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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/18/2005

File Folder USSR: PIPELINE-FORCED LABOR 6/7

FOIA

F06-114/9

Box Number 31

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3108

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 10799 | LETTER | EAGLEBURGER TO SENATOR ARMSTRONG RE REPORT ON FORCED LABOR IN USSR <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i> | 4 | 1/20/1983 | B1 |
| 10798 | MEMO | IKLE RE SOVIET FORCED LABOR <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 10795 | MEMO | POLITICAL AND LABOR COUNSELOR <i>PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</i> | 1 | ND | B3 |
| 10800 | PAPER | REPORT ON SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i> | 4 | 11/2/1982 | B1 |
| 10801 | CABLE | 112126Z FEB 83 <i>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</i> | 3 | 2/11/1983 | B1 |
| 10803 | CABLE | 101414Z MAR 83 <i>PAR 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</i> | 1 | 3/10/1983 | B1 B3 |
| 10796 | MEMO | BAILEY TO CLARK RE SOVIET SLAV LABOR AND WEST GERMAN BAILOUTS OF EAST GERMANY <i>R 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</i> | 1 | 3/22/1985 | B1 |
| 10804 | CABLE | 170906Z MAR 83 <i>D 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9</i> | 3 | 3/17/1983 | B1 B3 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 10805 | CABLE | 180251Z MAR 83 D 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9 | 1 | 3/18/1983 | B1 B3 |
| 10806 | CABLE | 091100Z MAR 83 D 9/25/2012 F2006-114/9 | 1 | 3/9/1983 | B1 B3 |
| 10797 | MEMO | MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE LETTERS FROM SENATORS BOSCHWITZ AND NICKLES ACTIONS BY CUSTOMS TO BAN CERTAIN SOVIET GOODS FROM IMPORT R 11/24/2011 F2006-114/9 | 2 | 11/18/1983 | B1 |
| 10802 | MEMO | VIETNAMESE GUEST WORKERS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9 | 11 | 2/6/1984 | B1 |

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Agreed DRAFT VI: Meeting 1/20/83

Dear Senator Armstrong:

The Department of State is pleased to submit the accompanying report on forced labor in the USSR in compliance with Senate Resolution 449 and Conference Report No. 97/891 which accompanied H.R. 6956 of September 29, 1982.

Soviet forced labor practices have changed considerably since Stalin's day, but there is no question that forced labor still is widely used today in the USSR, often under harsh and degrading conditions [approaching the internationally agreed definition of slavery.]* Such labor is used to execute various Soviet development projects and to produce large amounts of primary and manufactured goods for both domestic and Western export markets. As stated in our preliminary report of 5 November 1982, the issue of forced labor in the Soviet Union is a longstanding and grave human rights issue. The Soviet forced labor system, the largest in the world, comprises a vast network of some 1100 forced labor camps, which cover most areas of the USSR. It includes an estimated four million forced laborers, of whom at least 10,000 are considered to be political and religious prisoners.

Since our comprehensive interim report on this issue was released in November, 1982, we have continued our efforts to gather information and have also prepared several studies on particular facets of the issue. We have examined, for example, current Soviet forced labor law and practices as well as international law and agreements relating to forced labor. In addition, we have reviewed the human rights aspects of the issue and have prepared an update of international labor activities regarding the Soviet forced labor issue. Finally, we have examined Soviet efforts to recruit voluntary workers to Siberia and have explored the status of the growing number of Vietnamese workers in the USSR. Papers on these issues are included as part of this report.

We also have followed closely the efforts by private organizations to develop further information. The International Society for Human Rights, based in Frankfurt, Germany held hearings on this issue in Bonn on November 18-19, 1982. Our summary of those hearings is included in this submission. The Society intends to release the full testimony, transcripts, and other documents early this year. We will ensure that this documentation is made available to the Congress.

* (Note: Pending L clearance of bracketed clause)

** Identical and simultaneous letters to be sent to Sen. Percy (SFRC), Rep. Whitten (Appropriations), Rep. Zablocki (HFAC), and Sen. Hatfield (Appropriations)

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

*[In maintaining its extensive forced labor system to serve both the political and the economic purposes of the State, the Government of the Soviet Union has been violating its international obligations under several conventions and accords that aim to protect fundamental human rights. In particular, as discussed in the paper entitled "Legal Issues Relating to Forced Labor in the Soviet Union" (Tab), the Soviet Union's forced labor system violates the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Convention No. 29, and the Anti-Slavery Convention of 1926.

In addition to these international agreements,]* we have examined further the Soviet authorities' use of broadly worded legislation against "anti-Soviet agitation," "hooliganism" and "parasitism" intended to intimidate, punish and exploit political dissidents and religious activists. As we stated in our earlier report, for nearly 30 years the International Labor Organization (ILO) has investigated allegations concerning these Soviet practices. The Soviet authorities refuse to provide responses satisfactory to the ILO. The United States believes that these issues need to be addressed and that the burden of proof is on the USSR. We reiterate, therefore, that to resolve this issue the Soviet authorities must open to impartial international investigation their full system of forced labor camps and large scale labor brigades.

Since the Department of State issued its November 1982 interim report on forced labor in the USSR, several events related to our inquiry have occurred. As noted in our preliminary submission, a number of reports in our possession suggest that forced labor was used in the difficult and dangerous site preparation and other preliminary work related to the export pipeline. The media directed public attention to this matter, illuminating the Soviet Union's current forced labor practices. The publicity, we believe, has made Soviet authorities sensitive to the additional problems that would attend future exploitation of forced labor on the export pipeline project. It is well known that forced labor has been used on similar projects in the past and we have evidence that it is being used now, as well, in domestic pipeline construction.

In early December 1982 the USSR offered, and a delegation of Western trade unionists accepted, an invitation to observe ongoing construction of the export pipeline. While praising the visit, the official Soviet news agency TASS revealed on 10 December, 1982 that the delegation inspected only a single 300 kilometer section of the 4000 kilometer line; the inspection was performed largely by helicopter. One delegate--from a union ordinarily sympathetic to Soviet interests--reportedly later characterized the visit as a typical guided show tour of the USSR, and described the pipeline inspection itself as unsatisfactory.

*(Note: Pending L clearance of entire paragraph)

The ILO has accepted "in principle" an invitation from the official Soviet trade union apparatus to send an on-site mission to examine charges of forced labor on the export pipeline. The ILO has received no formal invitation from the Soviet government itself, which bears official responsibility for Soviet international obligations. Whether such an invitation comes formally from the Soviet Government or from its official trade union apparatus, there is continuing concern that without assurances from the Soviet Government that it could conduct a full inquiry into the Soviet forced labor system, such a mission would not be in a position to secure full disclosure of the facts.

The situation of the growing number of Vietnamese workers in the USSR, under conditions which may violate agreed international labor standards, continues to be of concern. It appears that many of the workers enter the Vietnam/USSR labor program in order to escape the poverty and unemployment of present-day Vietnam. At the same time, however, there are reports that working conditions in the USSR are harsh and that net wages of the Vietnamese workers are lower than those paid Soviets doing comparable work. There is little doubt that a significant part of the Vietnamese workers' pay is sequestered for payment toward the Vietnamese Government's official debts to the USSR. Also the workers' communication with their families probably is monitored and constrained. Further it is unclear whether Vietnamese contract workers, who must make a commitment for up to seven years, may quit their employment and return home freely.

We have obtained no convincing evidence that Vietnamese contract workers are employed on the export gas pipeline project. The secrecy with which both the Vietnamese and Soviet governments have surrounded this labor program has made it difficult to monitor. Considering its inherent potential for abuse and the human rights issues involved, we will continue to follow this program closely and to encourage greater international scrutiny.

We have included in this report two detailed graphic representations of forced labor installations in the Soviet Union. One depicts the site of a gas pipeline compressor station under construction, the other a manufacturing site which incorporates the grounds and building of a former church. These materials derive from intelligence sources. We will continue to make available further intelligence regarding the use of forced labor in the USSR through both the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence.

Finally, we wish to assure the Congress that the Administration will continue to pursue this issue vigorously and to develop all possible information on a priority basis. This information will be shared with interested Members of Congress.

