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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/16/2005

**File Folder** USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDNET: CHERNOBYL 4/9

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 29

YARHI-MILO

2910

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10420	CABLE	012031Z MAY 86 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	1	5/1/1986	B1
10421	CABLE	010304Z MAY 86 <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	4	5/1/1986	B1
10422	PAPER	SITUATION REPORT <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	3	5/2/1986	B1 B3
10417	FAX COVER SHEET	ERMARTH RE WARNING AGENDA/ASSESSMENT <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	2	5/2/1986	B3
10418	MEMO	ERMARTH RE WARNING ASSESSMENT--USSR <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	1	5/2/1985	B3
10419	MEMO	ERMARTH TO CASEY RE MONTHLY FORECAST AND WARNING REPORT--USSR <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8</b>	4	5/2/1986	B3
10423	PAPER	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL REACTOR UPDATE <b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>	2	ND	B1
10424	PAPER	CHERNOBYL REACTOR UPDATE	3	5/2/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10425	CABLE	ECONOMIC SUMMIT AND HANDING USSR NUCLEAR ACCIDENT <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	4	ND	B1
10426	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10425 <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	4	ND	B1

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EUR/P:DJDONCHI

PA/PRESS:ASTOCKMAN

OES:STHAYER

IMMEDIATE ALEDP, EUROP IMMEDIATE, NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE, MUNICH  
IMMEDIATE, NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE, ANKARA IMMEDIATE +  
IMMEDIATE US ELEMENT LIVE OAK, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE,  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE, LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE

INFORM CONSULS, FOR PAOS, PASS TO NSC FOR HINCKLEY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPRC

SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE 5/01/86. ✓

DJD  
AH  
AS  
BT

1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND CONTINGENCY  
PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED FOR USE BY THE DEPARTMENT  
SPOKESPERSON ON MAY 1, 1986. THE GUIDANCES IN PARAS.  
2, 4, 5, 6 WERE USED IN THE BRIEFING TODAY.

1. CANADA AND LIBYAN STUDENT PILOTS

Q: YESTERDAY A CANADIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTED THAT CANADA  
MAY ALLOW LIBYAN STUDENT PILOTS AND AIRPLANE MECHANICS  
WHO WERE EXPELLED FROM BRITAIN TO CONTINUE THEIR  
STUDIES IN CANADA. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT  
REPORT?

A: THE ARTICLE IS INCORRECT. THE CANADIAN FOREIGN  
MINISTER TOLD PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY THAT CANADA HAS NO  
INTENTION OF WEAKENING ACTIONS TAKEN BY OTHER FRIENDLY  
GOVERNMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE REGIME IN LIBYA.

2. SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER

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Q: HAVE THE SOVIETS RESPONDED TO OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE?

A: ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AT 4:00 P.M. A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON DELIVERED A NOTE TO THE DEPARTMENT EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND STATING THAT FOR THE PRESENT MOMENT ASSISTANCE IS NOT NEEDED.

Q: IS THIS REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN?

A: YES.

Q: HOW MANY TECHNICAL DETAILS HAVE THE SOVIETS GIVEN US?

A: THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN US HAS NOT GONE BEYOND WHAT THEY HAVE PROVIDED IN THEIR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS.

Q: WHAT ADVICE IS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROVIDING IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES FROM AMERICAN CITIZENS CONCERNING TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ADJACENT COUNTRIES?

A: -- WE ARE NOT ADVISING AMERICAN CITIZENS AGAINST TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION, SCANDINAVIA AND EASTERN EUROPE. WE ARE INFORMING THEM OF THE TRAVEL ADVISORY WE HAVE ISSUED RECOMMENDING AGAINST TRAVEL TO KIEV AND ITS ADJACENT AREAS.

-- AMERICANS CONSIDERING TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION, SCANDINAVIA OR EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD MONITOR CAREFULLY PRESS REPORTS ON THIS RAPIDLY CHANGING SITUATION TO MAKE AS FULLY INFORMED A DECISION AS POSSIBLE WITH RESPECT TO THEIR TRAVEL. MANY OF THESE COUNTRIES HAVE REPORTED INCREASED LEVELS OF RADIATION IN THE ENVIRONMENT.

### 3. SOVIET BAN ON WESTERN TV

Q: HAVE THE SOVIETS BANNED WESTERN TELEVISION FROM TELEVISIONING FROM THE SOVIET UNION? IS THIS TIED TO THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER?

A: -- WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE BANNED LIVE TELEVISION BROADCASTS BY WESTERN MEDIA FROM THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1 THROUGH MAY 4. THIS ACT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S

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OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS.

-- REGRETTABLY, THIS BAN IS INDICATIVE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE HANDLING WESTERN REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS FROM THE SOVIET UNION DURING THIS DISASTER IS MORE INFORMATION, NOT LESS.

4. SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT {SECTIONS MARKED WITH ASTERISK WERE USED} TECHNICAL ASPECTS.

Q: THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE GERMANS ARE URGING THE SOVIETS TO SHUT DOWN REACTORS SIMILAR TO THE CHERNOBYL PLANT. DOES THE U.S. AGREE WITH THIS ADVICE?

A: WE HAVE SEEN NO OFFICIAL REPORT ON THAT ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US AT THIS TIME WOULD NOT ALLOW US TO COMMENT.

Q: \* IS THE FIRE STILL BURNING IN THE DAMAGED REACTOR?

A: REPORTS ARE THAT FIRE IS OUT. WE HOPE THIS IS TRUE, BUT CAN'T CONFIRM INDEPENDENTLY AS YET.

Q: THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THEY HAVE THE PROBLEM OF RADIATION RELEASE UNDER CONTROL. DO WE AGREE WITH THE ASSESSMENT?

A: WE DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE AN INFORMED JUDGMENT ON THE EXTENT OF CONTROL OVER THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY BY THOSE AT THE SITE.

Q: \* IT HAS BEEN NOTED THAT WE REQUIRE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, MORE DETAILS. WHY DO WE NEED MORE DETAILS? WHAT WOULD WE DO WITH THEM?

