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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10881	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, JANUARY 3, 1983	4	1/4/1984	B1
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10878	MEMO	DEAVER/MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE YOUR SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	2	1/5/1984	B1
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10879	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10878	2	1/5/1984	B1
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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January 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 3, 1983

Dobrynin came in to see me on my first day in the office following his return from Moscow December 23. He had instructions responding to questions I had asked him before he left for Moscow, and he appeared to be in a businesslike mood.

My questions essentially asked whether the Soviets are ready for serious private dialogue with us. Dobrynin said he had been instructed by his government to say that they are ready for such a dialogue. He was authorized to conduct personally whatever such discussion we desire. However, he added, they also consider that Art Hartman in Moscow is an appropriate channel for this private dialogue.

Recognizing that Gromyko and I are to meet for some three hours later in the month, Dobrynin stressed that the Soviets are not interested in dialogue for the sake of dialogue; dialogue must have content. He asked me what I thought should be discussed in Stockholm.

I agreed that content would be the key to any constructive dialogue, and made the point that each side should be free to bring any issue to the table. On the Stockholm meeting, I said I thought we should review our relationship and how it should be conducted, including mechanisms. On substance, I thought we should discuss arms control (principally START, INF and compliance, but also CDE, MBFR and confidence-building measures) and regional issues (principally the Middle East, but southern Africa and Afghanistan as well). I told Dobrynin I would also want to discuss human rights. Characteristically he asked why; I replied because of the importance of human rights issues to you and to Americans generally. I said I saw no big bilateral problems on which Gromyko and I needed to spend much time in Stockholm, but added that there might be bilateral issues for others to discuss.

I told Dobrynin that if the Soviets want further discussion of the Stockholm agenda I am ready for it, but it could also be conducted by Rick Burt and his deputy Sokolov.

Dobrynin then referred to your letter to Andropov delivered December 24, and asked specifically what the language on START meant when it spoke of a common framework embodying a balance between the interests and advantages of both sides. I replied that we are prepared to look for a common framework that accommodates the different force structures of the two sides.

Dobrynin also asked about the language concerning "confidential exchanges of views at other levels" besides me and Gromyko. On this, I said that there might be certain issues on which we could designate others if this seemed appropriate.

In general, we agreed that the next step should be for both sides to begin setting out content for productive dialogue. At the same time, we also agreed that as that process moves along, it would be worthwhile to step back from time to time and have a more philosophical exchange on how different systems can relate to one another. I recalled talks I had had with then-Premier Kosygin about how free-market and centrally-planned economies can deal with each other. Dobrynin's examples, such as the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings on Cuba, had less to do with differences between systems than with the advantages of private channels like this one for handling sensitive issues between the two countries.

Dobrynin then asked how I saw U.S.-Soviet relations shaping up in 1984. I replied that I saw a question mark here: we want dialogue, but also recognize that things can get out of hand, particularly over differences concerning regional issues like the Middle East. I said I expected the world economy to improve this year, and also noted it would be an election year for us. In this respect, however, I said that although political pundits disagree on how this would affect U.S.-Soviet relations, I expect you will play it straight and determine your policy on the basis of what is good for the country, without reference to partisan politics.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets would respond to anything constructive from Washington even though it is an election year. I could not tell whether he was expressing an official view or only speaking for himself, but this could mean that the Soviets will not intervene in U.S. domestic politics during the coming months.

Mention of our election gave me the opening to ask Dobrynin about what is going on in Moscow. I said we had some sense of a transitional atmosphere there and invited him to comment.

Dobrynin replied that while in Moscow he had visited Andropov at home, and Andropov had asked him questions about what is going on here. Andropov seems to be conducting business at home, and Politburo members see him regularly there. Dobrynin said he had tried to get Armand Hammer in to see Andropov at home, but the basic decision had been taken not to receive visitors other than insiders. When I asked about Andropov's illness, Dobrynin replied that he did not know, and had not asked, noting that such matters are more sensitive in the Soviet Union than here. But he did say that during his own visit with Andropov, he (Dobrynin) reached for something Andropov wanted, implying that Andropov has some incapacity in arm movements at least. Politically, however, the agenda for the Politburo's regular Thursday sessions was set by Andropov, and his decisions on issues are final. I am passing these observations to Bill Casey.

