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10830	PAPER	PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS DRAFT <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i>	25	11/22/1983	B1
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DRAFT 11/22/83

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NLRR FOI-114/a #10830

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

I would like to speak to you tonight on one of the most important questions that every President must address: the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union.

The conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union is central to our entire foreign policy. It could not be otherwise. The Soviet Union shares with us the status and the responsibilities that come with being one of the two greatest powers on this planet. The Soviet Union's territory spans two continents, and eleven time zones. Like the United States, the Soviets have interests and allies far beyond their own frontiers. Perhaps most importantly, only the United States and the Soviet Union possess enormous nuclear arsenals capable of destroying all mankind.

As De Tocqueville predicted more than a century ago, it was perhaps inevitable that the United States and Soviet Russia would find themselves in competition as the only truly global powers in the world today. Moreover, the global strategic competition that De Tocqueville foresaw is sharpened by the differences between Western democratic values and the Communist view of the relationship among the individual, government, and society. Taken together, these factors ensure that the United

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States and Soviet Union will, for the foreseeable future, see one another as adversaries.

But despite our differences, we and the Soviets share a common interest in managing our adversarial relationship in order to keep nuclear war from ever occurring. This has been the objective of every President since the dawning of the nuclear era. It is my profound commitment to the American people and to all peoples of the world. We are all aware of the terrible devastation that nuclear weapons would inflict on human society -- indeed, on human life itself. We are determined to continue the pursuit of policies which will keep that devastation from ever occurring. Our children and their children must be able to sleep at night secure in the understanding that we are moving away from and not toward a nuclear holocaust. This requires a reasoned approach to the Soviet Union and to the world.

Soviet Policy: Part of the U.S. Strategy for Peace

Our policy toward the Soviet Union is but one element of a broader foreign policy that seeks to establish a durable foundation for world peace.

World peace requires, first and foremost that we eliminate the use of force and the threat of force from relations among states.

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War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of World War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by neighbors armed to the teeth seeking to dominate through the threat of armed attack.

As we see each evening on the television screen, even conventional wars wreak terrible human costs. Moreover, these conflicts impose incalculable costs on the peoples involved, and run the risk of a wider confrontation involving the great powers. I am working for a future in which regional disputes are settled by peaceful means, rather than by force of arms or military intimidation, a future in which mankind no longer faces the destruction and human tragedy of war.

As a means to this end, our strategy for peace aims at reducing and, ultimately, eliminating the excessively vast stockpiles of armaments in the world -- above all, the enormous numbers of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars per year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. It is

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also a source of sorrow for me that our own defense spending has had to be increased in order to restore the military balance in the face of a relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades. Peace and reducing the burden of armaments are, for me, two sides of the same coin.

In seeking to reduce arms levels, we assign the highest priority to reducing the levels of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear arms reductions depend ultimately on negotiation. But we and our Allies have also made considerable progress in recent years -- progress that is not generally appreciated -- to reduce the size of NATO's nuclear arsenal.

For example, it is a little known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed on the elimination of an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of 1000 warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

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Just as important as reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, we also seek to increase the stability of the nuclear balance. Nuclear war need never occur if we ensure that no nation could ever believe it could gain by attacking with nuclear weapons. Thus it is essential to minimize the number of so-called "first-strike" weapons.

Peace, furthermore, should mean more than just the absence of war. Thus together with elimination of the use of force and reductions in arms levels, we also seek to establish greater confidence and understanding among states.

We do not believe ideological differences are an insurmountable obstacle to establishing greater confidence among states. Confidence depends, first and foremost, on respect for the legitimate interests of other states, irrespective of differences in political and economic values. But confidence can also be strengthened by expanding contacts among peoples, through cultural and academic exchanges, and through trade. By building confidence, we can create a durable basis for cooperation to avoid war and reduce arms.

Confidence is, sad to say, sorely lacking in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the fifty years since our two nations established diplomatic relations, we have seen brief periods of

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partnership amidst longer ones of bitter confrontation. We have lived through the dark days of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the Cuban missile crisis. We have seen the high hopes for détente in the 1970s dashed by the Soviet Union's unrestrained military build-up and by Moscow's aggressive policies beyond its borders.

But I do not believe that confrontation is the destiny of the American and Soviet peoples. Our two societies share a number of common bonds. We are both relatively young nations, with diverse ethnic traditions and a similar pioneer philosophy. Our peoples have together experienced the horrors of war, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the victory over Nazi Germany. Although we continue to clash on the battlefield of ideas, it is important to remember that the American and Soviet peoples have never been at war with one another. If we are wise, there is no reason why we ever should.

Three Principles of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union

From the moment I entered office almost three years ago, I sought to establish the basis for a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I had no illusions that it would be easy to deal with a hostile and militarily powerful adversary, or that it would be easy to find solutions to the many serious problems between us. My overriding objective was

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to reduce the dangers of a Soviet-American military confrontation. But I also embarked on a search for areas in which our two nations could work together to mutual advantage, areas where there was a basis on which to instill greater confidence and mutual understanding to the US-Soviet relationship.

Our strategy for managing relations with the Soviet Union is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue:

Realism

An effective policy toward Moscow requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and the way it conducts itself in world affairs. If nothing else, history has taught us not to base our relations with the Soviet Union on trust. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. Indeed, misunderstandings can best be avoided if we are quite frank in acknowledging our ideological differences, and unafraid to defend the democratic values we hold so dear.

I have, of course, been forthright in discussing the nature of the Soviet Union and the problems we have with Soviet policies. I will continue to do so. But frank talk should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders. President Andropov and

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President Brezhnev before him have always stressed that peaceful coexistence is not the same thing as ideological coexistence. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "aggressive imperialists," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. I believe that Soviet leaders are no less clear-eyed. In fact, at a Central Committee meeting in June, Andropov himself stated:

"A struggle is underway for the minds and hearts of the billions of people on the planet, and the future of mankind depends to a considerable extent on the outcome of this ideological struggle."

