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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/16/2005

**File Folder** USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,  
1986 6/9

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

YARHI-MILO

2912

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10443	PAPER	UPDATE ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	2	5/5/1986	B1 B3
10444	CABLE	032029Z MAY 86 <b>D 2/22/2008 NLRRF06-114/8</b>	7	5/3/1986	B1
10445	CABLE	031557Z MAY 86 <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	4	5/3/1986	B1 B3
10455	CABLE	031617Z MAY 86 <b>D 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	5	5/3/1986	B1 B3
10446	CABLE	042255Z MAY 86 <b>D 2/22/2008 NLRRF06-114/8</b>	8	5/4/1986	B1
10449	COVER SHEET	MORNING SUMMARY CURRENT REPORTS <b>R 2/25/2008 NLRRF06-114/8</b>	1	5/5/1986	B1
10450	PAPER	CURRENT REPORTS <b>R 2/25/2008 NLRRF06-114/8</b>	1	5/5/1986	B1
10447	PAPER	AFGHANISTAN; ROK; AUSTRIA; NICARAGUA; SUDAN; JORDAN/SYRIA; BAHRAIN/QATAR <b>PAR 10/3/2008 F06-114/8</b>	2	ND	B1 B3
10451	PAPER	CURRENT REPORTS <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	5/5/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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1986 6/9

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

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2912

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10448	PAPER	AFGHANISTAN/GENEVA <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	1	ND	B1
10452	PAPER	CURRENT REPORTS <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	ND	B1
10453	PAPER	CHERNOBYL INCIDENT <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	2	ND	B1
10454	CABLE	051245Z MAY 86 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	8	5/5/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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1211  
JP

SECRET [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1), (3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 6, 5 May 1986

SPOT COMMENTARY: Update on Soviet Nuclear Accident

[REDACTED] no water in the cooling ponds for reactors 3 and 4. Water is available at other on-site sources, but high radiation levels in the area could hamper its transfer. If water cannot be supplied to remove the heat buildup in reactor 3, damage to the core would eventually occur, possibly resulting in additional radiation release. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The current weather forecast indicates that strong winds at 20 knots are blowing from the reactor site toward Chernobyl. This forecast and possible Soviet concern about more radioactive releases or the cumulative effects of radiation already released probably account for this delayed effort to relocate the 44,000 people of the city. It may also have been prompted by the visit yesterday of Premier Ryzhkov and several other officials, who could have ordered the evacuation as a prudent measure. [REDACTED]

Continued strong winds in the same direction and new radiation releases could threaten other areas. Of most immediate concern are the Kiev watershed, some 70 kilometers downwind from the reactor, and the city of Kiev with its population of 2.4 million, another 60 kilometers downwind. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Attempts to drop fire suppressent and neutron absorbing materials—a mixture of sand, lead shot, and boron according to Soviet officials—on the core of the unit during the past week probably is minimizing further release of radiation from this reactor. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-114/8 #10443

SECRET [REDACTED]

BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11




~~SECRET~~



121

v



Prepared by:

EURA;  
USMR;



~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

JP 10

PAGE 01 OF 02 NPIC 0627  
SIT473

DTG: 031557Z MAY 86 PSN: 019987  
TOR: 123/1636Z

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DISTRIBUTION: VP SIT MATL LINH /005  
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PRIORITY  
DE YEKHDK #0627 1231556  
P 031557Z MAY 86 ZYS ZZZ8  
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TO KARON

INFO SSO INSCOM //ADCSOPS-H-C-C//  
[REDACTED]

T O P S E C R E T RUFF NOFORN

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Q000

SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTIONS  
NPIC NOON HIGHLIGHT REPORT 86-0741 (S/TK)  
3 MAY 1986

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED,  
CONTROLLED, AND ELIGIBLE FOR FOREIGN RELEASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
IMAGERY POLICY MANUAL, JUNE 1982, AS AMENDED. CLASSIFICATION OF  
EACH PARAGRAPH IS SO DESIGNATED. SATELLITE MISSION REFERENCE DATA  
IS CLASSIFIED TSR. (C/TK)

COMMENTS AND QUERIES REGARDING ITEMS IN THIS REPORT SHOULD BE  
DIRECTED TO THE APPROPRIATE ANALYST VIA THE NPIC/PEG DIVISION CHIEF

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NLRR F06-114/8#10445

BY RWS NARA DATE 3/16/04

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOIA(b)(1), (3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 NPIC 0627

DTG: 031557Z MAY 86 PSN: 019987

(SECURE EXT 38-4645). IF DIALING ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED, CALL CIA  
HQ SECURE PHONE SYSTEM OPERATOR (EXT 33-0000). (S)

CONTENTS

USSR : EMISSION OF SMOKE/VAPOR CONTINUES AT CHERNOBYL (ITEM 1)

POLAND: HIND AT LATKOWO (ITEM 2)

THE ABOVE LIST IS CLASSIFIED SWN.

ITM001.

USSR - NUCLEAR DISASTER

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

12

PAGE 01 OF 02 NPIC 0628  
SIT471

DTG: 031557Z MAY 86 PSN: 019997  
TOR: 123/1640Z

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PRIORITY  
DE YEKHDK #0628 1231556  
P 031557Z MAY 86 ZYS ZZZ8  
FM NPIC

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INFO SSO INSCOM //ADCSOPS-H-C-C//  


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0000

SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTIONS  
NPIC NOON HIGHLIGHT REPORT 86-0741 (S/TK)  
EMISSION OF SMOKE/VAPOR CONTINUES AT CHERNOBYL. (SWN)

CONTINUING ANALYSIS OF THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (BE  
0233-02283) INDICATES REACTOR NO. 4 CONTINUES TO EMIT LIGHT-TONED  
SMOKE/VAPOR. THE CLOUD OF SMOKE/VAPOR APPEARS RELATIVELY DENSE  
COMPARED TO THAT OBSERVED ON 2 MAY. A HEAVY-LIFT HELICOPTER IS NEAR  
THE REACTOR, FLYING ALONG THE APPROXIMATE AZIMUTH OF THE SOUTHERLY  
DRIFTING SMOKE/VAPOR. SMALL SECTIONS OF THE WEST WALL OF REACTOR  
NO. 4 APPEAR TO HAVE COLLAPSED INTO THE REACTOR BUILDING. THE  
COOLING WATER INTAKE POND FOR REACTORS NO. 3 AND NO. 4 HAS BEEN  
DRAINED SINCE 2 MAY. THIS ACTIVITY SUGGESTS EITHER THE COOLING  
SYSTEM FOR AT LEAST REACTOR NO. 3 HAS BEEN OPERATED WITHIN THE PAST ,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

13

PAGE 02 OF 02 NPIC 0628

DTG: 031557Z MAY 86 PSN: 019997

24 HOURS, OR THE WATER IN THE INTAKE POND HAS BEEN DISCHARGED WITHOUT BEING CIRCULATED THROUGH THE REACTOR COOLING SYSTEM. (SWN)

MINOR ACTIVITY IS DISCERNIBLE ON PARTIAL COVERAGE OF THE TOWN OF PRIPYAT. APPROXIMATELY 10 CARGO TRUCKS HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO A LINE AT A CARGO TRANSFER FACILITY NEAR THE RAILYARDS NORTHWEST OF THE REACTOR COMPLEX, SINCE AT LEAST 29 APRIL. NO PERSONNEL OR VEHICLE MOVEMENT IS DISCERNIBLE IN THE AREA. (SWN)

ANALYST - R. BERKEBILE

IMR: 860503 01 05 OP064AA 02.5-06.2 0835Z OP065AA B HC BB 4 (TSR)

ITM002.

POLAND - AIR ACTIVITY

HIND AT LATKOWO. (SWN)

EIGHT HIND ATTACK HELICOPTERS ARE AT LATKOWO (BE 0169-08307). THIS IS THE FIRST OBSERVATION OF HIND HERE AND MAY BE AN UPGRADE OF THE

~~TOP SECRET~~

As of 11 a.m. EDT, no increases in radioactivity above normal background levels have been reported by the radiation monitoring networks in the United States or Canada.

