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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/13/2005

File Folder NSDD AND TALKING POINTS [SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN GENEVA] (2/2)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2905

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10354	PAPER	SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION TO GROMYKO CONTENTS [17 - 18] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	1/3/1985	B1
10355	PAPER	SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION TO GROMYKO FIRST SESSION: MORNING OF JANUARY 7 [19 - 20] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	1/3/1985	B1
10356	PAPER	OFFENSE/DEFENSE INTERACTION: CURRENT PROGRAMS [LONGER VERSION AS PER NSDD] [21 - 23] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1
10357	PAPER	OFFENSE/DEFENSE INTERACTION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE [LONGER VERSION AS PER NSDD] [24 - 26] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10358	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10356 [27 - 29] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1
10359	PAPER	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10357 [30 - 32] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1
10360	PAPER	SECOND SESSION: AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 7 4. NON-ARMS CONTROL "HEADLINES" [33 - 35] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1
10361	PAPER	SUBJECTS AND OBJECTIVES [36 - 40] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	5	1/3/1985	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10362	PAPER	STRATEGIC FORCES [41 - 43] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1
10363	PAPER	INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES [44 - 46] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	3	1/3/1985	B1
10364	PAPER	DEFENSIVE ARMS [47 - 48] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	2	1/3/1985	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 1, 1985

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 153

PT

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN GENEVA (U)

The Situation Today. We find ourselves at a unique point in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. In 1981, we embarked on two major efforts. First, we initiated a military modernization program determined to reverse a long period of decline and apparent unwillingness in this country to invest in our own security in the face of the unprecedented Soviet military buildup of the last decade or more. This modernization program was specifically designed to garner sufficient strength to ensure Western security through deterrence and to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Second, we committed ourselves to seeking equitable and verifiable agreements which would increase stability and security, reduce the risk of war, and lead to significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. (C)

Over the past four years, the United States has been able to sustain support for its strategic modernization program. With continued resolve, this program promises to restore the nuclear balance between the the Soviet Union and the United States by the end of the decade. During this same period, with a firmness of purpose, the NATO Alliance stood solidly with us. Despite an unprecedented Soviet propaganda campaign, NATO began the deployments of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles necessary to modernize NATO's LRINF missile force and redress the balance in this area also. At the same time, we offered a range of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union aimed at permitting each government to move to much lower levels of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. (C)

In response, the Soviet Union has focused primarily on intimidation to move us off our sound course, including implied threats, blatant attempts to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and the abandonment of ongoing negotiations. However, it is now clear that these efforts have failed. This has been an important factor in influencing the Soviet Union to alter its approach and agree to join us, once again, in negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear arms. While the Soviet Union can be expected to continue its extensive propaganda efforts, we must hope that the opportunity for real movement is better today than in previous years. (C)

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Authority: S. Tulley 11/27/92
NARA, Date 7/29/02
DECLASSIFIED

The Soviet Union and SDI. Another important factor influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible. The Soviet Union knows that the SDI represents a major U.S. resurgence of interest in strategic defense. The USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain relative advantages in the area of defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment. (C)

The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program -- and most especially, that portion of the program which holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight -- offers the prospect of permitting the U.S. technologically to flank years of Soviet defensive investment and to shift the "state-of-the-art" in defenses into areas of comparative U.S. advantage. This is one of the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program; but rather, on "preventing the militarization of space." While the Soviet Union may also be concerned about other potential "space weapons" programs, in large part, its focus on space reflects an attempt to confine future U.S. defensive activity within more traditional areas which are consistent with the long-term pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. (C)

The U.S. Rationale for SDI. For our part, we approach SDI from a different perspective. (C)

For the past twenty years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. The notion of the costs needed to deter aggression have changed over time. For example, we have moved away from simply holding at risk significant portions of Soviet industry and population. Today, we don't target population. Instead, our current strategy focuses on being able to deny basic Soviet war aims by destroying the forces and leadership needed to exploit aggression. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation, provided by offensive nuclear forces, to deter aggression has not changed over this period. (C)

This basic idea -- that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained -- also served as the

foundation for the U.S. approach to the SALT process. At the time that process began, the U.S. concluded that offensive deterrence was not only sensible, but necessary, since we anticipated that neither side could develop the technology for a defensive system which could effectively deter the other side. The ground-based, terminal, anti-ballistic missile systems then under consideration were both expensive and uncertain, and attacking ballistic missiles during any other phase of their flight was technically infeasible. Further, we lacked the basic computational capability to process the information needed quickly enough to manage a defense against a large number of inbound warheads. (C)

Today, however, the situation is different. Emerging technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before. Of equal importance, the trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and non-compliance with existing agreements, will, over the long-term, call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based. (S)

The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership -- ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of super-hard bunkers to protect its leadership -- thus further eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent. (S)

These trends indicate that continued long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several decades. (C)

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to rapidly expand its ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. (U)

However, the overriding importance of SDI to the United States is that it offers the possibility of radically altering the dangerous trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union is correct in recognizing the potential of advanced defense concepts -- especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses -- to change existing, and increasingly destabilizing, aspects of the strategic competition. This need not lead to a decisive U.S. unilateral advantage -- and that is certainly not our goal. However, if the promise of SDI is achieved, the Soviet advantage accumulated over the past twenty years at great cost will be largely neutralized. And, in the process, we will have enhanced deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance upon defensive systems -- systems which do not threaten anyone.

(C)

The Expected Soviet Approach. Over the next year, the Soviet Union may wish to shift its tactics and offer the prospect of a better U.S.-Soviet relationship in return for constraints on specific U.S. programs. However, no matter how the rhetoric may soften as the prospect of renewed negotiations looms, we should expect to be tested in different, more subtle, but just as serious ways. As a minimum, the Soviet Union will certainly continue to attempt to exploit any vulnerabilities they perceive to undermine public, allied and Congressional support for the general U.S. approach and for specific U.S. positions. (S)

The Soviet Union will likely continue to emphasize its theme of desiring to "prevent the militarization of space." In doing so, it will attempt to block advanced technologies associated with SDI in an attempt to confine defensive developments to areas of Soviet advantage and, thus, to slow the entire thrust of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet Union will also propose restraints on U.S. anti-satellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI technologies. Finally, it will likely continue to resist U.S. attempts to negotiate deep reductions in existing offensive forces, especially ballistic missiles and warheads. (S)

Expected Soviet Approach in Geneva. At the upcoming meeting in Geneva, there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will seek to be very reasonable and will take the opportunity offered by the meeting to lay the groundwork for serious negotiations in a range of areas. The U.S. delegation will be prepared to encourage the Soviet delegation to do so. On the other hand, we should anticipate that the Soviet Union desires, at that meeting, to get an agreement on modalities and the procedures for subsequent negotiations, as well as on the subject and objectives of those negotiations, that protects existing Soviet areas of advantage and, consequently, prejudices U.S. long-term interests. The Soviet Union has already launched a sophisticated propaganda

campaign designed to support this goal. (S)

The U.S. Approach. For our part, the thrust of the U.S. effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows.

1. We will continue to pursue the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to reduction of existing nuclear arsenals, and to seek other complementary means (including cooperative and confidence-building measures) of enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war. (S)
2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the ASAT/SDI program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements. (S)
3. Complementing this, we will also protect the U.S. strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (S)

Characterizing the U.S. Approach. To support this approach publicly, the following paragraph can be used to characterize to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics the basic, central concept that the U.S. is pursuing at the Geneva meetings and in subsequent negotiations. (e)

"During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon in the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree." (U)

Specific U.S. Goals for the January Meeting in Geneva. The following are the specific U.S. goals for the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Groyenko in Geneva in January. (C)

1. Establish, without concessions or pre-conditions, a sustained, formal negotiating process with the Soviet Union on offensive nuclear arms which would permit us to pursue our goal of achieving deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. (S)

2. Keep START and INF issues substantively separate, and preferably procedurally separate if possible. ~~(S)~~
3. Shape the nature of future discussions or negotiations in other areas to support U.S. interests by:
 - a. proposing negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums as appropriate;
 - b. avoiding a "space only" forum;
 - c. specifically protecting the SDI program and, thus, the promise offered by SDI; and
 - d. providing for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. ~~(S)~~
4. Keep the Soviet Union on the defensive at both the private and public levels with special attention to:
 - a. keeping the onus on Moscow to resume serious negotiations; and
 - b. denying the Soviet Union a sustainable basis for charging that a "failure" of the Geneva meeting was the responsibility of the U.S. ~~(C)~~
5. Avoid public negotiation with the Soviet Union. ~~(C)~~
6. Lay the groundwork necessary in the discussions with the Soviet delegation to provide the basis for later garnering public and Congressional support for the U.S. position. ~~(S)~~

Addressing the Offense/Defense Relationship. Early in the discussions, the U.S. delegation will provide to the Soviet delegation our conceptual thinking about the offense/defense relationship. This presentation is critically important since it sets the stage for the U.S. proposals about format, object and substance which follow. It also should permit the U.S. to preempt Soviet charges about the U.S. SDI program by citing the record of Soviet actions which have called into questions the fundamental assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty and which have contributed to the growing instability in the current situation. ~~(S)~~

This presentation should make the following points:

- The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. The U.S. hopes the

Soviet Union comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the United States or its allies.