Realism about the Soviet Union also means coming to grips with the facts of Soviet behavior throughout Soviet history, but especially over the past decade and a half. We have learned that the Soviet Union is distinctly unimpressed by unilateral Western restraint. The Soviet Union's military build-up continued over the last ten-to-fifteen years despite considerable restraint on the part of the United States and its allies. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their GNP to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBMs, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

Bolstered by its growing military power, the Soviet Union displayed an increasing willingness to use force -- both

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directly and indirectly -- to increase regional tensions and install regimes that were and are totally lacking in popular support. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. This type of interference has had tragic consequences for the peoples involved, and it has threatened -- and continues to threaten -- the security of other states.

We recognize that the regional tensions that the Soviets and their proxies seek to exploit are real, and have their roots in local situations. Our approach is to assist the governments and peoples of areas where such tensions exist to negotiate peaceful political solutions to these problems. We think that this is the only responsible approach in the nuclear age.

Unfortunately, the Soviets do not yet share this approach. Rather, the Soviet Union -- unchallenged for far too long by a United States still traumatized by the Vietnam experience -- has in recent years repeatedly sought to impose solutions by methods that necessarily threaten the interests of parties involved, of our friends and allies, and of the United States itself, as well as the peace of the world.

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Strength

Proceeding from this realistic view of the Soviet Union, we recognized from the outset that the United States and its allies and friends cannot negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union, or ensure that Moscow respects the vital interests of other countries, from a position of weakness. The greatest risk of nuclear war would come from a Soviet miscalculation that we were growing weak and that they could act aggressively without fear of response. This could create the kind of action-reaction cycle we all wish to avoid. Thus, my first priorities were to restore America's economic and military strength, and to restore the trust and confidence between us and our partners that is needed if we are to deal successfully together with the Soviet challenge.

I will not dwell tonight on the details of the economic recovery now underway, or the specific steps we have taken to restore the military balance. Suffice it to say that, thanks to the resolve of the American people and the bipartisan support received from the Congress, we have sent an unambiguous signal to Moscow that we will reestablish equality in the areas of the military balance where the Soviet Union has opened up destabilizing gaps over the past ten years. We have made clear that we will provide material and political support to governments and peoples threatened by the Soviets or their clients.

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We have also demonstrated that we are prepared to use our own military strength when absolutely necessary to protect our citizens and our interests and to advance the cause of peace. At the same time, we have made clear that, while we will restore the balance through our own programs if necessary, our preference is to do so through verifiable agreements that reduce arms on both sides to the lowest possible levels consistent with our security requirements.

In addition to rebuilding America's economic and military strength, an important element of our approach to the Soviet Union was strengthening our relations with Allies and friends throughout the world. Here too, we have achieved considerable progress. The countries of NATO and our Japanese allies are, in the main, committed as we are to prudent strengthening of our common defense capabilities. And we have made great strides in restoring the economic health of the Western democracies and in developing a common approach to international economic problems -- in particular, the need to avoid letting peaceful trade become an instrument for accelerating the Soviet military buildup.

Rather than the option of good-faith negotiations, the Soviet Union has chosen to deal with us by seeking to divide America from the rest of the world, essentially through

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propaganda. The Atlantic Alliance is now in the process of sending the Soviets a clear message that they can no longer count on divisions among Western governments as a means of maintaining military superiority. I am thinking, of course, of the deployment this month of the first Pershing and cruise missiles in Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

After more than two years of intensive negotiations, we would have preferred another result. Our ~~initial~~ objective ^{is} was to rid the world of this generation of missiles, and that was what I proposed in November 1981. The Soviets rejected that proposal, as they have rejected my subsequent proposal of an interim solution at equal levels, as a stepping-stone toward zero on both sides.

Proceeding with these deployments has been no easy matter for any of the countries involved, including our own. We are deploying with a heavy heart. Our preference was and still remains to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces through arms control rather than deployments. We stand ready to withdraw any and all of our new missiles if a fair bargain can be struck.

The initiation of deployments has occurred because the Soviet Union, despite major concessions on our part, would not accept a negotiated solution other than one which would preserve a sizeable Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The negotiating option remains open to the Soviets; we hope this time they will take it. We are ready to proceed.

Dialogue

In fact, the negotiating option is open to them everywhere, and not just in the arms control field. The increased realism and strength we have established provide the necessary underpinnings for an effective policy toward the Soviet Union. But our policy is not simply one of maintaining a military balance or containing Soviet expansionism. The third element of our strategy I mentioned earlier -- dialogue -- is integral to our whole approach. It is on this element that I would like to focus in the remainder of my remarks tonight.

From the first days of my Administration, we have pursued an intensive dialogue with the Soviet Union covering the four principal areas of our relationship: arms control, regional security, human rights, and bilateral cooperation. Through the direct correspondence I have maintained with Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov, and in diplomatic exchanges from the level of

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Secretary of State on down, we have conveyed a consistent message: that we do not shrink from competition with the Soviet Union, be it political, military, economic, or ideological; but that our aim is to resolve Soviet-American differences peacefully, and to search for agreements under which our two great nations can cooperate constructively to mutual advantage.

We always recognized that the path to agreements with Moscow and to greater Soviet-American cooperation would be a slow and difficult one. Having witnessed the rapid demise of the "détente" of the 1970s, we set our standards in negotiations with the Soviets high, and we expected no sudden breakthroughs. For one thing, the Soviets themselves have placed numerous obstacles in the way -- their continuing occupation of Afghanistan and brutal suppression of human rights within the USSR being but two examples. Moreover, I think the Soviets have not yet reconciled themselves to the fact that for the ^{foreseeable future} next five years and perhaps beyond, they must deal with Western governments that are united as never before in pursuing realistic policies toward the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of this year I authorized Secretary of State Shultz to initiate an intensified series of discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The purpose of this effort was to test whether the new Soviet leadership was

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prepared to join us in an effort to put our relations on a more positive footing. The Soviet response was not as forthcoming as we had hoped. Neither was it totally uninterested. Over the spring and summer, there were a few developments which suggested that the Soviet Union was considering engaging us in a search for better relations.

This modest progress was, to our regret, halted by the Soviets' destruction on September 1 of Korean Airlines flight 7 with 269 passengers on board, and their subsequent efforts to evade responsibility. The Soviet Union still owes the civilized world an unequivocal apology for the Korean Airlines massacre, as well as compensation for the victims' families. Perhaps of equal importance, the time has come for the Soviet Union to take positive steps to ensure that civilian air travelers need never again fear a recurrence of this tragedy.

