

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl
04/29/1986 (2)
Box: 29

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
1986 (2/9)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2908

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10395	CABLE	301217Z AOR 86 [1 - 2] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	4/30/1986	B1
10396	CABLE	301648Z APR 86 [18 - 18] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	4/30/1986	B1
10393	CABLE	300233Z APR 86 [19 - 23]	5	4/30/1986	B1
10394	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10393 [24 - 25]	2	4/30/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
1986 (2/9)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2908

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10397	CABLE	300511Z APR 86 [26 - 27] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	4/30/1986	B1
10405	CABLE	301027Z APR 86 [28 - 28] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	4/30/1986	B1
10398	CABLE	301548Z APR 86 [29 - 30] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	4/30/1986	B1
10399	CABLE	301331Z APR 86 [31 - 31] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	4/30/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
1986 (2/9)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2908

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10406	CABLE	300925Z APR 86 [32 - 32] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	4/30/1986	B1
10400	CABLE	300218Z APR 86 [33 - 33] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	4/30/1986	B1
10401	CABLE	301729Z APR 86 [36 - 37] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	4/30/1986	B1
10402	CABLE	301805Z APR 86 [38 - 38] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	4/30/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29, 1986 (2/9)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2908

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10403	CABLE	011637Z MAY 86 [39 - 39] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	1	5/1/1986	B1
10404	CABLE	011712Z MAY 86 [40 - 44] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	5	5/1/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

Return to SB ju file

PAGE 01 WARSAW 4452 DTG: 301217Z APR 86 PSN: 012973
EOB455 AN002527 TOR: 120/1324Z CSN: HCE030

DISTRIBUTION: DOBR-01 WRIT-01 MAT-01 /003 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:

OP IMMEDIATE /ROUTINE
UTS6664
DE RUDKRW #4452/01 1201223
O R 301217Z APR 86 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0736

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA 3031
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 04452

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMED, PL, UR
SUBJECT: CHARNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER: MISSION CONCERNS
REF: WARSAW 4398 (NOTAL)

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY AND CONSULATES ARE NEAREST FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS TO THE CHERNOBYL SITE (AND WERE APPARENTLY DIRECTLY IN THE PATH OF THE INITIAL RADIATION CLOUD). RELIABLE (BUT UNOFFICIAL) POLISH SOURCES REPORT EXPOSURE RATES IN POLAND RANGED BETWEEN 5 AND 20 TIMES BACKGROUND LEVELS. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS URGED THE POPULATION NOT TO DRINK MILK FROM THE COWS PASTURING ON GREEN FODDER, AND IS ORDERING IODINE DOSAGE FOR CHILDREN. THE GOP HAS STRESSED THE "ABSOLUTE NECESSITY" OF CAREFULLY WASHING ALL VEGETABLES. WITHOUT INDEPENDENT MONITORING CAPABILITY EMBASSY IS UNABLE TO VERIFY RADIATION LEVELS. WE HAVE OFFERED TO ASSIST GOP WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES, POWDERED MILK, ETC. ACTION REQUESTED: WE URGENTLY REQUIRE A USG ASSESSMENT OF THE HEALTH SITUATION HERE, USING INTELLIGENCE MEANS AS NECESSARY. CAN A MONITORING DEVICE BE SHIPPED ASAP FOR EMBASSY USE? REGARDING IODINE, MFA HAS INDICATED FOREIGN CHILDREN ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE IODINE PROGRAM, BUT WE HAVE HEARD OF SHORTAGES. DEPT. IS REQUESTED TO ASSESS ASAP THE NEED FOR IODINE AND, IF IT IS REQUIRED, TO PROCURE ADEQUATE SUPPLIES FROM THE NEAREST SOURCE. (THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE--MISSION'S MEDICAL SUPPORT-- HAS NONE AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH A SUPPLY IS REPORTEDLY ON THE WAY.) END SUMMARY.

3. RADIATION LEVELS. REPORTS ON RADIATION EXPOSURE RATES FROM A RELIABLE SCICOUNS CONTACT (BUT ONE SPEAKING UNOFFICIALLY) INDICATED THAT RADIATION RANGED BETWEEN 5 AND 20 TIMES BACKGROUND DEPENDING ON LOCATION IN THE COUNTRY. ACCORDING TO THE POLISH MEDIA, THE NORTHEASTERN PART OF POLAND EXPERIENCED THE HIGHEST EXPOSURE RATE BASED ON THAT DATA AND ASSUMING THAT A RATE OF 20 TIMES BACKGROUND WERE TO PERSIST FOR TEN DAYS, SCICOUNS ESTIMATES THAT THE TOTAL ABSORBED DOSES IN THE GENERAL POPULATION WOULD BE

ABOUT 0.07 REMS OR ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE 0.170 REM DOSAGE DESIGNATED AS THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BY THE US NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS REPORT NO. 39. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE LITERATURE, SUCH A LEVEL OF ABSORBED DOSE DOES NOT POST A HEALTH HAZARD FOR THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. OBVIOUSLY, THIS ESTIMATE DEPENDS ON THE ACCURACY OF INFORMATION THE SOURCE HAS PROVIDED ON THE EXPOSURE RATE. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO BE HEARD FROM WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC EXPOSURE RATES. IT HAS, HOWEVER, URGED THE POPULATION NOT TO DRINK MILK FROM COWS PASTURING ON GREEN FODDER, AND IT IS WITHDRAWING SUCH MILK FROM THE MARKET. POTASSIUM IODIDE IN LIQUID FORM UNDER THE NAME "LUGO" IS BEING DISPENSED TO INFANTS AND SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM MFA THAT FOREIGN CHILDREN WILL BE INCLUDED IN THIS PROGRAM.) THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS ISSUED A STATEMENT POINTING TO THE "ABSOLUTE NECESSITY" FOR CAREFUL WASHING OF ALL SPRING VEGETABLES.

4. POST CONCERNS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHAT THE GOP IS SAYING ABOUT THE EFFECTS IN POLAND OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER IS CONSERVATIVE AND POSSIBLY EVASIVE. WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS THAT THE LUGO IODINE COMPOUND IN FACT MAY NOT BE WIDELY AVAILABLE (AND AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 30 THE POLES HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT SUCH MEDICATION MAY BE AVAILABLE TO US AND OTHER FOREIGN CHILDREN HERE). THERE ARE TWO PREGNANT WOMEN AT POST, AND SEVERAL SMALL INFANTS UNDER ONE YEAR OF AGE. IN THESE AND OTHER FAMILIES THERE IS WIDESPREAD CONCERN OVER THE HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISASTER. EVEN THOUGH OUR INFORMATION TO DATE SHOWS NO IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR ALARM, IT IS--AS INDICATED ABOVE--POSSIBLE THAT THE GOP IS WITHHOLDING VITAL DATA. BT

to Amel Helat

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8 #10395

BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01
EOB458

WARSAW 4452
AN002526

DTG: 301217Z APR 86
TOR: 120/1325Z

PSN: 012975
CSN: HCE031

DISTRIBUTION: DOBR-01 WRIT-01 MAT-01 /003 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
UTS6677
DE RUDKRW #4452/02 1201243
O R 301217Z APR 86 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0737

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA 3031
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSAW 04452

5. EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER IN VIENNA, WHO RECOMMENDED AGAINST PRESCRIBING IODINE MEDICATION PENDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVE IODINE CONTAMINATION. POST MEDICAL ADVISOR (A TDY-BRITISH CONTRACT DOCTOR) AND LONDON CONTACTS ALSO RECOMMEND AGAINST PRESCRIBING SUCH MEDICATION, EVEN THOUGH, AS NOTED ABOVE, THE GOP IS GOING AHEAD WITH SUCH A PROGRAM FOR POLISH CHILDREN. IN ANY EVENT, THE POST CONTRACT MEDICAL FACILITY (AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY) HAS NO IODINE MEDICATION, ALTHOUGH REPORTEDLY A SUPPLY IS ARRIVING THIS EVENING.
6. IN THIS SITUATION, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE USG TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY WHICH WILL PERMIT THE DEPARTMENT AND MISSION TO REACH SENSIBLE DECISIONS ON WHAT IF ANYTHING TO DO REGARDING EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS AT THE POLAND POSTS AND VISITING US CITIZENS. WE URGE THAT SUCH AN EFFORT BE COMMENCED, ONE COMPONENT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO SHIP ASAP A MONITORING DEVICE TO THE EMBASSY. WE LIKEWISE NEED THE BEST MEDICAL OPINION AVAILABLE ON WHETHER SOME SORT OF IODINE TREATMENT IS APPROPRIATE FOR OUR CHILDREN AND, IF SO, WHAT IT IS, WHERE QUICKEST TO PROCURE IT AND SHIP IT TO WARSAW, ETC. (THIS ISSUE NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED EVEN IF A BRITISH SHIPMENT ARRIVES.)
7. FINALLY, IN A MEETING THIS MORNING AT MFA ON ANOTHER MATTER, CHARGE EXPRESSED THE USG'S SYMPATHY OVER THE SITUATION THAT HAS ARISEN IN POLAND BECAUSE OF THE CHERNOBYL'S DISASTER AND OFFERED US ASSISTANCE WITH MEDICATIONS AND/OR OTHER PRODUCTS SUCH AS POWERED MILK. MFA REP. WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS GESTURE AND SAID HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH IF US ASSISTANCE IS DESIRED.
8. ACTION REQUESTED: URGENT DEPARTMENT ATTENTION TO THE CONCERNS AND SUGGESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS. 4-6 ABOVE.
DAVIS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

April 30, 1986

TO: OES/N - Mr. Devine
FROM: L/N - Jonathan B. Schwartz *JBS*
SUBJECT: Soviet Duty to Warn Neighbors

L has advised the Press Office this morning that customary international law requires the Soviet Union to notify other states of the possibility of transboundary effects of the incident and to furnish them with the information necessary to address these effects. (We have not identified any specific treaty binding upon the Soviet Union which imposes this requirement. However, we believe that state practice and environmental declarations evidence this as a principle of customary international law. This issue of "notice" should be kept distinct from the issue of "state responsibility" for environmental damage. At present, we are giving no guidance on the latter, very sensitive subject.)

cc: OES/NTC - Mr. Prochnik/Mr. Congdon
L - Mr. Matheson
L/OES - Mr. Colson/Ms. Kennedy
L/EUR - Ms. West
EUR/SOV - Mr. Bean ✓

As a result of the measures taken within the last 24 hours, the discharge of radioactive substances has decreased and the level of radiation in the area of the incident has lowered.

Measurements taken demonstrate that fission chain reaction of the atomic generator is not occurring. The reactor is in an inactive ("zaglushennom") state.

Active work for cleaning the contaminated unit is in progress.

The Soviet Union possesses sufficient material, scientific and technical possibilities for the works to liquidate the consequences of the accident and at the present moment the need does not arise for assistance from other states. We are appreciative for the proposals of aid to us.

Foreign citizens located in the Soviet Union (in particular specialists or tourists) have not approached competent Soviet organisations in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl A.E.S. (atomic energy station).

Unofficial Translation

In Moscow there is appreciation for President Reagan's expression of sympathy in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl A.E.S. (atomic energy station), and also for the expressed readiness to render assistance in liquidating its consequences. We are undertaking all necessary efforts to localize the accident and keep its consequences to a minimum. At the present moment there is no need for assistance from other states.

As far as the facts of the situation, the President of the USA has been informed of them.



Washington, D.C. 20520

Hand-Carried
copies to all
AB
5/1

MEMORANDUM

April 30, 1986

TO: OES/N - Mr. Devine
FROM: L/N - Jonathan B. Schwartz *JBS*
SUBJECT: Soviet Duty to Warn Neighbors

L has advised the Press Office this morning that customary international law requires the Soviet Union to notify other states of the possibility of transboundary effects of the incident and to furnish them with the information necessary to address these effects. (We have not identified any specific treaty binding upon the Soviet Union which imposes this requirement. However, we believe that state practice and environmental declarations evidence this as a principle of customary international law. This issue of "notice" should be kept distinct from the issue of "state responsibility" for environmental damage. At present, we are giving no guidance on the latter, very sensitive subject.)

cc: OES/NTC - Mr. Prochnik/Mr. Congdon
L - Mr. Matheson
L/OES - Mr. Colson/Ms. Kennedy
L/EUR - Ms. West
EUR/SOV - Mr. Bean ✓

Send copies to:

6

Rodman
Pugliarasi
Steiner/Mandel
Thompson
Wright
Cobb
Furnell
Sestonovich

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 4

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # _____

DTG 012223Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # 03

RELEASER _____

ROUTINE

RECORD # _____

Jack - Come

FROM/LOCATION

1. USIA

Supervisor
J. Mandel

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. SEE ATTACHED

J. Mandel

2. _____
3. (McDermid) → Fortney

(S) will
gather the

4. Matlock

Staff comment

5. Sestanovich

and if you

6. Mandel

concerned

7. Raymond

back to work

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

today,

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Room

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION/SLUG FOR:

- MR. DONALD FORTIER
- AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
- DR. SESTANOVICH
- MS. JUDYT MANDEL
- MR. WALTER RAYMOND

NUCLEAR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL

Annex:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

Worldwide attention is focused on Chernobyl, a complex of nuclear power plants sixty miles north of Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, where a meltdown of the central core of a nuclear reactor has apparently taken place causing an explosion and fire that released dangerous quantities of radiation in the atmosphere.

Handwritten note: N-4444

Handwritten note: This seems to be the worst accident in history in a nuclear power plant.

~~This may be the worst nuclear accident in history.~~ Official Soviet press statements have termed it a "disaster," and because Soviet authorities rarely publicize news about any domestic catastrophies—even earthquakes or floods—their use of the word "disaster" is especially significant.

Nuclear radiation in the atmosphere doesn't respect national borders, it disperses into the air of the planet and is therefore an international concern. The failure of the Soviet Union to supply all the details about the Chernobyl event is particularly disturbing. Nearly two days after ~~Within hours of the accident,~~ radiation reaction readings in Scandinavia were one hundred times higher than normal, but the Soviets didn't alert the world for ~~more than a day,~~ and then ~~only after they received inquiries from Sweden and other governments.~~

Handwritten note: months after foreign governments began to raise questions. more than 2 days after the accident.

Officially, the Soviets claim that the situation at Chernobyl has stabilized, yet they have asked Sweden and West Germany for help. The United States has expressed regret to the Soviet government over this tragedy, and has offered to provide humanitarian and technical aid as soon as possible. The Soviets say they appreciate our offer, but are equipped to handle the problem themselves. Nevertheless, American specialists ^{have some} want to share their knowledge and experience with Soviet experts, for they know that sealing the damaged reactor, cleaning up the surrounding environment, and treating the thousands of people potentially affected by radiation, is a difficult and extensive process. In 1979, there was a partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. Most of the escaping radiation was contained, and there were no deaths or associated illnesses among the nearby population. American investigations ^{of} informed Soviet scientists about Three Mile Island as soon as the incident occurred, and a presidential commission later issued an exhaustive report to the public. *All industrial accidents in the US are reported promptly and investigations of the causes are conducted in public - with the results available to all.*

The extent of the Chernobyl catastrophe is not yet known, mainly because the Soviet government has released so little information. Rumors and speculation abound, and will continue as long as the Soviets refuse to set the record straight. Moreover, the people of the Soviet Union have been left in the dark about an accident that may seriously affect their well-being.

Isn't it time for all governments to adopt a policy of openness and full disclosure when accidents occur? Particularly when the consequences can affect all of us on this planet? Our hearts go out to those persons whose lives have been disrupted by this disaster. We pray for their speedy recovery.

When it comes to nuclear safety, no one can stand on ceremony. The potential dangers of human radiation poisoning and irreversible damage to the environment are of worldwide concern, regardless of the Soviet government's desire to avoid embarrassment. America wants to help.

Annex:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

~~And we also hope that the Soviet government will ~~cancel~~~~
~~In their interest, and in the~~
 For their sake, and for the sake of
 us on this planet, we hope that the
 Soviet government will ~~cancel~~ - even at
 this late date - make a decision to
 inform the public of the crucial details
 of what has happened.

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

13

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 4

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # _____

DTG 012223Z

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # 03

RELEASER _____

ROUTINE

RECORD # _____

FROM/LOCATION

1. USIA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. SEE ATTACHED

2. _____

3. (McDaniel) -> Fortner

4. Matlock

5. Sestanovich

6. Mandel

7. Raymond

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLAS

CLASSIFICATION

Room

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION/SLUG FOR:

- MR. DONALD FORTIER
- AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
- DR. SESTANOVICH
- MS. JUDYT MANDEL
- MR. WALTER RAYMOND

NUCLEAR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL



Annex:

Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

Voice:

Worldwide attention is focused on Chernobyl, a complex of nuclear power plants sixty miles north of Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, where a meltdown of the central core of a nuclear reactor has apparently taken place causing an explosion and fire that released dangerous quantities of radiation in the atmosphere.

This may be the worst nuclear accident in history. Official Soviet press statements have termed it a "disaster," and because Soviet authorities rarely publicize news about any domestic catastrophes—even earthquakes or floods—their use of the word "disaster" is especially significant.

Nuclear radiation in the atmosphere doesn't respect national borders, it disperses into the air of the planet and is therefore an international concern. The failure of the Soviet Union to supply all the details about the Chernobyl event is particularly disturbing. Within hours of the accident, radiation reaction readings in Scandinavia were one hundred times higher than normal, but the Soviets didn't alert the world for more than a day, and then only after they received inquiries from Sweden and other governments.