-- The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. The U.S. expects that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

-- It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The U.S. is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities.

-- Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory.

-- Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

-- This is a dangerous situation. It is one the U.S. and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

-- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each of nation. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

-- For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in that direction. As one looks at the situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

-- Since that time, your building program -- in both offensive and defensive systems -- has violated any reasonable sense of strategic balance.

-- And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union at least has also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it has also taken steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.

-- The ABM Treaty rested importantly on the limitation of large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions.

-- Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification.

-- It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground.

-- It was further agreed that other systems, such as air defenses, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous.

-- Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

-- Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.

-- The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.

-- The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made operational in a relatively short period of time.

-- The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between air defense systems and ABM systems.

-- The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

-- And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

-- For the immediate future the United States wishes to work with the Soviet Union to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place.

-- The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The U.S. SDI program is. The Soviet program should be.

-- If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

-- The U.S. SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban the research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed, even if desired.

-- For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.

-- Whenever research validates that a defensive technology can make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

-- At the same time, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. The U.S. believes that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.

-- It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S.,

high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.

-- The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution.

-- The United States also recognizes that, as Mr. Chernenko recently noted, there is an organic relationship between offensive and defensive forces. While the possibilities of a development as I have just described could be realized in the fairly distant future, U.S. is prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with the Soviet Union now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms. ~~(S)~~

The Issue of Negotiating Fora. While we should seek that negotiating approach which gives the United States the best possible negotiating leverage, in order to reduce pressure for concessions and agreement to preconditions, the immediate tactical objective of the U.S. is to obtain from the session in Geneva an agreement to begin formal negotiations on terms which do not prejudice the United States and its allies and key defense initiatives such as SDI and INF deployments. To achieve this objective, we should characterize agreement on basic negotiating structure(s), title(s), short statements describing the subject of the negotiations/discussions, starting date(s), and location(s) as a basic and necessary first step and measure of the seriousness of our mutual purpose. ~~(S)~~

a. Structure. With respect to negotiating structure, basic U.S. objectives are: (1) to enter negotiations on nuclear offensive forces while keeping START and INF issues substantively separate, and, preferably procedurally separate as well; (2) to propose corresponding negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums, as appropriate; (3) to avoid a "space only" forum; and, (4) to provide a forum for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. ~~(S)~~

The preferred U.S. negotiating structure would consist of three formal fora: separate START negotiations and INF negotiations (with these two negotiations addressing nuclear offensive forces); and negotiations on nuclear defensive forces. In addition, the U.S. would also prefer to supplement this negotiating structure with agreement to begin ongoing discussions about the long-term

maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. This structure would permit us to build upon the work previously accomplished at START and INF as quickly as possible while establishing a new negotiating forum to deal with nuclear defenses and a new discussion forum to deal with related issues of concern to both sides. (S)

Should the Soviet Union not agree to this approach, the U.S. Delegation is authorized to alter the U.S. proposal along the following lines and in the following order of U.S. preference:

1. Separate negotiations on START, on INF, and on defensive forces with the later to include nuclear and non-nuclear defenses. In this latter category of negotiations, the U.S. would continue to focus its efforts to constrain nuclear defenses.
2. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and nuclear defensive forces. Under this structure, the U.S. would seek separate START and INF subgroups to keep START and INF issues substantively separate,
3. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and on defensive forces.
4. A single negotiation on nuclear forces including nuclear offensive and defensive forces and related issues. (S)

Each of the above should also protect the U.S. desire for a forum for continued discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (C)

b. Titles. The preferred titles for such negotiations are implicit in the descriptions provided of the preferred negotiating structures. (C)

The Soviet Union will desire to include "space" in the title of one of the established fora. The word "space" should not appear in the description of any negotiations or discussions in a manner prejudicial to the U.S. For example, negotiations entitled Offensive and Defensive/Space Arms would be unacceptable. The title "Nuclear and Space Arms" for a single negotiation would be undesirable, but acceptable as a last resort if the Soviet Union insists on the word "space". (S)

Difficulty with respect to titles could be resolved by avoiding agreement on specific titles, referring only to the locale such as "Geneva Talks." (C)

c. Describing the Negotiations/Discussions. The preferred U.S. short descriptions of the negotiations are also implied in

the discussion of structure. In descriptions of agreed fora, the delegation is authorized to include reference to space in a manner which does not single out space and which makes clear that space issues apply to both offensive and defensive systems. For example, descriptions of separate negotiations on offensive forces and on defensive forces which described as subjects of the separate negotiations "nuclear offensive forces" and "strategic defenses and space arms", respectively, should be avoided in favor of formulations such as "strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, whether based on earth or in space" and "defensive arms, whether based on earth or in space." (S)

Other formulations which are not acceptable include the following:

- formulations which accept the Soviet definition of strategic arms, i.e. weapons capable of hitting Soviet territory by virtue of their location rather than their range, including third-country as well as intermediate-range systems;
- formulations which accept Soviet demands for compensation for third-country forces;
- formulations which exclude non-European based INF systems from limitation, which accept limitations on our carrier-based aircraft or other dual-capable aircraft with a radius of action less than that of the F-111, or which remove shorter-range INF ballistic missiles from at least collateral constraints;
- formulations which accept a substantive merger of START and INF;
- formulations which would imply that the relationship between offensive and defensive systems can only be addressed in the defensive forum or that space can only be addressed in the defensive negotiations;
- formulations which accept the Soviet objective of "preventing the militarization of space", which restrict the subject matter to just the space issues of SDI and ASAT, which imply the necessity of additional restrictions beyond those in existing treaties and agreements on US activities in outer space, or which prejudice U.S. freedom to pursue SDI and ASAT; and,
- formulations which uses the SALT II phrase "equality and equal security." In recent weeks, some Soviet statements have used a different formulation, "equality with due account taken of the legitimate interests of parties." While not preferred, this formulation is acceptable in the context of a general agreement which meets other primary U.S. objectives.

(S)

d. Starting Dates. The US should seek the opening of formal negotiations during the month of March, preferably between March 5 and March 19. Selection of these dates is not essential, but is useful to permit preparation, delegation selection, and consultations with allies and the Congress. (C)

e. Location. The US should seek a common location for all formal negotiations, preferably in Geneva. Separate locations could be acceptable in the context of an overall package which meets primary U.S. objectives. (C)

Substantive Presentations. We are on record as being prepared to engage in substantive discussions during the Geneva meetings, and to have concrete new ideas to present at that time. Our intended presentation on the U.S. concept of the offense/defense relationship certainly provides the basis for substantive discussion; and our proposal to open negotiations on nuclear defensive systems and to continue discussions on stability are specific, concrete new ideas worthy of note. (C)

During the discussion of negotiating fora, the Soviets may attempt to initiate discussion on the substance of the negotiating approaches the U.S. would intend to use in various fora or they may present substantive proposals of their own. In general, discussion of the substantive aspect of future U.S. negotiating positions should await the beginning of formal negotiations. Agreement to pre-conditions or substantive concessions for the purpose of reaching agreement to begin formal negotiations is not authorized. To the extent possible, we should attempt to maintain the best possible climate for entry into the formal negotiations or, if agreement is not reached on formal negotiations, to protect our leverage for continued discussions. In addition, we must be prepared to protect ourselves against Soviet accusations that the Geneva talks failed because the U.S. had nothing new to offer. (S)

The following guidance is provided on the treatment of the substantive detail associated with various issue. (C)

a. START. On START, the delegation should stress the basic flexibility and reasonableness of the elements of the current U.S. START position -- flexibility which could not be implemented in the face of the Soviet departure from Geneva. In addition, the delegation should indicate U.S. readiness to move beyond where the last round of START talks were left in Geneva and to explore trade-offs between relative U.S. and Soviet advantages. (S)

With respect to START trade-offs, the delegation is authorized to indicate to the Soviet Union that we have extensive flexibility with respect to both structure and content of the tradeoffs, so long as the outcome meets our basic standards with respect to equality, verifiability, stability, significance, and alliance security. In the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is

prepared to propose trade-offs and, in doing so, consider the use of asymmetrical limits and/or different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