But as much as I was shocked and outraged by the Soviets' behavior, the downing of KAL flight 7 did not lead me to reevaluate our policy toward the Soviet Union. In pursuing negotiations with the Soviets, I have never harbored any illusions that progress would be the result of Soviet good will or human kindness. Progress can only be achieved when the Soviets recognize that their best option is cooperation.

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Thus, in the aftermath of the destruction of KAL flight 7, I sent my negotiators back to Geneva and Vienna to continue the negotiations on reducing nuclear and conventional arms. Secretary of State Shultz went to Madrid to conclude the Conference that reviewed fulfillment of the Helsinki accords, and to meet face-to-face with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Throughout the fall, our diplomats have been in frequent contact on all issues in US-Soviet relations.

Let me describe to you our approach to each of the four areas of the US-Soviet agenda, and my hopes for the future.

The Four-Part Agenda

Regional Security

The first element of the US-Soviet agenda is the broad range of regional problems where the Soviet approach all too often threatens the security of other nations. It was the Soviet penchant for fanning regional tensions and intervening in regional disputes by using or encouraging the use of force that contributed most to the collapse of "détente." It is continuing Soviet adventurism in areas vital to the interests not just of the U.S., but also of a whole series of other countries, that poses the most serious risk of superpower confrontation. Soviet leaders must recognize that their efforts to exploit regional animosities will gain the Soviet

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Union no enduring strategic advantages, and can only further complicate the search for improved East-West relations.

We and the Soviets, in my view, should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. It was out of this belief that we tried to engage the Soviets last year in exchanges of views concerning what would be required to bring about a peaceful political solution in Afghanistan, complementing the efforts undertaken by the United Nations Secretary General. It was also out of this belief that we exchanged views with the Soviets on developments in southern Africa, as a means of supplementing the broad-gauge diplomatic effort which has been underway for several years to achieve a peaceful political solution to that region's many problems.

Our approach has been constructive. So far it has not been matched on the Soviet side. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

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Arms Control

Regional conflicts need to be addressed not only in the interests of the parties involved, but because they contain the risk of broader US-Soviet confrontation. And in the nuclear age, such a confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus alongside regional issues, arms control stands at the top of the US-Soviet agenda.

American and Soviet scientists have recently documented what common sense dictates: there would be no winners in a nuclear war, and human society and human life itself would be gravely threatened. It was in recognition of these grim realities that I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive series of initiatives that seek both to reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and to eliminate any incentive to use nuclear weapons even in a crisis. Together with our nuclear arms control initiatives, we have proposed the complete elimination of chemical weapons, and are pressing ahead with the Vienna negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.

Our standards in all these negotiations are high: we insist that agreements be based on real equality, that they make a meaningful contribution to international security, and that they be verifiable. Agreements that simply ratify a continuing

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Soviet build-up are worse than no agreements at all. Moreover, the doubts that have arisen recently about Soviet compliance with previous SALT agreements underscore the need to close every possible loophole.

If our standards are high, our flexibility is also great. The proposals I announced in September in the INF and START talks were directly responsive to Soviet concerns. In INF, I moved toward the Soviet position on aircraft and on the geographic coverage of a future agreement, and I offered special constraints on the system that Moscow claims to be most concerned about, the Pershing II. In START, I proposed the concept of a guaranteed build-down in strategic weapons as older systems are replaced. I stated that we were prepared to trade reductions in areas where we enjoy an advantage, bombers and cruise missiles, for reductions in the main area of Soviet advantage, warheads on land-based ballistic missiles.

The Soviet response to these initiatives was disappointing. The Soviet START Delegation practically ignored our new proposals. In INF, after showing the first signs of flexibility since the talks began, the Soviets abruptly declared the talks finished on the grounds that U.S. deployments had made negotiations impossible. The United States negotiated in good faith while the Soviets deployed over one hundred additional

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SS-20s with over three hundred warheads. We are ready to continue the search for an agreement that would reduce intermediate-range weapons to the lowest possible level, and hope the Soviet Union will join in that search.

Arms reductions are the most important aspect of our arms control agenda with the Soviets, but we have also presented a number of other initiatives to reduce the risk of war. In order to minimize the dangers of miscalculation in periods of tension, I have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps we call "confidence-building measures."

Our proposals cover a broad spectrum. Under negotiation in Geneva are proposals for advance notification of missile tests and major military exercises. We have also suggested that we and the Soviets work together with other nations to establish procedures for handling the possible seizure of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a safeguard against misunderstandings in time of crisis. I am pleased to say that the Soviets have agreed to a second round of talks on communications improvements beginning on _____.

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Human Rights

The third major subject of our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet abuses in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship. Soviet unwillingness to abide by solemn international commitments in this area has been all too characteristic of the Soviet approach to international affairs generally.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our outrage over the imprisonment of thousands of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews and other Soviet minorities, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for any decent human being to comprehend why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow 300 of their citizens to be reunited with close family members in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

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We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; the Soviet human rights record is a propaganda black eye the Soviets give themselves, and we would gladly see them stop. We are interested in results. [For example, we were heartened this spring when Soviet authorities agreed to grant exit visas to the Pentecostalist families who had sought refuge in our Moscow Embassy for almost four years. They were well aware of our interest, but the decision was theirs alone, and was of benefit to the people involved, and to the two countries. I see no reason why the same benefit should not be achieved in other, similar cases in this area.]

Bilateral Cooperation

The final element of our agenda with the Soviets includes economic and other bilateral relations. Despite strains in our relationship, we have preserved the framework for peaceful, non-strategic bilateral trade advantageous to both countries. The signing this summer of a new Long-Term Agreement on grain sales is a manifestation of our desire to promote such trade with the Soviet Union.

We have also made clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to explore ways of expanding bilateral cooperation in other areas. In particular, we are interested in finding new ways in

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which our two peoples can get to know one another, and increase understanding of each other's societies and cultures.

With this in mind, we proposed earlier this year that our governments begin negotiations on a new cultural and scientific exchanges agreement, and renew discussion on the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York. These were two areas where, in my judgment, the balance of mutual advantage was about equal, where both sides stood to gain by regularizing access to each other's society on a reciprocal basis. Because of the tragic events of September 1, we had to put off the start of these talks. But our interest in exploring ways to get to know each other better through reciprocal steps in areas like these continues strong.

