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**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/16/2005

**File Folder** USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,  
1986 9/9

**FOIA**

F06-114/9

**Box Number** 30

YARHI-MILO

3001

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10478	CABLE	141051Z MAY 86 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	5/14/1986	B1
10479	CABLE	151337Z MAY 86 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	1	5/15/1986	B1
10480	CABLE	151431Z MAY 86 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	2	5/15/1986	B1
10481	CABLE	151337Z MAY 86 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	4	5/15/1986	B1
10477	PAPER	IMPACT OF ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWERPLANT (UPDATE) <b>PAR 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	4	ND	B1 B2 B3
10482	CABLE	201500Z MAY 86 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	4	5/20/1986	B1
10484	CABLE	232336Z MAY 86 <b>R 3/24/2011 F2006-114/9</b>	3	5/23/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Draft

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT:

The Chernobyl Accident

Since hearing of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, the President's first concern has been the safety and welfare of all the people affected. It was with this concern in mind that the United States immediately offered technical and humanitarian assistance the Soviet Union might need to combat the accident or treat its victims.

The President extends his sympathies to all the victims of the accident. He expresses regret that in his remarks of May 14, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev chose to make ill-considered and baseless attacks on the United States and other governments. The characterization of events during the Three Mile Island incident was not based on fact. It should not be necessary to note that the United States, like many other countries, has been affected by this accident.

The President has taken note of the proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev to strengthen international cooperation to prevent or deal with similar situations in the future. The Government of the United States will study these proposals with care and in a positive spirit. We note that they appear to resemble closely proposals made at the Tokyo Summit earlier this month.

2

The position of the United States with respect to declaratory nuclear moratoria is well-known. We have made a number of proposals which could lead to progress in the area of nuclear testing and these stand. In his remarks of May 14, the General Secretary repeated his offer to meet the President to discuss a testing moratorium. We regret that General Secretary Gorbachev has not yet responded to the President's invitation, made first at the Geneva Summit, to visit the United States in 1986 for a discussion of all the issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, including testing. We await an answer from the Soviet side.

Wang: 0931M

3

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

(Uncoordinated as of 14:30, May 14)

— We are comforted by Mr. Gorbachev's assurances that "the worst is behind us" in dealing with the Chernobyl reactor tragedy. Our immediate concern, from the time we learned of the accident, was primarily for the well being of the people in the area. This is why we offered our assistance.

-- We have noted Mr. Gorbachev's suggestions regarding further international efforts to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. We believe that they deserve the most serious consideration. We strongly support additional international efforts to ensure nuclear plant safety and prompt reporting on accidents.

-- We are distressed, however, that Mr. Gorbachev used the occasion of his otherwise reassuring presentation to make unfounded charges against the United States and other Western Governments. On this score, he has obviously been misinformed. There has been no effort by this government, or its partners at the Tokyo Economic Summit, to make political capital out of the Chernobyl tragedy.

— The United States Government at no point encouraged inaccurate reporting on the accident. If some reports carried in the mass media were in fact inaccurate, this was an inevitable result of the extreme secrecy with which the Soviet authorities dealt with the accident in the days immediately following it. Citizens of foreign countries and their

governments had a legitimate interest in knowing the facts, since their own health could be affected. In the absence of detailed, official information, the media reported what they could learn on their own. Any attempt to attribute legitimate foreign interest in a major catastrophe to devious political motives is as deplorable as it is without basis. Unfounded accusations against others must not be used in an attempt to exonerate national officials from their obligation to inform the public promptly of accidents which may affect their health.

-- Mr. Gorbachev also seems to be misinformed regarding the position of the United States and its Allies on nuclear arms reduction. As the leaders who met at the Tokyo Economic Summit stated, "(quote from statement)." The position of the United States is that the United States and the Soviet Union should speed up negotiations to achieve a 50% reduction of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The United States has made concrete proposals and is waiting for a constructive Soviet reply.

-- Regarding a meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, the President has invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit the United States in late June to discuss the entire range of issues between the two countries. Mr. Gorbachev has not yet responded to this invitation. Nevertheless, it is clear that a meeting between the two leaders is possible in the nearest future if Mr. Gorbachev desires.

-- So far as the question of nuclear testing is concerned, the United States has proposed that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to consider the proposals of both sides on this issue. We have as yet no Soviet response

to this suggestion. It is difficult to understand the rationale for a meeting of our leaders confined to this one issue, when the Soviet Union has up to now been unwilling to authorize a discussion at the expert level.

NB: This does not cover explicitly the extension of the moratorium. We might handle that in the q's and a's. Also, we should distribute a fact sheet pointing out just when public announcements were made after the Three Mile Island accident: we have Gorbachev cold on this one.

6

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT

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We have noted Mr. Gorbachev's suggestions regarding further international efforts to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. We believe that they deserve the most serious consideration. We strongly support additional international efforts to ensure nuclear plant safety and prompt reporting on accidents.

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Mr. Gorbachev also seems to be misinformed regarding the position of the United States and its Allies on nuclear arms reduction. As the leaders who met at the Tokyo Economic Summit stated, "each of us supports balanced, substantial and verifiable reductions in the level of arms" and in regard to the U.S.-Soviet agreement to accelerate work at Geneva, "we appreciate the United States' negotiating efforts and call on the Soviet Union also to negotiate positively." The United States is eager to speed up negotiations to achieve a 50% reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The United States has made concrete proposals and is waiting for a constructive Soviet reply.

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So far as the question of nuclear testing is concerned, the United States has proposed that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to initiate a dialogue on verification of testing limitations. We have as yet no Soviet reponse to this suggestion. It is difficult to understand the rationale for a meeting of our leaders confined to the nuclear testing issue, when the Soviet Union has up to now been unwilling to authorize a discussion at the expert level.

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*Patlock 10*  
*File*

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1986

STATEMENT BY THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

We are comforted by Mr. Gorbachev's assurances that "the worst is behind us" in dealing with the Chernobyl reactor tragedy. Our immediate concern, from the time we learned of the accident, was primarily for the well-being of the people in the area. This is why we offered our assistance. Our offer stands.

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Radlock 11

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 14, 1986

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# # #

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8128 DTG: 141051Z MAY 86 PSN: 039388  
EOB361 AN008098 TOR: 134/11322 CSN: HCE193

CONCERNING FOOD PRODUCTS, AND THAT NO SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS NEED BE TAKEN, OTHER THAN WASHING OF FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. EMBASSY WILL ALSO CONTINUE RADIATION MONITORING USING EPA-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT ON A SEMI-WEEKLY BASIS AND ADVISE DEPARTMENT OF RESULTS WEEKLY.  
COMBS  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 08128

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, AMED, UR  
SUBJECT: RADIATION MONITORING AND EMBASSY FOOD SUPPLY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
  
2. NOW THAT RADIATION MONITORING HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS NO SHORT-TERM CONTAMINATION PROBLEM IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD, EMBASSY HAS BEGUN THINKING ABOUT HOW TO APPROACH THE LONGER-TERM PROBLEM OF CONTAMINATION WORKING ITS WAY INTO THE FOOD CHAIN. WHILE MOST MEAT, MILK AND PRODUCE MARKETED IN STATE STORES AND FARMERS' MARKETS IS GROWN AND PROCESSED IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY, WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT CONTAMINATED PRODUCTS COULD MAKE THEIR WAY TO EITHER MOSCOW OR LENINGRAD. IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE PROBLEM, AND TO PRESERVE THE PEACE OF MIND OF OUR EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS, EMBASSY REQUESTS FOLLOWING OF THE DEPARTMENT:
  - A. THAT THE TESTING BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOOD SAMPLES TAKEN IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD BE CONTINUED AT LEAST FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS;
  
  - B. THAT BASED ON THE ABOVE, M/MED PERIODICALLY ADVISE US AS TO POTENTIAL HAZARDS FACING EMBASSY AND CONGEN PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS THE ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUED USE OF MILK, PRODUCE, MEAT AND POULTRY FROM THE DIPLOMATIC GASTRONOMS (SOME OF WHICH IS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN ORIGIN), AND OF MILK AND PRODUCE OBTAINED IN STATE STORES AND FARMERS' MARKETS, THE ORIGIN OF WHICH MAY BE UNKNOWN. IN THIS REGARD, WE SUGGEST IT MAY BE ADVISABLE TO CONSULT WITH USDA SOVIET CROP EXPERTS TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHAT CROPS ARE GROWN IN THE AREA AFFECTED BY THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT AND WHAT ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN THAT AREA (SOVIET STATEMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING).
  
3. IN THE MEANTIME, EMBASSY WILL, ASSUMING M/MED CONCURS, CONTINUE TO INFORM EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS THAT NO SERIOUS PROBLEM NOW EXISTS

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRRF06-114/9 #10478  
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8240 DTG: 151337Z MAY 86 PSN: 041955  
EOB095 AN008890 TOR: 135/1504Z CSN: HCE672

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/006 A2

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C. MORATORIUM AS EXPEDIENT?

-- THE ANNOUNCED EXTENSION UNTIL AUGUST 6 OF THE UNILATERAL SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM MAY HAVE MADE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY. BASED ON PRIOR SOVIET MORATORIUM EXTENSIONS, RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS OF "NO HURRY" TO RESUME TESTING, AND AN INTEREST IN CONTINUING WESTERN PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING ANOTHER EXTENSION ANYWAY. HOWEVER, RESUMPTION OF TESTING ON THE HEELS OF CHERNOBYL' COULD APPEAR PARTICULARLY OBTUSE, AND THIS FACTOR MAY WELL HAVE TIPPED THE SCALES.

D. WHOSE PROPOSALS; WHOSE ACTIONS INSUFFICIENT?

-- GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION CONTAIN A COUPLE OF NEW FEATURES, BUT ALSO REFLECT STEPS URGED ON THEM BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND MEASURES DISCUSSED RECENTLY WITH VISITING IAEA OFFICIALS (SEE SEPTEL). BY PRESENTING THEM AS SOVIET IDEAS, GORBACHEV MAKES THEM MORE PALATABLE INTERNALLY AND ASSUMES A MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION INTERNATIONALLY. IN FACT THE MEASURES, IF ADOPTED, WOULD LARGELY ADDRESS DEFICIENT SOVIET ACTIONS AND PRACTICES IN THE CHERNOBYL' CASE.

E. "OPENNESS" EASTERN STYLE

-- IN WESTERN TERMS, GORBACHEV SUFFERED GREATLY IN THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIS "OPENNESS" RHETORIC AND THE TRADITIONAL SECRETIVE REACTION BY SOVIET OFFICIALDOM TO CHERNOBYL'. HARSH CRITICISM OF WESTERN MEDIA REPORTING PROBABLY ALSO REFLECTS SENSITIVITY TO WESTERN RADIO STATIONS AND OTHER MEDIA WHICH PROVIDED COVERAGE LACKING DOMESTICALLY.