Yours very truly,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

Drafted: EUR/P:TS Clear
 SESteiner
 x20682:Wang 908A
 Cleared: NSC:Walt Raymond/P.Dobriansky
 CIA:
 DOD:D. Feith
 USIA:
 DOL:T. Kucherov
 DOS: P:D. Lowenfeld
 " S/P:S. Randolph
 " S/IL:J. Warnock
 " INR:
 " EA:
 " HA:HSimon
 " PA:J. Kelly
 " H:P. Moore
 " IO:
 " L:G. Levitt
 " EUR:R. Burt

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- Regarding the current Vietnam/USSR labor agreement under which Vietnamese workers are "exported" to the USSR:
" ... there are reports that working conditions are harsh and that net wages of the Vietnamese workers are lower than those paid Soviets doing comparable work. There is little doubt that a significant part of the Vietnamese workers pay is sequestered to offset the Vietnamese Government's official debts to the USSR ... We have obtained no convincing evidence that Vietnamese contract workers are employed on the export gas pipeline project."
(Eagleburger cover letter, p.3)

Fred
FRED C. IKLE

The most noteworthy points made by the final report are:

- The Soviets use forced labor to promote the economic as well as political purposes of the State.
- Forced labor is an important element in the Soviet economy; it is used routinely on major construction projects of all kinds, including dams, buildings, roads, railroads, pipelines, and timber cutting and hauling. Forced labor has been used on Soviet military installations and "to this extent it plays a role in the Soviet defense effort" (tab 2, p.2)
- "In maintaining its extensive forced labor system to serve both the political and the economic purposes of the State, the Government of the Soviet Union ... is contravening the United Nations Charter and failing to fulfill its solemn undertakings in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Anti-Slavery Convention of 1926." (Eagleburger cover letter, p.1)
- "As noted in our November, 1982 submission; a number of reports suggest that forced labor was used in the difficult and dangerous site preparation and other preliminary work related to the export pipeline." (Eagleburger cover letter, p.2)
- The Soviet forced labor system, the largest in the world, comprises 1100 camps. It includes an estimated 4 million forced laborers of whom at least 10,000 are political and religious prisoners.

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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→ Paula Dobriansky

Regarding the current Vietnam...
which Vietnamese workers are...
...there are reports that working conditions are...
and that the wages of the Vietnamese workers are...
that some only 50 cents...
...it is doubtful that a significant part of the...
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PAGE NO. 312 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 5

Officer name) S. STEINER (Office symbol) EUR/17 (Extension) 20850 (Room number) 5229

DESCRIPTION CABLE: SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES

| (Agency) | DELIVER TO: | Extension | Room No. |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <u>NSC</u> | <u>1- PAULA DEBRIANSKY</u> | <u>395-3912</u> | <u>3-68</u> |
| <u>NSC/IS/P</u> | <u>DOUGLAS FEITH</u> | <u>697-2682</u> | <u>4B 856</u> |
| <u>NSA</u> | <u>STAN MOSCOWITZ</u> | <u>351-6241</u> | <u>S-5309</u> |
| | <u>2- NSC/S</u> | | |

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IMMEDIATE ALDAC

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HA:JBUNCHER
EUR:MPALMEK
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FOR PAO'S, POLITICAL AND LABOR COUNSELORS

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NLRR E06-114/9 #10795
BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

REPORT ON SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES

REF: STATE 326021 2 NOV 82 AND PREVIOUS

1. ~~C~~ - THE DEPARTMENT WILL FORWARD TO CONGRESS NEXT WEEK THE RESULTS OF AN INTERAGENCY INVESTIGATION INTO SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES, IN CONNECTION WITH A MANDATE SET BY SENATE RESOLUTION 449 AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1982. THE INTERAGENCY STUDY PROVIDES NEW GRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR, A STUDY OF THE SURROUNDING LEGAL ISSUES, AN UPDATE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) ACTIONS, A SUMMARY OF RECENT HEARINGS HELD IN BORN BY THE FRANKFURT-BASED INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM/USSR LABOR TREATY. THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO SELECTED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH IS PROVIDED IN PARA 12 BELOW.

no mention
of 1953

2. ~~C~~ - THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE MAJOR ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE US GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET FORCED LABOR

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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PRACTICES. IT PROVIDES A USEFUL "ROADMAP" OF THE NEW REPORT AND OF US CONCERNS OVER THIS SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. IT STATES THE NEED FOR AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET FORCED LABOR SYSTEM, PROVIDES AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES DEALING WITH SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR, AND INCLUDES () A REVIEW OF SOVIET TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE CONTRACT WORKERS. IT ALSO UNDERLINES THE NEED ON THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LAST MAJOR UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL SURVEY ON FORCED LABOR, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO REEXAMINE THE ISSUE AND REDEDICATE ITSELF TO ELIMINATING SUCH PRACTICES. POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND PUBLIC.

3. / - THE REPORT AND TRANSMITTAL LETTER ARE UNDER A GENERAL EMBARGO FOR RELEASE DURING THE WEEK BEGINNING FEBRUARY 14. WE WILL NOTIFY POSTS BY IMMEDIATE CABLE OF THE PRECISE EMBARGO RELEASE TIME AS SOON AS THIS HAS BEEN SET. TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME TO STUDY THE REPORT AND TO MAXIMIZE ITS IMPACT, WE ARE PROVIDING ADVANCE COPIES TO INTERESTED ALLIED EMBASSIES HERE AND TO SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE US AND EUROPEAN PRESS, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECTING THE EMBARGO.

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4. ~~C~~ - COPIES OF THE REPORT HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO ALL EUROPEAN POSTS AND TO SELECTED POSTS IN OTHER REGIONS. POSTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO SEE THAT COPIES ARE PREPOSITIONED FOR BROAD PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION TO KEY GOVERNMENT, MEDIA, LABOR, ACADEMIC AND OTHER AUDIENCES AS SOON AS THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED. POSTS MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION PROVIDE ADVANCE COPIES TO SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, AND MEDIA WITH A FIRM REMINDER OF THE EMBARGO DATE.

5. ~~C~~ - TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE IN CONNECTION WITH THE STUDY AND ADDITIONAL PRESS GUIDANCE WILL BE FORWARDED SEPTEL.

6. ~~C~~ - FOR PARIS FOR LABOR COUNSELOR GRIMES: PLEASE FORWARD COPIES TO BAKER, AFL/CIO, AS SOON AS RECEIVED. WE HAVE PROVIDED AFL/CIO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR IRVING BROWN WITH ADVANCE COPY BUT HE WILL WISH TO PICK UP ADDITIONAL COPIES FROM BAKER DURING HIS FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN VISIT. BROWN EXPECTS ARRIVE PARIS O/A FEB. --.

7. ~~C~~ - FOR COPENHAGEN FOR LADATT BRENCICK: PLEASE INSURE THAT SAKHAROV COMMITTEE RECEIVES ADVANCE COPY.

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8. ~~C~~ - FOR LONDON FOR LABOR COUNSELOR SCHRADER:
PLEASE ENSURE THAT ADVANCE COPIES GO TO JOSEPH GODSON
AND TO TUC LEADERS.

9. ~~C~~ - FOR BRUSSELS USEC FOR LABATT MATTSON: PLEASE
INSURE THAT ADVANCE COPIES ARE DELIVERED TO ICFTU AND
WCL.

10. ~~C~~ - FOR US MISSION GENEVA: PLEASE PROVIDE ADVANCE
COPIES TO ILO AND ITSS.

11. ~~C~~ - FOR MADRID FOR AMB. KAMPELMAN: YOU MAY PROVIDE
ADVANCE COPIES TO ALLIES URGING THEIR SUPPORT ON ISSUES
INVOLVED AND THEIR USE OF MATERIAL IN THEIR
PRESENTATIONS.

12. U - BEGIN TEXT OF TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS PLEASED TO SUBMIT THE
ACCOMPANYING REPORT ON FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR IN
COMPLIANCE WITH SENATE RESOLUTION 449 AND CONFERENCE
REPORT NO. 97/891 WHICH ACCOMPANIED H.R. 6956 OF

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 0922 DTG: 112126Z FEB 83 PSN: 043325
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BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 040922

FOR PAO'S, POLITICAL AND LABOR COUNSELORS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SCOM, UR
SUBJECT: REPORT ON SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES
INFORM CONSULS
REF: STATE 326021 2 NOV 82 AND PREVIOUS

4. C - COPIES OF THE REPORT HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO ALL EUROPEAN POSTS AND TO SELECTED POSTS IN OTHER REGIONS. POSTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO SEE THAT COPIES ARE PREPOSITIONED FOR BROAD PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION TO KEY GOVERNMENT, MEDIA, LABOR, ACADEMIC AND OTHER AUDIENCES AS SOON AS THE EMBARGO IS LIFTED. POSTS MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION PROVIDE ADVANCE COPIES TO SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT, LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, AND MEDIA WITH A FIRM REMINDER OF THE EMBARGO DATE.