As another example, we would like to explore ways to increase the representation of the other country's viewpoint in the news media. Soviet commentators of course have splendid access to our free media, and we welcome the challenge. I was pleased when Soviet television interviewed Deputy Secretary of State Dam a few months back on the prospects for the Geneva negotiations. My government is prepared to work with the U.S. news media to institute a more regular program of exchanges of this sort.

Conclusion

As you can see, our agenda with the Soviets is a formidable one. Although the prevention of war may be the overarching goal, all four areas -- regional security, arms control, human rights, bilateral cooperation -- are important. Indeed, a lasting improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on progress in all four.

In closing, let me return again to the three pillars of our policy toward the Soviet Union that I mentioned earlier: realism, strength and negotiation. As much as we would wish otherwise, competition is likely to be a central feature of our relations for some time to come. And I am proud to say that, thanks to the support of the American people, we have been successful over the past three years in restoring the strength necessary to avoid war and defend vital Western interests against continuing Soviet challenges.

Strength and realism provide the necessary foundation for ensuring peace in our relations with the Soviet Union. Our preference, however, is to reduce the risk of military conflict and to resolve Soviet-American differences through dialogue and negotiation. Our hope is that, in America's relations with the Soviet Union -- as in relations among all nations -- we can create for future generations a world free from the use of

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force, a world in which swords have been beaten into
ploughshares, a world in which states ^{countries} of differing social
systems can cooperate with one another on the basis of mutual
respect and shared interest.

We have in place a positive agenda that offers the basis
for a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. I am confident that,
in the coming months and years, if we sustain our approach,
this goal can be achieved. I call upon the leaders of the
Soviet Union to join us in the search for peace -- the sooner
they do so, the better for all mankind.

Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbow
11/21/83 632-8040 2547m

Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr.
EUR: MPalmer
EUR: RBurt

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NLRR F06-114/9 #10831

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

I would like to speak to you tonight on one of the most important questions that every President must address: the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union.

The conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union is central to our entire foreign policy. It could not be otherwise. The Soviet Union shares with us the status and the responsibilities that come with being one of the two greatest powers on this planet. The Soviet Union's territory spans two continents, and eleven time zones. Like the United States, the Soviets have interests and allies far beyond their own frontiers. Perhaps most importantly, only the United States and the Soviet Union possess enormous nuclear arsenals capable of destroying all mankind.

As De Tocqueville predicted more than a century ago, it was perhaps inevitable that the United States and Soviet Russia would find themselves in competition as the only truly global powers in the world today. Moreover, the global strategic competition that De Tocqueville foresaw is sharpened by the differences between Western democratic values and the Communist view of the relationship among the individual, government, and society. Taken together, these factors ensure that the United

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States and Soviet Union will, for the foreseeable future, see one another as adversaries.

But despite our differences, we and the Soviets share a common interest in managing our adversarial relationship in order to keep nuclear war from ever occurring. This has been the objective of every President since the dawning of the nuclear era. It is my profound commitment to the American people and to all peoples of the world. We are all aware of the terrible devastation that nuclear weapons would inflict on human society -- indeed, on human life itself. We are determined to continue the pursuit of policies which will keep that devastation from ever occurring. Our children and their children must be able to sleep at night secure in the understanding that we are moving away from and not toward a nuclear holocaust. This requires a reasoned approach to the Soviet Union and to the world.

Soviet Policy: Part of the U.S. Strategy for Peace

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As we see each evening on the television screen, even conventional wars wreak terrible human costs. Moreover, these conflicts impose incalculable costs on the peoples involved, and run the risk of a wider confrontation involving the great powers. I am working for a future in which regional disputes are settled by peaceful means, rather than by force of arms or of military intimidation, a future in which mankind no longer faces the destruction and human tragedy of war.

As a means to this end, our strategy for peace aims at reducing and, ultimately, eliminating the excessively vast stockpiles of armaments in the world -- above all, the enormous numbers of nuclear weapons.

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also a source of sorrow for me that our own defense spending has had to be increased in order to restore the military balance in the face of a relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades. Peace and reducing the burden of armaments are, for me, two sides of the same coin.

In seeking to reduce arms levels, we assign the highest priority to reducing the levels of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear arms reductions depend ultimately on negotiation. But we and our Allies have also made considerable progress in recent years -- progress that is not generally appreciated -- to reduce the size of NATO's nuclear arsenal.

For example, it is a little known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed on the elimination of an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of 1000 warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

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Just as important as reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, we also seek to increase the stability of the nuclear balance. Nuclear war need never occur if we ensure that no nation could ever believe it could gain by attacking with nuclear weapons. Thus it is essential to minimize the number of so-called "first-strike" weapons.

Peace, furthermore, should mean more than just the absence of war. Thus together with elimination of the use of force and reductions in arms levels, we also seek to establish greater confidence and understanding among states.

We do not believe ideological differences are an insurmountable obstacle to establishing greater confidence among states. Confidence depends, first and foremost, on respect for the legitimate interests of other states, irrespective of differences in political and economic values. But confidence can also be strengthened by expanding contacts among peoples, through cultural and academic exchanges, and through trade. By building confidence, we can create a durable basis for cooperation to avoid war and reduce arms.

Confidence is, sad to say, sorely lacking in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the fifty years since our two nations established diplomatic relations, we have seen brief periods of

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partnership amidst longer ones of bitter confrontation. We have lived through the dark days of the imposition of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, and the Cuban missile crisis. We have seen the high hopes for détente in the 1970s dashed by the Soviet Union's unrestrained military build-up and by Moscow's aggressive policies beyond its borders.

But I do not believe that confrontation is the destiny of the American and Soviet peoples. Our two societies share a number of common bonds. We are both relatively young nations, with diverse ethnic traditions and a similar pioneer philosophy. Our peoples have together experienced the horrors of war, and fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the victory over Nazi Germany. Although we continue to clash on the battlefield of ideas, it is important to remember that the American and Soviet peoples have never been at war with one another. If we are wise, there is no reason why we ever should.

