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10834	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ***R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9***	1	12/16/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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December 16, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is a copy of the current draft speech on U.S.-Soviet relations. It has been coordinated with Rick Burt, and I understand Secretary Shultz will review it tonight or early tomorrow morning.

When I met with Secretary Shultz yesterday, he indicated that he hoped the President could review the draft over the weekend, and that he also hoped that the speech could be scheduled for Tuesday evening, December 20.

I believe the draft is in pretty good shape, although it may need some stylistic fine tuning. (The speech writers have not yet seen it.)

I will be working on the following over the weekend:

1. The draft letter to Andropov, which I will revise to make reference to the speech. (It would be appropriate to have it delivered as soon as possible after the speech, unless it can be approved in time to deliver it shortly before the speech is delivered.)

2. A draft paper which Secretary Shultz would like to use for discussion with the President, summarizing the conclusions of the group he convened.

Secretary Shultz agrees that it would be well to confine discussion of the mechanics of any "special channels" we might consider to a smaller group than the one present at the breakfast discussions.

I will be available over the weekend if you would like to discuss any of these matters.

Enclosure: Draft Speech

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Declassify on: OADR

Draft 12/16/83

SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. Before these holidays are upon us, I think it is a good time to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed cannot, happen.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are experiencing a period of tension in our relations which is greater than we have seen for

many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we want to do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the seventies, we notice two things: America tended to withdraw from the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves: Throughout the 1970's, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 imtermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

But the Soviets not only amassed a monstrous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also began to use these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. And in Europe, their deployment of SS-20 missiles was a blatant effort to threaten our West European allies and split the NATO Alliance.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels that it can prevail and therefore has something to gain. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our Allies are strong enough to make clear to any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit but only disaster to him.

With your support and that of your representatives in the Congress, we have stopped America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend, and our commitment to defend our values has never been greater.

Now this, I think, has taken the Soviets by suprise. They had counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. After all, their propagandists have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history, and they said it so often that they may even have started believing it. But they can see now that this isn't happening.

And not only that. Telltale signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that doesn't work. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

The harsh words that we have exchanged have led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic manoeuvering, one thing stands out: the balance of power has been restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviets will produce a confrontation by miscalculating our strength or will. And we, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, so how can anyone think that we would do so now, when they are armed to the teeth?

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high and are a danger in themselves. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must resolve to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. If we are to avoid an arms race, with all the dangers it entails, we must do more. And it seems to me that our government and the Soviet government should concentrate our attention in three broad areas.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of Warld War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in regional or local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling local conflicts and exporting revolution is a dangerous practice which

exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat, we have tried to reduce the number and destructive power of our nuclear weapons. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in

terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed to eliminate an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. And the sad fact is that we can hardly go further until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels.

Third, we must work to <u>establish greater confidence and understanding</u>. Without this, we will hardly be able to accomplish much in reducing the use of force or lowering the level of arms.

Confidence has many facets. Complying with past agreements increases it while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviets. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep on trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world we live in and the nature of our adversaries. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to

refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it all the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components: economic health, political cohesion, Alliance solidarity as well as adequate defenses. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago, and this gives us the basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions. We will never walk away from a negotiating table. To do so would be unforgivable given the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators

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back to Geneva and Vienna because I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings were about that dastardly act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospherics.

Some Real Problems

Reducing the risk of war--and especially nuclear war--is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would greatly reduce the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons, even in time of crisis.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. There is no justification for these steps.

My negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to finish the search for agreements in INF and START. We have proposals that would increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate on these proposals in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the likelihood of conflicts in which such weapons might be used. Here we have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension.

We call these proposals "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

Our efforts have not stopped there. Together with our allies and the other nations of Europe, we will be joining in a conference on European security and confidence-building measures in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S. Delegation to the opening of that conference next month. Our goal will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce some of the apprehension and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities. By doing so, we would be diminishing the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but invite the cooperation of all others in this work as well -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to

defuse global tensions in the world that could escalate dangerously. I think we and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Here we have sought to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been underway for several years.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

Our Approach in a Nutshell: Realistic Engagement

These problems are real. Only some of them can be solved. All of them, however, can be managed peacefully. Not one of them need lead to confrontation between our two countries.

One very real problem is that we have fluctuated in our policies toward the Soviet Union in the past. We have gone from periods of confrontation to periods of cooperation and back again. We tended either not to talk at all, and to count only on

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our strength, or to do little more than talk, and neglect the strength we need for productive dialogue.

Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic. There is nothing wrong with talk: in today's world we and the Soviets, different as we are, must talk. But talk that does not address the real problems, thqt avoids unpleasant facts, creates illusions. In a democracy, it is those illusions, and the inevitable disillusionment, that lead to abrupt changes of course, to worsening relations.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realitstic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive relationship that can be sustained without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets. They must recognize that the days of paper promises, of the one-way street and of atmospherics for the sake of appearances are over. And they must recognize that even if they spurn the cooperation we desire, we and our allies will always be able to protect ourselves.

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But we will not walk away from the negotiating table, and we will be ready for negotiation whenever the Soviets are. Realistic engagement is not a policy for tomorrow or next year; it is a policy for the next decades. Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviets, too.

