don't think that improving the speech requires starting over. One small change that might begin to move it in the right direction is to build on the important claim made at the beginning that we see some important potential "opportunities for peace" at this time. The President should then ask the question--what do we and the Soviets have to do to seize these opportunities?--and give concrete, thoughtful answers. In this way, the "goals" of the present draft would become "tasks," or "challenges," or problems to be solved.

By focusing on key immediate tasks rather than long-term goals the President would sound more programmatic and purposeful than he is likely to now. He needs to sound as though his policy is designed to reach more than just distant and possibly unattainable goals. (Each of these "tasks" or "challenges," I might add, could usefully include some historical comparisons, indicating how the nature of the task is different or harder than in the past but also why the opportunity for progress now exists--after three years of trying to get our message across to Moscow.)

This change from "goals" to "tasks" would, with some significant re-drafting, send a different message in the entire first half of the speech. The talk about our desire to reduce the use of force would, for example, be made much less airy, focusing more on what each side has to do (and not do) to limit the risk of superpower conflict. This can sound tough but it has a constructive side. For example:

> "We believe that the situation in the Middle East has been made more dangerous for all concerned by the introduction of thousands of additional Soviet military personnel into Syria in the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. This is just one of many situations around the world in which the Soviet Union could bring its influence to bear to reduce risks for both sides. The confidence created by such progress would be valuable in trying to deal with other aspects of our competition."

Similarly, using the three tasks of U.S.-Soviet relations in the present draft, the President could say that the second task--reducing armaments--requires some serious thinking about how to increase strategic stability. Rather than simply try to top the Soviets in a vague commitment to a non-nuclear world, we can challenge them with our commitment to specific negotiating measures. For example:

> "Our thinking in the area of arms control has led us to embrace the build-down approach to reducing strategic weapons. [One sentence explaining build-down.] We wish the Soviet Union would do the same, and call on its leaders to do so. This is a time when we need more, not less discussion of this approach, for it is a formula that could make it possible for both sides to rethink many of their strategic programs."

The Soviets would be greatly intrigued to hear a hint that we might not have to build everything we plan, and would begin to ask what systems this could mean. In short, we would have their interest.

As for the final task--developing a constructive working relationship--the President could again make hard points and soft--hard on issues like the need for compliance with past agreements, soft-sounding on the obvious fact that we are willing to work even for small improvements in the relationship.

I have gone over this first half of the speech at some length because once it is recast, the remainder can be devoted to elaborating our approach. I have fewer difficulties with the rest of the text as it now stands, but it too could be strengthened by more concreteness. (And by less rhetoric that could open us to ridicule. For example, the President can't say that "ignorance" is a common enemy of the U.S. and the USSR. The country with the world's largest censorship apparatus is not an enemy of ignorance!)

Finally, the concluding quote from JFK's American University speech is a useful reminder of how different our job is from Kennedy's. He was lucky enough to be able to produce an agreement on a comparatively simple question--the test ban--in six weeks. Because we have much less chance of such breakthroughs, we have to give a more convincing proof that we are doing everything prudent to achieve them and that if we fail it will not be our fault. It just won't be enough to say "we all breathe the same air."

~~(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)~~ ~~à la Tarter~~ 95
January 10, 1984
1:00 p.m. NSC

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
~~NATIONAL PRESS CLUB~~ EAST Room
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

Rewrite

In these first days of 1984, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Para 2, draft of 12/15

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security, ~~and preserve~~ peace. If we can make even small steps, it will be a beginning in the long road to just We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States ~~questioned its~~ seemed filled with self

doubts and self reproach
~~role in the world~~ and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

INSERT A&B

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. ~~Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.~~

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. ~~In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.~~

So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation increased

INSERT B

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. ~~There is credibility and consistency.~~

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

INSERT D

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

~~Recently~~ we've been hearing ~~some very~~ strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. ~~These~~ harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is ~~being restored~~ and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. ~~Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress.~~ We ~~proved this~~ 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, ~~and~~ could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild ~~the~~ war-ravaged economies ~~of East and West~~, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

~~America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations.~~ Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. ~~Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.~~

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

INSERT D, P2

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

INSERT E

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

INSERT F

Would it not be better and safer ~~to~~ assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? ~~Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.~~ Second, ~~our aim is to~~ find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, ~~It~~ provide greater stability and build confidence.

INSERT E

Our strength and vision & progress provide the basis for ~~a stable relationship~~ demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiation. ~~If we are~~ That is why I say that 1984 is a year & opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace which are at hand, we must ~~do more than we have in the past~~ to seek out ~~out~~ areas & mutual interest and build on them. ~~It seems~~ I propose that our governments ~~intensify our consultations~~ make a major effort, this year, to ~~make progress in three~~ see if we can make progress in three broad areas.

To p 8 101

was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

102

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we ~~know we~~ cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to ~~deter war, but to~~ facilitate negotiation and ~~compromise~~ solutions. INSERT F 2

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss ~~all~~ the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist

INSERT F (p 5)

It would be better and safer if we could work together to assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should jointly examine concrete ~~steps~~ actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our ultimate goal.

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 10, 1984
1:00 p.m.

104

NSC

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It

was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist

111

aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union

exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in two world wars. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments?

Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistance that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

Jack:

Here are some comments/recommendations on the speech.

I have been brief. I understand that very few changes will be permitted now, since the Pres has basically approved it; so, I will be focusing on the most important. Also, I understand that the President, as in most speeches, doesn't want much negative.

I have affixed some changes directly onto the attached draft. Numbers in parentheses refer to draft.

