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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files

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File Folder: USSR-Olympics 1984 (1) ~~Box 90007~~ 30

Date: 5/30/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. letter	draft letter from the President to Chairman Chernenko (2 pp.) R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #1	n.d.	P1
2. letter	draft letter from the President to Chairman Chernenko (1 p.) R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #2	n.d.	P1
3. letter	duplicate of document #1 (2 pp.) R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #3	n.d.	P1
4. memo (8413012)	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Olympics: draft letter (1 p.) R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 #4	5/2/84	P1
5. letter	draft letter from the President to Chairman Chernenko (2 pp.) R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #5	n.d.	P1
6. memo (9344)	Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Soviet Olympic-Related Requests (3 pp.) P 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #6	1/29/84	P1
7. memo (9344)	Robert McFarlane to the President re Soviet Olympic-Related Requests (3 pp.) P 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 #7	n.d.	P1
8. letter	Captain J.A. Peebles to Jack Matlock re Olympics (2 pp.)	1/27/84	P1
9. paper	Intelligence Operations of the Warsaw pact Civilian Fleets (1 p.) R 7/10/01 F95-074 #9	1/27/84	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

-Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

File

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *[initials]*

SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

We have reviewed and concur, with editorial change on page 2, with the Department of State's draft letter to Mr. Ueberroth for Mr. Deaver's signature.

deb DeGraffenreid and *SRS* Sestanovich concur.

Attachment:

Tab I Draft letter to Mr. Ueberroth

- 7. #4286 - Matlock: Kimmitt cover note forwarded Kimmitt-edited State draft response to Michael Deaver with recommendation that he send in final from here (London).

MATLOCK



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 25, 1984

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

At Michael Deaver's request the Department has prepared a letter for his signature to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, concerning actions taken with respect to the 1984 Summer Games. A suggested draft response is attached for forwarding to Mr. Deaver.

for *Bruckmiller*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
as stated.

UNCLASSIFIED

Mr. Peter Ueberroth
President,
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
Los Angeles, California 90084

Dear Peter,

I would like to bring you up to date on the actions taken by the Federal Government in recent weeks concerning the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics.

As you know, in the latter part of April the Soviet media and Olympic officials spread allegations that the U.S. had "violated" the Olympic Charter and sought to gain political capital out of the Games in Los Angeles. In light of these spurious charges, the State Department instructed our Embassies in Eastern Europe to explain clearly that the U.S. Government welcomes athletes from all countries, that the Olympic Charter would be strictly enforced, and that the U.S. was prepared to take whatever measures would be required to ensure security at the 1984 Games. On May 9, these instructions were reiterated.

On April 27, Ed Derwinski, Counselor of the State Department, met with Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov to give the Soviet Government official and direct assurances of what we were prepared to do for Soviet visitors, along the lines of my letter to you of March 16, 1984. Several of our proposed actions constituted major exceptions to the procedures normally followed for Soviet nationals --procedures which are instituted

by the U.S. Government in reciprocity for Soviet restrictions on Americans in the USSR.

On May 9, the State Department furnished guidance to all its posts overseas to explain our position and enable each of them to respond authoritatively to the Soviet allegations about the Olympics. Similiar briefing materials were sent out by USIA at the same time.

On May 12, the State Department cabled its posts again with additional material refuting the various Soviet charges.

On May 14, the State Department took the unusual step of releasing the "non-paper" Ed Derwinski had given to the Soviet Embassy on April 27, in light of the absurd and wholly inaccurate interpretation given that meeting by Marat Gramov and the Soviet media. The same day, the Department ~~formally~~ *delivered a formal* protested ~~Gramov's remarks~~ *to the Soviet Embassy regarding Gramov's remarks.*

You met with George Shultz and me on May 15 and outlined the stand you would be taking in Lausanne at the forthcoming meeting of the IOC. We offered the assistance of two State Department officials, which you later declined.

On May 23, we relayed to our Embassies LAOOC's request for information from eighteen National Olympic Committees with whom your communications had been faulty. At LAOOC's request, we also sent a second message along these lines to an additional thirteen countries. We also authorized our Ambassadors in four key African countries to encourage attendance of their Olympic teams.

Our objective throughout this period has been to give quiet but firm and effective support to your own efforts to encourage or confirm attendance at the Games prior to the June 2 deadline, without intensifying the politicization of the Games caused by the Soviet boycott.

We are encouraged that no country outside the hard core of Soviet allies has so far chosen to stay away from the Games. Moreover, non-bloc press and official comment reported to us has exhibited no signs of reluctance to have their national athletes attend the Games. The State Department is, of course, sharing these assessments with your staff on a continuing basis.

While there is room to be optimistic, I believe there is more that could be done to "grease the skids" and I would like to offer some suggestions.

The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) will meet in Upper Volta June 14-16 to discuss the Olympics and its agenda for the coming year. Sending an American representative to the meeting to explain the arrangements in Los Angeles and generally spread goodwill could be extremely helpful. While this occurs after the June 2 deadline, it is important to remember that the Africans withdrew from the 1976 Olympics while in Montreal. One excellent candidate for this job would be Mayor Tom Bradley, who is both very knowledgeable and very well-respected in Africa.

The number of press accreditations for African journalists has long been a sensitive issue. We understand Nigeria, for example, has received only three accreditations, Ivory Coast one, and VOA's Africa service none. Given the enormous African interest in the Games and the important role of sports in the national life of these countries, we feel that LAOOC would do itself a large favor by indicating a willingness to grant additional accreditations.

We also anticipate that some African or other heads of State or very senior officials will decide to attend the Games only at the last minute. We hope that the Organizing Committee is prepared for such an eventuality and has the flexibility to accommodate requests for additional tickets, whether by

allocating additional seats to the national committees or by granting more liberal access to Stand G. In this connection, we understand you have granted special tickets to SCSA Secretary-General Lamine Ba. We believe this action will help significantly to promote full African participation.