Three Principles of U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union

From the moment I entered office almost three years ago, I sought to establish the basis for a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. I had no illusions that it would be easy to deal with a hostile and militarily powerful adversary, or that it would be easy to find solutions to the many serious problems between us. My overriding objective was

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to reduce the dangers of a Soviet-American military confrontation. But I also embarked on a search for areas in which our two nations could work together to mutual advantage, areas where there was a basis on which to instill greater confidence and mutual understanding to the US-Soviet relationship.

Our strategy for managing relations with the Soviet Union is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue:

Realism

An effective policy toward Moscow requires a realistic understanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and the way it conducts itself in world affairs. If nothing else, history has taught us not to base our relations with the Soviet Union on trust. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. Indeed, misunderstandings can best be avoided if we are quite frank in acknowledging our ideological differences, and unafraid to defend the democratic values we hold so dear.

I have, of course, been forthright in discussing the nature of the Soviet Union and the problems we have with Soviet policies. I will continue to do so. But frank talk should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders. President Andropov and

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President Brezhnev before him have always stressed that peaceful coexistence is not the same thing as ideological coexistence. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "aggressive imperialists," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. I believe that Soviet leaders are no less clear-eyed. In fact, at a Central Committee meeting in June, Andropov himself stated:

"A struggle is underway for the minds and hearts of the billions of people on the planet, and the future of mankind depends to a considerable extent on the outcome of this ideological struggle."

Realism about the Soviet Union also means coming to grips with the facts of Soviet behavior throughout Soviet history, but especially over the past decade and a half. We have learned that the Soviet Union is distinctly unimpressed by unilateral Western restraint. The Soviet Union's military build-up continued over the last ten-to-fifteen years despite considerable restraint on the part of the United States and its allies. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their GNP to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBMs, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

Bolstered by its growing military power, the Soviet Union displayed an increasing willingness to use force -- both

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directly and indirectly -- to increase regional tensions and install regimes that were and are totally lacking in popular support. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. This type of interference has had tragic consequences for the peoples involved, and it has threatened -- and continues to threaten -- the security of other states.

We recognize that the regional tensions that the Soviets and their proxies seek to exploit are real, and have their roots in local situations. Our approach is to assist the governments and peoples of areas where such tensions exist to negotiate peaceful political solutions to these problems. We think that this is the only responsible approach in the nuclear age.

Unfortunately, the Soviets do not yet share this approach. Rather, the Soviet Union -- unchallenged for far too long by a United States still traumatized by the Vietnam experience -- has in recent years repeatedly sought to impose solutions by methods that necessarily threaten the interests of parties involved, of our friends and allies, and of the United States itself, as well as the peace of the world.

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Strength

Proceeding from this realistic view of the Soviet Union, we recognized from the outset that the United States and its allies and friends cannot negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union, or ensure that Moscow respects the vital interests of other countries, from a position of weakness. The greatest risk of nuclear war would come from a Soviet miscalculation that we were growing weak and that they could act aggressively without fear of response. This could create the kind of action-reaction cycle we all wish to avoid. Thus, my first priorities were to restore America's economic and military strength, and to restore the trust and confidence between us and our partners that is needed if we are to deal successfully together with the Soviet challenge.

I will not dwell tonight on the details of the economic recovery now underway, or the specific steps we have taken to restore the military balance. Suffice it to say that, thanks to the resolve of the American people and the bipartisan support received from the Congress, we have sent an unambiguous signal to Moscow that we will reestablish equality in the areas of the military balance where the Soviet Union has opened up destabilizing gaps over the past ten years. We have made clear that we will provide material and political support to governments and peoples threatened by the Soviets or their clients.

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We have also demonstrated that we are prepared to use our own military strength when absolutely necessary to protect our citizens and our interests and to advance the cause of peace. At the same time, we have made clear that, while we will restore the balance through our own programs if necessary, our preference is to do so through verifiable agreements that reduce arms on both sides to the lowest possible levels consistent with our security requirements.

In addition to rebuilding America's economic and military strength, an important element of our approach to the Soviet Union was strengthening our relations with Allies and friends throughout the world. Here too, we have achieved considerable progress. The countries of NATO and our Japanese allies are, in the main, committed as we are to prudent strengthening of our common defense capabilities. And we have made great strides in restoring the economic health of the Western democracies and in developing a common approach to international economic problems -- in particular, the need to avoid letting peaceful trade become an instrument for accelerating the Soviet military buildup.

Rather than the option of good-faith negotiations, the Soviet Union has chosen to deal with us by seeking to divide America from the rest of the world, essentially through

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propaganda. The Atlantic Alliance is now in the process of sending the Soviets a clear message that they can no longer count on divisions among Western governments as a means of maintaining military superiority. I am thinking, of course, of the deployment this month of the first Pershing and cruise missiles in Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

After more than two years of intensive negotiations, we would have preferred another result. Our ~~initial~~ objective ^{is} was to rid the world of this generation of missiles, and that was what I proposed in November 1981. The Soviets rejected that proposal, as they have rejected my subsequent proposal of an interim solution at equal levels, as a stepping-stone toward zero on both sides.

Proceeding with these deployments has been no easy matter for any of the countries involved, including our own. We are deploying with a heavy heart. Our preference was and still remains to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces through arms control rather than deployments. We stand ready to withdraw any and all of our new missiles if a fair bargain can be struck.

The initiation of deployments has occurred because the Soviet Union, despite major concessions on our part, would not accept a negotiated solution other than one which would preserve a sizeable Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The negotiating option remains open to the Soviets; we hope this time they will take it. We are ready to proceed.

Dialogue

In fact, the negotiating option is open to them everywhere, and not just in the arms control field. The increased realism and strength we have established provide the necessary underpinnings for an effective policy toward the Soviet Union. But our policy is not simply one of maintaining a military balance or containing Soviet expansionism. The third element of our strategy I mentioned earlier -- dialogue -- is integral to our whole approach. It is on this element that I would like to focus in the remainder of my remarks tonight.

From the first days of my Administration, we have pursued an intensive dialogue with the Soviet Union covering the four principal areas of our relationship: arms control, regional security, human rights, and bilateral cooperation. Through the direct correspondence I have maintained with Presidents Brezhnev and Andropov, and in diplomatic exchanges from the level of

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Secretary of State on down, we have conveyed a consistent message: that we do not shrink from competition with the Soviet Union, be it political, military, economic, or ideological; but that our aim is to resolve Soviet-American differences peacefully, and to search for agreements under which our two great nations can cooperate constructively to mutual advantage.