HOWEVER, RECENT EVENTS HERE ALSO HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN CONCEPTS OF "OPENNESS." WHILE THERE ARE SLIGHT SIGNS OF SOME INTERNAL DIFFERENCES HERE OVER HOW FORTHCOMING THE USSR GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, THE OVERALL SOVIET CONCEPT OF "OPENNESS" ("GLASNOST'") ESSENTIALLY STRESSES CRITICISM OF INEFFICIENCY AND MALFEASANCE, SELF-CRITICISM, AND PUBLIC POPULISM INCLUDING DIRECT LEADERSHIP CONTACT WITH THE PEOPLE. THUS FAR, CHERNOBYL' HAS SUBSTANTIALLY CHALLENGED EVEN THIS MORE LIMITED SOVIET CONCEPT. COMBS  
BT

PRIORITY

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*Ambr  
Mladkov*

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4833

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 08240

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, SENV, SCUL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: EMBASSY COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV CHERNOBYL' ADDRESS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S MAY 14 TV ADDRESS ON CHERNOBYL'. EMBASSY NOTES IN PARTICULAR:

A. NO DOMESTIC SCAPEGOATING

-- GORBACHEV PRAISED THE HEROISM OF THOSE COPING WITH THE PROBLEM, FUZZED THE TIMING ISSUE, AND THUS FAR AT LEAST FOUND NO DOMESTIC CULPABILITY. HE KEPT OPTIONS OPEN, HOWEVER, BY NOTING THAT THE INVESTIGATION WAS INCOMPLETE. BY ANNOUNCING THAT A "POLITBURO" COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED HEADED BY RYZHKOV HE INJECTED PARTY OVERSIGHT WHILE PERHAPS KEEPING HIMSELF ONCE REMOVED. HE WILL REACT TO THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS.

B. DISTRACTION TACTICS

-- GORBACHEV'S HEAVY CRITICISM OF ALLEGED WESTERN MEDIA DISTORTIONS, PURPORTED U.S. PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, AND HIS ERRONEOUS COMPARISONS WITH THREE MILE ISLAND ALL ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF INITIAL SOVIET SILENCE AND SUBSEQUENT MINIMAL PUBLIC RELEASE OF DATA. THE STRONG EMPHASIS ON THESE CHARGES REFLECTS SOVIET EMBARRASSMENT, HISTORIC SOVIET SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, TRADITIONAL SOVIET REACTION, AND THE MAJOR ROLE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFICIALS.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF06-114/9 # 10479

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8261 DTG: 151431Z MAY 86 PSN: 041939  
EOB114 AN008931 TOR: 135/1455Z CSN: HCE667

CONFERENCE IN VIENNA UNDER THE AUSPICES OF IAEA TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS.

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- -- THIRD, TO INCREASE THE ROLE AND CAPABILITIES OF IAEA, SINCE ITS RESOURCES AND STATUS "DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY."

- -- FOURTH, TO INCREASE THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE UN, WHO AND UNEP IN "MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SAFE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITY."

OP IMMED  
STU8345  
DE RUEHMO #8261/01 1351434  
O 151431Z MAY 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

(COMMENT: IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, OF COURSE, WHAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE IN MIND, BUT IT STRIKES US THAT POINT THREE ESPECIALLY COULD LEAD TO A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN POLICY VIS-A-VIS IAEA AND ZERO-GROWTH BUDGETING. END COMMENT.)

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4851

SOVIET REPLY TO EMBASSY NOTE

- INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7424
- USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4730
- AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 8029
- AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 1596
- AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1487
- AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0345
- AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2428
- AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2848
- AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5215
- AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1164
- AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2449
- AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 2125
- AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 1375
- AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3732
- UNVIE MISSION VIENNA IMMEDIATE
- USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
- USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5850
- AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3529

3. IN RESPONSE TO THE EMBASSY'S INQUIRY BY DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON APRIL 30, THE MFA HAS INFORMED US THAT "IT IS SAFE FOR TOURISTS TO VISIT KIEV."  
(COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THIS TO BE DISINGENUOUS AT BEST. END COMMENT.)

4. IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, THE FRG EMBASSY REPORTS THAT SOVIET BANK OF FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIALS ARE PRESSING HARD FOR GERMAN BANKERS TO GO AHEAD WITH AN ANNUAL BANKING SEMINAR SCHEDULED FOR KIEV LATER THIS MONTH. THE FRG EMBASSY IS STRONGLY ADVISING THAT THE MEETING BE MOVED TO MOSCOW OR ANOTHER SOVIET CITY. THE GERMANS ALSO REPORT THAT THE SOVIETS READILY AGREED EARLIER TO SHIFT A BILATERAL MEETING ON ISLAND TRANSPORT FROM KIEV TO MOSCOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 08261

SOME NON-WESTERN EMBASSY REACTIONS

FOR S/NP AMBASSADOR KENNEDY

PASS EPA

5. THE INDIAN DCM (PROTECT) REPORTED MAY 13 THAT OVER 20 INDIAN STUDENTS WERE STUDYING IN THE KIEV AREA. THEY HAVE NOT INDICATED ANY PARTICULAR CONCERN, HE SAID. ALTHOUGH THE BT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, IAEA, UR  
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' UPDATE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

GORBACHEV SPEECH AND PROPOSALS

2. WE ASSUME MOST ADDRESSEES ARE FAMILIAR WITH MAIN POINTS OF GORBACHEV CHERNOBYL'-RELATED SPEECH EVENING OF MAY 14. FOR THOSE WHO MAY NOT BE, WE NOTE GORBACHEV MADE FOUR CONCRETE PROPOSALS:

- -- FIRST, "TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF SAFE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY ON THE BASIS OF CLOSE COOPERATION OF ALL STATES INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR ENERGY." THIS WOULD INCLUDE A SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS AT NUCLEAR REACTORS, "ESPECIALLY WHEN ACCOMPANIED BY EMISSIONS OF RADIOACTIVITY." HE ALSO CALLED FOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MECHANISMS FOR PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN CASES OF REACTOR ACCIDENTS.

- -- SECOND, TO CALL A SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 006-1149 #10480

BY KAL NARA DATE 4/7/2011

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01            MOSCOW 8261            DTG: 151431Z MAY 86    PSN: 041940  
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DE RUEHMO #8261/02 1351437  
O 151431Z MAY 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4852

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad IMMEDIATE 7425  
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4731  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 8030  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 1597  
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AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3733  
UNVIE MISSION VIENNA IMMEDIATE  
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5851  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3530

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 08261

FOR S/NP AMBASSADOR KENNEDY

PASS EPA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, IAEA, JL  
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' UPDATE

INDIAN EMBASSY HAS OFFERED TO HELP ANY OF THEM TO LEAVE EARLY IF DESIRED, NOT ONE STUDENT HAS DONE SO -- THEY WISH TO COMPLETE THEIR SEMESTER UNINTERRUPTED. THE GUYANESE DCM REPORTED SIMILAR REACTIONS AMONG GUYANESE STUDENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING ONE REPORTEDLY LIVING SOME 50 KM FROM CHERNOBYL'. THE CZECH POLCOUNS REPORTED NO PARTICULAR CONCERN AMONG CZECH STUDENTS IN THE AREA -- POSSIBLY A PREDICTABLE COMMENT GIVEN THE CZECH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS DISASTER.

FRG MONITORING TEAM

6. AN FRG RADIATION MONITORING TEAM ARRIVED IN MOSCOW MONDAY EVENING. THEY HAVE MEASURED ONLY BACKGROUND LEVELS OF RADIATION AROUND THE FRG EMBASSY.

LATE REPORT: GALE PRESS CONFERENCE

7. THE MAY 15 PRESS CONFERENCE BY DR. ROBERT GALE (UCLA) LEFT THE ATTENDEES WITH LITTLE NEW INFORMATION ON THE EXTENT OF SOVIET CASUALTIES IN THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT. ACCORDING TO GALE, 299 SOVIETS HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO SUBSTANTIAL LEVELS OF RADIATION (SAME FIGURE USED BY GORBACHEV IN LAST NIGHT'S SPEECH); OF THESE, THIRTY-FIVE RECEIVED THE HIGHEST LEVELS. GALE AND COLLEAGUES PERFORMED TRANSPLANTS ON NINETEEN OF THE THIRTY-FIVE; THE REMAINING PATIENTS EITHER DID NOT NEED TRANSPLANTS OR HAD SUFFERED IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE. THE NINETEEN ARE DOING "REASONABLY WELL." NOTING THAT TWENTY-EIGHT OF THE THIRTY-FIVE ARE STILL ALIVE, GALE ADDED THE "FURTHER DEATHS ARE UNAVOIDABLE."

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE RUMOR THAT A SWISS FIRM ENCOUNTERED SEVERE SOVIET BUREAUCRATIC OPPOSITION IN GETTING ITS DONATED MEDICINES INTO MOSCOW, GALE NOTED THAT, WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME DELAYS, ALL THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAD ARRIVED. THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD ALSO YIELDED THE STATEMENT THAT NONE OF THE VICTIMS BEING TREATED BY GALE HAD RECEIVED THEIR RADIATION DOSES WHILE IN THE TOWNS OF CHERNOBYL' OR PRIPYAT.

COMBS  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17  
May 15, 1986

TO: ~~JB~~ Jack Matlock  
how Pugliese;  
Steve Steiner

Steve Sestanovich  
Peter Rodman

FROM: Judyt Mandel

SUBJECT: VOA Editorial on Gorbachev Statement

Please provide comments/concurrence on the attached to Judyt Mandel (x3595, Room 351) by 4:30 today

Thanks. (Edits are VOA's and mine.)

Looks fine -  
[Signature]

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX # 17

RECORD #

86 MAY 15

PAGES

3

DTG

151830Z

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
RELEASE

FROM/LOCATION

1. USIA/VOA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. NSC JUDYT MANDEL 151835Z

- 2. \_\_\_\_\_
- 3. \_\_\_\_\_
- 4. \_\_\_\_\_
- 5. \_\_\_\_\_
- 6. \_\_\_\_\_
- 7. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

From:  
USIA/VOA

For  
NSC Judyt Mandel

395- 3595

[URGENT]

Editorial 0-1873 (2UR67)

May 16, 1986

**CHERNOBYL AND NUCLEAR SAFETY**

Anncr:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

On Wednesday evening, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev finally addressed the Soviet people on the subject of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. His assurances that the worst is over, and that everything possible is being done to save lives, to seal the damaged reactor, and to clean up the surrounding area were ~~comforting~~ <sup>welcome</sup>.

