Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: [President Address: US-Soviet Relations 01/16/1984] Speech on US- Soviet Relations Background Material] (1)
Box: 32

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer JET 5/18/2005

File Folder [PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS 1/16/84] U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS-BACKGROUND MATERIAL JAN 84 SPEECH ON 1/5

FOIA F06-114/9

Box Number 32

YARHI-MILO 3203

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10852	MEMO	DEAVER/MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	2	1/5/1983	B1
10853	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10852 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	2	1/5/1983	B1
10856	LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO "SIR ROB" R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	1/13/1983	B1
10857	PAPER	PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	25	11/22/1983	B1
10858	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10857 R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	25	11/22/1983	B1
10854	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS	2	12/20/1983	B1
10855	MEMO	COBB TO MATLOCK RE SOME THOUGHTS ON "THE SPEECH" R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

11/5/83

1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. McFarlane

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: Compliance Report and Speech

Regarding timing of the speech, I feel it is not necessary to delay it until after the verification/compliance report goes to Congress. I would consider it more important to get the speech on record several days before the Stockholm meeting than to wait for the report.

I feel that the compliance report is fully consistent with the policy enunciated in the speech — it is an element of realism — and should not be seen as any way inconsistant. The lesson we draw should be that Soviet violations underscore the need for more attention to verification in any future agreements, not that we cannot negotiate at all.

10852 2

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ January 5, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive and leaving out startling new initiatives.

Objective

We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your policy toward the Soviet Union.

You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you are following has not gotten through to all segments of our public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded accomodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.

To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a comprehensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.

Audience

You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences simultaneously:

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

-- U.S. opinion makers;
-- West European governments and publics;
-- Soviet leaders; and
-- The Soviet people.

The principal message we need to get across to each is:

U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.

Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.

Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.

Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.

We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. McFarlane

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: Compliance Report and Speech

Regarding timing of the speech, I feel it is not necessary to delay it until after the verification/compliance report goes to Congress. I would consider it more important to get the speech on record several days before the Stockholm meeting than to wait for the report.

I feel that the compliance report is fully consistent with the policy enunciated in the speech — it is an element of realism — and should not be seen as any way inconsistent. The lesson we draw should be that Soviet violations underscore the need for more attention to verification in any future agreements, not that we cannot negotiate at all.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: Mr. McFarlane

FROM: Jack Matlock

SUB: Compliance Report and Speech

Regarding timing of the speech, I feel it is not necessary to delay it until after the verification/compliance report goes to Congress. I would consider it more important to get the speech on record several days before the Stockholm meeting than to wait for the report.

I feel that the compliance report is fully consistent with the policy enunciated in the speech — it is an element of realism — and should not be seen as any way inconsistent. The lesson we draw should be that Soviet violations underscore the need for more attention to verification in any future agreements, not that we cannot negotiate at all.

10853

6

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ January 5, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive and leaving out startling new initiatives.

Objective

We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your policy toward the Soviet Union.

You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you are following has not gotten through to all segments of our public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded accomodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.

To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a comprehensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.

Audience

You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences simultaneously:

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

-- U.S. opinion makers;
-- West European governments and publics;
-- Soviet leaders; and
-- The Soviet people.

The principal message we need to get across to each is:

U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.

Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.

Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.

Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.

We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate the inner consistency of your policy.

Newsworthiness

Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particularly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back here as well.

The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would militate against achieving its objective with influential elites. Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially in Europe.

It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit. We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initiatives for later speeches, following some consultation with the Soviets.

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

(Myer/NSC)
January 5, 1984
10:30 a.m. AL

8

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club

~~Thank you for the warm welcome.~~ In just a few days, the United States will join ~~all~~ the nations of Euorpe, ~~to include~~ including the Soviet Union, ~~in the opening of~~ a security conference in Stockholm. The goal of the conference will be to find practical and meaningful ways to increase European security. It is part of our constant search to strengthen and preserve peace.

We live in a time of peace with not enough peace. And because America's highest aspiration is a durable peace, these are frustrating times -- as they have been for decades. It is high time to move forward and today is a time of opportunity to do so.

In our search for genuine progress we must think first of all ~~of~~ about our relations with the Soviet Union. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. Our two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy civilization itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than reducing the risk of war and making sure that nuclear weapons are never used.

Soviet leaders understand this as well as ~~I~~ we do. Yet, our search for ways to reduce the level of arms and to build a cooperative working relationship is still being frustrated. Why is this so and what we can do about it?

When we look back over the experience of the 1970's we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the

world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through the threat and use of force.

Three years ago, we embraced the mandate of the American people to change course and today America is once again able to demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and our determination to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why today is a time of real opportunity. History teaches us that wars begin when a government feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, ~~to him, but~~ only an unimaginable disaster. ~~to all~~ Thus, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency. Deterrence is being restored. ~~We have the ability~~ *

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.

Neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves can wish away the deep differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will continue. But because our arms make the rivalry so potentially

10

world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through the threat and use of force.

Three years ago, we embraced the mandate of the American people to change course and today America is once again able to demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and our determination to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. That is why today is a time of real opportunity. History teaches us that wars begin when a government feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, ~~to him, but~~ only an unimaginable disaster. ~~to all.~~ Thus, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. Deterrence is being restored. There is credibility and consistency. ~~We have the ability~~ *

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.

Neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves can wish away the deep differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will continue. But because our arms make the rivalry so potentially

dangerous, we must keep it within bounds. We and the Soviet Union have ~~few~~ common interests. ~~But, so long as the United States and the Western Alliance remain strong, we do share several fundamental interests~~ Foremost is that of avoiding war and reducing the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call "constructive competition."

Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words, what stands out is the fact that ~~the balance of power~~ deterrence is being restored and this means that the world is a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now.

Our strength provides the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders are realists. They know that it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunity.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in

many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And the working relationship between our two countries is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be improved.

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. We must engage the Soviet Union in a dialogue that is as cordial and cooperative as our differences permit, a dialogue that will serve to reduce the level of arms, promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, and build a constructive working relationship ~~between our two nations~~.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

Preventing war is my solemn responsibily. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution just exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions? The answer is obvious, and I call upon the Soviet leaders to join with us in a search to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives arms races everwhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is necessary to establish a stable military balance. Our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. And just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe ~~over the last~~ during the past three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero

option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that the Soviet Union shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to move from words to deeds.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish a solid working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps, while violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters the relationship, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. But while we have a long way to go, we are determined to keep trying.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of ~~us~~ ours. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it all the more important for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is of course more than military strength. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point. Equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am more than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range

of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm conference. We will work hard to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Although our approach has been constructive, not much has come of our efforts. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, ~~perhaps~~ as

~~more than~~ much as any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and others who wish to ~~live~~ join family abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

We are not interested in propaganda advantage. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international convenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can --and we must-- keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

That is the objective of our policy toward the Soviet Union. ~~It is~~ Our ~~I call this~~ policy of "constructive competition." ~~It~~ It is ~~a policy~~ for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans and will require patience. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot meet us half-way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

19

> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of US-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than twenty years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

I call upon the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress. If the Soviet Union joins us in a genuine give and take, and truly wants fair outcomes, they will happen. The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the future. I can send no stronger signal. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest advances. We do not fear compromise. In a spirit of constructive competition, we can strengthen peace, reduce greatly the level of arms, and brighten the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.

10856 21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1/13/83 NEW ZEALAND

Dear Rob:

There is no more important subject with which an American President deals than the United States' relations with the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Korean Air Lines tragedy and Moscow's unfortunate decision to suspend the major arms negotiations, our relations have entered an especially difficult period. For this reason, I have decided to present to the American people and to governments and publics throughout the world a comprehensive statement of my approach to the Soviet-American relationship and my hopes for the future.

In my address from the White House on January 16, I will reaffirm the readiness of the United States to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more positive and stable long-term relationship. I will as well call upon the Soviets to make a comparable and substantive response. While I will not be announcing specific new initiatives, I will be clarifying certain misperceptions about U.S. policy. I will also set forth a framework for future our dialogue with the Soviet Union, making clear my sincere desire to improve East-West relations.

Because of the special significance I attach to my statement, I wanted to share the text with you beforehand. I hope you will agree that it meets our common objectives by setting a positive tone both for the opening of the CDE meeting in Stockholm, and for George Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

I look forward to seeing you next month when we can discuss these and other questions in detail. Meanwhile, all best wishes and my congratulations on your knighthood.

Warm regards,

Ronald Reagan

2926m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Background

Embargoed until 18:00, Jan 15

~~For Immediate Release 1/14~~

22

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

On Monday, January 16, in the East Room of the White House, the President will deliver a major address on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. While he will point out the many problems in the relationship, his primary message will be to reaffirm the readiness of the U.S. to pursue a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at building a more productive and stable long-term relationship.

The President will discuss the full range of issues in the US-Soviet relationship -- including arms control, regional problems, human rights and bilateral cooperation -- stressing his desire to move forward in all these areas. The President will emphasize his commitment to achieving significant reductions in arms levels and diminishing the risks of conflict, noting his readiness to meet the Soviets halfway if they are willing to do likewise. And he will also urge that the Soviet Union live up to its human rights obligations, including those assumed under the Helsinki Final Act.

The President will restate our conviction that, despite serious U.S.-Soviet differences, conflict between the two countries is not inevitable, and that more positive relations are not merely possible but necessary. He will call on the Soviet Union for positive actions to that end.

2896m/1

8336849

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

23

November 30, 1983

83 NOV 30 P11 : 01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

November 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Address on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Herewith a second draft speech of an address on U.S.-Soviet relations that you requested.

Bowman McElwaine
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS

I would like to speak to you tonight on one of the most important questions that every President must address: the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union.

The conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union is central to our entire foreign policy. It could not be otherwise. The Soviet Union shares with us the status and the responsibilities that come with being one of the two greatest powers on this planet. The Soviet Union's territory spans two continents, and eleven time zones. Like the United States, the Soviets have interests and allies far beyond their own frontiers. Perhaps most importantly, only the United States and the Soviet Union possess enormous nuclear arsenals capable of destroying all mankind.