5. C - TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS RELEASE IN CONNECTION WITH THE STUDY AND ADDITIONAL PRESS GUIDANCE WILL BE FORWARDED SEPTEL.

6. C - FOR PARIS FOR LABOR COUNSELOR GRIMES: PLEASE FORWARD COPIES TO BAKER, AFL/CIO, AS SOON AS RECEIVED. WE HAVE PROVIDED AFL/CIO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR IRVING BROWN WITH ADVANCE COPY BUT HE WILL WISH TO PICK UP ADDITIONAL COPIES FROM BAKER DURING HIS FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN VISIT. BROWN EXPECTS ARRIVE PARIS O/A FEB. 24.

7. C - FOR COPENHAGEN FOR LABATT BRENCICK: PLEASE INSURE THAT SAKHAROV COMMITTEE RECEIVES ADVANCE COPY.

8. C - FOR LONDON FOR LABOR COUNSELOR SCHRADER: PLEASE ENSURE THAT ADVANCE COPIES GO TO JOSEPH GODSON AND TO TUC LEADERS.

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10. C - FOR US MISSION GENEVA: PLEASE PROVIDE ADVANCE COPIES TO ILO AND ITSS.

11. C - FOR MADRID FOR AMB. KAMPelman: YOU MAY PROVIDE ADVANCE COPIES TO ALLIES URGING THEIR SUPPORT ON ISSUES INVOLVED AND THEIR USE OF MATERIAL IN THEIR PRESENTATIONS.

12. U - BEGIN TEXT OF TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS.

1. C - THE DEPARTMENT WILL FORWARD TO CONGRESS NEXT WEEK THE RESULTS OF AN INTERAGENCY INVESTIGATION INTO SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES, IN RESPONSE TO SENATE RESOLUTION 449 AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION OF SEPTEMBER 2, 1982. THE INTERAGENCY STUDY PROVIDES NEW GRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR, A STUDY OF THE RELEVANT LEGAL ISSUES, AN UPDATE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) ACTIONS, A SUMMARY OF RECENT HEARINGS HELD IN BONN BY THE FRANKFURT-BASED INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM/USSR LABOR TREATY. THE MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S TRANSMITTAL LETTER TO SELECTED CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH IS PROVIDED IN PARA 12 BELOW.

2. C - THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER PROVIDES A CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE MAJOR ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE US GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET FORCED LABOR

PRACTICES. IT PROVIDES A USEFUL "ROADMAP" OF THE NEW REPORT AND OF US CONCERNS OVER THIS SIGNIFICANT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. IT STATES THE NEED FOR AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET FORCED LABOR SYSTEM, PROVIDES AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES DEALING WITH SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR, AND INCLUDES A REVIEW OF SOVIET TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE CONTRACT WORKERS. IT ALSO UNDERLINES THE NEED ON THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LAST MAJOR UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL SURVEY ON FORCED LABOR, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO REEXAMINE THE ISSUE AND REDEDICATE ITSELF TO ELIMINATING SUCH PRACTICES. POSTS SHOULD DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND PUBLIC, AND EMPHASIZE THAT US WILL SEEK APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL BODIES.

3. C - THE REPORT AND TRANSMITTAL LETTER ARE UNDER A STRICT EMBARGO FOR RELEASE A.M. THURSDAY FEBRUARY 17 IN WASHINGTON. TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME TO STUDY THE REPORT AND TO MAXIMIZE ITS IMPACT, WE ARE PROVIDING

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS PLEASED TO SUBMIT THE ACCOMPANYING REPORT ON FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR IN COMPLIANCE WITH SENATE RESOLUTION 449 AND CONFERENCE REPORT NO. 97/891 WHICH ACCOMPANIED H.R. 6956 OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1982.

SOVIET FORCED LABOR PRACTICES HAVE CHANGED CONSIDERABLY SINCE STALIN'S DAY, BUT SOVIET AUTHORITIES STILL EXPLOIT FORCED LABOR ON A LARGE SCALE. THE SOVIET FORCED LABOR SYSTEM GRAVELY INFRINGES INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. FORCED LABOR, OFTEN UNDER HARSH AND DEGRADING CONDITIONS, IS USED TO EXECUTE VARIOUS SOVIET DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS AND TO PRODUCE LARGE AMOUNTS OF PRIMARY AND MANUFACTURED GOODS FOR BOTH DOMESTIC AND WESTERN EXPORT MARKETS. AS STATED IN OUR PRELIMINARY REPORT OF 5 NOVEMBER 1982, FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION IS A LONGSTANDING AND GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. THE SOVIET FORCED LABOR

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 0922 DTG: 112126Z FEB 83 PSN: 043325

SYSTEM, THE LARGEST IN THE WORLD, COMPRISES A NETWORK OF SOME 1100 FORCED LABOR CAMPS, WHICH COVER MOST AREAS OF THE USSR. THE SYSTEM INCLUDES AN ESTIMATED FOUR MILLION FORCED LABORERS, OF WHOM AT LEAST 10,000 ARE CONSIDERED TO BE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PRISONERS.

IN MAINTAINING ITS EXTENSIVE FORCED LABOR SYSTEM TO SERVE BOTH THE POLITICAL AND THE ECONOMIC PURPOSES OF THE STATE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION--AS

DISCUSSED IN THE PAPER ENTITLED "LEGAL ISSUES RELATING

TO FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION" (TAB 2)--IS CONTRAVENING THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND FAILING TO FULFILL ITS SOLEMN UNDERTAKINGS IN THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION OF 1926.

SINCE OUR INTERIM REPORT ON THIS ISSUE WAS RELEASED IN NOVEMBER, 1982, WE HAVE CONTINUED OUR EFFORTS TO GATHER INFORMATION AND HAVE PREPARED SEVERAL STUDIES ON PARTICULAR FACETS OF THE ISSUE. WE HAVE EXAMINED, FOR EXAMPLE, CURRENT SOVIET FORCED LABOR LAW AND PRACTICES AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE REVIEWED THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE AND PREPARED AN UPDATE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE SOVIET FORCED LABOR ISSUE. FINALLY, WE HAVE EXAMINED SOVIET EFFORTS TO RECRUIT VOLUNTARY WORKERS TO SIBERIA AND EXPLORED THE STATUS OF THE GROWING NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WORKERS IN THE USSR. PAPERS ON THESE ISSUES ARE INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT REPORT.

WE ALSO HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE EFFORTS OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS TO DEVELOP FURTHER INFORMATION. THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BASED IN FRANKFURT, GERMANY HELD HEARINGS ON THIS ISSUE IN BONN ON NOVEMBER 18-19, 1982. OUR SUMMARY OF THOSE HEARINGS IS INCLUDED IN THIS SUBMISSION. THE SOCIETY INTENDS TO RELEASE THE FULL TESTIMONY, TRANSCRIPTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS EARLY THIS YEAR. WE WILL ENSURE THAT THIS DOCUMENTATION IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE CONGRESS.

WE HAVE EXAMINED FURTHER THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES' USE OF BROADLY WORDED LEGISLATION AGAINST "ANTI-SOVIET AGITATION," "HOOLIGANISM" AND "PARASITISM" INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE, PUNISH AND EXPLOIT POLITICAL DISSIDENTS AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVISTS. AS WE STATED IN OUR EARLIER REPORT, FOR NEARLY 30 YEARS THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) HAS INVESTIGATED ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THESE SOVIET PRACTICES. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES REFUSE TO PROVIDE RESPONSES SATISFACTORY TO THE ILO. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THESE ISSUES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AND THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE USSR. WE REITERATE, THEREFORE, THAT TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES MUST OPEN TO IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION THEIR ENTIRE FORCED LABOR SYSTEM.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT FORCED LABOR HAS BEEN USED ON PIPELINE PROJECTS IN THE PAST AND WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT IT IS BEING USED NOW, AS WELL, IN DOMESTIC PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION. AS NOTED IN OUR NOVEMBER, 1982 SUBMISSION, A NUMBER OF REPORTS SUGGEST THAT FORCED LABOR WAS USED IN THE DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS SITE PREPARATION AND OTHER PRELIMINARY WORK RELATED TO THE EXPORT PIPELINE. THE MEDIA DIRECTED PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER, ILLUMINATING THE SOVIET UNION'S CURRENT

FORCED LABOR PRACTICES. THE PUBLICITY, WE BELIEVE, HAS MADE SOVIET AUTHORITIES SENSITIVE TO THE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS THAT WOULD ATTEND FUTURE EXPLOITATION OF FORCED LABOR ON THE EXPORT PIPELINE PROJECT.

