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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
1986 3/9

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2909

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10407	FAX COVER SHEET	AMBRAMOWITZ TO MATLOCK RE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	5/1/1986	B2 B3
10408	PAPER	CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER: INITIAL ANALYSIS PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	20	5/1/1986	B1 B3
10409	FAX COVER SHEET	FORTIER AND MCDANIEL RE RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES TO TRAVELLERS IN THE USSR PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	1	5/1/1986	B3
10410	MEMO	RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES TO TRAVELLERS IN THE USSR PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/8	2	5/1/1986	B1 B3
10411	MEMO	SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER	3	5/1/1986	B1
10412	CABLE	011257Z MAY 86 R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	5/1/1986	B1
10413	CABLE	011737Z MAY 86 R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	5/1/1986	B1
10414	CABLE	011732Z MAY 86 R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	5/1/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10415	CABLE	011352Z MAY 86 <i>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</i>	1	5/1/1986	B1

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WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

File in Chernobyl

B



S/S #

85 MAR 26 1986
PIP: 47
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 107431 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages 4
FROM: MBova S/S 73126 7224
(Officer name) *(Officer symbol)* *(Extension)* *(Room number)*
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Soviet Statements re Chernobyl

<u>TO: (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
NSC	Rod McDaniel	456-2257	
	<i>RALPH</i>		
	<i>MATLOIC</i>		
	<i>ST. MARTIN</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: PLEASE DELIVER URGENTLY TO ADDRESSEE.

S/S Officer: *MBig J Andrew*

2

Unofficial Translation

As a result of the measures taken within the last 24 hours, the discharge of radioactive substances has decreased and the level of radiation in the area of the incident has lowered.

Measurements taken demonstrate that fission chain reaction of the atomic generator is not occurring. The reactor is in an inactive ("zaglushennos") state.

Active work for cleaning the contaminated unit is in progress.

The Soviet Union possesses sufficient material, scientific and technical possibilities for the works to liquidiate the consequences of the accident and at the present moment the need does not arise for assistance from other states. We are appreciative for the proposals of aid to us.

Foreign citizens located in the Soviet Union (in particular specialists or tourists) have not approached competent Soviet organizations in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl A.E.S. (atomic energy station).

Unofficial Translation

In Moscow there is appreciation for President Reagan's expression of sympathy in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl A.E.S. (atomic energy station), and also for the expressed readiness to render assistance in liquidating its consequences. We are undertaking all necessary efforts to localize the accident and keep its consequences to a minimum. At the present moment there is no need for assistance from other states.

As far as the facts of the situation, the President of the USA has been informed of them.

В результате принятых мер за истекшие сутки выделение радиоактивных веществ уменьшилось, уровни радиации в районе происшествия снизились.

Проводимые измерения свидетельствуют о том, что цепной реакции деления ядерного топлива не происходит. Реактор находится в заглушенном состоянии.

Развернуты активные работы по очистке загрязненных участков.

Советский Союз располагает достаточными материальными, научными и техническими возможностями для работ по ликвидации последствий аварии и на данном этапе потребности в содействии со стороны других государств не возникает. Мы признательны за предложение вам помощи.

В компетентные советские организации не поступало обращений со стороны находящаяся в Советском Союзе иностранных граждан (в частности специалистов или туристов) в связи с аварией на Чернобыльской АЭС.

В Москве признательны за выраженное Президентом Рейганом сочувствие в связи с аварией на Чернобыльской АЭС, а также за проявленную готовность оказать содействие в устранении последствий случившегося. Нами предпринимаются все необходимые усилия по локализации аварии и сведению к минимуму ее последствий. На данном этапе потребности в содействии в этой связи со стороны других государств не возникает.

Что касается фактического положения дел, то о нем Президент США нами проинформирован.

1210 1411

80 M -1 P

NA

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S K

80 MAY 19 9:48

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1-1-80
2-5-80
C (File)

MESSAGE NO. 107505 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NO FORN/WINTEL No. Pages 18

FROM: Arb. Abramowitz INR/OD 2220 6527
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
CIA/DDI	RKerr		
OSD	Ekle <i>McDane</i>		
NSC	J1atlock		
DIA			
NSA			

FOIA(b)(2) (3)

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: *mms*
SC Mont

Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster:

Initial Analysis

(ICOD: 2000 GMT, 1 May 1986)

Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster

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1. Current Status

A. Chernobyl Reactor

May 1 morning imagery showed what appeared to be smoke/vapor continuing to be emitted from the severely damaged reactor, Unit #4, at Chernobyl, indicating that the fire continued to burn, despite Soviet statements to the contrary. Fire engines and emergency vehicles continued to be parked in the same locations around the reactor site where they were originally observed two days ago. This area has been very heavily contaminated.

Other imagery showed continuing efforts at fire suppression by helicopter. The fire suppressant units may contain earth or sand in an attempt to smother the fire. Imagery of Kiev showed the city to be functioning normally (see Map 1).


Although there have been press reports that Reactor 3 is also melting, the Intelligence Community has no technical data to support this. The infrared signature on Landsat photos of Chernobyl does not allow us to distinguish between the large amount of heat emanating from Reactor 4 and any possible loss from Reactor 3. On April 29, after the accident, it appeared that cooling water was being pumped into Reactor 3. Even though this reactor has been shut down, it is still necessary to continue cooling.

There are also reports that four reactors that are identical to the severely damaged Chernobyl unit--Kursk 3 & 4 and possibly Smolensk 1 & 2--have been shutdown by the Soviets.

The emergency command and control site that was about 1 km southeast of the reactor has been moved, and may now be located at a possible field hospital and decontamination site approximately 4.8 km to the southeast.

B. Current Evidence of a Meltdown

The withdrawal of the emergency command and control center to a greater distance probably reflects the continued spewing of the heavier radioactive fission particulates from the burning reactor core. Preliminary analysis of data from Scandinavia suggests that all of the volatile [gaseous] fission products [radioactive krypton, xenon, iodine] vented from the reactor. [At Three Mile Island a tiny fraction of 1 percent of the volatile fission products vented.] More than 50 percent of the total fission products [including particles of radioactive cesium, strontium, barium, tellurium, lanthanum, ruthenium, (in addition to the gases noted above) has already been scattered.



0 10
kilometers

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Radioactive particles deposited in Sweden and Finland now include some of the heavier, less reactive, radioactive elements. The appearance of these elements in samples so far from the site of the accident is a strong indicator that at least a partial core meltdown has occurred, and that a major fraction of the core's radioactivity has been and is continuing to be dispersed. Speculation that fracturing and subsequent burning, rather than melting, of the damaged fuel in the core occurred, does not change this assessment. The difference in expected radiological consequences between the two cases is essentially meaningless.

C. Nature of the Accident

Continuing analysis of available imagery suggests the following sequence of events:

--For an as yet undetermined reason, at least part of the reactor coolant was lost. West German sources have reported that an initial power loss was the immediate cause, which interrupted the pumping of coolant water into the reactor. The operators may have tried to use auxiliary power, which either failed or came on too late to prevent an initial overheating.

--At that point the operators probably tried to shut down the reactor. However, even when a reactor is shut down, its temperature will continue to rise for an uncertain period of time.

--Given the initial loss of coolant, the remaining coolant channels overheated, feeding superheated steam into the steam separator, which takes heat from the reactor to feed to the turbine. [Alternatively, the overheating of the reactor core, coupled with a rupture of the feed water tubes running through the reactor may have generated an gas--either hydrogen or methane--which then exploded, shattering the steam lines in the adjacent steam separator.]

--At this point, the steam separator apparently exploded. This destroyed the upper portion of the reactor hall, with two immediate effects: first, this added air to the overheated graphite core, fueling the fire; second, the uranium core was now melting, if it had not already begun to do so after the reactor was shut down. The destruction of the reactor hall allowed radioactivity to spread. By this time, everyone in the immediate area, estimated at between 50 and 100 workers, were dead or dying. [The Soviets have now admitted to two dead and 197 hospitalized, of whom 18 are said to be in serious condition.]

--The continuing fire now spread a cloud of radioactive gas.