As De Tocqueville predicted more than a century ago, it was perhaps inevitable that the United States and Soviet Russia would find themselves in competition as the only truly global powers in the world today. Moreover, the global strategic competition that De Tocqueville foresaw is sharpened by the differences between Western democratic values and the Communist view of the relationship among the individual, government, and society. Taken together, these factors ensure that the United

25

States and Soviet Union will, for the foreseeable future, see one another as adversaries.

But despite our differences, we and the Soviets share a common interest in managing our adversarial relationship in order to keep nuclear war from ever occuring. This has been the objective of every President since the dawning of the nuclear era. It is my profound commitment to the American people and to all peoples of the world. We are all aware of the terrible devastation that nuclear weapons would inflict on human society -- indeed, on human life itself. We are determined to continue the pursuit of policies which will keep that devastation from ever occuring. Our children and their children must be able to sleep at night secure in the understanding that we are moving away from and not toward a nuclear holocaust. This requires a reasoned approach to the Soviet Union and to the world.

Soviet Policy: Part of the U.S. Strategy for Peace

Our policy toward the Soviet Union is but one element of a broader foreign policy that seeks to establish a durable foundation for world peace.

World peace requires, first and foremost that we eliminate the use of force and the threat of force from relations among states.

26

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of World War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by neighbors armed to the teeth seeking to dominate through the threat of armed attack.

As we see each evening on the television screen, even conventional wars wreak terrible human costs. Moreover, these conflicts impose incalculable costs on the peoples involved, and run the risk of a wider confrontation involving the great powers. I am working for a future in which regional disputes are settled by peaceful means, rather than by force of arms or military intimidation, a future in which mankind no longer faces the destruction and human tragedy of war.

As a means to this end, our strategy for peace aims at reducing and, ultimately, eliminating the excessively vast stockpiles of armaments in the world -- above all, the enormous numbers of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars per year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. It is

27

also a source of sorrow for me that our own defense spending has had to be increased in order to restore the military balance in the face of a relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades. Peace and reducing the burden of armaments are, for me, two sides of the same coin.

In seeking to reduce arms levels, we assign the highest priority to reducing the levels of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear arms reductions depend ultimately on negotiation. But we and our Allies have also made considerable progress in recent years -- progress that is not generally appreciated -- to reduce the size of NATO's nuclear arsenal.

For example, it is a little known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed on the elimination of an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of 1000 warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

28

Just as important as reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, we also seek to increase the stability of the nuclear balance. Nuclear war need never occur if we ensure that no nation could ever believe it could gain by attacking with nuclear weapons. Thus it is essential to minimize the number of so-called "first-strike" weapons.

Peace, furthermore, should mean more than just the absence of war. Thus together with elimination of the use of force and reductions in arms levels, we also seek to establish greater confidence and understanding among states.

We do not believe ideological differences are an insurmountable obstacle to establishing greater confidence among states. Confidence depends, first and foremost, on respect for the legitimate interests of other states, irrespective of differences in political and economic values. But confidence can also be strengthened by expanding contacts among peoples, through cultural and academic exchanges, and through trade. By building confidence, we can create a durable basis for cooperation to avoid war and reduce arms.

Confidence is, sad to say, sorely lacking in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the fifty years since our two nations established diplomatic relations, we have seen brief periods of

29

partnership amidst longer ones of bitter confrontation. We have lived through the dark days of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the Cuban missile crisis. We have seen the high hopes for détente in the 1970s dashed by the Soviet Union's unrestrained military build-up and by Moscow's aggressive policies beyond its borders.

But I do not believe that confrontation is the destiny of the American and Soviet peoples. Our two societies share a number of common bonds. We are both relatively young nations, with diverse ethnic traditions and a similar pioneer philosophy. Our peoples have together experienced the horrors of war, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the victory over Nazi Germany. Although we continue to clash on the battlefield of ideas, it is important to remember that the American and Soviet peoples have never been at war with one another. If we are wise, there is no reason why we ever should.

Three Principles of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union

From the moment I entered office almost three years ago, I sought to establish the basis for a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I had no illusions that it would be easy to deal with a hostile and militarily powerful adversary, or that it would be easy to find solutions to the many serious problems between us. My overriding objective was

to reduce the dangers of a Soviet-American military confrontation. But I also embarked on a search for areas in which our two nations could work together to mutual advantage, areas where there was a basis on which to instill greater confidence and mutual understanding to the US-Soviet relationship.

Our strategy for managing relations with the Soviet Union is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue:

Realism

An effective policy toward Moscow requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and the way it conducts itself in world affairs. If nothing else, history has taught us not to base our relations with the Soviet Union on trust. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. Indeed, misunderstandings can best be avoided if we are quite frank in acknowledging our ideological differences, and unafraid to defend the democratic values we hold so dear.

I have, of course, been forthright in discussing the nature of the Soviet Union and the problems we have with Soviet policies. I will continue to do so. But frank talk should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders. President Andropov and

President Brezhnev before him have always stressed that peaceful coexistence is not the same thing as ideological coexistence. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "aggressive imperialists," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. I believe that Soviet leaders are no less clear-eyed. In fact, at a Central Committee meeting in June, Andropov himself stated:

> "A struggle is underway for the minds and hearts of the billions of people on the planet, and the future of mankind depends to a considerable extent on the outcome of this ideological struggle."

Realism about the Soviet Union also means coming to grips with the facts of Soviet behavior throughout Soviet history, but especially over the past decade and a half. We have learned that the Soviet Union is distinctly unimpressed by unilateral Western restraint. The Soviet Union's military build-up continued over the last ten-to-fifteen years despite considerable restraint on the part of the United States and its allies. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their GNP to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBMs, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

Bolstered by its growing military power, the Soviet Union displayed an increasing willingness to use force -- both

32

directly and indirectly -- to increase regional tensions and install regimes that were and are totally lacking in popular support. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. This type of interference has had tragic consequences for the peoples involved, and it has threatened -- and continues to threaten -- the security of other states.

We recognize that the regional tensions that the Soviets and their proxies seek to exploit are real, and have their roots in local situations. Our approach is to assist the governments and peoples of areas where such tensions exist to negotiate peaceful political solutions to these problems. We think that is the only responsible approach in the nuclear age.

Unfortunately, the Soviets do not yet share this approach. Rather, the Soviet Union -- unchallenged for far too long by a United States still traumatized by the Vietnam experience -- has in recent years repeatedly sought to impose solutions by methods that necessarily threaten the interests of parties involved, of our friends and allies, and of the United States itself, as well as the peace of the world.

Strength

Proceeding from this realistic view of the Soviet Union, we recognized from the outset that the United States and its allies and friends cannot negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union, or ensure that Moscow respects the vital interests of other countries, from a position of weakness. The greatest risk of nuclear war would come from a Soviet miscalculation that we were growing weak and that they could act aggressively without fear of response. This could create the kind of action-reaction cycle we all wish to avoid. Thus, my first priorities were to restore America's economic and military strength, and to restore the trust and confidence between us and our partners that is needed if we are to deal successfully together with the Soviet challenge.

I will not dwell tonight on the details of the economic recovery now underway, or the specific steps we have taken to restore the military balance. Suffice it to say that, thanks to the resolve of the American people and the bipartisan support received from the Congress, we have sent an unambiguous signal to Moscow that we will reestablish equality in the areas of the military balance where the Soviet Union has opened up destabilizing gaps over the past ten years. We have made clear that we will provide material and political support to governments and peoples threatened by the Soviets or their clients.

We have also demonstrated that we are prepared to use our own military strength when absolutely necessary to protect our citizens and our interests and to advance the cause of peace. At the same time, we have made clear that, while we will restore the balance through our own programs if necessary, our preference is to do so through verifiable agreements that reduce arms on both sides to the lowest possible levels consistent with our security requirements.

In addition to rebuilding America's economic and military strength, an important element of our approach to the Soviet Union was strengthening our relations with Allies and friends throughout the world. Here too, we have achieved considerable progress. The countries of NATO and our Japanese allies are, in the main, committed as we are to prudent strengthening of our common defense capabilities. And we have made great strides in restoring the economic health of the Western democracies and in developing a common approach to international economic problems -- in particular, the need to avoid letting peaceful trade become an instrument for accelerating the Soviet military buildup.

Rather than the option of good-faith negotiations, the Soviet Union has chosen to deal with us by seeking to divide America from the rest of the world, essentially through

propaganda. The Atlantic Alliance is now in the process of sending the Soviets a clear message that they can no longer count on divisions among Western governments as a means of maintaining military superiority. I am thinking, of course, of the deployment this month of the first Pershing and cruise missiles in Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

After more than two years of intensive negotiations, we would have preferred another result. Our initial objective was to rid the world of this generation of missiles, and that was what I proposed in November 1981. The Soviets rejected that proposal, as they have rejected my subsequent proposal of an interim solution at equal levels, as a stepping-stone toward zero on both sides.

Proceeding with these deployments has been no easy matter for any of the countries involved, including our own. We are deploying with a heavy heart. Our preference was and still remains to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces through arms control rather than deployments. We stand ready to withdraw any and all of our new missiles if a fair bargain can be struck.

The initiation of deployments has occurred because the Soviet Union, despite major concessions on our part, would not accept a negotiated solution other than one which would preserve a sizeable Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The negotiating option remains open to the Soviets; we hope this time they will take it. We are ready to proceed.

Dialogue

If fact, the negotiating option is open to them everywhere, and not just in the arms control field. The increased realism and strength we have established provide the necessary underpinnings for an effective policy toward the Soviet Union. But our policy is not simply one of maintaining a military balance or containing Soviet expansionism. The third element of our strategy I mentioned earlier -- dialogue -- is integral to our whole approach. It is on this element that I would like to focus in the remainder of my remarks tonight.

From the first days of my Administration, we have pursued an intensive dialogue with the Soviet Union covering the four principal areas of our relationship: arms control, regional security, human rights, and bilateral cooperation. Through the direct correspondence I have maintained with Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov, and in diplomatic exchanges from the level of

37

Secretary of State on down, we have conveyed a consistent message: that we do not shrink from competition with the Soviet Union, be it political, military, economic, or ideological; but that our aim is to resolve Soviet-American differences peacefully, and to search for agreements under which our two great nations can cooperate constructively to mutual advantage.