As an example of the above, the delegation is authorized to suggest that, recognizing the Soviet Union's preference for certain types of forces, the U.S. is prepared to consider a trade-off between their areas of advantage and ours. The delegation can explain that one way this could be achieved is by adding to the current U.S. proposal a specific limit on the number of air launched cruise missiles permitted to each side. The U.S. limit would be well below the number of such missiles that could be deployed on the U.S. bomber force if the Soviet Union were to agree to commensurate reductions in the destructive capability of their ballistic missiles. However, in recognition of the Soviet preference for ballistic missiles, the corresponding limit on Soviet air launched cruise missiles would be lower than that permitted the U.S. (S)

The delegation should stress that this is one example, that the U.S. has additional ideas, and that the U.S. is prepared to use these ideas to meet both Soviet and U.S. concerns in the context of formal negotiations. The delegation should again reemphasize the point that, in the context of such negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to consider the use of asymmetrical limits and different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

b. INF. The delegation should stress to the Soviet Union that major progress in negotiations across the board and in areas of interest to both sides would prove easier if an early breakthrough were possible in the area of INF. The delegation should also stress that we and our allies remain committed to our basic standards for evaluating an INF agreement:

- equal rights and limits expressed globally, with no export of the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia;
- no compensation for British and French nuclear forces;
- no reduction in NATO conventional force capability; and
- effective verification. (S)

At the same time, the delegation should point out that we have demonstrated flexibility and have sought to address Soviet concerns. We believe that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September, 1983, U.S. proposals which would have provided for an equal global limit under which the United States would have considered not deploying its full global allotment in Europe. At that time, the United States also indicated its willingness to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. The delegation should stress that within these basic principles, and in the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to

show considerable flexibility with respect to formulation and trade-offs. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through which equal warhead levels could be reached through equal percentage reductions on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from its planned levels of deployment -- 224 GLCM and Pershing II launchers carrying 572 missiles/warheads). (S)

In introducing the equal percentage reductions example, the delegation should take care not to indicate to the Soviets any acceptance of the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions per se. When used in situations where there is not a beginning balance, or where there is not agreement that the reductions will ultimately lead to equal levels of forces (as is the case in the U.S. START build-down proposal), equal percentage reductions do not lead to equal force levels. If applied in different contexts, the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions could damage U.S. interests. If pressed for an endorsement of the general principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions, the delegation should note that while the U.S. cannot endorse the general principle, the LRINF missile issue has some unique features that, in the interest of making progress on this important issue, may make the use of the certain specific equal percentage reduction approaches acceptable to the United States and its Allies within the limited context of the LRINF missile agreement under discussion. (S)

c. Space Arms Control. In response to initiatives from the Soviet Union involving space arms control, the U.S. delegation should remind the Soviet delegation that an extensive body of international law and treaties exists with respect to space, including the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Further, the delegation should point out that it is the Soviet Union which has the largest number of warheads which would transit space; it is the Soviet Union which has an existing ASAT system, and it is the Soviet Union which has a deployed ABM system which can attack objects in space. The delegation should explain that the United States is prepared to consider Soviet proposals related to space during the course of formal negotiations. However, because issues involving space cannot logically be separated from the major areas to which they relate, we are only prepared to deal with these proposals in the context of nuclear offensive and defensive negotiations as appropriate to each. (S)

d. ASAT Limitations. The U.S. will not propose substantive ASAT initiatives at this time. If pressed by the Soviet Union for agreement to an immediate ASAT moratorium, the delegation should point out that, as the U.S. has consistently made clear, while the U.S. will not agree to such a proposal as a precondition for negotiations, in formal negotiations on the full range of nuclear arms control issues, the United States is prepared to consider areas of mutual restraint which might be negotiated in the context of a broader range of agreements which would provide for stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms. (S)

e. Other Areas. In other arms control areas (e.g., nuclear testing, MBFR, CBW, CDE, CD, and the full range of U.S.-proposed confidence building measures), the delegation is authorized to restate, reaffirm and explain the U.S. positions in each of these areas as appropriate. The delegation should stress the need and the U.S. desire to make progress, where possible, across this full spectrum of issues. (S)

f. Verification and Compliance. The delegation should stress the importance the United States attaches to effective verification of, and compliance with, arms control agreements. Further, the delegation should note that, for this reason, we have proposed specific verification, inspection and confidence building measures and have sought to have the Soviet Union resolve our very serious concerns about Soviet non-compliance. (S)

In addition, the U.S. delegation is authorized to draw upon current guidance on arms control related issues, as supplemented by this directive, to respond as necessary and appropriate, within the terms of such guidance, to serious Soviet proposals or use such guidance in countering the development of a situation which could create a serious setback for the United States in its effort to gain support among allies and within the United States. (C)

Ronald Reagan

The Secretary's Presentation to Gromyko

Contents

First Session: Morning of January 7

- 1. Introduction: Importance of this meeting; much time lost; time to look to future; task to reach agreement on "subject and objectives," move from common ground at level of principle to mutually acceptable agreements.
- 2. The Offense/Defense Interaction - Current Problems: Soviet actions which have called into question assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty; need to redress instability in current situation.
- 3. The Offense/Defense Interaction - Looking to the Future: Near-term need to make current regime more stable; President's view that both sides have interest in longer term in considering possibility of increased reliance on defenses.

Second Session: Afternoon of January 7

- 4. Non-arms control headlines: VE-Day anniversary; Berlin air corridors; touch on regional exchanges (Middle East, S. Africa, Afghanistan); Hebrew teachers and a few human rights cases, including Shcharanskiy; noting Olmer visit, other bilateral exchanges and Soviet acceptance of discussion on Pacific air safety, propose forward movement on consulates.
- 5. Subjects and Objectives: Initial thoughts on subjects and objectives for three negotiations - START, INF and defensive nuclear space arms (with fallbacks); proposals for titles, dates, locations; full agreement will result from negotiations themselves; suggestion of further Ministerial meetings.
- 6. Strategic Forces: Basic points review flexibility inherent in previous US position, express readiness to go beyond where talks left off and explore trade-offs; further points illustrating possibility of asymmetrical limits or aggregation (in latter context, recapping Stockholm presentation); possible supplemental points detailing possible common framework.
- 7. INF: Basic points on fundamental US criteria, flexibility in fall 1983 proposal; additional points suggesting equal percentage reductions approach.
- 8. Defensive Arms: Basic points giving US view that space only one aspect of broader defensive arms question, that existing defensive systems should be addressed as well, and that US ready to address space in offensive and defensive arms negotiations, as appropriate. Contingency point for responding to proposal for ASAT moratorium or query about President's ASAT "mutual restraints" offer. Supplemental points on joint space rescue proposal.

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NLRR F06-114/8 #10354

BY L01 NARA DATE 9/30/08

Third Session: Morning of January 8 { NEW VERSIONS
TO BE PROVIDED 1/4/85

- 9. Format for Negotiations: Reiterate proposals (or present fallback proposals) on fora, dates/locations; another Ministerial in 4-6 weeks; role of special representatives.
- 10. Subjects and Objectives: US views on subjects and objectives for talks on strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms and on defensive arms (recapitulates item 5, plus fallbacks as needed).
- 11. Negotiation of Joint Communique: Need for confidentiality, work out agreed press line if possible. }

Contingency Talking Points: Responses to Possible Soviet Arguments and Proposals

- 12. Gromyko's Responses to Your Arguments, and suggested rejoinders
- 13. START - Contingency Points on Possible Soviet Proposals: Link renewed START talks to reaffirmation of ABM Treaty; modified START position to take account of US but not Soviet LRINF; full START/INF merger; Vladivostok-style guidelines; public reaffirmation of no-undercut policy.
- 14. INF - Contingency Points on Possible Soviet Proposals: immediate deployment freeze; repackaged no-US-deployments proposal; continued demand for compensation for UK/French; redefined INF agenda; "true" zero option; modified walk-in-the-woods; defer INF pending removal of US deployments; defer INF pending agreement on START.
- 15. Space Arms Control - Contingency Points on Possible Soviet Proposals: "prevention" of militarization of space/ban all "space-strike" systems; ASAT moratorium from outset of talks.] TO BE REVISED
- 16. Other Areas - Contingency Points on Possible Soviet Proposals: Nuclear testing; nuclear freeze; non-use of force; no first use; chemical weapons; etc.

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The Secretary's Presentation to Gromyko

First Session: Morning of January 7

1. Introduction

Background: To set the stage, you would note the importance the President attaches to the meetings, emphasize the US view that nuclear arms reductions are of highest priority, and express readiness to agree on the "subject and objectives" of new negotiations.

Note: It would be preferable if you were to speak first. Since the first session will be hosted by the Soviets, however, the choice will be theirs. If Gromyko speaks first, you would draw on contingency talking points as appropriate, before delivering the following presentation. The points below have, however, been designed with a view toward preempting familiar Soviet arguments, particularly on the SDI.