This sequence of events took place on Friday 25 April and early Saturday 26 April. We do not know when the Soviets began

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evacuation of the surrounding towns, established the security perimeter and moved in helicopters to fight the fire. We became aware of the incident on Monday 28 April, following Scandinavian reports of radiation drifting from the USSR. Our satellite imagery of the 29th showed the accident, evidence of evacuation, and command posts being established. While the helicopter fire-fighting activity has increased since then, little else has changed. River traffic continues, as does normal life in Kiev 60 miles to the south.

D. Casualties

The entire Intelligence Community believes a fatality figure of two is preposterous. A normal day shift at an individual Soviet RBMK-1000 power reactor is reported to be around 100 people; a night shift would be 25-35 people. This would mean that, because Unit 3 and 4 are adjacent, as many as 200 people in the daytime or 50-70 people at night could have been working in the vicinity of Reactor Unit 4 when the accident began. While we would expect that an immediate evacuation was ordered when the seriousness of the accident became apparent, still a fairly large crew (compared to US reactor operations) would be expected to remain to carry out emergency procedures in an attempt to shut down the reactor and to solve whatever problem may have caused the accident. This crew would be a "forlorn hope," kept at the site in order to rectify the problem, but with the knowledge that they would be lost should the problem worsen dramatically. The only alternative to this would be to abandon the site immediately at the sign of major problems, which would virtually insure the sort of disaster that ultimately occurred.

If the accident situation lasted for any amount of time we would expect the emergency crew to be augmented as the seriousness of the situation became known. Shift supervisors and foremen from the other units would be called in to make sure that appropriate actions were being taken to head off any potential catastrophe. Imagery showing fire engines and emergency vehicles near the reactors supports the supposition that additional personnel were responding to the accident. They could only have been brought in before any explosion. Based on numbers of vehicles in the area and postulating an augmented emergency crew, as much as 100 people could have been in the immediate vicinity of the reactor when a major steam/gas explosion occurred, ripping open the reactor building and causing major structural damage.

Because of the extent of the damage observed on imagery of the site, we feel that all the people in the immediate vicinity of the Unit 4 explosion were either killed or suffered lethal radiation doses at the time of the explosion. The failure of the Soviets to evacuate the fire engines from the lethal radiation zone around the destroyed reactor building is another indication of fatalities.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOINTEL~~

II. Economic Effects

A. The Chernobyl Plant in Economic Perspective

The 4,000 megawatt (MW) Chernobyl nuclear power plant represents nearly one-tenth of the electric generating capacity of the Ukraine (and one percent of total Soviet capacity). The Ukraine and Moldavia essentially comprises the South Consolidated Electric Power System (South OES) in the USSR (see Map 2, which shows the regional electric transmission lines). In turn, the South OES is one of nine OESes comprising the Unified Power System of the USSR. (Two other OESes--the Central Asia OES and the Far East OES--are isolated from the unified system and operate independently.) The unified system also is linked to the East European CEMA countries, Finland, Norway, and Turkey. This integration increases the flexibility of Soviet electric power supply in that power can be transferred between the linked systems, albeit usually only in small amounts (e.g., in 500 MW loads).

It is likely that Chernobyl Reactors 1, 2, and 3 will not be operational for at least three years, if not longer. Two larger RBMK reactors under construction within 2 km of the explosion cannot be worked on either because of the radiation. This represents a net loss of 7,000 megawatts of electricity [4,000 current and 3,000 potential].

The Chernobyl accident also sets back plans in the latest Soviet Five Year Plan to increase the share of electricity generated by nuclear power from 11 percent to 20 percent of the total.


B. Coping with Reduced Generating Capacity

The Soviets could transfer judicious amounts of power from adjacent OESes to the South OES, but would have to be careful of robbing Peter to pay Paul. Other short-term options for adjusting to the shutdown of the Chernobyl plant include:

- increase power output at fossil-fuel plants and selectively ration electricity;
- cut back electricity exports via the South OES; and
- increase imports via the South OES from Poland.

Nuclear Power Plants & Electrical Transmission Lines

The United States Government has not recognized the sovereignty of Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania over the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations are not necessarily authoritative.



6248 1-68 State (SRI/SC)

*Transmission lines with less than 220 kV capacity are not shown.

Over the longer term, the Soviets might consider delaying any planned retirement of older generating capacity, especially in the South OES and adjacent regions.



FOIA(b)(1), (3)

Selective rationing of electric power probably will be Moscow's first response if only because it could take days or even weeks to implement some of its other short-term options. This would provide immediate relief; otherwise, key industries in the Ukraine and Belarussia—which is at the end of a major trunk line fed by the Chernobyl plant—could suffer serious power shortages.

Cutting back on electricity exports would have negligible hard-currency consequences for the USSR and would relieve considerable pressure on an otherwise capacity-short system. In 1984, the last year for which detailed information is available, the USSR exported 24.7 billion kWh of electricity, an amount comparable to the estimated annual output of the Chernobyl plant. More than 19 billion kWh went to its CEMA partners; the balance appears to have gone to Western countries, primarily to Finland but also to Turkey, Norway, and Greece. The only hard-currency generated by these sales was some \$15 million from 552 million kWh sold to Greece and from about one million kWh sold to Norway. (Sales to Finland and Turkey are on barter terms.) With the exception of sales to Finland and Norway, most of the electric power appears to have been shipped via the affected South OES (and possibly the Transcaucasus OES for exports to Turkey).

Increased imports from Poland are a distinct possibility. According to Polish statistics, Poland is a net importer of electric power from the USSR, but only marginally so. Overall, Poland is a significant net exporter of electric power, with major customers including other East European countries and Austria. Slack demand last year apparently denied Poland the chance to reclaim lost coal markets in the West. Poland thus may be capable of increasing coal exports to the USSR to help ensure steady, higher levels of operation in coal-fired power plants, and might be able to increase its exports of electric power to the South OES. Conceivably, Poland might also boost exports to other East Europeans to compensate for the likely decline in Soviet exports.

C. Short-Term Energy Resources

The shutdown of the Chernobyl' plant puts additional strain on the USSR's already troubled energy sector. While gains were posted for all major fuels during the first quarter of 1986 compared with the same period last year, the oil industry is still falling short. Output recovered to nearly 12.1 mb/d, the

highest level since 1984 but less than earlier achieved and below the 12.3 mb/d rate planned for 1986. More than 100 teams from different producing regions were sent to the important Samotlor field in West Siberia in an effort to boost output. The output of natural gas continues to increase faster than planned, and coal output continues to increase--perhaps finally raising the coal industry up from its nearly seven-year doldrums. This improved performance by coal could not have come at a more opportune time given the setback to the USSR's nuclear program and the increased reliance on fossil fuel plants.

D. Nuclear Reactor Sales

Soviet nuclear reactor exports have not included the type that exploded at Chernobyl. Nevertheless, Moscow will be very hard-pressed to play down the unfavorable publicity generated by the Chernobyl incident in their continuing efforts to market their nuclear reactors. At present there are Soviet reactors in Finland and in all European East Bloc countries except Poland; two are under construction in Cuba. The Soviets have offered assistance to Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia. They have bid on plants for Yugoslavia and, recently, North Korea.

E. Effect on World Commodity Prices

Chernobyl should have no real effect on world commodity prices. The quick upswing in wheat futures prices was a typical spurt of speculative activity in the face of uncertainty. The global stock of wheat is currently in excess of 300 million metric tons; Soviet wheat production for 1986 is projected to be about 190 million metric tons, with an additional 17 million being imported. Even a disaster of the scope of Chernobyl would be unlikely to dent global stock. (Effects on Soviet grain production are discussed below.)

III. Ecological Effects

A. Population Affected

The Southwest Region, which includes Chernobyl, is densely populated, even in rural areas. Large villages are located in the major river valleys. The Chernobyl plant employed some 10,000 workers. Based on an average family size of 2.5, the workers' settlement of Pripyat, located just northwest of the plant, has a population of at least 25,000. Chernobyl, 17 km south of the reactor, had a 1970-estimated population of 10,100. Both of these towns have been evacuated, although we do not know if the evacuation took place before or after the explosion.