-2-

Officially, the Soviets claim that the situation at Chernobyl has stabilized, yet they have asked Sweden and West Germany for help. The United States has expressed regret to the Soviet government over this tragedy, and has offered to provide humanitarian and technical aid as soon as possible. The Soviets say they appreciate our offer, but are equipped to handle the problem themselves. Nevertheless, American specialists want to share their knowledge and experience with Soviet experts, for they know that sealing the damaged reactor, cleaning up the surrounding environment, and treating the thousands of people potentially affected by radiation is a difficult and extensive process. In 1979, there was a partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania. Most of the escaping radiation was contained, and there were no deaths or associated illnesses among the nearby population. American investigations informed Soviet scientists about Three Mile Island as soon as the incident occurred, and a presidential commission later issued an exhaustive report to the public.

The extent of the Chernobyl catastrophe is not yet known, mainly because the Soviet government has released so little information. Rumors and speculation abound, and will continue as long as the Soviets refuse to set the record straight. Moreover, the people of the Soviet Union have been left in the dark about an accident that may seriously affect their well-being.

-3-

When it comes to nuclear safety, no one can stand on ceremony. The potential dangers of human radiation poisoning and irreversible damage to the environment are of worldwide concern, regardless of the Soviet government's desire to avoid embarrassment. America wants to help.

Annex:

That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

INCOMING
TELEGRAM 18

PAGE 01

047810 ICA708
30/1652Z OES/N.

047810 ICA708

ACTION OFFICE VBE-01
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AC-01 EU-03 DR-01 VBB-01 VBR-01
VOA-02 /014 A3 1

O 301648Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4550
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4262
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7208
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
BT

5. IN SUMMARY, WE SUGGEST WE STICK TO THE
FACTS, AVOID NEEDLESS SPECULATION THAT WILL
FRIGHTEN OUR AUDIENCE, AND PUT PUBLIC
PRESSURE UPON THE SOVIETS TO LET THE WORLD
KNOW WHAT REALLY HAS HAPPENED.

HARTMAN
BT
#7407

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 07407

USIA FOR VOA, VOA/BRE, VOA/BRU, VOA/BX, VOA/BXE,

STATE FOR EUR/SOV, OES/N

LENINGRAD FOR P&C-ALL IN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: VOA COVERAGE -- CHERNOBYL REACTOR INCIDENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO VOA COVERAGE OF
THE INCIDENT AT THE NUCLEAR REACTOR IN
CHERNOBYL, USSR. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT VOA
COVERAGE, PARTICULARLY SPECULATORY COMMENT BY
"INFORMED" EXPERTS, THAT SAYS, ESSENTIALLY,
THE OBVIOUS: THAT RADIATION IS EXTREMELY
DANAGEROUS AND THE EFFECTS OF THIS INCIDENT
WILL BE LONG LASTING. WE STRONGLY SUGGEST
THAT SUCH COVERAGE IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: WE
ARE SCARING PEOPLE, YET WE OURSELVES DO NOT
KNOW THE FACTS ABOUT THIS INCIDENT.

3. WE WOULD RECOMMEND ANOTHER APPROACH. WE BELIEVE
OUR COVERAGE SHOULD STRESS THE CONTRADICTION
BETWEEN THE WAY THE SOVIETS HAVE HANDLED THIS
INCIDENT -- THE FACTS ARE WELL KNOWN -- AND
THEIR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT "OPENNESS"
("GLASHOST"). INTERDEPENDENCE, AND EACH
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ITS CITIZENS
AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HANDLE NUCLEAR
MATERIALS IN AN OPEN, SAFE, AND MATURE FASHION.
IN THIS CONTEXT WE NOTE A COMMENT BROADCAST
ON THE MOSCOW WORLD SERVICE IN ENGLISH AT 1710 GMT
29 APRIL (MONITORED FBIS LONDON 291811Z APR 86) "MAJOR
BREAKDOWNS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SUCH AS
THE THREE MILE ISLAND PLANT ACCIDENT IN THE
UNITED STATES OR THE ONE AT CHERNOBYL IN THE
UKRAINE CALL FOR A GREATER DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION RATHER THAN AN IMMEDIATE SHUT-DOWN
OF ALL SUCH FACILITIES." WE SHOULD ALSO STRESS
THAT NHA EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY
SWEDEN AND FINLAND ARE ALSO CALLING FOR MORE
INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIETS.

4. ADDITIONALLY YOU WILL RECALL THAT ABOUT TWO YEARS
AGO THE USSR JOINED THE IAEA "INIS" SYSTEM FOR
EXCHANGING INFORMATION (VIA COMPUTER NETWORK)
ON SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS WITH A VIEW TO ITS USE-
FULNESS IN CASE OF A MAJOR ACCIDENT. WE SUGGEST
THAT AMONG THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE USSR HAS
THEREBY ACCEPTED IS A PROCEDURE FOR INFORMING
THE PUBLIC AND OTHER AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS OF NUCLEAR
ACCIDENTS. PLEASE PROVIDE US WITH INFO ON THE
IAEA SYSTEM; IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO CHECK WITH

Associate Directorate
for Broadcasting

Director	-----	X
Deputy Director	-----	X
Assistant Director	-----	X
Chief Clerk	-----	X
Director of Administration	-----	X
Director of Intelligence	-----	X
Director of Operations	-----	X
Director of Planning	-----	X
Director of Security	-----	X
Director of Training	-----	X
Director of Liaison	-----	X
Director of Information	-----	X
Director of Public Affairs	-----	X
Director of Technical Services	-----	X
Director of Legal Services	-----	X
Director of Health Services	-----	X
Director of Nutrition Services	-----	X
Director of Other Services	-----	X
Director of Unassigned	-----	X

D/Director
Deputy Director
Asst. Dir. for Int'l Affairs
Asst. Dir. for Information
Asst. Dir. for Operations
Asst. Dir. for Planning
Asst. Dir. for Security
Asst. Dir. for Training
Asst. Dir. for Liaison
Asst. Dir. for Information
Asst. Dir. for Public Affairs
Asst. Dir. for Technical Services
Asst. Dir. for Legal Services
Asst. Dir. for Health Services
Asst. Dir. for Nutrition Services
Asst. Dir. for Other Services
Asst. Dir. for Unassigned

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FO6-114/8#10396

BY HJI NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4219 DTG: 300511Z APR 86 PSN: 012927
EOB428 AN002529 TOR: 120/1257Z CSN: HCE017

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:

OP: IMMED
DE RUEHC #4219 1200512
O 300511Z APR 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 2114

~~SECRET~~ STATE 134219

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, TRGY, PARM, SW
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

REF: STOCKHOLM 03311

1. (U) THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS UNCLASSIFIED BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT, WHICH THE EMBASSY CAN SHARE WITH SWEDES WITH THE CAVEAT THAT WEIGHTS AND NUMBER OF CHANNELS ARE ESTIMATES, NOT PRECISE FIGURES:

-- THE CHERNOBYL SITE CONSISTS OF FOUR POWER REACTORS, EACH RATED AT ONE THOUSAND MEGAWATTS ELECTRIC. THIS KIND OF A REACTOR ESSENTIALLY CONSISTS OF A LARGE BLOCK OF GRAPHITE WEIGHING SOME 1,000 METRIC TONS, WITH VERTICAL HOLES WHICH ALLOW THE PLACEMENT OF SOME 1,600 CHANNELS FOR LOW-ENRICHED (1.1 TO 1.8 PERCENT U-235) URANIUM FUEL. THE FUEL IS CONTAINED WITHIN A CAPSULE INSIDE A TUBE, WITH WATER FLOWING THROUGH THE TUBE AND AROUND THE CAPSULE FOR COOLING AND HEAT TRANSFER.

-- WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE WAS INITIATED. HOWEVER, IF IN SOME MANNER THE WATER FLOW IN THE CHANNEL WAS INTERRUPTED, THE FUEL WOULD MELT AND BURN THROUGH THE TUBE, AND EITHER IGNITE THE GRAPHITE OR CAUSE A STEAM-GRAPHITE INTERACTION, WHICH COULD ALSO SET THE GRAPHITE ON FIRE.

-- ONCE THE GRAPHITE IGNITED, IT WOULD BURN AT A VERY HIGH TEMPERATURE AND MELT OTHER FUEL CHANNELS. THUS A LARGE PART OF THE REACTOR CORE COULD BE AFFECTED. IN ADDITION, HYDROGEN AND OTHER COMBUSTIBLE GASES SUCH AS METHANE COULD BE GENERATED AND EXPLODE.

2. (S) FOLLOWING ARE SECRET TALKING POINTS EMBASSY SHOULD USE IN DISCUSSING SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT WITH SWEDISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

-- WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT REACTOR BUILDING NUMBER FOUR AT CHERNOBYL AND THE ADJACENT GENERATOR HALLS HAVE SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE, PROBABLY THE RESULT OF AN EXPLOSION.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8 #10397

RY LOS NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

27

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4219 DTG: 300511Z APR 86 PSN: 012927

EX
DI
S

-- SPECIFICALLY, THE UPPER PORTION OF THE REACTOR BUILDING IS LARGELY DESTROYED. WE BELIEVE THE EVENT WAS PROBABLY INITIATED BY A LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT, WHICH CAUSED FUEL MELTING. ASSOCIATED HIGH TEMPERATURES PROBABLY PRODUCED HYDROGEN AND METHANE, WHICH CAUSED THE EXPLOSION. A LARGE PLUME OF SMOKE COMING FROM THE REACTOR INDICATES THE GRAPHITE IN THE REACTOR CORE IS STILL BURNING.

-- THE THREE OTHER REACTORS HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN, BUT CONDENSERS CONTINUE TO OPERATE TO REMOVE RESIDUAL HEAT. ALL COOLING WATER PUMPING ACTIVITY TO BUILDING NUMBER FOUR HAS CEASED. SOME COOLING WATER IS BEING DIVERTED TO ADJACENT OVERFLOW BASINS.

EX
DI
S

-- COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SET UP A FEW KILOMETERS FROM THE PLANT. WHITEHEAD
BT

EX
DI
S

EX
DI
S

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 STOCKHOLM 3340 DTG: 301027Z APR 86 PSN: 012776
EOB363 AN002536 TOR: 120/1126Z CSN: HCE978 THE AREA OF CHERNOBYL.

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
WHSR COMMENT: SUM

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT PUBS
EOB:

3. OUR CONTACT ANTICIPATES A SHIFT IN WINDS IN THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR DAYS WHICH COULD CARRY A NEW PLUME IN THE DIRECTION OF SWEDEN. THE CLOUD'S RADIOACTIVE CONTENT WOULD DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS OF EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE CHERNOBYL FIRE, BUT OUR SMHI CONTACT THOUGHT THAT, IF HEAT AND EMISSIONS AT THE SITE WERE REDUCED, CHANCES FOR A LOW AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY WERE GOOD. NEWELL
BT

OP IMMED
UTS6249
DE RUFHSC #3340 1201028
O 301027Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2193

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3377
AMCONSUL Leningrad IMMEDIATE 0501
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0745
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2736
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0104
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1833
AMEMBASSY PARIS 6451
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2236

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 03340

VIENNA FOR IAEA

USEC

USOEC

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ESCA, TRGY, SENV, UR, SW
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3318, B) STOCKHOLM 3311, C) STOCKHOLM 3296

1. AN EMBASSY OFFICER HAS SPOKEN TO THE OFFICE IN THE SWEDISH METEOROLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL INSTITUTE (SMHI) MAKING WIND MEASUREMENTS OVER SCANDINAVIA AND TRACKING THE MOVEMENT OF THE CLOUD OF NUCLEAR DEBRIS FROM THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. SMHI CONFIRMS THAT THE FIRST PLUME CARRYING RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS MOVED OVER EASTERN SWEDEN ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON AND THAT BY THEIR CALCULATIONS THIS WOULD TIME THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AS OF EARLY SATURDAY, APRIL 26. WEAK WINDS KEPT THE CLOUD HANGING OVER MUCH OF SOUTHERN SCANDINAVIA THROUGH MONDAY AND TUESDAY. AT THE MOMENT (A.M. ON APRIL 30), WESTERLY WINDS ARE PICKING UP AND DISPERSING THE CLOUD. RADIATION READINGS ARE ACCORDINGLY COMING DOWN.

2. AFTER SUNDAY, A SECOND AND HIGHER PLUME SWEEPED FIRST WESTWARD TOWARDS POLAND AND LATER TO THE SOUTH TOWARDS ROMANIA. THE SWEDES ANTICIPATE THE RADIATION IT IS CARRYING TO BE LIGHT SINCE WINDS IN THE AREA OF CHERNOBYL ARE WEAK AND MUCH OF THE RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES ARE PROBABLY STILL SUSPENDED OVER THE ACCIDENT SITE. SMHI BELIEVES THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL RAINFALL IN

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/8 # 10405
BY L05 NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 COPENHAGEN 3025 DTG: 301548Z APR 86 PSN: 013411
EOB578 AN002609 TOR: 120/1711Z CSN: HCE104

MEASURABLE CONTAMINATION THERE.

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1

C. EXAMINATION OF THE AIR SAMPLE COLLECTED ON GLASS FIBRE FILTERS OVER THE PERIOD APRIL 24-28 SHOWS BOTH PARTICULAR AND GASEOUS SPECIES OF ISOTOPES IN THE FOLLOWING CONCENTRATIONS:

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB:

IODINE 131 - 0.26 BQ PER CU.M.
CESIUM 137 - 0.06 BQ PER CU.M.
CESIUM 134 - 0.03 BQ PER CU.M.

OP IMMED
VSK000 STU7197
DE RUFHCP #3025/01 1201550
O 301548Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

OTHER GAMMA SPECTRUM CONTAMINATION PRESENT IN THIS SAMPLE IN LESSER QUANTITIES, FOR WHICH RISØ AS YET CANNOT PROVIDE QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT:

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6785

ZIRCONIUM - 95
NIOBIUM - 95
RUTHENIUM - 103
RUTHENIUM - 106
IODINE - 132
IODINE - 133
BARIUM - 140
LANTHANUM - 140
CERIUM - 141
CERIUM - 144
NEPTUNIUM - 239
TELLURIUM - 132
MOLYBDENUM - 99

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2176
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0260
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 6939
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7633
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6068
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 0146

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 03025

D. OTHER AIR SAMPLES TAKEN SUBSEQUENTLY AT RISØ SHOW LESSER CONCENTRATIONS OF IODINE 131 RANGING FROM 0.004 BQ. PER CU.M. ON APRIL 28-29 TO 0.014 BQ PER CU.M. ON APRIL 29. PRIOR TO THE APRIL 28 MEASUREMENT THE RECORDED CONCENTRATIONS HAD BEEN NIL, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CESIUM 137 AT 5 MICRO BQ PER CU. M.

CORRECTED COPY (ADDING SECTION INFO)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TNUC, TRGY, UR DA
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

E. BASED ON THEIR ANALYSIS RISØ BELIEVES IT "ALMOST CERTAIN" THAT THE CONTAMINATION RESULTS FROM A FUEL FAILURE AT HIGH TEMPERATURE OF A BRMK 1000 MW REACTOR.

REFS: (A) STATE 132741
(B) COPENHAGEN 2999 (NOTAL)

1. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE; SEE PARA 4.

4. ACTION REQUESTED.

2. (C) MFA NUCLEAR AFFAIRS SPECIALIST FINN ERSKOV INFORMED US THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE SOVIETS APRIL 29 THROUGH THE DANISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW THAT SOVIET FAILURE PROMPTLY TO NOTIFY THE DANES OF THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR ACCIDENT WAS "NOT SATISFACTORY." THE EMBASSY ALSO REQUESTED FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT. IN RESPONSE THE SOVIETS REFERRED THE EMBASSY TO THAT DAY'S TASS RELEASE.

A) THE MFA HAS EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN ANY INFORMATION THE USG CAN MAKE AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. EMBASSY URGES THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, PRESUMABLY THROUGH THE DANISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, BE PROVIDED THE FULLEST POSSIBLE BRIEFING.

3. (LOU) RISØ, THE DANISH NATIONAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, APRIL 30 PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS REF A:

A. THE FIRST INDICATIONS OF CONTAMINATION WERE DETECTED IN A ROUTINE EXAMINATION OF A GRASS SAMPLE TAKEN ON THE RISØ GROUNDS, NEAR ROSKILDE ON THE ISLAND OF SJAELLAND. IT SHOWED A DEPOSITION OF IODINE 131 ISOTOPE IN A CONCENTRATION OF 200 BQ PER SQ.M. SAMPLES TAKEN SINCE HAVE SHOWED CONCENTRATIONS RANGING FROM 100 TO 1000 BQ PER SQ.M.

B. ALL GRASS SAMPLES WERE GATHERED ON SJAELLAND. WITHIN THIS LIMITED AREA THERE APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT GREATER CONCENTRATIONS IN THE NORTH OF THE ISLAND. A COLLEAGUE IN HAMBURG HAS TOLD RISØ THAT THERE IS NO

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8# 10398

BY LBJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01
EOB579

COPENHAGEN 3025
AN002608

DTG: 301548Z APR 86 PSN: 013414
TOR: 120/1711Z CSN: HCE105

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU7198
DE RUFHCP #3025/02 1201550
O 301548Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6786

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2177
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0261
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 6940
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7634
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6069
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 0147

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 03025

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TNUC, TRGY, UR DA
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

B) RISØ RESEARCHERS HAVE REQUESTED EARLY NOTIFICATION OF RECORDED CONTAMINATION IN THE U. S. AS THE RESULT OF THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT. WE HOPE THIS INFORMATION CAN BE PROVIDED IN TIMELY RECIPROICATION AND SUGGEST IT BE PASSED DIRECTLY BY PHONE TO SENIOR RESEARCHER IN HEALTH PHYSICS DR. ASKER AARKROG. (TELE: 45-2-37-12-12).