IN EARLY DECEMBER, 1982 THE USSR OFFERED, AND A DELEGATION OF WESTERN TRADE UNIONISTS ACCEPTED, AN INVITATION TO OBSERVE ONGOING CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPORT PIPELINE. WHILE PRAISING THE VISIT, THE OFFICIAL SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS REVEALED ON 10 DECEMBER, 1982 THAT THE DELEGATION INSPECTED ONLY A SINGLE 300 KILOMETER SECTION OF THE 4000 KILOMETER LINE; THE INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED LARGELY BY HELICOPTER. ONE DELEGATE--FROM A UNION ORDINARILY SYMPATHETIC TO SOVIET INTERESTS--LATER CHARACTERIZED THE VISIT AS A TYPICAL GUIDED SHOW TOUR OF THE USSR, AND DESCRIBED THE PIPELINE INSPECTION ITSELF AS UNSATISFACTORY.

THE ILO HAS ACCEPTED "IN PRINCIPLE" AN INVITATION FROM THE OFFICIAL SOVIET TRADE UNION APPARATUS TO SEND AN ON-SITE MISSION TO EXAMINE CHARGES OF FORCED LABOR ON THE EXPORT PIPELINE. THE ILO HAS RECEIVED NO FORMAL INVITATION FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ITSELF, WHICH BEARS OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOVIET INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. WHETHER SUCH AN INVITATION COMES FORMALLY FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OR FROM ITS OFFICIAL TRADE UNION APPARATUS, THERE IS CONTINUING CONCERN THAT WITHOUT ASSURANCES FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THAT IT COULD CONDUCT A FULL INQUIRY INTO THE SOVIET FORCED LABOR SYSTEM, SUCH A MISSION WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO SECURE FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE FACTS.

THE SITUATION OF THE GROWING NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WORKERS IN THE USSR, UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH MAY VIOLATE AGREED INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, CONTINUES TO BE OF CONCERN. IT APPEARS THAT MANY OF THE WORKERS ENTER THE VIETNAM/USSR LABOR PROGRAM IN ORDER TO ESCAPE THE POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT OF PRESENT-DAY VIETNAM. AT

THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT WORKING

CONDITIONS IN THE USSR ARE HARSH AND THAT NET WAGES OF THE VIETNAMESE WORKERS ARE LOWER THAN THOSE PAID SOVIETS DOING COMPARABLE WORK. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE VIETNAMESE WORKERS' PAY IS SEQUESTERED TO OFFSET THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL DEBTS TO THE USSR. ALSO THE WORKERS' COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR FAMILIES PROBABLY IS MONITORED AND CONSTRAINED. FURTHER IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER VIETNAMESE CONTRACT WORKERS, WHO MUST MAKE A COMMITMENT FOR UP TO SEVEN YEARS, MAY QUIT THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND RETURN HOME FREELY.

WE HAVE OBTAINED NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT VIETNAMESE CONTRACT WORKERS ARE EMPLOYED ON THE EXPORT GAS PIPELINE PROJECT. THE SECRECY WITH WHICH BOTH THE VIETNAMESE AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS HAVE SURROUNDED THIS LABOR PROGRAM HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO MONITOR. CONSIDERING ITS INHERENT POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES INVOLVED, WE WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THIS PROGRAM CLOSELY AND TO ENCOURAGE GREATER INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY.

WE HAVE INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT TWO DETAILED GRAPHIC REPRESENTATIONS OF FORCED LABOR INSTALLATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. ONE DEPICTS THE SITE OF A GAS PIPELINE COMPRESSOR STATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION, THE OTHER A MANUFACTURING SITE WHICH INCORPORATES THE GROUNDS AND BUILDING OF A FORMER CHURCH. THESE MATERIALS DERIVE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE #3 OF #3 SECSTATE WASHDC #922 DTG: 112126Z FEB 83 PSN: #43325

FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE CONGRESS FURTHER INTELLIGENCE REGARDING THE USE OF FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR. THIS WILL BE DONE THROUGH THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES ON INTELLIGENCE.

THE LAST MAJOR UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL SURVEY ON FORCED LABOR APPEARED IN 1953. THAT REPORT OF THE UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FORCED LABOR, WHICH FOCUSED ON THE EXPLOITATION OF FORCED LABOR FOR POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC PURPOSES, IS DISCUSSED IN THE LEGAL ISSUES PAPER AT TAB

2. SINCE THE EXPLOITATION OF FORCED LABOR REMAINS AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUE AND INFRINGES FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS IT APPROPRIATE THAT IN 1983--THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT--THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AGAIN REVIEW THIS ISSUE AND REDEDICATE ITSELF TO ELIMINATING SUCH PRACTICES.

YOURS VERY TRULY,

LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

END OF TEXT. SHULTZ
BT


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

SOV. FORCED LABOR
10803
INCOMING
TELEGRAM


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UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE, FORCED TO SLEEP UNDER LOCK AND KEY.) SHAFTS AT THE SITE HAVE BEEN EXCAVATED 18 METERS DEEP WITH THE USE ORCON PROPIN WMINTEL OF EXPLOSIVES. ALL MINERAL PROCESSING AND PELLETIZING IS DONE ON SITE. A NUMBER OF EXCAVATIONS AT THE SITE ARE ACTIVELY PROGRESSING AND BLAEV INDICATED THAT FUNDING IS NOT A PROBLEM DUE TO THE COMPLEX'S HIGH PRIORITY.

3. BY WORKING AT THE LOCATION, SOVIET CONVICTS ARE ABLE TO REDUCE THE LENGTH OF THE SENTENCES AS MUCH AS 50 PERCENT. THE CONVICTS SPEND THE ENTIRE WORK DAY UNDERGROUND AND ARE TRANSPORTED OUT OF THE MINES BY TRAM CARS EVERY EVENING AT 4:30 P.M. WITH LITTLE FANFAIR. [REDACTED] COMMENT: DURING ONE EVENING THE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONNEL FROM THE MINES WAS OBSERVED BY FOREIGN VISITORS MUCH TO THE CHAGRIN OF THE SOVIET GUARDS CHARGED WITH PREVENTING SUCH OBSERVATIONS.) ALL OF THE PERSONNEL ARE KEPT UNDER CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE AND GUARD BY THE SOVIETS. ACCORDING TO THE [REDACTED] ENGINEER ALL OF THE PERSONNEL ARE CONVICTED SOVIET FELONS AND THERE ARE PROBABLY NO POLITICAL PRISONERS AT THE LOCATION. DUE TO THE REMOTE LOCATION OF THE COMPLEX, FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE OFTEN IN SHORT SUPPLY. [REDACTED] COMMENT: GIVEN THE HARSH WORKING CONDITIONS AND REGULAR SHORTAGES OF NECESSITIES, THE MORTALITY RATE OF THE FORCED LABOR AT ORCON PROPIN WMINTEL TYRNYAUZ IS PROBABLY VERY HIGH.)

4. WHILE FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES MAY BE IN SHORT SUPPLY AT TYRNYAUZ, HEAVY MACHINERY EQUIPMENT IS NOT. IN ADDITION TO A 1100 HORSEPOWER U.S. MANUFACTURED RUBBER TIRE LOADER, THE SOVIETS EMPLOY THE SITE SIX KOMATSU MINING TRUCKS EACH WITH 120 TON CAPACITY, 20 SOVIET BUILT TRUCKS EACH WITH 50 TON CAPACITY AND AT LEAST 35 SOVIET MANUFACTURED MINING SHOVELS EACH WITH LIFTING CAPACITIES OF BETWEEN FOUR AND EIGHT CUBIC METERS.)