Talking Points

-- President views this meeting as major opportunity to launch new effort aimed at reaching arms control agreements that enhance security of both our nations.

-- Much time has been lost since USSR suspended negotiations at the end of 1983. New weapons deployments continuing on both sides. Increasing concerns about consistency of Soviet actions with concepts underlying existing agreements.

-- Our principal task today, however, is to look to the future, to establish a more efficient process and more effective negotiating approaches for addressing critical arms control questions. Hope our meetings today and tomorrow can lay the basis for progress toward that end.

-- Agreed purpose of our meetings is to define subject and objectives for new negotiations on "nuclear and space" arms. I intend to present some ideas on the substance of these negotiations, as well as on procedural arrangements; expect you will do the same.

-- Indeed, I think we can agree that no procedural arrangements will bear fruit unless both sides are prepared to engage in serious and substantive give-and-take that takes into account other side's concerns. As President has stressed, we are ready.

-- Our meetings in September and the correspondence between our two leaders give me reason to hope that we will be able to make headway in these next two days toward identifying areas of common ground.

- We both agree that the "question of questions" is to ensure that our relationship evolves toward peace rather than confrontation and, in particular, that we get control over nuclear weapons.

- We agree that the preeminent task toward this end is to reduce nuclear arms, and in the longer term to eliminate them.

- We also seem to agree that nuclear arms reductions and the military use of space are inherently related, and should be addressed as part of a constructive and coordinated effort to establish a more reliable deterrent balance between offensive and defensive capabilities.

-- We obviously have difficult negotiations ahead of us to translate these areas of common ground into concrete agreements which both our countries can accept. With hard and constructive efforts on both sides, however, we can succeed.

3731M

21
1/3/85

2. The Offense/Defense Interaction: Current Problems
[Longer version as per NSDD]

Background: The following points would seek to put the monkey on the Soviets' back by citing Soviet actions which have undermined the ABM Treaty (such as the Krasnoyarsk radar), and stressing the need to redress the growing instability in the current situation.

Talking Points

-- I would like to set forth our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

-- The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the US would initiate military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were to be directly attacked. We hope the Soviet Union comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the US or its allies.

-- The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. The US expects that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

-- We will maintain a sufficient deterrent with or without arms control agreements. However, we believe that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if this relationship is regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.

-- But it is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The US is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities.

-- Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory.

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BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

-- Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

-- This is a dangerous situation. It is one the US and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

-- In preparing for this meeting and for renewed negotiations, the US has conducted a review of our past arms control efforts. While some worthwhile agreements have been reached, our efforts in the area of strategic arms have not fulfilled their original promise in terms of constraining the arms competition and enhancing stability.

-- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the US hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each nation. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

-- For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in that direction. These premises, however, have come increasingly into question over the past decade; as one looks at the situation today, it appears that US anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

-- Since that time, your building program -- in both offensive and defensive systems -- has violated any reasonable sense of strategic balance.

-- And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union has also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done everything permitted by the AEM Treaty, and it has also taken steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.

- The AEM Treaty rested importantly on the limitation of large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on

such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions.

- Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification.

- It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground.

- It was further agreed that other systems, such as air defenses, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous.

- Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

-- Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.

-- The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.

-- The SH-08 AEM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made operational in a relatively short period of time.

-- The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between air defense systems and ABM systems.

-- The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.

-- And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

(3906M)

24
1/3/85

3. The Offense/Defense Interaction: Looking to the Future
[Longer version as per NSDD]

Background: The following points emphasize the need in the near term to make the current regime of mutual deterrence more stable, and lay out the President's view that both sides have an interest in the longer term in considering the possibility of increased reliance on defenses.

Talking Points

--It is important that you understand the conceptual and political framework in which we approach renewed negotiations.

-- For the immediate future the United States wishes to work with the Soviet Union to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place.

-- The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The US SDI program is. The Soviet program should be.

-- Now I know you will argue that it is the United States, and not the Soviet Union, that has decided to embark on the creation of a nationwide ABM system, including the deployment of defensive systems in space. On this, let me state the following.

-- The President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies could make it feasible for our two countries to move away from a situation in which the security of both our countries is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating offensive nuclear retaliation.

-- We believe both sides have an interest in determining the answer to this question. Indeed, your country has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system.

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BY LOS NARA DATE 9/30/08

-- The US SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban the research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed, even if desired.

-- No decisions on moving beyond the stage of research have been taken, nor could they be for several years. Such research is necessary to see if it will be possible to move toward a world in which the threat of nuclear war is eliminated.

-- If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the US view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

-- Whenever research validates that a defensive technology can make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

-- For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.

-- At the same time, both the US and the Soviet Union recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. The US believes that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.

-- It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the US, high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.

-- The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution.

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- 3 -

-- The United States also recognizes that, as Mr. Chernenko recently noted, there is an organic relationship between offensive and defensive forces. While the possibilities of a development as I have just described could be realized in the fairly distant future, US is prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with the Soviet Union now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms.

-- We are prepared to discuss with you the whole question of strategic defense (both existing and possible future systems), reductions in offensive arms, and the nature of the offense-defense relationship that we should be seeking to establish and maintain in the future.

(3916M)

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1/3/85

27

2. The Offense/Defense Interaction: Current Problems
[earlier version]

Background: The following points would seek to put the monkey on the Soviets' back by citing Soviet actions which have undermined the ABM Treaty (such as the Krasnoyarsk radar), and stressing the need to redress the growing instability in the current situation.

Talking Points

-- I would like to set forth our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

-- The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the US would initiate military action against the USSR or the Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were directly attacked. We hope the USSR comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the US or its allies.

-- The United States is determined to maintain sufficient forces to deter attack against ourselves and our allies. This means forces of such size, effectiveness and survivability as to deny an opponent any possibility of gain from an attack. We expect that you wish to maintain similar capabilities.

-- We will maintain a sufficient deterrent with or without arms control agreements. However, we believe that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if this relationship is regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.

-- But it is hard for us to understand why the USSR has placed so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The US is obliged to take the steps necessary to maintain our offensive and defensive capabilities.

-- Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, if a crisis situation should arise, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional.

-- This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR F06-114/8 #10358

BY LOS NARA DATE 9/30/08

-- This is a dangerous situation. It is one we must address. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

-- In preparing for this meeting and for renewed negotiations, the US has conducted a review of our past arms control efforts. While some worthwhile agreements have been reached, our efforts in the area of strategic arms have not fulfilled their original promise in terms of constraining the arms competition and enhancing stability.

-- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, we negotiated measures that we hoped would be helpful to the security of each of us. Those constraints were based on two assumptions:

(1) with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparable limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels, and

(2) the constraints on ballistic missile defenses would preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the agreements.

-- These premises, however, have come increasingly into question over the past decade.

-- Both sides today have substantially greater offensive capabilities than in 1972. Not only have the numbers of offensive weapons reached exceedingly high levels; of even greater concern, systems have been deployed -- on the Soviet side, in significant numbers -- which have the capability for a devastating attack on the other side's missile silos and command and control facilities.

-- On the defensive side, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the ABM Treaty, has exploited technical ambiguities, and has also taken steps we believe are not consistent with it.

-- The viability of the ABM Treaty was based on several key assumptions:

-that large phased-array radars would be constrained so as to limit potential breakout or circumvention to provide the base for a territorial ABM defense. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but they were to be on the periphery and outward facing.

-that ABM interceptors, launchers and radars would be neither mobile nor transportable.

-that the line between anti-aircraft and antiballistic missile defenses would be unambiguous.

-that the ABM Treaty would be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty, of indefinite duration, on offensive nuclear forces.

-- Unfortunately, today those assumptions no longer appear to obtain. The Krasnoyarsk radar appears to be identical to radars for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, and could serve as part of a base for a nationwide defense.

-- The inconsistency of the location and orientation of this radar with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty is a serious concern, and it causes us to question the Soviet Union's long-term intentions in the ABM area.

-- We are also concerned about other Soviet ABM activities that, taken together, give rise to legitimate questions on our part as to whether the Soviet Union intends to deploy a wide-spread ABM system. The SA-X-12 anti-air missile is one element of our concern; it seems to have some capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles.

-- In the area of defensive nuclear forces, it has not proven possible to work out mutually acceptable agreements that would bring about meaningful reductions in offensive nuclear forces, particularly in the most destabilizing categories of such forces.

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3. The Offense/Defense Interaction: Looking to the Future
[earlier version]

Background: The following points emphasize the need in the near term to make the current regime of mutual deterrence more stable, and lay out the President's view that both sides have an interest in the longer term in considering the possibility of increased reliance on defenses.

Talking Points

--It is important that you understand the conceptual and political framework in which we approach renewed negotiations.

-- For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and make more effective the regime for reliable mutual deterrence which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective.