But it was ~~distressing to hear him accuse the United States and other Western governments of a lack of sympathy, and of using the Chernobyl tragedy for political gain.~~ <sup>His accusations that</sup> ~~ed~~ <sup>for the Soviet people and were</sup> ~~On the contrary,~~ <sup>were false and disturbing,</sup> As soon as we learned about the accident, our first concern

was for the safety of the people in the area. The U.S. immediately offered technical and humanitarian help, ~~to the Soviet government.~~ That offer still stands. ~~And on~~ May 5th, the seven-nation Tokyo Summit expressed deep sympathy for all people affected by the Chernobyl event and readiness to extend assistance whenever requested.

Mr. Gorbachev suggested future international efforts to enhance safety standards at nuclear power plants. We agree this is ~~X~~ <sup>v</sup> vitally important ~~issue~~ and will give serious consideration to Soviet proposals. But we should ~~emphasize~~ <sup>add</sup> that nuclear power plant safety is already carefully monitored in the United States. Any aberration in standard procedure, no matter how slight or unrelated to reactor operation, is immediately reported to our national Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which, in turn, reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Recent Soviet press stories, while saying almost nothing about Chernobyl, dwelt instead on the frequency of U.S. nuclear events -- almost all minor incidents that posed no hazard to public safety and which our government made no effort to hide. Even in the

case of the worst accident in the United States -- a partial reactor meltdown in 1979 at Three-Mile Island in Pennsylvania -- built-in containment structures prevented almost all radiation from entering the atmosphere, and radiation outside the plant never reached dangerous levels. Nobody contracted radiation disease, and nobody died.

Mr. Gorbachev <sup>falsely claimed</sup> further alleged that U.S. authorities withheld information about Three-Mile Island for more than a week. In fact, all available information was issued to the public within five hours after the event began, and foreign governments and the IAEA were notified the same day. That night President Carter addressed the nation and disclosed all known facts about the incident. It took Mr. Gorbachev eighteen days to tell the Soviet people about Chernobyl. Not surprisingly, during the interim, the Kremlin's silence fueled a rash of ~~un~~formed rumors and speculation among an anxious press and public abroad. Sadly, Mr. Gorbachev ~~chose~~ to misrepresent this legitimate international demand for answers as an "unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign."

*was either misinforme or chose*

As affirmed by the Tokyo Summit, we ~~will~~ believe nuclear power, properly managed, will continue to be used widely to serve man's energy needs. It is the responsibility of each country that builds nuclear power plants to ensure the safety of their design, manufacture, operation, and maintenance. It is also essential for each government to provide complete and immediate information about nuclear accidents, exactly what the Soviets failed to do in the case of Chernobyl. Mr. Gorbachev has now assured us that "all measures will be taken to rule out a repetition" of what happened at Chernobyl. For the sake of the thousands affected by this tragedy, we hope and trust this will be done.

*replace with attacks 41*

Anncr:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

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It is not unusual for those who make ~~mist~~ mistakes to try to cover them up, and to ~~hide~~ seek to justify their own behavior by blaming others. However, in a matter of this seriousness Mr. Gorbachev ~~cannot afford~~ ~~to leave any~~ to content himself with ~~partial answers.~~

~~To~~ accept misinformation has an obligation -- to the Soviet people and to the world -- to learn and to speak the truth. Telling the facts about Chernobyl is the only honest course now.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10481 23

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*F. de:  
Chernobyl*

PAGE 01 OF 04 **MOSCOW 8240**  
SIT971

DTG: 151337Z MAY 86 PSN: 041955  
TOR: 135/1504Z

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**PRIORITY**

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4833

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 08240

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NLRR E06-114/9 #10481

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: **PREL, SENV, SCUL, UR, US**  
SUBJECT: **EMBASSY COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV CHERNOBYL' ADDRESS**

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE SEEN THE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S  
MAY 14 TV ADDRESS ON CHERNOBYL'. EMBASSY NOTES IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 8240

DTG: 151337Z MAY 86 PSN: 041955

PARTICULAR:

A. NO DOMESTIC SCAPEGOATING

- - - - -

-- GORBACHEV PRAISED THE HEROISM OF THOSE COPING WITH THE PROBLEM, FUZZED THE TIMING ISSUE, AND THUS FAR AT LEAST FOUND NO DOMESTIC CULPABILITY. HE KEPT OPTIONS OPEN, HOWEVER, BY NOTING THAT THE INVESTIGATION WAS INCOMPLETE. BY ANNOUNCING THAT A "POLITBURO" COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED HEADED BY RYZHKOV HE INJECTED PARTY OVERSIGHT WHILE PERHAPS KEEPING HIMSELF ONCE REMOVED. HE WILL REACT TO THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS.

B. DISTRACTION TACTICS

- - - - -

-- GORBACHEV'S HEAVY CRITICISM OF ALLEGED WESTERN MEDIA DISTORTIONS, PURPORTED U.S. PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, AND HIS ERRONEOUS COMPARISONS WITH THREE MILE ISLAND ALL ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT ATTENTION FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF INITIAL SOVIET SILENCE AND SUBSEQUENT MINIMAL PUBLIC RELEASE OF DATA. THE STRONG EMPHASIS ON THESE CHARGES REFLECTS SOVIET EMBARRASSMENT, HISTORIC SOVIET SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, TRADITIONAL SOVIET REACTION, AND THE MAJOR ROLE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFICIALS.

C. MORATORIUM AS EXPEDIENT >

- - - - -

-- THE ANNOUNCED EXTENSION UNTIL AUGUST 6 OF THE UNILATERAL SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM MAY HAVE MADE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY. BASED ON PRIOR SOVIET MORATORIUM EXTENSIONS, RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS OF "NO HURRY" TO RESUME TESTING, AND AN INTEREST IN CONTINUING WESTERN PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE ISSUE, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING ANOTHER EXTENSION

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 8240

DTG: 151337Z MAY 86 PSN: 041955

ANYWAY. HOWEVER, RESUMPTION OF TESTING ON THE HEELS OF CHERNOBYL' COULD APPEAR PARTICULARLY OBTUSE, AND THIS FACTOR MAY WELL HAVE TIPPED THE SCALES.

D. WHOSE PROPOSALS; WHOSE ACTIONS INSUFFICIENT>

-----  
-- GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION CONTAIN A COUPLE OF NEW FEATURES, BUT ALSO REFLECT STEPS URGED ON THEM BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND MEASURES DISCUSSED RECENTLY WITH VISITING IAEA OFFICIALS (SEE SEPTEL). BY PRESENTING THEM AS SOVIET IDEAS, GORBACHEV MAKES THEM MORE PALATABLE INTERNALLY AND ASSUMES A MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION INTERNATIONALLY. IN FACT THE MEASURES, IF ADOPTED, WOULD LARGELY ADDRESS DEFICIENT SOVIET ACTIONS AND PRACTICES IN THE CHERNOBYL' CASE.

E. "OPENNESS" EASTERN STYLE

-----  
-- IN WESTERN TERMS, GORBACHEV SUFFERED GREATLY IN THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIS "OPENNESS" RHETORIC AND THE TRADITIONAL SECRETIVE REACTION BY SOVIET OFFICIALDOM TO CHERNOBYL'. HARSH CRITICISM OF WESTERN MEDIA REPORTING PROBABLY ALSO REFLECTS SENSITIVITY TO WESTERN RADIO STATIONS AND OTHER MEDIA WHICH PROVIDED COVERAGE LACKING DOMESTICALLY.

HOWEVER, RECENT EVENTS HERE ALSO HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOVIET AND WESTERN CONCEPTS OF "OPENNESS." WHILE THERE ARE SLIGHT SIGNS OF SOME INTERNAL DIFFERENCES HERE OVER HOW FORTHCOMING THE USSR GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, THE OVERALL SOVIET CONCEPT OF "OPENNESS" ("GLASNOST'") ESSENTIALLY STRESSES CRITICISM OF INEFFICIENCY AND MALFEASANCE, SELF-CRITICISM, AND PUBLIC POPULISM INCLUDING DIRECT LEADERSHIP CONTACT WITH THE PEOPLE. THUS FAR,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 8240

DTG: 151337Z MAY 86 PSN: 041955

CHERNOBYL' HAS SUBSTANTIALLY CHALLENGED EVEN THIS  
MORE LIMITED SOVIET CONCEPT. COMBS  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# Soviet Nuclear Accident

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1986

## A Task Force Report

CONTACT: DAVE COHEN (202) 382-4355

The EPA national monitoring network is continuing to detect radioactivity from the Chernobyl accident at a number of locations in the United States. Levels of iodine-131 in rainwater and air particulate samples appear to be decreasing. There is too little data to draw any conclusion about a trend for the milk network.

Only one milk sample out of 25 analyzed yesterday contained iodine-131. The sample was collected in Spokane, Washington on May 13 and contained 41 pCi/l of iodine-131. This is only slightly higher than the 26 pCi/l reported at two locations yesterday.

Nine out of fifteen rainwater samples analyzed yesterday contained iodine-131. The levels measured range from 39 pCi/l to 2110 pCi/l. The percentage of samples containing iodine-131 has remained about the same for the past few days, but the average rainwater concentration reported today is less than half that reported yesterday (410 pCi/l compared to 1000 pCi/l) and the highest value reported today (2110 pCi/l) is less than the highest value reported yesterday (2400 pCi/l). It appears that the radioactivity remains widely dispersed and is likely to be present in any rainwater that falls in the U.S., but the concentration of iodine-131 is clearly decreasing. The amount of deposition is also decreasing. The highest value reported today is 2310 pCi/m<sup>2</sup>; the highest yesterday was 8410 pCi/m<sup>2</sup>.

Sixteen air particulate samples analyzed yesterday contained iodine-131. The concentrations measured range from 0.06 pCi/m<sup>3</sup> to 1.4 pCi/m<sup>3</sup>. The highest value reported today, the lowest value reported today and the average of today's values are all slightly lower than those reported yesterday.

Beginning today, the daily updates will contain only the new readings above background reported for that day. If you want a complete listing, please keep yesterday's report as a data base and add all subsequent readings, including today's, to that base.

PLEASE NOTE: THE EPA PRESS OFFICE WILL BE OPEN OVER THIS WEEKEND FROM 10am to 12pm IF YOU WOULD LIKE THE LATEST READINGS.