5. (LOU) COMMENT: THE DANISH MEDIA HAS RESPONDED TO CHERNOBYL WITH INTENSE COVERAGE, DETAILED REF B. SOME DEMONSTRATIVE ACTIVITY AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IS EXPECTED AND THE USSR WILL BE UNDER SEVERE CRITICISM FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE AFFAIR. THE ACCIDENT HAS ALSO FOCUSED ADDITIONAL POPULAR ATTENTION ON HE BARSEBAECK REACTOR, VIRTUALLY WITHIN SIGHT OF COPENHAGEN ACROSS THE ORESUND IN SWEDEN. FINALLY, THE ACCIDENT HAS GIVEN RISØ A MUCH-NEEDED OPPORTUNITY TO PROFILE ITSELF AS THE REPOSITORY OF USEFUL, EVEN ESSENTIAL EXPERTISE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. WITH ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH ACTIVITIES UNDER RECURRING POLITICAL ATTACK FROM DENMARK'S MANY NUCLEAR-PHOBES, RISØ'S LONG-TERM PROSPECTS STAND TO BENEFIT GREATLY FROM THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THEIR MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT ROLE. TODMAN
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 MOSCOW 7374 DTG: 301331Z APR 86 PSN: 013044
EOB483 AN002548 TOR: 120/1354Z CSN: HCE047

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:

EMBASSY OF POSSIBLE URGENT REQUEST FOR VISAS FORTH-
COMING. NOTIFICATION THAT DEPARTMENT APPROVES PLAN
FOR THREE-MAN TEAM TO COME TO MOSCOW WOULD BE SIGNAL
FOR EMBASSY BONN TO REQUEST VISAS, FOR MOSCOW TO SUPPORT
VISAS AT MFA AND FOR EUCOM TO SECURE RESERVATIONS ON
NEXT AVAILABLE FLIGHT TO MOSCOW.

5. (U) WE BELIEVE THAT PRESENCE OF TEAM TDY TO
EMBASSY WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO ANXIETIES AMONG INTER-
NATIONAL MOSCOW COMMUNITY WITH WHOM WE COULD SHARE
INFORMATION IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE.
HARTMAN
BT

OP IMMED
STU6560
DE RUEHMO #7374 1201333
O 301331Z APR 86 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4241
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0251

INFO CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
HQ USAF RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAREUR DCSI HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE//
DIA WASHDC//DR/AT/AT-4// IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 07374

USCINCEUR FOR GEN LAWSON FROM AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMED, KSCA, TRGY, SENV, UR
SUBJECT: REACTOR ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL AND RADIATION
MONITORING (U)

REF: PHONCON DATT, USDAO MOSCOW/CDR TULL, USCINCEUR
30 APR 86.

1. (C) THE SOVIET REACTOR ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL
HAS RESULTED IN WIDESPREAD DISTRIBUTION OF RADIOACTIVE
CONTAMINATION AND INCREASED CONCERN WITHIN THE MOSCOW
AMERICAN COMMUNITY CONCERNING POSSIBLE PUBLIC HEALTH
RISK TO FAMILIES LIVING IN MOSCOW. WE ARE AWARE, FOR
EXAMPLE, OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
TO RESTRICT OR CURTAIL CONSUMPTION OF DAIRY PRODUCTS,
OUT OF CONCERN FOR CONSUMER SAFETY.

2. (C) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ACCURATE DATA OR
DEPENDABLE ADVICE WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT WHICH ONLY ADDS TO THE GROWING CONCERN HERE.
SUCH DATA AND ADVICE ARE NEEDED NOW.

3. (U) PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES PER REF INDICATE
THREE-MAN TEAM FROM USEUCOM ASSETS IS AVAILABLE TO
HELP US. TEAM
WOULD STANDBY TO DEPART FROM FRANKFURT. RAPID
RESPONSE FROM EUCOM TO INFORMAL QUERY MUCH APPRECIATED.
REQUEST EUCOM COLLECT VISA APPLICATION INFORMATION ON
THREE-MAN TEAM AND STAND BY FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUCTIONS
TO REQUEST SOVIET VISAS. VISA INFORMATION IS NAME,
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PASSPORT NUMBER.

4. (U) REQUEST EUCOM TELEPHONE VISA INFORMATION
TO AMERICAN EMBASSIES BONN AND MOSCOW. BACKUP WITH
TELEGRAM. FURTHER REQUEST AMEMBASSY BONN TELL SOVIET

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8# 10399

BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

32 ✓

PAGE 01 AMCONSUL Leningrad 0972 DTG: 300925Z APR 86 PSN: 012672
EOB324 AN002443 TOR: 120/1011Z CSN: HCE959

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A1
WHSR COMMENT: SUMMARY ITEM

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT PUBS
EOB:

CONCERN OVER THE INCIDENT, SINCE VILNIUS IS MUCH CLOSER TO CHERNOBYL' THAN LENINGRAD. ONE STUDENT REPORTED THAT A YALE PHYSICS PROFESSOR HAD ADVISED HER TO HAVE HER CLOTHES CHECKED BY A GEIGER COUNTER AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. WE ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TWO OF THE STUDENTS TO BE CHECKED AT A SOVIET HOSPITAL FOR POSSIBLE RADIATION EXPOSURE, TO ENSURE THEIR OWN PEACE OF MIND AND THAT OF THEIR PARENTS. ACTION REQUEST: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EVALUATION OR ADVICE EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT MAY BE ABLE TO GIVE CONCERNING POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF CIEE STUDENTS TO HIGHER LEVELS OF RADIATION WHILE IN VILNIUS.

OP IMMED
STU5734

DE RUFHLG #0972 1200925
O 300925Z APR 86
FM AMCONSUL Leningrad

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4612

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5862
USIA WASHDC 1125

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE Leningrad 00972

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CASC, TRGY, UR, US
SUBJECT: Leningrad REACTIONS TO THE CHERNOBYL-NUCLEAR
- ACCIDENT

REF: MOSCOW 7267

5. MOST TOUR GROUPS ARE RELATIVELY CALM ABOUT THE SITUATION, BUT A FEW APPEAR TO BE REACTING BADLY TO THE CHERNOBYL' NEWS. ONE TOUR GROUP OF 70 AMERICANS (LED BY BRITISH TOURGUIDES), HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE IN LEAVING LENINGRAD DUE TO WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS A RADIATION THREAT. HOWEVER, THEY ARE IN A QUANDRY ABOUT WHERE THEY WANT TO GO, SINCE THE MOST EASILY AVAILABLE FLIGHTS GO TO FINLAND, WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS CONTAMINATED TOO. WE HAVE TRIED TO QUIET THEIR FEARS.

6. WE HAVE RECEIVED A SMALL NUMBER OF PRESS INQUIRIES FROM THE UNITED STATES. ONE REPORTER WHO WORKS ON A NEWSPAPER SERVING THE THREE-MILE ISLAND AREA CALLED TO ASK WHAT THE "EMBASSY" IN Leningrad KNEW ABOUT THE DISASTER AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY ILL-EFFECTS THERE. WE INFORMED HER THAT MOSCOW WAS THE CAPITAL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ASKED THAT SHE CALL OUR EMBASSY THERE FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.

MAGEE
BT

1. SEE PARA 4 FOR ACTION REQUEST.

2. SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN ALMOST TOTALLY UNCOMMUNICATIVE, NOT EVEN VOLUNTEERING DETAILS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED ABOUT THE ACCIDENT. AT A RECEPTION ON APRIL 29, Leningrad ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DEPUTY FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF IGOR BALLOD SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION ON THE ACCIDENT OTHER THAN WHAT HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED. BALLOD BECAME EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN REMINDED BY A WESTERN CONSULAR COLLEAGUE THAT THE Leningrad NUCLEAR POWER COMPLEX WAS VERY SIMILAR IN DESIGN TO THAT OF CHERNOBYL', SINCE BOTH CONTAINED FOUR RBMK-1000 (GRAPHITE-MODERATED) REACTORS. BALLOD DEFENSIVELY NOTED THAT THE Leningrad NUCLEAR POWER COMPLEX WAS PERFECTLY SAFE, AND "ANYWAY IT IS 100 KILOMETERS AWAY, IN ESTONIA." BALLOD THEN SOUGHT TO MAKE HIMSELF SCARCE FOR THE REST OF THE EVENING. OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED OFTEN MENTIONED THE THREE-MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, APPARENTLY UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS AT LEAST OF EQUAL SERIOUSNESS TO THE ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL'.

3. WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TOURIST INQUIRIES ABOUT THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT AND HAVE RESPONDED ALONG THE LINES USED BY EMBASSY MOSCOW (REFTEL). WE ARE ALSO TAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN Leningrad (IREX'ERS, CIEE, ETC.) ARE KEPT INFORMED OF THE SITUATION.

4. THE CIEE STUDENTS (APPROXIMATELY 40) WERE IN VILNIUS OVER THE WEEKEND AND SOME HAVE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8#10406

BY hjt NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

*File
Pres-Gov
Messages*

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 4124 DTG 300218Z APR 86 PSN:012077
EOB173 AND22355 TOR: 120/0223Z CSN:EHA362

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBP-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
WHSR COMMENT: SENT TO JP

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT MART LINH MATL VP MCD FORT
EOE

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #4124 1200219
O 300218Z APR 86 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7510

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 1136
USDEL SECRETARY 5495
WHITE HOUSE 1078

~~SECRET~~ STATE 134124 TOSEC 080173

E.O. 12956: DECL: OADR
TAGS: US, UR,
SUBJECT: ~~SOVIET DELIVER MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV
TO THE PRESIDENT~~

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR ISAKOV CAME TO DEPART MENT
AT 6:00 PM TUESDAY AFTERNOON TO DELIVER WHAT HE
CHARACTERIZED AS A MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. HE
PRESENTED FOLLOWING TEXT TO EUR SENIOR DEPUTY WOESSNER:

BEGIN TEXT

-- 1.) AS IT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED IN THE SOVIET
PRESS, AN ACCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 26 IN ONE OF THE
POWER BLOCK ROOMS OF THE CHERNOBYL ATOMIC POWER STATION,
130 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH OF KIEV. THE ACCIDENT HAS
RESULTED IN DESTRUCTION OF A PART OF THE REACTOR BUILDING
STRUCTURE, CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE REACTOR AND SOME LEAK OF
RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE. THREE REMAINING POWER BLOCKS HAVE
BEEN STOPPED, THEY ARE IN ORDER AND ARE IN OPERATION
RESERVE.

-- 2. ACCORDING TO THE MEASUREMENTS WHICH ARE
CONTINUOUSLY BEING TAKEN BY SOVIET SERVICES, THE
RADIATION SITUATION IN THE REGIONS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT
TO THE PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT HAS REQUIRED PARTIAL
EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION. DUE TO THE MEASURES TAKEN
THE RADIATION SITUATION HAS BEEN STABILIZED. ADDITIONAL
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT
ARE BEING TAKEN.

--3. ACCORDING TO THE DATA OF THE SOVIET COMPETENT
AUTHORITIES, DISSEMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION
IN THE WESTERN, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DIRECTIONS HAS BEEN
DETECTED. THE LEVELS OF CONTAMINATION ARE SOMEWHAT ABOVE
THE PERMISSIBLE NORMS, BUT NOT TO AN EXTENT THAT WOULD
REQUIRE SPECIAL MEASURES TO PROTECT THE POPULATION.

END TEXT

3. ISAKOV SAID THE MESSAGE WAS TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
GORBACHEV. WHEN ASKED IF THIS WAS A DIRECT RESPONSE TO
OUR EARLIER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, ISAKOV SAID THE
MESSAGES PROBABLY CROSSED IN TRANSMISSION. ISAKOV SAID
THAT IN ADDITION TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS NOTE, SOVIET
TV NEWS PROGRAM VREMYA WAS CARRYING MORE INFORMATION ON
THE ACCIDENT. (IN FACT THE VREMYA BROADCAST ADDED
NOTHING TO THE MESSAGE) WHEN ASKED WHAT "STABILIZED"
MEANT IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS NOTE, ISAKOV SAID HE DID NOT
KNOW. WOESSNER THANKED ISAKOV AND INDICATED THAT OUR
OFFER OF ASSISTANCE STILL STANDS. WOESSNER REPEATED OUR
HOPE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE SCALE AND
NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT.

4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ISAKOV SAID THE MESSAGE WAS FROM
GORBACHEV, IT BEARS THE EARMARKS OF A STANDARD RELEASE
FOR WIDE DISTRIBUTION BY SOVIET EMBASSIES.
WHITEHEAD
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8 #10400

RV HOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08



UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 4000 DTG: 300007Z APR 86 PSN: 011864
EOB137 AN002317 TOR: 120/0050Z CSN: HCE804

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
 /006 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #4000 1200007
O 300007Z APR 86 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 5476
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
JAMES R GORSON
IIR OF FAC
ATA WASGDC
PLUS 134 OTHERS
 SLNO SAIPAN 1179
 TREASURY WASHDC 1314
ALL USDOC DISTDIR
ZEN/BEIRUT POUCH
ZEN/KABUL POUCH
ZEN/BAGHDAD POUCH

UNCLAS STATE 134000 TOSEC 080166

INFORM CONSULS

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OTRA, CASC
SUBJECT: TRAVEL ADVISORY FOR THE KIEV AREA

1. A SOVIET GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS INDICATED THAT DUE TO THE RECENT ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRAVEL TO KIEV MAY BE DANGEROUS. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THEREFORE ADVISES THAT TRAVEL TO THAT CITY AND ADJACENT AREAS IS NOT RECOMMENDED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

2. EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFINITE. WHITEHEAD
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01
EOB513

HELSINKI 2047
AN002553

DTG: 301427Z APR 86 PSN: 013149
TOR: 120/1451Z CSN: HCE061

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /003 A1
WHSR COMMENT: SUMMARY ITEM

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU6778
DE RUFHNC #2047 1201427
O 301427Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8529

INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 6598
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 6638
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 3629
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 7641
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6272

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CAS 7/10/02

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HELSINKI 02047

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: AMED, MNUC, TNUC, FI
SUBJECT: INFORMATION RE RADIATION LEVELS IN HELSINKI

REF: HELSINKI 2046

1. FINNISH NUCLEAR EXPERT PROFESSOR JORMA MIETTINEN TOLD EMBASSY ON THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 30 THAT THE CURRENT "BACKGROUND RADIATION" IN HELSINKI IS 100 MICRORADS, THAT IS FIVE TIMES NORMAL BACKGROUND LEVELS. HE SAID THAT IN RAIN WATER WHERE THERE HAS BEEN RECENT RAIN RADIATION LEVELS ARE 50 TIMES NORMAL, EXPLAINING THAT NORMALLY THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO RADIATION IN RAIN WATER.

2. HE SAID THAT THE RADIATION TRACES ARE "HIGHLY EFFLUENT FISSION PRODUCTS OF A NUCLEAR REACTOR" I. E., HE SAID A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT IN THE USSR. HE STRESSED THAT CURRENT BACKGROUND RADIATION LEVELS ARE NOT DANGEROUS TO HUMAN BEINGS.

3. EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR WILL BE ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT MOMENTARILY ON THE RADIATION SITUATION IN FINLAND. EMBASSY WILL REPORT RELEVANT DATA.
SCHNABEL
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 BONN 3854 DTG: 301729Z APR 86 PSN: 013512
EOB614 AN002594 TOR: 120/1806Z CSN: HCE120

SUCH A MATTER. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DID NOT PROVIDE RUHFUS WITH ANY DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT.

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT DOAN
EOB:

OP IMMEDIATE
STU7545
DE RUFHOL #3854/01 1201729
O 301729Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0454

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8936
OECD COLLECTIVE
FRG COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 13854

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: GE, KSCA, TRGY
SUBJECT: FRG INFORMATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER

REF: MOSCOW 94829

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. (SUMMARY) FRG OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS OFFICIALLY REQUESTED OR ACCEPTED FRG ASSISTANCE TO DEAL WITH THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO BONN JULIJ KWISINSKIJ DID CALL ON FRG INTERIOR MINISTER FRIEDERICH ZIMMERMANN APRIL 29 TO ASSURE HIM THAT THE ACCIDENT POSED NO DANGER TO THE FRG. IN ADDITION, SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN THE FRG HAVE INFORMALLY CONTACTED INDIVIDUALS AT NUCLEAR FIRMS AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR INFORMATION ON HOW TO EXTINGUISH GRAPHITE FIRES. IN THESE MEETINGS, THE SOVIETS REQUESTED INFORMATION ABOUT FRG MANUFACTURERS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIPMENT, AND THE TYPES AND SPECIFICATIONS OF FRG NUCLEAR DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT, RESPIRATORS, RADIATION SUITS, AND MONITORING EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIETS ALSO ASKED FOR THE NAMES OF PHYSICIANS SPECIALIZING IN NUCLEAR MEDICINE, DECONTAMINATION, AND TREATMENT OF RADIATION POISONING.
(END SUMMARY)

2. FRG FOREIGN OFFICE, INTERIOR MINISTRY, AND RESEARCH MINISTRY SOURCES HAVE DENIED WIDESPREAD PRESS REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS OFFICIALLY REQUESTED FRG ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. ACCORDING TO DR. ADOLF VON WAGNER, NEWLY APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND SPACE EXPLOITATION, STATE SECRETARY DR. JUERGEN RUHFUS OFFERED EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING AN INITIAL APRIL 29 CALL BY THE NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO BONN JULIJ KWISINSKIJ (GERMAN SPELLING). KWISINSKIJ REPORTEDLY REACTED COOLLY TO THE OFFER AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON

3. IN A SECOND CALL MADE LATER THAT EVENING ON FRG INTERIOR MINISTER FRIEDERICH ZIMMERMANN, KWISINSKIJ DELIVERED A STATEMENT WHICH REPEATED SOME OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN AN EARLIER TASS PRESS RELEASE. ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, THE REACTOR ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN ONE OF THE FOUR BLOCKS OF THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THEREBY A PORTION OF THE BUILDING WAS DESTROYED AND RADIOACTIVITY WAS RELEASED. THE OTHER THREE BLOCKS OF THE PLANT WERE NEVERTHELESS INTACT AND HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN IN THE MEANTIME. SOME AREAS TO THE NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST OF THE PLANT WERE CONTAMINATED AND THE POPULATION HAD BEEN EVACUATED. THE LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVITY MEASURED AT AN UNSPECIFIED DISTANCE FROM THE PLANT EXCEEDED NORMAL LEVELS, BUT NOT SIGNIFICANTLY. FURTHER MEASURES TO PROTECT THE POPULATION WERE NOT NECESSARY. THE SITUATION WAS STABILIZED AND UNDER CONTROL.

4. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DID NOT PROVIDE DATA ON THE RADIATION LEVELS AT THE SITE, THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE, OR THE COURSE OF THE SUSPECTED GRAPHITE FIRE. FOR HIS PART, INTERIOR MINISTER ZIMMERMANN REITERATED THE FRG'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE, AND REQUESTED THAT THE FRG BE INFORMED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

5. DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS, SOVIET DIPLOMATS HAVE ALSO INFORMALLY CONTACTED SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHERS AT FRG NUCLEAR FIRMS AND INDUSTRY ORGANIZATIONS FOR INFORMATION ON THE PROPERTIES OF GRAPHITE AND ON METHODS OF EXTINGUISHING GRAPHITE FIRES. THE SOVIETS ALSO REQUESTED INFORMATION ON MANUFACTURERS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIPMENT, AND THE TYPES AND SPECIFICATIONS OF FRG NUCLEAR DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT, RESPIRATORS, RADIATION SUITS, AND MONITORING EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ASKED FOR THE NAMES OF PHYSICIANS SPECIALIZING IN NUCLEAR MEDICINE, DECONTAMINATION, AND TREATMENT OF RADIATION POISONING, AS WELL AS THE NAMES OF SPECIALISTS IN RADIATION-MONITORING TECHNIQUES.

6. INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYING INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED BY THE SOVIETS INCLUDE A NUCLEAR INDUSTRY LOBBYING GROUP

BT

DECLASSIFIED

NI RR F06-114/8 #10401
KAT NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

37

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01
EOB615

BONN 3854
AN002593

DTG: 301729Z APR 86 PSN: 013513
TOR: 120/1807Z CSN: HCE121

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT DOAN
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS7613
DE RUFHOL #3854/02 1201730
O 301729Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0455

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8937
OECD COLLECTIVE
FRG COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 13854

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: GE, KSCA, TRGY
SUBJECT: FRG INFORMATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER

(DEUTSCHE ATOMFORUM), A PRINCIPLE FEDERAL NUCLEAR REGULATORY AGENCY (GESELLSCHAFT FUER REAKTOR SICHERHEIT), A STATE-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY (TECHNISCHE UEBERWACHUNG VEREIN OR TUEV), AND SEVERAL PRIVATE COMPANIES WITH EXPERIENCE IN GRAPHITE MATERIALS.

7. ONE FRG NUCLEAR REGULATORY OFFICIAL AT THE TUEV CONFIDED THAT HE WAS ASTOUNDED BY THE LACK OF BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND EQUIPMENT IMPLIED BY THE SIMPLE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOW ASKING BASIC QUESTIONS ABOUT RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT AND DECONTAMINATION GEAR, WHICH IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED AT WESTERN NUCLEAR PLANTS, CAME AS A SHOCK TO THE STAFF.

8. IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, THE FRG WEATHER SERVICE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT MEASUREMENTS TAKEN BY A WEATHER STATION AT OFFENBACH (NEAR FRANKFURT) ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 30 SHOW DOUBLE NORMAL LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY IN THE AIR. THE ELEVEN OTHER MEASURING STATIONS IN THE FRG SHOW NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY AND THE WEATHER SERVICE IMMEDIATELY STATED THAT THE HIGHER LEVEL PRESENTS NO DANGER TO THE POPULATION.

9. THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HAS 'RECOMMENDED' THAT FRG TOURISTS AVOID THE KIEV AREA. THE FOREIGN OFFICE AVOIDED RECOMMENDING THAT GERMANS LIVING IN THE KIEV AREA RETURN TO THE FRG. NEVERTHELESS, THE FOREIGN OFFICE ADDED THAT IT CONSIDERS A MEASURE TAKEN BY ONE FRG CONSTRUCTION FIRM WORKING IN KIEV TO REPATRIATE EMPLOYEES' FAMILIES TO BE SENSIBLE.
BURT##

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

38

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 7427 DTG: 301806Z APR 86 PSN: 013573
EOB183 AN002357 TOR: 120/1844Z CSN: HCE127

TRAVEL INTO KIEV AND SURROUNDING AREAS.

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT DOAN
EOB:

OP IMMEDIATE
UTS7724
DE RUEHMO #7427 1201807
O 301806Z APR 86 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4274

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7214
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4556
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1448
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0257
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2811
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5167
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1105
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2412
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3488
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3687
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 2387

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 07427

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KSCA, TRGV, SENV, CASC, UR
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 4,
- AS OF 1530 GMT APRIL 30

REF: (A) MOSCOW 7333, (B) MOSCOW 7317, (C) MOSCOW 7231

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AN INTENSE DAY OF CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN EMBASSIES AND NON-OFFICIAL SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE YIELDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN KIEV AND THE MOSCOW DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY'S REACTION TO THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT.

3. EVACUATIONS. THE FRENCH EMBASSY IS ARRANGING FOR THE RETURN TO MOSCOW OF THE FOUR LANGUAGE INSTRUCTORS NOW PRESENT IN KIEV ALONG WITH THEIR STUDENTS. BECAUSE RAIL TRAVEL WOULD ROUTE EVACUEES NORTH OF THE CITY INTO POSSIBLY HIGHLY CONTAMINATED AREAS, THE EMBASSY IS FLYING MANY OTHER FRENCH CITIZENS DIRECTLY TO PARIS. THE BRITISH ARE ADVISING THEIR CITIZENS TO LEAVE KIEV AND MINSK AND IN THE CASE OF A GROUP OF EIGHTY STUDENT TOURISTS, ARRANGING FOR A PLANE TO ARRIVE IN MOSCOW ON MAY 2 TO FLY THEM TO ENGLAND. THE U.K. HAS ISSUED A TRAVEL ADVISORY AGAINST VISITING THE WESTERN PARTS OF THE USSR. THE AUSTRIAN EMBASSY HAS BEGUN PULLING OUT ALL FAMILIES LOCATED IN THE KIEV REGION. THE CANADIANS, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR TRAVEL ADVISORY, ARE STRONGLY DISCOURAGING

4. KIEV. ACCORDING TO A WEST GERMAN BUSINESSMAN RESIDENT THERE, THE CITY MAINTAINS SOME SENSE OF NORMALCY; TOURISTS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES CONTINUE TO CHECK IN AND OUT OF THE HOTELS AND A LARGE BICYCLE RACE SCHEDULED FOR THE MAY FIRST HOLIDAY PERIOD IS SO FAR ON TRACK. FRENCH STUDENTS, HOWEVER, REPORT THAT THEY HAVE DETECTED SOME NERVOUSNESS AMONG THE POPULACE; KIEV RADIO IS REPORTEDLY REFERRING TO THE ACCIDENT AS A "CATASTROPHE" -- A DESCRIPTION CONSISTENT WITH THAT GIVEN TO A VISITING FRENCH JOURNALIST BY A CC CPSU MEMBER WHO CHARACTERIZED IT AS A "MAJOR DISASTER." FRENCH CONTACTS ALSO NOTE THAT UNIVERSITY OF KIEV STUDENTS HAVE BEEN TOLD, "DO NOT BATHE, DO NOT DRINK WATER, DO NOT FISH IN THE DNEPR, AND DO NOT EAT ANYTHING CAUGHT IN THE DNEPR." WE HAVE RECEIVED OTHER REPORTS WHICH IN SPITE OF THEIR VARIATIONS, ALL POINT TO ALREADY-MODEST LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION OF THE DNEPR AND KIEV WATER RESERVOIR. A RELIABLE SOVIET SOURCE REPORTS THAT A SMALL TOWN NEAR THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE RESERVOIR IS IN A STATE OF PANIC. DESPITE SOME EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, INTOURIST APPEARS TO BE DISCOURAGING TRAVEL TO KIEV.

5. SWEDISH EMBASSY OFFICERS SAID TODAY THAT THEIR MISSION WILL SOON BEGIN BRINGING IN IODIDE TABLETS FOR THEIR COMMUNITY. ALSO, LATE THIS AFTERNOON, SWEDISH NUCLEAR AUTHORITIES INFORMED THEIR EMBASSY HERE THAT RADIATION LEVELS IN SWEDEN HAD BEGUN TO INCREASE AGAIN AND HAD REACHED LEVELS MUCH HIGHER THAN EARLIER THIS WEEK; NUMBERS SUCH AS GREATER THAN ONE HUNDRED TIMES AMBIENT LEVEL ARE BEING REPORTED IN SWEDEN.

6. THIS AFTERNOON DURING HIS CALL AT THE MFA ON THE CHERNOBYL' INCIDENT, THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD THAT THE ACCIDENT BEGAN SATURDAY, APRIL 26. HARTMAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-714/8# 10402
BY NAJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

Handwritten signatures and initials

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 THE HAGUE 3361 DTG: 011637Z MAY 86 PSN: 015714
EOB461 AN002927 TOR: 121/1651Z CSN: HCE554

DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 / 007 A2

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS9658
DE RUFMTH #3361 1211638
O 011637Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2065

INFO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UNVIE MISSION VIENNA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2083

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ THE HAGUE 03361

L FOR SCHWARTZ, OES FOR PROCHNIK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, PREL, TRGY, IAEA, NL
SUBJECT: EC DEMARCHE ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DUTCH MFA OFFICIAL INFORMED US THAT THE NETHERLANDS, AS PRESIDENT OF THE EC, DELIVERED A DEMARCHE AT 1 A.M. THIS MORNING IN MOSCOW IN REGARD TO THE SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER. THE WORDING OF THE DEMARCHE IS AS FOLLOWS:

THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WISHES IN THE FIRST PLACE TO EXPRESS TO THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION ITS FEELINGS OF SINCERE SYMPATHY ON THE PART OF THE 12 MEMBER STATES IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT DISASTEROUS EVENTS IN CHERNOBYL.

THIS AFTERNOON THE PRESIDENCY EXPRESSED TO THE CHIEF OF THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT THE REQUEST OF THE 12 MEMBER STATES THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO CITIZENS OF THE EC WHO ARE IN THE REGION OF THE ACCIDENT AND TO THOSE WHO INTEND TO LEAVE.

IN ADDITION TO ITS EARLIER REQUEST, THE PRESIDENCY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO IMPRESS ON SOVIET AUTHORITIES THE NECESSITY OF FULLY INFORMING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE FULLEST DETAIL AND WITHOUT DELAY ABOUT THE ACCIDENT IN CHERNOBYL AND NOTABLY ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCIDENT.

FINALLY, THE 12 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EC DECLARE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO OFFER TO THE USSR SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MIGHT BE DESIRED IN DEALING WITH THE INCIDENT.

3. THE MFA OFFICIAL SAID THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE OFFER OF ASSISTANCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ACCIDENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND ASSISTANCE THEREFORE IS NO LONGER NEEDED. THE INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION "RIDICULED" THE EC REQUEST, ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, WHO WAS READING FROM A REPORTING CABLE, AND IN THE END OFFERED NO FURTHER INFORMATION. THE EC INTENDS TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE IAEA IN VIENNA TOMORROW ASKING SECRETARY GENERAL BLIX TO INITIATE A CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET ACCIDENT. THE EC WILL PRESS FOR A TIGHTENING OF IAEA REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBER STATES' REPORTING OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS. THE EC WILL TWIST THE KNIFE IN SOVIET WOUNDS BY STRESSING THE PRECEDENT SET BY THE U.S. COOPERATION ON DISCUSSING THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN WHICH THE SOVIETS LED THE CHARGE OF THOSE CRITICAL OF U.S. SAFETY PROCEDURES. BREMER
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8 # 10403

BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 3143 DTG: 011712Z MAY 86 PSN: 016537
EOB138 AN003226 TOR: 122/0115Z CSN: HCE664

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A2
WHSR COMMENT: 5 LINER

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU0611
DE RUFHBC #3143/01 1211718
O 011712Z MAY 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8614

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8939
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3274
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 7485
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4290
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7531
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5122
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6640
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6385
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7647
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 6976

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 03143

EXDIS

LONDON FOR RMO ARNOLD WEBER AT MED CONFERENCE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENGR, TRGY, PREL, AMED, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA REQUESTS SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE ON
- RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
-
REF: (A) BUCHAREST 3102, (B) STATE 136047

1. (A - ENTIRE TEXT)
-
2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING A SUDDEN INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY ON MAY 1, GOR LEADERSHIP HELD AN EMERGENCY MEETING, WHICH DECIDED TO FORM A SPECIAL COMMITTEE, REVIEW THE ALARMING MEASUREMENTS, AND SEEK U. S. SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE. ACTION REQUESTED: AN IMMEDIATE REPLY TO THE ROMANIAN REQUEST, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SENDING AN EXPERT ON RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT TO ROMANIA. IF SERIOUS DAMAGE TO DAIRY OR OTHER FOOD SUPPLIES SEEMS LIKELY, USG SHOULD BEGIN CONSIDERING WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST TO OFFER EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE. END SUMMARY.
-
3. FOREIGN MINISTER VADUVA CALLED IN DCM TO AN "URGENT" MEETING ON MAY 1, IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR WHO IS TRAVELLING IN ROMANIA. IOAN URSU, FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ACCOMPANIED THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND LED THE DISCUSSION. MARIN IVASCU, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY, JOINED LATER. RACEANU (MFA) WAS ALSO PRESENT. URSU NOTED THAT THE EMBASSY HAD INQUIRED ABOUT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/8# 10404
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 3143

DTG: 011712Z MAY 86 PSN: 016537

RADIATION LEVELS ON APRIL 30 (REF A), AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR INTEREST.

4. URSU SAID THAT AS SOON AS GOR LEARNED ABOUT THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT, IT HAD ALERTED ITS NATIONAL NETWORK OF MONITORING STATIONS TO MEASURE AIR, WATER AND SOIL RADIOACTIVITY. UNTIL THE NIGHT OF APRIL 30/MAY 1, THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY -- WHICH HAD RESULTED IN A "COMMUNIQUE" OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THAT EFFECT ON APRIL 30. (NOTE: WE HAVE NOT SEEN THIS REPORT.)

5. DURING THE NIGHT OF APRIL 30/MAY 1, THERE WAS A GREAT INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY IN SEVERAL REGIONS OF ROMANIA, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHEASTERN PART, URSU CONTINUED. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU CHAIRED A MEETING OF THE LEADERSHIP TO REVIEW THE RESULTS, WHICH URSU ATTENDED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND AS A PHYSICIST. THE LEADERSHIP DECIDED TO FORM A PARTY/STATE GROUP, HEADED BY ACADEMICIAN ELENA CEAUSESCU TO IMPLEMENT THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO PROTECT THE POPULATION, LIVE-STOCK AND THE COUNTRY IN GENERAL. THE LEADERSHIP ALSO ASKED TO PASS TO U. S. AUTHORITIES, IN CONFIDENCE, THE KEY RADIOACTIVE MEASUREMENTS, AND A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE BY SPECIALISTS OR APPROPRIATE MATERIALS TO HELP ANALYZE THE SITUATION IN ROMANIA. URSU SAID THAT SINCE IT WAS A HUMANITARIAN MATTER, GOR DID NOT OBJECT TO SHARING THE INFORMATION WITH OTHER STATES, BUT ASKED REPEATEDLY THAT IT BE HELD CONFIDENTIALLY.

6. MEASUREMENTS OF RADIOACTIVITY AT 4:30 TO 5:00 A. M. ROMANIAN TIME, MAY 1 (AFTER NEGLIGIBLE REPORTS UP TO NIGHT OF APRIL 30):

- A. IASI (MOLDAVIA):
 - SOIL RADIOACTIVITY SLIGHTLY OVER ALARM LEVEL (50,000 PICO CURIES PER SQUARE METER).
 - AIR: CLOSE TO NORMAL, NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.
- B. SUCEAVA:
 - SOIL ABOVE WARNING LEVELS (20,000 PICO CURIES PER SQUARE METER)
- C. TIRGU MURES (TRANSYLVANIA):
 - SOIL CLOSE TO WARNING LEVEL (10,000 PICO CURIES)

BT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 3143 DTG: 011712Z MAY 86 PSN: 016541
EOB140 AN003225 TOR: 122/0117Z CSN: HCE665

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT
EOB:

EXDIS

OP IMMED
UTS9698
DE RUFHBC #3143/02 1211720
O 011712Z MAY 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8615

- INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8940
- AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3275
- AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 7486
- AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4291
- AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7532
- AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5123
- AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6641
- AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6386
- AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7648
- AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 6977

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 03143

EXDIS

LONDON FOR RMO ARNOLD WEBER AT MED CONFERENCE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENGR, TRGY, AMED, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA REQUESTS SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE ON

D. TULCEA (DANUBE DELTA):
- -- INCREASE IN ATMOSPHERIC RADIATION, 600 PICO
- CURIES PER CUBIC METER.
-

7. AFTER FORMING THE COMMITTEE, THEY OBTAINED THE
FOLLOWING HIGHER LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY AT 1:00 P. M.
MAY 1:

A. IASI:
- -- SOIL: OVER 200,000 PICO CURIES
- -- AIR: FOR FIRST TIME, SMALL READING AT ABOUT
- WARNING LEVEL
- (ABOUT 1000 PICO CURIES PER CUBIC METER)

B. SUCEAVA: LEVELS SAME AS EARLIER

C. TULCEA: AIR RADIOACTIVITY REACHED 3000 PICO CURIES
- PER CUBIC METER, THEN DROPPED A LITTLE.

D. GALATI (DANUBE, NEAR SOVIET BORDER):
- -- AIR RADIOACTIVITY REACHED ABOUT 2000 PICO
- CURIES.

E. THERE WAS ALSO A SMALL INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY IN
SEVERAL OTHER PLACES IN ROMANIA, INCLUDING BUCHAREST,
BUT NOT A CAUSE FOR CONCERN.
-

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 3143 DTG: 011712Z MAY 86 PSN: 016541

E
X
D
I
S

8. ASKED WHY THERE MIGHT BE SUCH A SUDDEN INCREASE IN RADIATION, AFTER NORMAL READINGS, URSU SAID HE HAD NO OFFICIAL CONCLUSION. HOWEVER, IT LOOKED TO HIM AS IF ROMANIA HAD BEEN LUCKY AT FIRST, WITH THE WIND HEADED TOWARD POLAND; BUT UNFORTUNATELY THE WIND SHIFTED. HE ATTRIBUTED THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN SOIL RADIOACTIVITY TO AN ACCOMPANYING LIGHT RAIN -- "NOT MUCH RAIN, BUT ENOUGH."