Based on rural population densities (171 person/square mile) and major towns and cities, the population in the

surrounding area is (see Map 3):

within 30 km	50,000 people
within 40 km	250,000 people
within 160 km	7 million people
within 208 km	9 million people

Kiev is the largest city in the region, approximately 100 km downstream from the Chernobyl reactor. The 1984 population estimate for Kiev is 2.4 million, with another 1.9 million outside the city but within the Kiev Oblast.

Both Pripyat and Chernobyl appear to have been evacuated. We do not know if the evacuation took place when the initial problem occurred, or after the explosion. No evacuation from Kiev is evident. We do not have enough information about the evacuation to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense planning.

B. Medical Consequences

Of the various types of radioactivity released by the reactor, the most immediate concern is iodine, which is easily absorbed by humans and can lead to thyroid cancer. To preclude the absorption of radioactive iodine, iodine tablets or liquid can be taken. Radioactive iodine 131 has a half-life of about eight days.


The longer term threat is provided primarily by cesium-137 and strontium-90, which have half-lives of 30 years and 29 years respectively. Cesium concentrates in electrolytes (bodily fluids). Strontium concentrates in the bones. It is readily absorbed via dairy products. Thus, the milk supplies and milk producing areas around the accident site will be contaminated, posing a difficult problem for Soviet officials who may be reluctant to admit the importance of the accident by dumping tainted milk. Both types of radiation can cause such cancers as leukemia, lung, and bone.

C. Effect on Agriculture (Food and Water Resources)

The type of radiation being emitted is easily absorbed by plants, especially during the rainy spring season. However, it is impossible for us adequately to address the radiological impact of the accident on Soviet agriculture at this time, other than to say that things could have been worse. The area closest to the plant and, presumably, receiving the highest levels of radioactive contamination, is a low lying, relatively swampy area where truck crops are the major agricultural activity. It lies about 100 km north of the Ukraine


Map 3

ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THE AREA OF THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR



Map 3

ESTIMATED POPULATION IN THE AREA OF THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR



----- Railroad
———— Road

breadbasket, and the winds blew away from the Ukraine at the time when the heaviest contamination vented from the damaged reactor. For this reason the immediate radiological threat is less than had the wind direction been reversed.

However, the Pripyat Marsh is a major water basin (see Map 4), and its contamination could have an effect lasting for generations. How soon the contamination will begin to affect cities and towns downstream is impossible to determine at this time. The migration of the radioactive products through soil and water table is dependent on the exact type of soil, water flow rate, turbulence and chemical composition. However, based on US accident cases, the water contamination problem is a longer rather than a shorter term problem.

The 30 mile long Kiev reservoir is certainly contaminated, but the extent and the type of contamination cannot be well estimated without access to measurements. The Kiev authorities may be able to mitigate the contamination through extra filtration.

IV. Soviet Consequences

International. Gorbachev's year-long effort to project a new image of Soviet leadership as more open, responsive, and concerned about popular issues such as the environment has been seriously damaged, especially in Europe, by the regime's handling of the Chernobyl incident. Faced with the emergency, the bureaucracy automatically reacted along familiar lines: highly restricted and centralized news control; denial of the importance of the issue to other countries; an automatic replay of past American problems in nuclear energy; and a reflexive linking of the issue to the need to accept Gorbachev's arms control initiatives. The initial Soviet admission, several days after the accident apparently took place, was probably prompted by two factors: (1) the inability to continue covering it up, owing to the detection of radiation in Scandinavia; and (2) an assessment at that time that the situation was out of control and required foreign assistance. Indeed, the Soviet government did initially request aid from Sweden and West Germany; on May 1, the Soviets asked Italy for aid, according to the press.

However, in the following days the Soviets have reverted to their more familiar behavior in such crises. They have claimed to have put out the fire and gotten the situation under control; most Western analysts believe the fire has continued to burn. On April 30 the Soviets put on television pictures of Reactors 3 and 4 before and after the accident. This confirmed the seriousness of the damage, although the pictures were shown to promote the view that as there was no smoke the fire must be out. We believe that the smoke was edited out of the image. The testimony of a Soviet embassy officer before a congressional subcommittee on May 1 was an interesting

exception to their continued reticence. The Soviet official insisted that the accident occurred on Monday, although we continue to believe that Friday or Saturday is more likely.

The regime has banked upon an ephemeral European unhappiness over Moscow's reluctance to inform its neighbors about Chernobyl and the probability that traditional interests will soon reassert their priority. Nevertheless, Gorbachev probably will try to mend fences with his neighbors, probably in bilateral communications, in the future.

Domestic. Party and governmental officials probably approve of the regime's handling of the Chernobyl incident as being in line with Soviet law and custom, and in accord with deeply ingrained Russian reluctance to reveal problems to foreigners.

The popular reaction will, as always, vary according to social class. Critical intellectuals rely on foreign broadcasts and personal contacts for much of their information and will be much better informed than the man in the street, and thus critical of the regime's restriction on news. Bureaucrats also rely on foreign broadcasts as an important supplement to official information, and are likely to be ambivalent toward the regime's handling of the crisis. The ordinary workers will for the most part be passive, expecting the government to handle the crisis properly. But, at the same time, the ordinary people are the most avid rumor mongers, disregarding logic and mutual incompatibility of conflicting rumors. The response of this social class is the one that the regime fears most, and this concern is one of the primary shapers of the regime's clamp on news. The only area in the USSR likely to have any public demonstrations is Estonia and Latvia where there is a long standing resentment of the regime as well as more consciousness on environment issues.

Leadership Aloofness. It is a Soviet tradition that Politburo leaders remain uninvolved publicly with hot issues such as the KAL shootdown and the current crisis. Gorbachev has not said a word in public about the Chernobyl accident, and the traditional May Day parades took place in Moscow and the republic capitals without reference it. As usual, the state, not the party is the responsible organization for handling the problem, and the customary responsible body has been created, a government inquiry commission headed by the deputy premier for fuels and energy, Boris Shcherbina. While such commissions often whitewash events, in this case it is likely that a review of the atomic energy industry will lead to changes in operating procedures and design changes in reactors. Furthermore, some officials will be singled out as responsible and punished. A scandal over the building of the Atomash factory in Volgadonsk (which produces nuclear reactors) eventually led to the retirement of deputy premier I. T. Novikov, then in charge of construction, in July 1983.

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Political scapegoating? Inevitably, there will be politics involved even in determining responsibility for the Chernobyl disaster and its consequences. In addition to sacking technical officials, there may be an effort to use the event for attacking, or even removing, high-level political officials. Gorbachev might find this a convenient occasion to undercut Ukrainian leader Shcherbitskiy, whose state apparatus charged with ecological controls and clean-up is poorly organized and ill-equipped to handle the Chernobyl pollution. Should such a power move develop, it would materialize only slowly, and would probably be signalled ahead of time by traditional political indicators in the press.

V. Foreign Reactions

A. East Bloc

Immediate Health Concerns. Poland announced early on that radiation levels in the northeastern portion of the country posed potential health hazards. The government set up a high-level commission in direct contact with the Soviets to consult on the problem. Precautionary health and safety standards were instituted in those areas affected by the fall-out. Polish children 16 years old and younger were being given iodine to prevent their absorbing radioactive iodine from the atmosphere. Government spokesmen said--somewhat paradoxically--that there was "no indication of a health hazard."

Hungary and Yugoslavia announced they are monitoring radiation levels, but that the radioactivity measured thus far posed no public health problems. Romania made a similar announcement. Romanian television announced that Ceausescu chaired a party leadership meeting to review the situation. A task force headed by his wife was formed to oversee the quality of the environment. It was also noted that there had been "some increase in radioactivity" in the northeastern part of the country. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany made no announcements about monitoring, or about any safety precautions. Moreover, the East Germans in general have downplayed the affair, following the Soviet line that the severity of the accident has been greatly exaggerated by the Western press.