- We must negotiate the effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972. We are prepared to negotiate constructively toward this end.

- And we must reverse the erosion which has taken place of the premises assumed when we entered into the ABM Treaty.

-- The research, development and deployment programs of both sides should be consistent with our longer-term aims.

-- Now I know you will argue that it is the United States, and not the Soviet Union, that has decided to embark on the creation of a nationwide ABM system, including the deployment of defensive systems in space. On this, let me state the following.

-- The President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies could make it feasible for our two countries to move away from a situation in which the security of both our countries is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating offensive nuclear retaliation.

-- We believe both sides have an interest in determining the answer to this question. Indeed, your country has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system.

-- A situation in which both of our countries could shift their deterrent posture toward greater reliance on effective defenses could be more stable than the current situation.

-- It could provide a basis for achieving the radical solution both our leaders seek -- eliminating nuclear weapons entirely on a global basis.

-- Our effort to see whether this is possible is embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative. The SDI is strictly a research effort and is being conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty.

-- No decisions on moving beyond the stage of research have been taken, nor could they be for several years. Such research is necessary to see if it will be possible to move toward a world in which the threat of nuclear war is eliminated.

-- If, at a future point, testing or deployment of systems not now permitted by the ABM Treaty were contemplated, we believe that should be a matter for negotiation.

-- The Soviet Union has been actively engaged in the same sort of research for several years. Your military has intensive efforts underway to develop lasers, particle beams and other technologies for ballistic missile defense.

-- I doubt either side is prepared to abandon its research efforts now, before we know whether there are defensive systems that could enhance rather than diminish the security of both sides. We doubt an effective and verifiable ban on research, as such, could be designed in any event.

-- We are prepared to discuss with you the whole question of strategic defense (both existing and possible future systems), reductions in offensive arms, and the nature of the offense-defense relationship that we should be seeking to establish and maintain in the future.

-- In this context, we are also prepared to explore the possibilities for effective and verifiable limitations in the area of space weapons, on which the Soviet Union has placed such emphasis.

-- We do not consider it either timely or practical, however, to pursue the chimera of a sweeping ban on all military uses of space. For example, ballistic missile early-warning satellites are a valuable military use of space, and make a significant contribution to the stability of deterrence.

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-- Two days of talks in Geneva do not provide enough time to fully explore all the issues.

-- We believe our negotiating efforts today and tomorrow should focus on the most urgent question before us: how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms and enhance the stability of the strategic environment.

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33

Second Session: Afternoon of January 74. Non-Arms Control "Headlines"

Background: Gromyko has evaded your suggestion that time be set aside for these issues, but it is important that some discussion take place. The most likely time would be during the second session Monday afternoon, after the two sides have made their basic presentations on arms control, but before getting more deeply into substance. Since the Soviets have some interest in an exchange on VE-Day, it would probably be best to raise issues that are less pleasant together with this topic, rather than separating the relatively sweet and the relatively sour. Alternatively, you may wish to raise VE-Day late in this second session, reserving the right to come back to other non-arms control topics the next day. The best format would probably be the "headlines" that Gromyko introduced and you both used during your September sessions.

On substance, there have been three developments since our first memo on non-arms control topics. First, the Soviets have given us a counterproposal on Middle East exchanges, for talks in Moscow in February at Assistant Secretary level. Second, Ambassador Hinton has suggested that you raise Afghanistan; we think that fuller discussion should be deferred to a later meeting, but the President's reference to Afghanistan exchanges in his last letter to Chernenko should be mentioned. Third, the Soviets have accepted the US-Japanese proposal to talk about Pacific air safety measures, and this should be noted in urging further movement on bilateral topics, specifically consulates.

Talking PointsVE, VJ-Day Anniversaries

-- We intend to recognize the Soviet contribution to the common victory in 1945.

-- I well remember my moving visit to the Leningrad war dead cemetery in 1975.

-- But Soviet efforts to downplay our contribution and isolate West Germany and Japan make it very difficult to contemplate appropriate joint commemoration of the anniversary.

-- We should face the future rather than the past, and concentrate on peace and reconciliation, avoiding a competitive propaganda approach.

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BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

Berlin Air Corridors

-- Have noted small reductions in coverage of your airspace reservations in Berlin corridors, but issue is unresolved, and your practices still create serious problems for Allied aircraft.

-- Don't want this issue to interfere with improvements in bilateral relations, but more flexibility on your side will be required.

Regularized Exchanges on Regional Issues

-- Welcome your ^{response to our} proposal for talks on the Middle East ~~in~~ ~~Moscow in February~~ and will be getting back to you. // Ret

-- We have had exchange of papers on southern Africa, and our offer of further discussions stands. President mentioned Afghanistan in his last letter to Chernenko; Far East (both Kampuchea and northeast Asia) is still important.

-- Would be good if we were moving toward regularized exchanges at policy level President proposed in UNGA address.

Human Rights

-- In no other area could Soviet gestures be so beneficial to relations as in human rights. Ludmila Alekseyeva's mother emigration before New Year is example of good step. Examples of further steps: Shcharanskiy (worried about health); Sakharov (full medical treatment and study facilities should be granted); Josif Begun; Yuri Crlov.

-- Most critical issue is repression of Hebrew teachers: savage beatings, extortion, severe sentences on trumped-up charges.

-- Issue is Soviet international commitment to foster cultural and religious freedom.

-- Every bit as damaging as decline in emigration levels to Soviet reputation and to prospects for better relations.

Bilateral Issues

-- Area where we seem to be able to do some business: Olmer visit, meetings on coast guard search and rescue and on hotline upgrade this month. On Pacific air safety, we are working on proposals for date and location of talks, welcome your interest.

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- 3 -

-- Ought to try to keep moving forward, avoid artificial linkages. We are willing to talk about Aeroflot issue on its merits, think we should both be able to move forward on exchanges agreement and on consulates on their merits.

-- We proposed last April that technical team visit Kiev to look at properties, have some specialists looking at our chancery in Moscow this month, propose they go on to Kiev. Would like response.

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5. Subject and Objectives

Background: By way of introduction to your presentation on the substantive aspects of START, INF and defensive arms, you would lay out our general thoughts on the principal concrete task: reaching agreement on the fora for follow-on negotiations, their subject, title, objectives, location, and timing. This would lay the basis for possible negotiation of a joint communique the following day. In addition, you would raise the possibility of another Ministerial meeting, so that Gromyko will be able to obtain instructions on how to respond before the next day's meeting.

Talking Points

-- Having in this morning's session discussed our general views, I propose this afternoon that we concentrate on our principal task, agreement on the fora for negotiations, their subject, title, and objectives, and their location and timing.

-- I would hope that, by the conclusion of our discussions tomorrow, we will have made sufficient progress to announce agreement to open formal negotiations.

-- In any case, I hope we can agree on the desirability of the two of us meeting again at an early date to give impetus to the negotiating process.

Offensive Forces

-- With respect to offensive nuclear systems, we would prefer to begin where we broke off in the START and INF negotiations. We believe that much good work was done in both sets of talks, even though many issues remained unresolved.

-- Moreover, while the issues involved are clearly related, we continue to believe it would be most practical to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in separate fora.

-- Thus, we propose that we begin new negotiations on strategic arms reductions, and a second set of new negotiations on reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

-- The subject of the first, strategic offensive arms -- or, more precisely, intercontinental-range offensive nuclear forces -- is fairly well established.

-- We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

-- As a title for such talks, we believe that "Strategic Offensive Nuclear Arms Reductions Talks" would be an apt description.

-- I propose that the objective of renewed talks be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms.

-- In the case of the second negotiation we envisage, on intermediate-range nuclear forces, we likely still differ on the exact scope of the agenda.

- But here too I think that our previous efforts revealed a common emphasis on reducing longer-range INF missiles, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination.

- Moreover, we seem to agree that while systems in or in range of Europe should be a central concern, any agreement must take account of the global aspects of the INF problem.

- And both sides have proposed that certain INF aircraft and shorter-range missile systems be dealt with in some fashion.

-- We propose as the title for new talks on INF the "Intermediate-range Nuclear Offensive Arms Reductions Talks."

-- The objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

-- I suggest that, for both the strategic and intermediate-range negotiations, the location of the talks be Geneva and that the date on which both fora be convened be the first Tuesday in March (March 5th).

Defensive Systems

-- Let me now turn to our ideas for how to address the other aspects of "nuclear and space arms" on which we agreed in November to begin negotiations.

-- In the early days of SALT I both sides agreed that a treaty limiting defensive arms should be paralleled by a treaty limiting offensive arms and vice versa. For reasons including those I advanced this morning, we continue to believe there is merit in such an approach.

-- We understand that the USSR believes that controlling weapons in space should be a priority matter. We believe, however, that a forum permitting negotiation of defensive nuclear arms would be a more appropriate complement to new negotiations on offensive nuclear systems.