E
X
D
I
S

9. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. URSU AND IVASCU SAID ROMANIAN SCIENTISTS WANTED INFORMATION FROM U.S. SCIENTISTS ON PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF HARM FROM THE VARIOUS ISOTOPES. THEY WERE AWARE OF RADIOACTIVE IODINE AND THE THREAT TO THE THYROID; THEY WERE LESS ACQUAINTED WITH CESIUM AND STRONTIUM. WHAT WERE THE ANTIDOTES? WERE THERE NOT ANTIDOTES MORE SOPHISTICATED THAN POTASSIUM IODIDE (WITH WHICH THEY WERE FAMILIAR)? WHAT TREATMENT WAS THERE FOR ANIMALS? WERE THERE OTHER ISOTOPES? SO FAR, ROMANIA HAD NEVER HAD ANY CASES OF RADIATION POISONING, AND URSU REALIZED THAT THE U.S. HAD A GREAT BODY OF EXPERIENCE. THEY THEREFORE REQUESTED WHATEVER WRITTEN MATERIALS OR INSTRUMENTS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THEY WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY SPECIALISTS. THEY WANT KNOWLEDGE, NOT BROAD ADVICE. URSU THEN ADDED, ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT, THAT ROMANIA HAD NO INFORMATION WHATSOEVER ABOUT THE REACTOR INCIDENT ITSELF, OTHER THAN THAT AVAILABLE THROUGH THE PRESS, AND SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE, ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

E
X
D
I
S

10. COMMENT: APPARENTLY GOR HAS NOT BEEN BRIEFED AT ALL BY THE SOVIETS, AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE USSR

E
X
D
I
S

WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SPARE EXPERTS. WE HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A HUMANITARIAN AND SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION THAT WILL BE APPRECIATED AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS HERE. THE INFORMATION MAY ALSO BE OF VALUE TO US. WHILE WE SHOULD RESPECT THE GOR REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIALITY -- OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO AVOID PANIC, AS WELL AS OFFENSE TO THE SOVIETS -- WE CAN EXPECT EVENTUALLY TO HAVE A STRONGLY POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE ATTITUDES OF ORDINARY ROMANIANS AS WELL, ONCE THEY LEARN THE U.S. PROVIDED PROMPT HELP.

11. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL FOR USG TO GAUGE HOW BADLY FOOD SUPPLIES WILL BE CONTAMINATED HERE. IF
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 BUCHAREST 3143 DTG: 011712Z MAY 86 PSN: 016544
EOB139 AN003224 TOR: 122/0117Z CSN: HCE667

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
 /006 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU0619
DE RUFHBC #3143/03 1211722
O 011712Z MAY 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8616

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8941
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3276
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 7487
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4292
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7533
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5124
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6642
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6387
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7649
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 6978

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 03143

EXDIS

LONDON FOR RMO ARNOLD WEBER AT MED CONFERENCE

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENGR, TRGY, PREL, AMED, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA REQUESTS SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE ON

THIS TURNS OUT TO BE SERIOUS, WE MAY ALSO WANT TO
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING A MAJOR POLITICAL
DEMONSTRATION BY PROVIDING RELIEF ASSISTANCE, AS WE
DID FOLLOWING FLOODS AND THE EARTHQUAKE IN THE 1970S.
END COMMENT.

12. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE
ANSWER TO THE REQUEST FOR SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE.
PLEASE ALSO ADVISE WHAT DATA WE CAN SHARE WITH GOR
ON THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT ITSELF. KIRK
BT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 10 STATE 135824
ORIGIN EUR-00

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606 C

45

ORIGIN OFFICE PA-02
INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 PMD-01 REA-01 RPE-01 OECD-01 EWEA-01
EEC-02 GC-01 EEU-03 CA-02 SOEC-01 NO-01 EI-01 NE-02
GE-01 UK-02 SOV-01 FI-01 CE-01 SOML-01 SOBI-01 OCT-01
PO-02 IT-02 MT-02 FR-02 WE-02 SP-02 PMS-01 PL-02 HU-02
PM-01 AL-01 BU-02 YO-02 RO-02 BE-01 GR-01 TU-01 CY-01
SE-01 AU-01 SW-01 CZ-02 NL-01 LU-01 IC-01 SZ-01 DA-01
/075 A1 JS

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 EB-00 H-01
MHO-01 IO-17 NSAE-00 COME-00 L-03 PM-10 PA-02
EPAE-04 OCS-06 CA-02 SIG-03 OES-09 ACDA-12 SP-02
DOEE-00 NRC-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 /095 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/P: AHUMPHREY
APPROVED BY: EUR/P: DJDONCHI
PA/PRESS: ASTOCKMAN

-----364221 010257Z /70

O 010215Z MAY 86 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
AMCONSUL MUNICH IMMEDIATE
USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO US ELEMENT LIVE OAK IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 135824

INFORM CONSULS, FOR PAOS, PASS TO NSC FOR HINCKLEY

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE 4/30/86.

1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED FOR USE BY THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON ON APRIL 30, 1986. ALL OF THE GUIDANCES WERE USED IN THE BRIEFING TODAY.

2. SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER

Q: WHAT HAS BEEN THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND OUR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE CHERNOBYL ATOMIC ENERGY STATION ACCIDENT?

A: - IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE INDICATED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION AND REQUESTED DETAILS REGARDING THE SCALE AND NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED US WITH PRELIMINARY INFORMATION WHICH PARALLELS THAT AVAILABLE IN THE SOVIET MEDIA. WE ARE, HOWEVER, AWAITING A FORMAL RESPONSE TO OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

3. USSR: WELFARE/WHEREABOUTS OF AMCITS

Q: DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE AN ACCOUNTING OF THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE KIEV AREA?

A: -- WHILE THE EMBASSY DOES NOT YET HAVE AN EXACT COUNT OF THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE KIEV AREA, IT IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO IDENTIFY AND CONTACT THEM. THE EMBASSY HAS ESTABLISHED REGULAR CONTACT WITH A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS THERE, ADVISING THEM OF THE DEPARTMENT'S TRAVEL ADVISORY, PASSING REQUESTS AND MESSAGES FROM THEIR RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES AND FROM THE DEPARTMENT, AND RELAYING THEIR RESPONSES. ALL AMERICANS CONTACTED THUS FAR REPORT THAT THEY ARE FINE AND THE SITUATION IS NORMAL.

-- WE ARE AWARE OF NO LONG TERM RESIDENTS IN THE KIEV AREA, AND HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY USIA THAT THERE ARE NO AMERICAN EXCHANGE STUDENTS THERE IN ANY OF ITS PROGRAMS.

Q: ARE THERE ANY PLANS TO EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM KIEV?

A: -- THERE ARE NO PLANS AT THIS TIME TO UNDERTAKE SUCH AN EVACUATION. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IF THE NEED SHOULD ARISE. AN INTOURIST STUDENT GROUP THERE WHICH HAS AMERICAN MEMBERS IS PLANNING TO LEAVE EARLY. THE EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED INTOURIST IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD TO ASSIST AMERICAN TRAVELLERS IN MAKING CHANGES IN THEIR TRAVEL PLANS TO AVOID KIEV AND RETURN TO THE U.S. EARLY IF THEY WISH. THE EMBASSY ADVISES US THAT MOST OF THOSE WHO HAVE REQUESTED SUCH CHANGES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING THEM.

Q: HAS INTOURIST PROVIDED A COUNT OF AMERICANS IN KIEV?

A: -- THE EMBASSY IS IN CONTACT WITH INTOURIST FOR ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE KIEV AREA.

Q: WHAT ADVICE IS THE DEPARTMENT GIVING TO AMERICANS ELSEWHERE IN THE SOVIET UNION?

A: -- THE EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE SAFETY OF AIR AND WATER IN THE KIEV AREA. YESTERDAY WE REQUESTED THE SOVIETS TO PROVIDE ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION ON THE ACCIDENT. WE ARE AWAITING THEIR RESPONSES. MEANWHILE, WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES.

4. USSR: NUCLEAR INCIDENT AND SOVIET INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Q: WHAT ARE THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO INFORM OTHER PEOPLES OR COUNTRIES OF SUCH AN INCIDENT?

A: -- WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOTIFY OTHER STATES OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS OF THE INCIDENT AND TO FURNISH THEM WITH THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THESE EFFECTS.

-- WHILE THERE ARE NO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PER SE, IT IS A PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT AN INCIDENT LIKELY TO HAVE TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND IN A TIMELY FASHION.

Q: WHAT KIND OF INTERNATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM EXISTS?

A: -- THERE IS AN INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM THAT IS COORDINATED THROUGH THE PARIS-BASED OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, BUT THIS ONLY INCLUDES OECD MEMBERS (WESTERN EUROPE, U.S., CANADA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM 46

PAGE 02 OF 10 STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

ZEALAND). THE NEA HAS AGREEMENTS TO EXCHANGE DATA WITH THE VIENNA-BASED INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OF WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS A MEMBER. HOWEVER, SOVIET -ESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR TIMELY INFORMATION HAVE NOT BEEN GOOD IN THE PAST.

Q: WHAT IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THIS COORDINATING PROCESS WITH THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.

A: THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH (EPA) ADMINISTRATOR THOMAS IN COORDINATING OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION ON THE ISSUE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, JOHN NEGROPONTE HAS SET UP AN INFORMAL WORKING GROUP THAT MEETS DAILY TO MONITOR THE SITUATION AND MAINTAIN DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH OUR OVERSEAS POSTS.

Q: IS THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF SOVIET NUCLEAR FACILITIES OPEN FOR INSPECTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY?

A: -- THE IAEA INSPECTION SYSTEM EXAMINES SAFEGUARDS FOR THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR NON-PROLIFERATION PURPOSES, NOT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY PURPOSES. HAVING MADE THAT POINT, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS REACTOR WAS INCLUDED IN THEIR OFFER OF FACILITIES, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW AT THIS TIME IF IT HAS BEEN INSPECTED.

5. USSR: TRAVEL ADVISORY FOR THE KIEV AREA

-- A SOVIET GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS INDICATED THAT DUE TO THE RECENT ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL POWER PLANT, TRAVEL TO KIEV MAY BE DANGEROUS. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THEREFORE ADVISES THAT TRAVEL TO THAT CITY AND ADJACENT AREAS IS NOT RECOMMENDED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

6. USSR: WELFARE OF AMERICANS (TAKEN QUESTION)

Q: HOW MANY U.S. CITIZENS ARE IN THE AFFECTED AREA

A: -- WE DO NOT HAVE A COUNT OF THE AMERICANS IN THE KIEV AREA, SINCE TOURISTS ARE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT OR THE U.S. EMBASSY OF THEIR WHEREABOUTS.

-- EMBASSY MOSCOW HAS NO REPORTS OF AMERICANS AFFECTED BY THE ACCIDENT. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REQUESTS FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, EVACUATION OR OTHER ASSISTANCE BY AMERICANS IN THE USSR.

7. FOLLOWING IS AN EDITED TEXT OF THE EPA CHAIRED BRIEFING HELD AT 11:00 A.M. APRIL 30 AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

MODERATOR: YESTERDAY, AS MANY OF YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED A TASK FORCE REGARDING THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. EPA ADMINISTRATOR LEE THOMAS HAS BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE GROUP. TODAY, HE AND MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE WILL MAKE A PRESENTATION WITH REGARD TO WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THOSE MATTERS. AND AFTER THAT PRESENTATION, WE'LL BE HAPPY TO ENTERTAIN YOUR QUESTIONS.

MR. THOMAS: I AM LEE THOMAS, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND HERE TODAY AS THE CHAIRMAN OF AN INTERAGENCY TASK GROUP WORKING TO REVIEW AND RESPOND TO THE SITUATION THAT'S OCCURRED IN THE

SOVIET UNION.

I HAVE WITH ME, IN ORDER FROM MY IMMEDIATE LEFT DOWN, HAROLD DENTON, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WITH THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION; DR. LESTER MACHTA, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF AIR RESOURCES LABORATORY WITH THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION; SHELDON MEYERS -- SHELDON, IF YOU WOULD CHANGE PLACES WITH DALE BUNCH -- SHELDON MEYERS, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS WITH THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; AND DALE BUNCH, WHO IS THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR REACTOR DEPLOYMENT WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. THESE GENTLEMEN ALL REPRESENT AGENCIES THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THIS TASK GROUP.

WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO DO IN THIS BRIEFING THIS MORNING IS BOTH EXPLAIN THE PROCESS WE WILL USE FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION WITH THIS TASK GROUP WHICH WE WILL TRY TO HAVE ON A TIMELY AND CONTINUING UP-DATED BASIS, AT LEAST DAILY. ALSO TO EXPLAIN TO YOU WHAT WE KNOW TODAY ABOUT THE EVENT AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT, AND THEN RESPOND TO QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE.

IT'S DIFFICULT TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ON MANY ISSUES BECAUSE OF THE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION AND DATA GAPS THAT WE HAVE THIS MORNING. I THINK WE CAN DRAW SOME CONCLUSIONS BUT IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTIONS, DON'T BE FRUSTRATED IF WE CAN'T DRAW COMPLETE CONCLUSIONS AT THIS POINT. BUT, HOPEFULLY, OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS, AS INFORMATION COMES IN, BETTER ANALYSIS IS PERFORMED, THOSE CONCLUSIONS WILL BECOME FIRMER AND MORE EXPANSIVE.

WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS GIVE YOU A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF WHAT WE KNOW, AND THEN I'D LIKE FOR EACH OF THREE OF THESE EXPERTS TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF TECHNICAL PRESENTATION. THEN I'D LIKE TO OPEN IT UP FOR QUESTIONS.

WE KNOW THAT A MAJOR ACCIDENT OCCURRED AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR FACILITY. WE KNOW THAT THAT MAJOR ACCIDENT RESULTED IN AN EXPLOSION AND MAJOR DAMAGE TO UNIT 4 AT THAT FACILITY. WE KNOW THAT A FIRE OCCURRED, AND THAT WE HAVE A CONTINUING FIRE AT THAT FACILITY AND THAT WE HAVE DAMAGE AND THE FIRE AT THAT ONE UNIT.

WE KNOW THAT AS THE FIRE CONTINUES, WE DO HAVE CONTINUING EMISSIONS, RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS, BUT THEY WOULD BE DIMINISHED RELEASES OVER TIME FROM THE INITIAL EMISSION RELEASE.

WE KNOW THAT AS FAR AS METEOROLOGY IS CONCERNED, AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT THE EMISSIONS WOULD HAVE MOVED -- AIRBORNE -- NORTHWEST. WE KNOW FROM THE TENTATIVE READINGS THAT HAVE OCCURRED, THE ELEVATIONS THAT HAD BEEN DETECTED IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, SPECIFICALLY SWEDEN, WE WOULD BACK CALCULATE THE EVENT TO SATURDAY.

WE KNOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES IN WIND CONDITIONS AND METEOROLOGY SINCE THE EVENT, WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT IN ADDITION TO THE MOVEMENT NORTHWEST, WE ALSO WOULD HAVE MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH, AS WELL AS TO THE EAST. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT DISPERSION BECAUSE OF THE METEOROLOGY, AND WE'RE ABLE TO PREDICT, TO SOME DEGREE, WHAT THAT MEANS AS FAR AS DISPERSION PATTERNS ARE CONCERNED.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

47

PAGE 03 OF 10 STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

WE ALSO KNOW THAT AS FAR AS MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES, THAT WE ARE NOT AT A POINT WHERE WE WOULD FEEL THERE ARE ANY HEALTH OR ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM THIS EVENT. WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE ELEVATED READINGS FROM SWEDEN INDICATE VERY LOW DEPOSITION OR FALLOUT AT THIS POINT, IN TIME, WITH VERY SMALL MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES AS FAR AS THOSE READINGS ARE CONCERNED.

TO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION, TECHNICAL INFORMATION, QUICKLY TO FILL IN ON THOSE POINTS, I'M GOING TO ASK, FIRST, HAROLD DENTON, IF HE WOULD REVIEW FOR YOU THE FACILITY ITSELF AND WHAT WE FEEL OCCURRED AT THAT FACILITY, AND, TECHNICALLY, WHAT WE THINK IS OCCURRING AT THIS POINT.

WE HAVE, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, I'M SURE, FOR YOU TO SEE, UNLESS WE COULD GET THE LIGHTS TURNED OUT, AN OVERVIEW WHICH IS A SCHEMATIC OF THE FACILITY ITSELF. IF WE CAN'T TURN THE LIGHTS OUT, THEN HAROLD WILL GO THROUGH A DISCUSSION WITHOUT THAT OVERVIEW, BUT WE DO HAVE THAT AVAILABLE.

HAROLD.