A: A PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND WELFARE OF U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD, NOT ONLY OUR OWN OFFICIALS, BUT ALSO AMERICANS TRAVELING ABROAD. WE NEED THE BEST POSSIBLE TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE TO THE REACTOR AND THE EXTENT AND LEVELS OF THE RADIOACTIVE RELEASES IN ORDER TO CALCULATE THE RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH HAZARDS OF THE RELEASE INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. SECONDLY, IN ORDER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REACTOR SAFETY IN THE WEST, WE AND OTHER NATIONS BELIEVE THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING WITH TECHNICAL INFORMATION ABOUT HOW THE ACCIDENT WAS

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INITIATED AND HOW IT EVOLVED.

Q: \* THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF A SECOND MELTDOWN OF THE CORE REACTOR NUMBER THREE. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THIS?

A: WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT THERE IS A CORE MELT IN THE SECOND REACTOR [NO. 3].

Q: HAVE THE SOVIETS APPROACHED AMERICAN EXPERTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE ACCIDENT?

A: NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS OFFERS OF HELP FROM PRIVATE AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE BEING PASSED ON TO THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.

Q: WHAT SORT OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE?

A: WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH OTHER NATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE INFORMATION OR INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM. THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS CONTACTS WITH THE COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY, CONCERNING LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY.

Q: DOES THE US ADHERE TO AND APPLY THE NUSS STANDARDS WE ARE ASKING THE SOVIETS TO APPLY?

A: THE UNITED STATES APPLIES EVEN STRICTER STANDARDS. FOR DETAILS YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

5. USSR: WELFARE/WHEREABOUTS OF AMCITS

Q: HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE REGISTERED WITH OUR EMBASSY IN THE SOVIET UNION?

A: THE MOST RECENT EMBASSY ESTIMATE OF AMERICANS RESIDENT IN THE USSR IS 470 OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE AMERICANS.

Q: HOW MANY AMERICAN TOURISTS ARE THERE IN THE SOVIET UNION?

A: WE ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE BETWEEN 500 AND 600 AMERICAN TOURISTS CURRENTLY IN THE USSR. MOST OF THE AMERICANS ARE WITH INTOURIST GROUPS. THIS ESTIMATE IS BASED ON EMBASSY SEASONAL ESTIMATES AND CALLS BY

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AMERICANS IN THE U.S. INQUIRING ABOUT THEIR RELATIVES TRAVELING IN THE SOVIET UNION. ALTHOUGH WE WELCOME REGISTRATION OF AMERICAN TRAVELERS AT OUR EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES SO THAT WE CAN CONTACT THEM EXPEDITIOUSLY IN EMERGENCIES SUCH AS THIS, MOST AMERICAN TOURISTS DO NOT REGISTER.

Q: ARE THERE ANY PLANS TO EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM KIEV?

A: EMBASSY MOSCOW PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONTACTING AMERICAN TOURISTS AND STUDENTS IN KIEV AND ADVISING THEM OF THE SITUATION. WE BELIEVE THAT MOST AMERICANS WHO WISH TO DO SO HAVE LEFT KIEV. ALL AMERICANS CONTACTED THUS FAR HAVE REPORTED THAT THEY ARE FINE. WE HAVE NO PLANS TO EVACUATE AMERICANS AT THIS TIME. OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND CONSULATE IN LENINGRAD ARE FACILITATING CHANGES IN TRAVEL PLANS FOR THOSE AMERICANS WISHING TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION.

#### B. INTERNATIONAL SAFETY STANDARDS FOR REACTORS

THE IAEA HAS BEEN WORKING SINCE 1974 ON A NUCLEAR SAFETY STANDARDS (NUSS) PROGRAM. A SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP CHAIRED BY CANADA, IN WHICH THE U.S. WAS A VERY ACTIVE PARTICIPANT, SELECTED FIVE AREAS FOR WHICH "CODES OF PRACTICE" WERE ESTABLISHED.

THESE ARE:

- GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.
- SAFETY IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING.
- DESIGN FOR SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.
- SAFETY IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATION.
- QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR SAFETY IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS.

A SERIES OF 55 "SAFETY GUIDES" WAS THEN DEVELOPED TO AID THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF REACTOR DESIGN, SITING, CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION UNDER THESE FIVE GENERAL CODES. THE CODES AND GUIDES HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, AND ALMOST ALL HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED.

THE SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP HELD ITS LAST MEETING IN DECEMBER, 1985. CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO FORMATION OF A TECHNICAL LEVEL NUCLEAR SAFETY STANDARDS ADVISORY GROUP TO FOLLOW UP FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION OF



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THE STANDARDS.

THESE STANDARDS ARE MANDATORY FOR THE AGENCY'S OWN OPERATIONS AND AGENCY-ASSISTED OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, LIKE ALL IAEA STANDARDS, THEIR APPLICATION BY COUNTRIES IS VOLUNTARY, AND DEPENDS ON THE WILL OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER STRICTER STANDARDS ARE NEEDED IS A MOOT POINT UNTIL THE STANDARDS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY COMPETENT INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY ALL.

THE USSR PARTICIPATED AT THE MANAGEMENT LEVEL IN THE SENIOR ADVISORY GROUP, AND HAS FORMALLY APPROVED ALL OF THE CODES AND GUIDES. HOWEVER, THE STANDARDS ARE PRIMARILY BASED ON AN EXHAUSTIVE COMPILATION OF THE BEST PRACTICES CURRENTLY FOLLOWED IN COMMERCIAL REACTORS IN THE U.S., EUROPE, CANADA AND JAPAN. CERTAIN BLOC COUNTRIES SUCH AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR ALSO PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OF THE STANDARDS. THUS, CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS ARE BUILT INTO THE STANDARDS {FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ALL REACTORS HAVE CONTAINMENT FACILITIES} WHICH ARE NOT CHARACTERISTIC OF REACTORS IN THE USSR. MOREOVER, THE USSR HAS IN PRACTICE NOT ADHERED AS CLOSELY AS HAVE OTHERS TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS THOSE CONCERNING OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF ADJOINING COUNTRIES.

7. INTERVIEW OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE ON NBC-TV'S "TODAY SHOW", BALI, INDONESIA, MAY 1, 1986 {TEXT RECEIVED FROM PRESS OFFICE}

BRYANT GUMBEL: ON CLOSE-UP THIS MORNING, A VIEW FROM THE TOP. PRESIDENT REAGAN IS ON THE ISLAND OF BALI THIS MORNING, MEETING WITH ASIAN LEADERS, BUT HIS MEETINGS THERE AND THE UPCOMING ECONOMIC SUMMIT ARE BEING OVERSHADOWED BY THE NUCLEAR DISASTER IN THE SOVIET UNION. TRAVELING WITH THE PRESIDENT IS HIS SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE SHULTZ, WHO JOINS US THIS MORNING FROM BALI. THANK YOU FOR BEING WITH US, MR. SECRETARY. GOOD MORNING TO YOU FROM HERE. GOOD EVENING TO YOU THERE.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: GOOD EVENING.