Lamine Ba also hopes to bring between 100 and 150 African Olympic contenders to Atlanta in July to participate in a pre-Olympic training camp organized by Mayor Andrew Young, with support shared by Mayor Young, the U.S. Information Agency, and Lamine Ba's organization. The training camp has proven extremely popular with African athletes and sports officials. If these numbers (or more) actually show up, there may well be a financial shortfall which the Committee or its corporate sponsors might wish to help cover.

You may also wish to consider a personal appearance on AFNET, a closed circuit satellite television hookup run by the US Information Agency to many African countries. It would be a good means of spreading the word about the Los Angeles Olympics to opinion leaders throughout the continent.

Please continue to let me know if there is any way we can help on these or any other projects to ensure fullest possible participation at the Games. We all continue to have the highest

-6-

respect for the tremendous job you and the Committee are doing on behalf of a successful 1984 Summer Olympics.

Sincerely,

Michael K. Deaver

POSSIBLE Q'S FOR PRESIDENT'S MINI PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1:00 TODAY

Q: U.S.-Soviet relations are now at a deep freeze according to many experts -- worst ever -- why do you think this is the case? Are the Russians just playing politics trying to see that you don't get re-elected?

A: If relations are bad, it's because the Soviets have chosen to worsen them. We are prepared to try to solve problems in a fair and businesslike way. They may think their action will have an effect on our elections, but if so, I think they are wrong.

Q: What do you think the real reasons were for the Russian pull-out from the Olympics?

A: Certainly not the reasons they have given, because we bent over backwards to meet their demands and make it clear they would be welcome. I'm not sure what the real reasons were, but revenge for our boycott in 1980 and the desire to make a political gesture may have been part of it. The Soviets appear to be isolating themselves from the world community. That is their choice and not ours. We are ready for more constructive relations when they are.

Q: Why didn't you do more to get them to reconsider their decision?

A: Well, we had done everything to meet the concerns they expressed before they made the decision, and they made it clear that the decision was final.

Q: What can you do to effect a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations? Do you take any credit at all for this bad state of affairs between the two countries? Haven't you contributed to the rhetoric, etc.?

A: We have a reasonable long-term policy, as I set forth in my speech last January, and we will continue to follow it. Relations can improve as much as the Soviets want it to. And I don't think that speaking frankly about Soviet actions and policies is the problem. The problem is Soviet actions and policies.

Q: Does any of this portend a crisis of some sort with the Soviets? Are we in more danger now than we were before?

A: No. I see no danger of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Our deterrence will preserve peace between us.

Q: What do you know about Chernenko's health?

A: I wouldn't speculate on that.

Q: What's the latest on the Sakharovs?

A: I understand from news reports that Academician Sakharov is on a hunger strike because the Soviet authorities refuse to let his wife travel abroad for medical treatment. I do not understand why the Soviet government has refused to allow Mrs. Bonner to seek medical treatment abroad, and I certainly hope a tragedy can be averted.

File Olympics

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 9, 1984

TO:

JACK MATLOCK
WALT RAYMOND
KARNA SMALL
TY COBB
BOB SIMS
RUSS MACK
KIP HOLLY

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

Attached is complete, up-to-date
guidance from State on the Soviet
withdrawal from the LA Olympics.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

PRESS AND BACKGROUND MATERIALS
REGARDING
SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM 1984 OLYMPICS

NOTE: Pages 4-8 are for
Background Use Only

May 9, 1984
b

PRESS GUIDANCE

**FOR USE ON THE RECORD
BY AUTHORIZED SPOKESMEN**

Q: Do you have any comment on the Soviet announcement that they will not participate in the Olympics in Los Angeles?

A: We have seen the TASS report on this subject, and have confirmed through diplomatic channels that the Soviet Union does not intend to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. We regret that the Soviets have chosen to make a decision for which there is absolutely no justification. It will undoubtedly disappoint hundreds of millions of people around the world. President Reagan had committed the U.S. to live up fully to its obligations under the Olympic Charter as host country. The vague allegations contained in the Soviet Olympic Committee's statement provide no support for charges that the U.S. has not fully met these Olympic obligations.

Q: What about the Soviet charges that we were not living up to our obligations as hosts?

A: They are wholly without foundation. In recent months, we have made exhaustive efforts to meet Soviet concerns about their participation in Los Angeles, and we have met those concerns. The Soviets have not been hindered by the U.S. or hampered from participating freely in the Olympics.

Q: Then how do you explain the Soviet decision?

A: We do not. It is inexplicable to us.

Q: What effect will this have on our approach to the Olympics?

A. None. We remain committed to supporting the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee to the fullest extent possible. Our doors are open and we are eager to greet all athletes from every Olympic nation who want to participate in the Games of the XXIII Olympiad.

Q: What have been the Soviet Complaints?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A: Soviet complaints about USG actions have focused on the following areas:

- Denying a visa to their Olympic Attache.
- Instituting a visa requirement for participants, contrary to the Charter.
- Preventing the travel of Soviet citizens to Olympic sites in closed areas.
- Failure to provide adequate security.
- Encouragement and incitement of anti-Soviet demonstrations and creation of an anti-Soviet atmosphere.
- Reserving the right to search the Soviet cruise ship which was to serve as their headquarters.
- Encouraging defections.

Soviet complaints against LAOOC have focused on the following areas:

- Exorbitant and unprecedented costs.
- More than one Olympic village.
- Transportation problems due to dispersed venues.
- Smog and crime.
- Extreme commercialization of the Games and profiteering.
- Selling the Olympic torch relay.
- Accreditation of RFE and Radio Liberty.

BACKGROUND ONLY
- 5 -

Q: What steps has the USG taken to deal with the Soviet complaints?

A: -- The President personally and publicly assured the IOC that the US would live up to the Olympic Charter. These reassurances have been repeated publicly and privately to the Soviets.

-- Authorized at least 25 Aeroflot charter flights for the Olympics.

-- Assured the Soviets by diplomatic note and privately that, as agreed by the IOC, all Olympic participants could enter the U.S. on the basis of their Olympic identity cards without visas.