MR. DENTON: AS HAS BEEN SAID, THE INFORMATION IS RATHER SKETCHY SO YOU SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER I SAY TODAY

AS BEING PRELIMINARY.

THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN UNIT NO. 4 AT CHERNOBYL. THERE ARE THREE OTHER PLANTS ON THE SAME SITE. THIS PLANT BEGAN OPERATION IN 1983. AND JUST BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, THERE ARE ABOUT 14 OTHER SIMILAR PLANTS OPERATING IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THERE'S ONE OTHER PLANT OPERATING THAT'S EVEN BIGGER THAN THIS ONE.

IT'S QUITE DIFFERENT THAN U.S. DESIGNS. IT'S WHAT WE CALL A GRAPHITE-MODERATED DESIGN. AND IF WE COULD SEE, IF THIS COULD BE SEEN -- MAYBE IF WE TURN DOWN THE LIGHTS A BIT IN THE AUDITORIUM, PERHAPS WE COULD SEE THE SLIDE.

MR. THOMAS: COULD WE TURN THE LIGHTS FOR MAYBE ONE MINUTE AND THEN WE COULD TURN THEM BACK UP JUST SO YOU COULD GET A VIEW OF WHAT THE FACILITY LOOKS LIKE. IT'LL GIVE YOU A PICTURE OF IT.

MR. DENTON: I GUESS WE'LL GO WITHOUT.

MR. THOMAS: I GUESS WE'LL GO WITHOUT.

MR. DENTON: MAYBE WE CAN PASS OUT SOME COPIES OF THIS SLIDE LATER. WHAT IT SHOWS IS THAT THIS IS A VERY LARGE, IN PHYSICAL DIMENSION, PLANT. WHAT I WANTED TO FOCUS ON WAS THE REACTOR CORE PART.

THE REACTOR CORE IS A LARGE BLOCK OF GRAPHITE. THERE ARE ABOUT A THOUSAND TONS OF GRAPHITE THAT COMPOSE THE REACTOR CORE. AS YOU KNOW, U.S. PLANTS ARE BASED ON A LIGHT-WATER REACTOR DESIGN; THEY ARE ENCASED IN A REACTOR VESSEL AND THEY USE WATER AS BOTH A MODERATOR AND COOLANT. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION, AS YOU'LL LEARN.

WITHIN THESE BLOCKS THERE ARE PRESSURE TUBES. THESE PRESSURE TUBES ARE ABOUT 3-1/2 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND WITHIN EACH PRESSURE TUBE IS A CLUSTER OF FUEL RODS. I THINK THERE ARE ABOUT 16 FUEL RODS PER CLUSTER. SO COOLING WATER FOR THIS REACTOR GOES THROUGH THESE

PRESSURE TUBES. IT BOILS IN THE LOWER HALF OF THE PRESSURE TUBE AND THEN GOES DIRECTLY TO THE TURBINES. SO, IN A SENSE, IT'S A DIRECT CYCLE, PRESSURE-TUBE REACTOR AND IT'S UNIQUE TO THE RUSSIANS. THEY DESIGNED IT, AND I DON'T THINK IT'S BEEN BUILT OUTSIDE THEIR AREA.

WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT THE INITIATING EVENT WAS. BUT IT'S QUITE CLEAR THAT WHATEVER HAPPENED CAUSED THE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT IN THIS PLANT. THE FUEL WAS COOLING, THE CORE BEGAN TO HEAT UP, FUEL-MELTING BEGAN TO OCCUR. AS WATER AND STEAM GOT TO THE FUEL, THERE WAS A REACTION BETWEEN THE STEAM AND THE CLADDING; THE CLADDING IS ZIRCONIUM, THE TUBING IS ZIRCONIUM. THIS LED TO METAL WATER REACTIONS. THE CLADDING OF THE PRESSURE TUBE FAILED AND STEAM BEGAN TO ATTACK THE GRAPHITE. GRAPHITE WILL REACT WITH WATER AND PRODUCE HYDROGEN AND CARBON MONOXIDE, AND SOME OTHER COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS.

THERE'S EVERY INDICATION THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CLADDING AND THE GRAPHITE AND THE STEAM AND AIR, A VIOLENT EXPLOSION OCCURRED INSIDE THE REACTOR CORE. THIS EXPLOSION LED TO BREACHING THE CONTAINMENT AND DISPERSAL OF CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF FISSION PRODUCTS.

YOU MAY RECALL AT TMI WE HAD A VERY LARGE CONTAINMENT THERE. ESSENTIALLY, ALL THE FISSION PRODUCTS STAYED WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT.

I THINK THE CONTAINMENT IS CERTAINLY BREACHED. A FIRE FOLLOWED THE EXPLOSION. I WOULD EXPECT THAT TODAY THE CHARCOAL IS STILL BURNING; IT'S PROBABLY BURNING FROM THE TOP DOWN. THERE'S STILL VERY HIGH TEMPERATURES EXISTING IN THE CORE. RADIATION LEVELS WITHIN THE PLANT ITSELF ARE SO VERY HIGH THAT I WOULD EXPECT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO TAKE ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION THERE.

I THINK I'LL STOP HERE AND THEN TURN TO THE NEXT SPEAKER AND LET HIM DISCUSS THE DISPERSION OF THE FISSION PRODUCTS THAT PROBABLY OCCURRED.

MR. THOMAS: THANK YOU, HAROLD. I'M GOING TO ASK LESTER MACHTA FROM NOAA IF HE WOULD DEFINE THE METEOROLOGY, AS WE KNEW IT, WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED.

LESTER.

MR. MACHTA: WHEN THE FIRST EVENT OCCURRED, THE MATERIAL WENT TOWARD THE NORTHWEST AND CAME TO SOMEWHAT OF A STOP BECAUSE OF VERY LIGHT WINDS IN NORTH CENTRAL SCANDINAVIA. AT THIS POINT, WE THINK IT'S BEGINNING TO DRIFT EASTWARD AND SOUTHEASTWARD RATHER SLOWLY.

THE LATER MATERIAL THAT MAY HAVE BEEN RELEASED, IF ANY WAS, WAS CARRIED, FIRST, TOWARD THE WEST -- A CORRECTION -- FIRST TOWARD THE EAST AND THEN SOUTH AND THEN TOWARD THE WEST. SO SOME OF THE REPORTS SAY RADIATION THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FOUND IN AUSTRIA OR TO THE WEST OF CHERNOBYL PROBABLY CAME FROM LATER RELEASES FROM THE ACCIDENT.

THE COVERAGE OF THE RADIOACTIVE CLOUD IS REALLY QUITE LARGE, WE THINK, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE IN THE MOVEMENT OF POLLUTION. SO THAT, SAY, FROM THE INITIAL EVENT, OUR GUESS WOULD BE THAT IT'S COVERING PROBABLY A GOOD PART OF EASTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE; PROBABLY THE NORTHWESTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND MAY EXTEND

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 04 OF 10 STATE 135824
WELL INTO THE ARCTIC BASIN.

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

48

AS WELL.

WE DON'T YET KNOW WHAT THE DISPERSION IS FROM THE MORE RECENT RELEASES THAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED.

I THINK AT THIS POINT PERHAPS WE CAN STOP. I MIGHT MENTION THAT THE WAY IN WHICH WE'RE DETERMINING THE PATHS OF THE MATERIAL IS NOT BY ACTUAL MEASUREMENTS OF THE RADIOACTIVITY. WHAT WE'RE DOING IS USING OBSERVED CONVENTIONAL WINDS THAT ARE REPORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CARRYING THE MATERIAL AT ABOUT 5,000 FEET ABOVE THE GROUND.

THANK YOU.

MR. THOMAS: WE ASK SHELDON MEYERS IF HE WOULD GIVE US A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FROM WHAT WE KNOW AT THIS POINT IN THE VICINITY OF THE INCIDENT.

SHELDON.

MR. MEYERS: I WANT TO EMPHASIZE WHAT LEE SAID EARLIER, THAT WE HAVE VERY LIMITED DATA. BUT BASED UPON THE DATA THAT WE DO HAVE, WE DON'T EXPECT THAT IF THAT PLUME REACHES THE U.S. THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY SIGNIFICANT HEALTH EFFECT ON THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES. THAT IS BASED UPON A NUMBER OF ASSUMPTIONS THAT WE'VE MADE, BASED UPON EXPERIENCE WITH FALLOUT CONDITIONS MOSTLY FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING IN THE PAST.

THAT IS, THE LARGER PARTICLES GENERALLY TEND TO PRECIPITATE OUT WITHIN A HUNDRED MILES OF THE SOURCE. GENERALLY, AS A PLUME MOVES THROUGH THE ATMOSPHERE,

THERE IS PRECIPITATION WHICH FURTHER REMOVES SOME OF THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. AND, LASTLY, IT WAS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF DILUTION THAT TAKES PLACE AS THE PLUME PASSES OVERHEAD.

THERE WAS MENTION OF THE SWEDISH DATA. WE HAVE LIMITED INFORMATION FROM THEM, AND IT APPEARS THAT THEIR BACKGROUND LEVEL HAS BEEN EXCEEDED BY ABOUT ONE MILLIREM OVER THE SEVERAL DAYS THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN THOSE MEASUREMENTS. AND TO PUT THAT IN CONTEXT IN THIS COUNTRY, THE AVERAGE BACKGROUND LEVEL DUE TO ALL SOURCES, NATURAL AND OTHERWISE, IS ABOUT 90 TO A 100 MILLIREM PER YEAR.

SO WE THINK THAT IF AND WHEN IT WILL EVENTUALLY GET HERE, IT WILL BE HARDLY MEASURABLE AND RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT.

EPA DOES OPERATE WHAT WE CALL THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM -- ERAMS -- AND THAT SYSTEM IS IN PLACE AROUND THE COUNTRY IN ALL 50 STATES. IT WILL BE THE FIRST INDICATOR OF ANYTHING COMING IN IN THE WAY OF INCREASES OVER OUR NORMAL LEVELS. WE'VE ACCELERATED THE MEASUREMENTS OF PARTICULATES FROM TWICE A WEEK TO DAILY SO THAT WE'LL GET A VERY QUICK RESPONSE IF ANYTHING DOES COME IN; AND IF WE DO GET ANY INDICATION AT ALL, WE'LL SPEED UP THE MEASUREMENTS OF THE OTHER KINDS OF MEDIA THAT WE DO MEASURE.

IN ADDITION TO PARTICULATES, WE MEASURE SURFACE WATER, DRINKING WATER AND MILK SAMPLES. RIGHT NOW THOSE ARE ON THEIR NORMAL SCALE, BUT IF ANYTHING UNTOWARD SEEMS TO BE COMING ALONG, WE'LL INCREASE THOSE MEASUREMENTS

THANK YOU.

MR. THOMAS: THE PROCESS WILL BE FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM ALL U.S. SOURCES, INPUT FROM INTERNATIONAL SOURCES. TO CONTINUE TO UPDATE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU JUST HEARD, WE WILL HAVE A DAILY PROCESS FOR PROVIDING THAT INFORMATION TO YOU -- ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR CONCLUSIONS THAT WE'RE ABLE TO DRAW, OR (TO) RESPOND TO QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

WITH THAT, THEN, BRIEF OVERVIEW, WHY DON'T I OPEN IT UP AND SEE IF WE CAN RESPOND TO SPECIFIC ISSUES IN

QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE.

Q: THIS IS TO MR. DENTON. YOU SAID THIS WAS BASICALLY A LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT. COULD YOU JUST TAKE US THROUGH THAT SCENARIO YOU DESCRIBED SLOWLY AGAIN AND STEP-BY-STEP AND DESCRIBE THIS LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT?

MR. DENTON: I DON'T REALLY KNOW THE INITIATING EVENT. UNDER NORMAL OPERATION, EACH PRESSURE TUBE IS FED WITH WATER. THERE ARE SOME 16,000 INDIVIDUAL PRESSURE TUBES. EACH PRESSURE TUBE HAS ITS OWN SOURCE OF WATER. WATER BOILS IN THESE PRESSURE TUBES, TURNS TO STEAM AND THEN EVENTUALLY DRIVES THE TURBINE. SO WE DON'T KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE INITIAL UPSET.

ONE UNIQUE FEATURE OF THIS PLANT ALSO IS IT REFUELS ON-LINE, SO THERE IS A REFUELING MACHINE WHICH IS ABLE TO PUT FUEL ELEMENTS IN AND TAKE FUEL ASSEMBLIES OUT WHILE THE PLANT IS OPERATING AT FULL POWER.

SOMETHING OBVIOUSLY OCCURRED. IT COULD HAVE BEEN A PIPE BREAK, IT COULD HAVE BEEN A MALFUNCTION OF THE REFUELING MACHINE, IT COULD HAVE BEEN A LOST OF ELECTRICAL POWER OR CONTROL. SOMETHING LED TO LOSS OF COOLING IN ONE OR MORE CHANNELS. BASED ON THE SEVERITY OF THE ACCIDENT AND THE SORT OF MEASUREMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, THIS LED, THEN, TO UNDERCOOLING OF A LARGE NUMBER OF CHANNELS. THE FUEL OBVIOUSLY HEATED UP IN A LARGE NUMBER; FUEL MELTING BEGAN, METAL WATER REACTIONS BEGAN, THESE PRESSURE TUBES LOST THEIR INTEGRITY AS A RESULT OF INTERACTING WITH THE VERY HOT STEAM. THE GRAPHITE REACTS WITH THE HOT STEAM, IT PRODUCES HYDROGEN AND CARBON MONOXIDE. THESE ARE COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS.

MY SPECULATION IS THAT THESE COMBUSTION PRODUCTS EVENTUALLY LED TO A CHEMICAL EXPLOSION WITHIN THE CORE ITSELF. THIS PROVIDED A WAY FOR AIR TO GET IN THE CORE. AND ONE WAY TO THINK ABOUT THIS IS, THINK OF IT AS A GIANT COAL PILE THAT'S BURNING BUT WITH AN INTENSE HEAT SOURCE ONLY INSIDE. BUT THE INITIATING EVENT IS UNKNOWN.

Q: HOW LONG WOULD THIS HAVE TAKEN FROM FIRST INDICATIONS OF LOSS OF COOLANT TO THE EXPLOSION AND THEN THE FIRE? HOW LONG WOULD IT HAVE TAKEN? CAN YOU GIVE US SOME TIME PHASEMENT?

MR. DENTON: FOR ANY ONE CHANNEL, IF YOU LOSE COOLING

IN ONE CHANNEL, YOU CAN GET FUEL DAMAGE VERY QUICKLY. I WOULD THINK IN A MATTER OF MINUTES. BUT WHETHER THIS STARTED AS ONE CHANNEL OR WHETHER IT WAS A TOTAL LOSS OF FLOW TO THE REACTOR CORE ALL AT ONCE, I HAVE NO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 05 OF 10 STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606 : 49

INFORMATION ON THAT; OR WHETHER IT WAS RELATED TO THE REFUELING MACHINE.

YOU MAY RECALL THAT THERE'S ONE PLANT SOMEWHAT SIMILAR TO THIS CALLED WINDSCALE THAT ABOUT 30 YEARS AGO HAD A PROBLEM, AND IT WAS RELATED SOMEWHAT TO THE ON-LINE REFUELING.

Q: THERE IS SOME INFORMATION TODAY THAT PERHAPS THE SECOND REACTOR AT THIS SAME LOCATION MAY BE SOMEHOW INVOLVED, MAY BE SOMEHOW GOING THROUGH A MELTDOWN. WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THAT?

MR. THOMAS: WE DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT INDICATES THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH A SECOND REACTOR AT THIS FACILITY. THERE ARE FOUR REACTORS THERE, AS YOU KNOW. THEY ARE IN FAIRLY CLOSE PROXIMITY, UNIT 3 AND UNIT 4, UNIT 4 BEING THE ONE WHERE THERE WAS THE PROBLEM. SO THERE IS CONJECTURE ABOUT WHETHER THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITH UNIT 3. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THE DESIGN OF THIS FACILITY ALSO INCLUDES SOME JOINT OPERATION OF THOSE TWO UNITS FROM A COMMON CONTROL AREA, AGAIN LEADING TO CONJECTURE ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OF PROBLEMS AT THE OTHER UNIT.

BUT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION AT THIS POINT THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS AT THE OTHER UNIT.

Q: I WOULD LIKE TO PUT THE QUESTION TO DR. DENTON. COULD YOU GIVE US A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT YOU THINK MIGHT BE GOING ON AT THIS REACTOR SITE NOW AND THE ENVIRONMENT IMMEDIATELY AROUND IT? AND ARE YOU AT ALL CONCERNED THAT THESE OTHER PLANTS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT IN EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN MIGHT BE IN DANGER OF BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT ITSELF?

MR. DENTON: WE'VE BEEN TOLD, I BELIEVE, THAT THE OTHER THREE UNITS WERE SHUT DOWN AT ABOUT THE TIME THE TROUBLES IN UNIT 4 OCCURRED. I GUESS I THINK THAT THERE'S PROBABLY STILL FIRE GOING ON IN THE UPPER PART OF THE REACTOR GRAPHITE BLOCK INVOLVING THE GRAPHITE AND THE FUEL; THAT THIS IS BURNING ITS WAY DOWN THROUGH THE ROUGHLY 20 FEET OR SO OF GRAPHITE, AND THAT THE RADIATION LEVELS NEARBY ARE VERY HIGH. SO I THINK THAT THERE'S PROBABLY BEEN AN EVACUATION FROM THE CONTROL

ROOM OF UNIT 3, FOR EXAMPLE, BUT WITH THE EQUIPMENT LEFT RUNNING TO KEEP IT COOL.