Political. The Polish government hinted at a general amnesty if Solidarity backs down from its plans to hold May 1 and May 3 (old Polish National Day) demonstrations. All indications are that the demonstrations were likely to be small and containable. The Chernobyl accident could give the protesters an additional anti-regime (anti-Soviet) issue around which to rally.

Czechoslovakia is a major supplier of reactor components

both within the bloc and as part of Soviet nuclear reactor exports, and expects nuclear power to supply roughly 20% of the planned increase in its electricity output in the next five-year plan. Thus, the Czechs are particularly concerned about public reaction, both domestically and abroad.

Romania, already hard pressed to meet its energy demands, receives some of its electrical power from the Chernobyl plant and may soon face sporadic shortages. Romanian-Soviet discussion of bilateral economic agreements are expected in the near future and a Ceausescu visit to Moscow is again being rumored; this development could complicate that bargaining.

Hungary is heavily committed to nuclear energy. Anti-nuclear protests--small ones--may develop here, if only as another outlet for exhibiting dissatisfaction with the government. The country does have an active environmentalist group which can be expected to seize on the episode for new campaigns.

There may be similar protests in Yugoslavia, where Western-style demonstrations are popular. Moreover, there is a serious debate over nuclear power in Yugoslavia--an industry in its early stages--and this accident is sure to enliven that debate.

No protests are likely in Bulgaria, however, where there is a large nuclear power industry struggling to grow larger. Behind the scenes concern about its effect on the country's agricultural exports is likely to grow .

Three bloc countries--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR--produce an appreciable share of their electricity from Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. Heretofore nuclear programs within the bloc have been bilateral, between the Soviets and the participating country. The long-term Science and Technology program announced at the CEMA session in December 1985, earmarked nuclear energy as one of the five priority areas in which the bloc members will increase efforts at joint production. CEMA head Vyacheslav Sychev said that total capacity of the nuclear power plants in the bloc will double in the next five years. Most bloc countries have been reluctant to commitment themselves fully to the ambitious integration schemes backed by the Soviets via CEMA. The Chernobyl accident will likely increase the foot-dragging.

B. Western Europe

Immediate Health Concerns. Scandinavia as well as some parts of West Germany, Austria and Switzerland have reported significant increases in radioactivity--three to ten times normal levels in many areas, and over a hundred times in western Sweden where rain fell. Nevertheless, health authorities in all except Austria have not called for

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precautionary measures. Officials in eastern Austria warned mothers to keep babies inside.

Political. The four day delay in notifying affected countries has provoked a round of official criticism of the Soviets. Sweden lodged a diplomatic protest and demanded an international investigation of Soviet nuclear power stations. The other nordic nations, except Finland, demanded an official Soviet report. Although the French press sharply criticized the USSR, the French government has remained muted--perhaps due to France's distance from the disaster and their commitment to nuclear energy. The West Germans have asked the USSR to shut down similar plants and seconded US urgings that an international team inspect the Chernobyl plant. Other countries have also blasted the Soviets' dinosaurian response--denting Gorbachev's carefully cultivated image as a forthcoming new Soviet leader.

Peace and ecological groups are likely to mount limited protests against the Soviets, while seeking primarily to exploit public anxieties to foster generalized opposition against things nuclear--energy and weapons. Swedish activists are lobbying to preserve a 1970 vote to dismantle Sweden's four nuclear plants by 2010. Greens in the FRG, who recently staged several rowdy anti-nuclear power demonstrations, will step up their efforts, as will the British Greens and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) who have protested low-level leaks at a reactor on the Irish Sea. Heightened public anxieties may also strengthen the hand of the FRG Social Democrats' left-wing which--in cooperation with the East German communist party--is drafting a proposal for a central European nuclear weapons free zone.

VI. Other Soviet Reactor Problems

A. Civil. Since the late 1940s, Moscow has had its share of nuclear-related accidents, although only the disintegration of a nuclear-powered satellite over Canada affected other countries. Emigre reports and occasional Soviet press items document at least five domestic incidents:


- In 1948, workers at Soviet atomic energy installations were said to have developed cataracts and other illnesses because of radiation leaks.
- In 1958, an explosion at the Kyshtym facility near Chelyabinsk contaminated more than 125,000 square kilometers of Siberian countryside.
- In 1963, apparent laxity in the handling of radioactive materials led to a wave of leukemia cases in Moscow.
- In 1965, Soviet scientists reported unusual levels of strontium in the Caspian sea, suggesting it had been used as a nuclear waste dump.

--In 1968, the Soviet press took the unusual step of denying rumors that nuclear power plants caused disease. Trud, for example, published the complaint of someone living near such a plant that "the high level of radioactivity" might explain "why I am frequently sick." The paper's decision to publish such a letter, even while rejecting the premise, suggests a nuclear episode at the time.

Two enigre accounts, Igor A. Medvedev's Nuclear Disaster in the Urals (1979) and Boris Komarov's The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union (1980), provide details on these specific incidents. USA reported that reactors were deliberately built outside populated areas to limit the number of people who would be affected by or be aware of problems. Furthermore, the authorities always denied any report of a problem.

That procedure has become less effective, however, as more plants have been built, the ecology movement has expanded, more people have come in contact with such plants, and more ques-

B. Military. Numerous humint reports indicate that radiation sickness is a common fear in the Soviet Navy; that there are special clinics for affected submariners; and even that spinal taps are routinely administered to check for radiation sickness. Inadequate quality control of reactor system production and poor practices by operating personnel have led to a large number of naval reactor problems, with chronic reactor leaks being the most commonly noted. Some classes are more affected than others: the first-generation Soviet nuclear submarines (the H-class SSBNs, E-class SSGNs, and W-class SSNs) have notoriously bad propulsion plants. The second-generation V-I-class SSNs and C-class SSGNs also have been trouble-ridden. On several occasions, submarines' nuclear power plants failed completely, requiring the units to be towed home. Nuclear propulsion problems have required individual submarines to be out of service for years at a time, and have even necessitated scrapping a few of them.



Map 13-5-66 STATE (WORLD)
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86 MAY 1 2:03

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FROM Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence

FOIA(b)(3)

SUBJECT Radiological Health Consequences to Travellers in the USSR

CLASSIFICATION

PAGES 2

SENT TO:	DELIVER TO:	EXTENSION	ROOM
White House <i>C</i>	Donald R. Fortier Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs	456-2257	WHSR
White House <i>C</i>	Rodney B. McDaniel, Executive Secretary, NSC	395-3684	304 OE0B
NSC <i>C</i>	Ron St. Martin, Senior Director, Crisis Management Center	395-7310	
	[REDACTED]		

REMARKS: THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN THE ATTACHED.

DICK KERR
DDI

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NLRR F06-11418 #10409
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11

FOIA(b)(1), (3)

SECRET [REDACTED]

01 28

1 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Radiological Health Consequences to Travellers
in the USSR [REDACTED]

1. Summary. We continue to see no short term radiological health hazards to persons outside the vicinity of Chernobyl (distances beyond 40-50 km). There can be long term consequences to people, particularly at great distances, if radioactive iodine-contaminated foodstuffs are ingested.

2. Discussion. Although the total radiation released from the damaged reactor at Chernobyl was immense, possibly hundreds of millions of Curies, most is either confined to the immediate vicinity of Chernobyl or has been dispersed widely, thus diluting its potency.

3. The radiation released can be divided into two classes--particulate and gaseous. The particulates, which contain many long-lived, highly radioactive elements, settle out from the atmosphere within tens of kilometers of the source. These particulates will represent the Soviets' long term clean-up problem. [REDACTED]

4. The radiation detected [REDACTED] is predominately from the gaseous releases. By far, the majority of these gases were released at the instant of the reactor explosion. Thus, radiation readings far from the site should peak as this bow wave passes, then decline rapidly. This is true even though the damaged reactor [REDACTED]

5. The primary gaseous releases [REDACTED] are radioactive noble gases (zenon, krypton, etc.). These are dangerous gases when concentrated because of the high energy (2 million electron volts) of the gamma rays given off when they decay. But being noble elements, they cannot react chemically to form particulates, and are no danger to foodstuffs. As the bow wave of these gases is dissipated, the danger subsides.