-- Authorized a month-long port call for a Soviet cruise ship to serve as their Olympics headquarters. Assured Soviets privately that after initial customs and safety inspection, subsequent searches of ship would be only for cause (e.g., bomb threats) and not for purpose of harassment.

-- Authorized entry of Aeroflot and shipping personnel in advance of games to do preparatory work.

-- Indicated our willingness to receive an Olympic attache with full diplomatic status (but not the individual originally proposed.)

-- Informed them we would be ready to rent vehicles (normally prohibited) to Soviet officials during the Olympics.

-- Told the Soviets publicly and privately that emigre groups opposing Soviet participation, organizing demonstrations or inciting defections have no USG sanction whatsoever.

-- Opened all areas containing Olympic sites, hotels, airports, etc. to Soviet travel from June 1-August 15.

-- Undertook full responsibility for security of the Soviet ship, at a preliminarily estimated cost in excess of \$500,000.

-- Told the Soviets privately that every possible security precaution was being undertaken.

Q: Did you take concrete measures to assure Soviet security and to prevent demonstrations?

A: Security preparations to protect Olympic participants have been underway for a long time and have been extraordinary in their scope. Over 17,000 people will have Olympic security-related duties in Los Angeles. The USG has committed \$50,000,000 to provide federal support for the Olympic security effort.

We have also taken some specific steps to meet Soviet concerns. The USG assumed full responsibility for security for the Soviet ship and had planned to spend in excess of \$500,000 for this purpose. No demonstrations would have been permitted in the vicinity of the pier where the Soviet ship would have berthed.

LAOOC has also been very responsive to Soviet concerns about security issues. During the visit of the Soviet sports committee delegation to Los Angeles in December 1983 they did not express any dissatisfaction with the security arrangements. LAOOC informed the Soviets that there would be no demonstrations in facilities under LAOOC control, including all venues and the Olympic Villages.

Q: Why do you really think the Soviets did not come?

A: -- It is inexplicable to us.

-- We worked hard to meet all the Soviets' legitimate concerns.

-- We went the extra mile on this. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been reluctant to engage either us or the LAOOC in any sort of dialogue.

-- After the April 24 IOC meeting in Lausanne, it became apparent that the Soviets had no further concrete demands.

-- We are at a loss to explain the Soviet decision.

Q: But what could the real reasons be?

A: -- While we, of course, cannot know what the "real reasons" are, the effect is to isolate the Soviets even further from the world community. They are trying to blame us for this, but it is their own choice. The analogy is the walkout from the START and IMF negotiations. It is certainly not our choice, and they will also not succeed in convincing world public opinion that it is.

Q: Have they had problems with defections in past Olympics?

A: -- We are aware of only one near defection by a Soviet athlete in Olympic history.

Q: Have the Soviets had any problems with recent sports groups?

A: No. There have at least seven groups with a total of at least 160 Soviet athletes in the United States since January. All have been well received, and none of the groups was greeted by any hostile demonstrations during its visit.

Q: Will the U.S. Government take any steps to encourage the Soviets to change their mind?

A: -- We would welcome a Soviet decision to come. However, any change in their current position is theirs to make.

Q: Does it mean the President's efforts to improve relations with the Soviets have failed?

A: -- We will continue our efforts to put our relations with the Soviet Union on a more constructive basis for the long-term. We hope they will respond. If they do not, however, it will be because they have chosen the path of self-isolation and trying to raise tensions, presumably for short term reasons of their own.

Q: Are other East Europeans boycotting the games?

A: -- We have seen reports on this but have no firm word on other participants.

Q: What are the prospects of getting the Russians to come back to the negotiating table and discuss arms control? Do you think they are staying away simply to try to affect the election and make certain Ronald Reagan is not re-elected?

A: I believe the Soviets will eventually come back to the negotiating table on nuclear arms reduction because it is in their interest to do so. But I can't predict when they will do this. They may feel that they can affect the U.S. election by their behavior, but, if so, I think they are wrong.

Follow-up: There are reports that the MX is in trouble -- it may not pass -- in fact, Congress may cancel that program. What impact will that have on our negotiations with the Soviets? (What are you doing to save the MX?)

A: The MX program is an integral part of our defense modernization program and follows on the recommendations of the bipartisan Presidential commission headed by Brent Scowcroft. Obviously, if we begin dismantling our defense modernization program that would reduce Soviet incentive to limit their own arms build-up and to negotiate fair, balanced agreements for mutual reductions. Cutting back on programs like the MX without an agreement which preserves the nuclear balance would not only weaken our deterrent, and thus increase the danger of war, but also would make arms reduction much more difficult.

Q: Obviously, in the current climate there is no hope of a U.S.-Soviet Summit...it looks like the Democrats will use foreign policy failures, especially deteriorating relationships with the Soviets, as a campaign issue -- what will be your response?

A: I won't presume to advise the Democrats. But I do think that President Reagan has a fair, flexible and balanced approach to the Soviet Union -- an approach which deserves bipartisan support. In the past, our policies toward the Soviets have suffered from fluctuations and a lack of steadiness. We need to put an end to that. The President is not going to sell the store or expose us to danger just to please the Soviets, and I have to presume that his political opponents don't want to do that either.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Basic Points to Make

-- We have a steady, long-term policy. We are prepared to improve relations whenever the Soviets are ready.

-- The Soviets seem not to be ready at this time, but we'll keep trying.

-- The Soviets may be going through a period of frustration because their assessment in the 70's that the balance of power was shifting in their favor has been proved wrong.

-- We also should not forget that the Soviet Government has gone through three changes of leadership in as many years. They may not be in the best position to make changes in past policies, even when these are failing.

-- Though it is unfortunate that the Soviets are unwilling at the moment to meet us halfway in solving problems, the situation is not dangerous in terms of a U.S.-Soviet military confrontation.