SO I WOULD THINK THAT THIS ACCIDENT, PER SE, WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN ACCIDENT IN ONE, TWO OR THREE. ASSUMING THE EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE THERE, I WOULDN'T EXPECT THAT THE SPREAD -- I GUESS THERE COULD BE A POTENTIAL FOR CONVENTIONAL FIRES TO SPREAD, AND THAT'S PROBABLY OF CONCERN.

MR. THOMAS: WE HAVE A QUESTION RIGHT OVER HERE.

Q: HOW CERTAIN ARE YOU, THEN, THAT A MELTDOWN ACTUALLY OCCURRED? AND IF IT DID OCCUR, WHY DIDN'T THE CHINA SYNDROME SITUATION DEVELOP?

MR. DENTON: THIS PLANT DOESN'T HAVE WATER WHICH BOILS DRY. WHEN WE USE THAT WORD, WE THINK OF A MELTDOWN THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY COOLING, IT'S 200 TONS OF FUEL THAT MELT DOWN AS A GLOB AND MELT THROUGH THE REACTOR VESSEL. THIS WAS SURROUNDED BY, AS I SAID, A THOUSAND TONS OF GRAPHITE. SO, IN A SENSE, TO COIN A NEW WORD, YOU COULD CALL THIS A "BURN-UP" RATHER THAN A CORE JUST BY ITSELF.

MR. THOMAS: YES, RIGHT HERE.

Q: BASED ON WHAT YOU KNOW OF THE ACCIDENT, DO YOU FIND IT CREDIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT ONLY TWO WERE KILLED? WOULD THAT BE MR. MEYERS TO ANSWER THAT?

MR. THOMAS: WE REALLY -- AND, SHELDON, YOU MAY WANT TO FILL IN BEHIND ME -- BUT WE DON'T HAVE, I THINK, ENOUGH INFORMATION ON BOTH WHAT OCCURRED, THE EXTENT OF THE RELEASE TO DRAW -- THE EXTENT OF ACTION THAT WERE TAKEN OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. IN OTHER WORDS, AS HAROLD DENTON MENTIONED, INCONCLUSIVE INFORMATION ON HOW LONG THE PROBLEM WAS WORKED BEFORE THERE WAS AN EXPLOSION -- WHAT ACTION MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME, SUCH AS EVACUATION OF THE WORK AREA ITSELF OR SURROUNDING AREAS, TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CASUALTIES. SO I THINK IT WOULD BE CONJECTURE THAT WE'RE NOT PREPARED, BASED ON THE DATA WE HAVE TO DATE, TO MAKE, TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CASUALTIES OR INJURIES.

Q: IS IT POSSIBLE IT COULD BE ONLY TWO, OR IS THAT PREPOSTEROUSLY LOW? OTHER REPORTS HAVE SUGGESTED THERE MAY BE THOUSANDS KILLED.

MR. THOMAS: I JUST CAN'T CONJECTURE A GUESS AS TO WHAT IT COULD BE, AND I THINK THE REASON YOU'VE GOT SUCH TREMENDOUS RANGES BEING GIVEN BY PEOPLE IS THE VERY LACK OF DATA AS TO NOT ONLY WHAT OCCURRED, BUT OVER WHAT PERIOD OF TIME AND WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME.

YES, BACK HERE.

Q: CAN YOU PROBABLY REFER TO MR. MACHTA ANY INFORMATION ON WHAT THAT COULD MEAN TO SOVIET AGRICULTURE, AND HENCE, TO WORLD AGRICULTURE, THAT THIS CLOUD SHIFTS OVER A (INAUDIBLE) AREA?

MR. THOMAS: MAYBE WE OUGHT TO ASK LESTER TO FIRST TALK ABOUT THE METEOROLOGY AND THEN SHELDON TALK ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THAT KIND OF IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE.

LESTER.

MR. MACHTA: ACCORDING TO OUR ESTIMATES OF WHERE THE RADIO ACTIVITY MAY HAVE MOVED, IT WOULD HAVE MOVED OVER THE WESTERN PART OF RUSSIA, WHICH IS AN AGRICULTURAL AREA. IT'S NOW, WE THINK, MOVING BACK OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES CONCERN, I'LL HAVE TO DEFER TO SHELDON.

MR. MEYERS: AGAIN, BASED UPON LIMITED DATA, IT IS POSSIBLE, DEPENDING UPON THE PLUME, IF SOME RADIO-ACTIVE MATERIAL WERE DEPOSITED ON GRAZING LAND, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HAD COWS, AND THE COWS ATE THE GRASS AND PRODUCED SOME MILK, THAT MILK WOULD PROBABLY BE CONTAMINATED. IT'S NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT IT WOULD BE TO A WHEAT CROP, FOR EXAMPLE. IT WOULD STRONGLY DEPEND UPON HOW IT WAS DEPOSITED, WHETHER IT RAINED, WHETHER THE GROWING SEASON WAS NEARLY COMPLETE. IF IT WERE THE KIND OF SETUP WHERE THE WHEAT WAS FULLY GROWN, FOR EXAMPLE, IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THE CROP MIGHT NOT BE DAMAGED -- UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME.

MR. THOMAS: YES, RIGHT HERE.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 06 OF 10 STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606 : 50

Q: CAN YOU TELL US, WAS THIS PLANT ONE OF THE ONES THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO OPEN TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AS TO SAFEGUARDS? AND IF SO, HAVE ANY U.S. OR IAEA INSPECTORS RECENTLY VISITED THIS PLANT?

MR. THOMAS: I DON'T HAVE THAT INFORMATION FOR YOU TODAY. I WOULD INDICATE THAT AT THE NORMAL STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING, WHICH I BELIEVE IS GENERALLY SCHEDULED FOR AROUND L2 OR L2:L5, THERE WILL BE MORE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE ONE YOU JUST ASKED ABOUT.

YES.

Q MR. DENTON, PLEASE, SUPPOSING THERE WERE A PARTIAL MELTDOWN OR WORSE AT ONE OF YOUR SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS, OR THE ONE AT HANFORD, WASHINGTON, WHICH I UNDERSTAND DO NOT HAVE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS -- I KNOW YOU DON'T THINK A PARTIAL MELTDOWN IS LIKELY, BUT SUPPOSING THERE WERE -- WHERE WOULD THE RADIATION GO?

MR. DENTON: I THINK WE HAVE A MEMBER HERE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. LET ME HAVE HIM RESPOND TO IT.

MR. THOMAS: YES.

BOTH OF THOSE FACILITIES YOU WERE DISCUSSING ARE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES. LET ME ASK DALE BUNCH IF HE'LL RESPOND TO THAT.

MR. BUNCH (DOE): I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE SAVANNAH RIVER REACTORS ARE NOT GRAPHITE REACTORS, AS THE PLANT AT CHERNOBYL. THERE IS A PRODUCTION REACTOR AT HANFORD, WASHINGTON. IT'S QUITE DISSIMILAR FROM THE FACILITY IN RUSSIA; IT BEARS NO RESEMBLANCE TO IT AT ALL. IT HAS BOTH SPECIAL SAFETY SYSTEMS TO SHUT DOWN THE REACTOR BEFORE YOU GET OVERHEATING OF THE GRAPHITE, AND IT HAS SYSTEMS --

Q COULD I JUST INTERRUPT FOR A SECOND? WE KNOW ABOUT THE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND TMI HAD THEM, TOO. IF THERE WERE SOME SORT OF MELTDOWN AT ONE OF THESE PLANTS, SAVANNAH RIVER OR HENFORD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY'RE WHITE-WATER REACTORS OR GRAPHITE REACTORS, OR WHATEVER, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE RADIATION, SINCE THEY DON'T, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, HAVE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS?

MR. BUNCH (DOE): THE POINT I WAS GETTING TO, SIR, IS -- IN FACT, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN WHAT HAPPENED AT CHERNOBYL AND TMI. THE RADIATION WAS LARGELY CONTAINED IN TMI BECAUSE OF THE VERY ROBUST SYSTEMS IN THE PLANT TO KEEP THE RADIATION INSIDE THE FACILITY. AT THE

PRODUCTION REACTOR AT HANFORD, WE HAVE A SPECIAL CONFINEMENT SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY DEvised TO HANDLE SEVERE ACCIDENTS, INCLUDING SUCH THINGS AS DELUGE-WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS TO KEEP THE BUILDING COOL SO THE GRAPHITE DOESN'T OVERHEAT AND SPECIAL FILTERS TO REMOVE FISSION PRODUCTS EVEN SHOULD YOU GET A BURNING EVENT.

Q: COULD YOU TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS AND WHY THEY DO NOT HAVE CONTAINMENTS? AND WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY WOULD HAVE AN ACCIDENT?

MR. BUNCH (DOE): I'M, PERSONALLY, NOT REAL FAMILIAR WITH THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS. THEY ARE PRODUCTION FACILITIES; THEY HAVE CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS; THE CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS HAVE SPECIAL FILTRATION DEVICES TO PROTECT AGAINST THE ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF FISSION

PRODUCTS, EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A SEVERE ACCIDENT. SO THAT THE PURPOSE OF A CONFINEMENT IS BASICALLY TO MAKE SURE THAT IF THERE IS AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE, IT'S DIRECTED TO A BANK OF FILTERS WHICH FILTER OUT ALL, OR ESSENTIALLY ALL THE HARMFUL MATERIALS.

Q: BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE CONFINEMENTS?

MR. BUNCH: THEY DO HAVE CONFINEMENTS.

Q (INAUDIBLE)

MR. BUNCH: THAT'S CORRECT.

Q: THEY DO NOT.

A: THEY DO NOT.

MR. THOMAS: WE HAVE A QUESTION RIGHT HERE.

Q: THIS IS A QUESTION FOR MR. MACHTA: JUST GOING BY EXPERIENCE ON HOW THESE CLOUDS DRIFT, CAN YOU TELL US IF THE PLUME REACHES THE U.S., WHAT THE LOGICAL ROUTE FOR REACHING THE U.S. WOULD BE AND ABOUT WHAT THE TIME FRAME MIGHT BE?

MR. MACHTA: IN TERMS OF THE TIME FRAME, I THINK IT IS VERY MANY DAYS FROM NOW THAT THE BULK OF THE MATERIAL WOULD ARRIVE AT THE U.S. THE MOST LOGICAL WAY IN WHICH IT MIGHT COME TO THE UNITED STATES IS ACROSS THE PACIFIC AND REACH THE WEST COAST, BUT THAT, AS I SAY, IS AT LEAST, I WOULD SAY, A WEEK OFF. THE ALTERNATE WAY WOULD BE GOING INTO THE POLAR BASIN AND REACHING

THE STATE OF ALASKA, AND THEN PERHAPS HEADING SOUTHWARD, BUT THAT IS NOT A TERRIBLY LIKELY THING, AND ONLY, IN MY OPINION, WOULD BE A SMALL PIECE OF THE MAIN BODY OF THE CLOUD.

MR. THOMAS: WOULD YOU LIKE TO TALK ABOUT DISPERSION?

Q: THAT HIGH ROUTE, THE POLAR ROUTE THROUGH ALASKA, IS THAT AT A HIGHER ALTITUDE THAN THE ROUTE OVER THE PACIFIC?

MR. MACHTA: IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE AT HIGHER ALTITUDES. THE ESTIMATES THAT WE'VE BEEN MAKING WAS CARRYING THE MATERIAL AT ABOUT 5,000 FEET. SOME OF IT DOES MIX UP, WITH LOWER CONCENTRATIONS AT HIGHER ALTITUDES, AND THOSE COULD BE CARRIED INTO THE BASIN AND BE CARRIED.

Q: A PACIFIC ROUTE, THEN, AT A LOWER ALTITUDE, AS I UNDERSTAND FROM WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, WOULD THAT THEN CARRY A GREATER CHANCE OF DEPOSIT TO THE GROUND, BASICALLY?

MR. MACHTA: IT WOULD HAVE A GREATER PROBABILITY, BUT IT WOULD TAKE A VERY MUCH LONGER TIME; AND DURING THAT TIME, THERE WILL BE MUCH, MUCH GREATER DISPERSION AND MUCH GREATER DILUTION.

Q: MR. THOMAS, IF THE SOVIETS TAKE US UP ON OUR OFFER TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, WHAT SPECIFICALLY COULD WE OFFER THEM? AND MORE SPECIFICALLY, DO WE HAVE CIVILIAN AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TRAINED TO FIGHT REACTOR FIRES, DESPITE THE RADIATION HAZARD PROBLEM?

MR. THOMAS (EPA): WELL, IN THAT OFFER OF ASSISTANCE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 07 OF 10 STATE 135824

7927 EUR5686

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5686

51

THAT WAS MADE, WE HAD SPECIFIED A RANGE OF ASSISTANCE THAT RANGES FROM MONITORING CAPABILITY TO TRAINED PERSONNEL AS FAR AS MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES ARE CONCERNED, TO A FULL RANGE OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FROM U.S. AGENCIES THAT ARE WELL VERSED AND WELL TRAINED IN DEALING WITH RADIOACTIVE ISSUES, ALL THE WAY FROM MONITORING AND RESPONSE TO MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES. AND THAT WAS SPECIFIED AS FAR AS THE OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS CONCERNED.

THE SPECIFIC QUESTION RELATING TO -- I THINK YOU'RE GETTING AT -- THIS PARTICULAR FIRE AND WHETHER THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD BE TRAINED TO DEAL WITH THIS,

I'D HAVE TO SEE IF DELL OR HAROLD HAVE ANY FEEL FOR THAT.

MR. BUNCH (DOE): I CAN GIVE YOU SOME GENERAL INFORMATION. THERE IS A FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN. THERE ARE RADIOLOGICAL TEAMS WHICH ARE POSITIONED AT VARIOUS PLACES AROUND THE COUNTRY AND PERIODICALLY TRAINED TO RESPOND TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES. PART OF THAT TRAINING DOES INCLUDE COPING WITH FIRES IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OR NUCLEAR TEST FACILITIES.

Q: COULD YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC IN TERMS OF ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE HAVE OFFERED INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL TO GO IN AND HELP PUT OUT WHAT (INAUDIBLE) IS THE CONTINUING FIRE AND PROBLEM?

MR. THOMAS: NO. WE MADE A GENERAL OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IN THE KIND OF CATEGORIES I INDICATED, AND WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED A RESPONSE, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, TO THAT OFFER, ALTHOUGH AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING I THINK THEY CAN PROBABLY BRING YOU UP TO DATE MORE CURRENTLY IN THAT THEY ARE THE ONES WHO ARE MANAGING THAT SPECIFIC REQUEST.

YES, SIR.

QUESTION: TO FOLLOW THAT UP, DO YOU KNOW WHETHER ANY STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO CONTAIN THE DISASTER? HAVE THE SOVIETS TAKEN ANY STEPS TO CONTAIN IT OUTSIDE OF SHUTTING OFF THE OTHER THREE REACTORS?

MR. DENTON (EPA): TO MY KNOWLEDGE, I DON'T KNOW OF ACTIONS THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN BEYOND THE ACTIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN NOTED CONCERNING THE OTHER UNITS.

RIGHT HERE. THEN I'LL COME BACK TO YOU.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF HOW MANY WORKERS WERE AT THE SITE? I PICKED UP SOME INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS PLACES TO SUGGEST THAT THEY HAD CONSTRUCTION CREWS WHO WERE BUILDING ANOTHER REACTOR.

MR. THOMAS: WE DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION, I DON'T THINK, THAT WOULD GIVE YOU A GOOD RESPONSE TO THAT AT THIS POINT.

Q: WHEN DID THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FIRST DETECT SOME KIND OF PROBLEM AT THE PLANT?

MR. THOMAS: THE INFORMATION I HAVE IS THAT THE FIRST INDICATION WE HAD OF THE PROBLEM WAS THE INDICATION THAT WAS EVIDENCED BY THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE ELEVATED READINGS AS FAR AS SWEDEN IS CONCERNED, THAT WAS WHEN WE BEGAN TO GET INFORMATION AS OTHER COUNTRIES DID ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

Q: THERE WAS NOTHING ELSE THAT SOMETHING HAD HAPPENED WHEN IT DID ON SATURDAY?

MR. THOMAS: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Q: MR. DENTON, HOW LONG WOULD THIS FIRE TAKE TO BURN OUT IF NO EFFORTS TO PUT IT OUT ARE SUCCESSFUL?

MR. DENTON: IT'S SPECULATIVE, BUT I GUESS WEEKS, IF THERE IS NO SUCCESSFUL EFFORT, BECAUSE OF THE --

Q: CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC -- THREE WEEKS, FIVE WEEKS, TEN WEEK?

MR. DENTON (DOE): NO. NO, I'D JUST SAY WEEKS, AS OPPOSED TO DAYS OR MONTHS.

Q: IS THERE AN OUTSIDE LIMIT? COULD IT TAKE MORE THAN A MONTH TO PUT THIS FIRE OUT?

MR. DENTON (DOE): YOU KNOW, WE REALLY DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT CONDITION THE CORE IS IN. THE WEEKS ARE THE BEST ESTIMATE I CAN GIVE YOU. IT DEPENDS ON HOW MUCH AIR IS GETTING TO THE CORE, AND THAT SORT OF -- I PERCEIVE --

Q: FOLLOWUP QUESTION, PLEASE?

MR. DENTON (NRC): I PERCEIVE IT LOOKS LIKE A CHIMNEY, AND WILL BURN UNTIL IT BURNS ITSELF OUT OR THE AIR SUPPLY IS TURNED OFF.

Q: I HAVE ONE FOLLOW-UP TO THAT. YOU SAID HERE THAT THE EMISSIONS OF RADIATION FROM THE FIRE WILL BE REDUCING. COULD YOU GIVE US SOME SCALE OF THAT? IS IT HALF-WAY? WILL THE EMISSIONS BE CUT IN HALF AFTER A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME?