MR. GUMBEL: WE HAVE HAD THE NEWS OF THE SOVIETS' REFUSAL OF OUR ASSISTANCE. HOW ARE YOU INTERPRETING THAT REFUSAL THIS MORNING?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, I WOULDN'T CALL IT A REFUSAL.

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THEY GAVE US SOME INFORMATION. THEY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR OFFER AND THEY SAID THAT THEY FELT THAT THEY HAD THE MATERIAL AND EXPERTISE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM, SO THEY WOULDN'T NEED OUR HELP.

MR. GUMBEL: ARE YOU INCLINED AT THIS TIME TO ACCEPT WHAT INFORMATION THEY ARE GIVING YOU AS FACT?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WE ARE GATHERING INFORMATION OURSELVES, AS IS EVERYBODY, AND POOLING IT. WE GET INFORMATION FROM PICTURES, WE GET INFORMATION FROM THINGS THAT WE HEAR FROM THE REGION AND IT SEEMS TO US VERY CLEARLY TO BE A MUCH LARGER EVENT THAN THEIR REPORTS WOULD SUGGEST.

MR. GUMBEL: WELL, AT THIS POINT, HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THAT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WHAT OUR INFORMATION IS TELLING US AND WHAT THEY ARE TELLING YOU?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: IT IS POSSIBLE TO SUPPRESS NEWS, I GUESS, IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WHEN IT COMES TO RADIOACTIVITY, YOU CAN'T SUPPRESS IT AND YOU CAN'T AVOID HAVING PICTURES TAKEN. SO WE ARE GETTING INFORMATION INDEPENDENTLY OF WHAT THEY SAY.

MR. GUMBEL: HAVE WE OFFICIALLY, IN ANY MANNER, EXPRESSED OUR DISPLEASURE AT THEIR FAILURE TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WE FEEL THAT ANY COUNTRY WHERE SOMETHING HAPPENS THAT AFFECTS THINGS ACROSS THEIR BORDERS -- OTHER COUNTRIES, IN OTHER WORDS -- HAS A REAL -- BASICALLY, AN OBLIGATION TO KEEP PEOPLE INFORMED. AND, WE FEEL THAT THEY SHOULD BE PROVIDING MORE INFORMATION AND MORE PROMPTLY.

MR. GUMBEL: AT THAT --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: AND WE'VE SAID THAT. WE'VE LET THEM KNOW THAT.

MR. GUMBEL: AT THIS POINT, DO YOU VIEW THEIR BEHAVIOR AS IRRESPONSIBLE?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, I THINK THAT'S A LITTLE HARD TO SAY. THEY HAVE A MAJOR CALAMITY ON THEIR HANDS AND NO DOUBT, THEY'RE STRUGGLING WITH IT, AND ONE DOESN'T KNOW IMMEDIATELY WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WHAT ITS IMPLICATIONS ARE. SO I'M INCLINED TO GIVE THE BENEFIT

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OF THE DOUBT ON THE EARLY HOURS, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT BY NOW THEY COULD BE PROVIDING A LOT MORE INFORMATION THAN THEY ARE.

MR. GUMBEL: IF THIS ACCIDENT IS AS SERIOUS AS THIS PRELIMINARY INFORMATION YOU'RE GETTING WOULD SEEM TO SUGGEST IT IS, CAN YOU AT THIS TIME ASCERTAIN WHAT THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES MIGHT BE ON SOVIET POLICIES AND PRIORITIES?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, THEY HAVE TO EXAMINE THEIR OWN WAY OF CONSTRUCTING AND DEVELOPING NUCLEAR POWER, IF THEY CAN HAVE A DISASTER OF THIS SCOPE OBVIOUSLY. FROM OUR STANDPOINT, WE HAVE BEEN OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ON SUBMARINES AND ON SHIPS, WE'VE NEVER HAD AN ACCIDENT. WE HAVE HAD A HUGE AMOUNT OF TIME IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS -- CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES. WE'VE NEVER HAD A PERSON KILLED. SO OUR SAFETY RECORD IS A VERY STRONG ONE, BUT OF COURSE, WE CONSTANTLY EXAMINE THE PROCESSES OF MANAGING THESE PLANTS.

MR. GUMBEL: MR. SECRETARY --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I THINK PERHAPS THERE'S ANOTHER IMPLICATION HERE. PEOPLE WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR MATTERS, PARTICULARLY THEY WORRY ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE'S ALWAYS THIS TRANSPOSITION IN PEOPLE'S MINDS, AND THIS IS A TIME WHEN WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF CUTTING DRASTICALLY DOWN ON NUCLEAR STOCKPILES. THE PRESIDENT HAS PROPOSED ELIMINATING ENTIRELY INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HE AND MR. GORBACHEV HAVE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF EACH SIDE, AND WE'D LIKE TO SEE PROGRESS ON THAT IN GENEVA. AND WE HAVE BEEN WORKING AT THAT, WE HAVEN'T HAD A RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO OUR LONG STANDING START PROPOSALS, BUT WE HOPE WHEN THE NEW ROUND STARTS IN THE MIDDLE OF MAY THAT IT WILL BE ACTIVE AND WE CAN SATISFY OURSELVES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD IN GETTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOWN.

MR. GUMBEL: MIGHT THIS ACCIDENT FORCE THE SOVIETS INTO SOME DIFFICULT GUNS VERSUS BUTTER DECISIONS?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, THEY -- I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT THAT. THEY HAVE A MAJOR PROBLEM ON THEIR HANDS. THEY OBVIOUSLY WILL HAVE A SHARP REDUCTION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER AVAILABLE TO INDUSTRY,

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PARTICULARLY IN THE KIEV SECTOR. BUT SINCE THEY HAVE A GRID LIKE WE DO, IT AFFECTS THEIR WHOLE ENERGY INDUSTRY.