-- Our deterrent ensures that there will not be a nuclear war. But we are interested in better relations and will be patient and prepared to negotiate fairly and realistically whenever the Soviets are ready to do so.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Q: With the Olympics pull-out, arms control walk-out and heightened rhetoric on the part of many who say that U.S.-Soviet relations are at the lowest point ever -- what can you say about the state of our relations with the Soviet Union? And what are you going to do about it?

A. Relations have been pretty bad many times in the past and I'm not prepared to agree that they are at the lowest point ever. We do want them to be improved, but this requires a willingness on the Soviet part to start solving some of the problems which have created tensions. We have made a whole series of suggestions, covering every area of the relationship, and will work toward solving as many of the problems as we can as soon as the Soviets themselves are willing.

Follow-up: Why was U.S. blind-sided by Soviet pull-out? Officials have been quoted as saying we were dumbfounded. Was this a failure of intelligence?


A: I wouldn't say we were "blind sided," since we knew their decision could go either way. But we did meet all of the requests and take care of all the concerns they expressed to us, so we had every reason to believe they would come, if they were acting in good faith. There was certainly nothing more we could have done to make them feel welcome.

Q: Do you think this Olympics fiasco means the end of the games as we know them? Should we find a more or less neutral country where we could have the games all the time?

A: The Olympics have survived blows in the past and I am sure they will survive this one. The question of whether the Games should be held on a permanent or neutral site is one for the Olympic Movement to decide, not for government officials.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5/10

FOR: JACK MATLOCK
FROM: KARNA 
RE: MCFARLANE ON MEET THE PRESS

You have already been tasked to put together some key Q's and A's for Bud's appearance this weekend. Note that the panel consists of:
Marvin Kalb, NBC
Andrea Mitchel, NBC
John Wallach, Heast
Bob Woodward, Washington Post
Carl Rowan, columnist

In addition to what you are putting together, could you include answers to the attached questions. It would be best to have each question with its answer on a separate page.

May I have your responses by 1:00 p.m. Friday. (Note: short answers are best).

Many thanks.

US-SOVET RELATIONS

Q: With the olympics pull-out, arms control walk-out and heightened rhetoric on the part of many who say that US-Soviet relations are at the lowest point ever -- what can you say about -the state of our relations with the Soviet Union? And what are you going to do about it?

(1)

Follow-up: Why was US blind-sided by Soviet pull-out? Officials have been quoted as saying we were dumbfounded. Was this a failure of intelligence?

(2)

Q: Do you think this olympics fiasco means the end of the games as we know them? Should we find a more or less neutral country where we could have the games all the time?

(3)

Q: What are the prospects of getting the Russians to come back to the negotiating table and discuss arms control? Do you think they are staying away simply to try to affect the election and make certain Ronald Reagan is not re-elected?

(4)

Follow-up: There are reports that the MX is in trouble -- it may not pass - in fact, Congress may cancel that program. What impact will that have on our negotiations with the Soviets? (What are you doing to save the MX?)

(5)

Q: Obviously, in the current climate there is no hope of a US-Soviet Summit...it looks like the Democrats will use foreign policy failures, especially deteriorating relationships with the Soviets, as a campaign issue -- what will be your response?

(6)

5/8
1200

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RMK has seen

Mr. McFarlane:

Palmer called Sokolov, who said that the Soviet Embassy had nothing official on the Olympics decision.

5/9 Jack Matlock

*Rtn to J. Matlock -
for his files -*

Press Guidance on Olympics In Response to TASS Report

-- We have seen the press reports that the Soviets have decided not to participate but we have no official confirmation that that is their decision.

-- We have made exhaustive efforts to meet Soviet requests for facilitating their participation and in fact have met them.

-- We are therefore puzzled by these reports since we know of no grounds for the Soviets to avoid participation.

-- Needless to say, we would welcome the participation of the Soviets and all countries in the Olympics.

*Olympics
(Letter not sent)*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have asked His Excellency Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, to present this message to you during his visit to Moscow.

I have personally assured President Samaranch and Mr. Peter V. Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, that the Government of the United States is thoroughly committed to upholding the Olympic Charter and fulfilling its responsibilities as the host nation of the Games of the XXIII Olympiad.

President Samaranch is visiting your country to ensure that your government and your sports officials are fully informed that the United States will warmly welcome all athletes from all teams and provide nondiscriminatory treatment for all Olympic nations.

I know that you share my enthusiasm for this great sporting event, and I am looking forward to seeing all the outstanding athletes of the world marching behind their flags in Los Angeles on July 28. I consider sport to be one of the finest opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand each other.

DECLASSIFIED / Released
NLS - F95-074 #1
BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/16/99

The American people look forward to serving as host for the Olympic Games and to providing an hospitable climate in which the athletes can perform to the best of their abilities.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

Dear Mr. Chairman;

I have asked His Excellency Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, to present this message to you during his visit to Moscow.

I have personally assured President Samaranch and Mr. Peter V. Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, that the government of the United States is thoroughly committed to upholding the Olympic Charter and fulfilling its responsibilities as the host nation of the Games of the XXIII Olympiad.

President Samaranch is visiting your ^{country}~~nation~~ to ensure that your government and your sports officials are fully informed that the United States will warmly welcome all athletes from all teams and provide nondiscriminatory treatment for all Olympic nations.

I know that you share my enthusiasm for this great sporting event, and I am looking forward to seeing all the outstanding athletes of the world marching behind their flags in Los Angeles on July 28. I consider sport to be one of the finest opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand each other.

The American people look forward to serving as hosts for the Olympic Games and to providing an hospitable climate in which the athletes can perform to the best of their abilities.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

DECLASSIFIED/Released
NLS F95-074 # 2
BY amf, NARA, DATE 11/16/99

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 3539
Re open

84 MAY 7 12: 53

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Matlock</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

*Jack: Please redo this letter by
COB today. Ueberath is not going
to Moscow*

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Unclass PAGES 2
FROM Bob Kimmitt 456 2224 WH
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Letter to Chernenko

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>State</u>	<u>Charles Hill</u>		

REMARKS: This draft would replace letter sent to you on Friday. Need comments by COB today, 5/7.

Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

Los Angeles, California 90084 USA
Telephone (213) 209-1984
Telex: 194694 • (Int'l) 4720482



Reply To:
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 905
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 682-1984

May 7, 1984

MEMO TO: Michael Deaver
FROM: Jay Moorhead
SUBJECT: Letter to Chernenko

Ueberroth has requested that, if possible, the letter from Reagan to Chernenko be changed. Peter thinks that if the reference to him is changed to Samaranch it will carry more weight with the Russians, especially since he will have just met with the President. Samaranch would be independently confirming, to Chernenko, that both the U.S. Government and the LAOOC are upholding the Olympic Charter etc. The Russians will have no excuse.

The letter Peter wants to suggest is taken from your previous letter.

Olympics

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Mr. Peter V. Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, will be visiting Moscow shortly and I want you to be aware of his visit. Mr. Ueberroth is extraordinarily well prepared to manage preparation for the Olympic Games, and has been hard at work for five years spearheading the effort to prepare the best possible conditions for world-class athletic performances in Los Angeles this summer.

Mr. Ueberroth is visiting your country to ensure that your government and your sports officials understand that the United States Government and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee are committed to observance of the Olympic Charter and non-discriminatory treatment for all Olympic nations. I have personally assured Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, that the United States as host government will welcome all athletes from every participating nation, and will fully adhere to its obligations under the Olympic Charter.

I know that you share my enthusiasm for this great world sporting event, and I am looking forward to seeing the outstanding athletes marching behind the Soviet flag in Los Angeles on July 28. I trust that Mr. Ueberroth will have the opportunity to meet with the appropriate people during his visit to the Soviet Union and establish a basis for the cooperation which will be necessary as we approach the opening ceremonies in Los Angeles.

I consider sport to be one of the finest opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand each other. The American

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NLS F95-074 #3
BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

people look forward to serving as host for the Olympic Games and providing a hospitable climate in which the athletes can perform to the best of their abilities. I hope that the visit of Mr. Ueberroth to Moscow will be received in this spirit.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



May 2, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Olympics: Draft Letter from President Reagan
to Chairman Chernenko

Attached is a draft letter on the 1984 Olympics for the President's signature. We understand the letter, when signed, would be delivered to Peter Ueberroth of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee via the LAOOC office in Washington.

Richard D. Kuzla
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 11/20/98

Dear Mr. Chairman:

~~I would like to introduce to you~~ Mr. Peter V. Ueberroth, ~~who~~
~~is~~ President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, *will*
be visiting Moscow shortly and I want you to be aware of his visit.
Mr. Ueberroth is extraordinarily well prepared to ~~handle this manage~~
~~task,~~ *preparations for the Olympic Games,* and has been hard at work for five years spearheading the effort to prepare the best possible conditions for world-class athletic performances ~~at the Olympic Games~~ in Los Angeles this summer.

Mr. Ueberroth is visiting your country to ensure that your government and your sports officials understand that the United States Government and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee are committed to observance of the Olympic Charter and non-discriminatory treatment for all Olympic nations. I have personally assured Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, that the United States as host government will welcome all athletes from every participating nation, and will fully adhere to its obligations under the Olympic Charter.

I know that you share my enthusiasm for this great world sporting event, and I am looking forward to seeing the outstanding athletes marching behind the Soviet flag in Los Angeles on July 28. I trust that Mr. Ueberroth will have the opportunity to meet with the appropriate people during his visit to the Soviet Union and establish a basis for the cooperation which will be necessary as we approach the opening ceremonies in Los Angeles.

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NLS F95-074 #5
BY smf NARA, DATE 11/16/99

I consider sport to be one of the finest opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand each other. The American people look forward to serving as host for the Olympic Games and providing a hospitable climate in which the athletes can perform to the best of their abilities. I hope that the visit of Mr. Ueberroth to Moscow will be received in this spirit.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko,
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.

Olympic

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you today and to hear from you about plans for the Games of the XXIII Olympiad in Los Angeles this summer.

As I said during our meeting, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee has the full support of the United States Government in making preparations for the games. The United States is totally committed to upholding the Olympic Charter and fulfilling its responsibilities as the host nation of the games.

The Olympic games should not be used for political purposes. Athletes and Olympic officials of all countries will find a warm welcome in Los Angeles and will be treated equally and without discrimination, in accord with the Olympic Charter and Olympic spirit.

I have instructed agencies of the federal government to cooperate fully with Olympic and local officials to ensure the safety of all participants. We want to create a hospitable climate in which all participants can perform to the best of their ability.

I consider sport to be one of the finest opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand each other. The International Olympic Committee deserves the support of all governments

in arranging the premier sporting event for athletes of all nations. I am looking forward personally to seeing the outstanding athletes of the world marching behind their flags on July 28.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Juan Antonio Samaranch
President of the International Olympic Committee
Chateau de Vidy
CH-1007 Lausanne
Switzerland

Olympics

9344
Add-on

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:


Soviet Olympic-Related Requests

The Soviets have made a series of requests to the Los Angeles Olympic Committee (LAOC) for approval of Aeroflot flights, a long-duration ship call at Long Beach, and the accreditation of an Olympic Attache for the duration of the Games (TAB II). LAOC is under pressure to provide a reply and has sought guidance from the federal government. Since some of the requests would require suspension of post-KAL sanctions against Aeroflot, the major questions should be subject to Presidential decision.

The Issues

Aeroflot flights: The Soviets have requested up to 25 round trips by IL-62M and two to three by IL-76T, to transport members of their "Olympic family," spectators, and third-country teams. Although they intend to fly most on a Moscow-Havana-Los Angeles route, they also ask for permission for some flights to land in New York and/or Washington to pick up and discharge passengers.

Ship call: The Soviets have requested that the 480-passenger-berth "Gruzia" be allowed to enter Long Beach harbor between July 15 and 20 and to remain at Pier No. 2 until after the Olympic Games have closed. The Port Security Committee will approve the entry of the vessel before and after the Games to discharge passengers and cargo and pick them up again, but is strongly opposed to the ship's staying at the berth for the duration of the games. Their objections are based on problems of ensuring the security of the ship while in port.