Overall, Dobrynin's comments left the impression that Andropov is operating the government from his residence, but is acting as a decisive leader at that distance. For my part I commented that as far as we are concerned there is a functioning Soviet government and we are prepared to deal with it.

In conclusion, Dobrynin said he had to raise one "unpleasant matter" and handed me the text of an "oral statement" protesting our declaration of areas of the Mediterranean as a "zone of dangerous activities of the U.S. Navy." I said we would study the démarche and respond appropriately. The text of the démarche is being transmitted to the NSC staff by a Hill-McFarlane memorandum.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ January 5, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the State draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive and leaving out startling new initiatives.

Objective

We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your policy toward the Soviet Union.

You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you are following has not gotten through to all segments of our public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded accommodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.

To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a comprehensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.

Audience

You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences simultaneously:

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-- U.S. opinion makers;
-- West European governments and publics;
-- Soviet leaders; and
-- The Soviet people.

The principal message we need to get across to each is:

U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.

Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.

Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.

Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.

We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

Draft: 12/18/83 (noon)

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we must think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

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Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their military spending by three-to-four percent every year. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was at once an effort to split the NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American

strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not military superiority.

With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong. Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized system is proving less able than the Western democracies to adapt to the challenges of a new era.

A Safer World

Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the

danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward

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the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world, and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

Preventing War, ~~for me~~, is ~~public enemy number one.~~ unthinkable my solemn responsibility. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes

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solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

(Does this invite them into the M.E peace process

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a

little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to radically reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."

The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the

other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to begin making that vision a reality.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish greater mutual confidence and understanding.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have drastically reduced the rate of inflation to its present low level and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings

were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons even in time of crisis. And I am more than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would

increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first

session of the conference in recognition of the importance we attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from the Warsaw Pact will also attend.

Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions; our respective interests, and how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the

Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to ~~collaborate~~ cooperate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in

results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

A Policy of Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,

productive relationship that can be sustained over the long term, without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match our good will, we will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm in January. If invited, he will also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. [And

as I have said ~~I would hope that~~, if these and other talks create the basis for real progress and concrete results ~~in our relationship,~~ I will be ready to meet with Soviet President Andropov.]

Conclusion

Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too. No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help

make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ January 5, 1983 14

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

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We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

US-USSR 27

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 5, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the State draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive and leaving out startling new initiatives.

Objective

We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your policy toward the Soviet Union.

You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you are following has not gotten through to all segments of our public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded accommodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.

To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a comprehensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.

Audience

You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences simultaneously:

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

-- U.S. opinion makers;
-- West European governments and publics;
-- Soviet leaders; and
-- The Soviet people.

The principal message we need to get across to each is:

U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.

Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.

Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.

Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.

We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

(Myer/NSC)
January 5, 1984
10:30 a.m. AL

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club

~~Thank you for the warm welcome.~~ In just a few days, the United States will join ~~all~~ the nations of Euorpe, ~~to include~~ including the Soviet Union, ~~in the opening of~~ a security conference in Stockholm. The goal of the conference will be to find practical and meaningful ways to increase European security. It is part of our constant search to strengthen and preserve peace.

We live in a time of peace with not enough peace. And because America's highest aspiration is a durable peace, these are frustrating times -- as they have been for decades. It is high time to move forward and today is a time of opportunity to do so.

In our search for genuine progress we must think first of all ~~of~~ about our relations with the Soviet Union. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. Our two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy civilization itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than reducing the risk of war and making sure that nuclear weapons are never used.

Soviet leaders understand this as well as ~~I~~ we do. Yet, our search for ways to reduce the level of arms and to build a cooperative working relationship is still being frustrated. Why is this so and what we can do about it?

When we look back over the experience of the 1970's we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the

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dangerous, we must keep it within bounds. We and the Soviet Union have ~~few~~ common interests. ~~But, so long as the United States and the Western Alliance remain strong, we do share several fundamental interests~~ foremost among which is that of avoiding war and reducing the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call "constructive competition."

Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words, what stands out is the fact that ~~the balance of power~~ deterrence is being restored and this means that the world is a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now.

Our strength provides the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders are realists. They know that it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunity.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in

many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And the working relationship between our two countries is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be improved.

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. We must engage the Soviet Union in a dialogue that is as cordial and cooperative as our differences permit, a dialogue that will serve to reduce the level of arms, promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, and build a constructive working relationship ~~between our two nations~~.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

Preventing war is my solemn responsibily. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution just exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions? The answer is obvious, and I call upon the Soviet leaders to join with us in a search to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives arms races everwhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is necessary to establish a stable military balance. Our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. And just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe ~~over the last~~ during the past three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero

option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that the Soviet Union shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to move from words to deeds.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish a solid working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps, while violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters the relationship, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. But while we have a long way to go, we are determined to keep trying.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of ~~us~~ ours. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it all the more important for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is of course more than military strength. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point. Equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago.

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Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am more than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range

of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm conference. We will work hard to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Although our approach has been constructive, not much has come of our efforts. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, ~~perhaps~~ as

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~~more than~~ much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and others who wish to ~~live~~ live, over and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov. family abroad

We are not interested in propaganda advantage. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international convenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can --and we must-- keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

That is the objective of our policy toward the Soviet Union. ~~It is a~~ ~~I call this~~ Our policy of "constructive competition." ~~It~~ It is a ~~policy~~ for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans and will require patience. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot meet us half-way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

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> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of US-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than twenty years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

I call upon the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet Union joins us in a genuine give and take, and truly wants fair outcomes, they will happen. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. I can send no stronger signal. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We do not fear compromise. In a spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, reduce greatly the level of arms, and brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

We recently marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union -- what better time to review the history of U.S.-Soviet relations in order to understand of the problems in this relationship we face today. The ancient Greek philosopher Sophocles said "a sensible man judges of present by past events." I believe we must know what has happened in the last 50 years in order to understand what is happening today and to anticipate what may happen tomorrow in coping with the first nation to pose a direct threat to this country since the War of 1812.

On November 16, 1933, President Roosevelt expressed to the Soviet Government the hope "that the relations now established between our people may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our Nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world." This is indeed a hope we still cherish. What went wrong in the last 50 years to prevent the realization of this worthy aspiration?

The illusions some may have had about the Soviet Union in those days should have vanished in 1939 when the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany and then joined Germany in destroying and devouring Poland. In the following years, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, annexed part of it and then proceeded to annex Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Between 1939 and 1945 the Soviet Union annexed about 262 thousand square miles of territory, an area larger than France and almost as

large as Texas. In contrast, the United States voluntarily gave the Philippines independence in 1946, a move planned for 1944, but interrupted by the war.

After the Soviet Union was attacked by its former ally, Germany, in 1941, the United States provided it with Lend-Lease assistance which eventually totalled nearly $11 billion. Much of this assistance was delivered at great peril to Allied seaman on the notorious Murmansk run. Despite this assistance, the Soviets regarded the Western Allies with suspicion and never fully cooperated with them in the war effort.

Before the war ended, the seeds of the Cold War were sown at the Yalta Conference in early 1945 where the Soviets agreed to holding free elections and establishing democratic governments in Eastern Europe and most specifically in Poland. Stalin reportedly once stated that "whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system", and he was true to his word. After Soviet troops occupied Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe, Stalin largely ignored the Yalta agreements and proceeded to establish Communist regimes in areas his troops occupied. This led to profound and lasting contention between the USSR and the Western Allies who were devoted to promoting freedom, independence, and well-being throughout all of Europe west of the Soviet Union.

The so-called revisionist historians, determined to fault our post-war policy in Europe, have tried to make the United States equally responsible for the Cold War. They, and others, have too easily ignored the nature of the Soviet regime and Stalin's character. In the postwar years, the Western Powers

were headed by freely-elected democratic leaders. Stalin, on the other hand, was the tyrant who brought about the deaths of millions of his fellow countrymen during the 1930s -- through forced collectivization and later the great purges. No doubt many brave Soviet troops lost their lives needlessly in the war because Stalin had killed off most of the Red Army leaders in years preceding Hitler's attack. Stalin's successor, Khrushchev, who knew him well, later attacked him for his "brutality, persecution mania, suspiciousness, and capriciousness."