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ORCON PROPIN WMINTEL
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJ: FORCED CONVICT LABOR
DOI: LATE FEBRUARY 1983
REF: [REDACTED]
SOURCE: [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. IN LATE FEBRUARY 1983, AN [REDACTED] MECHANICAL ENGINEER WHO IS A [REDACTED] SOVIET CITIZEN ASSIGNED TO WORK AT THE TYRNYAUZ ORCON PROPIN WMINTEL MINING COMPLEX IN THE KAGBARDIND-BALKARSKAYA ASSR, SAID THAT FORCED CONVICT LABOR IS UTILIZED AT THE SITE. ACCORDING TO THE ENGINEER, THERE ARE BETWEEN 3,000 AND 4,000 CONVICTED SOVIET FELONS CURRENTLY WORKING AT THE MINES THERE. THE COMPLEX IS LOCATED IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS NEAR MT. ELBRUS. IT IS A 2-1/2 HOUR AUTOMOBILE DRIVE FROM THE NEAREST AIRPORT WHICH IS LOCATED AT MINERALVODY. [REDACTED]

2. ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE COMPLEX K.T.H. (BLAEV), THE SOVIETS MINE PRIMARILY MOLYBDENUM AT TYRNYAUZ. NEITHER BLAEV OR HIS CHIEF ENGINEER GEORGE (DANILENKO) WOULD DISCUSS MINERALS OTHER THAN MOLYBDENUM MINED AT THE COMPLEX OR DISCLOSE LEVELS OF PRODUCTION AT TYRNYAUZ. BOTH MEN AVOIDED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORK FORCE AT THE COMPLEX. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE IS STRONG INDICATION THAT URANIUM IS MINED AT TYRNYAUZ, SPECIFICALLY ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE COMPLEX. NO FOREIGN ACCESS WAS PERMITTED TO THIS AREA. ALSO, ALL FOREIGN VISITORS TO TYRNYAUZ WERE

FOIA(b)(1), (b)(3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR EOL-114/9 #10803

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

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1927

10796

FORCED
LABOR 14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 22, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NAB*

SUBJECT: Soviet Slave Labor and West German Bailouts
of East Germany

I draw your attention to the attached cables.

The first (Tab I) provides hard intelligence of the use of prisoners to build pipelines in the Soviet Union. The second (Tab II) is another chapter in the years-long saga of the West German use of their taxpayers' funds to continuously bail out the bankrupt East German regime, whatever government is in power in Bonn. It is high time a stop was put to this practice, or if it continues, the German people should be notified of it.

Attachments

Tab I CIA Cable re Use of Prisoners
Tab II CIA Cable re East/West Germany

cc: Don Fortier
Dennis Blair
John Lenczowski
Paula Dobriansky

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FDG-114/9 #10796

BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12

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RI
SIBERIAN PIPELINE

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND (AP) -- A SOVIET OFFICIAL SAID TUESDAY THAT THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE WAS VIRTUALLY FINISHED AND IT WAS NOW TOO LATE TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS THAT FORCED LABOR WAS USED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION.

VASSILI PROKHOROV, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET TRADE UNION COUNCIL, BLAMED THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION FOR NOT INVESTIGATING THE CLAIMS EARLIER.

"THE ILO ADMINISTRATION HAS FAILED TO USE ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET TRADE UNIONS TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE TRUE FACTS," HE SAID.

FOR NINE MONTHS, SAID PROKHOROV, HE HAD WAITED FOR THE ILO TO REPLY TO AN INVITATION TO INSPECT THE PIPELINE BUT THE "GENTLEMEN FROM THE ILO GO ON INVENTING VARIOUS PRECONDITIONS."

"NOW THERE IS ALMOST NOTHING LEFT TO SEE AS ONLY 50 OF THE 4,451 KILOMETERS OF PIPES HAVE STILL TO BE LAID," HE SAID. A KILOMETER IS ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF A MILE.

LAST WEEK THE ILO SAID THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD REFUSED TO LET ILO INVESTIGATORS TALK FREELY TO PIPELINE WORKERS, AND THAT AS A RESULT NO ON-SITE PROBE TOOK PLACE. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS -- DENIED BY MOSCOW -- THAT THE SOVIET USED FORCED LABOR ON THE PROJECT, WHICH WILL SUPPLY GAS TO WESTERN EUROPE.

PROKHOROV SAID AS MANY AS 40,000 PEOPLE HAD WORKED ON THE PIPELINE AND THAT GIVEN THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BEING EMPLOYED ONLY HIGHLY QUALIFIED WORKERS WERE USED.

AP-WX-06-07-83 1600EDT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 24, 1983

Memo For Paula Dobriansky

Here's the introduction for the
President's signature.

I hope that SECDEF will sign
the transmittal memo to Judge Clark
and send it out by June 28 or 29.

Thanks for riding herd on this
item.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be a stylized 'L' or 'J' followed by a flourish.

INTRODUCTION TO POLICY REVIEW'S EXCERPT FROM THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FEBRUARY 1983 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR

Among the grimmest--and most representative--institutions of the Soviet Union is that country's forced labor system. It is unlike anything existing in the free world or indeed anywhere else in the world.

The over-one-thousand forced labor camps in the Soviet Union command our attention and warrant our condemnation not simply for their harsh and often inhumane conditions. History will fix upon that network of labor camps less as an example of official brutality (such examples abound) than as a symbol of the singular cynicism and bald coerciveness of the Soviet system generally. For in the Soviet Union, forced labor serves not only a penal function, but also enormously important political and economic functions.

Soviet authorities use their forced labor apparatus to punish individuals for holding or expressing political or religious views that the authorities disapprove. The "crimes" for which such individuals receive sentences at forced labor are acts that do not qualify as crimes in nations that respect basic human rights. In this regard, the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor observed, in its 1953 report: "A system of forced labour as a means of political coercion . . . is by its very nature and attributes, a violation of the fundamental rights of the human person . . . "

Even less widely understood is the importance of forced labor to the Soviet economy. In many of the Soviet Union's grandest development projects--from the Moscow subway and the Volga-Don canal to the Baikal-Amur rail line and the USSR's vast web of natural gas pipelines--forced labor has played a critical role. One need hardly belabor so pathetic and patent an irony--that the Workers' Paradise has since its earliest days relied for a not insubstantial portion of its Gross National Product on the toil of forced laborers.

23

A debt is owed to Senator William L. Armstrong of Colorado and to the U.S. Congress generally for highlighting Soviet forced labor law and practices through a congressional resolution that directed the State Department to prepare a written report thereon.

Policy Review, one of America's most incisive journals of ideas, has decided to reprint a major section of that report. Though it is not the usual practice of Policy Review to carry previously-published documents, the exception the editors are making in this case reflects the importance of the subject matter.

The Soviet Union's abuse of forced labor should interest academics and policymakers, human rights activists and international law scholars, political theorists and economists. For the sake of those political and religious dissidents victimized by that abuse, and for the sake of our own better comprehension of the nature of Soviet totalitarianism, I commend to Policy Review's readers the following report.

Ronald Reagan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USSR - Forced Labor

S 24

7831

10797

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT: Letters from Senators Regarding Action by Customs to Ban Certain Soviet Goods for Import

Senators Boschwitz and Nickles have written you separately (Tab II) urging that U.S. Customs Service ban the import from the Soviet Union of certain commodities, on grounds that they are produced by forced labor. The importation of articles produced by forced labor is prohibited by Title 19, Section 1307 of the U.S. Code.

Customs Commissioner von Raab has in fact recommended that such a ban be imposed on a rather extensive list of commodities, and an interagency meeting was held last month to consider the question. The meeting indicated sharp differences of opinion among the various agencies represented, and within Treasury itself. In particular, the evidence available to support a finding that the imports in question were in fact produced by forced labor seems thin. In most cases, the Agency could only state that there was evidence on file that some commodities in that category had, at some recent time, been produced at forced labor camps. There was concern that, in any legal test of the ruling, the evidence on hand would be insufficient to sustain it in court. State took the position that the ruling should also be considered from the point of view of its political impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, and Commerce requested the opportunity to check on what volume of U.S. imports would be affected, pointing out that if the volume is large and the evidence slim, the Soviets could retaliate by suspending the Long-Term Grain Agreement, which would have a major political impact in the United States.

In short, all agencies, including Treasury, asked for a thorough review, and one was ordered. I have not been notified whether it has yet been completed. Although I attended the interagency meeting at Treasury, the issue has not been formally sent to the NSC for review.

I believe that the best way to answer the Senators' letters is to inform them that the matter is still under interagency consideration, with particular attention being directed to the sufficiency of evidence available to sustain the ruling they request.