Olympic Attache: The Soviets have requested accreditation of an attache with diplomatic status with access to Olympic facilities and to air transportation to San Francisco and Washington without the normal travel notifications required by the State Department.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-074 #6

By *smf*, NARA, Date 11/16/99

Procedural: The Soviets are pressing LAOC to provide answers to these requests. Most of them, however, are properly under the jurisdiction of USG agencies.

Timing: As regards permission to Aeroflot, it is important not to convey a favorable decision before the KAL-related resolutions in ICAO have run their course.

Discussion

1. Aeroflot: It is generally agreed that we should allow flights to carry the Soviet "Olympic family" on routes and under conditions as prescribed by the FAA to avoid exposure of sensitive U.S. installations. It is also agreed that Aeroflot should not be given intermediate landing rights in New York or Washington, or be allowed to transport nationals of third countries. Opinion is divided as to whether Aeroflot should be allowed to transport Soviet "spectators": it could be held that this is not strictly essential to participation in the Olympics, but Embassy Moscow has pointed out the practical difficulty of distinguishing between members of the Olympic family and "spectators" and recommends that we not attempt to draw the distinction. I personally concur with this view.

2. Ship call: We must recognize that the Soviets may well make a major issue over this, since it is probably very important to them, in terms of providing support to and control over their large team and officials

However, I believe we will be on strong ground in denying the request to stay if we do not grant a comparable privilege to another country.

According to the Port Security Committee, all such requests have either been deflected or turned down. If we can hold to this position, we can argue with the Soviets that our decision is not discriminatory.

3. Attache: This should be decided, to the degree our security permits, on a non-discriminatory basis. That is, if Olympic Attaches with diplomatic status are granted to other countries, we cannot defend a decision to treat the Soviets differently. The FBI, of course, should be alerted to the situation so that it can provide appropriate surveillance.

4. Procedures and timing: State recommends strongly that the Soviets be instructed to make their specific requests through normal diplomatic channels--that is, through the State Department (TAB IV). This is appropriate, and could be used to solve the problem of timing. Since the ICAO actions should have been taken in a few weeks, a request to State for approval of the Aeroflot flights could simply be held until the timing is right.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you recommend to the President:

1. That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team, but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate stops in the U.S.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is granted other countries.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. That LAOC be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests through normal diplomatic channels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

A memorandum to the President incorporating these points is attached at TAB I for your approval.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Richard Levine ^{RL (bygones)} concurs.

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum to the President
- Tab II - Moorhead-McManus Memorandum with Soviet requests
- Tab III - Letter of January 27, 1984, from Capt. Peebles
- Tab IV - Derwinski-Deaver Memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Soviet Olympic-Related Requests

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F95-074 #7
By smj NARA, Date 11/16/99

Issue

Whether to approve Soviet requests for Aeroflot flights and a ship call to support their participation in the Los Angeles Olympic Games.

Facts

The Soviets have made a series of requests to the Los Angeles Olympic Committee (LAOC) for approval of Aeroflot flights, a long-duration ship call at Long Beach, and for relaxation of other U.S. restrictions to enable them to provide support to their team in the Olympic Games. Granting the requests for Aeroflot flights would require suspending application of the sanctions applied to the Soviet airline following the KAL shoot-down. Other Soviet requests raise national security concerns.

Discussion

When the Los Angeles Olympic Committee was designated as host for the 1984 summer Olympics, it made a commitment to treat all members of the International Olympic Committee on a non-political and non-discriminatory basis. LAOC, therefore, feels constrained to reply to the Soviet requests in a manner as forthcoming as possible.

The Soviets have not yet formally accepted the Olympic invitation and have stated that it might be May before they would announce their decision. In the meantime, they are attempting to obtain assurance on as many points as possible regarding how they will be treated by U.S. authorities. While our intelligence community believes that the Soviets want to participate, there is a distinct risk that if we fail to suspend our sanctions and some of our normal restrictions on Soviet officials in order to permit them to support their team on a non-discriminatory basis, they will refuse to come and charge us with reneging on commitments to deal with participants on an equal basis. Given the high profile of the Olympics throughout the world, our decisions have the

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

potential to create a major public stir if they are seen as unfairly handicapping Soviet participation and thus precipitating a Soviet refusal to attend.

On the Soviet request for special Aeroflot flights, all agencies recommend that these be granted for the specific purpose of bringing the Soviet "Olympic family" to Los Angeles, but without the right to land elsewhere in the U.S. or to carry third-country passengers. The FAA would direct appropriate flight routes to avoid sensitive U.S. facilities. However, we do not wish to convey an approval to the Soviets until the resolutions in ICAO related to the KAL shoot-down have been voted on, since approval of the flights could be interpreted as a weakening of our desire to have the Soviets condemned. This can be managed if LAOC instructs the Soviets to apply through normal diplomatic channels for permission to operate the flights, since the State Department could then delay notification until the actions in ICAO have been completed.

Regarding the Soviet request for a port call, the Port Security Committee has no objection to brief calls before and after the Olympics to deliver and, subsequently, pick up equipment and passengers. However, the Committee is strongly opposed to allowing the ship to stay at the pier in Long Beach Harbor during the Games, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At present, no other country has been granted permission to keep a ship in port during the Olympics, and so long as we allow no one else to have a ship there, we should be able to defend refusal of this request as non-discriminatory. Although the Soviets are likely to press the point, we believe that permission should not be granted. If it should subsequently appear that the Soviets will refuse to attend unless the ship stay is permitted, we can review the situation to see whether countermeasures are possible to minimize the potential national security threat.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the Olympic Games in Los Angeles be treated as a special event, for which every effort should be made to treat the Soviets on a non-discriminatory basis, unless overriding interests of national security require special arrangements.