We always recognized that the path to agreements with Moscow and to greater Soviet-American cooperation would be a slow and difficult one. Having witnessed the rapid demise of the "détente" of the 1970s, we set our standards in negotiations with the Soviets high, and we expected no sudden breakthroughs. For one thing, the Soviets themselves have placed numerous obstacles in the way -- their continuing occupation of Afghanistan and brutal suppression of human rights within the USSR being but two examples. Moreover, I think the Soviets have not yet reconciled themselves to the fact that for the ^{foreseeable future} next five years and perhaps beyond, they must deal with Western governments that are united as never before in pursuing realistic policies toward the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of this year I authorized Secretary of State Shultz to initiate an intensified series of discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The purpose of this effort was to test whether the new Soviet leadership was

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prepared to join us in an effort to put our relations on a more positive footing. The Soviet response was not as forthcoming as we had hoped. Neither was it totally uninterested. Over the spring and summer, there were a few developments which suggested that the Soviet Union was considering engaging us in a search for better relations.

This modest progress was, to our regret, halted by the Soviets' destruction on September 1 of Korean Airlines flight 7 with 269 passengers on board, and their subsequent efforts to evade responsibility. The Soviet Union still owes the civilized world an unequivocal apology for the Korean Airlines massacre, as well as compensation for the victims' families. Perhaps of equal importance, the time has come for the Soviet Union to take positive steps to ensure that civilian air travelers need never again fear a recurrence of this tragedy.

But as much as I was shocked and outraged by the Soviets' behavior, the downing of KAL flight 7 did not lead me to reevaluate our policy toward the Soviet Union. In pursuing negotiations with the Soviets, I have never harbored any illusions that progress would be the result of Soviet goodwill or human kindness. Progress can only be achieved when the Soviets recognize that their best option is cooperation.

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Thus, in the aftermath of the destruction of KAL flight 7, I sent my negotiators back to Geneva and Vienna to continue the negotiations on reducing nuclear and conventional arms. Secretary of State Shultz went to Madrid to conclude the Conference that reviewed fulfillment of the Helsinki accords, and to meet face-to-face with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Throughout the fall, our diplomats have been in frequent contact on all issues in US-Soviet relations.

Let me describe to you our approach to each of the four areas of the US-Soviet agenda, and my hopes for the future.

The Four-Part Agenda

Regional Security

The first element of the US-Soviet agenda is the broad range of regional problems where the Soviet approach all too often threatens the security of other nations. It was the Soviet penchant for fanning regional tensions and intervening in regional disputes by using or encouraging the use of force that contributed most to the collapse of "détente." It is continuing Soviet adventurism in areas vital to the interests not just of the U.S., but also of a whole series of other countries, that poses the most serious risk of superpower confrontation. Soviet leaders must recognize that their efforts to exploit regional animosities will gain the Soviet

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Union no enduring strategic advantages, and can only further complicate the search for improved East-West relations.

We and the Soviets, in my view, should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. It was out of this belief that we tried to engage the Soviets last year in exchanges of views concerning what would be required to bring about a peaceful political solution in Afghanistan, complementing the efforts undertaken by the United Nations Secretary General. It was also out of this belief that we exchanged views with the Soviets on developments in southern Africa, as a means of supplementing the broad-gauge diplomatic effort which has been underway for several years to achieve a peaceful political solution to that region's many problems.

Our approach has been constructive. So far it has not been matched on the Soviet side. But we are prepared to continue if the Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us ready to collaborate.

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Arms Control

Regional conflicts need to be addressed not only in the interests of the parties involved, but because they contain the risk of broader US-Soviet confrontation. And in the nuclear age, such a confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus alongside regional issues, arms control stands at the top of the US-Soviet agenda.

American and Soviet scientists have recently documented what common sense dictates: there would be no winners in a nuclear war, and human society and human life itself would be gravely threatened. It was in recognition of these grim realities that I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive series of initiatives that seek both to reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and to eliminate any incentive to use nuclear weapons even in a crisis. Together with our nuclear arms control initiatives, we have proposed the complete elimination of chemical weapons, and are pressing ahead with the Vienna negotiations to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe.

Our standards in all these negotiations are high: we insist that agreements be based on real equality, that they make a meaningful contribution to international security, and that they be verifiable. Agreements that simply ratify a continuing

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Soviet build-up are worse than no agreements at all. Moreover, the doubts that have arisen recently about Soviet compliance with previous SALT agreements underscore the need to close every possible loophole.

If our standards are high, our flexibility is also great. The proposals I announced in September in the INF and START talks were directly responsive to Soviet concerns. In INF, I moved toward the Soviet position on aircraft and on the geographic coverage of a future agreement, and I offered special constraints on the system that Moscow claims to be most concerned about, the Pershing II. In START, I proposed the concept of a guaranteed build-down in strategic weapons as older systems are replaced. I stated that we were prepared to trade reductions in areas where we enjoy an advantage, bombers and cruise missiles, for reductions in the main area of Soviet advantage, warheads on land-based ballistic missiles.

The Soviet response to these initiatives was disappointing. The Soviet START Delegation practically ignored our new proposals. In INF, after showing the first signs of flexibility since the talks began, the Soviets abruptly declared the talks finished on the grounds that U.S. deployments had made negotiations impossible. The United States negotiated in good faith while the Soviets deployed over one hundred additional

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SS-20s with over three hundred warheads. We are ready to continue the search for an agreement that would reduce intermediate-range weapons to the lowest possible level, and hope the Soviet Union will join in that search.

Arms reductions are the most important aspect of our arms control agenda with the Soviets, but we have also presented a number of other initiatives to reduce the risk of war. In order to minimize the dangers of miscalculation in periods of tension, I have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps we call "confidence-building measures."

Our proposals cover a broad spectrum. Under negotiation in Geneva are proposals for advance notification of missile tests and major military exercises. We have also suggested that we and the Soviets work together with other nations to establish procedures for handling the possible seizure of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a safeguard against misunderstandings in time of crisis. I am pleased to say that the Soviets have agreed to a second round of talks on communications improvements beginning on _____.