-- In such a forum, we would be prepared to address the question of space-based defensive systems in a serious and constructive manner. Space-related questions could also be taken up in the offensive arms negotiations as well, as appropriate.

-- But we believe that it is important to address questions relating to existing defensive systems based on earth, as well as potential future space-based systems, and to restore and revalidate the assumptions on which the ABM Treaty was based.

-- We therefore propose that we establish a third negotiating forum, in which each side could address aspects of the offense-defense relationship not dealt with in the two offensive nuclear arms fora.

-- Given our shared objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons, and the concerns you expressed at our September meetings regarding the potential deployment of nuclear arms in space, the focus of discussion should be on defensive nuclear arms.

-- Thus, as the title for such talks, we suggest the Defensive Nuclear Arms Talks. Their objective would be agreement on measures to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and on steps toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear-armed defensive systems.

-- We propose they also be located in Geneva and that they convene on the second Tuesday in March (March 12).

Continuing Forum to Address Strategic Stability

-- In addition to the three formal negotiating fora I have suggested, we believe it would be useful to establish a continuing channel for more unstructured, conceptual exchanges on the maintenance of strategic stability and the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

-- This could be done through diplomatic channels, or perhaps more usefully, through periodic meetings of special representatives.

Conclusion

-- I hope you will give all these proposals serious consideration, so that by the end of our meetings tomorrow we will have identified some common ground on "subject and objectives" of new negotiations in the offensive and defensive areas.

-- Of course, we should recognize that a fully agreed approach can only emerge through the negotiating process itself.

-- In the remainder of today's discussions, we should begin the process of reaching a fuller understanding of one another's approach to the negotiations by exploring some of the concrete issues involved.

NOTE: At this point you may wish to give Gromyko a chance to respond. Depending on his position, you would have the option of moving to one of the fallback positions set forth in your instructions -- although this may be more appropriate for the next day's meeting, when negotiation of a joint communique would presumably occur. In any event, after Gromyko's response, you would go on to the following talking points addressing strategic, INF, and defensive arms in more specific terms.

Possible Fallbacks (Contingency Points)

[If Gromyko presses for combined START/INF negotiation:

-- While we continue to believe separate fora are more practical, we are prepared to agree to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in a single forum.

-- We would envisage, however, that there would be separate working groups to address strategic and INF issues.]

[If Gromyko objects to "nuclear" qualifier for defensive arms negotiations:

-- We are prepared to agree to address all defensive systems, nuclear and non-nuclear, in Defensive Arms Talks.

-- We cannot, however, agree to a negotiation focused exclusively on space-based systems. As I stated, space-related issues can be addressed as part of the broader offensive and defensive arms negotiations.]

[If Gromyko calls for single negotiating forum:

-- Although we agree there is an interrelationship among all these issues, we believe it more practical to address offensive and defensive forces in separate negotiations.

-- We would, therefore be prepared to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear offensive arms in a single forum, but believe strongly that it would be more practical to treat defensive systems in a separate forum.

-- (If pressed) Nonetheless, as a gesture of good will, we are prepared to agree to a single omnibus negotiating framework. We would propose that forum be entitled the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, and assume that, within the single negotiating structure, there would be working groups to address individual issues.]

[If Gromyko insists on reference to "space" in title of negotiations:

-- We do not believe that it would be productive to have a negotiation that focused exclusively on space arms.

-- As I noted, space-related issues could be taken up in both the context of offensive and defensive arms. We are prepared to indicate that space arms would be addressed in both the nuclear offensive and defensive fora.

-- (If pressed) Nonetheless, as a gesture of good will, we are prepared to agree to a single omnibus negotiating framework that would be entitled the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks. We assume that, within the single negotiating structure, there would be working groups to address individual issues.]

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6. Strategic Forces

Background: You would open by reviewing the flexibility and reasonableness inherent in the previous US START position. You would then go on to reiterate US readiness to move beyond where the last round of START left off and to explore trade-offs between relative areas of US and Soviet advantage. By way of illustration, you would set forth the possibility of asymmetrical limits and/or aggregation (in the latter context, reiterating the concept of a common framework that you described to Gromyko in Stockholm). Supplemental points are provided that preview some of the details of our proposed new structure [these would require White House approval].

Talking Points

Review of US position, readiness to explore trade-offs

-- Our proposals in START were designed precisely to achieve more stable balance at substantially reduced levels. Our original START proposal entailed a one-third reduction in number of ballistic missile warheads on each side.

-- We also proposed important limitations that would reduce and constrain those systems that pose greatest threat to strategic stability, large, highly-MIRVed ICBMs.

-- At same time, we demonstrated considerable flexibility. We expressed readiness to talk about alternative ways to reduce the destructive power of ballistic missiles. We were also prepared, in response to Soviet concerns, to negotiate constraints on heavy bombers and cruise missiles to levels well below those permitted by SALT II.

-- There was basis for a trade-off between each side's concerns. Unfortunately, Soviet side did not explore that possibility, and then suspended the dialogue on these issues. We remain ready to work with you to achieve mutually acceptable strategic arms agreement embodying major cuts and putting us well on the road to a more stable strategic situation.

-- In previous discussions with you on the question of reducing strategic arms, I have stressed US readiness to explore new ideas going beyond where we left off in the last round of START, ideas that could overcome some of the fundamental differences that have divided us in negotiations to date.

-- In seeking a more stable and reliable balance at levels lower than now exist, we recognize that there are important asymmetries between the intercontinental-range nuclear forces of our two countries, and that equality can be achieved without requiring forces that are mirror-images.

-- We are prepared to explore concrete trade-offs that would take account of the differences in our force structures, as we seek to establish a more stable balance at reduced levels.

-- We are flexible regarding both the structure and content of the trade-offs, so long as the result is an agreement that meets our basic criteria of equality, verifiability, militarily significant reductions, and stability.

-- We can envisage proceeding in a number of alternative directions. We could, for example, consider asymmetrical limits or different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome.

-- Of course, we are also ready to listen to any new Soviet thoughts in this area.

Examples of Trade-Offs: Asymmetrical Limits

-- As an example of asymmetrical limits, we could envisage a trade-off involving a Soviet advantage in the overall destructive capacity of ballistic missile forces in exchange for a US advantage in the number of air-launched cruise missiles.

-- If the Soviet Union were interested in pursuing this idea, we would be prepared to add to the current US proposal a specific limit on the total number of ALCMs permitted to each side. The US level would be well below the number that could otherwise be deployed on the US bomber forces, if the Soviet Union were prepared to agree to commensurate reductions in the destructive capacity of its ballistic missiles.

-- To the extent the Soviet side insisted on retaining an advantage in ballistic missile destructive capacity and potential, the corresponding limit on Soviet ALCMs would be lower than the level permitted the US.

Examples of Trade-Offs: Common Structure (recap of Stockholm)

-- This is but one way we could proceed. Another practical approach would be to consider limitations that would aggregate the elements of the sides' forces in different ways than the sides' have proposed to date.

-- For example, as I suggested at Stockholm, we could try to come up with a common structure which could incorporate key elements of both the US and Soviet positions. This could involve mutual acceptance of parts of the Soviet Union's proposal and parts of our own proposal.

-- Such a common structure would be a means of recognizing the concerns already expressed by both sides in the START negotiations -- one that would account for the Soviet Union's concerns over limiting US bombers and cruise missiles, while meeting our concerns about the large Soviet ICBM force. It would not have to make each other's forces identical or to achieve equality in every measure.

-- For our part under such an arrangement, we would want to see constraints that begin the process of effecting genuine reductions in the number of Soviet and US missile warheads, especially those on MIRVed ballistic missiles, and ease the asymmetry in the destructive power of our two strategic forces.

-- In turn, there could be accompanying limits on US heavy bombers and long-range air-launched cruise missiles, about which the Soviet Union has expressed concern.

[Supplemental Points Providing Further Details of Framework -- would need to be cleared by White House:]

-- More specifically, such an arrangement might involve two parallel networks of ceilings and subceilings, one on the total number of delivery vehicles (as emphasized by the Soviet side), the other on the total number of warheads (as emphasized by the US). The latter ceiling could encompass warheads on air-launched cruise missiles together with those on ballistic missiles.

-- Within these ceilings, we would envisage appropriate sublimits. For example, within the aggregate ceiling on delivery vehicles, there would be a ceiling on heavy ICBMs below that established in SALT I and II.

-- Within aggregate ceiling on ballistic and cruise missile warheads, there would be a subceiling on the number of warheads on the most destabilizing systems, MIRVed ballistic missiles.

-- The likely de facto outcome of such an approach would be some Soviet advantage in ballistic missiles and some US advantage in bombers -- hence, the trade-off.