OK

No

—

—

2. That Aeroflot be allowed to operate special flights to support their Olympic team, but without the right to transport third-country nationals or to land at intermediate stops in the U.S.

OK

No

—

—

3. That the Soviet ship be allowed to enter Long Beach Harbor before and after the Olympics, but not to remain at the pier during the Games, unless such privilege is granted other countries.

OK

No

—

—

4. That LAOC be instructed to ask the Soviets to submit their requests through normal diplomatic channels.

OK

No

—

—

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

949


Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

Los Angeles, California 90084 USA
Telephone (213) 209-1984
Telex 194694 • (Int'l) 4720482



Reply To:
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 905
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 682-1984

December 16, 1983

MEMO TO: MICHAEL A. MCMANUS, JR.
FROM: JAY MOORHEAD 
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND FOR SOVIET REQUESTS

Per your request, the LAOOC asks that the White House take the following factors into consideration while making decisions on the Soviet requests:

1. The Soviet requests should be viewed as consistent with the Olympic Charter. Any country making a similar request to the U.S. government should be handled in the same way as the Soviet request.
2. U.S. policy regarding the Olympics (including the Olympic Family) and U.S. State Department policy regarding the Soviets, should be viewed as two distinct policies.
3. The Administration must take into consideration that any policy restricting the Soviet ship and airplanes will create a negative environment for the LAOOC and the U.S. government, creating the possibility of an Eastern Bloc boycott.
4. The Soviets are fully prepared to abide by all existing U.S. laws regarding the entry of their passenger and cargo ship -- including subjecting the vessel to inspection by the U.S. Customs Service and appropriate U.S. government agencies.
5. We support the Soviet requests, but suggest that the U.S. government put conditions on the request for docking the ship. For example, subject the ship to periodic inspections, in order to satisfy the objections that may be raised by the U.S. government agencies.

6. Since, the Soviet Olympic delegation may number over 1,000 plus, large amounts of cargo including horses, yachts, rowing shells, canoes, sports equipment and other logistical support materiel, it has been customary for the Soviet NOC to make similar requests at previous Olympic games where seaports were available. Given the distance and economics involved these requests reflect their typical preparation to participate in the Games. The requests therefore will be viewed in the Soviet Union and other nations as a test of U.S. willingness to abide by the Olympic Charter and facilitate the logistical support of foreign Olympic teams.

QUESTIONS OF THE SOVIET OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
WITH REGARD OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE SOVIET
OLYMPIC TEAM TO LOS ANGELES ON AEROFLOT FLIGHTS
TO THE LAOOC

- 1) Official confirmation for permission to use the Aeroflot Charter flights to transport the Soviet Olympic Delegation. It is planned to fly up to 25 round trips on the aircraft IL-62M and 2-3 round trips on aircraft IL-76T: Sports inventory and other belongings (Possibly horses). Anticipated start: July 1-10th, possible ending: August 15-30th, 1984. Aircraft load: 100-160 passengers.
- 2) Confirmation of agreement on flight route Moscow-Shannon-Havanna-Los Angeles and return.
- 3) Order of formalizing flights on definite dates, through Diplomatic channels, through the LAOOC, CAB, local Traffic Control.
- 4) Recommendations from American officials for commercial and technical servicing of Aeroflot flights including supply of fuel. Identifying servicing carrier and fuel-supply co. at main and auxiliary airports.
- 5) Permission for arrival to Los Angeles of 2 Aeroflot specialists (representative and engineer) in order to organize the arrival and service the flights.

It is anticipated that the specialists will arrive one month before the beginning of transportation operations, and will leave one month after their termination. Procedure for formalization of obtaining permissions.

- 6) Auxiliary airports on U.S. territory for Aeroflot aircraft. Characteristics of main and auxiliary airports. Estimate of navigation and landing taxes and fees. Any local requirements or landing rights. *which airports in an emergency?*
- 7) Obtaining visas for working crew members for flights to basic and auxiliary airports. Formalization of visas for 2-3 changing flight crews in Los Angeles as well as the possibility of their moving to auxiliary airports. Also visas for above mentioned specialists of Aeroflot, to basic and auxiliary airports.
- 8) Permission for Soviet and foreign passengers, Olympic participants and tourists to fly on Soviet planes. Possible permission to land in New York (Kennedy) and Washington (Dulles) airports to pick up and discharge same passengers.
- 9) Agreement on mutual recognition of flight documents between American carriers and Aeroflot for both individual passengers and cargo *tax, airway bills*
- 10) Permission for members of Olympic teams of other countries and tourists to fly on Aeroflot at their request.

- 11) Customs exemptions on spare parts on flights of Aeroflot, American or other carriers in case of need.
- 12) Accommodations for crew members and representatives as well as transportation between airports and hotels.
- 13) Provisions for security of Aeroflot aircrafts at basic and alternative airports.
- 14) Possibility of rental cars for Aeroflot personnel. Hiring of some local help (1 or 2) for temporary employment.

Tr LG/PFL
12/2/83

MEMORANDUM

On the discussions between the representatives of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee and the representatives of the National Olympic Committee of the USSR (a list of names of those participating is attached).

The Soviet side gave the following information: the National Olympic Committee of the USSR made the decision to deliver part of the sport inventory, equipment, specific national foods and non-alcoholic beverages as well as part of the Sports delegation on board of the Soviet passenger ship "Gruzia" (Black Sea Shipping Company) rented by the Committee. The ship's size is as follows:

Length	-	156.18 meters
Width	-	21.82 meters
Depth	-	5.9 meters

Capacity 480 passengers berths; cargo space in the horizontal method of loading and unloading has 2 circumferences of 5400 cubic meters. The ship has three access ramps: at the bow, at the stern, and one on the right side.

The ship plans to arrive in port on July 15-20 and to remain there until the closing of the Olympic Games.

During the time the ship is docked, a portion of the above listed property will be stored, part of the sporting delegation will reside aboard ship, the ship will be used as a place for the Soviet delegation to conduct cultural entertainment, rest and recreation for part of the athletes.