MR. GUMBEL: ONE FINAL NOTE, SIR, HOW CONCERNED ARE YOU THAT THIS ACCIDENT MIGHT SPARK A NEW ROUND OF ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTESTS WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT NATO MISSILES IN EUROPE?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: THE PROTESTERS ARE ALWAYS THERE. I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT, AS FAR AS NUCLEAR POWER IS CONCERNED, TO KEEP POINTING TO THE EXTRAORDINARY SAFETY RECORD IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND OUR CONTINUED VIGILANCE ON THAT MATTER.

AS FAR AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CONCERNED, WE THINK THAT THEY SHOULD BE REDUCED -- THAT'S BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM ALL ALONG -- AND ELIMINATED. THE POINT IS HOW DO YOU DO THAT? HOW DO YOU COME DOWN ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS SO THAT YOU HAVE STABILITY AS YOU ARE REDUCING? THAT'S WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ABOUT AND ARE ABOUT, AND THAT'S WHAT THE PRESIDENT KEEPS EMPHASIZING, SO WE'LL CALL FOR LITTLE HELP ON THAT SCORE. BUT WE DON'T WANT TO HAVE THE U.S. REDUCE WITHOUT THE SOVIET UNION REDUCING. THAT'S THE POINT.

MR. GUMBEL: SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ, MR. SECRETARY, WE'RE AWARE YOU HAD TO JOCKEY YOUR SCHEDULE A LITTLE BIT TO STAY WITH US HERE. WE DO APPRECIATE IT HERE. THANK YOU.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: OKAY. 44

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 136732

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, UR  
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER - TRAVEL BY DR. GALE

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ARMAND HAMMER HAS OFFERED THE SERVICES OF HIS ASSOCIATE DR. ROBERT GALE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION UNIT AT UCLA, TO THE SOVIETS FOR ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER. (TEXT OF HAMMER LETTER FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH FOUR.) SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR SOKOLOV TOLD EUR DAS MARK PALMER ON MAY 1ST THAT THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED HAMMER'S OFFER.

3. EUR/SOV CONTACTED DR. GALE, WHO WILL ARRIVE IN MOSCOW VIA FRANKFURT ON LUFTHANSA AT 6:10 PM LOCAL TIME, FRIDAY, MAY 2ND (NOT/NOT THE TIME SHOWN IN THE LETTER BELOW). THE SOVIETS WILL HANDLE HIS AIRPORT FORMALITIES AND EITHER THEY OR OCCIDENTAL WILL MAKE HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS (PERHAPS THE WORLD TRADE CENTER). DR. GALE INTENDS TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT PROFILE AND DOES NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE "SPONSORED" BY THE USG. HE MAY CONTACT THE EMBASSY QUIETLY, HOWEVER; DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES

EMBASSY'S APPROPRIATE ASSISTANCE.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

APRIL 29, 1986

HIS EXCELLENCY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION  
MOSCOW, USSR

DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY:

I WAS SADDENED TO HEAR OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER STATION NEAR KIEV. WE WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED TO HEAR THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN EXPOSURE OF SOME OF THE POPULATION TO THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

AS YOU KNOW, ONE OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS TYPE OF EXPOSURE CAN BE IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE TO THE BLOOD AND BONE MARROW WHICH CAN BE FATAL. PREVIOUS NUCLEAR REACTOR ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THIS TYPE OF SERIOUS PROBLEM WHICH RESULTS IN DEATHS OF VICTIMS SOME TWO WEEK AFTER EXPOSURE WITH NO IMMEDIATE SYMPTOMS.

INDIVIDUALS EXPOSED TO BONE MARROW LETHAL DOSES OF NUCLEAR RADIATION CAN BE POTENTIALLY RESCUED BY THE TRANSPLANTATION OF BONE MARROW CELLS FROM A SUITABLE DONOR. DONORS MIGHT BE RELATIVES OR VOLUNTEERS CHOSEN FROM A COMPUTER BASE DONOR POOL.

DR. ROBERT PETER GALE, CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL BONE TRANSPLANTATION REGISTRY, PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION UNIT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES (UCLA), HAS OFFERED TO MOBILIZE THE RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSPLANTATION CENTERS TO PROVIDE POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT REQUIRE BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTS AS A LIFE-SAVING PROCEDURE. I AM WELL ACQUAINTED WITH DR. GALE ON BOTH A PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASIS AND KNOW OF HIS WELL RENOWNED WORK IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADVISOR ON CANCER MATTERS. HE AND HIS TEAM ARE ALSO PREPARED TO HELP IDENTIFY POTENTIAL BONE MARROW DONORS EITHER FROM WITHIN THE USSR OR USING BOTH THE US AND EUROPEAN COMPUTER-BASED DONOR BANKS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY IN EXISTENCE.

DR. GALE IS PREPARED TO COME IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOVIET

UNION TO MEET WITH SOVIET NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS AND HEMATOLOGISTS TO ASSESS THE SITUATION AND DECIDE ON THE

OPTIMAL COURSE OF ACTION WITH THE HOPE OF SAVING THE LIVES OF THOSE AT RISK. DR. GALE CAN TAKE A FLIGHT FROM LOS ANGELES TOMORROW AT 3:00 PM (WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30TH) WHICH WOULD ARRIVE IN MOSCOW AT 6:00 PM ON THURSDAY, MAY 1. I WILL BEAR ALL COSTS FOR HIS EFFORTS WHICH CAN BE SO IMPORTANT TO SAVING THE LIVES OF THOSE CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN EXPOSED.

MR. GENERAL SECRETARY, PLEASE ACCEPT MY PROFOUND SYMPATHY FOR THIS TRAGEDY AND MY SINCEREST OFFER TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY. I AM NOW IN WASHINGTON AND CAN BE REACHED THROUGH THE EMBASSY HERE.

WITH WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

RESPECTFULLY,

SIGNATURE

END TEXT.

WHITEHEAD

BT

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NLRR F06-114/8# 10420

BY LOI NARA 9/30/08

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 04 ~~SECSTATE WASHDC~~ 5993  
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NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UR, US, PREL  
SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON NUCLEAR  
ACCIDENT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SOVIET CHARGE SOKOLOV DELIVERED TO EUR DAS PALMER TWO  
NON-PAPERS WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS RESPONSES FROM  
GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL OFFER OF  
ASSISTANCE AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION. (TEXTS OF THE  
TWO SOVIET NON-PAPERS FOLLOW IN PARAS 3 AND 4 BELOW.)