# # #

May 16, 1986

CHERNOBYL FEDERAL RESPONSE  
ERAMS DATA

Country	Location	Sample Type	Col Date	Nuclide	Activity	Units
USA	AL, Montgomery	Air	5/15	I-131	0.06	pCi/m 3
USA	AZ, Phoenix	Air	5/13	I-131	1.4	pCi/m 3
USA	CA, Berkeley	Air	5/13	I-131	0.42	pCi/m 3
USA	CA, Los Angeles	Air	5/13	I-131	0.18	pCi/m 3
USA	CA, Los Angeles	Air	5/14	I-131	0.18	pCi/m 3
USA	CO, Denver	Air	5/13	I-131	0.27	pCi/m 3
USA	IA, Iowa City	Rain	5/14	I-131	99	pCi/l
	IA, Iowa City	Deposition	5/14	I-131	790	pCi/m 2
USA	ID, Idaho Falls	Air	5/13	I-131	0.40	pCi/m 3
USA	IL, Chicago	Rain	5/14	I-131	39	pCi/l
	IL, Chicago	Deposition	5/14	I-131	450	pCi/m 2
USA	IN, Indianapolis	Air	5/13	I-131	0.15	pCi/m 3
	IN, Indianapolis	Rain	5/14	I-131	50	pCi/l
	IN, Indianapolis	Deposition	5/14	I-131	550	pCi/m 2
USA	MN, Minneapolis	Rain	5/14	I-131	330	pCi/l
	MN, Minneapolis	Deposition	5/14	I-131	2310	pCi/m 2
USA	MO, Jefferson City	Rain	5/14	I-131	210	pCi/l
	MO, Jefferson City	Deposition	5/14	I-131	460	pCi/m 2
USA	MT, Helena	Rain	5/14	I-131	570	pCi/l
	MT, Helena	Deposition	5/14	I-131	1150	pCi/m 2

(more)

CHERNOBYL FEDERAL RESPONSE  
ERAMS DATA

Country	Location	Sample Type	Col Date	Nuclide	Activity	Units
USA	NE, Lincoln	Air	5/13	I-131	0.21	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	NE, Lincoln	Air	5/14	I-131	0.32	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	NV, Las Vegas	Air	5/13	I-131	0.84	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	OH, Columbus	Air	5/13	I-131	0.24	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	UT, Salt Lake City	Air	5/12	I-131	1.1	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	VA, Virginia Beach	Rain	5/13	I-131	180	pCi/l
	VA, Virginia Beach	Deposition	5/13	I-131	180	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	WA, Spokane	Air	5/13	I-131	0.74	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
	WA, Spokane	Milk	5/13	I-131	41	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
	WA, Spokane	Rain	5/14	I-131	2110	pCi/l
	WA, Spokane	Deposition	5/14	I-131	800	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	WY, Cheyenne	Air	5/13	I-131	0.43	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
	WY, Cheyenne	Air	5/14	I-131	0.37	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	WY, Jackson	Rain	5/7	I-131	100	pCi/l

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~Matlock~~ 30  
3726

*Chernobyl*

May 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CHEW

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL *Bob for*  
SUBJECT: House Resolution on Chernobyl

We have reviewed the House Resolution on the Chernobyl accident  
attached at Tab A and have no objection to any of its provisions.

Attachment

Tab A Resolution



### WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/12/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --

SUBJECT: H.RES. 440

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input type="checkbox"/> SS	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: For appropriate action.

RESPONSE:

Benjamin J. Guthrie  
Clerk

32  
W. Raymond Colley  
Deputy Clerk

Office of the Clerk  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

May 9, 1986


The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:


I have the honor to transmit herewith an engrossed and attested copy of House Resolution Number 440, as adopted by the U. S. House of Representatives on May 1, 1986, conveying the sympathy of the American people to the people of Ukraine, especially to the families of victims, and for other purposes.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

  
BENJAMIN J. GUTHRIE, Clerk  
U. S. House of Representatives

Enclosure



33

## H. Res. 440

### *In the House of Representatives, U. S.,*

*May 1, 1986.*

Whereas on or about April 26, 1986, a catastrophic accident occurred at the nuclear powerplant at Chernobyl, sixty miles north of Kiev in Ukraine;

Whereas Soviet authorities made no efforts to inform neighboring countries of Europe and other countries affected by the accident of the accident, preventing them from offering warning and a measure of protection for their citizens;

Whereas neighboring European nations have reported high levels of nuclear radiation as a result of the Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl, which may have potential adverse long-term effects;

Whereas this accident has resulted in significant loss of life;

Whereas large numbers of people have sustained serious injuries;

Whereas Americans with relatives in the Kiev area are anxious over the fate of their family members; and

Whereas this accident could result in longstanding technical, medical, and environmental problems: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

(1) conveys the sympathy of the American people to the people of Ukraine, especially to the families of victims;



(2) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to facilitate direct channels of communication to allow relatives to receive word about the fate of family members;

(3) supports the offer of the United States Government to provide technical and medical assistance to help authorities in Ukraine cope with the tragedy;

(4) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to allow the American people to provide material and moral assistance to the accident victims and their families by facilitating the prompt delivery of humanitarian packages;

(5) expresses its concern and support for those nations in Europe that have experienced nuclear radiation from the Chernobyl accident;

(6) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to facilitate the furnishing of technical and humanitarian assistance by appropriate international organizations in order to address the immediate problems and develop cooperative strategies for the future consideration of this problem that has international ramifications;

(7) deplores the Soviet Union's failure to provide the world with notification of and information about the nuclear

accident at Chernobyl, and calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to permit the international press to cover the situation freely so that the world may be assured of complete and accurate information;


(8) calls upon the Government of the Soviet Union to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct an investigation of the cause of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl and to share the results of the investigation with other nations in order to assess the safety and reliability of nuclear reactor design and operation; and

(9) calls upon the President to take prompt steps to establish at the International Atomic Energy Agency a mechanism for an automatic, immediate response by agency technical personnel, including onsite visits and monitoring, to any nuclear accident posing a significant threat to public health and safety.

Attest:



*Benjamin J. Civile*  
Clerk.



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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REFERRAL**

TIME STAMP

86 MAY 12 P 2: 42

SYSTEM I LOG NUMBER: 3726

(FIRST DRAFT OF REMARKS)

ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK DUE: 14 MAY 1986

- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Speakes
- Prepare Memo \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\* PUT RESPECTIVE STAFF OFFICER'S NAME IN MARGIN BESIDE CHANGES.

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

DUE: 13 MAY 1986

\*PHONE to action officer at ext. 5112

- |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Burghardt     | <input type="checkbox"/> Levine                | <input type="checkbox"/> Sachs               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cannistraro   | <input type="checkbox"/> Linhard               | <input type="checkbox"/> Sestanovich         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Childress     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mahley                | <input type="checkbox"/> Sigur               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cobb          | <input type="checkbox"/> Major                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Small               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Covey         | <input type="checkbox"/> Mandel                | <input type="checkbox"/> Sommer              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky     | <input type="checkbox"/> Matlock               | <input type="checkbox"/> Soos                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> deGraffenreid | <input type="checkbox"/> May                   | <input type="checkbox"/> Stark               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dobriansky    | <input type="checkbox"/> Menges                | <input type="checkbox"/> Steiner             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donley        | <input type="checkbox"/> Miller                | <input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Douglass      | <input type="checkbox"/> North                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Teicher             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Grimes        | <input type="checkbox"/> Platt                 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Thompson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hughes        | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi | <input type="checkbox"/> Tillman             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer       | <input type="checkbox"/> Raymond               | <input type="checkbox"/> Wigg                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Laux          | <input type="checkbox"/> Reger                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Wright              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lehman        | <input type="checkbox"/> Ringdahl              | <input type="checkbox"/> _____               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Lenczowski    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sable      | <input type="checkbox"/> _____               |

INFORMATION

McDaniel

Pearson

Secretariat

Rodman

Lehman

Exec. Sec. Desk

Poindexter (advance)

Fortier (advance)

## WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/12/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ---

SUBJECT: H.RES. 440

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: For appropriate action.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew  
Staff Secretary  
Ext. 2702

Office of the Clerk  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515

May 9, 1986

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit herewith an engrossed and attested copy of House Resolution Number 440, as adopted by the U. S. House of Representatives on May 1, 1986, conveying the sympathy of the American people to the people of Ukraine, especially to the families of victims, and for other purposes.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

*Benjamin J. Guthrie*  
BENJAMIN J. GUTHRIE, Clerk  
U. S. House of Representatives

Enclosure





H. Res. 440

*In the House of Representatives, U. S.,*

*May 1, 1986.*

Whereas on or about April 26, 1986, a catastrophic accident occurred at the nuclear powerplant at Chernobyl, sixty miles north of Kiev in Ukraine;

Whereas Soviet authorities made no efforts to inform neighboring countries of Europe and other countries affected by the accident of the accident, preventing them from offering warning and a measure of protection for their citizens;

Whereas neighboring European nations have reported high levels of nuclear radiation as a result of the Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl, which may have potential adverse long-term effects;

Whereas this accident has resulted in significant loss of life;

Whereas large numbers of people have sustained serious injuries;

Whereas Americans with relatives in the Kiev area are anxious over the fate of their family members; and

Whereas this accident could result in longstanding technical, medical, and environmental problems: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives—

- (1) conveys the sympathy of the American people to the people of Ukraine, especially to the families of victims;



(2) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to facilitate direct channels of communication to allow relatives to receive word about the fate of family members;

(3) supports the offer of the United States Government to provide technical and medical assistance to help authorities in Ukraine cope with the tragedy;

(4) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to allow the American people to provide material and moral assistance to the accident victims and their families by facilitating the prompt delivery of humanitarian packages;

(5) expresses its concern and support for those nations in Europe that have experienced nuclear radiation from the Chernobyl accident;

(6) calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to facilitate the furnishing of technical and humanitarian assistance by appropriate international organizations in order to address the immediate problems and develop cooperative strategies for the future consideration of this problem that has international ramifications;

(7) deplores the Soviet Union's failure to provide the world with notification of and information about the nuclear

accident at Chernobyl, and calls upon the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Soviet Union to permit the international press to cover the situation freely so that the world may be assured of complete and accurate information;

(8) calls upon the Government of the Soviet Union to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct an investigation of the cause of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl and to share the results of the investigation with other nations in order to assess the safety and reliability of nuclear reactor design and operation; and :

(9) calls upon the President to take prompt steps to establish at the International Atomic Energy Agency a mechanism for an automatic, immediate response by agency technical personnel, including onsite visits and monitoring, to any nuclear accident posing a significant threat to public health and safety.

Attest:



*Benjamin J. Gutierrez*  
Clerk.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 16, 1986

ACTION

**SIGNED**

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *A*

SUBJECT: House Resolution on Chernobyl

At Tab A is a resolution passed by the House of Representatives on various aspects of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl. Among other things, it calls upon the U.S. Government to provide technical and medical assistance, and requests the President to establish a mechanism at the International Atomic Energy Agency for responding to future nuclear accidents.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to David Chew indicating that NSC has no objection to any of its provisions.

*Matlock*, Pugliese, *Sable*, Thompson and St. Martin concur. *R.C. 4/7*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to David Chew at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

- Tab I      Memo to DChew
- Tab A      Resolution

~~Secret~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRREF06-114/9 \*10477

BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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maTlock

DRC 41-86  
May 1986



Defense Research Comment

~~NOFORN//SI//NF~~  
~~NOCONFRACT~~

*Chernobyl*

### Impact of Accident at Chernobyl Nuclear Powerplant (Update) (U)

~~(S//NF//WN//NC)~~ The Chernobyl Nuclear Powerplant accident on 26 April continues to affect the delivery of Soviet electric power to Ukrainian and East European customers and, indirectly, to lower priority consumers in the USSR.<sup>1</sup> While there are no indications of a necessity for rationing yet, the shutdown of other reactors of the Chernobyl type — 1,000-MW graphite-moderated, pressure tube reactors (RBMK) — makes temporary rationing more likely in the future.