We always recognized that the path to agreements with Moscow and to greater Soviet-American cooperation would be a slow and difficult one. Having witnessed the rapid demise of the "détente" of the 1970s, we set our standards in negotiations with the Soviets high, and we expected no sudden breakthroughs. For one thing, the Soviets themselves have placed numerous obstacles in the way -- their continuing occupation of Afghanistan and brutal supression of human rights within the USSR being but two examples. Moreover, I think the Soviets have not yet reconciled themselves to the fact that for the next five years and perhaps beyond, they must deal with Western governments that are united as never before in pursuing realistic policies toward the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of this year I authorized Secretary of State Shultz to initiate an intensified series of discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The purpose of this effort was to test whether the new Soviet leadership was

38

prepared to join us in an effort to put our relations on a more positive footing. The Soviet response was not as forthcoming as we had hoped. Neither was it totally uninterested. Over the spring and summer, there were a few developments which suggested that the Soviet Union was considering engaging us in a search for better relations.

This modest progress was, to our regret, halted by the Soviets' destruction on September 1 of Korean Airlines flight 7 with 269 passengers on board, and their subsequent efforts to evade responsibility. The Soviet Union still owes the civilized world an unequivocal apology for the Korean Airlines massacre, as well as compensation for the victims' families. Perhaps of equal importance, the time has come for the Soviet Union to take positive steps to ensure that civilian air travelers need never again fear a recurrence of this tragedy.

But as much as I was shocked and outraged by the Soviets' behavior, the downing of KAL flight 7 did not lead me to reevaluate our policy toward the Soviet Union. In pursuing negotiations with the Soviets, I have never harbored any illusions that progress would be the result of Soviet good will or human kindness. Progress can only be achieved when the Soviets recognize that their best option is cooperation.

39

Thus, in the aftermath of the destruction of KAL flight 7, I sent my negotiators back to Geneva and Vienna to continue the negotiations on reducing nuclear and conventional arms. Secretary of State Shultz went to Madrid to conclude the Conference that reviewed fulfillment of the Helsinki accords, and to meet face-to-face with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Throughout the fall, our diplomats have been in frequent contact on all issues in US-Soviet relations.

Let me describe to you our approach to each of the four areas of the US-Soviet agenda, and my hopes for the future.

The Four-Part Agenda

Regional Security

The first element of the US-Soviet agenda is the broad range of regional problems where the Soviet approach all too often threatens the security of other nations. It was the Soviet penchant for fanning regional tensions and intervening in regional disputes by using or encouraging the use of force that contributed most to the collapse of "détente." It is continuing Soviet adventurism in areas vital to the interests not just of the U.S., but also of a whole series of other countries, that poses the most serious risk of superpower confrontation. Soviet leaders must recognize that their efforts to exploit regional animosities will gain the Soviet

40

Union no enduring strategic advantages, and can only further complicate the search for improved East-West relations.

We and the Soviets, in my view, should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. It was out of this belief that we tried to engage the Soviets last year in exchanges of views concerning what would be required to bring about a peaceful political solution in Afghanistan, complementing the efforts undertaken by the United Nations Secretary General. It was also out this belief that we exchanged views with the Soviets on developments in southern Africa, as a means of supplementing the broad-gauge diplomatic effort which has been underway for several years to achieve a peaceful political solution to that region's many problems.

Our approach has been constructive. So far it has not been matched on the Soviet side. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

41

Arms Control

Regional conflicts need to be addressed not only in the interests of the parties involved, but because they contain the risk of broader US-Soviet confrontation. And in the nuclear age, such a confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus alongside regional issues, arms control stands at the top of the US-Soviet agenda.

American and Soviet scientists have recently documented what common sense dictates: there would be no winners in a nuclear war, and human society and human life itself would be gravely threatened. It was in recognition of these grim realities that I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive series of initiatives that seek both to reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and to eliminate any incentive to use nuclear weapons even in a crisis. Together with our nuclear arms control initiatives, we have proposed the complete elimination of chemical weapons, and are pressing ahead with the Vienna negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.

Our standards in all these negotiations are high: we insist that agreements be based on real equality, that they make a meaningful contribution to international security, and that they be verifiable. Agreements that simply ratify a continuing

Soviet build-up are worse than no agreements at all. Moreover, the doubts that have arisen recently about Soviet compliance with previous SALT agreements underscore the need to close every possible loophole.

If our standards are high, our flexibility is also great. The proposals I announced in September in the INF and START talks were directly responsive to Soviet concerns. In INF, I moved toward the Soviet position on aircraft and on the geographic coverage of a future agreement, and I offered special constraints on the system that Moscow claims to be most concerned about, the Pershing II. In START, I proposed the concept of a guaranteed build-down in strategic weapons as older systems are replaced. I stated that we were prepared to trade reductions in areas where we enjoy an advantage, bombers and cruise missiles, for reductions in the main area of Soviet advantage, warheads on land-based ballistic missiles.

The Soviet response to these initiatives was disappointing. The Soviet START Delegation practically ignored our new proposals. In INF, after showing the first signs of flexibility since the talks began, the Soviets abruptly declared the talks finished on the grounds that U.S. deployments had made negotiations impossible. The United States negotiated in good faith while the Soviets deployed over one hundred additional

SS-20s with over three hundred warheads. We are ready to continue the search for an agreement that would reduce intermediate-range weapons to the lowest possible level, and hope the Soviet Union will join in that search.

Arms reductions are the most important aspect of our arms control agenda with the Soviets, but we have also presented a number of other initiatives to reduce the risk of war. In order to minimize the dangers of miscalculation in periods of tension, I have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps we call "confidence-building measures."

Our proposals cover a broad spectrum. Under negotiation in Geneva are proposals for advance notification of missile tests and major military exercises. We have also suggested that we and the Soviets work together with other nations to establish procedures for handling the possible seizure of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a safeguard against misunderstandings in time of crisis. I am pleased to say that the Soviets have agreed to a second round of talks on communications improvements beginning on _____.

Human Rights

The third major subject of our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet abuses in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship. Soviet unwillingness to abide by solemn international commitments in this area has been all too characteristic of the Soviet approach to international affairs generally.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our outrage over the imprisonment of thousands of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews and other Soviet minorities, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for any decent human being to comprehend why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow 300 of their citizens to be reunited with close family members in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; the Soviet human rights record is a propaganda black eye the Soviets give themselves, and we would gladly see them stop. We are interested in results. For example, we were heartened this spring when Soviet authorities agreed to grant exit visas to the Pentecostalist families who had sought refuge in our Moscow Embassy for almost four years. They were well aware of our interest, but the decision was theirs alone, and was of benefit to the people involved, and to the two countries. I see no reason why the same benefit should not be achieved in other, similar cases in this area.

Bilateral Cooperation

The final element of our agenda with the Soviets includes economic and other bilateral relations. Despite strains in our relationship, we have preserved the framework for peaceful, non-strategic bilateral trade advantageous to both countries. The signing this summer of a new Long-Term Agreement on grain sales is a manifestation of our desire to promote such trade with the Soviet Union.

We have also made clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to explore ways of expanding bilateral cooperation in other areas. In particular, we are interested in finding new ways in

which our two peoples can get to know one another, and increase understanding of each other's societies and cultures.

With this in mind, we proposed earlier this year that our governments begin negotiations on a new cultural and scientific exchanges agreement, and renew discussion on the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York. These were two areas where, in my judgment, the balance of mutual advantage was about equal, where both sides stood to gain by regularizing access to each other's society on a reciprocal basis. Because of the tragic events of September 1, we had to put off the start of these talks. But our interest in exploring ways to get to know each other better through reciprocal steps in areas like these ~~continues strong~~.

As another example, we would like to explore ways to increase the representation of the other country's viewpoint in the news media. Soviet commentators of course have splendid access to our free media, and we welcome the challenge. I was pleased when Soviet television interviewed Deputy Secretary of State Dam a few months back on the prospects for the Geneva negotiations. My government is prepared to work with the U.S. news media to institute a more regular program of exchanges of this sort.

47

Conclusion

As you can see, our agenda with the Soviets is a formidable one. Although the prevention of war may be the overarching goal, all four areas -- regional security, arms control, human rights, bilateral cooperation -- are important. Indeed, a lasting improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on progress in all four.

In closing, let me return again to the three pillars of our policy toward the Soviet Union that I mentioned earlier: realism, strength and negotiation. As much as we would wish otherwise, competition is likely to be a central feature of our relations for some time to come. And I am proud to say that, thanks to the support of the American people, we have been successful over the past three years in restoring the strength necessary to avoid war and defend vital Western interests against continuing Soviet challenges.

Strength and realism provide the necessary foundation for ensuring peace in our relations with the Soviet Union. Our preference, however, is to reduce the risk of military conflict and to resolve Soviet-American differences through dialogue and negotiation. Our hope is that, in America's relations with the Soviet Union -- as in relations among all nations -- we can create for future generations a world free from the use of

force, a world in which swords have been beaten into ploughshares, a world in which states of differing social systems can cooperate with one another on the basis of mutual respect and shared interest.

We have in place a positive agenda that offers the basis for a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. I am confident that, in the coming months and years, if we sustain our approach, this goal can be achieved. I call upon the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us in the search for peace -- the sooner they do so, the better for all mankind.

10858

49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT 11/22/83

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS

I would like to speak to you tonight on one of the most important questions that every President must address: the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union.

The conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union is central to our entire foreign policy. It could not be otherwise. The Soviet Union shares with us the status and the responsibilities that come with being one of the two greatest powers on this planet. The Soviet Union's territory spans two continents, and eleven time zones. Like the United States, the Soviets have interests and allies far beyond their own frontiers. Perhaps most importantly, only the United States and the Soviet Union possess enormous nuclear arsenals capable of destroying all mankind.

As De Tocqueville predicted more than a century ago, it was perhaps inevitable that the United States and Soviet Russia would find themselves in competition as the only truly global powers in the world today. Moreover, the global strategic competition that De Tocqueville foresaw is sharpened by the differences between Western democratic values and the Communist view of the relationship among the individual, government, and society. Taken together, these factors ensure that the United

50

States and Soviet Union will, for the foreseeable future, see one another as adversaries.