INTERIM TRAVEL GUIDANCE: Precise information on radiation levels resulting from the Chernobyl Soviet nuclear power plant incident remains unavailable at this time. The nature of this incident suggests that increased levels of radiation might exist in surrounding areas, causing the greatest potential public health risk in those areas closest to the incident. The U.S. Public Health Service is making interim guidance available for U.S. citizens who may be traveling to these areas. This guidance will be reviewed and updated as further information becomes available and communicated to the media and to public health officials throughout the nation.

1. Americans living or traveling in or around the affected region may wish to take the following precautions to minimize exposure to radiation:

- Avoid drinking fresh milk or eating other dairy products;
- Eat processed foods when possible and wash or peel fresh produce;
- When possible, drink bottled water and other bottled beverages instead of local water.

2. For U.S. citizens who have visited affected areas recently and have departed from them on or after April 26, 1986, routine medical screening procedures are not recommended. If you have concerns, information and answers to specific questions may be obtained from your state radiation control program or your physician.

3. For U.S. citizens who are planning travel to these areas in the near future, carefully monitor press reports of this situation so that you have the most up-to-date information before making a firm travel commitment.

We have sent technical experts to Moscow and Warsaw. They arrived over the weekend. They are there in a technical capacity to evaluate the health environment at our missions. The team at the Moscow embassy is comprised of military personnel.

An EPA radiation specialist arrived in Poland yesterday to make measurements of radioactivity at the U.S. embassy in Warsaw. Values were low, perhaps three times normal background.

# # #



EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

29

MORNING SUMMARY

May 5, 1986

Current Reports

1. USSR
  - A. Convoy Activity in Chernobyl
  - B. Status of Reactors
2. Afghanistan: Babrak Karmal Resigns as General Secretary
3. ROK: Violent Student-Police Confrontations
4. Austria: Waldheim Faces Runoff
5. Nicaragua: Ortega Adds New Conditions for Contadora Signature
6. Sudan: Ugandan Refugees Flee Attacks
7. Jordan/Syria: Assad To Visit Amman
8. Bahrain/Qatar: Border Dispute Continues To Simmer

Analysis

1. ROK: Student Demonstrations Persist
2. Afghanistan/Geneva VII: Not Yet the Final Stretch
3. Costa Rica: Arias Plans Grandiose Inaugural

Classified by: Nicholas Platt and  
Morton I. Abramowitz  
Declassify on: Originating Agency's  
Determination Required

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/8<sup>72</sup> 10449

BY CW NARA DATE 7/25/08

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/KEYWORD~~

CURRENT REPORTS

May 5, 1986

1. USSR

A. Convoy Activity in Chernobyl

May 4 imagery showed extensive convoy activity in and around the town of Chernobyl. Nearly 500 buses and 200 trucks were seen in the town and in convoys on nearby roads.

INR Comment: The town of Chernobyl is probably contaminated; it lies within the reported 30 km evacuation zone, so the reason for the vehicles' presence now is unclear. A previous evacuation may have been suspended when the explosion occurred and is now being resumed. Some of the convoys may also be bringing in additional relief or decontamination crews. (~~SECRET/NOFORN~~)

B. Status of Reactors

Decreasing amounts of smoke or vapor continue to come from damaged reactor 4, according to May 4 imagery. The cooling water intake pond for reactors 3 and 4 appears completely dry; the water level in the pond for reactors 1 and 2 appears to have fallen. No circulation of water is evident. Thirteen vehicles have arrived at the administration building since the last imagery May 2.

INR Comment: The smoke or vapor indicates reactor 4 is still emitting radioactivity. The reason for draining the pond is still unknown. The Soviets claim to have shut down reactors 1-3 at the time of the accident. Reactors shut down for a week would not need cooling water, but the cooling water basins should have remained ready. (~~SECRET/NOFORN~~)

2. AFGHANISTAN: BABRAK KARMAL RESIGNS AS GENERAL SECRETARY

Afghanistan's ruling party May 4 announced that its 18th party plenum had acceded to Babrak Karmal's request to resign as general secretary, Embassy Kabul and Moscow domestic press report. Ex-security chief and Central Committee Secretary Najibullah was unanimously named to replace him. Babrak continues as president and politburo member, but Embassy Kabul reports the revolutionary council was scheduled to meet May 4 to decide who will become president.

INR Comment: Although Moscow may have engineered this change as a signal of a broader reconciliation process, Najibullah's accession to power cannot be viewed as a dramatic departure from Babrak's chairmanship. The Soviets remain in control and the mujahidin will not be convinced of Moscow's desire to broaden the regime's social base. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

(See Item 2, Analysis, for related information.)

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~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~

MLRR F06-114/8 # 10450

BY CA NARA DATE 7/25/08



DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR F06-114/8#10447  
BY L05 NARA DATE 10/3/08

Embassy Kabul Comment: It is unlikely Babrak will remain as president. Most Afghans initially will applaud the removal of Babrak, whom they consider primarily responsible for bringing Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The USSR continues to control Afghanistan's political scene, however, and any fundamental changes will have to be approved, if not initiated, in Moscow. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. ROK: VIOLENT STUDENT-POLICE CONFRONTATIONS

The constitutional revision petition rally in Inchon May 3 was postponed after pitched street battles between students and riot police, according to Embassy Seoul and press reports. There were 100 arrests and 30 police were injured. National police director Kang urged the NKDP to refrain from holding further rallies, and Foreign Minister Lee May 4 told Ambassador Walker the Inchon riot had revealed the opposition's radical and violent intentions.

Embassy Seoul Comment: The rioting youth had their own agenda and were not under NKDP control. Initial government reaction showed frustration and anger. Arrests of opposition leaders, including the Rev. Mun Ik-Hwan, are increasingly likely. (CONFIDENTIAL)


INR Comment: The political opposition, which is against student violence and anti-Americanism and is under government pressure to return the constitutional revision issue to the national assembly, could decide to postpone, at least temporarily, future rallies to preserve its moderate, non-violent image. (CONFIDENTIAL)

(See Item 1, Analysis, for further information.)

4. AUSTRIA: WALDHEIM FACES RUNOFF

Waldheim failed to gain an absolute majority in the May 4 election and must face Steyrer in a runoff June 8, according to press reports. Waldheim received 49.6 percent of the vote to Steyrer's 43.7.

INR Comment: In the month until the runoff, Waldheim's lead will suffer from revelations further taxing his credibility. Should Waldheim nonetheless win, Chancellor Sinowatz may postpone his own June 25 US visit. (CONFIDENTIAL)



FOIA(b) (1)  
FOIA(b) (3)



FOIA(b) (1)  
FOIA(b) (3)



6. SUDAN: UGANDAN REFUGEES FLEE ATTACKS

Over 27,000 predominantly Madi Ugandan refugees have abandoned 16 of 17 UNHCR camps in southern Sudan for the Ugandan border, Embassy Khartoum reports. They fled following attacks by local bandits and Acholi tribesmen from Uganda. Law and order on the Nile's east bank has reportedly broken down, with indiscriminate looting, raping, and killing. Senior UNHCR officials report no indication of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) involvement in the attacks.

Embassy Khartoum Comment: It seems the Acholis are carrying the Uganda war into Sudan, attracted to the camps by food and supplies. The SPLA probably would not want to take on roving bands of Acholis in addition to the Sudanese army on the east bank. The UNHCR cannot expect much help from Sudanese authorities either, since the government does not control the area. ~~(SECRET)~~

7. JORDAN/SYRIA: ASSAD TO VISIT AMMAN

Syrian President Assad will visit Jordan May 5, according to press reports. Assad's first visit to Amman in a decade follows up Hussein's December visit to Damascus.