6. At about the same time as the noble gases were released, major amounts of gaseous iodine were released as well. The radioactive iodine

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does not represent a near term radiological health problem, however, because the gamma rays emitted are only about a tenth as energetic as for the noble gases.

7. Iodine is a great long term concern because it does chemically react with the environment and does contaminate foodstuffs. The major health hazard stems from dairy cattle that ingest contaminated feed, and concentrate the iodine in their milk. This, in turn, is concentrated in thyroid glands in people, particularly infants, who drink the milk. Direct inhalation is also a hazard, though less radioactivity is concentrated in the thyroid by this means. The carcinogenic effect of this radioactive iodine is well documented. Cancer of the thyroid is fatal about 25 percent of the time. Radioactive iodine has a half life of about eight days. This means that, for practical purposes, only food or milk produced within the next few months will be a danger.

8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The only concern might be if the reactor blows again as the Soviets pour water on it to cool it off, and the winds were blowing to Kiev. Even then the total dosage in Kiev should be within safe levels. Radioactive iodine levels will need to be monitored.

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Gordon C. Oehler
Director
Scientific and Weapons Research
Central Intelligence Agency



NUCLEAR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL

Annrcr:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

Worldwide attention is focused on Chernobyl, a complex of nuclear power plants

sixty miles north of Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, where a meltdown of the central core of a nuclear reactor has taken place, causing an explosion that released dangerous quantities of radiation. It is believed that the graphite housing of the core may still be burning at Chernobyl, spewing particles of radioactive debris into the atmosphere.

the nuclear did not cause the explosion

Permit for technical accuracy

There seems little doubt that this is the most serious nuclear accident in history. Official Soviet press statements have termed it a "disaster," and because the Soviets rarely publicize news about any domestic catastrophes -- even earthquakes or floods -- their use of the word "disaster" is especially significant.

No - 1958 (?)

Nuclear radiation in the atmosphere doesn't respect national borders. It disperses into the air of the planet and is therefore an international concern. The reluctance of the Soviet Union to supply all of the details about the Chernobyl event is especially disturbing. Within hours of the accident, radiation readings in Scandinavia were one hundred times higher than normal, but the Soviets didn't alert the world to the event for more than a day, and then only after they received an inquiry from the Swedish government. They didn't inform the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna until Monday, April 28 -- two days after the explosion occurred.

more than a day -

Officially, the Soviets claim that the situation at Chernobyl has stabilized, that radiation levels are under control. Nevertheless, they have asked Sweden and West Germany for help, and there are unconfirmed reports of mass evacuations from the

not official

Chernobyl area. The United States has expressed regret to the Soviet government about this tragedy, our concern about civilian casualties, and our readiness to provide humanitarian and technical assistance as soon as possible. But as yet, the Soviets have not asked for our help.

American specialists want to share their knowledge and experience with Soviet experts, for they know that sealing the damaged reactor, cleaning up the surrounding environment, and treating the thousands of people potentially affected by radiation is a difficult and extensive process. In 1979, there was a partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. Most of the escaping radiation was contained, and there were no deaths or associated illnesses among the nearby population. Nevertheless, the knowledge Americans gained from their study of the Three Mile Island incident and the recommendations for immediate safety measures could be especially important to the Soviets at this tragic time.

The extent of the Chernobyl catastrophe is not yet known, mainly because the Soviet government has released so little information. Rumors and speculation abound, and will continue to increase as long as the Soviets refuse to set the record straight. American and Japanese tourists returning from the Kiev area, for example, say they were warned about possible contamination of the drinking water, but there have been no official cautions from the Kremlin. U.S. intelligence sources believe there is reason to fear that a second reactor at Chernobyl may be in danger of meltdown; yet, again, there is no word from Moscow to confirm or deny this report.

*NO! -
They
do not
think so,*

When it comes to nuclear safety, no one can stand on ceremony. The potential dangers of human radiation poisoning and irreversible damage to the environment are of worldwide concern, regardless of the reticent Soviet government's desire to

avoid embarrassment. We want to help in whatever way we can -- to minimize casualties, prevent further contamination, and to work with Soviet authorities to make nuclear energy safe for the future.

Anncr: That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

To: JFM
From: PWR 33

May 1, 1986



POLITICAL TALKING POINTS/THEMES

Whatever the cause of the accident, the Soviets' handling of the accident reminds us of some things about the Soviet system.
E.G.:

- The Soviet attitude toward international obligations:
 - o IAEA Experts' Guidelines (1983-84), which Soviet experts participated in drafting, laid down standards of conduct for such cases, including timely sharing of information to affected states.
 - o Other countries' ability to assess environmental impact, hazards to health, and future extent of both, is seriously hampered by withholding of facts about cause and circumstances of the accident.
 - o Demonstrates requirement for effective verification and greater transparency in agreements reached with U.S.S.R.

- Aspects of the Soviet system:
 - o Callousness toward their own people.
 - o Misleading, even deceptive public statements. E.g., TASS's claim that this was first Soviet nuclear accident, when we know of at least five (including a major explosion in Siberia in 1958 that contaminated more than 125,000 sq. km. of countryside).
 - o Casts doubt on Gorbachev's pledges of "openness" and his image as a "modern, enlightened" type of leader.

SB
Pls keep a copy -
JFM

summary cables ³⁴
 thru May 1
 relate to nuclear
 incident

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 04476

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, SENV, CASC, UR, PL
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR DISASTER; GOP INFORMS POLISH
PUBLIC CONCERNING RADIATION LEVELS AND PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES

REF: WARSAW 4452 (NOTAL)

1. 0 - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. A TELEVISION APPEARANCE OF SIX MEMBERS OF THE GOP CHERNOBYL' EMERGENCY PANEL PROVIDED THE FIRST OFFICIAL FIGURES OF RADIATION LEVELS IN POLAND FOLLOWING THE SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER. ACCORDING TO THEM, THE MAXIMUM ABSORBED DOSE RATE ENCOUNTERED (IN NORTHEAST POLAND) WAS ABOUT 150 TIMES BACKGROUND; THE MINIMUM ABOUT THREE TIMES BACKGROUND. THE AVERAGE WAS ABOUT 0.1 REM. THE POPULATION WAS ASSURED THAT THIS LEVEL OF EXPOSURE POSED NO HEALTH HAZARD. THE PANEL EXPLAINED THE IODINE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM (WHICH THEY EMPHASIZED AS BEING NECESSARY) WHICH CONTINUES TO PROVIDE THE IODINE PREPARATION FOR CHILDREN BELOW AGE 16 EVEN ON THE MAY DAY HOLIDAY. IT REPEATED EARLIER PUBLISHED CAUTIONARY MEASURES CONCERNING MILK FROM COWS GRAZING ON OPEN PASTURE. IT RECOMMENDED WASHING ALL FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. THE TELECAST ALSO SHOWED AN OFFICIAL SOVIET REPORT ON CHERNOBYL' ALONG WITH A PURPORTED STILL SHOT OF THE REACTOR AFTER THE DISASTER. END SUMMARY.

3. ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 30, POLISH TELEVIEWERS WERE TREATED TO A REMARKABLE DISPLAY OF CANDOR (OR AT LEAST OF SIMULATED CANDOR) BY MEMBERS OF THE BLUE-RIBBON PANEL HASTILY ASSEMBLED BY THE GOP ON MONDAY IN THE WAKE OF THE CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR DISASTER. SIX MEMBERS OF THE PANEL PARTICIPATED IN THE FIFTEEN-MINUTE "MEET THE PRESS" SESSION FOLLOWED BY PANEL RESPONSES TO

TELEPHONE INQUIRES FROM VIEWERS. PANELISTS WERE: MINISTER OF HEALTH MIROSLAW CYBULKO; DOMESTIC TRADE MINISTER JERZY JOZWIAK; DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF MOTHER AND CHILD PROF. KRYSZYNA BOZEK; PROF. ZBIGNIEW JAWOROWSKI OF THE CENTRAL LABORATORY FOR RADIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS; DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AND RESEARCH AGENCY MIECZYSLAW SOWINSKI; AND PROF. JANUSZ NAUMAN OF THE POSTGRADUATE MEDICAL CENTER. THE PANELISTS BRIMMED EXPERTISE AND EXUDED TRANQUILITY, OF COURSE INTENDED TO ALLAY THE ANXIETIES OF THE POLISH PEOPLE.