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NLRR F06-114/8#10421

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY NET NARA DATE 9/30/08

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 5993 DTG: 010304Z MAY 86 PSM: 014576

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PALMER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE SOVIET RESPONSE BUT NOTED THAT IT LEFT MANY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED. PALMER SAID THAT WE HOPED TO RECEIVE ANSWERS FROM THE SOVIETS TO SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE LEVEL OF THE RADIATION AT THE SITE OF THE ACCIDENT, THE EXTENT OF THE DANGER TO KIEV AND ITS WATER SUPPLY AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE RADIATION. SOKOLOV RESPONDED THAT HE WAS SURE THAT AS MORE INFORMATION BECAME AVAILABLE IT WOULD BE PROVIDED. HE SAID THAT THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL COMMISSION AND THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES ASSIGNED TO IT TESTIFIED TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE ACCIDENT. PALMER SAID THAT WE WERE NATURALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE

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POSSIBLE DANGER TO OUR PERSONNEL IN THE USSR AND SAID THAT WE MIGHT SHORTLY BE ASKING TO SEND A TEAM TO ASSESS LEVELS OF RADIATION IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD. SOKOLOV SAID THEY WOULD CONSIDER ANY REQUEST FOR VISAS WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED, BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS.

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3. BEGIN TEXT OF FIRST SOVIET NOTE

AS A RESULT OF MEASURES TAKEN WITHIN THE LAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS, THE DISCHARGE OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES HAS DECREASED AND THE LEVEL OF RADIATION IN THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT HAS DECREASED.

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MEASUREMENTS TAKEN DEMONSTRATE THAT A FISSION CHAIN REACTION IS NOT OCCURRING IN THE REACTOR. THE REACTOR IS IN A SHUT-DOWN (ZAGLUSHENNIY) STATE.

ACTIVE WORK ON CLEANING THE CONTAMINATED UNIT IS IN PROGRESS.

THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSES SUFFICIENT MATERIAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES TO CONDUCT THE WORK TO

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PAGE 03 OF 04

SECSTATE WASHDC 5993

DTG: 010304Z MAY 86

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LIQUIDATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT AND AT THE PRESENT MOMMENT THE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER STATES DOES NOT ARISE. WE APPRECIATE THE PROPOSALS OF ASSISTANCE TO US.

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FOREIGN CITIZENS LOCATED IN THE USSR (IN PARTICULAR SPECIALISTS OR TOURISTS) HAVE NOT APPROACHED THE COMPETENT SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL AES (NUCLEAR POWER STATION).

END TEXT OF FIRST SOVIET NON-PAPER

4. SECOND SOVIET NON-PAPER

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BEGIN TEXT

MOSCOW APPRECIATES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL AES (NUCLEAR POWER STATION) AND ALSO THE EXPRESSED READINESS TO RENDER ASSISTANCE IN LIQUIDATING ITS CONSEQUENCES. WE ARE UNDERTAKING ALL NECESSARY EFFORTS TO LOCALIZE THE ACCIDENT AND TO KEEP ITS CONSEQUENCES TO A MINIMUM. AT THE PRESENT MOMENT THERE IS NO NEED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER STATES.

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CONCERNING THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION, THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THEM.

END TEXT OF THE SECOND SOVIET NON-PAPER

5. COMMENT: AS WITH THE SOVIET MESSAGE OF APRIL 29, THESE SOVIET MESSAGES APPEAR TO ADD LITTLE OR NO INFORMATION TO WHAT IS ALREADY AVAILABLE IN THE SOVIET MEDIA. IN SPITE



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 5993 DTG: 010304Z MAY 86 PSN: 014576

OF SOKOLOV'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE NON-PAPERS AS  
REPLIES TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, THE FIRST NON-PAPER,  
AT LEAST, APPEARS TO BE A CIRCULAR CABLE TO SOVIET  
DIPLOMATIC POSTS. WHITEHEAD  
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WALLEY

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 2, 1986

**MEMORANDUM TO ALL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES AND OFFICE DIRECTORS**

**SUBJECT: Working Group Relocation**

The Executive Secretary has directed that the Chernobyl Working Group, instituted in his memorandum of April 29, is to be relocated to the Operations Center, Room 7516, to facilitate coordination of the Department's response to the nuclear accident in Chernobyl in the Soviet Union, particularly in light of the upcoming week-end.

The Working Group will be located in Task Force 1, Telephones: (202) 647-6610 (Non-Secure), KY-3: 5228, and KY-71: ID# 02878 (202) 683-9327.

Wayne G. Griffith  
Acting Director,  
Operations Center

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MESSAGE NO. 10750 CLASSIFICATION U No. Pages 2

FROM: CWG S/S-O (TFI) 647-6610 7516  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Chernobyl Working Group  
Relocation - 5/2/86

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>CIA</u>	<u>local</u>		
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<u>NSA</u>			
<u>TREAS</u>			
<u>WHSR</u>			

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:  
NSOC  
Energy  
FBIS  
FEMA

S/S Officer: \_\_\_\_\_



May 2, 1986

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Wayne G. Griffith  
Acting Director,  
Operations Center

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*Matthew*

NLRR Feb-11/8 #10422

BY *RWS* NARA DATE 3/16/11

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FOIA(b)(1), (3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

No. 2, 2 May 1986

SITUATION REPORT: Chernobyl' Accident

[REDACTED] the core area of the damaged Chernobyl' reactor. The 180-ton fuel-transfer machine may have fallen either into the core or into the adjacent spent fuel storage pond. A release of radiation from the highly reactive spent fuel could pose additional problems.

Shutdown of Other Reactors

[REDACTED] press reports that the USSR has shut down all 14 of the reactors similar in design to the failed unit at Chernobyl'.