Chris Lehman and Doug McMinn concur.

unavailable

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NLRR 506-114/9 #10797

RECOMMENDATION:

BY KML NARA DATE 11/28/81

That you sign the letters at Tab I to Senators Boschwitz and Nickles.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Attachments:

- Tab I Letters to Senators Boschwitz and Nickles
- Tab II Letters from Senators Boschwitz and Nickles

26

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Boschwitz:

Thank you for your letter of October 28, 1983, regarding the Reader's Digest article on the importation of products which might have been produced by slave labor in the Soviet Union.

We take this matter extremely seriously. Although the question has not yet been referred to the NSC for review, I understand that it is being examined on an interagency basis. One of the questions which has arisen is whether the evidence of the use of forced labor to produce specific products is adequate to withstand a possible challenge in court by U.S. importers.

I can assure you that the question will be given the most careful examination.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Rudy Boschwitz
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Nickles:

Thank you for your letter of October 27 regarding the proposal by the Customs Service to ban imports of certain products from the USSR on grounds that they may be produced by forced labor.

We take this matter extremely seriously. Although the question has not yet been referred to the NSC for review, I understand that it is being examined on an interagency basis. One of the questions which has arisen is whether the evidence of the use of forced labor to produce specific products is adequate to withstand a possible challenge in court by U.S. importers.

I can assure you that the question will be given the most careful examination.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Don Nickles
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

CHARLES H PERCY ILL CHAIRMAN

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CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

SCOTT COHEN, STAFF DIRECTOR
GERYLD B CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

October 28, 1983

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

An article in the September 1983 Reader's Digest included the information that the United States in 1982 imported from the Soviet Union \$118 million worth of chemicals, \$10 million worth of uranium, \$4.2 million worth of gold, \$3.5 million worth of wood and wood products, and other products. Much or all of these goods were produced by indentured or slave labor in Soviet camps and prisons. Since the importation of goods made by forced labor is specifically prohibited under Title 19, Section 1307 of the U.S. Customs Code, we urge you to take the necessary steps to ensure that importation of goods made by forced labor is halted.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,


Rudy Boschwitz

RB:tcn

DON NICKLES
OKLAHOMA

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

29
7831
COMMITTEE:
ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES
LABOR AND HUMAN
RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

RECEIVED
83 OCT 31 P 1:24

October 27, 1983

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

My understanding is that new regulations dealing with the importation of forced-labor products which have been proposed by the Customs Service have been referred to your office for review. This issue is of concern to me and I am supportive of Commissioner von Raab's action.

To assist in your review I have enclosed a copy of a letter I sent to the Commissioner last month. I urge your favorable action in assisting the Customs Service's enforcement of the current law.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this issue.

Sincerely,


DON NICKLES
U.S. Senator

DN/ssr
Enclosure

12/28/83

3. USSR: THE FORCED-LABOR SYSTEM

Pravda has again criticized the Department's February 1983 report on Soviet forced labor, as well as the November 17 Congressional resolution condemning Soviet forced-labor practices. Pravda described as "incredible" the estimates on the scale of the forced-labor system. It also reflected sensitivity to pressures within the Administration to prohibit the import of goods allegedly produced by forced labor.

* * *

About four million convicts perform forced labor in the USSR, about two million in labor camps and another two million as unconfined laborers. Most of these convicts are ordinary criminals. The number of political and religious prisoners involved is not known with any certainty. We cannot extrapolate from known data on about 850 cases because many political and religious cases are prosecuted on charges involving ordinary crimes and so are "lost" in the general penal population. Several studies agree on about 10,000 as a plausible estimate, although others range higher.

Soviet law specifies corrective labor as an essential element of punishment and as preventing prisoners from being a burden on society. Most corrective labor is performed in small facilities manufacturing items such as furniture and other wood products, simple electronic components, polished glass and clothing. Some confined inmates are also used on nearby construction projects and work such as logging. The Soviet economy has come to rely on this huge cheap and flexible labor force that is subject to discipline. The role of the law-enforcement agencies and the courts in supplying the labor force has tended to degrade the criminal justice system by encouraging findings of guilt. Authorities use the camps to meet local manpower needs by quickly giving eligible convicts the status of unconfined forced laborers and assigning them to construction projects in remote areas for which free labor is difficult to recruit.

Prisoners convicted under the political and religious articles of the criminal code are subjected to especially harsh treatment; in effect, they are singled out as a special category of the penal population. As "especially dangerous state criminals," they do not qualify for amnesty or parole; nor do they receive leniency or early release since they usually refuse to show the required evidence of remorse or rehabilitation by admitting guilt and renouncing their beliefs.

The number of camp inmates currently does not approach the Gulag population of Stalin's time, nor are the conditions in the camps so brutal. The present system, nonetheless, contradicts the regime's depiction of the Soviet state as the most progressive, enlightened, and humane in the world--hence, Moscow's sensitivity to US exploitation of the issue.

HICE FORCED LABOR 31

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS

10802

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CITE

(U) VIETNAMESE GUEST WORKERS IN THE USSR
AND EASTERN EUROPE^{1/}

Summary

(C) The Vietnamese Government since 1981 has been sending its citizens to work on a variety of projects in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The workers have gone abroad under unpublished intergovernmental agreements, separate from longstanding training and study programs. There is no convincing evidence to support the claims that as many as 500,000 have been or will be sent; the best estimate appears to be at least 55,000 in place and 100,000 projected through 1985.

(C) The Vietnamese work for fixed periods--labor contracts are said to cover periods as long as seven years--and a substantial portion of their wages are withheld to be credited against Hanoi's mounting deficits in these countries. Technical terms of employment evidently are spelled out beforehand when the worker signs a contract with the Vietnamese Government, but precise working and living conditions probably are not detailed.

(S/NF) All evidence seems to indicate that the program is voluntary and highly sought after by Vietnamese youth, especially those from northern Vietnam. Youths throughout the country apparently hope to improve their lives of poverty and unemployment. Reports indicate that Vietnamese authorities are selective in choosing whom they send; they exclude "reactionary" elements, such as those who were associated with the US or the former Republic of Vietnam.

^{1/} (U) This report updates INR Reports 413-AR, "Vietnam: Labor 'Export' to the USSR and Eastern Europe," LIMITED OFFICIAL USE, June 17, 1982, and 345-AR, "Vietnamese 'Export' of Labor to the USSR and Eastern Europe," SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT, March 25, 1982.

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Report 773-AR
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(S/NF/NC) After arrival at their new job sites, some Vietnamese have been disillusioned by Soviet labor conditions. Complaints have been reported about cold weather, hard work, surveillance, and less-than-expected availability of goods, compounded by the largely segregated existence imposed on foreign laborers.

(S/NF/NC) There is some evidence that Laos also has sent a few workers to Eastern Europe under similar circumstances, indicating that Vietnam's guest worker program is not unique in Indochina.

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New "Labor Cooperation" Program

(C) Although the Vietnamese guest worker program probably began earlier on an experimental basis, the first agreement was signed with the USSR on April 2, 1981, followed by a protocol that November presumably for 1982. A protocol covering 1984 was signed December 26, 1983. An accord with Vietnam was signed by Czechoslovakia in September 1981--although Prague probably also had received earlier contingents--followed by Bulgaria in November and East Germany in January 1982. Additional protocols were signed with Czechoslovakia in early November 1982 and Bulgaria in January 1983.

(C) Vietnam's main objectives apparently are to train some of its many unemployed youths and to use some of their earnings to repay its debts to other communist countries. Other motivations may be to bring in foreign exchange and to lessen the impact of food shortages in Vietnam by having fewer people dependent on the consumer market. The number of workers abroad has not been published officially, although estimates of the number to be sent through 1985 range from 100,000 (according to a Vietnamese Embassy spokesman in Bangkok in November 1981 and a pro-Hanoi publication in Paris in December 1981) to 500,000 (according to an East European source cited in the September 1981 London Economist).

(S) The Vietnamese vice director of the Department of International Cooperation on Labor in the Vietnamese Labor Ministry, Tran Huu Dinh, reportedly stated in March 1983 that the labor exchange program had been initiated after the war ended in 1975 in order to provide Vietnamese workers job training that would teach them basic skills and to assist socialist countries with labor shortages. Workers were to go through an initial training program keyed to the host country and to the anticipated job. Dinh said that about 50,000 workers would pass through the program by April 1983 and that another 50,000 would participate before it was completed in 1985. An internal Vietnamese report states that the purpose of the training and work is:

"...to assimilate Soviet successes in advanced technology and science, to become 'new socialist persons,' and to have social class consciousness, love of socialism, and love of the fatherland, so that when the cadre and workers return to Vietnam they can contribute all their strength and ability to building socialism and defending the fatherland."