Conclusion

No one can predict whether the Soviets will rise to this challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase contacts and understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. We have fought common enemies together; today those enemies are named hunger, pestilence, pollution, and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, President John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, on the eve of Christmas and the approach of the New Year, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TO: Robert C. McFarlane WHITE HOUSE

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December 18, 1983

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Speech on US-Soviet Relations

Attached is a new draft of the speech on US-Soviet relations which reflects the Department's comments on the version received from your staff.

C Hill per ltr

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft Speech

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

Draft: 12/18/83 (noon)

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we must think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their military spending by three-to-four percent every year. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was at once an effort to split the NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American

strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not military superiority.

With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong. Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized system is proving less able than the Western democracies to adapt to the challenges of a new era.

A Safer World

Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the

danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward

the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world, and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes

solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a

little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to radically reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."

The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the

other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to begin making that vision a reality.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish greater mutual confidence and understanding.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have drastically reduced the rate of inflation to its present low level and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings

were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons even in time of crisis. And I am more than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would

increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first

session of the conference in recognition of the importance we attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from the Warsaw Pact will also attend.

Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions, our respective interests, and how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the

Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in

results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

A Policy of Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,

as I have said before, if these and other talks create the basis for real progress and concrete results, I would be ready to meet with Soviet President Andropov.]

Conclusion

Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too. No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help

productive relationship that can be sustained over the long term, without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match our good will, we will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm in January. If invited, he will also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. [And

make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

2740m

Rm. 368

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Speech on US-Soviet Relations

Attached is a new draft of the speech on US-Soviet relations, which reflects the Deparment's comments on the version received from your staff.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As Stated

Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbow
12/16/83 632-8040 2739m

Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr.
EUR: JDobbins
EUR: RBurt

Draft: 12/17/83

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we must think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the last decade, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to the military as the United States. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was a blatant effort to split the NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American

strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies are strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all.

With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are strong and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.

Indeed, signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that history is leaving behind. So it is no wonder that Soviet leaders are feeling frustrated -- and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

These harsh words have led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will produce a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward

the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world, and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes

solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a

little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." We cannot begin to make that dream a reality, however, until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to <u>establish greater mutual confidence and understanding</u>.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while

denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in

expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have virtually eliminated the scourge of inflation and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.

We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospherics.

Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons even in time of crisis.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by

broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S. Delegation to the first session of that conference.

Our goal there will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we have sought to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the

diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been underway for several years.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

A Policy of Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive relationship that can be sustained over the long term, without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. They must recognize that the days of atmospherics for the sake of atmosphere are over. If they cannot match our good will, we will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

We will stay at the negotiating table, and we will be ready for negotiation whenever the Soviets are. Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too.

Conclusion

No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the

future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

2735m

Draft 12/17/83

SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. As these holidays approach, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for

many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we want to do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves: Throughout the last decade, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to the military as the United States. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

But the Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also used these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was a blatant effort to threaten our friends and allies and to split the NATO Alliance.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American strength or else the danger of war would increase. History

teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our Allies are strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all.

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And not only that. Signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that history is leaving behind. So it is no wonder that Soviet leaders are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

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understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will produce a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons; much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world,

and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling regional and local conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." We cannot

begin to make that dream a reality, however, until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Third, we must work to establish greater confidence and understanding.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep on trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it all the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally

important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have virtually eliminated the scourge of inflation and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a former basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings were about that horrible act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospherics.

Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war--and especially nuclear war--is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would greatly reduce the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons, even in time of crisis.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitions yet fair, proposals that would increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures."

They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S. Delegation to the first session of that conference.

Our goal there will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but invite the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we have sought to

engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been underway for several years.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might over the past decades because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk

to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive relationship that can be sustained without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. They must recognize that the days of atmospherics for the sake of atmosphere are over. If they cannot match our good will, we will be able to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

We will stay at the negotiating table, and we will be ready for negotiation whenever the Soviets are. Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union, too.

The Challenge

No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase contacts and understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, President John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

> "So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, on the eve of Christmas and the approach of the New Year, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

Draft: 12/17/83 (pm)

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we must think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities are never used.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice two things: America tended to question its role in the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their military spending by three-to-four percent every year. They deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new missiles was a blatant effort to split the NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American

strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not military superiority.

With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.

This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong. Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized system is proving less able than the Western democracies to adapt to the challenges of a new era.

A Safer World

Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are armed to the teeth.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world, and gradually to build greater confidence between our two nations.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend

its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to radically reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."

The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to make that vision a reality.

Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish greater mutual confidence and understanding.

Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep trying.

Our Approach

In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell you what they mean to me.

Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components. Economic health is the starting point; equally important are political unity at home and solidarity with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago. We have virtually eliminated the scourge of inflation and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings

were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospherics.

Real Problems, Realistic Solutions

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons even in time of crisis.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first session of the conference in recognition of the importance we attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from the Warsaw Pact will also attend.

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Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions, our respective interests, and how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet abuses in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We know that this is a sensitive area for the

Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

A Policy of Realistic Engagement

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to

talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive relationship that can be sustained over the long term, without swings of euphoria and despair.

That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union. I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match our good will, we will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.

Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:

> We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.

We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign

Minister Gromyko in Stockholm in January. If invited, he will also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. And I would hope that, if these and other talks create the basis for real progress in our relationship, I will be able to meet with Soviet President Andropov.

Conclusion

Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too. No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never find us wanting.

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