~~(S//NF//WN//NC)~~ Meanwhile, uncertainty still surrounds the status of the reactor core at Chernobyl Unit 4, the condition of Unit 3, and the likelihood of further radioactivity from the plant. The evacuation of the city of Pripyat near the powerplant occurred within the first two days after the accident. Preliminary analysis suggests that, unless protective measures were taken, much of Pripyat's population (30,000) could have been exposed to dangerous radiation levels about 15 minutes after the hydrogen explosion at Unit 4. Chernobyl, located several miles farther from the plant, was evacuated days later on 4 May. Politically, the USSR has reversed its public relations policy from silence to qualified openness coupled with a propaganda counterattack.

#### Sequence of Events

~~(S//NF//WN//NC)~~ Soviet officials apparently were aware of serious operational problems at Chernobyl Unit 4 on Friday, 25 April. However, there are indications that coolant flow problems may have occurred as early as Wednesday, 23 April. Meltdown must have occurred late Friday or early Saturday, 26 April, since the atmospheric conditions that sent radiation to Scandinavia occurred at that time. A hydrogen explosion and graphite fire occurred at 1:23 a.m., 26 April, according to Soviet authorities. The explosion probably was the result of hydrogen buildup in the reactor building. Reporting of radiation release and core damage has varied greatly.


~~(S//NF//WN//NC)~~ DIA's assessment is that most of the reactor's nuclear fission product inventory, which is estimated at 15 billion curies, is still present in a rubble bed composed of melted zirconium fuel rod cladding, broken

chunks of concrete biological shielding, and considerable quantities of unburned but damaged graphite. It is not believed that all 1,700 tons of graphite used as a moderator have been burned, but significant portions are still extremely hot and smoldering. Rainfall is not considered a problem; it would vaporize quickly because of the heat emitted from the reactor. The chance for a "China syndrome" type accident is not likely since the rubble bed would help prevent a concentration of liquefied fuel pellets. The amount of radioactivity being released into the atmosphere is much less than during the initial accident stage.

~~(S//NF//WN//NC)~~ Since 29 April, wind has shifted away from Scandinavia and has assumed a counterclockwise pattern. Reports indicate that smoke may be rising from the damaged fan/filter machine room located between Units 3 and 4. Reports of a meltdown occurring at Unit 3 are unconfirmed. As of

FOIA(b)(2)

~~Secret~~



(U) Evacuation of Downtown Chernobyl Area

8 May, no new damage levels at Unit 3 were observed; a meltdown is questionable at this time.

#### Impact on Electric Power Industry


~~(S/NF)~~ The accident at Chernobyl is continuing to strain power system operations in the South Interconnected Power System (OES), which serves the Ukraine and Moldavia. Also, the indefinite shutdown of units at Kursk and Smolensk in the energy-deficient Center OES, which includes Moscow, is destabilizing to this power system. Because of a priority ranking system for electric power consumers, key military and industrial consumers will be unaffected by the power shortages. Some brownouts are expected, but, unless another accident in the region occurs, long-term power shortages are unlikely. Some delays in constructing new RBMK reactors at new powerplants will occur, but mid- to long-term construction will be unaffected. It is likely that a planned shift away from RBMK reactors in favor of pressurized water reactors (VVER) will be accelerated as much as possible, despite problems at the VVER production plant Atommash in Volgodonsk. Only Soviet nuclear reactors of the 1,000-MW VVER type, such as Unit 5 at

Voronezh, have a protective dome and improved containment systems. The Kursk and Smolensk RBMK powerplants, which recently have been shut down, probably will be reactivated in the near future, eliminating shortfalls in the Center OES. Although Units 1 and 2 at Chernobyl will not be operational for at least a year, new capacities coming on line at other regional nuclear powerplants should mitigate effects on the South power system.

#### Effects on Population

~~(C)~~ The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is located in a generally rural area with numerous settlements about 6 to 9 km apart along transportation routes. The workers' settlement of Pripyat located immediately to the northwest of the plant is a small, modern high-rise city with an estimated population of 25,000 to 30,000. Major cities located nearby that could be expected to play a supporting role in evacuation, cleanup, and reconstruction are Gomel, 130 km to the northeast, population 486,000; Chernigov, 82 km east, population 289,000; Kiev, 115 km south, population 2,509,000; Zhitomir, 165 km southwest, population 280,000; and Mozyr, 94 km northwest, population 98,000.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~(C)~~ Population Densities Within 600 km of the Chernobyl Plant

~~(S/NE/WN/NC)~~ As of 8 May the number of casualties in the area of the Chernobyl powerplant had not been determined. Soviet authorities on 7 May announced that 84,000 residents of towns in the vicinity had been evacuated. However, evacuation did not begin until 27 April, after the explosion and release of radiation, and was not completed until 5 May. The town of Pripyat was in the general path of the initial radioactive cloud. If Pripyat's residents had received some degree of warning, many perhaps could have used available shelters that would reduce whole-body doses to less than lethal levels. Some residents are likely to have experienced potentially lethal doses of radiation depending upon their location, protection, and duration of exposure, as affected by local wind speed. Evacuation of the town of Chernobyl, located 15 km south of the powerplant, did not take place until 4 or 5 May. Since wind direction was primarily north, exposure of the population of that city to major radiation doses is questionable. With wind shifts turning south and southwest, reports of increases in radiation levels in Kiev are building. Some alarm among the population has been noted as airports and train stations became jammed with people bent on leaving the city.

### Soviet Political Response

~~(C)~~ Faced with negative international reaction to its initial failure to provide detailed information, the Kremlin belatedly adopted a more aggressive public relations program designed to minimize repercussions both at home and abroad. On 1 May, Vitaliy Churkin, Second Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, presented the Soviet position (with little new information) in an unusual appearance before a US congressional committee. On 2 May, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov and Party "second" Secretary Yegor Ligachev toured the site of the damaged reactor. On 6 May, the chairman of the government commission investigating the Chernobyl accident and several other high-level officials held a press conference aimed at convincing

the international community that the USSR was willing to provide an open and frank accounting of the catastrophe.

~~(C)~~ Concurrently, the Soviet press went on the propaganda offensive, charging the West with politicizing the Chernobyl accident and accusing the United States of creating a climate of hysteria to deflect world attention from what the USSR claims is a US unwillingness to halt the arms race. Soviet media are also providing much fuller coverage of evacuation and cleanup efforts. The reversal in the Kremlin's public relations policy — from silence to a qualified openness coupled with a propaganda counterattack — suggests that Soviet leaders recognize the initial news blackout as damaging to both international and domestic policy.

~~(C)~~ While the international outcry against the Kremlin's handling of the Chernobyl disaster, particularly the initial Soviet silence, has resulted in at least a temporary setback for Gorbachev, the accident does present him with some opportunities. Gorbachev will probably exploit it to purge some political opponents. He may also use the incident as additional justification for his policy of trying to upgrade Soviet technology.

### Outlook

~~(S/NE/WN/NC)~~ The present status of Chernobyl's Units 3 and 4 precludes an accurate prediction of consequences. Unit 4 continues to smoke and vent radiation, a condition likely to persist indefinitely. Present evidence suggests that there has not been a meltdown at Unit 3. Casualties cannot be assessed because available Western surveillance means are unable to monitor routes and activities associated with evacuation efforts. The Soviet propaganda offensive, including increasing links to the Kremlin's arms control campaign, is likely to continue indefinitely.

*Defense Intelligence Agency  
Industrial Resources and Economics Division  
Directorate for Research*

FOIA(b) (2)

FOIA(b) (3)





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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

*File: Chernobyl*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 08551

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, KPRP, UR  
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' AND THE SOVIET FUTURE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR POWER STATION BROUGHT TO THE FORE TRADITIONAL TRAITS OF THE RUSSIAN POLITY (INSECURITY, SENSE OF INFERIORITY, SECRETIVENESS AHEAD OF HUMAN LIFE) AND ALSO SHOWED THAT DECISION-MAKING IN THE GORBACHEV ERA IS LITTLE DIFFERENT THAN TWENTY YEARS AGO. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, CHERNOBYL' WAS NOT HANDLED ALL THAT DIFFERENTLY THAN KAL, INCLUDING A HEALTHY EXHIBITION OF THE COUNTER-ATTACK SYNDROME. WHILE LETTING HIS COLLEAGUES GET OUT IN FRONT (INCLUDING A MAY 2 "SITE VISIT"), GORBACHEV DISTANCED HIMSELF (IN THE EARLY STAGES) FROM THE CRISIS, PERHAPS TO GAIN A MORE FAVORABLE POSITION FOR INSTITUTING SUBSEQUENT CADRE CHANGES. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO EUROPE, MAY BE DOUBLY DAMAGED BY CHERNOBYL' BOTH IN THE NATION'S IMAGE ABROAD AND IN THE LIGHT IN WHICH GORBACHEV'S ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WILL NOW BE CONSIDERED. ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR THE LONG TERM MOSCOW MAY VIEW STRENGTHENED WESTERN FEARS ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY AS PROVIDING AN ATMOSPHERE MORE CONDUCTIVE TO PROMOTING ITS DISARMAMENT IDEAS.

3. WHILE NUMEROUS SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY WILL BE AFFECTED, WE DO NOT ENVISION CHERNOBYL'

BEING THE SOURCE OF AN "ECONOMIC DISASTER" IN THE COMING MONTHS. SOME IMPACT WILL BE FELT, HOWEVER: MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES OF POWER FACILITIES MAY HAVE TO BE ALTERED; KEY MANAGERS OF THE ECONOMY ARE OBVIOUSLY DISTRACTED WITH CLEANUP EFFORTS AT CHERNOBYL'; SOVIET ENERGY RELATIONS WITH CEMA PARTNERS MAY BE STRAINED AND SOME FOREIGN MARKETS FOR NON-RBMK TYPE EXPORT REACTORS MAY DISAPPEAR; AND HOPES FOR A BOOM TOURIST SEASON FROM THE WEST ARE CLEARLY SHATTERED. SIGNS ARE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NO INTENTION OF DIRECTING THEIR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PLANS AWAY FROM NUCLEAR POWER.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT THE EC BAN WILL HAVE VIRTUALLY NO IMPACT ON SOVIET AGRICULTURE AND THAT THE GROSS HARVEST WILL BE LARGELY UNAFFECTED BY THE ACCIDENT, THOUGH UTILIZATION MAY BE. ANY INABILITY TO USE FORAGES COULD RESULT IN INCREASED IMPORTS OF GRAIN AND THERE ALSO MAY BE A CURRENT REASSESSMENT OF THEIR STOCKS POSITION; BOTH COULD TRIGGER MORE BUYING.