But despite our differences, we and the Soviets share a common interest in managing our adversarial relationship in order to keep nuclear war from ever occuring. This has been the objective of every President since the dawning of the nuclear era. It is my profound commitment to the American people and to all peoples of the world. We are all aware of the terrible devastation that nuclear weapons would inflict on human society -- indeed, on human life itself. We are determined to continue the pursuit of policies which will keep that devastation from ever occuring. Our children and their children must be able to sleep at night secure in the understanding that we are moving away from and not toward a nuclear holocaust. This requires a reasoned approach to the Soviet Union and to the world.

- Nuc War not winnable
- Must not be fought

Soviet Policy: Part of the U.S. Strategy for Peace

Our policy toward the Soviet Union is but one element of a broader foreign policy that seeks to establish a durable foundation for world peace.

World peace requires, first and foremost that we eliminate the use of force and the threat of force from relations among states.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of World War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by neighbors armed to the teeth seeking to dominate through the threat of armed attack.

As we see each evening on the television screen, even conventional wars wreak terrible human costs. Moreover, these conflicts impose incalculable costs on the peoples involved, and run the risk of a wider confrontation involving the great powers. I am working for a future in which regional disputes are settled by peaceful means, rather than by force of arms or military intimidation, a future in which mankind no longer faces the destruction and human tragedy of war.

As a means to this end, our strategy for peace aims at reducing and, ultimately, eliminating the excessively vast stockpiles of armaments in the world -- above all, the enormous numbers of nuclear weapons. We must reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars per year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. It is

also a source of sorrow for me that our own defense spending has had to be increased in order to restore the military balance in the face of a relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades. Peace and reducing the burden of armaments are, for me, two sides of the same coin.

In seeking to reduce arms levels, we assign the highest priority to reducing the levels of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear arms reductions depend ultimately on negotiation. But we and our Allies have also made considerable progress in recent years -- progress that is not generally appreciated -- to reduce the size of NATO's nuclear arsenal.

For example, it is a little known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed on the elimination of an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of 1000 warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

Just as important as reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, we also seek to increase the stability of the nuclear balance. Nuclear war need never occur if we ensure that no nation could ever believe it could gain by attacking with nuclear weapons. Thus it is essential to minimize the number of so-called "first-strike" weapons.

Peace, furthermore, should mean more than just the absence of war. Thus together with elimination of the use of force and reductions in arms levels, we also seek to establish greater confidence and understanding among states.

We do not believe ideological differences are an insurmountable obstacle to establishing greater confidence among states. Confidence depends, first and foremost, on respect for the legitimate interests of other states, irrespective of differences in political and economic values. But confidence can also be strengthened by expanding contacts among peoples, through cultural and academic exchanges, and through trade. By building confidence, we can create a durable basis for cooperation to avoid war and reduce arms.

Confidence is, sad to say, sorely lacking in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the fifty years since our two nations established diplomatic relations, we have seen brief periods of

partnership amidst longer ones of bitter confrontation. We have lived through the dark days of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the Cuban missile crisis. We have seen the high hopes for détente in the 1970s dashed by the Soviet Union's unrestrained military build-up and by Moscow's aggressive policies beyond its borders.

Bring Toqueville here

But I do not believe that confrontation is the destiny of the American and Soviet peoples. Our two societies share a number of common bonds. We are both relatively young nations, with diverse ethnic traditions and a similar pioneer philosophy. Our peoples have together experienced the horrors of war, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the victory over Nazi Germany. Although we continue to clash on the battlefield of ideas, it is important to remember that the American and Soviet peoples have never been at war with one another. If we are wise, there is no reason why we ever should.

— Kennedy AU Quote?

Three Principles of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union

From the moment I entered office almost three years ago, I sought to establish the basis for a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I had no illusions that it would be easy to deal with a hostile and militarily powerful adversary, or that it would be easy to find solutions to the many serious problems between us. My overriding objective was

to reduce the dangers of a Soviet-American military confrontation. But I also embarked on a search for areas in which our two nations could work together to mutual advantage, areas where there was a basis on which to instill greater confidence and mutual understanding to the US-Soviet relationship.

Our strategy for managing relations with the Soviet Union is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue: ~~X~~ negotiation

Realism

An effective policy toward Moscow requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and the way it conducts itself in world affairs. If nothing else, history has taught us not to base our relations with the Soviet Union on trust. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. Indeed, misunderstandings can best be avoided if we are quite frank in acknowledging our ideological differences, and unafraid to defend the democratic values we hold so dear.

I have, of course, been forthright in discussing the nature of the Soviet Union and the problems we have with Soviet policies. I will continue to do so. But frank talk should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders. President Andropov and

President Brezhnev before him have always stressed that peaceful coexistence is not the same thing as ideological coexistence. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "aggressive imperialists," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. I believe that Soviet leaders are no less clear-eyed. In fact, at a Central Committee meeting in June, Andropov himself stated:

> "A struggle is underway for the minds and hearts of the billions of people on the planet, and the future of mankind depends to a considerable extent on the outcome of this ideological struggle."

Realism about the Soviet Union also means coming to grips with the facts of Soviet behavior throughout Soviet history, but especially over the past decade and a half. We have learned that the Soviet Union is distinctly unimpressed by unilateral Western restraint. The Soviet Union's military build-up continued over the last ten-to-fifteen years despite considerable restraint on the part of the United States and its allies. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their GNP to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBMs, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

Bolstered by its growing military power, the Soviet Union displayed an increasing willingness to use force -- both

directly and indirectly -- to increase regional tensions and install regimes that were and are totally lacking in popular support. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. This type of interference has had tragic consequences for the peoples involved, and it has threatened -- and continues to threaten -- the security of other states.

We recognize that the regional tensions that the Soviets and their proxies seek to exploit are real, and have their roots in local situations. Our approach is to assist the governments and peoples of areas where such tensions exist to negotiate peaceful political solutions to these problems. We think that is the only responsible approach in the nuclear age.

Unfortunately, the Soviets do not yet share this approach. Rather, the Soviet Union -- unchallenged for far too long by a United States still traumatized by the Vietnam experience -- has in recent years repeatedly sought to impose solutions by methods that necessarily threaten the interests of parties involved, of our friends and allies, and of the United States itself, as well as the peace of the world.

58

Strength

Proceeding from this realistic view of the Soviet Union, we recognized from the outset that the United States and its allies and friends cannot negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union, or ensure that Moscow respects the vital interests of other countries, from a position of weakness. The greatest risk of nuclear war would come from a Soviet miscalculation that we were growing weak and that they could act aggressively without fear of response. This could create the kind of action-reaction cycle we all wish to avoid. Thus, my first priorities were to restore America's economic and military strength, and to restore the trust and confidence between us and our partners that is needed if we are to deal successfully together with the Soviet challenge.

I will not dwell tonight on the details of the economic recovery now underway, or the specific steps we have taken to restore the military balance. Suffice it to say that, thanks to the resolve of the American people and the bipartisan support received from the Congress, we have sent an unambiguous signal to Moscow that we will reestablish equality in the areas of the military balance where the Soviet Union has opened up destabilizing gaps over the past ten years. We have made clear that we will provide material and political support to governments and peoples threatened by the Soviets or their clients.

We have also demonstrated that we are prepared to use our own military strength when absolutely necessary to protect our citizens and our interests and to advance the cause of peace. At the same time, we have made clear that, while we will restore the balance through our own programs if necessary, our preference is to do so through verifiable agreements that reduce arms on both sides to the lowest possible levels consistent with our security requirements.

In addition to rebuilding America's economic and military strength, an important element of our approach to the Soviet Union was strengthening our relations with Allies and friends throughout the world. Here too, we have achieved considerable progress. The countries of NATO and our Japanese allies are, in the main, committed as we are to prudent strengthening of our common defense capabilities. And we have made great strides in restoring the economic health of the Western democracies and in developing a common approach to international economic problems -- in particular, the need to avoid letting peaceful trade become an instrument for accelerating the Soviet military buildup.

Rather than the option of good-faith negotiations, the Soviet Union has chosen to deal with us by seeking to divide America from the rest of the world, essentially through

propaganda. The Atlantic Alliance is now in the process of sending the Soviets a clear message that they can no longer count on divisions among Western governments as a means of maintaining military superiority. I am thinking, of course, of the deployment this month of the first Pershing and cruise missiles in Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

After more than two years of intensive negotiations, we would have preferred another result. Our ~~initial~~ objective ~~was~~ is to rid the world of this generation of missiles, and that was what I proposed in November 1981. The Soviets rejected that proposal, as they have rejected my subsequent proposal of an interim solution at equal levels, as a stepping-stone toward zero on both sides. Even while the INF negotiations were underway the USSR continued its steady deployment of new SS-20 missiles.

Proceeding with these deployments has been no easy matter for any of the countries involved, including our own. We are deploying with a heavy heart. Our preference was and still remains to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces through arms control rather than deployments. We stand ready to withdraw any and all of our new missiles if a fair bargain can be struck. What has been deployed can always be withdrawn.

The initiation of deployments has occurred because the Soviet Union, despite major concessions on our part, would not accept a negotiated solution other than one which would preserve a sizeable Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The negotiating option remains open to the Soviets; we hope this time they will take it. We are ready to proceed.

Dialogue

In fact, the negotiating option is open to them everywhere, and not just in the arms control field. The increased realism and strength we have established provide the necessary underpinnings for an effective policy toward the Soviet Union. But our policy is not simply one of maintaining a military balance or containing Soviet expansionism. The third element of our strategy I mentioned earlier -- dialogue -- is integral to our whole approach. It is on this element that I would like to focus in the remainder of my remarks tonight.

From the first days of my Administration, we have pursued an intensive dialogue with the Soviet Union covering the four principal areas of our relationship: arms control, regional security, human rights, and bilateral cooperation. Through the direct correspondence I have maintained with Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov, and in diplomatic exchanges from the level of

Secretary of State on down, we have conveyed a consistent message: that we do not shrink from competition with the Soviet Union, be it political, military, economic, or ideological; but that our aim is to resolve Soviet-American differences peacefully, and to search for agreements under which our two great nations can cooperate constructively to mutual advantage.