-- There would, at same time, be sufficient flexibility for sides to structure their forces as they preferred, in context of overall reductions in warheads, delivery vehicles and destructive potential.]

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7. Intermediate-range nuclear forces

Background: You would summarize in some detail where we left off in the fall of 1983 and the areas of US flexibility still to be explored. Additional points introduce the equal percentage reductions to equal warhead levels approach.

Talking Points

Basic points reviewing flexibility in US fall 1983 proposal

-- We should find a solution to put INF behind us. Resolution of this issue would be in the interests of both countries and would facilitate arms control progress across the board. This will require a creative effort by both sides to overcome the problems which have stymied that negotiation.

-- We and our Allies will continue to evaluate a potential INF agreement against several basic criteria:

- equal rights and limits expressed globally, with no export of the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia;
- no compensation for British and French nuclear forces;
- no reduction in NATO conventional force capability; and
- effective verification.

-- The US demonstrated considerable flexibility during the course of the INF talks. Last fall we presented proposals that represented a major effort to accommodate Soviet concerns on several basic questions, and I note that there were questions on which the differences in our views were narrowed.

-- We both agree that the priority objective should be to reduce longer-range INF missile systems, those planned and those in being.

-- We stated that we would not deploy our full global allotment of LRINF missiles in Europe and offered to discuss specific commitments with regard to US deployments in Europe. The Soviet side expressed a readiness to consider some constraints on its missiles in Asia. There thus was a narrowing of our differences on the question of geographic scope.

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NLRR F06-114/8 # 10363

BY MSI NARA DATE 9/30/08

-- Moreover, we offered to make specific reductions in the number of Pershing IIs that could be deployed, in response to particular concerns expressed by the Soviet side.

-- We also offered to explore limits on LRINF aircraft and were able somewhat to narrow differences on this score in the last weeks of the Geneva talks.

-- We believe a mutually acceptable accord is possible on the basis of these proposals. In formal negotiations, we remain ready to explore the considerable flexibility inherent in them, and to consider any new ideas the Soviet side has to offer.

Equal Percentage Reductions to Equal Warhead Outcome

-- We are prepared to take a creative approach to INF in the interest of resolving this issue.

[Variant 1:

-- As an example of the approach the US is prepared to take in resumed negotiations on INF, we could envisage a proposal incorporating equal percentage reductions to achieve equal global warhead levels.

Note: This assumes equal percentage reductions in planned US launchers in Europe and existing Soviet launchers globally, with the US having the right to deploy outside of Europe additional launchers (over and above the level to which it reduced in Europe) to achieve equality in global LRINF missile warhead levels.]

[Variant 2:

-- As an example of the approach the US is prepared to take in resumed negotiations on INF, we could envisage a proposal incorporating equal percentage reductions in planned US LRINF deployments in Europe and in the existing global Soviet SS-20 force.

-- The US would retain a legal right to deploy an equal number of warheads globally; we presently have no plans to deploy LRINF missiles outside of Europe or the US.]

[Variant 3:

-- As an example of the approach the US is prepared to take in resumed negotiations on INF, we could envisage a proposal by which the US would cut its planned LRINF deployments in Europe by half were the Soviet Union to reduce its existing global SS-20 force by half.

-- The US would retain a legal right to deploy an equal number of warheads globally; we presently have no plans to deploy LRINF missiles outside of Europe or the US.

Note: given the concern about avoiding the principle of equal percentage reductions per se, it might be better to simply suggest that US and Soviet deployments be cut by a specific amount, i.e., half.]

(pick up following points for all three variants)

-- With agreement on this, and picking up some of the points discussed in earlier negotiations on secondary issues, the details of an accord could be settled in a short period of time.

-- This offer represents a significant step toward Soviet concerns and could open the door to a resolution of the INF issue. We urge you to give it most serious consideration.

[If Gromyko Attempts to Pocket Equal Percentage Reduction Approach as a Principle:

-- The US is not prepared to accept the concept of equal percentage reductions per se. However, in the interest of achieving a quick solution that will put the INF issue behind us, the US is prepared to consider certain equal percentage reduction approaches as a means to achieve a mutually acceptable accord governing LRINF missile systems.]

3737M

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8. Defensive Arms

Background: You would indicate that we view space as one aspect of the broader range of offensive and defensive issues. You would point out that an existing body of international law already governs space and that space is already "militarized." You would attempt to get Gromyko's agreement to address space as part of both the nuclear offensive and defensive fora. Supplemental points raise the possibility of a joint space rescue mission.

Talking Points

-- While we are ready to address these issues seriously, "space" cannot be viewed in isolation; it is one aspect of the broader range of nuclear offensive and defensive arms issues. For this reason, we believe space-related issues should be addressed in the nuclear offensive and defensive arms fora.

-- We will give careful consideration to Soviet concerns, I would note, however, that there is already a considerable body of international law governing space. The stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space is banned by the Outer Space Treaty. The testing and deployment of ABM systems and their components in space is banned by the ABM Treaty.

-- Further, your side has long had military systems in space, including national technical means of verification and means of communication. We also have such systems and, although they are military systems, we believe these types of systems to perform desirable functions.

-- Moreover, the only operational dedicated anti-satellite system is a Soviet system. It is the Soviet Union that maintains the only operational ABM system. And the Soviet Union has the largest number of offensive nuclear warheads that would transit space.

-- As I indicated this morning, we on our side have important concerns concerning existing defensive systems and the erosion of the assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty in recent years.

-- We wish to raise our legitimate concerns in that area concurrently. In the same forum we will welcome a presentation of your views concerning additional measures concerning new defensive arms.

-- We also believe, consistent with our mutually stated goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, that restricting nuclear defensive arms should be a special concern.

-- As to possible future missile defense systems, space-based or otherwise, this is a question for the future. The relevant technologies are still in the research and technical experimental phase. As I noted before, SDI is a research program; research and technical experimentation is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

-- If, and when, our research should lead us to conclude that a defensive technology not permitted by the ABM Treaty could strengthen deterrence, this would be a matter for discussion as provided by the ABM Treaty.

-- We are, however, prepared to discuss now the question of defenses, both future and existing, whether space-based or otherwise, and how they relate to offensive arms and to the overall offense-defense relationship. We are prepared to join you in a serious negotiation on defensive arms if you also are desirous of doing so.

[If Gromyko Raises ASAT Moratorium or President's "mutual restraints" offer:

-- We have made clear that we will not accept a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite systems as a precondition for negotiations.

-- With regard to ASAT limitations, the US is prepared -- in formal negotiations -- to consider areas of mutual restraint which might be negotiated in the context of broader agreements providing for stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms.]

Space Rescue - Supplemental Points

-- The US does not view or seek to make space an arena of competition between our two countries. I would comment that there have been notable cooperative efforts between us, for example, the instrumentation developed by US scientists now carried aboard your Vega space probe.

-- The President has asked me to reiterate the offer we made last January for a joint US-Soviet manned mission to develop space rescue techniques. Such a mission would be relatively easy to set up from a technical view, and would benefit both our manned space programs.

(3738M)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 4, 1985

TO: Ron Lehman
Jack Matlock ✓
Steve Steiner
Bob Linhard

FROM: Karna ✓

Here is the State Dept. summary from this morning's TODAY show - which you and Bud had requested - showing the interview with Menshikov.

NBC MORNING NEWS SUPPLY -- JANUARY 4, 1985

ARMS TALKS - The Administration has outlined a hardline negotiating position for Geneva, especially for the President's Star Wars Proposal. Outside observers say the hardline stance on defensive systems could prevent any progress. But the Administration is prepared to offer tradeoffs on offensive weapons. (Andrea Mitchell, the White House)

CENTRAL COMMITTEE ADVISOR STANISLAR MENSNIKOV INTERVIEWED BY STEVE MALLORY - Mr. Menchikov: We expect the Americans to be realistic and constructive at Geneva so we can bring an end to the arms buildup and finally an end to nuclear weapons. We have not seen a single US military program cancelled or even modified to the extent that it would give new hope. We have to continue to build arms because the US does. Space is a key issue. If there is a decision on space, there will be a decision on all the other things. If there is no decision on space, we will be in an arms race for the next 10 to 15 years. I expect space and nuclear weapons to be discussed as a single issue -- neither to be decided without the other. There is a hope for the success of the negotiations. The Soviet Union is ready for radical and constructive solutions -- for radical reductions in arms -- and we are looking forward to seeing what Mr. Shultz brings in his luggage.

NICARAGUA - Concern is growing about attacks on civilians by US-backed Nicaraguan rebels. Rebel leaders flatly deny this and say such reports are communist propoganda. In the field they say they warn civilians that they will be shot if they are seen with government soldiers. Despite these reports, Nicaragua's more moderate oppositon leaders have announced unexpectedly that they support CIA funding of the rebels -- a dramatic change in their position. Arturo Cruz: Military pressure on the Nicaraguan government must continue.