5. SOME OF THE FIRST GLORIES OF THE GORBACHEV PERIOD CAME FROM SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FEATS (PARTICULARLY IN SPACE). S AND T ALSO, HOWEVER, SPAWNED HIS FIRST DOMESTIC CRISIS. THE MOST INTRIGUING SCIENCE POLICY ASPECT MAY BE THE IMPACT ON THE SOVIET S AND T LEADERSHIP. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AS AN INSTITUTION AND ITS PRESIDENT, ALEKSANDROV, HAVE BEEN NOTICEABLY ABSENT FROM PRESS COVERAGE OF THE "HEROIC DEEDS OF CHERNOBYL'," WHILE TWO MEMBERS OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION, ACADEMY VICE-PRESIDENT VELIKHOV AND GOSKOMGIDROMET CHAIRMAN IZRAEL', HAVE BEEN LIONIZED. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW: THE POLITICAL ASPECT

6. CHERNOBYL' SHOWED AT A GLANCE THE TREMENDOUS WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM: UNWIELDY, SLOW AT REPORTING PROBLEMS CLEARLY AND AT MAKING AND COORDINATING DECISIONS, WITH A DECISION-MAKING RESPONSIBILITY THAT IS SPREAD AMONG TOO MANY MINISTRIES, STATE COMMITTEES, AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS. TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM, TO REVEALING SERIOUS PROBLEMS AT HOME--IN SHORT, INSECURITY AND INFERIORITY--QUICKLY CAME TO THE FORE AS THE CRISIS UNFOLDED. MOREOVER, CHERNOBYL' BT

*Confidential*

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NLRRF06-114/9 #10482

BY KAL NARA DATE 4/7/2011

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 08551

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USDOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/USSREE/USSR/JBROUGHER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, KPRP, UR  
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' AND THE SOVIET FUTURE

ONCE AGAIN REVEALED THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES' PRIORITY ON SECRECY OVER INDIVIDUAL LIVES AND WELFARE--IN CLEAR CONTRAST TO THE IMAGE THE SOVIET MEDIA AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN PAINSTAKINGLY TRYING TO CREATE. AS WITH THE KAL CRISIS, A PATTERN DEVELOPED OF INITIAL SILENCE, HIDING THE FACTS, AND THEN FIGURING OUT A PUBLIC LINE WHICH WAS ALLOWED TO DRIBBLE OUT. A COUNTER-ATTACK SYNDROME WAS ALSO PRESENT: THE RADIOS (RL/RFE AND VOA) AND WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS IN MOSCOW AND ABROAD WERE BLAMED FOR "CREATING A CRISIS." DRAWING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE AUSTRIAN EMBASSY IN TRYING TO SUPPORT ITS CITIZENS IN ZHLOBIN (MOSCOW 7824) AND SOME UNOFFICIAL SOVIET COMMENTS, CHERNOBYL' MAY HAVE CREATED DIVISIONS AT SOME LEVELS IN THE SYSTEM OVER THE GORBACHEV "OPENNESS" CAMPAIGN AND THE TRADITIONAL ROUTE AND HOW TO MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE USSR.

7. GORBACHEV WAS CAREFUL TO INSULATE HIMSELF FROM THE FIRST CRISIS OF HIS REIGN; HE AVOIDED PUBLIC COMMENT WHILE LETTING LESSER OFFICIALS GET OUT IN FRONT, THEREBY SHOWING SOME SENSITIVITY TO POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS. CPSU "SECOND" SECRETARY AND POLITBURO MEMBER LIGACHEV, PREMIER RYZHOKOV (HEAD OF A POLITBURO COMMITTEE COVERING THE ACCIDENT), AND UKRAINIAN FIRST SECRETARY SHCHERBITSKIY VISITED THE DISASTER "AREA" ON MAY 2. RYZHOKOV, AS HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND SHCHERBITSKIY, AS UKRAINIAN PARTY BOSS, WERE UNDERSTANDABLE

INCLUSIONS IN THE GROUP. THE CHOICE OF LIGACHEV MAY INDICATE THAT THE PARTY'S INITIAL CONCERN WITH CHERNOBYL' WAS MORE POLITICAL THAN TECHNICAL. SHCHERBITSKIY MAY BEAR LITTLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATION OF THE PLAN AND THE DISASTER ITSELF. HOWEVER, THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WILL PROVIDE MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR THINGS TO GO WRONG AS THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES DEAL WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT. IF GORBACHEV INDEED WANTS TO GET RID OF SHCHERBITSKIY, THE ACCIDENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES SHOULD STRENGTHEN GORBACHEV'S HAND.

8. CHERNOBYL' MARKED A DOUBLE SETBACK FOR GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE WHERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISASTER WERE DIRECTLY FELT. THE ACCIDENT REINFORCED THE WESTERN POPULAR IMPRESSION OF SOVIET BACKWARDNESSES AND CUT ACROSS GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS TO PROJECT A NEW, MORE "EUROPEAN" SOVIET IMAGE. SOVIET SECRECY AND TARDINESS IN PROVIDING INFORMATION PROJECTED CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR SOVIET CITIZENRY AND FOR AFFECTED POPULATIONS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. SECONDLY, NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN EUROPE MAY FURTHER BLUNT GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES WHICH HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO AROUSE INCREASED CONFUSION AND SKEPTICISM IN THE WEST DUE TO THEIR FREQUENCY AND VAGUENESS. SOVIET ASSURANCES ON VERIFICATION, FOR EXAMPLE, AND CALLS FOR A NORDIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE WILL BE DROWNED OUT BY REMINDERS OF CHERNOBYL', PROBABLY AMONG LEFTIST WEST EUROPEAN GROUPS IN PARTICULAR. IN EASTERN EUROPE CHERNOBYL' WILL REINFORCE ALREADY EXISTING PUBLIC RESENTMENT OF MOSCOW, ESPECIALLY IN POLAND AND ROMANIA.

9. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN ARGUING THAT THE TRUE LESSON OF CHERNOBYL' IS THAT IT REVEALS ONCE AND FOR ALL THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND THE NEED FOR A TEST BAN, ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND THE DEMILITARIZATION OF SPACE. IN SPITE OF THE SERIOUS PUBLIC RELATIONS LOSSES IT HAS SUFFERED IN THE SHORT TERM, MOSCOW MAY CALCULATE THAT INCREASED WESTERN FEARS ABOUT NUCLEAR ENERGY MAY CREATE A MORE FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICY IN THE LONGER TERM.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

BT

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, KPRP, UR  
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' AND THE SOVIET FUTURE

10. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DRAW FIRM QUANTITATIVE CONCLUSIONS OF THE NON-AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC FALLOUT OF THE ACCIDENT. OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT IS THAT DESPITE THE NUMEROUS SECTORS AFFECTED, THE MACRO IMPACT ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY, WHILE TROUBLESOME, WILL BE MANAGEABLE AND NOT ANYTHING CLOSE TO AN "ECONOMIC DISASTER."

11. THE LOSS OF THE FOUR UNITS AT CHERNOBYL REPRESENTS ONLY ABOUT ONE PERCENT OF TOTAL ELECTRICITY CAPACITY AND SHOULD BE COVERED BY SWITCHING AMONG OTHER STATIONS THROUGH THE SOVIET UNIFIED POWER GRID. THIS WILL, HOWEVER, AFFECT THE SUMMER MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE FOR OTHER FACILITIES AND COULD RESULT IN INCREASED DOWN TIME FOR SOME UNITS DURING THE PEAK WINTER DEMAND. THE IMPACT OF THIS LOSS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND ON ELECTRICITY EXPORTS TO CEMA COUNTRIES WILL INTENSIFY IN THE LATTER PART OF THE YEAR AS THE WINTER DEMAND BEGINS TO BUILD. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, SEE THIS AS HAVING MORE THAN A SMALL IMPACT--THOUGH CAUSING SOME DISCOMFORT TO CONSUMERS IN THE UKRAINE--AND SHOULD NOT AFFECT THE SOVIET ABILITY TO EXPORT OIL TO THE WEST.

12. FOR THE LONGER TERM, WE EXPECT LITTLE PULL BACK BY THE SOVIETS IN THEIR COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR POWER. THE RBMK UNIT IS NOT THE CORNERSTONE OF THEIR PROGRAM, ONLY 6 MORE ARE ON THE DRAWING BOARDS OUT OF NEARLY

40 PLANNED FOR THE 1986-1990 PERIOD. WHILE ONE OR TWO OF THE SIX MAY BE CANCELLED AND AT LEAST TWO (CHERNOBYL') FURTHER DELAYED, THIS WOULD NOT REPRESENT A MAJOR RETRENCHMENT.

13. IN ADDITION TO COMPLICATING SOVIET ENERGY RELATIONS WITH ITS CEMA PARTNERS, THE CHERNOBYL' AFFAIR WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES TO THINK A BIT MORE ABOUT FURTHER GROWTH IN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE SOME NEGATIVE FALLOUT ON AMBITIOUS SOVIET PLANS TO INCREASE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION.

14. IN TRADE TERMS, SOVIET HOPES FOR A BOOM TOURIST SEASON FROM THE WEST ARE CLEARLY SHATTERED. THERE WILL ALSO BE SOME LEVEL OF UNPLANNED FOREIGN CURRENCY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLEAN-UP EFFORT. SOVIET EFFORTS TO SELL REACTORS TO NON-CEMA TRADING PARTNERS (FINLAND, YUGOSLAVIA) EVEN THOUGH NOT OF THE RBMK VARIETY, MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN JEOPARDY.

15. BY ALL INDICATIONS, THE SOVIETS ARE EXPENDING CONSIDERABLE MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES ON STABILIZING THE REACTOR, CLEANING UP THE AREA, AND SUPPORTING THE EVACUATED POPULATION. THIS EFFORT WILL CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AND PROBABLY RESULT IN THE DELAY OF THE COMPLETION OF SOME OTHER MAJOR PROJECTS. OUR BEST GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL LARGELY RELY FOR THEIR MAIN SOURCE OF LABOR ON THE CONSTRUCTION CREWS (TO THE EXTENT THESE PEOPLE HAVE NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THE RADIATION ALREADY IN THE AREA WORKING ON CHERNOBYL' UNITS FIVE AND SIX). SPECIALIZED

TECHNICIANS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD ARE ALSO BEING DRAWN FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY PROBABLY CAUSING A FURTHER SLOW DOWN IN BRINGING NEW NUCLEAR POWER UNITS ON STREAM. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT AT A TIME THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO ACCELERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH, BOTH CHAIRMEN OF THE NEWLY CREATED MANAGEMENT BUREAUS HANDLING ENERGY AND MACHINE BUILDING ARE DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE TIME TO THE CHERNOBYL EFFORT.