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Human Rights

The third major subject of our dialogue with the Soviet Union is human rights. It is Soviet abuses in this area, perhaps more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship. Soviet unwillingness to abide by solemn international commitments in this area has been all too characteristic of the Soviet approach to international affairs generally.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our outrage over the imprisonment of thousands of prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews and other Soviet minorities, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for any decent human being to comprehend why Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow 300 of their citizens to be reunited with close family members in the United States.

Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolutionary. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

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We know that this is a sensitive area for the Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are not interested in propaganda advantage; the Soviet human rights record is a propaganda black eye the Soviets give themselves, and we would gladly see them stop. We are interested in results. [For example, we were heartened this spring when Soviet authorities agreed to grant exit visas to the Pentecostalist families who had sought refuge in our Moscow Embassy for almost four years. They were well aware of our interest, but the decision was theirs alone, and was of benefit to the people involved, and to the two countries. I see no reason why the same benefit should not be achieved in other, similar cases in this area.]

Bilateral Cooperation

The final element of our agenda with the Soviets includes economic and other bilateral relations. Despite strains in our relationship, we have preserved the framework for peaceful, non-strategic bilateral trade advantageous to both countries. The signing this summer of a new Long-Term Agreement on grain sales is a manifestation of our desire to promote such trade with the Soviet Union.

We have also made clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to explore ways of expanding bilateral cooperation in other areas. In particular, we are interested in finding new ways in

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which our two peoples can get to know one another, and increase understanding of each other's societies and cultures.

With this in mind, we proposed earlier this year that our governments begin negotiations on a new cultural and scientific exchanges agreement, and renew discussion on the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York. These were two areas where, in my judgment, the balance of mutual advantage was about equal, where both sides stood to gain by regularizing access to each other's society on a reciprocal basis. Because of the tragic events of September 1, we had to put off the start of these talks. But our interest in exploring ways to get to know each other better through reciprocal steps in areas like these continues strong.

As another example, we would like to explore ways to increase the representation of the other country's viewpoint in the news media. Soviet commentators of course have splendid access to our free media, and we welcome the challenge. I was pleased when Soviet television interviewed Deputy Secretary of State Dam a few months back on the prospects for the Geneva negotiations. My government is prepared to work with the U.S. news media to institute a more regular program of exchanges of this sort.

Conclusion

As you can see, our agenda with the Soviets is a formidable one. Although the prevention of war may be the overarching goal, all four areas -- regional security, arms control, human rights, bilateral cooperation -- are important. Indeed, a lasting improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on progress in all four.

In closing, let me return again to the three pillars of our policy toward the Soviet Union that I mentioned earlier: realism, strength and negotiation. As much as we would wish otherwise, competition is likely to be a central feature of our relations for some time to come. And I am proud to say that, thanks to the support of the American people, we have been successful over the past three years in restoring the strength necessary to avoid war and defend vital Western interests against continuing Soviet challenges.

Strength and realism provide the necessary foundation for ensuring peace in our relations with the Soviet Union. Our preference, however, is to reduce the risk of military conflict and to resolve Soviet-American differences through dialogue and negotiation. Our hope is that, in America's relations with the Soviet Union -- as in relations among all nations -- we can create for future generations a world free from the use of

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force, a world in which swords have been beaten into ploughshares, a world in which states ^{countries} of differing social systems can cooperate with one another on the basis of mutual respect and shared interest.

We have in place a positive agenda that offers the basis for a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. I am confident that, in the coming months and years, if we sustain our approach, this goal can be achieved. I call upon the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us in the search for peace -- the sooner they do so, the better for all mankind.

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EXCERPTS FROM JFK AU SPEECH

"Let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end ~~them~~ now our differences at least we can help make the world safe for diversity; for, in the final analysis, a most basic link is that we all inhabit this same small planet".

(Quoting from a text on Soviet Military Strategy)

"Truly as it was written long ago when a wicked flea that no man pursueth. Yet it is said -- ~~when to man~~ and sad to read these Soviet statements -- to realize the extent of the gulf between us; but it is also a warning -- a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets; not to see only a distorted and desparate view of the other side; not to ~~see~~ ~~in~~ see conflict as inevitable, accomodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats".

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SOVIET SPEECH

Confidence-Building Measures: Perhaps in the past we have striven to secure major leaps in negotiations between the US and the USSR. What we hope to do in Stockholm is to agree on a series of measures, perhaps not as important as major reductions of nuclear arsenals, that can provide the foundation from which we can develop a degree of confidence in dealing with each other. Perhaps these measures can also lead to providing a momentum to the peace process that will improve the bilateral negotiating atmosphere and allow us to achieve those major arms reductions we so ardently desire.

A key objective of our efforts must be the reduction of the risk of accidental nuclear war, where a terrible conflagration results from the miscalculation of one leadership or the other. Our most earnest efforts must be directed at this key, overriding goal -- the prevention of nuclear conflict.

Should include:

-- Nuclear war cannot be fought, certainly there can be no winners in a nuclear conflict.

-- Superiority is an elusive goal. We must set as our key objective the establishment of an equitable balance between our respective nuclear and conventional forces.

-- A key destabilizing factor in the Central European theater, potentially the most dangerous arena of conflict, is the fact that the Soviets maintain their forces in a very high state of readiness and in forward deployed positions; in short, in a preemptive posture .

SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. Before these holidays are upon us, I think it is a good time to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed cannot, happen.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are experiencing a period of tension in our relations which is greater than we have seen for

many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is and what we can do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the seventies, we notice two things: America tended to withdraw from the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves: Throughout the 1970's, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.

But the Soviets not only amassed a ^{massive} monstrous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also began to use these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. And in Europe, their deployment of SS-20 missiles was a blatant effort to spit the NATO Alliance and threaten our West European allies.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels that it can prevail and therefore has something to gain. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our Allies are strong enough to make clear to any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit but only disaster to him.

With your support and that of your representatives in the Congress, we have stopped America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend, and our commitment to defend our values has never been greater.

Now this, I think, has taken the Soviets by surprise. They had counted on us to keep on ^{continuing our gradual decline} weakening ourselves. After all, their propagandists have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history, and they said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that this isn't happening.