We always recognized that the path to agreements with Moscow and to greater Soviet-American cooperation would be a slow and ~~difficult one~~. Having witnessed the rapid demise of the "détente" of the 1970s, we set our standards in negotiations with the Soviets high, and we expected no sudden breakthroughs. For one thing, the Soviets themselves have placed numerous obstacles in the way -- their continuing occupation of Afghanistan and brutal supression of human rights within the USSR being but two examples. Moreover, I think the Soviets have not yet reconciled themselves to the fact that for the [next five years / foreseeable future] and perhaps beyond, they must deal with Western governments that are united as never before in pursuing realistic policies toward the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of this year I authorized Secretary of State Shultz to initiate an intensified series of discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The purpose of this effort was to test whether the new Soviet leadership was

prepared to join us in an effort to put our relations on a more positive footing. The Soviet response was not as forthcoming as we had hoped. Neither was it totally uninterested. Over the spring and summer, there were a few developments which suggested that the Soviet Union was considering engaging us in a search for better relations.

This modest progress was, to our regret, halted by the Soviets' destruction on September 1 of Korean Airlines flight 7 with 269 passengers on board, and their subsequent efforts to evade responsibility. The Soviet Union still owes the civilized world an unequivocal apology for the Korean Airlines massacre, as well as compensation for the victims' families. Perhaps of equal importance, the time has come for the Soviet Union to take positive steps to ensure that civilian air travelers need never again fear a recurrence of this tragedy.

But as much as I was shocked and outraged by the Soviets' behavior, the downing of KAL flight 7 did not lead me to reevaluate our policy toward the Soviet Union. In pursuing negotiations with the Soviets, I have never harbored any illusions that progress would be the result of Soviet good will or human kindness. Progress can only be achieved when the Soviets recognize that their best option is cooperation.

Thus, in the aftermath of the destruction of KAL flight 7, I sent my negotiators back to Geneva and Vienna to continue the negotiations on reducing nuclear and conventional arms. Secretary of State Shultz went to Madrid to conclude the Conference that reviewed fulfillment of the Helsinki accords, and to meet face-to-face with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Throughout the fall, our diplomats have been in frequent contact on all issues in US-Soviet relations.

Let me describe to you our approach to each of the four areas of the US-Soviet agenda, and my hopes for the future.

Too long

The Four-Part Agenda

Regional Security

The first element of the US-Soviet agenda is the broad range of regional problems where the Soviet approach all too often threatens the security of other nations. It was the Soviet penchant for fanning regional tensions and intervening in regional disputes by using or encouraging the use of force that contributed most to the collapse of "détente." It is continuing Soviet adventurism in areas vital to the interests not just of the U.S., but also of a whole series of other countries, that poses the most serious risk of superpower confrontation. Soviet leaders must recognize that their efforts to exploit regional animosities will gain the Soviet

Union no enduring strategic advantages, and can only further complicate the search for improved East-West relations.

We and the Soviets, in my view, should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. It was out of this belief that we tried to engage the Soviets last year in exchanges of views concerning what would be required to bring about a peaceful political solution in Afghanistan, complementing the efforts undertaken by the United Nations Secretary General. It was also out this belief that we exchanged views with the Soviets on developments in southern Africa, as a means of supplementing the broad-gauge diplomatic effort which has been underway for several years to achieve a peaceful political solution to that region's many problems.

Our approach has been constructive. So far it has not been matched on the Soviet side. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

GOAL - "Risk Reduction" "Stability"

66

Arms Control

Regional conflicts need to be addressed not only in the interests of the parties involved, but because they contain the risk of broader US-Soviet confrontation. And in the nuclear age, such a confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus alongside regional issues, arms control stands at the top of the US-Soviet agenda.

American and Soviet scientists have recently documented what common sense dictates: there would be no winners in a nuclear war, and human society and human life itself would be gravely threatened. It was in recognition of these grim realities that I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive series of initiatives that seek both to reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and to eliminate any incentive to use nuclear weapons even in a crisis. Together with our nuclear arms control initiatives, we have proposed the complete elimination of chemical weapons, and are pressing ahead with the Vienna negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.

Yes

Our standards in all these negotiations are high: we insist that agreements be based on real equality, that they make a meaningful contribution to international security, and that they be verifiable. Agreements that simply ratify a continuing

Soviet build-up are worse than no agreements at all. Moreover, the doubts that have arisen recently about Soviet compliance with previous SALT agreements underscore the need to close every possible loophole.

If our standards are high, our flexibility is also great. The proposals I announced in September in the INF and START talks were directly responsive to Soviet concerns. In INF, I moved toward the Soviet position on aircraft and on the geographic coverage of a future agreement, and I offered special constraints on the system that Moscow claims to be most concerned about, the Pershing II. In START, I proposed the concept of a guaranteed build-down in strategic weapons as older systems are replaced. I stated that we were prepared to trade reductions in areas where we enjoy an advantage, bombers and cruise missiles, for reductions in the main area of Soviet advantage, warheads on land-based ballistic missiles.

The Soviet response to these initiatives was disappointing. The Soviet START Delegation practically ignored our new proposals. In INF, after showing the first signs of flexibility since the talks began, the Soviets abruptly declared the talks finished on the grounds that U.S. deployments had made negotiations impossible. The United States negotiated in good faith while the Soviets deployed over one hundred additional

SS-20s with over three hundred warheads. We are ready to continue the search for an agreement that would reduce intermediate-range weapons to the lowest possible level, and hope the Soviet Union will join in that search.

Arms reductions are the most important aspect of our arms control agenda with the Soviets, but we have also presented a number of other initiatives to reduce the risk of war. In order to minimize the dangers of miscalculation in periods of tension, I have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps we call "confidence-building measures."

Our proposals cover a broad spectrum. Under negotiation in Geneva are proposals for advance notification of missile tests and major military exercises. We have also suggested that we and the Soviets work together with other nations to establish procedures for handling the possible seizure of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a safeguard against misunderstandings in time of crisis. I am pleased to say that the Soviets have agreed to a second round of talks on communications improvements beginning on _____.

Human Rights

The third major subject of our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet abuses in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship. Soviet unwillingness to abide by solemn international commitments in this area has been all too characteristic of the Soviet approach to international affairs generally.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our outrage over the imprisonment of thousands of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews and other Soviet minorities, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for any decent human being to comprehend why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow 300 of their citizens to be reunited with close family members in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; the Soviet human rights record is a propaganda black eye the Soviets give themselves, and we would gladly see them stop. We are interested in results. For example, we were heartened this spring when Soviet authorities agreed to grant exit visas to the Pentecostalist families who had sought refuge in our Moscow Embassy for almost four years. They were well aware of our interest, but the decision was theirs alone, and was of benefit to the people involved, and to the two countries. I see no reason why the same benefit should not be achieved in other, similar cases in this area.

Bilateral Cooperation

The final element of our agenda with the Soviets includes economic and other bilateral relations. Despite strains in our relationship, we have preserved the framework for peaceful, non-strategic bilateral trade advantageous to both countries. The signing this summer of a new Long-Term Agreement on grain sales is a manifestation of our desire to promote such trade with the Soviet Union.

We have also made clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to explore ways of expanding bilateral cooperation in other areas. In particular, we are interested in finding new ways in

which our two peoples can get to know one another, and increase understanding of each other's societies and cultures.

With this in mind, we proposed earlier this year that our governments begin negotiations on a new cultural and scientific exchanges agreement, and renew discussion on the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York. These were two areas where, in my judgment, the balance of mutual advantage was about equal, where both sides stood to gain by regularizing access to each other's society on a reciprocal basis. Because of the tragic events of September 1, we had to put off the start of these talks. But our interest in exploring ways to get to know each other better through reciprocal steps in areas like these continues strong.

As another example, we would like to explore ways to increase the representation of the other country's viewpoint in the news media. Soviet commentators of course have splendid access to our free media, and we welcome the challenge. I was pleased when Soviet television interviewed Deputy Secretary of State Dam a few months back on the prospects for the Geneva negotiations. My government is prepared to work with the U.S. news media to institute a more regular program of exchanges of this sort.

Conclusion

As you can see, our agenda with the Soviets is a formidable one. Although the prevention of war may be the overarching goal, all four areas -- regional security, arms control, human rights, bilateral cooperation -- are important. Indeed, a lasting improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on progress in all four.

In closing, let me return again to the three pillars of our policy toward the Soviet Union that I mentioned earlier: realism, strength and negotiation. As much as we would wish otherwise, competition is likely to be a central feature of our relations for some time to come. And I am proud to say that, thanks to the support of the American people, we have been successful over the past three years in restoring the strength necessary to avoid war and defend vital Western interests against continuing Soviet challenges.

Strength and realism provide the necessary foundation for ensuring peace in our relations with the Soviet Union. Our preference, however, is to reduce the risk of military conflict and to resolve Soviet-American differences through dialogue and negotiation. Our hope is that, in America's relations with the Soviet Union -- as in relations among all nations -- we can create for future generations a world free from the use of

force, a world in which swords have been beaten into ploughshares, a world in which states of differing social systems can cooperate with one another on the basis of mutual respect and shared interest.

We have in place a positive agenda that offers the basis for a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. I am confident that, in the coming months and years, if we sustain our approach, this goal can be achieved. I call upon the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us in the search for peace -- the sooner they do so, the better for all mankind.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbow
11/21/83 632-8040 2547m

Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr.
EUR: MPalmer
EUR: RBurt

Draft 12/15/83

SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. Before these holidays are upon us, I think it is a good time to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed cannot, happen.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are experiencing a period of tension in our relations which is greater than we have seen for

many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the seventies, we notice two things: America tended to withdraw from the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves: Throughout the 1970's, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 imtermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

But the Soviets not only amassed a monstrous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also began to use these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. And in Europe, their deployment of SS-20 missiles was a blatant effort to spit the NATO Alliance and threaten our West European allies.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels that it can prevail and therefore has something to gain. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our Allies are strong enough to make clear to any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit but only disaster to him.