4. PROF. JAWOROWSKI, WHO HAS BEEN PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR ON A MARIE SKLODOVSKA-CURIE FUND GRANT AND IS AN INTERNATIONALLY-RESPECTED RADIOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS SPECIALIST, PROVIDED WHAT IS THE "HARDEST" GOP DATA TO DATE ON THE LEVELS OF ABSORBED RADIATION DOSE BY THE POLISH POPULATION. HE SAID: A) THAT THE AVERAGE ABSORBED DOSE THROUGH APRIL 30 WAS ABOUT 0.1 REM; B) THAT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF RADIATION EXPOSURE WAS SUCH THAT IF IT WERE SUSTAINED FOR TEN DAYS IT WOULD RESULT IN AN ABSORBED DOSE OF ABOUT 0.50 REM; C) THAT THE LOWEST ABOVE BACKGROUND LEVEL REPORTED IN POLAND WAS ABOUT 50 TIMES LOWER, I.E. 0.012 REM. HE ASSURED HIS VIEWERS THAT THESE DOSES WERE NOTHING TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT SINCE THE "RECOMMENDED ABSORBED DOSE LIMIT FOR INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT WAS 10 REMS." (COMMENT: THIS LEVEL OF ABSORBED DOSE IS A LIMIT SET IN THE US NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION MEASUREMENT REPORT 39 FOR RADIATION WORKERS AS "A RETROSPECTIVE ANNUAL DOSE . . . FOR DOSE INCREMENTS WELL DISTRIBUTED OVER TIME." END COMMENT.) HE CHOSE NOT TO TELL THE VIEWERS THAT THE RECOMMENDED LIMIT ON ABSORBED DOSE FOR THE GENERAL POPULATION IS ONLY 0.17 REM, PRESUMABLY SINCE THE QUOTE AVERAGE

UNQUOTE ACCUMULATED DOSE WAS ALREADY 0.10 REM. IN EFFECT HE WAS ENLISTING THE WHOLE POPULATION OF POLAND INTO THE FRATERNITY OF RADIATION WORKERS, AN HONOR FOR WHICH THEY WERE NOT PREPARED. HAVING SELECTED THE 10 REM LIMIT, JAWOROWSKI THEN ATTEMPTED A REDUCTION (#) AD ABSURDUM OF CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL ABSORBED DOSE LEVELS BY POINTING OUT THAT EVEN IF THE MAXIMUM RADIATION LEVELS PERSISTED FOR 100 DAYS--A PROPOSITION WHICH HE REJECTED AS RIDICULOUS--THE TOTAL ABSORBED DOSE WOULD BE BELOW THE 10 REM LEVEL.

5. JAWOROWSKI SAID THAT THE RADIATION WAS FIRST DETECTED IN POLAND DURING SUNDAY NIGHT, APRIL 27; SOWINSKI HASTENED TO ADD THAT THIS FIRST DETECTION OCCURRED IN NORTHEAST POLAND. SOWINSKI ALSO SAID THAT THE RADIATION LEVEL "STABILIZED" (READ PEAKED) ON APRIL 29 AND THAT THE QUOTE AVERAGE UNQUOTE HAS BEEN DROPPING SINCE THEN. BT

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

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USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 8267

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 WARSAW 04476

HE CONCEDED THAT LOCAL INCREASES ARE BEING OBSERVED BECAUSE OF WEATHER PATTERN VARIATIONS, BUT HE REPEATED THAT THE OVERALL LEVEL IS DROPPING. CYBULSKI URGED THAT ALL GREEN VEGETABLES BE WASHED THOROUGHLY BEFORE CONSUMPTION AND REPEATED THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN THE PRESS THAT MILK FROM COWS GRAZING ON OPEN PASTURES NOT BE CONSUMED. HE APPEALED TO THE FARMER'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO SOCIETY TO STOP DELIVERING SUCH MILK TO PICK-UP POINTS.

6. PROFESSOR BOZEK DESCRIBED THE IODINE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM WHOSE PURPOSE WAS PROPHYLACTIC. JOZWIAK ASSURED THE PUBLIC THAT THERE WAS NOT A SHORTAGE OF IODINE SOLUTION AND THAT CLINICS WOULD ADMINISTER THE DOSE THROUGHOUT THE MAY 1 HOLIDAY. (COMMENT: POTASSIUM IODINE IS AN ABUNDANT CHEMICAL PRESUMABLY AVAILABLE IN POLAND IN SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES FOR THIS PROGRAM. AS IS WELL KNOWN MEDICINES ARE CONTINUALLY IN SHORT SUPPLY IN POLAND; VITAMIN PILL AND ASPIRINS ARE INFORMALLY RATIONED. THE GOP MUST BE PLEASED TO HAVE ENCOUNTERED A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM FOR WHICH THEY CAN SUPPLY THE PRESCRIBED QUOTE CURE UNQUOTE. END COMMENT.) THE IODINE TREATMENT WAS RECOMMENDED FOR CHILDREN BELOW 16 YEARS OF AGE ALL OVER POLAND. (COMMENT: NO DATA ON IODINE 131 CONCENTRATION WAS PRESENTED. JAWOROWSKI SAID IN EFFECT THAT THE RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE COUNTRY VARIED BY A FACTOR OF ABOUT FIFTY. WHILE IODINE TREATMENT MAY HAVE MADE SENSE FOR CHILDREN IN THE HIGHEST EXPOSURE AREAS, IT CANNOT MAKE SENSE FOR THOSE IN THE LOW EXPOSED AREAS WHERE HIS DATA IMPLIES SUPPLIES SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER ABSORBED DOSES. END COMMENT.) BOZEK DID NOT THINK THAT DAILY WASHING OF CHILDREN'S HAIR AND CLOTHING WAS DEMANDED BY THE RADIATION SITUATION BUT SHE ALLOWED THAT SUCH A PRACTICE WAS COMMENDABLE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A RADIATION EMERGENCY.

7. BOZEK ALSO ADDRESSED THE CONCERNS OF PREGNANT WOMEN. SHE ASSURED THEM THAT NEITHER THEY NOR THEIR UNBORN CHILDREN

WERE IN DANGER FROM THE RADIATION. RATHER, SHE SAID, THEY WERE IN GREATER DANGER FROM THE MOTHER-TO-BE GETTING UPSET AND GENERATING INTERNAL STRESS. IODINE TREATMENT WAS NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PREGNANT WOMEN.

8. IT RAINED A BIT THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 30. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, JAWOROWSKI WELCOMED THE RAIN AND WISHED THAT MORE WOULD FALL ESPECIALLY FROM HIGH ALTITUDE CLOUDS. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD PRECIPITATE THE RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES, WASH PLANTS, PASTURES, ETC AND WOULD HASTEN THE RETURN OF THE RADIATION LEVEL TO BACKGROUND LEVELS.

9. CYBULSKI REPORTED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INCIDENT INFORMATION CENTERS IN EACH REGION VOYEVO D HEALTH OFFICE AND URGED THE POPULATION TO MAKE USE OF THESE CENTERS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE PANEL WOULD REPEAT A TELEVISION APPEARACHE SHOULD THE SITUATION WARRANT.

10. THE SAME NEWSCAST WHICH TELEVISTED THIS SESSION WITH THE PANEL ALSO BROADCAST THE OFFICIAL SOVIET TELEVISION REPORT ON CHERNOBYL. IT INCLUDED A STILL PICTURE OF THE REACTOR WHICH SHOWED HALF THE BUILDING SEVERELY DAMAGED, THE OTHER HALF APPARENTLY INTACT. THE NEWSCASTER SAID THAT A) THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL, B) ONLY TWO PEOPLE HAD DIED, C) WESTERN MEDIA WERE EXAGGERATING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ACCIDENT, AND D) ABOUT 170 PEOPLE WERE HOSPITALIZED AND 49 RELEASED.