And not only that. Telltale signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that doesn't work. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

The harsh words that we have exchanged ^{have} ~~has~~ led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic manoeuvring, one thing stands out: the balance of power has been restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviets will produce a confrontation by miscalculating our strength or will. And we, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, so how can anyone think that we would do so now, when they are armed to the teeth?

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high and are a danger in themselves. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must resolve to improve.

There is the ever-present risk of an accidental nuclear war growing out of tragic miscalculation

between the SU and the US

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. If we are to avoid an arms race, with all the dangers it entails, we must do more. And it seems to me that our government and the Soviet government should concentrate our attention in three broad areas.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of World War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in regional or local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling local conflicts and exporting revolution is a dangerous practice which

exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat, we have tried to reduce the number and destructive power of our nuclear weapons. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowestst level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in

terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and our allies agreed to eliminate an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. And the sad fact is that we can hardly go further until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels.

Third, we must work to establish greater confidence and understanding. Without this, we will hardly be able to accomplish much in reducing the use of force or lowering the level of arms.

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Our Approach

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Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of world we live in and the nature of our adversaries. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival who does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our values.

I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each other. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to

refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it ^{all} the more imperative for us to talk.

Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in return.

Strength is of course more than military might. It has many components: economic health, political cohesion, Alliance solidarity as well as adequate defenses. We are stronger in all these areas than we were three years ago, and this gives us the basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.

Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions. We will never walk away from a negotiating table. To do so would be unforgivable given the stakes involved for the whole world.

When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269 passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators

back to Geneva and Vienna because I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings were about that ^{terrible} dastardly act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not merely atmospheric.

Some Real Problems

(START AND INF)

Our Approach in a Nutshell

(FOLLOWING NEEDS TO BE REWRITTEN, WITH EYE TO DISTINGUISHING OUR APPROACH FROM DETENTE AND ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION. IS THERE A PHRASE? SHOULD ENCAPSULATE DETERRENCE, FIRMNESS, OPENESS TO NEGOTIATE REAL PROBLEMS, LONG-TERM STEADINESS)

In the past our policies toward the Soviet Union have fluctuated between periods of cooperation and periods of confrontation. But when we tried to cooperate--as during World War II and during the detente of the seventies--we often closed our eyes to unpleasant facts in order to preserve a friendly atmosphere. This is a dangerous course for a democracy, since

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our people must understand the world as it is to understand the policies we must follow to deal with it. And it always led to subsequent disillusionment and a worsening of relations.

We must try in the future to hold a steady course, resisting swings of euphoria and despair.

Conclusion

Reasons for optimism: common interest in avoiding nuclear war, never fought war, etc.

Kennedy quote:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

Conclude with appeal to Soviets to join us in pondering the lessons of the past and rededicating ourselves to solving problems in the future.

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Draft: 12/16/83

SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

My fellow Americans:

We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future. Before these holidays are upon us, I think it is a good time to share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.

When we think of world peace we think first of all of our relations with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but because the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that this does not, indeed cannot, happen.

I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are experiencing a period of tension in our relations which is greater than we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight

about why this is and what we can do about it.

Causes of Tension

If we look back over the seventies, we notice two things: America tended to withdraw from the world and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves: throughout the 1970's, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their gross national product to defense as the United States. They deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States deployed no comparabnle weapons.

But the Soviets not only amassed a monstrous arsenal while we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also began to use these arms to establish their domination over other countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of other nations. And in Europe, their deployment of SS-20 missiles was a blatant effort to split the NATO Alliance and threaten our West European allies.

This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was

absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American strength or else the danger of war would increase. History teaches us that wars begin when one side feels that it can prevail and therefore has something to gain. If we are to keep the peace, we must make sure that we and our allies are strong enough to make clear to any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit but only disaster to him.

With your support and that of your representatives in the Congress, we have stopped America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our defenses are on the mend, and our commitment to defend our values has never been greater.

Now this, I think, has taken the Soviets by surprise. They had counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. After all, their propagandists have been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of history, and they said it so often that they may have even started believing it. But they can see now that this isn't happening.

And not only that. Telltale signs are accumulating that it is their system, not ours, that doesn't work. So it is no wonder that the Soviets are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in their shrill propaganda.

A Safer World

The harsh words that we have exchanged have led many to fear that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision course." This is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic manoeuvring, one thing stands out: the balance of power has been restored and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.

It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviets will produce a confrontation by miscalculating our strength or will. And we, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We did not do so even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, so how can anyone think that we would do so now, when they are armed to the teeth?

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much too high and are a danger in themselves. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions which we must resolve to improve.

Our Aims

Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the Soviet Union end there. If we are to avoid an arms race, with all the dangers it entails, we must do more. And it seems to me that our government and the Soviet government should concentrate our attention in three broad areas.

First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of World War Two alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In many other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in regional or local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend its influence and control by fueling local

conflicts and exporting revolution is a dangerous practice which exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this direction.

Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons

It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.

Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat, we have tried to reduce the number and destructive power of our nuclear weapons. It is a little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power. Just ~~last month~~^{Two months ago,}, we and our allies agreed to eliminate an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for each new one.

But this is not enough. As I said in my speech to the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." The sad fact is that we cannot even begin to make that dream a reality until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.

Third, we must work to establish greater confidence and understanding. Without this, we will hardly be able to accomplish much in reducing the use of force or lowering the level of arms.

Confidence has many facets. Complying with past agreements increases it while violating them undermines it. Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

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Some Real Problems

Reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these weapons, even in time of crisis.

The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. There is no justification for these steps.

My negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to finish the search for agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to negotiate on these proposals in good faith. Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the likelihood of conflicts in which such weapons might be used. Here we have proposed to the Soviets a series of steps to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension, *that could lead to a tragic, unwanted conflict.*

We call these proposals "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a further safeguard against misunderstandings.

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Our efforts have not stopped there. Together with our allies and the other nations of Europe, we will be joining in a conference on European security and confidence-building measures in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S. Delegation to the opening of that conference next month, *as an indication of our sincere effort to make this conference succeed.* Our goal will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce some of the *apprehension* mystery and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities. By doing so, we would be diminishing the risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but invite the cooperation of all others in this work as well -- including the Soviet Union.

Arms control has been the most visible area of US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to defuse *29662* tensions ~~in the world~~ that could escalate dangerously. I think we and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Here we have sought to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been underway for several years.