With your support and that of your representatives in the Congress, we have stopped America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend, and our commitment to defend our values has never been greater.

Now this, I think, has taken the Soviets by suprise. They had counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. After all, their propagandists have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history, and they said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that this isn't happening.

And not only that. Telltale signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that doesn't work. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

The harsh words that we have exchanged has led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic manoeuvering, one thing stands out: the balance of power has been restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviets will produce a confrontation by miscalculating our strength or will. And we, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, so how can anyone think that we would do so now, when they are armed to the teeth?

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high and are a danger in themselves. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must resolve to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. If we are to avoid an arms race, with all the dangers it entails, we must do more. And it seems to me that our government and the Soviet government should concentrate our attention in three broad areas.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of Warld War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in regional orlocal problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling local conflicts and exporting revolution is a dangerous practice which

exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat, we have tried to reduce the number and destructive power of our nuclear weapons. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowers level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in

terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed to eliminate an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. And the sad fact is that we can hardly go further until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels.

Third, we must work to <u>establish greater confidence and understanding</u>. Without this, we will hardly be able to accomplish much in reducing the use of force or lowering the level of arms.

Confidence has many facets. Complying with past agreements increases it while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviets. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep on trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world we live in and the nature of our adversaries. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to

refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components: economic health, political cohesion, Alliance solidarity as well as adequate defenses. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago, and this gives us the basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions. We will never walk away from a negotiating table. To do so would be unforgivable given the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators

back to Geneva and Vienna because I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings were about that dastardly act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospherics.

Some Real Problems

(START AND INF)

Our Approach in a Nutshell

(FOLLOWING NEEDS TO BE REWRITTEN, WITH EYE TO DISTINGUISING OUR APPROACH FROM DETENTE AND ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION. IS THERE A PHRASE? SHOULD ENCAPSULATE DETERRENCE, FIRMNESS, OPENESS TO NEGOTIATE REAL PROBLEMS, LONG-TERM STEADINESS)

In the past our policies toward the Soviet Union have fluctuated between periods of cooperation and periods of confrontation. But when we tried to cooperate--as during World War II and during the detente of the seventies--we often closed our eyes to unpleasant facts in order to preserve a friendly atmosphere. This is a dangerous course for a democracy, since

our people must understand the world as it is to understand the policies we must follow to deal with it. And it always led to subsequent disillusionment and a worsening of relations.

We must try in the future to hold a steady course, resisting swings of euphoria and despair.

Conclusion

Reasons for optimism: common interest in avoiding nuclear war, never fought war, etc.

Kennedy quote:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Conclude with appeal to Soviets to join us in pondering the lessons of the past and rededicating ourselves to solving problems in the future.

8336691

86

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Speech on US-Soviet Relations

Per your request, please find attached the latest draft of the speech on US-Soviet relations.

for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

DRAFT 11/23/83

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Last month marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of US-Soviet diplomatic relations. In announcing this step, President Roosevelt expressed his "trust" that US-Soviet relations would grow "closer and more intimate with each passing year." Unfortunately that trust has not been vindicated. Nor have our nations been able, as he hoped, "to cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of peace."

Experience has long since taught us not to premise our relations with Moscow on trust. We know we are in a long-term competition with a rival whose respect for our interests depends on our political resolve and economic and military strength. At the same time, however, we continue to share President Roosevelt's belief that it is essential to maintain an active dialogue with Moscow and to do everything possible to direct US-Soviet relations toward "the peaceful purposes of the civilized world." In an age of nuclear weapons, our responsibility to keep the peace means that we cannot afford to stop talking.

For a brief but vital interlude during World War II, US-Soviet relations were overwhelmingly cooperative. Caught up in the spirit of this cooperation, optimists found it easy to think that it might last. They thought that the post-war Soviet regime might decisively curtail the domestic and international practices that had delayed recognition for sixteen years. Trusting that their own good will would prove contagious, these optimists hoped that there would be no repetition of the systematic mass murders and repressions of the 1920's and '30's; that Moscow's efforts to subvert foreign governments and foment Communist insurrections were a thing of the past; that the unprovoked invasions of Finland and Poland, and the Baltic states by the Red Army were wartime aberrations.

In the event, the war brought no change in Moscow's predatory conduct. The Soviets rejected the opportunity to maintain their alliance with us. They showed no interest in trying to translate our common victory into an enduring system of collective welfare and security. Instead, they presented us with an almost uninterrupted series of provocations and challenges.

As a result, the process of building a safer and more humane world became an uphill struggle -- a struggle in which our attempts to control the atom, to put an end to colonialism, to erect safeguards against aggression, and to foster international contacts and communication were countered by Soviet rejection of the Baruch Plan, by the subjugation of the countries of Eastern Europe, by the invasion of South Korea, and by the lowering of an almost impenetrable Iron Curtain behind which tens of millions of people were deprived of their most elementary human rights. Moreover, the underlying Soviet drive to dominate and control has persisted to the present day. It has in many respects become even more threatening.

If we are to deal realistically with the continuing Soviet challenge to our values and interests, we must face the unpalatable facts. We are confronted by a regime that continues to oppress its own people and to stifle their aspirations for individual freedom and collective self-expression. The infamous Gulag still holds thousands of innocent prisoners whose only crimes are their religious convictions, their political principles, or their ethnic affiliations and commitments. Courageous spokesmen for civil rights continue to be confined in psychiatric prisons or, like Academician Andrei Sakharov, to be kept under virtual house arrest in remote provincial cities.

Would-be emigrants continue to be denied exit visas, while would-be reformers are stripped of their citizenship and driven into foreign exile. Political censorship is still ubiquitous; foreign broadcasts continue to be jammed; history continues to be rewritten; and privilege and power remain the monopoly of a self-perpetuating ruling elite that continues to sacrifice popular well-being to its own appetite for military might and foreign adventure.

The high priority that the Soviet leadership gives to increasing its military power is indicated by the uninterrupted growth in Soviet defense spending during the past fifteen years. In this period the military has consistently consumed between 13 and 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product. What makes this relentless military buildup so ominous is not only the resultant accumulation of highly destabilizing weapons but also, and above all, the fact that it has continued in international and domestic circumstances that would have led any other government to reconsider its course. Internationally, the buildup persisted throughout the period of "detente." It continued despite cutbacks in Western defense spending, despite agreements on arms limitations, and despite improvements in East-West political, economic, and cultural relations.

Domestically, the Soviet military buildup has persisted despite declining rates of economic growth, rising consumer dissatisfaction, and increasingly severe shortages of capital for badly needed plant modernization and investment in new industries..

Even allowing a large margin for Soviet tendencies toward "overinsurance," this military buildup greatly exceeds any reasonable defensive requirements. This is even clearer when one examines the actual mix of Soviet forces and weapons with their heavily offensive orientation. The evidence virtually compels one to conclude that the sustained buildup of the past fifteen years was undertaken to provide the wherewithal for precisely the sort of intimidation and aggression with which the Soviet Union has in fact confronted us in recent years.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union does not appear satisfied merely to accumulate military power. It uses it. Thirty years ago, Soviet tanks were employed against stone-throwing protesters in East Berlin -- just as they were subsequently employed to imprison the entire population of that city behind the unspeakable Berlin wall. In 1956, Soviet forces invaded Hungary to suppress the reform efforts of a Communist regime -- an operation that was repeated in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, where the Communist government had the temerity to come out in favor of "socialism with a human face."

92

Then, in 1979, came the Christmas-Eve invasion of Afghanistan, followed over the next two years by the heavy-handed political and military intimidation of Poland, which culminated in the Soviet-sponsored installation of General Jaruzelski's martial law regime. Not to speak of the Soviet proxy war against the peoples of Cambodia and the Soviet-supported deployment of Cuban forces to Ethiopia, Angola, and, most recently, Nicaragua. For Soviet leaders, military power is clearly something to be used without compunction wherever this can be done with impunity.

When Chairman Andropov took office the hope was widely voiced that he would take steps to reduce the scope and severity of the US-Soviet competition. Mindful of earlier disappointments, we were not willing to lower our guard in anticipation of a radical change in Soviet behavior. Neither, however, were we insensitive to the possibilities of change. We intensified our dialogue with Moscow in order to make certain that our concerns and our desires for an improved relationship are clearly understood. And we reciprocated the few small steps that could be interpreted as possible harbingers of greater Soviet responsiveness and flexibility.

We were heartened by Soviet willingness to end the long ordeal of the Pentecostalist families who took refugee in the US Embassy in Moscow five years ago.

We were also pleased that the Soviets stopped withholding certain data that were essential for a serious evaluation of their START position. And we were gratified when they finally acknowledged that warheads should be the unit of account at the INF talks in Geneva. We did not overestimate the significance of these steps, but we welcome them and hope that they would be followed by others of greater substance.

It was against this background that I prepared for the extensive talks I was scheduled to hold with Foreign Minister Gromyko this past September. [It was against this background that I instructed Secretary of State Shultz to plan to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko both in Madrid and then against in New York this past September.] Had Foreign Minister Gromyko approached our talks in a constructive spirit, the President had authorized me to invite him to the White House for a follow-on meeting for rapid progress. [Had Foreign Minister Gromyko approached these talks in a constructive spirit, I had authorized Secretary Shultz to invite him...] In the event, of course, the ruthless shootdown of Korean Airlines Flight 7, Moscow's brazen and deceitful reaction to that tragedy, and Foreign Minister Gromyko's unacceptable behavior at the first of our scheduled meetings in Madrid [at the first of his scheduled meetings with Secretary Shultz in Madrid] made it clear that no real progress in our relations was immediately in the offing.

Thanks to our in-depth understanding of the nature of the Soviet system and the realism of our underlying approach to US-Soviet relations, we were neither surprised nor disoriented by the fact that our hopes had once against been disappointed. However, we found it discouraging that Moscow could still not bring itself to observe even minimal standards of international civility.