As soon as World War II ended, the United States demonstrated its peaceful intentions by unilaterally disarming with a rapid demobilization. From 13 million in uniform in 1945 we went down to 1.4 million by 1947. During the same period, Soviet forces reduced from 12 million to four million, but the Soviets still stationed 30 divisions with half a million troops in Central and Eastern Europe, which is about what they have there today. U.S., British and French forces in Europe at that time were down to 10 weak divisions.

Although we had a monopoly of atomic weapons, we kept very few on hand during the first postwar years. Indeed, in 1946, we offered to establish international control over atomic weapons through the Baruch Plan. This farsighted offer foundered on Soviet opposition -- most importantly on the unwillingness of the Soviets to permit on-site inspection to prevent cheating. This has, incidentally, remained a major impediment in reaching other arms control agreements with the Soviets. What we did not know at the time, was that the Soviets had been working on an atom

bomb since the early 1940s and were to have their own three years after we proposed the Baruch Plan. In any case, a historic opportunity was lost, and succeeding generations have had to live with the threat of nuclear war because of this Soviet intransigence.

Soviet hostility toward the United States had already been made clear when, in February 1946, Stalin gave a speech indicating his belief that war was inevitable with the Western powers. Even a staunch liberal like Supreme Court Justice William Douglas regarded this as a "declaration of World War III."

Stalin's postwar designs became even clearer when the Soviets refused to evacuate northern Iran when they had agreed to and demanded joint control of Turkey's Dardanelles Straits -- after having laid claim to considerable Turkish territory. To the West in Central Europe, the division of Germany was beginning as the Soviets communized their occupation zone and obviously opposed a united Germany which they could not control -- even though we proposed guaranteeing the demilitarization of Germany for 25 or even 40 years. Incidentally, the Soviets began building up German armed forces in their zone years before Germans were armed in the Western zones. While the Soviets promoted their objectives with armed forces and secret police, the United States offered Europe economic assistance.

Increased Communist threats to Greece and Turkey in 1947 resulted in the Truman Doctrine and U.S. aid for these threatened countries. Later that year, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a U.S.-financed plan for the economic recovery of war torn Europe. The plan was open to all of Europe -- East and West

-- including the Soviet Union. Stalin correctly recognized that this Marshall Plan would promote the freedom and independence of the countries involved and would have nothing to do with it; moreover, he would not let any of the Eastern European countries under his control participate. The Soviets then declared war on the Marshall Plan and tried to foment strikes and riots in France and Italy -- attempting to use the large Communist parties in these countries to this end. When this failed, Stalin sought to tighten his hold over areas under his control and influence. In February 1948, the Communists seized complete control of Czechoslovakia and placed considerable pressure on Finland. In June, the Soviets attempted to take over West Berlin by first forcing out the Western Allies through a blockade of the city. A dramatic U.S.-British airlift kept this city of over two and a quarter million supplied for nearly a year before the Soviets gave up their attempt to starve the West Berliners into submission.

About the time the Berlin Blockade began, Stalin decided that the Yugoslav Communist leader Tito was not sufficiently submissive and sought to have him replaced. Tito and the Yugoslavian people successfully resisted this attempt and were given considerable U.S. economic and military assistance to help them maintain their independence -- even though Tito had been anything but friendly to the U.S. before he fell out with Stalin.

The events of 1948 encouraged West European countries to combine in their own defense, first with the Brussels Treaty and in 1949 with the formation of NATO which included the U.S. In response to the Berlin Blockade, the U.S. stationed B-29 bombers

in Western Europe, the first U.S. strategic deployment in Europe since World War II. Nineteen forty-nine also saw the first successful Soviet atomic bomb test and the Communist takeover of China.

In 1949, the U.S. withdrew all of its troops from South Korea -- except for a 500-man advisory group; moreover, both General MacArthur and Secretary of State Acheson had publicly excluded South Korea from the U.S. Pacific defense perimeter. Stalin no doubt concluded that the U.S. would not defend South Korea, and in June 1950, the North Koreans attacked the South. They were led then by Kim Il-Sung who is still in power and who was most recently responsible for the terrorist attack in Rangoon which murdered a number of high-ranking South Korean officials.