INR Comment: Substantive results are unlikely. The rapprochement process initiated last summer has considerably diminished the level of hostility between the regimes, but accomplished little else. Assad will probably seek Jordanian endorsement of Syria's Lebanon policy and a restatement of rejection of direct negotiation with Israel. The two are anti-Arafat and will probably explore the possibility of cooperation in manipulating Palestinian politics, but are unlikely to find much common ground. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

8. BAHRAIN/QATAR: BORDER DISPUTE CONTINUES TO SIMMER

GCC Secretary General Bishara left for Bahrain and Qatar May 3 to try to contain the border dispute, according to press reports. Hassan Kamel, an advisor to the Qatari Amir, told Embassy Doha May 3 that Qatar April 30 had given the Saudis five terms for resolution of the dispute, including Bahrain's agreement to submit the status of all disputed islands and reefs to arbitration. Kamel said Saudi King Fahd asked for two weeks to respond.

INR Comment: Bahrain probably will continue to resist any effort toward wholesale arbitration and will expect the Saudis to support its position. Bishara probably was encouraged by the Saudis to mediate the dispute. The Qataris, however, seem determined to keep the heat on the Bahrainis, making this problem difficult to defuse in the short term. ~~(SECRET/NOFORN)~~



BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 5, 1986

1. ROK: STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS PERSIST

Despite government repression, student political protest continues, often accompanied by violence. Students are using a variety of forms of protest, including two cases of self-immolation, and anti-US themes have become more prominent. Ambivalent about student support for its constitutional-revision campaign, the political opposition has discouraged student participation in its rallies and has strongly urged students to avoid violence and anti-Americanism.

\* \* \*

In its effort to end student demonstrations, the government has jailed or detained more than 900 student activists, declared all student demonstrations unlawful, and deployed massive police force to break up protests quickly. This has so far apparently diminished the number and size of this spring's demonstrations compared to last year's, but they are still occurring, and are often violent.

Campus activists are also using other methods. In February, two-thirds of the graduating class of the most prestigious university in Korea walked out of commencement. Two students set themselves on fire during an April 28 demonstration. Several new anti-US themes--criticism of Team Spirit and of the recent US military action against Libya--have appeared. A popular theme in 1980--opposition to compulsory military training--has reappeared. Anti-nuclear themes and demands for the withdrawal of US and Japanese capital from the ROK have become more prominent.

Although appreciative of moderate student support for their democratization campaign, political opposition leaders are concerned about the violence and anti-American tone of many student demonstrations. Kim Dae-jung in late April publicly criticized violence by student extremists espousing anti-American, antinuclear themes. In trying to persuade the students to focus their efforts on peaceful demands for greater democratization, New Korea Democratic party (NKDP) leaders are seeking to protect the party from government retaliation and maintain vital domestic and international--especially US--support for their objectives.

These NKDP efforts are likely to have little impact on the extremist students, who disdain the NKDP and want to destroy the entire system rather than to reform the present government. Violent student protest is likely to continue to test the patience and discipline of the government. Barring some unanticipated development, however, such as a major police overreaction causing serious casualties, the authorities should be able to contain future demonstrations.

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2. AFGHANISTAN/GENEVA VII: NOT YET THE FINAL STRETCH

At the seventh round of Geneva negotiations, starting today, the participants will confront the central issue of a Soviet troop withdrawal. Convinced that the Soviets intend to get out of Afghanistan soon, UN negotiator Cordovez is optimistic. We anticipate protracted and inconclusive wrangling.

\* \* \*

During his March shuttle mission, Cordovez extracted from the Karmal regime an unacceptable Soviet/DRA timetable for troop withdrawal and an agreement to continue proximity talks to discuss the settlement's key fourth instrument. In return, Pakistan consented to participate in direct talks once the settlement was concluded.

[REDACTED]

The fourth instrument binds all elements of the settlement together and specifically covers the troop withdrawal time table and monitoring arrangements. Cordovez recently gave the Pakistani and DRA foreign ministers a new draft to serve as a basis for the Geneva talks.

[REDACTED]

Aside from the timeframe question, other issues will also bedevil the negotiations. Kornienko's remarks suggest that Kabul may again raise the issues of simultaneity and direct talks--subjects on which Islamabad is unyielding. He also intimated that an agreement with Iran might be a Soviet/DRA prerequisite for a final settlement with Pakistan. A Pakistani foreign ministry official on April 30 confirmed that Pakistan would reject a DRA/Soviet proposal for a joint Afghan-Pakistani monitoring commission and will insist on a UN role.

The official also said the resistance leaders are being kept up to date on the negotiations.

[REDACTED]

The Pakistanis have argued to the Soviets that there are "political elements" in Afghanistan other than the current ruling party "which favor good relations with the USSR." The key question is whether Moscow is ready to face the humiliation of abandoning its clients and turning Afghanistan over to other "elements" that might consider "good" relations to be a pragmatic necessity but would try to keep them as minimal as possible. We do not yet see evidence that Moscow is ready for such a step.



NLRR F06-114/8#10452

- 3 -

BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/083. COSTA RICA: ARIAS PLANS GRANDIOSE INAUGURAL

President-elect Arias intends to use his May 8 inauguration to announce an "alliance for freedom" of Latin American democracies against the dictatorships of Nicaragua, Cuba, Chile, and Paraguay. He hopes to pressure and isolate Nicaragua by calling on Contadora to set a time table for democratization. He means to restrain himself on his differences with the United States over contra funding, but international media reporters will try to catch Arias off guard and will press the other Latin dignitaries for statements.

\* \* \*

Arias takes over from Luis Alberto Monge, perhaps the most popular president in Costa Rica's long democratic history. He wants to make his mark through an ambitious economic program and a central role in regional affairs. He hopes his inaugural address will be "remembered by Costa Rican school children for years to come" and has asked advisers to review the inaugural speeches of presidents Kennedy and Reagan.

Arias intends to use his inaugural to put maximum diplomatic pressure on Managua. He deeply resents Costa Rica's diminished prestige, perceived diplomatic isolation, and loss of credibility in South America and Europe vis-a-vis Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua. He will unveil a short timetable for Contadora, including precise steps for democratization in Nicaragua, and invite attending presidents to endorse a statement of democratic principles for all of Latin America. Arias lobbied intensely for high-level participation from the Contadora and support-group countries to add force to his initiatives but deliberately did not invite Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.

Arias sees his initiative as a last chance for Nicaragua either to sign a Contadora treaty or face isolation and greater US military pressure. Although he strongly dislikes the Sandinistas, Arias does not believe the US-backed contras can oust them. Rather, he fears that prolonged civil war in Nicaragua will keep investors away from Costa Rica, flood the country with more refugees, interfere with national development plans, and undermine Costa Rican democracy. If Contadora fails, Arias has no other strategy for dealing with the Sandinistas, except perhaps to accommodate while praying quietly for US intervention.

Arias is eager to meet with Vice-President Bush and intends to avoid repeating his earlier criticism of support for the contras that had embarrassed the United States. Nicaragua--rather than the rites of Costa Rican democracy--will be the focus of the international media, which will look to all the foreign dignitaries for stories on this issue. To the extent that the visitors accept Arias' concepts, the inauguration could put considerable public pressure on the Sandinistas.



UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: TRGY, AMED, SENV, CZ, UR  
SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA AND PUBLIC REACTION TO  
CHERNOBYL DISASTER

REF: (A) PRAGUE 2401 (NOTAL), (B) PRAGUE 2357 (NOTAL)  
(C) PRAGUE 2405 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA FOR THE FIRST TIME  
MAY 4 BEGAN REPORTING INCREASED LEVELS OF RADIATION  
-- 0.20-0.50 MICROGRAYS (SIC) PER HOUR. ANNOUNCEMENTS  
CONTINUED, HOWEVER, TO DOWNPLAY ANY CONCEIVABLE HEALTH  
RISK, AND GOC HAS NOT RECOMMENDED PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES.  
PRESS AND TELEVISION COMMENTARY HAS DWELT UPON THE  
HYSTERICAL AND ANTI-SOVIET NATURE OF WESTERN REACTIONS  
TO THE ACCIDENT. THE CZECHOSLOVAK PUBLIC APPEARS TO  
BE AWAKENING TO THE PROSPECT THAT MORE IS AFOOT THAN  
ITS LEADERS ARE TELLING IT, ALTHOUGH MANY CITIZENS  
SEEM GENUINELY UNINFORMED OR UNCONCERNED. WESTERN  
EMBASSIES EXHIBIT VARYING DEGREES OF ANXIETY.  
END SUMMARY.