Far from utilizing the KAL shootdown as an excuse to freeze US-Soviet relations, as Soviet spokesmen like to allege, we have combined our decisive condemnation of Moscow's irresponsible conduct with a clear demonstration of our willingness -- indeed, our determination -- to continue our quest for a more stable and productive relationship. While acting together with others to protest the Soviet Union's trigger-happiness and stonewalling, we have participated actively and constructively in the preparations for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which is scheduled to open next month in Stockholm and to consider a range of measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack and accidental war. And, we have tabled new and yet more forthcoming proposals at both the START talks and the INF talks in Geneva. In our eyes, there is no contradiction between firmness in the face of Soviet misconduct and flexibility in the pursuit of equitable agreements.

On the contrary, we have always believed that our strategy of building strength and defending human rights should complement and reenforce a parallel strategy of serious and comprehensive negotiation.

Unfortunately, the Soviet approach to our most important negotiations has been heavily onesided and essentially propagandistic. Instead of joining us in an effort to resolve common problems through a process of mutual give-and-take, they have coupled verbal reassurances and token concessions with intransigent demands and take-it-or-leave-it offers. Most recently, they chose to walk out of the INF [and START] negotiations in Geneva instead of seriously addressing the new proposals we had just put foward in an effort to meet many of their expressed concerns. Such bullying will not work and is utterly inconsistent with the Soviet Union's responsibility as a nuclear superpower. What is needed is not a display of petulance but a display of statesmanship on behalf of international stability and peace. Accordingly, we call on the Soviets to resume negotiations....

For our part, we recognize that no true negotiating outcome can incorporate all of the preferences of just one of the parties. As has been true in the past we are prepared to be flexible and to entertain any forthcoming, compromises that are

consistent with our fundamental objectives and protect our vital interests. These absolutely indispensable preconditions mean that there will be certain issues on which we cannot and will not bend. But, given reciprocity, there will be other issues on which we can. This was the spirit in which we approached the US-Soviet negotiations on the Long-Term Grain Agreement which was concluded in August. It is the spirit that governed our conduct at the long but successful CSCE negotiations in Madrid. And it is the spirit behind our START and INF positions, as well as the confidence-building measures we will propose at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Our goal in all of our negotiations with Moscow is to foster better and safer relations on the basis of real improvements in Soviet conduct. If we can achieve this, we can reduce the costs of competition, the risks of confrontation, and the possibilities of conflict. We believe this is a goal that is entirely consistent with the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is a goal that we believe prudent and responsible Soviet leaders ought to share.

In bargaining with the Soviets, we are prepared for modest advances as well as major breakthroughs. We have made ambitious proposals that, if accepted, could put the

Soviet-American relationship on a fundamentally new and much safer footing. We have also made more limited proposals designed to stabilize the competition at the margins.

Our arms control strategy is the best illustration of how we have set our sights both high and low. We have offered a plan for the deepest cuts in strategic weapons ever proposed in Soviet-American talks on this subject. In accordance with the guidelines of the Scowcroft Commission and the counsel of congressional leaders of both parties, we have tabled a START proposal that calls for a mutual build-down of both Soviet and American strategic forces under a formula that requires the destruction of two missiles for every new missile that is deployed. We have also proposed the full abolition of an entire class of nuclear weapons -- intermediate-range missiles -- on our side as well as theirs. At the same time, I have instructed our negotiators to explore any indication of Soviet flexibility. In INF, while continuing to believe zero is the most desirable outcome, we have offered the Soviets an agreement that would require less drastic reductions. We have asked whether 420 warheads on each side would be acceptable, given Moscow's apparent determination to retain the better part of its overblown arsenal.

In other arms talks as well, we have favored any steps, however small, that promised to strengthen stability. We are hopeful, for example, that agreement will be possible on such steps as improving the "hot line". As I have already mentioned, other so-called "confidence- and security-building measures" have been under discussion directly with the Soviets, and similar proposals will be discussed at the Europe-wide conference that will open next month in Stockholm. Working again with our allies, we are also actively exploring ways to make long-overdue progress at the Vienna talks on a mutual, balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

In dealing with Soviet policies in the Third World, we have followed the same two-fold approach -- doing what we can to keep the competition in bounds while exploring the possibility of more fundamental improvement. Naturally, our first priority has had to be to prevent new instances of Soviet expansionism and interference in the Third World. This goal has guided us in trying to create a shield for the independence of Caribbean and Central American nations.

But, perhaps more ambitiously, we have also tried to point the Soviet Union toward a more constructive role. We have given our full support to UN mediation to secure a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Because withdrawal of Cuban

forces from Angola would contribute so much to final achievement of independence for Namibia, we have kept this set of issues high on the Soviet-American agenda. And, because the development needs of the Third World are so great, we have called on the Soviet Union to assume an appropriate share of the effort in this area, and to pursue policies that complement those of other industrialized nations.

Finally, in all our dialogue with the Soviet Union we have paid constant attention to human rights. And here too we have expressed our interest in two kinds of changes. We have pressed for concrete, specific, immediate improvements, both in the treatment of particular individuals and in the way in which these issues are discussed between East and West. We have, for example, in concluding the Madrid CSCE Review Conference, been able to agree on two human rights follow-on meetings in the next two years, to address such specific issues as family reunification. Similarly, the Soviets know that US law explicitly links most-favored nation trading status to freedom of emigration.

But, even as we focus on these matters, we have tried to reiterate the larger significance of human rights for the future of the Soviet-American competition. The ever-broader enjoyment of human rights by Soviet citizens would be a real

and enduring contribution to peace. It was with this in mind that the Western nations put so much effort into widening the obligations that European governments assume toward their own people when they participate in CSCE. Nothing would so strengthen European security as Soviet respect for those obligations.

Our approach on every one of these issues is flexible but also demanding. Above all, we know the difference between major results and minor ones. We will never dismiss small gains as valueless, but neither will we settle for a little and pretend that it is a lot. The American people have had more than enough of a cycle of exaggerated expectations and extreme disappointments. Nor will we mistake progress in a single area for a more comprehensive breakthrough. A true restructuring of such a deeply competitive relationship requires real commitment and follow-through. We hope the Soviet leadership understands this point clearly: if they desire a major improvement in relations, then minor adjustments in their policies, let alone cosmetic changes, will not suffice.

If we were to see more significant changes in Soviet behavior, we would be prepared to respond appropriately. If we could eliminate some of the most important points of conflict, it would prove much easier to solve the remaining problems that

divide us. On this basis we could begin to develop a relationship of very broad mutual benefit indeed. We hope that the Soviet leadership is ready to rethink its behavior sufficiently thoroughly to bring such a relationship about.

This is the outlook that has guided -- and will continue to guide -- this Administration at the bargaining table. Its practical meaning should be clear enough. In particular, it indicates the very pointed questions that the Soviet leaders should ask themselves as they review their policies.

If, for example, the Soviet Union will not accept equitable arms agreements and refuses to yield any of the one-sided advantages they have built up, then the United States and it allies will have to continue their modernization programs to neutralize these advantages. Is there any Soviet gain in this result? We believe not. We believe that Soviet interests were not well served in the past by rejecting American proposals -- such as the arms control offers put forward by President Carter in March 1977, at the beginning of his term. At that time he offered a choice between radical cuts and more limited but stabilizing measures. Looking back, surely the Soviet leadership must wonder what, if anything, it gained -- in the long run -- by flatly rejecting both.

Similarly, if the Soviet Union insists on pursuing policies in the Third World, and not least in our own hemisphere, that threaten us and our friends, then we will have to respond equally strongly. Isn't the level of tension in the third-world too high already? We believe so, and believe the Soviet view should be the same. Looking back, surely the Soviet leadership must wonder what it gained --in the long run-- from its confrontation with the United States in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Finally, if improvement in Soviet human rights performance means nothing more than occasional, cynically manipulated releases of individuals, then the Soviets cannot expect that international -- and internal -- pressures for better performance will stop growing. Doesn't the Soviet Union pay a price at home and abroad for this censure, and for the isolation that goes with it? We believe the price is large and steadily increasing. Let the Soviets review the record themselves. Looking back, surely the leadership must have had second thoughts about what was really gained --in the long run-- by rejecting the cooperative possibilities of the Marshall Plan and denying its own citizens and the citizens of Eastern Europe the benefits of membership in a broader European community.

We hope the Soviets are reflecting on some of the opportunities that have been lost as a result of their failure to make major changes in their conduct. If so, they may draw appropriate lessons for the future. Isn't it clear that the West would respond differently to Soviet initiatives -- such as proposed pledges of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, or a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- once the Soviet conventional threat to Europe had been reduced? Wouldn't the Soviet Union be able to claim a legitimate role in international peacemaking if it did not consistently stimulate or prolong conflicts that obstruct the peacemaking efforts of others? And would not other countries view cooperation with the Soviet leadership differently if it were at last prepared to cooperate with its own people?

Nothing in our experience entitles us to expect that the Soviet leaders will answer these questions as we hope. Yet we should not assume that they have learned less from their history than we. We believe that in weighing their choices the Soviet leadership must eventually conclude, if only to themselves, that the policy of rejection has not served their country well. Furthermore, they must realize that it is bound to prove even more costly in the future thanks to our success in rebuilding both our own economic, political, and military strength and the strength of our friends and allies.

As a result of our success, we believe that we have shaken Moscow's former confidence that what it calls "the correlation of forces" has permanently shifted in its favor. Our credibility as a tough and resolute competitor has undoubtedly been enhanced, and the Soviet leadership now knows that it must bear the full consequences of continued efforts to encroach on Western interests. This has not prevented Moscow from testing our resolve and threatening to escalate US-Soviet competition. On the contrary, the Soviets have repeatedly tried to intimidate us and our allies and have recently tried to foster a full-fledged war scare. Nevertheless, Moscow's growing respect for our deterrent power has almost certainly reenforced Moscow's caution and diminished the actual risk of a US-Soviet military confrontation. The Soviets are no more eager than we are to commit mutual suicide -- and no less aware of the absolutely catastrophic effects of a nuclear war.