The U.S. immediately came to South Korea's rescue and, later joined by several Allies, fought a costly and bloody war for the next three years. This blatant act of Communist aggression, encouraged if not ordered by Stalin, led to a rapid strengthening of U.S. and West European defenses. Our defense budget soared from $13 billion a year to about $50 billion. A NATO military command was established under General Eisenhower, and U.S. troops were sent to bolster West Europe's weak defenses; moreover, there was a concerted effort to enable West Germany to contribute to its own defense in a European Defense Community (EDC) with France.

Stalin died in 1953, and his successors sought to dampen Western defense efforts by resorting to a policy of detente. Soviet leader Malenkov publicly declared in August 1953 that a

lessening of tension might lead to a disintegration of this Western alliance. Indeed, the EDC concept was defeated in the French Chamber of Deputies a year later.

After Stalin's death, President Eisenhower was urged to have a summit meeting with the new Soviet leaders. He insisted, however, that the Soviets do something concrete to demonstrate good intentions. In 1955, the Soviets agreed to the Austrian State Treaty, which they had consistently blocked for eight years. A summit was held in Geneva a few months later, but produced no results. President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" summit proposal to ensure against surprise attacks was rejected out of hand by the Soviets; however, the Soviets capitalized on the "Spirit of Geneva", created by the mere fact of a summit, to promote their detente campaign, which was reinforced by significant conciliatory moves in other areas. This was beginning to erode NATO's cohesion. For example, Iceland asked us to remove our troops and bases from that country, but reversed this decision when detente ended.

Soviet detente successes were nullified by the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in the fall of 1956. Prior to this, the courageous Poles had stood up to the Soviets emboldening the Hungarians to follow their example. This was a bad time for the Soviets -- there was even an anti-Communist uprising in North Vietnam. It was also not an easy time for us, however. In October 1956 the British, French and Israelis, to our dismay, attacked Egypt, and the Soviet leader Khrushchev sought to exploit this situation to increase Soviet influence in

the Mid East. The Soviets even threatened to rocket Paris and London if the British and French did not remove their forces from Egypt. A year later, we began to feel threatened by Soviet rockets.

In 1957, we were alarmed by the first successful Soviet test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which could reach this country in about half an hour and against which we had no defense. This Soviet achievement was especially dramatized by the launching of Sputnik, the world's first satellite. Overnight we acquired a collective inferiority complex in the face of this Soviet technology. We were behind the Soviets in a critical area.

The Soviets then sought to exploit our sense of inferiority. In November 1958, Khrushchev threatened to take actions designed to remove Western protection of West Berlin. At this time we believed in the so-called "missile gap", and it was some time before we had sufficient intelligence data to the contrary. We did, however, manage to forestall Soviet action until the discovery that there was no "missile gap" decreased Khrushchev's ability to threaten us.

Thwarted in efforts to force us out of Berlin, the Soviets and their East German puppets sealed off East Berlin in August 1961 to stem the enormous flow of refugees to West Berlin. The infamous Berlin Wall was erected to augment the "iron curtain" of barbed wire and mine fields which seals in the Soviet Bloc. These inhuman barriers are the most visible and dramatic evidence of

the enormous gap between Soviet-controlled Europe and free Europe where people may come and go as they please.

Spurred by the perceived missile gap, the U.S. accelerated its strategic build-up until we had gained a considerable lead over the Soviets. At no time, however, did we ever attempt to exploit this lead. We threatened no one. In a misreading of our national will, in 1962 Khrushchev attempted to place missiles in Cuba in order to gain a strategic advantage and to obtain a military position in this hemisphere. This profound Soviet miscalculation brought our two countries to the brink of disaster. Fortunately, then, as now, we and the Soviets shared a desire to avoid nuclear war. Our military advantage in 1962 and cool nerves promoted a peaceful, if imperfect, resolution of this most serious crisis in our relationship.