16. THE LEVEL OF IMPACT OF ALL OF THE ABOVE FACTORS WILL ONLY BECOME KNOWN OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT TWELVE TO EIGHTEEN MONTHS AS THE SOVIETS CONSIDER WHETHER TO BRING CHERNOBYL' UNITS 1 AND 2 BACK ON STREAM, AS PROGRESS ON OTHER PLANNED REACTORS IS  
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8551 DTG: 201500Z MAY 86 PSN: 050437  
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SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' AND THE SOVIET FUTURE

OBSERVED, AND AS THE SUCCESS OF THE CLEAN UP EFFORT  
BECOMES CLEARER.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE  
-----

17. SOVIET OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT NO  
SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE TO THE FOOD CHAIN.  
ACCORDING TO ONE WHO RETURNED LAST WEEK FROM KIEV,  
FARMERS' MARKETS HERE ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY, ALTHOUGH  
PRODUCE IS BEING CHECKED FOR RADIOACTIVITY. HOWEVER,  
WE NOTE IN THIS WEEK'S SEEDING REPORT THAT VEGETABLES  
PRODUCED "UNDER GLASS AND PLASTIC SHEETING" IN  
KIEV OBLAST ARE BEING DELIVERED TO STORES IN  
"SIGNIFICANTLY" GREATER VOLUME THAN LAST YEAR.  
ALTHOUGH SOVIET CONTACTS PROTEST THE E.C. BAN ON  
SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FOODSTUFFS, "MOST OF  
WHICH WAS PROCESSED BEFORE THE ACCIDENT," THE ACTION  
IS EXPECTED TO HAVE INITIALLY NO IMPACT. FOOD EXPORTS  
ACCOUNT FOR LESS THAN ONE PERCENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S  
FOREIGN SALES. MOREOVER, MOST GOES TO EASTERN EUROPE.

18. IN OUR VIEW, THE GROSS HARVEST WILL BE LARGELY  
UNAFFECTED BY THE ACCIDENT, THOUGH UTILIZATION MAY BE.  
REPORTS THAT LEAVES AND STEMS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN SEED  
TO HARBOR RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES SUGGEST THAT THE  
FORAGE CROP MAY SUFFER MOST. HOWEVER, MUCH WILL  
DEPEND ON THE CONCENTRATION OF THE TWO LONG-LIVED  
ISOTOPES (STRONTIUM 90 AND CESIUM 137) IN THE

AFFECTED AREA. ANY INABILITY TO USE FOR FORAGE COULD  
RESULT IN INCREASED IMPORTS OF GRAIN. THERE IS ALSO  
A VIEW THAT THE ACCIDENT HAS CAUSED THE SOVIETS  
TO REASSESS THEIR STOCKS POSITION. THIS, TOO, COULD  
TRIGGER MORE BUYING. REGARDLESS OF CAUSE, ALMOST  
ANY SOVIET ACTIVITY IN COMMODITY MARKETS OVER THE  
NEXT FEW MONTHS WILL BE ATTRIBUTED TO CHERNOBYL'.

SCIENCE POLICY  
-----

19. WHILE TOO EARLY TO GAUGE THE ENTIRE IMPACT OF  
THE ACCIDENT ON A STILL-UNFOLDING GORBACHEV SCIENCE  
POLICY, THREE FEATURES HAVE EMERGED THAT COULD  
CONTRIBUTE TO A NEW COMPLEXION ON SCIENCE PLANNING  
POST-CHERNOBYL'. AS THE PRESS COVERAGE BLOSSOMED  
THE END OF THE FIRST WEEK OF THE CRISIS, A NOTICEABLE  
DEFENSIVENESS TOWARDS NUCLEAR POWER SURFACED IN  
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND, IN PARTICULAR, IN REMARKS  
BY COMMISSION HEAD BORIS SHCHERBINA. THIS DEFENSIVENESS  
COULD WELL BE FOR DOMESTIC REASONS (PERHAPS CHERNOBYL'  
FUELED LATENT DISENCHANTMENT WITH NUCLEAR POWER) AS  
WELL AS FOR A BRUISED INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE, ONE  
WHICH HAD BEEN GAINING GROUND RECENTLY VIA SOVIET  
SPACE TRIUMPHS. A SECOND FEATURE DEALS IN  
PERSONALITIES: YEVGENIY P. VELIKHOV (VICE PRESIDENT,  
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES) AND YURIY IZRAEL' (CHAIRMAN,  
GOZKONGIDROMET) HAVE BEEN HYPED AS THE SCIENTISTS  
ON THE SPOT--ACTIVE, SLEEVES ROLLED UP, PROPOSING  
EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS UNIQUE IN THE HISTORY  
OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND IN CONTROL. THEIR PROMINENCE  
IMMEDIATELY RAISES THE QUESTION, "WHERE ARE THE  
OTHER KEY S AND T FIGURES?" FOR EXAMPLE, WHY  
HAVEN'T ACADEMY PRESIDENT ALEXANDROV OR GURIY  
MARCHUK (CHAIRMAN, GKNT) BEEN SEEN LATELY? BESIDES  
THE APPARENT NON-ROLE OF THE ACADEMY AS AN INSTITUTION,  
A THIRD POINT IS THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE FUTURE  
HOLDS FOR OTHER SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE  
STATE COMMITTEE FOR SAFETY IN THE ATOMIC POWER  
INDUSTRY OR S AND T FIGURES ASSOCIATED WITH REACTOR  
DEVELOPMENT LIKE A.M. PETROSYANTS (CHAIRMAN, GNAE).  
IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT CHERNOBYL' WILL LEAD  
GORBACHEV TO A "RE-STAFFING" OF THE SOVIET S AND T  
LEADERSHIP THAT MANY HAVE FELT HAS BEEN LONG OVERDUE.  
COMBS

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# Soviet Nuclear Accident

MATLOCK 51

PM  
Sullivan  
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1986

## A Task Force Report

CONTACT: DAVE COHEN (202) 382-4355

Radioactivity from the Chernobyl accident is still being detected in air particulate, rainwater and milk samples at various locations throughout the United States. The attached table contains the latest results from the EPA monitoring network and also includes measurements made by nuclear power plant operators and reported by NRC.

Only four air particulate samples out of 81 reported by the EPA air monitoring network today contained iodine-131. This is the smallest number of positive detections since shortly after the releases from the accident arrived in this country.

Twelve rainwater samples out of 26 analyzed by the EPA monitoring network contained iodine-131. This is the smallest percentage seen in some time. The average concentration is now down to 70 pCi/l and the average deposition is down to 292 pCi/m<sup>2</sup>. These values are continuing to fall.

The EPA milk monitoring network found iodine-131 in four samples out of eleven, with values ranging from 17 pCi/l to 24 pCi/l. However, one sample reported by NRC contained 320 pCi/l. This is the highest milk concentration reported thus far, and it indicates that milk concentrations may not have peaked. Since rainwater concentrations seemed to have peaked last week, it is expected that milk concentrations will peak this week.

All levels reported by EPA are still extremely small and far below levels that could pose any threat to public health, even among the most sensitive portions of the population, such as pregnant women.

To help put the EPA readings in some context, please note that the Protective Action Guide (the federal level at which preventive measures would be taken) for "deposition" (a measure that combines the concentration of radiation in rainwater and the amount of rainfall) is 130,000 pCi/m<sup>2</sup> for Iodine-131; and the Protective Action Guide for milk is 15,000 pCi/l for Iodine-131.

## CHERNOBYL FEDERAL RESPONSE REPORT

May 21, 1986

Country	Location	Sample Type	Col Date	Nuclide	Activity	Units
USA	AK, Prudhoe Bay	Rain	5/15	I-131	45	pCi/l
USA	AL, Ashford	Milk	5/19	I-131	17	pCi/l
USA	AR, Little Rock	Rain	5/19	I-131	39	pCi/l
	AR, Little Rock	Deposition	5/19	I-131	1601	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	IN, Indianapolis	Rain	5/19	I-131	28	pCi/l
	IN, Indianapolis	Deposition	5/19	I-131	200	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	KS, Topeka	Rain	5/17	I-131	28	pCi/l
	KS, Topeka	Deposition	5/17	I-131	1160	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	ME, Augusta	Rain	5/17	I-131	76	pCi/l
	ME, Augusta	Deposition	5/17	I-131	300	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	MN, Minneapolis	Air	5/16	I-131	0.14	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	ND, Bismarck	Air	5/18	I-131	0.28	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	NE, Lincoln	Rain	5/16	I-131	120	pCi/l
	NE, Lincoln	Rain	5/17	I-131	75	pCi/l
	NE, Lincoln	Deposition	5/17	I-131	530	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	NH, Concord	Rain	5/17	I-131	160	pCi/l
	NH, Concord	Deposition	5/17	I-131	130	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>
USA	NJ, Trenton	Milk	5/19	I-131	24	pCi/l
USA	OH, Columbus	Rain	5/19	I-131	22	pCi/l
	OH, Columbus	Deposition	5/19	I-131	120	pCi/m <sup>2</sup>

The following data has been reported by NRC.

USA	AL, Dothan	Rainwater	5/12	I-131	290.0	pCi/l
USA	FL, Crystal River	Air Particulate	5/5-13	Ba-7	0.165	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	Sb-122	0.0075	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	I-131	0.149	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	Ru-103	0.025	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	Cs-134	0.041	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	Cs-136	0.006	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	Cs-137	0.082	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	La-140	0.01	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/5-13	Ts-132	0.0123	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/15	I-131	0.093	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/15	Cs-137	0.013	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	GA, Augusta	Rainwater	5/13	I-131	8.0	pCi/l
		Rainwater	5/13	I-131	15.0	pCi/l
USA	GA, Decatur	Rainwater	5/13	I-131	117.0	pCi/l
	GA, Smyrna	Rainwater	5/12	I-131	37.0	pCi/l
USA	MI, Charlevoix	Air Particulate	5/13-14	Cs-137	3.1	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Rainwater	5/14	I-131	220.0	pCi/l
		Air Particulate	5/15-16	Cs-137	2.4	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
USA	OH, Toledo	Rainwater	5/15	I-131	133.0	pCi/l

Country	Location	Sample Type	Col Date	Nuclide	Activity	Units
USA	OH, Toledo	Air	5/18	I-131	0.02	pCi/m 3
USA	PA, Philadelphia	Milk	5/19	I-131	19	pCi/l
USA	PA, Pittsburgh	Milk	5/19	I-131	18	pCi/l
USA	TX, Austin	Rain	5/17	I-131	15	pCi/l
	TX, Austin	Deposition	5/17	I=131	60	pCi/m 2
USA	UT, Salt Lake City	Air	5/18	I-131	0.35	pCi/m 3
USA	WA, Olympia	Rain	5/19	I-131	220	pCi/l
	WA, Olympia	Deposition	5/19	I-131	330	pCi/m 2
USA	WI, Madison	Rain	5/19	I-131	16	pCi/l
	WI, Madison	Deposition	5/19	I-131	510	pCi/m 2