The avoidance of nuclear war is by far the most important interest we and the Soviets have in common. But it is by no means the only one. While we are fated to be competitors, we do not believe that our competition has to -- or should be allowed to -- preclude important elements of cooperation. If Moscow insists on more intensive competition, we are prepared for it. For our part, however, we remain ready and eager to improve relations. Accordingly, we invite the Soviet

leadership to remember the historic opportunities it has missed and to capitalize on the opportunities that are now at hand -- opportunities to reduce the danger of war, to curb the arms race, to peacefully settle destabilizing regional conflicts, and to promote the welfare of our own citizens and the social and economic development of the peoples of the "third world."

It is long past time to seize these opportunities together. President John F. Kennedy spoke of a similar challenge not long before his death when he reminded us that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. There could be no greater tribute to President Kennedy than to embark on that journey today. [To this end, I have invited/I have instructed Secretary Shultz to invite Foreign Minister Gomyko to meet with me/him in Stockholm in mid-January in conjunction with the opening of the CDE.] I call on the Soviet Union to accept this invitation, to take a constructive approach to the talks, and to join us in a journey down the road to peace.

S/P:JAzrael

Wang. no 0194C

SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. Before these holidays are upon us, I think it is a good time to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed cannot, happen.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are experiencing a period of tension in our relations which is greater than we have seen for

many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we want to do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the seventies, we notice two things: America tended to withdraw from the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves: Throughout the 1970's, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 imtermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

But the Soviets not only amassed a monstrous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also began to use these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. And in Europe, their deployment of SS-20 missiles was a blatant effort to threaten our West European allies and split the NATO Alliance.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels that it can prevail and therefore has something to gain. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our Allies are strong enough to make clear to any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit but only disaster to him.

With your support and that of your representatives in the Congress, we have stopped America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend, and our commitment to defend our values has never been greater.

Now this, I think, has taken the Soviets by suprise. They had counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. After all, their propagandists have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history, and they said it so often that they may even have started believing it. But they can see now that this isn't happening.

And not only that. Telltale signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that doesn't work. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

The harsh words that we have exchanged have led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic manoeuvering, one thing stands out: the balance of power has been restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviets will produce a confrontation by miscalculating our strength or will. And we, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, so how can anyone think that we would do so now, when they are armed to the teeth?

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high and are a danger in themselves. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must resolve to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. If we are to avoid an arms race, with all the dangers it entails, we must do more. And it seems to me that our government and the Soviet government should concentrate our attention in three broad areas.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of Warld War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in regional or local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling local conflicts and exporting revolution is a dangerous practice which

exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat, we have tried to reduce the number and destructive power of our nuclear weapons. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in

terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed to eliminate an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. And the sad fact is that we can hardly go further until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels.

Third, we must work to establish greater confidence and understanding. Without this, we will hardly be able to accomplish much in reducing the use of force or lowering the level of arms.

Confidence has many facets. Complying with past agreements increases it while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviets. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep on trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world we live in and the nature of our adversaries. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to

refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it all the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components: economic health, political cohesion, Alliance solidarity as well as adequate defenses. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago, and this gives us the basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions. We will never walk away from a negotiating table. To do so would be unforgivable given the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators

back to Geneva and Vienna because I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings were about that dastardly act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospherics.

Some Real Problems

Reducing the risk of war--and especially nuclear war--is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would greatly reduce the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons, even in time of crisis.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. There is no justification for these steps.

My negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to finish the search for agreements in INF and START. We have proposals that would increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate on these proposals in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the likelihood of conflicts in which such weapons might be used. Here we have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension.

We call these proposals "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

Our efforts have not stopped there. Together with our allies and the other nations of Europe, we will be joining in a conference on European security and confidence-building measures in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S. Delegation to the opening of that conference next month. Our goal will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce some of the apprehension and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities. By doing so, we would be diminishing the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but invite the cooperation of all others in this work as well -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to

defuse global tensions in the world that could escalate dangerously. I think we and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Here we have sought to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been underway for several years.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

Our Approach in a Nutshell: Realistic Engagement

These problems are real. Only some of them can be solved. All of them, however, can be managed peacefully. Not one of them need lead to confrontation between our two countries.

One very real problem is that we have fluctuated in our policies toward the Soviet Union in the past. We have gone from periods of confrontation to periods of cooperation and back again. We tended either not to talk at all, and to count only on

our strength, or to do little more than talk, and neglect the strength we need for productive dialogue.

Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic. There is nothing wrong with talk: in today's world we and the Soviets, different as we are, must talk. But talk that does not address the real problems, thqt avoids unpleasant facts, creates illusions. In a democracy, it is those illusions, and the inevitable disillusionment, that lead to abrupt changes of course, to worsening relations.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realitstic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive relationship that can be sustained without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets. They must recognize that the days of paper promises, of the one-way street and of atmospherics for the sake of appearances are over. And they must recognize that even if they spurn the cooperation we desire, we and our allies will always be able to protect ourselves.

But we will not walk away from the negotiating table, and we will be ready for negotiation whenever the Soviets are. Realistic engagement is not a policy for tomorrow or next year; it is a policy for the next decades. Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviets, too.

Conclusion

No one can predict whether the Soviets will rise to this challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase contacts and understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. We have fought common enemies together; today those enemies are named hunger, pestilence, pollution, and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, President John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, on the eve of Christmas and the approach of the New Year, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

10854 14

NON-LOG

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE December 20, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Presidential Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

I believe the attached draft is basically sound. It conveys our views systematically and calmly, and this is important at this time, because it can serve as a basic document for both our public and private diplomacy in the future. It may strike some as a trifle dull and lacking in spectacular initiatives, but I believe this is no handicap, since calmness, steadiness and policy coherence should be what we are trying to convey. To attempt to add a "new initiative" in order to attract attention would be counterproductive: it would be seen by the Soviets as proof that our effort to intensify the dialogue is a pose, and could strike thoughtful members of the public as gimmickry.

For these reasons, I believe strongly that the paragraph at the bottom of page 16 and beginning of page 17 should be revised to omit the suggestion that Shultz would go to Moscow if invited, and also the reference to a possible summit. The Soviets could take legitimate offense at the President inviting Shultz to Moscow without consulting them in advance, and direct references to summitry would confirm their suspicion that the President wants one to assist his reelection campaign, and therefore might be willing to pay a high price for one. I have suggested alternative wording on the draft which puts us squarely on record as favoring a regular high-level dialogue, but omits the sort of particulars which could undermine the attempt to achieve it.

I have also suggested revisions at the start and finish to take account of the fact that the speech will be given early in January, as well as a few changes of words here and there to avoid undesirable overtones. Ron Lehman has questioned the figures given at the top of page 7 on nuclear warhead levels, and I have asked him to check these out and confirm or change them.

Aside from the text itself, I have the following thoughts and suggestions:

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

12

--Particular care should be taken to see that changes by the speechwriting staff do not detract from the overall message the speech is designed to achieve. More vivid language may be desirable to perk it up, but vivid language is tricky in that it is often taken out of context and overshadows the basic message.

--If possible, we should aim to have a final text approved by the President a day or so in advance, so that the President can notify allied leaders in advance. It also would not hurt to have Hartman deliver a text in Moscow a few hours in advance.

--Advance planning is also desirable to maximize attention in Europe. For example, VOA broadcasts in translation will be of higher quality if the translators have a few hours advance time to work on them. So far as the Russian Service of VOA is concerned, it should be instructed to run the full text, and perhaps to repeat it in late night broadcasts.

--Some advance notice to key members of Congress might also be helpful. In particular, if the Kennedy quote is used, the President might wish to give his brother a call before the broadcast to alert him to the fact.

--Immediately following the delivery, we should have prepared background material and Q & A's for posts abroad, to insure maximum emphasis in their public affairs efforts.

I had planned to be on home leave in Florida during the holidays and to return to Washington January 3. If, however, the speech is to be delivered January 3 and you need me to coordinate some of the matters above in advance, I will of course return whenever necessary.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you recommend to the President that he approve the final text a working day or two before delivery.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you authorize consultations with key persons in State, USIA and on the NSC staff a day before delivery in order to ensure proper advance notification and coordination with VOA and posts abroad.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Text of speech on U.S.-Soviet relations

10855

123

JACK: Some thoughts on "The Speech"

--Prior Coordination. This could be a big bomb if the proper groundwork has not been laid first (it could be a media bust; could be treated as just another Administration twist bending to political pressures but not reflecting our real policy, or as Flora Lewis says, giving the impression that we can turn this policy on or off just by pushing buttons). Likewise, we will have to demonstrate that it indeed does have ~~not~~ staying power.

--- First, we need to coordinate with Congress, particularly those who have urged some sort of reconciliation speech. Also, given the increasing identification of Reagan as a JFK-style innovator as opposed to a doctrainnaire conservative and given the very important reference to the AU speech, particular consultations should be directed to Ted Kennedy.

--- Second, we need to make sure that the Allies really do know that this speech is coming and that, more importantly, it is responsive to their concerns they have expressed. For example, we could write a letter (form), but with individual paragraphs that would reflect genuine thoughts these PMs have expressed. Trudeau, e.g., we could reference aspects of the meeting with Reagan last week. Craxi has indicated that he would like some particular movement and Lubbers & Kohl have been especially adamant. The letter should include statements indicating (a) A desire to lower E-W tensions; (B) A desire to terminate megaphone diplomacy, lower the level of rhetoric; (C) Call attention to the consistencies of our policy that have tended to get lost with media attention focused so heavily on the gaffes.

At least w/ the INF basing countries plus Canada

--- Third, we should put out the word to selected members of the strategic intellectual complex. Their support could be crucial. We don't want them to, as they are prone to, look for things in the speech to denigrate.

--Also, Trudeau made an interesting point in his departure statement where he indicated that "The President has assured me that he has made sure that his Administration really does understand that his policy is that enunciated in Tokyo". It didn't happen in the discussions and I doubt if such a thing has happened, but it was a clever Trudeau move. It does also remind us that for the President to really succeed in this speech he will have to insure that his Administration -- speechwriters, OSD officials, NSC staff, State, etc. --really do understand that this is policy. How will this be done?

--Finally, if we want to lend credence to this, we could use the technique of a high-level emissary. If he came from the bureaucracy it could rankle Hartman, of course. But, how about Richard Nixon? He would convey the "officialness" of the speech and probably be well received by the Soviets.

--Ty