MR. DENTON (NRC): I THINK THE VOLATILE ELEMENT SUCH AS NOBLE GASES, IODIDES, SILISIIUMS HAVE PROBABLY LARGELY ALREADY BEEN RELEASED, AND THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE

EXPLOSION OCCURRED, AND THERE WAS A DIRECT PATH TO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE VERY TOP OF THIS BUILDING IS A SORT OF INDUSTRIAL GRADE CONTAINMENT SORT OF BUILDING; IT'S NOT A HIGH-STRENGTH CONTAINMENT. BUT WE HAVE FOUND OFF-SITE OTHER TYPES OF LESS VOLATILE FISSION PRODUCTS -- NEPTUNIUM, FOR EXAMPLE, NIOBIUM, ALL OF WHICH INDICATE THERE WAS A VERY VIOLENT EXPLOSION AND DISBURSED A LOT OF THIS MATERIAL INTO THE ATMOSPHERE, AND THAT THEN TOOK THE PATH THAT YOU HEARD DESCRIBED.

Q: YES, RIGHT HERE.

Q: WOULD A NORMAL CONTAINMENT DOME HAVE WITHHELD THAT EXPLOSION?

MR. DENTON (NRC): I DON'T KNOW BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW THE FULL DETAILS ON REALLY WHAT OCCURRED. IT CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE HELPED.

Q: HOW OFTEN -- ON THE QUESTION THAT MR. DENTON WAS ASKED -- UPI IS NOW QUOTING U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES SAYING A SECOND MELTDOWN HAS NOW OCCURRED. I KNOW YOU DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THAT, BUT COULD SUCH AN EVENT HAVE HAPPENED IF THE PLANT WAS IN COLD SHUTDOWN, OR HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE TO SHUT DOWN NUMBER THREE, ASSUMING THEY STARTED TO SHUT DOWN? COULD YOU GIVE US SOME SCENARIOS OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

COURT GOING
THE TELEGRAM

PAGE 08 OF 10 STATE 135824
HAPPENING THERE?

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

52

MR. DENTON (NRC): I GUESS I HAVE -- I HAVE NO INDICATION ANYTHING IS GOING ON IN UNIT THREE. EVERYTHING I KNOW ABOUT IS CONSISTENT WITH JUST THE MELTDOWN, THE BURNING IN UNIT FOUR.

Q: COULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY THE POINT OF THE MELTDOWN BECAUSE YESTERDAY PROFESSOR ALAN BROMLEY OF YALE UNIVERSITY WAS PRETTY SURE THE MELTDOWN COULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE THERE WOULDN'T BE THE TEMPERATURE FOR IT?

MR. THOMAS: YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE EVENT AT UNIT FOUR --

YES.

MR. THOMAS: -- AND CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER A MELTDOWN OCCURRED OR NOT?

Q: YES, BECAUSE YESTERDAY, PROFESSOR BROMLEY OF YALE UNIVERSITY (INAUDIBLE)

MR. DENTON: OUR EVIDENCE COMES LARGELY FROM THE MEASUREMENTS OF RADIONEUTRONS (PHONETIC) IN COUNTRIES LIKE SWEDEN, AND FROM THE KINDS OF MEASUREMENTS BEING MADE THERE, IT'S CERTAINLY CONSISTENT WITH A MELTDOWN OCCURRING. IT TAKES EXTREMELY HIGH TEMPERATURES TO GET THESE FISSION PRODUCTS OUT.

Q: ARE YOU FINDING ANY IONIUM (NIOBIUM?) AND NEPTUNIUM IN THE SWEDISH (INAUDIBLE) HAS IT GOTTEN THAT FAR?

MR. DENTON: THEY REPORTED THEIR MEASUREMENTS TO THE U.S., YES.

Q: AND WHAT ARE THEY -- THOSE ELEMENTS, DO YOU KNOW?

MR. DENTON: YES, THOSE PARTICULAR ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN DETECTED. I DON'T HAVE THE MAGNITUDES WITH ME.

Q: I THINK WHEN YOU WERE ANSWERING A QUESTION OVER HERE, WE NEVER QUITE GOT TO THE END OF IT ABOUT WHETHER THE EMISSIONS WOULD DEMINISH. YOU STARTED TO SAY THAT (INAUDIBLE).

MR. DENTON: I THINK THE VOLATILE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OFF, AND ARE LARGELY OUT IN THE ATMOSPHERE BEING DISBURSED, BUT THE BURNING IS STILL GOING ON. THEREFORE, YOU WOULD CONTINUE TO EVOLVE WHATEVER GASES ARE STILL PRESENT IN THE BOTTOM PERHAPS OF THE CORE, AND SO I THINK AT A SLOWER RATE, AND PERHAPS AS THE BURNING AND THE TEMPERATURE, YOU MIGHT STILL GET PARTICULATES IN THE SMOKE. SO I THINK IT DEFINITELY IS REDUCED FROM WHAT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED ON THAT VERY FIRST HOUR OR TWO AFTER THE BREACH OF THE BUILDING.

Q: MR. DENTON, COULD YOU DISCUSS CONDITIONS AT THIS PLANT SITE? ARE YOU ASSUMING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE OTHER THREE REACTORS ARE FULLY-MANNED WITH PERSONNEL? ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT RADIATION BOMBARDMENT MIGHT HAVE DAMAGED SOME OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF THE OTHER REACTOR PLANTS? I UNDERSTAND THOSE ARE NOT SHIELDED AS THEY ARE IN THE UNITED STATES NOW.

GIVE US SOME SENSE -- YOU HAVE HAD THIS UNIQUE EXPERIENCE OF THREE MILE ISLAND. WHAT'S YOUR RUSSIAN COUNTERPART GOING THROUGH RIGHT NOW?

MR. DENTON (NRC): I FEEL A LOT OF SYMPATHY FOR MY

RUSSIAN COUNTERPART. NO ONE FROM MY STAFF HAS EVER BEEN TO THE SITE, SO WE DON'T HAVE ANY FIRST-HAND INFORMATION. SEVERAL, MANY YEARS AGO, WE DID HAVE AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM AND WENT TO SOME SIMILAR UNITS. UNITS ONE AND TWO, I THINK, ARE FAR ENOUGH AWAY THAT THEY WOULD NOT LIKELY BE AFFECTED IN ANY EVENT. UNIT THREE DOES SHARE SOME COMMON SYSTEMS. I DON'T KNOW HOW, WHETHER THEY ARE BEING ABLE TO MAN UNIT THREE OR NOT. I WOULD SUSPECT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MAN UNIT THREE, SO I ASSUME THAT UNITS THREE AND FOUR ARE BOTH EVACUATED AND SYSTEMS ARE RUNNING ON THEIR OWN IN UNIT THREE.

Q: BUT THEY'RE NOT MEANT TO RUN UNATTENDED INDEFINITELY --

MR. DENTON: THAT'S RIGHT, BUT --

Q: ISN'T THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS?

MR. DENTON: THAT'S RIGHT, NOT INDEFINITELY, BUT IF THEY SHOULD, UNLESS THEY ARE AFFECTED SOMEHOW BY UNIT FOUR, SHOULD RUN FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

MR. THOMAS: A QUESTION OVER HERE.

Q: YOU SAY THEY'RE TRYING TO SHUT DOWN UNIT THREE, WHAT ACTUALLY WOULD THEY DO TO SHUT IT DOWN? AND HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE TO GET TO SHUTDOWN?

MR. DENTON: SHUTDOWN NORMALLY MEANS PUTTING THE CONTROL RODS IN AND STOPPING THE FISSION PROCESS, PUT STILL THERE'S THE K HEAT, AND THAT HAS TO BE REMOVED FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AFTERWARDS. SO I THINK WE USE THE TERM TO MEAN THAT THEY NO LONGER PRODUCE ELECTRICITY, THEY ARE NOT RUNNING AT 3300 MEGAWATTS THERMAL; IT'S JUST DOWN TO THE K HEAT LEVEL IN THE FUEL.

Q: BUT WITH K HEAT, (INAUDIBLE) -- IT TAKES A LONG TIME TO CHECK.

MR. THOMAS: YES, AND, BUT IT'S NOT NEARLY THE PROBLEM THAT IT IS AT FULL POWER, AND THEY ARE EVENTUALLY GOING TO HAVE TO COPE WITH WHAT YOU DO WITH UNIT THREE IN CASE THERE ARE EQUIPMENT FAILURES.

Q: YOU ARE (INAUDIBLE) INSURING ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE ACCIDENT WOULDN'T HAVE A HEALTH IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES. WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION? CAN YOU GIVE US ANY ESTIMATE OF HOW MANY SOVIET CITIZENS MAY BE EXPOSED TO RADIATION, DID THEY REALLY TAKE A TOLL IN THE SHORT-RUN OR IN THE LONG-RUN?

MR. THOMAS: WE JUST DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT CAN LET US DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS ON THAT KIND OF QUESTION AT THIS POINT. HOPEFULLY, OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COMES IN, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU A BETTER ANSWER ON THAT QUESTION. WE JUST DON'T HAVE IT TODAY.

Q: COULD YOU MAKE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY RELEASED IN THIS EVENT AND THAT WHICH WOULD BE RELEASED THROUGH A NUCLEAR WARHEAD IN A TEST? AND ALSO THE AMOUNT OF RADIATION THAT WAS IN THE ATMOSPHERE PRIOR TO THE '63 TESTBAN TREATY?

MR. THOMAS: I DON'T THINK WE'D BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THAT QUESTION TODAY AS I LOOK DOWN ACROSS THIS PANEL.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 09 OF 10 STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

STATE 135824

7927 EUR5606

53

I JUST DON'T THINK WE HAVE THIS INFORMATION ON THIS STAGE.

Q: TO COME BACK TO UNIT THREE AGAIN, BECAUSE I THINK THAT'S A LITTLE CONFUSING. WE BELIEVE THAT IN UNIT THREE THEY PROBABLY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING IT OFF FULL POWER AND IN A SEMI-SHUTDOWN STATE, OR WHAT WOULD YOU CALL THAT?

THAT'S FOR MR. DENTON.

MR. DENTON: DEFINITELY, IT'S BEEN TAKEN OFF THE LINE; IT'S NO LONGER PRODUCING ELECTRICITY. THE CONTROL RODS ARE IN, AND THEY PROBABLY LEFT IT IN THEIR NORMAL COOLDOWN PERIOD -- AND YOU DO HAVE TO COOL THE PLANT FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, UP TO MANY MONTHS BEFORE YOU CAN TURN OFF ALL THE COOLING. BUT THE LONGER THE PERIOD, THE LESS COOLING IS NEEDED. SO IT WILL REQUIRE COOLING FOR A LONG TIME.

Q: MR. THOMAS, DO YOU THINK IT WAS IRRESPONSIBLE OF THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO HAVE ALERTED ITS NEIGHBORS TO THE ACCIDENT EARLIER?

MR. THOMAS: I DON'T WANT TO DRAW THAT KIND OF CONCLUSION. WE'RE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE NOTIFICATION ISSUE, AND I THINK THAT AS WE GET BETTER INFORMATION ABOUT EXACTLY WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED, WHEN NOTIFICATION COULD HAVE BEEN MADE, I THINK WE'LL BE ABLE TO DRAW MORE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THAT CONCERNED; BUT WE'RE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THAT ISSUE.

YES, SIR.

Q: MR. THOMAS, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE UNITED STATES IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS OCCURRED?

MR. THOMAS: IN THE UNITED STATES -- AND I COULD ASK HAROLD DENTON TO RESPOND TO PART OF THIS -- BUT WE HAVE AN EXTENSIVE SYSTEM FOR BOTH ON-SITE SAFETY AND OFF-SITE SAFETY. YOU HEARD REFERENCE, FOR INSTANCE, TO THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES. I USED TO COORDINATE, FOR INSTANCE, WHEN I WAS THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR AT THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, THE OFF-SITE RESPONSE AUTHORITIES, AND WE HAVE AN EXTENSIVE PLAN OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH STANDBY TEAMS AND 24-HOUR NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS, WITH RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES, FULL BACKUP CAPABILITY, INTEGRATED WITH STATE HEALTH OFFICIALS FOR RESPONSE TO ANY KIND OF SITUATION THAT WOULD OCCUR.

AND THAT OFF-SITE RESPONSE IS TIED IN WITH THE ON-SITE SAFETY SYSTEM. YOU HAVE BOTH THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE EXTENSIVE, AND THEN YOU HAVE ANY KIND OF RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS TO AN EVENT. AND I MAY ASK HAROLD IF HE WOULD RESPOND A LITTLE BIT FROM THE ON-SITE POINT OF VIEW.

MR. DENTON: AS YOU KNOW, AFTER TMI, WE CHANGED A LOT OF THINGS BECAUSE UP TO THAT POINT WE HAD USED THE DESIGN BASIS EVENT, ASSUMING ACCIDENTS WOULD NOT GET ANY WORSE. TODAY PLANTS HAVE HYDROGEN IGNITERS, FOR EXAMPLE, JUST TO COPE WITH THE EVOLUTION OF HYDROGEN GAS. THAT'S THE TYPE OF LESSON WE'VE LEARNED.

AND I THINK THE MAIN THING IS THE VALUE OF CONTAINMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, IF YOU HAVE A BIG STRONG CONTAINMENT, THEN YOU CAN COPE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF EVENTS WITHOUT REALLY GETTING THE PUBLIC AFFECTED.

MR. THOMAS: WE'RE GOING TO TAKE PROBABLY ABOUT THREE MORE QUESTIONS, IF I COULD. WE HAVE A FOLLOW-UP FOR HAROLD DENTON.

Q: BACK TO THE ISSUE OF THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS. THEY DO HAVE CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS, MR. BUNCH, BUT AS I WANTED TO ASK YOU, THEY DON'T HAVE, AS MOST OF US UNDERSTAND, BIG, STRONG REINFORCED CONCRETE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS. SINCE THEY DO NOT, DO YOU THINK THAT INCREASES THE RISK THAT IF THERE WERE SOME SORT OF

MELTDOWN, THERE COULD BE LARGE RADIATION RELEASES, AND I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU --

MR. DENTON: WE HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE PLANTS, BUT I DO KNOW THAT WHEN THE ORIGINAL PRODUCTION PLANTS AT HANFORD AND SAVANNAH RIVER WERE SITED, THAT'S WHY THEY HAD LARGE LAND AREAS. YOU KNOW, THERE'S 300-400 SQUARE MILES AT EACH PLACE -- AND THAT WAS BACK IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE TECHNOLOGY, SO TO SOME EXTENT, THEY MAY HAVE TRIED TO TRADE DISTANCE FOR CONTAINMENT. BUT I'D REALLY HAVE TO REFER TO DALE -- WE HAVE NO FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF EITHER SAVANNAH RIVER OR HANFORD-TYPE PLANTS.

Q: BUT YOU'RE AN EXPERT -- ONE OF THE WORLD'S EXPERTS IN THIS FIELD. BASED ON YOUR EXPERTISE, DO YOU FEEL IF THERE WERE SOME SORT OF MELTDOWN IN ONE OF THE PLANTS, THAT THERE WOULD BE POTENTIAL FOR LARGE RADIATION RELEASE?

MR. DENTON: THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE THE POTENTIAL IN ANY PLANT, AND IT DEPENDS ON HOW WELL ENGINEERED AND DESIGNED THE CONFINEMENT SYSTEM IS, AND I REALLY DON'T KNOW THAT SYSTEM. THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS ARE HEAVY WATER-MODERATED, SO THAT'S A MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THOSE PLANTS AND THE RUSSIAN PLANT.

MR. THOMAS: OVER HERE.

Q: DR. DENTON, I WONDER IF YOU CAN GIVE US AN IDEA OF WHAT IS GOING TO BE LEFT AT THIS SITE AFTER THIS FIRE IS OUT, WHAT KIND OF PROBLEM THE SOVIETS ARE GOING TO FACE AT THAT POINT?

MR. DENTON: I THINK THERE IS HEAVY CONTAMINATION ALL AROUND UNITS THREE AND FOUR, AND I JUST DON'T KNOW WHAT, WHETHER THEY WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO OPERATION OR NOT.

IT'S OBVIOUSLY A LOT MORE DIFFICULT TO CLEAN UP THAT TYPE OF EVENT THAN IT WAS AT TMI WHERE THE RADIATION WAS MORE OR LESS CONFINED, AND YOU RECALL THAT'S TAKEN YEARS AND YEARS, WHEN MOST OF THE RADIATION WAS STILL IN THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL. THIS HAS BEEN DISBURSED, NO DOUBT, THROUGHOUT THE UNIT FOUR BUILDINGS AND THE SURROUNDING AREA.

MR. THOMAS: FINAL QUESTION RIGHT HERE.

Q: YES, A QUESTION OF DR. MACHTA: YOU SAY YOUR WINDSPEEDS AND DIRECTIONS DATA ARE COMING FROM SOVIET SOURCES? IS THAT THE CASE? AND IF SO, DO YOU FEEL THOSE SOURCES ARE RELIABLE?

MR. MACHTA: ENTIRELY. THERE'S NO INDICATION WHATSOEVER THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE INFORMATION RECEIVED THROUGH THEM. IT'S THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CHANNELS.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM 59

PAGE 10 OF 10 STATE 135824
MR. THOMAS: IT'S A PART OF THE --

7927 EUR5606

LES, YOU MAY WANT TO EXPAND, BUT THERE'S AN ONGOING AND INTER-ACTIVE PROCESS, AS FAR AS METEOROLOGICAL DATA IS CONCERNED INTERNATIONALLY, UNRELATED TO THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT THAT LESTER WAS RELYING ON AND TALKING ABOUT AS FAR AS METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION IS CONCERNED.

LET ME EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S UPDATE BRIEFING MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THAT YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN, AND ALSO THAT WE WILL PROVIDE UPDATE INFORMATION ON A DAILY BASIS. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE IS COORDINATING THAT.

THANK YOU.

(THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDED AT 12:00 P.M.) WHITEHEAD

UNCLASSIFIED