We believe Moscow would need very strong justification to further disrupt the power network and economic activity by shutting down the remaining RBMK reactors. Such a disruption would be tolerable, if, for example, preliminary accident evaluation by the Soviets suggested a basic design fault in all the RBMK reactors, not just in the model damaged at Chernobyl'. If the Soviets shut down all 15 RBMK reactors, they would reduce generating capacity by 15,500 MW and cut annual power production by about 104 billion kilowatt-hours-

SECRET [REDACTED]

### Impact on Water Supplies

The Chernobyl' plant is located just north of the Kiev Reservoir which supplies the bulk of the drinking water for the Ukrainian capital—a city of 2.5 million people. Some radiation has undoubtedly been carried to the reservoir by winds and by the two rivers—the south-flowing Dniepr and Pripyat'—that feed it. Because these rivers drain directly through contaminated areas, radiation levels in the water will probably rise over the next several weeks. Aquatic plants and fish may ingest enough radioactivity to make fish unsuitable for human consumption. Protracted contamination could eventually be carried to other reservoirs further down the Dniepr below Kiev. The degree of surface water contamination is unknown at this time, but is probably a matter of concern. [REDACTED]

Because few people in the area receive their drinking water from drilled wells, groundwater contamination will be less of a hazard for the population of Kiev. Contaminants entering the ground very near the reactor would likely affect the water in drilled wells east of Chernobyl'. The geology of the area suggests that there will be no major effects on well water to the south and west of the Chernobyl'-Kiev area. [REDACTED]

### West European Reaction

Curbs on the importation of Soviet and East European foodstuffs are expanding. West Germany has joined Sweden and Denmark in imposing restrictions on the importation of agricultural products from the USSR and Poland, requiring that milk, fruit, meat, and poultry be checked for radiation beforehand. Italy has also imposed a temporary ban on food products from the Soviet Union. All travellers, planes, and cars arriving in West Germany from Eastern Europe are being checked for radiation. [REDACTED]

Negative European comments continue, including an unusually caustic statement from the Swiss government criticizing the Soviets for their failure to provide timely information on the accident. The European Commission yesterday delivered a demarche to the Soviet Union requesting further information and [REDACTED] will make another today to the IAEA to initiate an investigation of the accident's consequences. The EC and the individual governments will press hard for tighter IAEA requirements on reporting nuclear accidents. [REDACTED]

Prepared by: [REDACTED] (SOVA, [REDACTED])

Contributors:

[REDACTED]



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
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WASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT

W/ BONNIE  
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FROM Fritz W. Emarth  
NIO/USSR

SUBJECT Warning Agenda/Assessment

FOIA(b) (3)

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Asst. Dir. for Int. Security	Roger Pajak (OS/OIS)	566-5822	Room 4324 Mn. Treasurer

REMARKS:

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NLRR FD6-114/8 #10417  
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FROM Fritz W. Emarth  
NIO/USSR

SUBJECT Warning Agenda/Assessment

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ate **B** Mark Parris D/EUR/SOV

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NSA/A053, [REDACTED]

REMARKS:



National Intelligence Council

2 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution  
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR  
SUBJECT: Warning Assessment -- USSR

1. Attached is the assessment prepared following the NIU/USSR Warning and Forecast meeting held on 22 April 1986. Comments would be most welcome.

2. The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 20 May at 1400 hours in [redacted] CIA Headquarters. Please have your clearances passed and call [redacted] with your attendance plans by COB Friday, 18 April. I solicit suggestions regarding any topics or contingencies you feel we may be overlooking and request that such recommendations be forwarded to me by COB, Friday, 18 April.

[redacted]  
Fritz W. Ermarth

THIS MEMORANDUM IS  
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
FROM ATTACHMENT

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02270-dh  
2 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth  
National Intelligence Officer for USSR

SUBJECT: Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR

1. US-Soviet RelationsA. Discussion:

During the next several months, at least, the Soviets will continue to emphasize public diplomacy and propaganda tactics--aimed at undermining domestic and Allied support for the President--rather than decide to seek serious political compromise. The Soviets probably see the window for an agreement with this Administration beginning to close and are thinking about its successor, but they haven't given up yet on a deal with President Reagan. Moscow most likely is now planning toward a Fall summit.

In the meantime, we anticipate additional arms control proposals aimed at the galleries.

The Geneva NST talks will play a secondary role.

The Soviets probably want to institutionalize the summit process for dealing both with this Administration and its successor.

Gorbachev has become more sensitive to appearances as concerns developments in US-Soviet relations and may feel an increased need to show results. Gorbachev may be having difficulty selling the flattening of the US defense budget and Congressional opposition to Administration policies as being related to the current climate of US-Soviet relations.

Postponing Shevardnadze's meeting with Secretary Schultz may have been done as a low cost way to show Soviet domestic constituencies as well as the Arab world that Gorbachev is, indeed, toughminded. Moscow probably calculated that a Summer summit was already a longshot.

The Soviets are relieved that the US will continue for the moment to abide SALT II because of the certainty this affords them in their political and economic planning. This decision could be helpful to Gorbachev in maintaining his course of dialogue to the extent he does face skepticism.

The Soviets will not sacrifice a significant US arms control concession or other major piece in its chess game with the US on behalf of Qadhafi; but Gorbachev probably believes that he can utilize the US-Libyan confrontation to further pressure the US to make a concession by appearing to threaten the summit process.

B. Collection Notes:

What are Soviet views on the utility of their recent, tougher tactics for serving policy interests rather than undermining possible skepticism in Moscow about Gorbachev's policies? How do the Soviets perceive the strength of the US economy over the next several years? To what extent, if at all, are the Soviets looking past this Administration in their planning?

C. Warning:

The Soviets will likely make new arms control proposals over the next several months aimed at undermining public and Allied support for the Administration's policies. The Soviets may make a major push for a CDE agreement this Summer.

2. Soviet-Libyan Relations

A. Discussion:

The Soviets will continue to avoid putting the USSR and Soviet armed forces at risk on behalf of Qadhafi and will not give him a defense agreement--because they don't want a military confrontation with the US and because they don't exercise strong influence over Qadhafi or trust him. However, the Soviets do want to take advantage of Qadhafi's weakness and the US-Libya confrontation by gaining a greater military and stronger political presence in Libya, weakening the US position in the Middle East, and enlarging US differences with the Allies.

Moscow does not like the image of the arms it has supplied to Libya yielding so little. Its interest is in creating the impression that they worked better than they did and in improving their future

effectiveness. The Kremlin probably is pleased that the international community does not perceive that its arms support to Qadhafi has strongly encouraged his terrorism.

NIO/USSR believes Libya has major political importance to the USSR, and that the Soviets are fearful of suffering a major political reverse if Qadhafi is overthrown and not replaced by a leader at least as closely allied to the USSR. Soviet options are poor, however, and Moscow most likely will try to patch things up with Qadhafi while attempting to gain greater influence over Libyan politics and the choice of a possible successor.