In connection with this, the Soviet side has asked to examine and decide the following question connected with the stay of the ship in port:

- 1) The Port Authority of Long Beach, on the basis on the inquiry of the agency of the Soviet ship company "W. Diamond," agreed to grant a place at Pier #2 for the docking of "Gruzia" for the specified time. The Soviet side would like to receive confirmation from the Organizing Committee and the Port Authority of Long Beach that they do not require any additional agreements with the Government of the USA for entering and docking the ship, and that this place of docking will be retained for the ship for the whole time of her stay in the port, i.e. from July 15-20 to August 15th, 1984.
- 2) Conforming with the recommendations of the authorities of the Port of Long Beach and the Organizing Committee, it is necessary to take effective measures for the protection of the ship during the period of its mooring.

The Soviet side feels it is necessary to have guarantees that the LAOOC, the authorities of the port, and other organizations will take all necessary measures required from them to ensure the security of the ship at dock in agreement with corresponding international and local practices and will indicate the necessary security measures which the master of the ship must undertake with their assistance.

3) During the ship's mooring, the crew, passengers (part of the delegation), some athletes participating in the cultural events and in recreation, and the cargo will be on board. The ship will be visited by guests of the master and of the Head of the delegation. The Soviet side requests the acceptance by U.S. Officials that the following individuals have the authority to approve entry to the ship while in port:

- The Master of the Ship
- The Head of Delegation
- The Olympic Attache

The above-mentioned persons in agreement with U.S. authorities will establish three kinds of passes:

- a) For members of the crew
- b) For those living on ship
- c) For short time visitors

These passes will be issued by the Soviet side; these passes will be the basis for unimpeded passage onto the ship and from her.

The Soviet side would like confirmation that the above mentioned cargo located on board, may be loaded and unloaded without impediment and delivered to places of usage.

The ship will be supplied without any impediment with all necessary items: food, water, fuel etc. for its normal operation.

4) In view of the long distance between the USSR and the USA, the difference in time, the different languages, large number of members of the Soviet delegation, the Soviet side requests permission for operating the ship's radio station in its transmitting range.

5) Taking into consideration the length of the stay of the Soviet ship in the port and the necessity of solving many questions, the Soviet side feels it is expedient to have the representative Morflot USSR present in port during the length of this stay.

The American side having considered the above questions replies as follows:

Tr AM/PFL
12/2/83

STATUS OF THE OLYMPIC ATTACHE

- 1) Diplomat with diplomatic passport and diplomatic visa (A-1), Diplomatic tagplates for a car.
- 2) Free admission to all Olympic facilities (villages, sport sites, etc) without the regular notification required of Soviet Diplomatic and Consular officials.
- 3) Free admission to international airport for flights to San Francisco and Washington D.C. twice a month.
- 4) Free admission to shortest highway between Los Angeles and San Francisco.
- 5) Free admission to the airport to meet Soviet delegations.
- 6) Free admission to the Soviet ship in the port of Los Angeles.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

27 JAN 1984

~~SECRET~~

DIA INPUT

Extracts from: Intelligence Operations of the Warsaw Pact Civilian Fleets (U), DDB-1700-47-83-SAO

~~(C/NOFORN/WNINTEL)~~ SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT):

Soviet SIGINT collection priorities are:

- U.S. Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) transmissions.
- Clear-test U.S. Navy teletype and manual morse transmissions regarding ship movement. Desired data includes time of departure, time of arrival, destination, mission and the identity of the ships involved.
- U.S. Navy radiotelephone communications.
- Any other transmissions of a military nature, including non-U.S.

~~(C)~~ VISUAL INTELLIGENCE (VISINT):

In addition to their standing requirements, Soviet civilian ships are subject to both term and ad hoc VISINT collected tasking. Term tasking is often levied on civilian ships to provide enhanced observation of major US/NATO exercises. Ad hoc tasking usually results from a civilian ship being in a better location to provide timely coverage of a warship or event than any available military asset.

~~(C)~~ PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE (PHOINT):

PHOINT analysis techniques range from looking at the photos for information of intelligence value to precisely measuring parts of the image (photogrammetry) to determine exact sizes or size relationships.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT):

- HUMINT resources abroad can have either legal or illegal status.
- Visits by merchant and other civilian ships to foreign ports provide an excellent opportunity for HUMINT operations.
- HUMINT activities by Warsaw Pact civilian ships include servicing of illegals.
- The civilian fleets are employed for infiltrating illegals into target countries.
- Warsaw Pact shipping company representative offices in foreign countries are commonly used as legal cover for HUMINT operations.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F95-074 #9

BY

CAJ

NARA, DATE

7/18/01

~~SECRET~~



THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1984

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MICHAEL K. DEEVER,
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Olympic-Related Charter Flight and Port Call
Requests

Soviet sports authorities are attempting to use the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) as a conduit for pressing certain demands on the US Government. We are particularly concerned that they are trying to use that channel to circumvent established procedures for the clearance of Soviet charter flights and port calls by Soviet passenger ships. These procedures have been developed to ensure that all interested USG agencies are consulted on such clearance requests, so that, in addition to commercial factors, policy, national security and intelligence factors are taken into consideration. A basic element in these procedures is that clearance requests must be in government-to-government channels, in the form of written communication either between the Soviet Embassy and the Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs or between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Moscow. Use of these channels, with which the Soviets are quite familiar, ensures that all necessary information is transmitted and reduces the potential for confusion and delay.

The Department will accept only those Soviet clearance requests that are submitted in these official channels; it will not accept requests submitted through LAOOC. I would appreciate it if you reminded LAOOC that such requests are properly government-to-government matters and that it should decline to act as a middleman for the Soviets on them. We have reminded the Soviet Embassy at the working level that we will require the same formal requests for clearance of Olympic-related charter flights and port calls as for any other flights or calls.

I also call to your attention the memorandum of December 10 from Mr. McFarlane to the Secretary of State indicating that consideration of Soviet Olympic-related flights would be deferred until about January 15.

Edward J. Derwinski

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