(C) Types of Work

The labor cooperation agreements presumably also cover types of employment and training, as well as how wages are to be allocated and perhaps even the location of work. The communist press claims that the Vietnamese are working in a variety of jobs that require some skill. This may reflect Vietnam's concern that some workers gain experience that will be useful later at home. Types of jobs cited include metal cutting, weaving, clothes making, dyeing, shoe making, and timber processing. Some Vietnamese work in building materials factories; others have jobs as welders, reinforcement and concrete workers, carpenters, stonemasons, machine operators, bulldozer operators, assembly workers, drivers, vehicle mechanics, crane operators, etc.

Distribution of Workers

(C) Soviet Union. Before any formal guest worker program existed, Vietnamese students participated in academic and vocational-technical training programs in the USSR which may have involved substantial on-the-job training. According to the November 16, 1982, issue of the Soviet journal Information Documents, the Soviet Union over the preceding decade had conducted training in Vietnam and the USSR for 106,000 Vietnamese cadre in construction trades. In 1982, 4,500 Vietnamese students reportedly were studying in 150 Soviet higher education establishments.

(C) An experimental version of the program apparently began in 1979 or 1980 and was formalized in an April 1981 Soviet-Vietnamese accord on "labor cooperation." Although the text remains unpublished, descriptions of it by official Soviet and Vietnamese spokesmen a year later suggest that it covers wages and social benefits (allegedly comparable to those for Soviet citizens), living conditions, vacations, and length of service.

(C) A treaty signed in December 1981, but published when it went into effect in September 1982, defined the legal rights of Vietnamese in the USSR as well as those of Soviet citizens in Vietnam. Protocols to the agreement were later signed to cover 1982, 1983, and 1984. A citizen of each country resident in the other is entitled to the same legal safeguards as a citizen of the country of employment, and the country in which a crime is committed has the sole right to try the offender.

(S/NF/NC) Moscow and Hanoi have admitted publicly that 11,000 Vietnamese guest workers were in the USSR in late 1982, and Moscow radio reported that 7,000 more were expected in 1983. In early October 1983, the Vietnamese Labor Minister, in Moscow to negotiate a new protocol for 1984, said that 16,000 Vietnamese

workers currently were in the USSR. The latest information, a late-1983 internal report from the Vietnamese Committee on Labor Management in the Soviet Union, states that nearly 20,000 Vietnamese cadre and workers received permission from the government to go to the Soviet Union to train and work for a period of 4-6 years.

(S/NF/NC) The USSR follows an established pattern in its dealings with Vietnamese guest workers.^{2/} Questions of selection and compensation of workers and labor codes are decided beforehand in agreements between the USSR and the country supplying the labor. The home country is then responsible for hiring the individuals or groups of workers. The length of stay in the USSR, according to East Europeans who have worked there, is specified in contracts signed beforehand. An important exception is that the USSR seems to be paying the Vietnamese less, and Hanoi is appropriating more of the workers' pay, than is common with other foreign workers in the USSR.

(S/NF/NC) Most contracts for Vietnamese workers in the USSR are for 5-6 years after a period of language and technical training, depending on the job. A mid-term "home leave" in Vietnam, partially at Soviet expense, is said to be part of the agreement. The April 1981 accord apparently provided that the Soviets arrange suitable housing, eating, and social facilities. As implied in communist propaganda and reported in letters from Vietnamese workers in the USSR, the Vietnamese generally live apart in dormitories or compounds and lead a segregated life, as do other foreign workers (and Soviets in Vietnam). Although official Soviet trade unions and youth organizations are said to be involved with the workers, it seems likely that primary off-the-job supervision comes from the Vietnamese cadre who accompany the contingents. This again follows the pattern of other guest workers in the Soviet Union.

(C) Most groups appear to be sent to European Russia or to the southern tier of Siberia which, to a Vietnamese, still would seem exceedingly cold in the winter. Adjustment to winter conditions appears to be a problem. The Soviets issue winter clothing which some workers find inadequate.

(C) Among the work sites mentioned by Soviet and Vietnamese media are textile, chemical, and machine-tool factories, coal

^{2/} (S/NF/NC) The Soviet practice of utilizing foreign guest workers has extended far beyond the use of Vietnamese laborers and currently includes tens of thousands of East Europeans and thousands of North Koreans. Bulgaria currently has an estimated 50,000 guest workers employed within the USSR.

mines, and land reclamation and transportation projects; the latter two undoubtedly require large amounts of unskilled labor. A letter from one worker, which appears authentic, tells of his "hard work" on the BAM (Baykal-Amur) Railroad paralleling the Trans-Siberian line. A contingent of Vietnamese was observed working near a railroad in the Soviet Far East, and another subsequently was seen by Western travelers in Khabarovsk--an area which has not been mentioned in communist media.

(C) Such letters complaining about the cold, working conditions, low allowances, and surveillance by Vietnamese overseers reportedly have reached Vietnam as well as the West. A number of refugees report that letters have been received by families in Vietnam, suggesting that correspondence is permitted. It may be subjected to censorship, however, by Vietnamese cadre in charge at the work sites. To avoid this, some Vietnamese purportedly have found ways to smuggle letters out.

(C) Despite some worker discontent, there is no evidence that either the Vietnamese or Soviet Government has been dissatisfied with the arrangement so far, and it is highly probable that it will continue in some form. A recent agreement on increased cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam in economic planning and development, revealed last November on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of their treaty of friendship and cooperation, points in that direction. In addition, a recent article in the USSR's journal Problems of the Far East on "The Participation of Soviet Far Eastern Areas in the USSR's Trade and Economic Cooperation With Vietnam" suggested that labor cooperation could expand in the future and noted the role that Vietnam could play in the economy of the Soviet Far East.

(S/NF/NC) Czechoslovakia. A Czechoslovak diplomat stated in February 1983 that the Czechoslovak-Vietnamese labor agreement had been signed in September 1981 for the period 1981-85 and that 20,000 Vietnamese workers were to be in Czechoslovakia under its "mutually advantageous" provisions by April 1983. The Czechoslovak news agency, however, stated that 30,000 workers "and apprentices" were in the country as of February 1983, a 4,000 increase over another Czechoslovak press report from December 1982. Inexplicably, in March 1983 the newspaper Rude Pravo lowered the figures to 21,000 workers and 3,000 apprentices.

(S/NF/NC) The Czechoslovak diplomat claimed that there were more Vietnamese workers in his country than in the Soviet Union. He further indicated that the total number of workers was at a high point and that it would be declining, especially as the need for them declined. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs stated that 44,000 foreign workers--including

26,000 Vietnamese, 13,000 Poles, 5,000 Cubans, 400 Bulgarians, 300 Mongolians, and 100 Laotians--were in Czechoslovakia as of early October 1983, according to a report from the Belgrade Politika.

(S/NF/NC) Although the Czechoslovak Government signed additional protocols in early November 1982 to cover 1983, another Czechoslovak diplomat said that his country had had some bad experiences with workers from southern Vietnam who were not as energetic as workers from the north and were more interested in black marketing. He also referred to growing "tensions," highlighted by the Czechoslovak press, owing to the number of Vietnamese in the country. Embassy Prague has indicated that, because of racial/cultural conflicts at unidentified factories in Czechoslovakia, a freeze on the number of Vietnamese had been imposed. Another source also indicated that Vietnamese workers in Czechoslovakia, unlike other alien workers, were required to get written permission from their Czechoslovak employers to visit other East Bloc countries.

(S/NF/NC) Czechoslovak media, in fact, had to take the extreme step of running editorials commenting on the friction and incidents. The Czechoslovak youth paper Mlada Fronta noted a certain intolerance toward the Vietnamese which was illustrated by the spreading of false rumors on "diseases being spread to Czechoslovakia from Asia." It also stated that individual occurrences of crime had been reported despite Vietnamese attempts to affirm the "new socialist morals of their country which does not support human aberrations." The occurrence of these "aberrations" is considered even more surprising by the paper because "it is well known that the Vietnamese are organized as a firm community with chiefs, brigadiers [brigadiri], and political educators."

(S/NF/NC) Although the Czechoslovaks have reported the most problems with their Vietnamese guest workers, the East Germans have indicated that they have similar difficulties. There also have been a few reports of problems between Vietnamese and Bulgarians. East European embassies in Hanoi mention such problems as Vietnamese wishing to marry East European nationals, workers not wanting to return to Vietnam, local mistrust or racist attitudes toward Vietnamese, poor Vietnamese work standards, and language problems.