11. COMMENT: DATA PROVIDED BY JAWOROWSKI IMPLY THAT THE PEAK ABSORBED DOES RATE LEVEL OBSERVED IN POLAND WAS ABOUT 2.3 MILLIREM PER HOUR. ASSUMING A BACKGROUND LEVEL OF 130 MILLIREM PER YEAR, THIS MEANS THAT THE MAXIMUM ABSORBED DOES LEVEL WAS ABOUT 150 TIMES BACKGROUND. THIS DATA ALSO IMPLY A LOW END ABSORBED DOSE LEVEL OF ABOUT 3 TIMES BACKGROUND.

12. THE GOP SHOULD RECEIVE HIGH MARKS FOR TRYING TO RESPOND TO SOCIETAL CONCERNS. HOWEVER, SCICOUNS WATCHED THE PROGRAM IN THE COMPANY OF AN QUOTE ORDINARY UNQUOTE POLE WHOSE COMMENT WAS THAT THEY WERE LYING. SCICOUNS' ASSURANCES THAT THERE WERE DISTINGUISHED SCIENTISTS DID NOT CONVINCHE HIS POLISH COMPANION. THAT THE POLISH PERSON-IN-THE-STREET DOESN'T BELIEVE THE GOP WAS EVIDENCED BY THE NEAR PANIC BUYING OF BUTTER, POWDERED MILK, BREAD, ETC IN ANTICIPATION OF SHORTAGES WHICH
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 WARSAW 04476

CAN NOW BE BLAMED ON RADIATION CONTAMINATION. THE IODINE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM SHOULD WIN KUDOS FOR THE GOP; THEY HAVE ACTED QUICKLY, FORCEFULLY, WITH SEMMING CONCERN FOR THE POEPLA AS ITS OVERRIDING GOAL, A STROKE OF GENIUS. OF COURSE, THEY HAVE OTHER MOTIVES FOR THEIR ACTION. THEY MUST AVERT PANIC, REDUCE A FURTHER BUILD-UP OF ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENT, AND PRESERVE THEIR ABILITY TO CONTINUE THEIR OWN NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM.

13. ADDITIONAL UNEVALUATED DATA. IN CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, THE RECTOR OF WARSAW UNIVERSITY (STRICTLY PROTECT) WHO IS HIMSELF A PHYSICIST, TOLD THE CHARGE THAT RADIATION LEVELS IN WARSAW ON APRIL 30 WERE 15 TO 30 TIMES BACKGROUND AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE DAY, THAT A SAMPLE OF DUST FROM AN AUTOMOBIL JUST RETURNED FROM THE NORTHEAST HAD BEEN ANALYZED AND SHOWED RADIATION AT 300 TIMES NORMAL LEVELS, AND THAT AIRCRAFT MEASUREMENTS IN THE HIGH ALTITUDE CLOUD OVER NORTHEAST POLAND (DATE NOT SPECIFIED) REGISTERED RADIATION AT 1000 TIMES BACKGROUND. HE DESCRIBED NORMAL BACKGROUND RADIATION IN WARSAW AS ABOUT 100 C. P. M. ON A GEIGER COUNTER.
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PASS S/NP: AMBASSADOR KENNEDY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 7,
AS OF 1430 GMT MAY 1

REF: MOSCOW 7427

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY:

2. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED THE DUTCH AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH MINIMAL INFORMATION ON THE CHERNOBYL' DISASTER IN A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO DISCOURAGE EVACUATION OF TOURISTS. EC COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR FULLER INFORMATION.
END SUMMARY

3. THE DUTCH DCM (PROTECT) GAVE POLCOUNS THE FOLLOWING READOUT ON AN APRIL 30 MEETING THEIR AMBASSADOR HAD WITH THE SOVIETS.

TURNAROUND:

4. AS OF LATE AFTERNOON APRIL 30, THE MFA OFFICIALLY WAS STATING IT WAS NOT COMPETENT TO ADDRESS THE

NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ISSUE, IT WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE DUTCH, AND DEPFONMIN KOVALEV WAS "OUT OF TOWN." THEY REFERRED THE DUTCH TO THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR ATOMIC ENERGY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT. LATER, THE DUTCH PASSED ON TO NIKIFOROV OF MFA PROTOCOL THE EC'S APPEAL THAT THE USSR HELP EC CITIZENS WHO WANTED TO LEAVE THE AREA. LATE AT NIGHT, HOWEVER, THE MFA CALLED IN AT LEAST UK, FRENCH, AUSTRIAN, FINNISH AND DUTCH, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, TO ADDRESS THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT.

DUTCH READOUT:

5. KOVALEV HAD WITH HIM A.M. PETROSYANTS, (CHAIRMAN, STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY) AMBASSADOR VLADIMIR PETROVSKIY, AND AN MFA OFFICIAL. KOVALEV OPENED WITH A STATEMENT SIMILAR TO THE ONE READ TO THE UK AMBASSADOR (SEPTEL). IT SAID THE USSR UNDERSTOOD THE DISQUIET OF OTHER COUNTRIES, WHICH THE USSR SHARED, BUT THE SOVIET UNION WISHED TO PROVIDE AS FULL INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE THESE ANXIETIES. THE USSR APPRECIATED THE VARIOUS OFFERS OF HELP BUT THEY WERE NOT NECESSARY SINCE THE USSR HAD ALL THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MEANS NECESSARY.

CURRENT STATUS:

6. KOVALEV THEN ADDRESSED REACTOR NO. 4, STATING THAT THE LEAKAGE HAD STOPPED, THE REACTOR WAS NOT WORKING, AND THERE WERE NO FURTHER POLLUTING EMISSIONS. THE THREE OTHER PLANTS WERE ON "RESERVE" (STANDBY BASIS), AND ALL ATTENTION WAS DIRECTED AT

PLANT NO. 4, INCLUDING LIQUIDATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCIDENT.

WESTERN PRESS COMPLAINT:

7. KOVALEV PROTESTED WESTERN PRESS COVERAGE WHICH HE SAID EXAGGERATED THE EVENT, CAUSING "EMOTIONAL REACTIONS" IN THE WEST. HE SAID HE HOPED THE INFORMATION PROVIDED WOULD DO AWAY WITH THESE EMOTIONAL REACTIONS.

DUTCH RESPONSE:

8. AFTER REPEATING PRIOR EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE, THE DUTCH REAFFIRMED THEIR APPEAL FOR THE SOVIETS TO ASSIST EC NATIONALS WHO BT

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PASS S/NP: AMBASSADOR KENNEDY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 7,

DESIRED TO LEAVE, AND CALLED FOR A FULLER AND MORE
PROMPT SOVIET PROVISION OF INFORMATION.

PETROSYANTS INTERVENTION:

9. KOVALEV ASKED PETROSYANTS TO PROVIDE MORE
INFORMATION. PETROSYANTS REVIEWED SOVIET PUBLIC
DATA ON DEATHS, HOSPITALIZATIONS AND RELEASES.
HE THEN ADDED THAT THE INCIDENT HAD BEEN "VERY
COMPLICATED." HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BELITTLE
THE MATTER, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT STATE WHAT THE
COMPLICATIONS WERE. A "LONG TIME" WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO LIQUIDATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
INCIDENT. THE CLOUD WHICH FORMED "ORIGINALLY" HAD
BEEN DANGEROUS: IT CONTAINED NOBLE GASES
("BLAGORODNIYE GAZI") LIKE KRYPTON, BUT ALSO
STRONTIUM 90 AND OTHERS, ALTHOUGH THESE WERE ONLY
A MINOR PART OF THE TOTAL EMISSION.