USA	SC, Columbia	Milk	5/15	I-131	6.12	pCi/l
USA	VA, Charlottesville	Rainwater	5/15	I-131	180.0	pCi/l
USA	WI, Manitowoc	Rainwater	5/16	I-131	3.0	pCi/l

USA	PA, Harrisburg	Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-134	0.029	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-136	0.007	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-137	0.050	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	I-131	0.057	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	I-132	0.006	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Ts-132	0.007	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-134	0.039	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-136	0.006	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-137	0.07	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	I-131	0.078	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	I-132	0.008	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Te-132	0.005	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Ru-103	0.018	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-134	0.023	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-137	0.091	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	I-131	0.088	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Ru-103	0.031	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air Particulate	5/7-14	Cs-134	0.041	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Milk	5/7-14	I-131	320.0	pCi/l
		Milk	5/7-14	I-131	20.0	pCi/l
		Milk	5/7-14	I-131	33.0	pCi/l
		Milk	5/7-14	I-131	44.0	pCi/l
		Milk	5/7-14	I-131	23.0	pCi/l
		Rhubarb	5/7-14	I-131	220.0	pCi/kg
		Fern	5/7-14	I-131	1800.0	pCi/kg
		Fern	5/7-14	Cs-137	39.0	pCi/kg
		Sassafras tea	5/7-14	I-131	1100.00	pCi/kg
		May Apple Weeds	5/7-14	I-131	880.0	pCi/kg
May Apple Weeds	5/7-14	Ru-103	29.0	pCi/kg		
USA	PA, Penn State	Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	Ru-103	0.0168	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	I-131	0.065	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	I-132	0.002	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	Te-132	0.006	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	Cs-134	0.022	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	Cs-136	0.002	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	Cs-137	0.048	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	Ba-140	0.004	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Air (Fiberglass)	5/14-15	La-140	0.005	pCi/m <sup>3</sup>
		Rainwater	5/14	I-131	95.2	pCi/l
Milk	5/14	I-131	26.7	pCi/l		



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Chernobyl*

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH BONE MARROW  
SPECIALISTS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY SHULTZ MET WITH DR. ROBERT GALE, THE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANT SPECIALIST, HIS SPONSOR, ARMAND HAMMER, AND TWO OF DR. GALE'S COLLEAGUES, DR. PAUL TERASAKI AND DR. RICHARD CHAMPLIN, ON MAY 22. DR. GALE REPORTED ON THE PROGRESS OF EFFORTS TO SAVE THE VICTIMS OF CHERNOBYL AND GAVE HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HOW THE SOVIETS HAD REACTED TO THE DISASTER. THE SECRETARY REEMPHASIZED THE PRESIDENT'S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIMS, READINESS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, AND DESIRE TO COOPERATE IN LEARNING HOW BETTER TO PREVENT AND COPE WITH NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS.  
END SUMMARY.

3. DRS. ROBERT GALE, PAUL TERASAKI AND RICHARD CHAMPLIN, ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR SPONSOR, DR. ARMAND HAMMER, MET WITH THE SECRETARY MAY 22 IN HIS OFFICE. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND EUR DAS MARK PALMER WERE ALSO PRESENT. THE SECRETARY BEGAN BY SAYING HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN DEEPLY DISTRESSED BY THE NEWS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. HE ASKED DR. GALE HOW HE SIZED UP THE SITUATION.

4. DR. GALE SPOKE OF A SHORT-TERM AND A LONG-TERM HEALTH THREAT. THIRTY-FIVE PEOPLE HAD BEEN IN IMMEDIATE, CRITICAL DANGER AND THOSE STILL SURVIVING WOULD BE IN CONTINUING DANGER FOR ANOTHER 2-3 MONTHS. A FURTHER THREE-HUNDRED PEOPLE WERE AT SERIOUS RISK, AND PERHAPS FIFTY TO A HUNDRED THOUSAND WERE POTENTIALLY AT RISK OVER THE YEARS TO COME. THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO MAKE THESE PEOPLE AVAILABLE TO GALE, WHO HOPED TO WORK WITH THE U.S. CANCER INSTITUTE TO MONITOR THIS POPULATION.

5. GALE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN VERY OPEN WITH HIM AND APPEARED WILLING TO ALLOW HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO PUBLISH ALL RELEVANT SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL DATA. GALE

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BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TAKE THEM UP ON THIS AND TO LEARN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM THE EVENT.

6. ASKED BY THE SECRETARY TO COMMENT ON THE SOVIETS' PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE, DR. GALE SAID THEIR MEDICAL RESOURCES, THOUGH NOT WORLD-CLASS, WERE "REASONABLE," AND THEIR PHYSICIANS WELL-READ AND KNOWLEDGEABLE, IF NOT AS PRACTICED IN TRANSPLANT OPERATIONS AS THEIR U. S. COUNTERPARTS. WHEREAS IN THE U. S. WE HAD ATTEMPTED NO MORE THAN 2-4 MARROW TRANSPLANTS AT ONE TIME, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN FACED WITH DOING TWENTY IN A SHORT TIME. IDENTIFICATION OF DONORS WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, EVEN WITH THE HELP OF DR. TERASAKI, THE WORLD'S LEADING EXPERT ON TISSUE TYPES. GALE SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET DOCTORS HAD PICKED UP SOME SKILLS. DR. CHAMPLIN (WHO HAD ASSISTED WITH THE USE OF DRUGS) NOTED THAT MOST OF THE SOVIETS' MODERN EQUIPMENT WAS OF U. S. OR EUROPEAN ORIGIN, AND THAT THEY SEEMED TO BE ABOUT TEN YEARS BEHIND.

7. DR. HAMMER RECALLED HOW THE OPERATION TO SEND DR. GALE TO THE USSR HAD GOTTEN STARTED WITH HIS TELEGRAM TO GORBACHEV, AND HOW THE SOVIETS HAD RESPONDED BY WAIVING RED TAPE FOR BOTH THE DOCTORS AND THEIR EQUIPMENT.

8. DR. GALE ESTIMATED THAT A "SUBSTANTIAL" NUMBER OF THE THIRTY-FIVE MOST CRITICAL CASES COULD STILL BE SAVED, AND THAT A "LARGE" NUMBER OF THE 300 SERIOUS VICTIMS ALSO COULD BE RESCUED. HE SAID HE HAD AVOIDED MAKING STATEMENTS EITHER CONFIRMING OR DENYING SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ACCIDENT, AND WOULD STICK TO THAT POLICY IF HE WERE INVITED TO VISIT CHERNOBYL.

9. SECRETARY SHULTZ TOLD THE DOCTORS HE THOUGHT THEY HAD NOT ONLY HELPED THE STRICKEN INDIVIDUALS, BUT GIVEN THE WORLD AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMMON BOND OF HUMANITY THAT

LINKS ITS PEOPLES. BY VOLUNTEERING THEIR SERVICES, THEY HAD IMPRESSED AND INSPIRED US ALL. THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN TRAVELING WHEN THEY HAD HEARD THE NEWS OF CHERNOBYL. THE PRESIDENT HAD IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED A MESSAGE TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV EMPHASIZING HIS SYMPATHY, READINESS TO HELP, AND SPECIFIC THINGS THE U. S. MIGHT DO. WE HAD ALSO EXPRESSED THE POINT THAT THE USSR OWED THE WORLD AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN VERY SLOW TO RELEASE INFORMATION, AND RUMORS TEND TO BE WORSE THAN THE FACTS. THE SOVIETS NOW SEEM TO HAVE ADOPTED A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE, BUT WERE ACCUSING US OF GLOATING OVER THEIR MISFORTUNE, WHICH WAS A TOTAL MISREADING OF THE FACTS. THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE PRESIDENT'S IMMEDIATE INSTINCT WAS ONE OF HUMAN SYMPATHY, A DESIRE TO HELP, AND AN INTEREST IN COOPERATING TO PREVENT AND COPE WITH FUTURE ACCIDENTS.

9. DR. GALE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD CAPITALIZE ON CHERNOBYL TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAD PROPOSED RADICAL REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; WE HAD IMPORTANT PROPOSALS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WHICH WE HOPED WOULD BE ACTED ON. ONE IMPLICATION OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THAT A NUCLEAR WAR COULD NOT BE WON AND SHOULD NEVER BE FOUGHT, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID.

10. ON POSSIBLE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM CHERNOBYL, DR. GALE AND DR. CHAMPLIN NOTED THAT MANY OF THE VICTIMS WERE FIREMEN WHO HAD LACKED ADEQUATE PROTECTION. THERE

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SHOULD HAVE BEEN A BETTER RESPONSE MECHANISM. THE THIRTY-FIVE MOST CRITICAL CASES WERE ALL IN THE PLANT OR WERE BROUGHT IN TO FIGHT THE BLAZE; MOST OF THE 300 OTHER SERIOUS CASES WERE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY AND MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PLANT, DR. GALE SAID. IT WOULD HAVE HELPED TO HAVE A CONTINGENCY LIST OF TISSUE TYPES AS PART OF THE ROUTINE MEDICAL SCREENING OF PERSONNEL AT THE FACILITY. SUCH A LIST MIGHT HAVE SAVED A WEEK. THE DONOR POOL SHOULD BE BETTER ORGANIZED. IN THE U. S., WE COULD WORK WITH THE NAVY TO TIE INTO THE DONOR POOL IN CASE OF ACCIDENTS ABOARD NUCLEAR SUBS, DR. GALE ADDED.

EXDIS

11. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY THANKING THE DOCTORS. HE ASKED THAT THEY CONVEY TO THE SOVIETS HIS SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIMS AND SENSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEM (FYI: DR. GALE PLANS TO RETURN TO THE USSR MAY 23 OR 24).

EXDIS

12. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY FOLLOWING THE MEETING:

I WAS PLEASSED TO VISIT WITH DR. HAMMER, DR. GALE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DRs. TERASAKI AND CHAMPLIN AND TO HEAR THEIR IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT.

EXDIS

I WAS IMPRESSED AND INSPIRED BY DR. GALE'S DESCRIPTIONS OF THE COURAGE AND SACRIFICE WITH WHICH HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUES, AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, HAVE SOUGHT TO COPE WITH THE EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT. AS THE PRESIDENT CONVEYED TO MR. GORBACHEV THE DAY AFTER LEARNING OF THE ACCIDENT, THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO LEND A HAND IN ANY WAY WE CAN IN HELPING THE SOVIET UNION RECOVER FROM THIS TRAGEDY.

EXDIS

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HAS PROPOSED SOME SPECIFIC STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF WHAT HAPPENED AT CHERNOBYL. WE ARE ALREADY DISCUSSING THE SPECIFICS OF SUCH COOPERATION IN THE IAEA FOLLOWING UP ON THE IDEA DEVELOPED AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT. WE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN COOPERATIVE ACTIVITY TO THIS END. SHULTZ  
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