By 1963, the Soviets felt compelled to return to a strategy of detente. We, too, had had enough of the tensions of the previous year. We concluded a limited test ban agreement, agreed to establish the "hot line" for emergency communications between the White House and the Kremlin, and for a time the Soviets stopped jamming the Voice of America.

In time, we reduced our defense expenditures, and in the mid-1960s froze the level of our ICBM force at 1,054 which has never been exceeded. Those who advocated this unilateral "freeze" believed that the Soviets would stop when they reached parity with us; however, in 1969, the Soviets reached this level and kept going until they had over 50 percent more ICBMs than did we.

In 1967 the U.S. and the USSR began to move toward arms control. A nuclear nonproliferation agreement was reached, but progress toward strategic arms talks was interrupted by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Here it should be noted that Soviet combat troops have, since World War II, only been used to suppress Communist countries or a friendly, Marxist-ruled country like Afghanistan. That should tell us something about the nature of Soviet alliances.

Although the Soviets had a numerical advantage in ICBMs, we were ahead of them in ICBM and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense technology. This gave the Soviets the incentive to negotiate. Had the Congress, for example, not approved funds for our ABM defense, we would probably have never reached an agreement limiting these systems.

The 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit resulted in SALT I and the ABM Treaty and promoted a number of agreements designed to promote closer ties between our countries. Detente was in full bloom. Unfortunately, the Soviets and we have totally different views of what detente means. For us the words of Franklin Roosevelt 50 years ago define what we would like in the relationship: normal and friendly relations and cooperation for our mutual benefit and world peace. The Soviets officially define detente or "peaceful coexistence" as simply: a form of struggle between Communism and capitalism short of engaging in all-out war.

During the detente of the 1970s, the Soviets sought our technology and favorable trade terms while forging ahead with

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their own arms buildup and expansionist designs. In the period 1972 - 1981 Soviet arms expenditures increased about 50 percent while U.S. arms expenditures increased less than 25 percent, and by 1981, Soviet expenditures were about two-thirds higher than ours. The USSR continued providing North Vietnam with massive military assistance used against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces fighting to defend the South from Communist aggression. The Soviets helped prolong the 1973 Mid East War, and at one time we had reason to be concerned about a large-scale Soviet intervention in that war. This is not how we envisaged detente.

The Communist victory in Indochina, Watergate, and Congressional restrictions on the Executive Branch of our Government encouraged Soviet adventurism. In 1975, the Soviets flew in Cuban troops to ensure Marxist-Leninist control of Angola; the Soviets and Cubans went into Ethiopia in large numbers; and Soviet presence and influence increased in other areas. Then, in 1979, came the invasion of Afghanistan where over 110,000 Soviet troops are now battling Afghan freedom fighters. More recently, we saw the Soviets force the suppression of budding freedom in Poland, and we should all, by now, be aware of what the Soviets are doing in our own hemisphere. I have recently addressed this issue.

In reviewing the last 50 years, a pattern should have become clear. The United States has devoted enormous human and material resources to help preserve the freedom and independence of those who have sought our assistance. The Soviet Union has done just the opposite. It has promoted totalitarian control and tyranny in countries under its control or influence. Do those in West

Europe who have been exercising their democratic right to demonstrate against us or anybody else realize that massive American economic and defense assistance, beginning in World War II, has played a key role in making this freedom possible? They have only to look East to see what might have been. Let anyone try demonstrating against the Soviet Union in any Soviet Bloc country and see what happens. Those who tried to form a peace movement in the Soviet Union are now all in jail.

We should not expect eternal gratitude from those we have helped, because the preservation of freedom and independence of others has been and continues to be in our national interest. Each country falling under totalitarian control represents an incremental impoverishment of our Nation and of the world, economically, politically and socially.

Although it may have escaped your attention, there is an encouraging aspect to U.S.-Soviet relations which has emerged over the years. It has long been clear that the one thing our two nations have in common is a sincere desire to avoid a thermo-nuclear war. And this is of enormous importance, to say the least. We have gone through periods of great tension without going to war, and I am confident that by following our best instincts and by making the necessary sacrifices, a major war can be avoided indefinitely.