10. SINCE THE LEAKAGE HAD STOPPED, THE SITUATION
WAS IMPROVING, PETROSYANTS ADDED. HOWEVER, HE
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LOCAL CLIMATE COULD BE AFFECTED.
HE SAID THE CURRENT READING FOR VILNIUS WAS 0.04
MILLIREMS PER HOUR, BUT THIS COULD RISE TO 0.07
MILLIREMS PER HOUR. HE CITED SWEDISH SOURCES TO

THE EFFECT THAT CONTAMINATION RATES SEVEN TIMES
NORMAL WERE NOT THREATENING. HE SAID KIEV'S NORMAL
READING WAS ZERO WHILE ITS CURRENT READING WAS
0.075 MILLIREMS PER HOUR; THIS WAS NOTHING TO BE
WORRIED ABOUT. IN CONCLUSION, HE SAW NO NEED FOR
TOURISTS TO EVACUATE. HE SAID THE DUTCH NOW HAD
ALL THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THE SOVIET COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS HAD DECIDED EARLIER THE SAME DAY NOT TO
HAVE A SECOND EVACUATION. (SEE SEPTEL ON PETROSYANTS'
COMMENTS TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.)

HEALTH SERVICE FOR FOREIGNERS:

11. KOVALEV ADDED THAT THE UKRAINIAN AND BYLEORUSSIAN
MINISTRIES OF PUBLIC HEALTH HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS OF FOREIGNERS CONCERNED ABOUT
THE HEALTH ASPECT. AS OF THE MORNING OF APRIL 30, A
CLINIC HAD ALSO BEEN OPENED IN MOSCOW TO CHECK
FOREIGNERS AS WELL. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BE
HAVING MORE CONTACT ON THIS MATTER, SO IT WAS
GROUNDLESS TO ADVISE TOURISTS TO EVACUATE. THE
DUTCH UNDERTOOK TO FORWARD THE SOVIET INFORMATION
FOR ANALYSIS. HARTMAN
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 6,
AS OF 1300 GMT MAY 1

REF: MOSCOW 7427

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. A WEST GERMAN BUSINESSMAN, EQUIPPED WITH A GEIGER COUNTER AND WITH EXPERIENCE IN ITS USE, ARRIVED IN KIEV YESTERDAY FROM MOSCOW. IN A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE FRG EMBASSY THIS AFTERNOON, THE BUSINESSMAN REPORTED MEASURING A RADIATION LEVEL IN THE STREETS OF KIEV OF 0.8 MILLIREMS PER HOUR; WITHIN HIS HOTEL ROOM, HE RECORDED 0.22 MILLIREMS PER HOUR, UP FROM ZERO AT ARRIVAL. THE WIND IN KIEV IS NOW BLOWING NORTH-TO-SOUTH.

3. IN A RECEPTION HONORING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PAN AM SERVICE, THE AMBASSADOR POINTEDLY TOLD THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF AVIATION HOW BADLY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS HANDLING THE CHERNOBYL' CRISIS AND TO INFORM THE LEADERSHIP, OR THIS REVIVED TOURIST LINK WILL SUFFER BECAUSE OF TRAVELLERS' WELL-FOUNDED CONCERNS. INTERESTINGLY, A CHICAGO TOUR REPRESENTATIVE TOLD THE IO THAT AN INTOURIST OFFICIAL COMPLAINED THAT THEY HAD SPENT ALL DAY APRIL 29 TAKING CANCELLATIONS OF TOURS.

4. AN AUSTRALIAN EMOFF WAS RETURNING TO MOSCOW FRIDAY NIGHT BY TRAIN, WHICH WAS STOPPED FOR 3 HOURS JUST OUTSIDE KIEV, SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE A FREIGHT TRAIN HAD DERAILED. WHEN THEY GOT TO KIEV AT 0300 SATURDAY MORNING, HE SAW AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE HILLING AROUND THE STATION, INCLUDING A LOT OF YOUNG SOLDIERS.

5. ACCORDING TO A NORWEGIAN EMOFF, THE EC AMBASSADORS HAVE BEEN CALLED TO A MEETING AT THE MFA TODAY AT 1600 MOSCOW TIME. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A READOUT.

6. CONTRARY TO RUMORS WHICH ARE WORKING THEIR WAY INTO WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, NEITHER THE BRITISH NOR THE SWEDISH EMBASSIES ARE OFFERING TO EVACUATE THEIR DEPENDENTS.

7. EMOFFS TALKED WITH AMERICAN STUDENTS IN THE PROGRESSIVE TOUR GROUP WHICH RETURNED THIS MORNING FROM KIEV AND DEPARTED THIS AFTERNOON FOR LONDON. KIEV, IN THEIR VIEW, HAD A SURFACE CALM ABOUT IT WHICH BELIED A DEVELOPING UNEASINESS. WHEN FIRST TOLD BY THE STUDENTS ABOUT WESTERN RADIO STORIES OF A MAJOR DISASTER AT THE CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, THEIR UKRAINIAN FRIENDS WERE HIGHLY SKEPTICAL. AS THE STUDENTS BECAME CONCERNED TO THE POINT OF DRINKING ONLY BOTTLED WATER, THEIR CONTACTS BEGAN TO ACCEPT THE NOTION THAT CLEARLY SOMETHING HAD GONE WRONG UP THERE, BUT TRIED TO RECONCILE IT AGAINST OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENTS BY SAYING, "IF THERE IS ACTUALLY A SERIOUS PROBLEM, WOULDN'T 'THEY' (I.E., THE GOVERNMENT) BE DOING

SOMETHING ABOUT KIEV -- EVACUATING, AT LEAST, THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN, OR WARNING US, OR TAKING SOME PRECAUTIONS?" THE BRITISH EMBASSY REPORTS THAT THE GROUP WAS TOLD BY BRITISH AIRWAYS THAT, BESIDES THE PHYSICAL EXAM REQUIRED BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES BEFORE DEPARTURE, AIRLINES' DOCTOR WOULD ADMINISTER ANOTHER EXAM AND, IN ADDITION, PROVIDE CLEAN TRACK SUITS FOR THE STUDENTS TO WEAR ABOARD THE PLANE.

8. THREE BRITISH STUDENTS, TWO FROM KIEV AND ONE FROM MINSK, ECHOED REPORTS OF CALM, BUT THE TWO FROM KIEV ADDED THAT THERE WAS INCREASED ROAD TRAFFIC OUTSIDE OF THE CITY. THEY DID NOT NOTE AN OVERLY LARGE PERCENTAGE OF EMERGENCY VEHICLES IN THE TRAFFIC, DESCRIBING IT AS ESSENTIALLY THE USUAL, BUT MORE OF IT. HARTMAN
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5. WE URGE DEPARTMENT INSURE THAT STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO SOVIET SPOKESMEN WERE IN FACT ISSUED IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY. HARTMAN
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TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, OPRC, UR

SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 5

REF: (A) STATE 135824, (B) MOSCOW 07291,
- (C) MOSCOW 07317

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRESS GUIDANCE OF APRIL 30 (REFTEL A) NOTES STATEMENT BY SOVIET SPOKESMAN THAT TRAVEL TO KIEV "MAY BE DANGEROUS." EMBASSY BECAME AWARE OF AP STORY WITH THIS QUOTE AT ABOUT 1500 MOSCOW TIME ON APRIL 30 (REFTEL B). IO VERNER CALLED SAZANOV IMMEDIATELY, BUT WAS NOT ABLE TO REACH HIM FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR. WHEN CONTACT WAS MADE VERNER READ THE AP QUOTE TO SAZANOV AND ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THE STATEMENT.

3. SAZANOV ADMITTED SAYING THAT IT MIGHT BE DANGEROUS IN KIEV, BUT HE SAID THIS WAS INTENDED AS A REPLY TO A QUESTION ON TRAVEL AND NOT AS AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN THAT CITY. HE WAS UPSET AT BEING QUOTED (REFTEL C). WHEN VERNER ASKED WHETHER EMBASSY PERSONNEL OR JOURNALISTS COULD TRAVEL TO KIEV, SAZANOV REPLIED, QUOTE NO, KIEV HAS BEEN CLOSED END QUOTE.

4. A SUBSEQUENT CALL TO THE TRAVEL OFFICE AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DREW THE REPLY QUOTE KIEV IS CLOSED FOR REASONS OF A TEMPORARY NATURE END QUOTE. THE SAME REPLY WAS RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON.

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