(S/NF/NC) East Germany. The counselor of the East German Embassy in Hanoi indicated in April 1983 that a labor agreement had been signed between East Germany and Vietnam in January 1982 to cover 1981-85. He stated that East Germany had agreed to train 10,000 Vietnamese workers during this period and that 7,000 workers had been sent to East Germany as of March 1983. A labor shortage in 1980-81 reportedly had resulted from the departure of

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Polish workers from East Germany, and the Vietnamese probably were used partly to fill the gaps created.

(S/NF/NC) The diplomat also noted that most Vietnamese went to East Germany on two-year contracts and received vocational training and salaries equal to those of East German workers. Vietnamese workers, he stated, received 50 percent of their salaries immediately; the other 50 percent was paid to the Vietnamese Embassy in East Berlin. The Embassy reportedly held this amount for the worker, minus an unknown portion which was paid to the Vietnamese Government as a tax. The remainder was returned to the worker upon his departure from East Germany. The recent elimination of one of the two weekly Interflug flights between East Berlin and Hanoi indicates a reduction in the size of the program.

(S/NF/NC) Bulgaria. Bulgarian diplomats in Hanoi reportedly said to Western embassy sources that their country had signed a labor agreement with the Vietnamese for 1981-85. Protocols also reportedly were signed with Bulgaria in January 1983 for that year and in October for 1984. A total of 17,000 workers were to be sent to Bulgaria during 1983-84 with 10,000 slated to work in the construction industry; 8,000 Vietnamese were in Bulgaria as of April 1983 under this agreement. The Bulgarian airline reportedly makes one flight a week transporting workers from Ho Chi Minh City to Sofia.

Vietnamese Selection of Workers

(S/NF/NC) Participants in the program reportedly are recruited by the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, and their backgrounds are checked by the Ministry of Interior. They must be relatively young, age 17-35, although skilled workers may be as old as 45. The term of participation can be as long as seven years, an unusually long period for a labor contract. There have been charges that "reeducation" camp inmates or parolees are among the participants in the program, but most intelligence reports indicate that those with personal backgrounds unacceptable to the authorities are specifically excluded.

(S/NF/NC) In fact, most reports indicate that candidates for the program must meet stringent criteria. Selection priority is given to Vietnamese workers who are members of communist youth groups (a January 1983 article stated that 85 percent of the young workers were Ho Chi Minh Youth League members), have close relatives in the communist party or government, or whose families have made sacrifices for the state. More than two dozen recent legal refugees report that places in the "work-study" program are sought by youths who believe they will be able to remit substantial goods and funds back to Vietnam. Similar opinions have been offered by southern boat refugees recently interviewed.

(S/NF/NC) According to a northern Vietnamese refugee, his brother paid 10,000 dong (more than US\$1,000) in bribes in April 1982 to become a candidate for the program. The same source reported that candidates had to be between ages 18 and 25, in good-to-excellent health, and have no criminal record, reactionary tendencies, or religious affiliation. He also noted that priority was given to veterans and those whose relatives were cadre or had been involved in the revolution.

(S/NF/NC) Reports indicate that the workers have specific preferences for East European countries of destination. A refugee source stated that workers bribed Vietnamese officials with 3,000-5,000 dong to be sent to the Soviet Union, 5,000-7,000 dong for East Germany, as much as 20,000 dong for Czechoslovakia, and higher amounts for Bulgaria. Although other reports have given a slightly different priority ranking, the USSR consistently remains the least desirable. The source indicated that Bulgaria was rated the highest because such capitalist goods as tape recorders, bicycles, and motorcycles could be bought there. The Soviet Union and East Germany got low ratings because of working conditions; one source reported that the East Germans "made the Vietnamese work too hard."

(S) Reports that pressure has been applied in recruitment are countered by the evidence that there is little difficulty in securing volunteers who perceive a chance to leave the poverty of Vietnam. When concern is expressed about the program, it is usually by skeptical southerners--acquainted with "reeducation camps"--who fear a repetition under more frigid conditions.

(C) The Vietnamese journal Youth in September 1982 noted that, although a majority of the laborers "work hard, strive to learn, etc.," a number have displayed such "negative manifestations" as an "uncivilized life style, lacking respect for public order, and violating the statutes of host countries." The article blamed these "negative manifestations" largely on "a lax selection process" and noted that many workers had become "low spirited, desperate and prone to negativism" and that others saw the program as "an opportunity to make a fast buck" which led to "improper actions."

(C) The journal Thanh Nien, in a September 1982 article, stated that:

"A number of men and women living abroad as cooperative laborers have displayed negative manifestations such as an uncivilized lifestyle, observing neither order nor hygiene in eating and living quarters, lacking respect for public order and violating the statutes of host countries, as well as our

own. Worse yet, some were given to unrestrained eating and drinking bouts, often leading to provocations and fist-fights.... Just as a 'worm can spoil a pot of soup,' these activities prompted friendly people to have ill feelings toward us."

(C) These problems were addressed in a January 1983 Thanh Nien article, "Some Ideas About Management of Labor-Cooperation Workers in Fraternal Socialist Countries," by Le Van Nhan, the head of the Overseas Youth Work Committee. Nhan emphasized that "absolutely good selection" and "strict organization of management" were essential to a smooth functioning of the program. A further tightening of already strict control and supervision of guest workers sent abroad was a necessary requirement in order that the "Vietnamese people's honor and fine traditions" be maintained in "friendly countries."

Deductions To Credit Vietnam's Accounts

(C/NF) After a deduction for living expenses and a monthly allowance, at least one-third of the worker's salary is credited against Vietnam's account in the USSR or the East European country involved. Although the monthly allowance is low, there are reports that incentive bonuses are paid directly to the workers. The bonus may justify claims by communist spokesmen that the Vietnamese receive wages comparable to their Soviet counterparts, but the actual salary after deductions probably is less.

(C) Both Moscow and Hanoi have labeled as "slander" the claim that the Vietnamese guest worker is laboring to pay off Vietnam's large-scale indebtedness to the USSR. They have not directly denied the claim, however, or denied that the labor is being credited against Vietnamese imports of Soviet goods which, in 1981 alone, were almost 600 million rubles more than Vietnam's exports to the USSR. Both sides claim that Vietnam's war debt was forgiven by Moscow in 1975, and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach said that other debts were forgiven in 1978. Nonetheless, much of the Soviet aid since the war has been in the form of loans and credits, not grants.

(C/NF) Crediting labor against present or future imports has been standard practice in the case of East European and Finnish guest workers in the USSR, and the Yugoslav newspaper Borba (June 10, 1982) suggested that this was the arrangement for the Vietnamese as well. Furthermore, sources in Hanoi reportedly acknowledged (according to the Far Eastern Economic Review, May 14, 1982) that an unspecified amount was withheld from the Vietnamese workers. Other reports estimate that 30-70 percent of wages are withheld.

(S/NF/NC) Lao Guest Workers

Paralleling the Vietnamese guest worker program is a reported program of Lao guest workers in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, although there have been no reported labor cooperation agreements with the Lao Government. A Czechoslovak Embassy officer in Vientiane described a program under which "several dozen" Lao were working in Czechoslovakia, most in pharmaceutical plants, and were being paid the same as Czechoslovak workers "if they do a good job." He said that they were selected by the Lao Government, usually were unmarried and in their early twenties, and remained in Czechoslovakia for about four years.

The Czechoslovak official said that the program benefited both countries because, as in the case of the Vietnamese workers, Czechoslovakia had a labor shortage and Laos needed training for its labor force. An intelligence report citing a former Lao official stated that, of the estimated 10,000 Lao students studying in socialist countries, approximately 20 percent were actually guest workers in various factories. He noted that 150 Lao laborers under three-year contracts were working in a medicine factory in Prague as of July 1981.

(C) Conclusion

Available evidence on the Vietnamese-Soviet-East European labor agreements is incomplete. Allegations of human rights violations in connection with the program, including the possibility that some of the workers may be indentured in some manner, remain unsubstantiated. The program appears to be voluntary and of benefit to the countries concerned as well as to most of the Vietnamese workers. The Soviets and East Europeans are able to alleviate their labor shortages while the Vietnamese gain needed trade credits, training, and employment for their people and presumably repay some of their foreign debt. As long as the Soviet and East European countries suffer labor shortages and Vietnam has a labor surplus, the program probably will continue in some form for the foreseeable future.

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