(1) FIRST: I had a long-standing lunch date with Al Myer today, which I kept. The speech came up -- he asking what I thought. Frankly, I told him, I thought it drifted too far toward "understanding," not enough on realism. Secondly, I told him that this speech, unlike others the President has given (re: Grenada) has as its principal target foreign and domestic elites (not Joe 6-pack in Des Moines). It must be a sophisticated, realistic address. Otherwise, it will not be taken seriously in the Kremlin, by the broad mass of educated European opinion and certainly not by the opinion-molders in this country. I think Don Fortier makes the same point. I don't think I convinced him, but it may help as having laid down a marker if you pursue it.

(2) Recommend reinclusion of language from Matlock draft, p. 1, para 2 as modified below:

> The establishment of a durable and stable world peace depends greatly on the American relationship with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is a sober and realistic Soviet-American relation. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but

to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed, cannot, happen.

(3) Page 2, after first para:

Looking back over the 1970's it was apparent that America had fallen into a state of neglect of its defenses and had become reluctant to continue to hold the mantle of responsibility as the leader of the Western Alliance system. But the rapid expansion and modernization of the Soviet military establishment continued apace and Moscow's global activities became much more pronounced and destabilizing. The USSR devoted twice as much of their GNP to defense in this period than did the United States and began to provide armaments to foreign countries in a massive manner. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies ~~have~~ used force ~~or~~ and intimidation to interfere in the affairs of other nations. The risk of serious confrontation grew.

INSERT A P 2

(4) P. 2, last para. Delete, replace with:

"And that is not the end of the tale. On the other side we have witnessed a decline in the prospects of the Soviet Empire. Soviet armed forces are sent into combat, but in every instance since World War II it has been against another Maxist regime. Domestic cohesion has been strained as that society struggles to produce sufficient food to feed its people, to cope with massive problems of alcoholism or to provide the people with what we consider in the West to be the basic necessities of a prosperous existence. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are frustrated -- and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

Recently we have heard some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin, anger that has caused some observers to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict.

However, despite our public differences and occasional exchanges of sharp rhetoric, I believe that our relationship with the USSR is on the firmest ground it has been on in many years. In fact, there is probably less danger of confrontation today than at any time in the past. This is attributable primarily to an admirable degree of prudence and restraint that both superpowers have exhibited. Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Mid-East escalation of 1973, one the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, ~~and certainly no level of tensions such as existed in the days of the Cold War.~~ At no time ~~over the course of~~ in the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert, ~~nor have there been any flashpoints that threatened to escalate to armed conflict.~~

INSERT C p 3

If one looks beyond the rhetoric this fact stands out clearly: credible deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

(5) Add to para 3, p.3, after "...staunchest friends." We threatened no one even when we were the world's only atomic power and we pose no challenge to global stability today.

(6) Substitute for para 3 (last), p. 3, and first para., p. 4.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. From this foundation we can proceed toward the attainment of a stable and realistic relationship with the USSR. Deterrence is...(pick up para 2, p.4)

(7) P.6, Before para 4, place:

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress a report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes Soviet behavior into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, a process which offers us the means of improving the security of both our countries and the opportunity to create a safer world.

(8) P. 7, after first para, add:

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other.

We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it all the more imperative for us to maintain a productive and continuous dialogue.

(9) P. 8, after first full para.

I must confess that I was very disappointed not only with the Soviet walkout on the intermediate range missile talks, but with their refusal to agree to the setting of starting dates for the next round of the MBFR and START negotiations.

I have been following the progress of all of these discussions and still feel that agreements can be achieved if both sides commit themselves to negotiate earnestly and in good faith. ~~In particular, while I would not go so far as to say that an agreement is in sight,~~ at the START talks in particular I believe that we have travelled much further toward a common position than is generally recognized. Our proposals there have called for deep reductions in ballistic missile warheads and would impose reductions and limitations on both the US and the USSR. We have shifted our position there significantly to take into account major Soviet concerns in an effort to narrow our differences, particularly in accommodating their demands for a higher ceiling on deployed ballistic missiles. Further, in response to their expressions that our positions imposed too many constraints on their ICBMs, we

indicated our willingness to explore alternative ways of limiting the size and destructive power of ballistic missile forces. Finally, in response to Soviet concerns over our bombers and air-launched cruise missiles we have stated that we would agree to numbers well below those which would have been allowed by SALT II.

In a unique bipartisan effort we have introduced a "build-down concept" designed to ensure reductions and channel modernization onto more stabilizing directions. This concept would require our two nations to scrap two old warheads for every new warhead deployed on the more destabilizing MIRVed ICBMs.

I was pleased that the Soviets did take two positive steps recently, tacitly agreeing to reduce the throw-weight of their missiles and to establish a working group to discuss confidence-building measures. These moves on both sides indicate that we ~~are~~ may be within striking distance of achieving a negotiated limitation and reduction on our strategic arsenals. We need to return immediately to the START discussions and pursue the progress that we have achieved.

(10) P. 11, first full para: Replace with:

"Our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risk of nuclear conflict. It is not an impossible dream, because the reduction of the possibility that nuclear war should erupt is in both of our interests. The challenge to both of us is clear and calls out for the best of intentions. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will react

to this opportunity, but I do not feel that this is an impossible dream, because these steps are so much in the interest of both our nations.

We should remember that our two countries share much in common -- indeed, we fought alongside one another in World War II and, I should underscore this fact, our two nations have never fought each other. There is no reason we ever should. Today while our relationship is certain to be characterized by disagreements and a conflict in ideals and goals, we share common enemies -- hunger, disease, and above all, war.

More than 20 years ago President Kennedy laid out an approach to dealing with the USSR that is as realistic, and at the same time, optimistic, today as it was in 1963. As the President indicated:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

End speech.

(11) Eliminate speech at this point.