2. CZECHOSLOVAK TELEVISION NEWS MAY 4, AS REPORTED  
REF A, FOR THE FIRST TIME DECLARED THAT LEVELS OF  
RADIATION IN SOME AREAS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD  
"SHOWN A SLIGHT INCREASE." THE 0.20-0.50 MICROGRAYS  
(SIC) PER HOUR TO WHICH THE GOC ADMITTED WERE HELD  
TO BE "200 TIMES LOWER THAN THE LEVEL OF RADIATION  
THAT WOULD DAMAGE HUMAN HEALTH." THERE HAS BEEN NO  
OTHER GOC STATEMENT OR OTHER PROVISION OF INFORMATION  
CONCERNING LEVELS OF RADIATION IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS  
ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO APPEARED ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE  
MAY 5 EDITION OF RUDE PRAVO. AN FSN WITH CONTACTS  
IN THE AGRICULTURE MINISTRY REPORTS THAT THE GOC HAS

3. EDITORIAL EMPHASES HAVE BEEN THE "HYSTERIA" THAT  
CZECHOSLOVAK JOURNALISTS OBSERVE IN WESTERN PUBLIC  
AND GOVERNMENTAL REACTIONS, THE "ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN"  
THAT WASHINGTON AND OTHER WESTERN CAPITALS ARE SEEN  
AS CONDUCTING, AND THE USG'S HANDLING OF THE THREE  
MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, WHICH IS DEPICTED AS AN EQUIVALENT  
DISASTER TO THAT WHICH OCCURRED IN THE UKRAINE.  
IN A MAY 4 EDITORIAL, RUDE PRAVO EDITOR ZDENEK HORENI  
TOUCHED ON ALL THESE EMPHASES AND ACCUSED THE USG OF  
"MISUSE OF AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE" IN AN EFFORT TO "DI-  
VERT ATTENTION FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRESENT-DAY  
QUESTIONS WHICH THE USSR IS URGENTLY PROPOSING AT  
INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS." MEDIA COMMENTARY HAS  
ALSO CHARACTERIZED U.S. FAILURE TO ACCED TO THE  
SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM AS A GREATER DANGER  
THAN THAT POSED BY THE ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL.

4. GOC SILENCE ON RADIATION LEVELS AND OFFICIAL  
PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ARE  
UNNECESSARY APPEAR NOT TO HAVE ASSUAGED THE FEARS  
OF SOME WHILE REINFORCING THE IGNORANCE AND/OR  
FATALISM OF MANY OLZOSOME FSN'S AND OTHER  
CZE

V CONTACTS HAVE EXPRESSED FEAR FOR THE  
SAFETY OF THEIR CHILDREN AND ANGER AT THE SOVIET  
UNION FOR SUBORDINATING CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZENS'  
PHYSICAL HEALTH TO ITS OWN POLITICAL INTERESTS.  
NOT ONLY DURING THE MAY DAY PARADE, HOWEVER, BUT  
ALSO DURING THE EXCEEDINGLY WARM WEEKEND WHICH

FOLLOWED, MANY CZECHOSLOVAK FAMILIES WALKED, PICNICKED,  
PLAYED AND GARDENED WITH APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN.  
FSN'S DISAGREE AS TO WHETHER THE PUBLIC'S LEVEL OF  
ANXIETY IS INCREASING, AND SEVERAL NOTE THAT THEIR  
REPETITIONS OF INFORMATION WITH WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED  
THEM HAVE ELICITED SKEPTICAL REACTIONS FROM OTHERS.  
SOME REPORT THAT GOC STATEMENTS OF MAY 4 AND 5 HAVE  
BEGUN TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC CONCERN. SEVERAL  
HAVE REMARKED IRONICALLY ON THE GOC'S DECISION,  
DESPITE THE RADIATION, TO SEND A TEAM OF CYCLISTS  
TO THE ZAVOD MIRU RACE DUE TO BEGIN IN KIEV.

5. WE CONTINUE TO MAKE AVAILABLE IN TELEPHONE  
BRIEFINGS OF OUR EMPLOYEES AND AMERICAN DEPENDENTS  
INFORMATION WE RECEIVE FROM THE DEPARTMENT, FROM  
NEIGHBORING POSTS, AND FROM AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN  
BT



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01  
EOB759

PRAGUE 2419  
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 PRAGUE 02419

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USIA FOR EU

E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: TRGY, AMED, SENV, CZ, UR  
SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAK MEDIA AND PUBLIC REACTION TO

RADIO. IN THESE BRIEFINGS, WE HAVE ADVISED THE EMBASSY COMMUNITY TO AVOID LOCAL DAIRY PRODUCTS, WASH ALL PRODUCE THOROUGHLY, RELY ON BOTTLED WATER, MINIMIZE EXPOSURE TO DUST AND GRASS (ESPECIALLY BY CHILDREN), AND AVOID TOUCHING PETS WHICH HAVE COME INTO CONTACT WITH GRASS AND DUST. BRITISH EMBASSY, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM LONDON, HAS POUCHED FOR ANALYSIS WATER AND MILK SAMPLES AND SPECIMENS OF LOCAL PRODUCE, BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHEN THE RESULTS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE. CANADIANS HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ARE SEEKING TO KEEP MEMBERS OF THE CANADIAN COMMUNITY INFORMED.

6. COMMENT: THE ABSENCE OF ANY RELIABLE DATA ON RADIATION LEVELS HERE IS OUR MOST PRESSING CONCERN. AS WE REPORTED REF C, RADIATION READINGS IN THE AREAS OF AUSTRIA NEAREST TO PRAGUE ARE THE HIGHEST IN THAT COUNTRY. THIS INFORMATION VACUUM, IT SEEMS TO US, IS BEGINNING TO TELL ON THE LOCAL POPULACE AS WELL. CZECHS AND SLOVAKS PROBABLY MORE FREQUENTLY LISTEN TO VOA, RFE AND BBC THAN TO AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN BROADCASTS. AS ONLY THE LATTER HAVE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN THIS AREA OF EUROPE, THERE MAY BE GENUINE IGNORANCE ON THE PART OF MANY AS TO THE NEED FOR THEM. END COMMENT.

SCHMIDT  
BT





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 USMISSION USUN NEW 1267 DTG: 051635Z MAY 86 PSN: 022563  
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CAS  
7/2/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN NEW YORK 01267  
SECSTATE PLEASE PASS TO DS/CC, DS/PL, DS/TAGS  
E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: ASEC, UR  
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION AT SOVIET MISSION  
RE: EVENTS AT CHERNOBYL

1. NEW YORK CITY POLICE REPORT THAT A SCHEDULED DEMONSTRATION BY THE UKRAINIAN STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, EXPECTED TO DRAW TWENTY-FIVE PEOPLE PROTESTING TREATMENT OF UKRAINIANS IN THE SOVIET UNION, EXPANDED TO MORE THAN TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE (225), PROTESTING THE NUCLEAR REACTOR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL. TWENTY-ONE PERSONS WERE ARRESTED FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT
2. THE DEMONSTRATION BEGAN AT 1630 HOURS FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1986, WITH APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS PROTESTING NUCLEAR POWER, THE EVENTS AT CHERNOBYL, AND THE LACK OF INFORMATION ON SAME COMING FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THESE PEOPLE WERE BEHIND POLICE BARRICADES AND PEACEFUL IN THE DESIGNATED DEMONSTRATION AREA (EXCEPT FOR ONE (1) WOMAN WHO REFUSED TO GO BEHIND THE BARRICADES AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT).
3. WHILE THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS TAKING PLACE, A VAN DROVE UP IN FRONT OF SMUN, STOPPED, AND TWENTY (20) PEOPLE DRESSED AS "NINJAS" JUMPED OUT AND CHARGED THE MISSION. THEY MADE NO ATTEMPT TO ENTER SMUN, HOWEVER, LYING DOWN ON THE SIDEWALK IMMEDIATELY AFTER CROSSING THE STREET. APART FROM STARTLING THE SOVIETS AND NYPD IN FRONT OF SMUN, THESE TWENTY SERVED LITTLE PURPOSE AS THEY WERE ARRESTED AND REMOVED IN POLICE VANS WITHIN MINUTES OF THEIR ARRIVAL.
4. THE DEMONSTRATION ENDED WITHOUT FURTHER EVENT OR ARREST AT 1830 HOURS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# Soviet Nuclear Accident