B. Collection:

We need data on Soviet assets and political influence in Libya, Soviet expectations about future US policy toward Libya, and Soviet plans to capitalize on the US-Libya conflict in Libya and the Middle East.

C. Warning:

In the next several months, the Soviets likely will provide support for automating and otherwise upgrading the Libyan air defense system. We probably will see additional Soviet and possibly other foreign advisors arriving in Libya to train Libyans on a number of new weapon systems and to upgrade command and control. The Libyans could present a greater air defense threat if they do get this support in about six months.

3. Soviet-East European Relations

A. Discussion:

The Soviets are continuing to enjoy success in pressuring East Europe for better terms of trade, but are not doing so well in their quest for greater CEMA integration.

Only Poland is not in rough balance with the USSR in trade now.

East Europe is currently paying the earlier high world price of oil due to previous agreements with the USSR. This will change slowly.

The dynamic of this improved Soviet economic situation vis-a-vis the region probably will become increasingly difficult to sustain owing to Moscow's weakening hard currency position, the availability of cheap oil on the world market, and the likely failure of the Soviet economy to grow according to Soviet hopes.

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Gorbachev is not seeking to abruptly gain greater political control over the region as he originally signalled. He likely has come to appreciate the region's delicate stability and anticipates that the current leaders in the region will pass soon and he only needs to bide his time before the opportunity will arise for him to make Soviet weight felt. The danger is that if the Soviets do not press their favorites in the meantime, they may not be well positioned in the event of the sudden death or incapacitation of a leader.

Moscow is keeping a close watch on East European relations with Western Europe, particularly the inner German dialogue. Gorbachev's remarks in East Berlin at the SED Party Congress did not rule out a Honecker visit to West Germany, but neither were they encouraging. The Soviets want to retain close control over relations between East Berlin and Bonn and they do not want to enhance Kohl's reelection prospects.

Moscow's calculus probably is to allow the inner German relationship to modestly progress if it yields substantial economic and political gains. The goal is to get Kohl to pay handsomely for a Honecker visit or make him suffer politically for failing to do so.

Moscow wants Bonn to be less supportive of the US, provide greater economic assistance to the GDR, ease restrictions on technology transfers to the bloc, and support greater Soviet borrowing to make up for Moscow's weakening hard currency position.

C. Collection:

We need information on how much slack the Soviets perceive in the East European economies and how hard they believe they can push the region without promoting instability. Also, do the Soviets perceive themselves losing leverage over East Europe owing to the USSR's weakening hard currency situation? How well planned out are East European efforts to obtain advanced Western commercial technologies, and what are the transfer mechanisms for acquiring them.

C. Warning:

The East Germans and Soviets may pressure Kohl hard in the next several months for significant political and economic concessions in return for a Honecker visit that would likely come this summer if it is to be before the FRG national elections in early 1987.

[REDACTED]  
Fritz W. Linnarth

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MESSAGE NO. (N)7540 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 2

FROM: BMCKINLEY S/S 73126 7224  
(Officer name) (Offic symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PLATT/POINDEXTER: CHERNOBYL REACTOR UPDATE

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>ROBNEY MCDANIEL</u>		
<u>NSC</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT</u>		
	<u>Mattocic</u>		

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REMARKS: ADVANCE COPY. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW VIA STATE COURIER ON 5/3.

S/S Officer: BMCKINLEY

*SL Mont*





MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Chernobyl Reactor Update

A Working Group has been established in the Department's operations center to coordinate State's activities relating to the Chernobyl accident. The Working Group will operate from 0700 to 2100 EDT weekdays and 0800 to 1700 EDT Saturday and Sunday.

A lack of hard data from the Soviets and East Europe has made it difficult for EPA to make an unequivocal judgment of existing radiation hazards. Relevant posts have been asked to obtain all available data. In addition, experts with monitoring equipment are being sent this weekend to Warsaw, Moscow, and Leningrad to measure levels of radiation exposure.

Until the levels at Embassy Warsaw and Consulates Krakow and Poznan can be verified by U.S. experts, Acting Secretary Whitehead has decided that the Department will authorize at USG expense the travel of women of child-bearing age and children under sixteen from official USG families if they desire to leave Poland. Similar travel is not judged to be necessary for Moscow or Leningrad. A recommendation for private U.S. citizens in those categories to avoid travel to Poland was issued today.

The severely damaged reactor number four at Chernobyl continued to emit vapor/smoke during May 2, albeit in reduced amounts. It is not clear if the graphite pile is still burning, but the core remains extremely hot. The Soviets have been claiming for some time that the fire is out, and technically they may be correct. In any case the reduced emissions of vapor/smoke signify that significantly less radioactive material is being carried from the site than two days ago.

Amconsul Leningrad reported success in getting radiation checks for a group from Massapequa High School at the Leningrad Institute of Health through Intourist, and will attempt to arrange the same services for other groups.

In developments internationally, the Canadian press has been harshly critical of Soviet efforts to conceal the nature

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NLRR FOI-114/8# 10423

BY ~~LOT~~ NARA DATE 9/30/09

and extent of the accident; the Hungarian government is making an effort to reassure the public on the safety of its nuclear plant at Paks; Argentine officials have expressed concern the accident will raise popular doubts about nuclear power generation in Argentina; and the Dutch [serving in EC Presidency] told Embassy The Hague that the Soviets had "ridiculed" their request for detailed information during EC demarche in Moscow May 1.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MESSAGE NO. W7538 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN/NOINT No. Pages 3

FROM: INR (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Chernobyl Reactor Update

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
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DOD			
NSA			
CIA			

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REMARKS:

S/S Officer: MMS  
SC Mont

Peter Rodman

Jack Matlock

Handed to ORF  
by Whitehead at  
meeting today - apparently  
sent to Schultz.

Jack

~~SECRET~~

S/S-0 37  
OUTGOING



# Department of State

THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT PROVIDES A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO ELICIT A UNIFIED, FIRM BUT MODERATE ALLIED RESPONSE TO SOVIET HANDLING OF THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY STATION. THE EUROPEANS ARE ANGRY AT THE SOVIETS' VIRTUAL TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CHANNEL OUR COMMON FRUSTRATION WITH THE SOVIETS INTO LONG TERM GOALS.