Why then, you might ask, does the Soviet Union devote so much of its resources to building up its armed forces -- at great cost to its hapless and long-suffering people -- if it does not

intend to launch World War III? Bear in mind, that without its impressive military power, the Soviet Union would not be a superpower. By most measures it would rank below several other nations. To the Soviets, military power is political power which can be used to intimidate and coerce the less powerful. Soviet leaders also depend on force to maintain their control over the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc countries. The danger comes when a feeling of dominant military power encourages the Soviets to take risks which could inadvertently lead to war.

For this reason, it is imperative that we and our Allies maintain and strengthen our defenses. We must do our part to prevent dangerous Soviet miscalculations. There is another reason for strengthening our defenses. Only this provides the Soviets an incentive to negotiate meaningful arms control agreements. The Soviets did not agree to negotiate on limiting intermediate-range missiles until they were convinced we were prepared to counter those proliferating SS-20 missiles the Soviets have targeted on Western Europe. We expect the Soviets to return to those negotiations and to negotiate seriously on missile reductions.

As you know, I have been and remain devoted to equitable and verifiable arms reductions both nuclear and conventional, and to concluding agreements on confidence building measures which reduce the risk of inadvertent war or surprise attacks. I am confident that if we build our defenses while seeking arms reductions, there is no reason why we cannot avoid the horrors of nuclear war.

We also look forward to the time when someday Franklin Roosevelt's 50-year old hope for normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union will be realized; however, this requires the Soviet Union to abandon its constantly-expressed hostility toward the United States and other Western countries and to abandon its expansionist goals. The historical record is clear. The Soviets have for decades consistently pursued expansionism, and we have opposed such a policy. The nature of our relationship with other countries is best exemplified by our relations with our neighbors Canada and Mexico whose borders with us are undefended on both sides. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, even seals its borders with neighboring Communist countries in Europe.

The effort of the Soviet regime to isolate its own people from the rest of the world is too well known to require elaboration. A powerful regime which fundamentally distrusts its own people, its own allies and everyone else is bound to be difficult for us all to live with. Still we must persevere in our efforts to maintain the peace and to seek a stable relationship with the Soviet Union.

There should be no fundamental reason why the United States and the Soviet Union cannot live in peace with each other. Certainly there is no animosity between our peoples. Let the Soviet leaders concentrate on improving the lot of their people in every regard. Let them give up spreading an oppressive influence and ideology to other countries. Let them seek truly

normal relations with other countries. Let them join with us in reducing nuclear and conventional arms; then Franklin Roosevelt's hope can be realized, and the prospects for world peace will be strengthened.

* * * * *

Soviet Speech

During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our respsonsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine purposes.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have, and will continue to struggle for a lsting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled with self doubt and self reproach and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence by armed force and threats. During this period, the USSR devoted twice as much of its gross national product to military expenditures as the United States. It deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20

intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States had no comparable weapons.

As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviet Union and its proxies have tried to force their will on others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: Deterrence is more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger now that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973 threat of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At no time in the past three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union placed its armed forces on alert. Yes, we are safer now.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies and our philosphies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why I say that 1984 is a year of opportunities for peace.

But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace which are at hand, we must do more to seek out areas of mutual interest and build on them. I propose that our governments make a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad problem areas.

First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to eliminate --the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting totalitarian rule only exacerbate local conflicts, increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult. Furthermore, such activity carries with it the risk of confrontations.

It would be better and safer if we could work together to assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our ultimate goal.

Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals, provide greater stability and build confidence.

Our third task is to establish a better working relationship with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the

rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

Cooperation and understanding are especially important to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.

I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see to it that our modernization program takes them into account so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove impediments to arms control, which offers us the means to improve the security of both our countries and to create a safe world.

The examples I have cited illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we can negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we are weak we can do neither. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear

confrontation could well be mankind's last. That is why I proposed over two years ago, a zero solution for intermediate range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an entire class of nuclear arms.

Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words, but the Soviets should back them up with concrete proposals that would lead to this nuclear-free world.

The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviet leaders should take advantage of it.