JP 39

FOR RELEASE: 2:00 P.M., MONDAY, MAY 5, 1986

## A Task Force Report

CONTACT: DAVE COHEN (202) 382-4355

Radiation data from air monitoring networks in the United States and Canada continue to show no increases over normal background levels. For the United States, analyses of samples received at the Eastern Environmental Radiation Facility on May 4 cover 12 samples collected on May 3, 7 samples collected on May 2, 3 samples collected on May 1, 2 samples collected on April 30, and one sample each collected on April 29, April 28, April 24, and April 21. Canadian data cover results from 24 stations collected May 1.

Radioactivity released into the atmosphere as a consequence of the nuclear power incident in the Soviet Union has now reached the area of Japan. Early readings of radioactive contamination taken in Japan of rainwater and locally grown vegetables indicate little or no health hazard. To the extent that the early Japanese findings are predictive of any possible radioactive contamination in the U.S., federal officials continue to believe there will be no public health risk here. Further updates on the situation will be provided as additional information becomes available.

Wind speeds at jet stream levels (about 30,000 feet) have been moving air rapidly west to east across the Pacific Ocean and the United States at speeds of over 100 mph. Small amounts of radioactivity that mixed upward to these levels from the Chernobyl nuclear accident have already been detected by aircraft flying off the northwest U.S. coast. Therefore, patches of activity are now moving across North America at high altitudes. The most likely source of early detection near the ground will be in rainwater, particularly from thunderstorms reaching altitudes of 20,000 to 30,000 feet or more. As of this time, it is believed that concentrations in rainwater will be low. Activity at lower altitudes is being transported less rapidly and will probably move into the U.S. during subsequent days.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has increased its frequency of analysis for all precipitation samples to daily and for milk samples to twice per week.

(more)



The advisory against travel to Kiev and adjacent areas remains in effect. Precise information on radiation levels resulting from the Chernobyl Soviet nuclear power plant incident remains unavailable at this time. The nature of this incident suggests that increased levels of radiation might exist in surrounding areas, causing the greatest potential public health risk in those areas closest to the incident. The U.S. Public Health Service is making interim guidance available for U.S. citizens who may be traveling to these areas. This guidance will be reviewed and updated as further information becomes available and communicated to the media and to public health officials throughout the nation.

1. Americans living or traveling in or around the affected region may wish to take the following precautions to minimize exposure to radiation:
  - o Avoid drinking fresh milk or eating other dairy products;
  - o Eat processed foods when possible and wash or peel fresh produce;
  - o When possible, drink bottled water and other bottled beverages instead of local water.
  
2. For U.S. citizens who have visited affected areas recently and have departed from them on or after April 26, 1986, routine medical screening procedures are not recommended. If you have concerns, information and answers to specific questions may be obtained from your state radiation control program or your physician.
  
3. For U.S. citizens who are planning travel to these areas in the near future, carefully monitor press reports of this situation so that you have the most up-to-date information before making a firm travel commitment.

We have sent technical experts to Moscow and Warsaw. They arrived over the weekend. They are there in a technical capacity to evaluate the health environment at our missions. An EPA radiation specialist arrived in Poland Saturday to make measurements of radioactivity at the U.S. embassy in Warsaw. Values were low, perhaps three times normal background.

(more)



The U.S. government welcomes the news that the Soviets have invited International Atomic Energy Agency Director Hans Blix and two of his associates to Moscow in connection with the Chernobyl incident. It is hoped that this indicates that the Soviets are now willing to make available the important information the world community requires to safeguard international health and safety.

The Task Force is receiving information it has requested on radiation readings in air, water and food from many foreign countries. As this information is analyzed, new travel advisories will be issued as needed. Also, to the best of our knowledge (given the continuing lack of data from the Soviets), the situation at the plant appears to remain stable with damage at reactor four only. We will continue to monitor the situation and will update it in the event of major changes.

# # #



# Soviet Nuclear Accident

*Sb. Martin*<sup>42</sup>

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(more)



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\* \* \*

Report of Dose Assessment Working Group for 5/5/86

Work Group Members:

- Mike Mardis, EPA
- Neal Nelson, EPA
- Jerome Puskin, EPA
- Chris Nelson, EPA
- Bill Gunter, EPA
- Ed Branagan, NRC
- Gail Schmidt, HHS
- DOE (To be identified)

These projections are based on the best data available to the EPA at this time. The data were collected through EPA, NRC, DOE, and DOS contacts and, in most cases, do not represent information provided directly by the governments of the respective countries. Most of the data are identified and described in Swedish. Unfortunately, none of the Work Group is fluent in that language.

QUALITY OF DATA

The Work Group has received little information regarding the measurement and quality assurance techniques used in generating this data. However, the sources of the data are generally considered to be reputable health protection organizations

Typical data assessment problems include possible transcription errors. Caution should be used in disseminating these dose assessments since their quality cannot be assured.

EXTERNAL EXPOSURES

Observed Exposures

The most important source of radiation from the accident is from external gamma irradiation. Information regarding external exposure levels in Europe are very sketchy. The most detailed information comes from Sweden, where levels in the range 100-1000 uR/hr (10-100 x background) have been observed in central and eastern parts of the country, beginning on April 28th.

At the highest levels observed in Western Europe i.e., 1,000 uR/hr, an individual would receive about 100 mrem of whole-body radiation in one week (about equivalent to the annual background dose). This may represent an overestimate since much of the measured exposure may be due to beta rather than gamma-rays, and external beta-irradiation would produce a negligible internal dose. Futhermore, indoor levels are likely to be appreciably lower than those measured outdoors.



Levels of 10-20 times background have been observed in Finland, Poland, West Germany, Austria, and other parts of Sweden. Exposure to these levels for a week could produce a dose of 10-20 mrem, or 10-20% of annual background.

CONCENTRATIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES IN AIR

Radionuclides that have been detected in air in European countries during the first five days following the accident include: I-131, Cs-134, Cs-137, Te-132, Ru-103, Mo-99, Np-239, and Nb-95. The Dose Assessment Work Group has received data on I-131 concentrations in air from four countries: (1) Finland, (2) Italy, (3) West Germany, and (4) Sweden. This does not mean that radioiodine has not been detected in air in other countries, but simply that values have not been reported.

The most extensive data have been received from Sweden. Concentrations of I-131 in air have ranged from less than 0.1 to up to 4,500 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted that the value of 4,500 Bq/m<sup>3</sup> may be a transcription error (possibly 4.5 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>), and this possibility needs to be investigated. If the value of 4,500 Bq/m<sup>3</sup> is erroneous, then the concentrations of I-131 in air range from less than 0.1 to 500 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>.

Reported concentrations of I-131 in air in Finland have ranged from 2 to 30,000 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted that the two highest values were reported in units of Bq/l (rather than Bq/m<sup>3</sup>). The possibility of a transcription error needs to be investigated.

Iodine-131 concentrations in air in Italy have ranged from less than 1 to about 40 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted that the I-131 data from Italy have been marked PROPRIETARY.

The measured concentrations of I-131 in air for the various countries can be compared with the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) of I-131 in air for the general public. The MPC for I-131 in air is 100 pCi/m<sup>3</sup> or about 3.7 Bq/m<sup>3</sup>. If an individual were exposed to a concentration of 3.7 Bq/m<sup>3</sup> of I-131 for a year, then the dose to the thyroid would be about 1.5 rem. Assuming an individual were exposed to a concentration of 10 Bq/m<sup>3</sup> for five days, then the dose to the thyroid of an individual is estimated to be about 60 mrems.

CONCENTRATIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES IN MILK

Sweden and Italy have reported a limited number of measurements of iodine-131 in milk. Levels in Sweden ranged from 5 to 696 Bq/l while those in Italy were from 0 to 93 Bq/l.

Drinking a liter of milk at a level of 700 Bq/l would provide a thyroid dose to an average adult of about 32 mrem, about one-third of the normal annual background. The annual PAG for the thyroid is 1.5 rem, i.e. an intake of 48 liters at this level would exceed the PAG.

Countries which are closer to the release can be expected to have higher concentrations of iodine-131 in milk than those measured in Sweden or Italy. Since iodine-131 has an eight-day half-life, the potential for contamination will decrease accordingly.

CONCENTRATIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES IN PRECIPITATION

Levels of radioactivity in rainwater in Sweden ranged from 5-27 uCi/liter of I-131. At Uppsala, 6 uCi/liter of I-131, 2 uCi/liter of I-132, 0.6 uCi/liter of I-133 and 0.2 uCi/liter of Cs-137 were found on April 29, 1986. In Japan, 0.010 to 0.013 uCi/liter of I-131 were reported in rainwater on May 4. If this water is collected in cisterns for human use it could cause a problem. A liter of rainwater contains 2 to 100 times more I-132 or I-133 per liter than allowed for a year's intake in U.S. drinking water and 2,000 to 10,000 times more I-131 per liter than allowed for a year's water intake. Drinking water in Gotland and Oskarshamn, Sweden contained 1/10 to 1/4 as much I-131 per liter as allowed in U.S. drinking water for a year.



# WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

*JP*  
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*file*

DATE: 5/5/85

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: --

SUBJECT: SUMMIT STATEMENTS

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHAVEZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HICKS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LACY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Attached are the final texts of the Summit statements on Chernobyl and Terrorism. FYI.

RESPONSE:

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(Final Draft)

STATEMENT ON  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

May 5, 1986

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial nations and the Representatives of the European Community, have discussed the implications of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. We express our deep sympathy for those affected. We remain ready to extend assistance, in particular medical and technical, as and when requested.
2. Nuclear power is and, properly managed, will continue to be an increasingly widely used source of energy. For each country the maintenance of safety and security is an international responsibility, and each country engaged in nuclear power generation bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its installations. Each of our countries meets exacting standards. Each country, furthermore, is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete information on nuclear emergencies and accidents, in particular those with potential transboundary consequences. Each of our countries accepts that responsibility, and we urge the Government of the Soviet Union, which did not do so in the case of Chernobyl, to



provide urgently such information, as our and other countries have requested.

3. We note with satisfaction the Soviet Union's willingness to undertake discussions this week with the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We expect that these discussions will lead to the Soviet Union's participation in the desired post-accident analysis.

4. We welcome and encourage the work of the IAEA in seeking to improve international cooperation on the safety of nuclear installations, the handling of nuclear accidents and their consequences, and the provision of mutual emergency assistance. Moving forward from the relevant IAEA guidelines, we urge the early elaboration of an international convention committing the parties to report and exchange information in the event of nuclear emergencies or accidents. This should be done with the least possible delay.

## STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

May 5, 1986

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies and the representatives of the European Community, assembled here in Tokyo, strongly reaffirm our condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms, of its accomplices and of those, including governments, who sponsor or support it. We abhor the increase in the level of such terrorism since our last meeting, and in particular its blatant and cynical use as an instrument of government policy. Terrorism has no justification. It spreads only by the use of contemptible means, ignoring the values of human life, freedom and dignity. It must be fought relentlessly and without compromise.

2. Recognizing that the continuing fight against terrorism is a task which the international community as a whole has to undertake, we pledge ourselves to make maximum efforts to fight against that scourge. Terrorism must be fought effectively through determined, tenacious, discreet and patient action combining national measures with international cooperation. Therefore, we urge all like-minded nations to collaborate with us, particularly in such international fora as the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, drawing on their expertise to improve and extend countermeasures against terrorism and those who sponsor or support it.



3. We, the Heads of State or Government, agree to intensify the exchange of information in relevant fora on threats and potential threats emanating from terrorist activities and those who sponsor or support them, and on ways to prevent them.

4. We specify the following as measures open to any government concerned to deny to international terrorists the opportunity and the means to carry out their aims, and to identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism. We have decided to apply these measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions in respect of any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, and in particular of Libya, until such time as the state concerned abandons its complicity in, or support for, such terrorism. These measures are:

- refusal to export arms to states which sponsor or support terrorism;

- strict limits on the size of the diplomatic and consular missions and other official bodies abroad of states which engage in such activities, control of travel of members of such missions and bodies, and, where appropriate, radical reductions in, or even the closure of, such missions and bodies;

- denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic personnel, who have been expelled or excluded from one of our states on suspicion of involvement in international terrorism or who have been convicted of such a terrorist offence;

- improved extradition procedures within due process of domestic law for bringing to trial those who have perpetrated such acts of terrorism;

- stricter immigration and visa requirements and procedures in respect of nationals of states which sponsor or support terrorism;

- the closest possible bilateral and multilateral cooperation between police and security organizations and other relevant authorities in the fight against terrorism.

Each of us is committed to work in the appropriate international bodies to which we belong to ensure that similar measures are accepted and acted upon by as many other governments as possible.

5. We will maintain close cooperation in furthering the objectives of this statement and in considering further measures. We agree to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation. We are ready to promote bilaterally and multilaterally further actions to be taken in international organizations or fora competent to fight against international terrorism in any of its forms.



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Chernobyl Incident: Background on State Department  
Press Statement Relating to Notification of Affected States

The State Department spokesman has stated our view in a low key manner that customary international law (but not a specific treaty) calls for notification in these circumstances. Our view is derived from the widespread practice and public declarations of states in other environmental contexts, including specific conventions on transboundary air and marine pollution and the more general principle that a state must take reasonable measures to minimize damage to its neighbors. We have not pressed this legal issue further and recommend strongly against being drawn into a legal debate that could divert attention from more central, practical considerations.

This paper is : (1) to explain generally the international law concepts underlying the press statement; and (2) to caution against public emphasis on this narrow legal issue and to suggest a broader, more constructive context for the information issue. We note that neither the press statement nor this paper addresses related legal issues such as the enforceability of a duty to notify, and any liabilities of the Soviet Union in connection with the incident.

(1) The meaning of the statement. International law is derived from two major sources -- treaties and custom. In this case, we have not identified any governing treaties to which the Soviet Union is a party. It is therefore necessary to examine customary international law. Customary international law imposes obligations but unlike a specific treaty, derives from the general practice of states, as reflected in, inter alia, their behavior, international agreements, and statements of policy.

Serious nuclear incidents are extremely rare so a body of practice specifically related to such incidents has not developed. However, practice more generally in the field of transboundary pollution, particularly as reflected in multilateral instruments which contain notification and consultation requirements (such as The Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, to which the Soviet Union is a party; the 1974 OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution; and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea), evidence support for a duty to inform states potentially affected by an incident of this gravity. A notification requirement is also consistent with the general principle that states should act with due regard for the interests of other states. Finally, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which includes the principle that states must ensure, consistent with their right to exploit their own resources, that activities within their jurisdiction and control do not cause damage to other states or areas outside of national jurisdiction, also evidences a customary international law duty to inform

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BY LBJ NARA DATE 9/30/08



neighboring states. We are unaware of authority that could be cited to support a deliberate decision to withhold available information needed to deal with potentially serious trans-boundary health and safety effects of a major disaster, particularly when specific and repeated requests for information have been made.