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SECONDLY, WE CAN EMPHASIZE TO THE ALLIES THAT THE SOVIET HANDLING OF THIS INCIDENT SUGGESTS THAT THE NEW GORBACH V STYLE MAY BE ONLY JUST THAT -- STYLE. WE ALL NEED TO TAKE A HARD LOOK BEYOND THE NEW STYLE TO THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING AND ESPECIALLY AT THEIR ACTUAL PERFORMANCE ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES -- FROM ARMS CONTROL TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

FINALLY, IN SPITE OF THIS APPARENT RETREAT TO TRADITIONAL SOVIET SECRECY, WE NEED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO PRESS THE SOVIETS FOR MORE OPENNESS AND TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH ARE INCUMBENT ON TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED NATIONS.

WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE FOR USE IN A FINAL

SUMMIT DECLARATION OR A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT:

**DECLASSIFIED**  
NLRR Feb-114/8#10425  
BY WJ NARA DATE 9/30/08



PAGE 04 OF 07 STATE 137673 TOSEC 080325 C06/14 005164 NOD679

WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGER POSED BY THE TRANSBOUNDARY RELEASE OF RADIATION FROM THE ACCIDENT AT THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY STATION. WE REGRET THE SOVIET DECISION NOT TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE INFORMATION WHICH OUR COUNTRIES REQUESTED IN ORDER TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS. WE ADVOCATE EARLY AGREEMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION, OR OTHER MECHANISM, UNDER WHICH STATES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO REPORT NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO TRANSBOUNDARY RADIATION RELEASES. SUCH REPORTING COULD BE MODELED ON EXISTING IAEA GUIDELINES AND THE EXISTING IAEA SYSTEM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY. WE ALSO ADVOCATE FORMAL ADOPTION OF NUCLEAR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS.

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ISSUE PAPER - NUCLEAR ACCIDENT COOPERATION

I. ISSUE / OBJECTIVE

-- CREATE ALLIED CONSENSUS FOR FIRM, BUT MODERATE, RESPONSE TO SOVIET HANDLING OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.

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-- EUROPEAN REACTION TO SOVIET DENIAL OF RADIOACTIVE DANGER, AND REFUSAL OF COOPERATIVE ACTION AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION RANGES FROM DISMAY TO ANGER. GORBACHEV'S PROJECTION OF HIS LEADERSHIP AS ONE OF NEW STYLE AND

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~~SECRET~~

# Department of State

39 S/S-0  
OUTGOING

PAGE 05 OF 07 STATE 137673 TOSEC 080325 C06/14 005164 NOD679  
SOVIET STATEMENTS AND INITIATIVES ON WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES  
WITH INCREASINGLY CRITICAL EYE.

-- SOVIETS, ALONG WITH U.S., WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICIPATED IN DRAFTING 1983 IAEA GUIDELINES FOR MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS AND FOLLOW UP GUIDELINES FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN TRANSBOUNDARY RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY.

-- GUIDELINES STRESS IMPORTANCE OF TIMELY REPORTING ON RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WHICH MIGHT TRANSCEND AN INTERNATIONAL BORDER AND COULD BE OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.

-- GUIDELINES ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS MAY EXCEED A STATE'S ABILITY TO MANAGE ALONE, AND CALL FOR SETTING OF TECHNICAL THRESHOLDS AND FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION.

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### III. TALKING POINTS

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-- DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT DANGERS POSED TO EUROPE AND OTHER AREAS BY RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE ELEMENTS FROM SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY STATION.

-- PERPLEXED AND DISAPPOINTED BY SOVIET REFUSAL TO SUPPLY NECESSARY TECHNICAL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY

NEIGHBORING AND POTENTIALLY AFFECTED STATES.

-- SOVIET HANDLING OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IS CONTRADICTION OF GORBACHEV'S CLAIM OF NEW STYLE OF OPENNESS, AND AN UNFORTUNATE REAFFIRMATION OF CLOSED NATURE OF THAT



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SOCIETY AND SOVIET GOVERNMENT RELIANCE ON SECRECY.

-- WHILE SOVIET UNRESPONSIVENESS MAY BE READ AS DISREGARD FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AS WELL AS FOR SAFETY OF NEIGHBORING STATES, WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO LEARN FROM DISASTER AND SET CORRECTIVE MEASURES IN PLACE.

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-- RECOMMEND DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO A MORE FORMAL ADHERENCE AMONG IAEA MEMBER STATES AND OTHERS TO STANDARDS FOR REPORTING RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE TO MINIMIZE HEALTH ENVIRONMENTAL, AND OTHER EFFECTS.

-- SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT COULD INCLUDE:

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PF1 Alternate PFs PF2 File NOTE PF3 Keep PF4 Erase PF5 Forward Note  
 PF6 Reply PF7 Resend PF8 Print PF9 Help PF10 Next PF11 Previous PF12 Return

LOOK AT THE NOTE

E01

From: NSRBM --CPUA  
 To: NSSIT --CPUA

Date and time 05/02/86 17:59:23

NOTE FROM: ROD B. MCDANIEL

Subject: State Cable 137673

Have I seen?--give to Matlock.

\*\*\* Forwarding note from NSJRP --CPUA 05/02/86 17:36 \*\*\*

To: NSRBM --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Jon R. Purnell

SUBJECT: State Cable 137673

Subject cable is an info memo from State to Secretary Shultz which contains some of State's latest thinking on ways of dealing with the Chernobyl nuclear accident. We cannot call it up on the regular computer system, but secretariat advises that it was sent to ADM Poindexter. I understand your office needs to approve its release to other NSC staff. Jack Matlock would like to see the memo and would appreciate your making a copy available.

Thanks.

PF1 Alternate PFs PF2 File NOTE PF3 Keep PF4 Erase PF5 Forward Note  
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MATLOCK

~~Secret~~  
CLASSIFICATION

42

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

30 MAR 2 17:15

MODE

SECURE FAX # 94

ADMIN FAX #

RECORD #

PAGES 5

DTG 022252

RELEASER ATL

FROM/LOCATION

1. THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. BOB PEARSON / TOKYO / TOR:

TOR: 022305Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

- 1. \_\_\_\_\_
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 7/29/02

~~Secret~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

S/S-0 43  
OUTGOING



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DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR Feb-114/8 #10426  
BY HDS NARA DATE 9/30/08



PAGE 04 OF 07 STATE 137673 TOSEC 080325 C06/14 005164 NOD679

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S/S-0  
OUTGOING

45

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
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