We have undertaken a set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and reduce the risk of a nuclear confrontation by providing greater stability. In the most recent round of negotiations on strategic arms we proposed -- with strong Congressional support -- a novel concept to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals on both sides by removing more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This proposal was not intended to disadvantage the Soviet Union. But it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these horrendous weapons and to make deterrence safer by moving to fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to work toward agreements in INF, START and MBFR. We will negotiate

in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them halfway.

We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications, including the "Hotline."

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts.

Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous for all concerned by introducing thousands of its military personnel and countless sophisticated weapons into Syria during the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting these dangers. The Soviets have announced to the world time and again that they have important interests in the Middle East. So do we. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in that region. I challenge the Soviets to security in the Middle East.

The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence, ~~and~~ peaceful competition and constructive cooperation that will serve both nations and people everywhere. ~~for the long haul.~~ It is a policy not just for this year, but for the long term. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting this week with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. ~~No one can~~ We can't predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating these risks is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we ~~have~~ fought ~~alongside one another in two world wars~~ common enemies in World War II. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, [redacted] and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as ~~realistic and hopeful~~ valid today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments?

Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their children, and what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistance that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

68-77

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING ON SOVIET SPEECH

DATE: Thursday, January 5, 1984
LOCATION: ~~Cabinet Room~~ Oval Office
TIME: 4:00 P.M.

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss draft of speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

You are scheduled to make ~~a~~ the subject speech on January 12 at the National Press Club.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President
Edwin Meese III
James A. Baker, III
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Richard G. Darman
David R. Gergen
Jack F. Matlock
Ben Elliott

IV. PRESS PLAN:

None

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

Comment on speech draft as you desire and solicit comments of others.

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

78784

The President intends to make a speech dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations on Monday, January 16, at the National Press Club.

Questions and Answers

Q. Is the speech connected with the report on compliance?

A. No, not directly. His speech will set forth his views of the relationship and his policy in broad terms.

Q. Will it contain new initiatives?

A. I doubt it, since the purpose of the speech is not to make new proposals--we have diplomatic channels for that--but to explain his attitude and policy.

Q. Is the speech meant to be a signal to the Soviets?

A We assume the Soviets will pay attention to his statement, along with the world public.

Q. Is this a sign that the President is seriously worried about the U.S.-Soviet relationship? Are we on the brink of war?

A. No, the speech is not the result of any specific event and certainly does not reflect alarm that we are on a collision course--because we are not. The President will be speaking on the subject because he has a genuine desire to improve the relationship and believes it will be helpful to spell out his policy and his goals in comprehensive fashion.

SYSTEM II PROFILE UNCLASSIFIED ID 8490014

RECEIVED 05 JAN 84 17

TO MCFARLANE FROM DARMAN, R DOCDATE 05 JAN 84

KEYWORDS USSR SPEECHES

SUBJECT: PRES SOVIET SPEECH

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 06 JAN 84 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE		FOR INFO
MATLOCK	FORTIER	LEHMAN, R	POINDEXTER
			KIMMITT

URGENT

COMMENTS ** URGENT/MEMO DUE TO MCFARLANE BY 0800 AM 6 JAN

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

Document No. SYSTEM II 90014

86

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/5/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --

SUBJECT: SOVIET SPEECH (1/5/84

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☑	JENKINS	☐	☐
MEESE	☐	☑	McFARLANE	☐	☑
BAKER	☐	☑	McMANUS	☐	☐
DEAVER	☐	☑	MURPHY	☐	☐
STOCKMAN	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐P	☑SS	ROGERS	☐	☐
FELDSTEIN	☐	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
FULLER	☐	☐	VERSTANDIG	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☑	WHITTLESEY	☐	☐
HERRINGTON	☐	☐	KIMMITT	☐	☑
HICKEY	☐	☐	ELLIOTT	☐	☑

REMARKS:

This will be discussed with the President tomorrow. (Please hold close.)

Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702

(NSC/Myer/BE)
January 5, 1984
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold our responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet

Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level

of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call "constructive competition."

Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and making the world a safer place.

The world is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom poses no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working

relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful

solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. In fact, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed

here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. But now is a time for opportunity -- a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of

activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm conference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find the United States ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive competition is a challenge for Americans; it will require patience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be

difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.