Customary international law, especially in an emerging area such as this, cannot be expected to provide precise rules, for example, by specifying the type of notification required in every circumstance. It is noteworthy, however, that an IAEA experts group, in which Soviet experts participated, prepared non-binding "Guidelines on Reportable Events, Integrated Planning, and Information Exchange in a Transboundary Release of Radioactive Materials" (published as INFCIRC/321 by the IAEA), recommending very specific forms of notification. This work could provide the basis for a more formal undertaking of states. (The U.S. proposed a convention under IAEA auspices in 1981.)

(2) Caution Against Public Emphasis of this Legal Issue. Consistent experience teaches that emphasizing the legal aspects of a foreign affairs issue of this character can detract from addressing more immediate practical concerns and make international cooperation more difficult. For one thing, as reflected above, customary international environmental law is in a formative stage and is subject to considerable divergence of views. Highlighting the narrow legal issue thus will immediately invite endless and non-productive debate. This is particularly risky because it could convert the issue to one of whether the U.S. legal position is correct, rather than how this incident should be dealt with and what lessons it offers for the future. Embassy reporting indicates the Soviet Union is beginning to furnish specific data about the incident to foreign governments, making a legal debate all the more counterproductive. Finally, the United States has significant interests of its own in how this body of law may develop. Broad generalizations which might provide a basis for criticism of Soviet conduct in this case could inadvertently provide a basis for criticism of the United States in other settings.

Not all legal duties are enforceable in any event. The spirit with which we have called for the Soviet Union to provide information can be seen in a constructive rather than a negative light. In the event of an accident of this nature, the highest priority is for nations to work together to mitigate its potential effects. Furnishing information is essential for true international cooperation to take place. Our public theme could therefore be that "we are all in this together." Rather than focusing on a narrow legal issue, the question of notification and reporting can be cast in terms of the more general U.S. position favoring the broadest possible cooperation in dealing with a serious nuclear incident.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, DC 20505

May 5, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JW*

SUBJECT: Guidance on Soviet Nuclear Disaster

Attached, as we discussed at our meeting this afternoon, is a memo from you to Ronald Post containing guidance on USIA, particularly VOA, handling of the Chernobyl disaster. We are also preparing this guidance to be sent out to diplomatic posts and public affairs officers abroad.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached to Ronald Post.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*RP/MS*  
Karna Small, Peter Rodman, Steve Steiner, Walt Raymond, Judy Mandel, and Lou Pugliese concur. *WJ* *AM*

Attachments

- Tab I Letter to Ronald Post
- Tab II Guidance Memo

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DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *CJS* NARA, Date *7/29/02*





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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD POST  
Acting Chief of the Executive Secretariat  
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Guidance on Soviet Nuclear Disaster

Attached is guidance on public handling of the Chernobyl disaster which was requested by NCA, but which we believe can also be useful to other elements of USIA.

Rodney E. McDaniel  
Executive Secretary

Attachment

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Declassify on: OADF

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997  
By CWS NARA, Date 7/29/02





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PUBLIC AFFAIRS TREATMENT OF THE CHERNOBYL  
NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENT

Outlined below are some general themes and specific suggestions that USIA (particularly VOA) may find useful in its ongoing coverage of the Chernobyl incident. Some of these themes are receiving wide coverage in the press and undoubtedly already figure into USIA planning.

In addition to news coverage and editorials, it would be useful to develop a series of VOA features which focus on particular aspects of the accident (e.g. potential health effects, the need for a full accounting of what happened, etc.) and their implications for the world public. These programs would be particularly useful for East European audiences, the Soviet language services and third world countries which acquire technology from the USSR. Other themes, as indicated below, should receive world wide treatment.

In many cases the substance will speak for itself even without a specific mention of the Chernobyl accident. Local audiences will understand the connection.

In general, in dealing with the international implications of the accident we should avoid going beyond the statements made by the President, press spokesmen, and senior administration officials. We should avoid speculation and stick to known facts, emphasize our humanitarian concerns, and note our support for the other governments who have requested more information from the Soviets to assess potential hazards to their populations. We should avoid appearing to try to make political capital from the event.

Themes

- Soviet failure to inform their own people and the world. (world wide)

Media coverage on this point has been intense. VOA features on how industrial accidents in other countries are handled (Three Mile Island, Bhopal, etc.) would add a new dimension, emphasizing the immediate and detailed reporting of what happened and full public investigation of the incidents. The secrecy surrounding Chernobyl is in sharp contrast to accepted practice and Gorbachev's own call for more public discussion of problems in the USSR.

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By CJS NARA, Date 7/29/02

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- The public's right to know - for its own safety and as a check on official abuses. (USSR and Eastern Europe)

Soviet delay in informing its neighbors of the accident is unjustifiable, whatever the immediate circumstances of the incident may have been. It is indicative of Soviet callousness toward the longer term dangers of exposure to radiation outside the immediate accident site.

Features might include interviews with doctors, physicists and environmental specialists on the potential medical, public health and environmental effects of exposure to high levels of radiation. Such features will be of sufficient interest in and of themselves that they can be run well after the immediate problem of radiation exposure has receded.

- Absence of public information leads to speculation and rumor. world wide

This should be used in rebuttal to Soviet charges that the West has exaggerated the nature of the accident. Interviews with members of the press or public investigators who have covered this or other industrial accidents might prove effective.

- The need for openness and full disclosure in order to build confidence and trust. world wide

Failure to provide accurate, timely information on a matter as important to health and safety undermines confidence and breeds mistrust.

- Multilateral cooperation in the nuclear field. (world wide)

Develop features on the IAEA and efforts to establish international safety procedures, including the 1984 memorandum of understanding on the subject and Soviet failure to date to agree to any IAEA inspection. Reference can be made to the May 5 Tokyo summit declaration on the implications of the Chernobyl accident.

- The arrogance of treating small countries as if they had no right to complain to large ones. (world wide)

Features on public reaction to the accident in Poland, Sweden, and other West European countries.

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- The accident's exposure of Soviet reluctance to provide essential information, a point which has relevance to the US objective of achieving effective verification of arms control agreements. (world wide)

This theme can be gradually developed over the coming weeks, citing the Chernobyl accident as an example of the need for verification. The reopening of the NST talks this week provides an opportunity to remind the world of our own verification proposals.

In addition, The Soviets have used this incident to score U.S. nuclear testing policy and promote their arms control proposals of Jan. 15. This can and should be rebutted, pointing out that the closed nature of Soviet society and Soviet withholding of information demonstrates anew the need for effective verification, a point which the US has stressed in our arms control proposals and to which the Soviets have so far been unwilling to agree.

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PAGE 01 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 8066 DTG: 051346Z MAY 86 PSN: 022193  
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SECTO

E. O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)  
SUBJECT: STATEMENT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL  
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MAY 4 TOKYO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON  
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.

2. WE, THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF SEVEN MAJOR  
INDUSTRIAL NATIONS AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE  
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, HAVE DISCUSSED THE IMPLICATIONS  
OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER STATION.  
WE EXPRESS OUR DEEP SYMPATHY FOR THOSE AFFECTED.  
WE REMAIN READY TO EXTEND ASSISTANCE, IN PARTICULAR  
MEDICAL AND TECHNICAL, AS AND WHEN REQUESTED.

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PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 8066 DTG: 051346Z MAY 86 PSN: 022193

3. NUCLEAR POWER IS AND, PROPERLY MANAGED, WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN INCREASINGLY WIDELY USED SOURCE OF ENERGY. FOR EACH COUNTRY THE MAINTENANCE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY IS AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND EACH COUNTRY ENGAGED IN NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION BEARS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY OF THE DESIGN, MANUFACTURE, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF ITS INSTALLATIONS. EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES MEETS EXACTING STANDARDS. EACH COUNTRY, FURTHERMORE, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROMPT PROVISION OF DETAILED AND COMPLETE INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES AND ACCIDENTS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE WITH POTENTIAL TRANSBOUNDARY CONSEQUENCES. EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES ACCEPTS THAT RESPONSIBILITY, AND WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH DID NOT DO SO IN THE CASE OF CHERNOBYL, TO PROVIDE URGENTLY SUCH INFORMATION, AS OUR AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE REQUESTED.

4. WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THE SOVIET UNION'S WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS THIS WEEK WITH THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA). WE EXPECT THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS WILL LEAD TO THE SOVIET UNION'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DESIRED POST-ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.

5. WE WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE THE WORK OF THE IAEA IN SEEKING TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, THE HANDLING OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND THE PROVISION OF MUTUAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE. MOVING FORWARD FROM THE RELEVANT IAEA GUIDELINES, WE URGE THE EARLY ELABORATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO REPORT AND EXCHANGE

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PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 8066 DTG: 051346Z MAY 86 PSN: 022193

INFORMATION IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCIES  
OR ACCIDENTS. THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH THE LEAST  
POSSIBLE DELAY.

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

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PASS EPA

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KSCA, ENRG, SENV, CASE, AMED, UR

SUBJECT: RADIATION READINGS: MOSCOW, MAY 4, 1986

REF: MOSCOW 7488

1. ON MAY 4 AT 1900 AND 2300 HOURS MOSCOW TIME, TEAM SPECIALISTS TOOK READINGS AT THE SAME FOURTEEN LOCATIONS LISTED IN PEFTTEL. AS BEFORE, THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED WITH TWO SODIUM IODINE CRYSTAL MICRO-R METERS; THESE RESULTS ARE STILL CONSIDERED PRELIMINARY. METER READINGS ARE FOR LOW-LEVEL RADIATION IN UNITS OF MICRORONTGEN PER HOUR. FIRST FIGURE REPRESENTS READING AT 1900 AND SECOND FIGURE IS FOR 2300 HOURS.

2. INSIDE LOCATIONS

- A. PUBLIC ACCESS (PAC) - 17 / 16
- B. FIRST FLOOR AMERICAN ELEVATOR - 13 / 14
- C. FIRST FLOOR CASHIER'S CAGE - 11 / 11
- D. SEVENTH FLOOR POLITICAL SECTION - CLOSED / 12

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PAGE 01

MOSCOW 7518

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- RECEPTION

- E. EIGHTH FLOOR SCIENCE OFFICE - CLOSED / 12
- F. EIGHTH FLOOR PRESS SECTION - CLOSED / 12
- G. NINTH FLOOR AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE - CLOSED / 15
- H. TENTH FLOOR DAO ENTRANCE - CLOSED / 16

OUTSIDE LOCATIONS

- A. PLAYGROUND GATE - 12 / 10
- B. MOTOR POOL 13 / 13
- C. GSO DOORWAY 11 / 12
- D. VEHICLE GATE 15 / 15
- E. PHONE OPERATOR'S ACCESS DOOR 14 / 14
- F. MCCALL GARDENS 14 / 14

3. AIR SAMPLES EVALUATED FOR BETA PLUS GAMMA PARTICULATES BY MEASURING FILTER PAPER WITH EBERLINE E520 WITH EBERLINE HP260 "PANCAKE" PROBE IN CONTACT WITH PAPER SURFACE.

-- SAMPLE OF 1885 CUBIC FEET OF AIR COLLECTED AT 2200 HOURS ON 3 MAY SHOWED NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM BACKGROUND (AVERAGE BACKGROUND LESS THAN 50 COUNTS PER MINUTE), WHEN MEASURED AT 2300 HOURS ON 4 MAY 1986.

-- SAMPLE OF 1885 CUBIC FEET OF AIR COLLECTED AT 2310 HOURS ON 4 MAY SHOWED RESULTS CONSISTENT WITH THE 3 MAY SAMPLE WHEN MEASURED IMMEDIATELY AND AT 12 HOURS FOLLOWING COLLECTION.

4. EUR/RAMT CAPABILITIES

- A. "EXTERNAL GAMMA EXPOSURE RATE," USING MICRO-R METERS.

-- LOWER LIMIT: 10-15 MICROROENTGEN/HOUR.



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- UNCERTAINTY: PLUS/MINUS 20 PERCENT.
- RELIABILITY: SINGLE STEP, METER READING.
- B. "PARTICULATE AIR CONCENTRATION" USING STAPLEX H1VOL, SCREEN WITH GEIGER COUNTER, COUNT WITH SINGLE CHANNEL ANALYZER.
- LOWER LIMIT: SCREEN, 50 CPM WITH HP-260 PANCAKE PROBE. COUNT, DETECTION LIMIT OF NOMINAL 5 NANOCURIES CS-137 AND 2000 CUBIC FOOT SAMPLE GIVES LIMIT OF APPROXIMATELY 1 TIMES 10EXP(-10) OR 1.0E-10 MICROCURIES PER MILLILITER.

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-- LOWER LIMIT: 1.0 MICROCURIE OR LESS OF I-131 INCORPORATED IN THE THYROID. (NOTE: SYSTEM CALIBRATION ON-SITE IS ON-GOING; DETECTION LIMIT SUBJECT TO CHANGE.)

-- UNCERTAINTY: TO BE DETERMINED.

-- RELIABILITY: TO BE DETERMINED.

- E. "REMOVABLE SURFACE CONTAMINATION" BY WIPING WITH NUCON SMEARS AND COUNTING WITH THIN-WINDOW 6-M ALPHA SCINTILLATOR, OR SINGLE CHANNEL ANALYZER WITH SPA-3 PROBE, FOR GROSS BETA, GROSS ALPHA, GROSS GAMMA, AND CS-137.

-- LOWER LIMIT: GROSS 50 TO 100 CPM PER SMEAR, OR NOMINAL 5 NANOCURIES CS-137.

-- UNCERTAINTY: MINUS 50 TO PLUS 100 PERCENT, VARIES WITH SYSTEM.

-- RELIABILITY: GOOD.

- F. "ADVISE AND ASSISTANCE."

-- SENIOR HEALTH PHYSICIST, CERTIFIED BY AMERICAN BOARD OF HEALTH PHYSICS.

-- TWO ADDITIONAL DEGREEED HEALTH PHYSICISTS.

-- ONE VETERINARY CORPS OFFICER.

NOTE: SOME OF THE ABOVE CAPABILITIES USE THE ONLY SINGLE CHANNEL ANALYZER SO THAT ALL CAPABILITIES CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY, ALTHOUGH REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF EACH TYPE ARE TAKEN.  
END NOTE.

5. RADIATION INSTRUMENTATION AVAILABLE:  
U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW.

- A. MICRO-R METERS, LUDLUM MODEL 19, 1 EACH (COE EPA-1).

- B. GEIGER COUNTER, EBERLINE E-520 WITH PROBE HP-270, 1 EACH (CODE EPA-2).

- C. MICRO-R METER, EBERLINE MODEL PRM-7, 1 EACH.

- D. GEIGER COUNTERS, EBERLINE MODEL E-520 WITH "PANCAKE" GM PROBES HP-260, 2 EACH.

- E. GEIGER COUNTER, EBERLINE MODEL E-520 WITH ENERGY-COMPENSATED SIDE WINDOW PROBE, 1 EACH.

- F. PORTABLE ANALYSERS, EBERLINE PRS-2 WITH SCINTILLATION PROBES AC-3 (ALPHA), PG-2 (LOW ENERGY GAMMA) AND SPA-3 (HIGH ENERGY GAMMA), 2 EACH.  
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- M. POCKET DOSIMETERS, DOD STANDARD IM9E, RANGE 0-200 MR, 10 EACH.

- N. POCKET DOSIMETERS, DOD STANDARD, IM97, RANGE 0-600R, 13 EACH.

- O. FILMS BADGES, ARMY STANDARD, 10 EACH.

6. ACTION: TEAM WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADVANCED METEOROLOGICAL DATA ADDRESSEES COULD PROVIDE CONCERNING UPCOMING WEATHER IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR. IN PARTICULAR, TEAM SHOULD KNOW OF EXPECTED SHIFTS IN THE WIND WHICH MIGHT BRING POSSIBLY RADIOACTIVE CLOUDS INTO THE MOSCOW AREA FROM CHERNOBYL.

HARTMAN  
BT