Administration officials say they will launch a major campaign to persuade Congress to restore funding to the rebels. (Robin Lloyd, the State Department)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

51
January 4, 1985

TO:

WALT RAYMOND
RON LEHMAN
CHRIS LEHMAN
TY COBB
JACK MATLOCK
BOB LINHARD
BILL WRIGHT
SVEN KRAEMER

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

Attached is front part of Bud's briefing yesterday, with his on-the-record statement. Karna has distributed the Q&A part.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 3, 1985

STATEMENT BY ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
ON GENEVA TALKS

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

12:00 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: I want to welcome you to the briefing that will be, more or less, a scene-setter for the upcoming talks in Geneva between Secretary Shultz and the U.S. party and the Soviet Foreign Minister and the Soviet party.

The briefing today will be in two parts. The first part will be an on-the-record statement by the President's ~~Foreign Policy~~ ^{National Security} Advisor, Robert C. McFarlane; and the second will be a background briefing by a senior administration official.

We have a number of press materials here in a kit that includes reproductions of these charts, a new booklet on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, which is being released for the first time today, and I want to particularly call your attention to it. It includes the Presidential statement at the beginning of the book.

Do we have any questions prior to the beginning?

Q Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes?

Q Can't you have the whole briefing on the record?

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q Larry, are you aware of the fact that the briefer's name has already been published as the person giving this briefing?

MR. SPEAKES: I'm aware it's been published in The New York Times this morning, but I don't know whether that constitutes a license for anyone else, but you have to make your own moral judgments on this.

Q Will the briefer appear saying substantially the same things in front of a television camera in the next several days?

MR. SPEAKES: There are no plans for the briefer to appear on television in the next several days.

Q Larry, those charts aren't in --

MR. SPEAKES: Aren't what?

Q Aren't in the book.

MR. SPEAKES: Oh, they will be brought in. You'll get them on the way out.

All right. Anybody else anywhere? Everybody feel pretty comfortable with the rules?

MR. MCFARLANE: Good morning. In the course of the past year, the President has directed and managed a review of the full family of United States arms control positions, covering the spectrum

of separate negotiations which have gone on in the past and presumptively will be resumed in the future. More recently, he has chaired and now completed a review of preparations for the opening of talks with the Soviet Union to take place next Monday in Geneva.

The United States approaches the January 7th and 8th meetings with the Soviet Foreign Minister with a sense of determination and patience and with hope for a productive outcome. We fully recognize this is the beginning of a long and complicated process. The issues involved go to the very heart of national security interests of both countries.

They are extremely complex from a technological standpoint. Furthermore, these talks are only a part, although a vital part, of the broader relationship between our two countries, a relationship involving regional issues, human rights, bilateral issues, as well.

While considerable time, therefore, may be needed to reach agreement on arms control outcomes, the U.S. is hopeful that the Geneva meetings will facilitate progress toward addressing the difficult arms control issues before us. We are realistic concerning the obstacles we face, but we are determined at the same time to do our part to make these efforts succeed and to establish a framework and a process for resuming the bilateral arms control dialogue.

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to the international community to make these efforts succeed. The United States, for its part, has constructive ideas to present in Geneva, and we will listen carefully to the Soviet presentations. Our negotiators will be flexible and patient.

With equal commitment and flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union, we are hopeful that these meetings will provide a start down the long road toward achieving equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear forces, toward enhancing deterrence and ensuring the peace.

END

12:04 P.M. EST

SOVIET LEADERS DECIDE ON STANCE AT ARMS TALKS

BY ANNA CHRISTENSEN

54

MOSCOW (UPI) -- THE RULING POLITBURO HAS DECIDED ON THE POSITION FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO WILL TAKE IN NEXT WEEK'S PRELIMINARY ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ; THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY SAID.

"AN APPROPRIATE DECISION ON THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION WAS TAKEN" BY THE POLITBURO, WHICH DISCUSSED "QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN GENEVA ON JANUARY 7-8" DURING ITS REGULAR MEETING THURSDAY, TASS SAID.

THE NEWS AGENCY GAVE NO OTHER DETAILS IN THE DISPATCH, WHICH WAS READ ON THE EVENING TELEVISION NEWS.

WESTERN DIPLOMATS DESCRIBED THE TASS ANNOUNCEMENT AS "HIGHLY UNUSUAL" AND SAID IT WAS DESIGNED TO SHOW THE WORLD GROMYKO HAD THE UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF HIS COLLEAGUES DESPITE BEHIND-THE-SCENES DISCORD.

THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS ARE AIMED AT RESUMING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, WHICH WERE SUSPENDED IN NOVEMBER 1983 WHEN NATO BEGAN DEPLOYING U.S. PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

KREMLIN LEADERS HOPE NEXT WEEK'S MEETING WOULD LEAD TO TALKS ON A SPACE WEAPONS BAN. THE SOVIET UNION IS BELIEVED TO BE YEARS BEHIND THE UNITED STATES IN SPACE WEAPON TECHNOLOGY AND COULD ONLY KEEP UP THE PROGRAM AT HUGE EXPENSE.

IN WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT REAGAN THURSDAY SAID THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO HIS DECISION TO CONTINUE RESEARCH ON A "STAR WARS" ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEM BECAUSE THE PROGRAM THREATENED NO ONE.

UNLIKE GROMYKO'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SHULTZ LAST SEPTEMBER, THE GENEVA TALKS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WIDELY IN THE SOVIET PRESS -- AN INDICATION OF HOW MUCH THE KREMLIN IS RELYING ON THE DISCUSSIONS TO EASE SUPERPOWER TENSION.

"THE HOPES FOR THE LESSENING OF TENSION, FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, REVIVAL OF THE PROCESS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION EXPRESSED ON THE NEW YEAR EVE WERE LINKED DIRECTLY WITH THE COMING MEETING," THE OFFICIAL IZVESTIA NEWSPAPER SAID.

THE NEWSPAPER ALSO EXPRESSED ALARM THE SUPERPOWER RIVALRY WOULD SPREAD TO SPACE SAYING, "HE WHO CONTROLS SPACE CONTROLS THE EARTH."

A TASS NEWS ANALYSIS SAID NOT ONLY WAS THE MEETING NECESSARY TO CURB THE ARMS RACE, BUT ALSO TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE "FREE FROM NUCLEAR THREAT, SUSPICION, HATRED, FEAR AND ENMITY."

"THE PREVENTION OF THE RACE IN SPACE WEAPONS PLAYS A KEY ROLE HERE BECAUSE ONCE SUCH A RACE BEGINS, IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS IN ITSELF AND, MOREOVER, WOULD GIVE AN IMPETUS TO THE ARMS RACE IN OTHER AREAS," THE NEWS AGENCY SAID.

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(PRAVDA EDITORIAL)

BY ANNA CHRISTENSEN

MOSCOW (UPI) -- FAILURE BY THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION TO REACH AGREEMENT ON DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS WILL MEAN A NEW AND DEADLY ESCALATION OF THE ARMS RACE, THE COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY PRAVDA SAID TODAY.

"IF A RELIABLE BARRIER IS NOT PUT UP IN THE WAY OF MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE, A NEW, DEADLY SPIRAL OF THE ARMS RACE BECOMES INEVITABLE AND THE DANGER OF THERMONUCLEAR WAR WILL GROW IMMENSELY," THE PRAVDA EDITORIAL SAID.

THE COMMENTS WERE MADE THREE DAYS BEFORE PRELIMINARY ARMS CONTROL TALKS SCHEDULED IN GENEVA MONDAY BETWEEN SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO AND SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ.

THE RULING POLITBURO THURSDAY DEBATED AND APPROVED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT GROMYKO WILL CARRY TO THE GENEVA TALKS, THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS SAID, BUT IT GAVE NO DETAILS OF THE KREMLIN AGENDA.

PICKUP 4THGRAF: WESTERN DIPLOMATS

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PM-SOVIET 1STLD-PICKUP4THGRAF 1-4

(PRAUDA EDITORIAL)

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PICKUP 4THGRAF: WESTERN DIPLOMATS

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SOVIET LEADERS DECIDE ON STANCE AT ARMS TALKS

BY ANNA CHRISTENSEN

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT RAYMOND
 RON LEHMAN
 CHRIS LEHMAN
 TY COBB
 JACK MATLOCK
 BOB LINHARD
 BILL WRIGHT
 SVEN KRAEMER
 RON SABLE
 JOHN LENCZOWSKI
 KARNA SMALL

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

Steve

SUBJECT:

Geneva Preparations -- Arms Control Themes

Attached for your use is a copy of the interagency-cleared arms control themes which we have developed as part of our preparations for the Geneva meetings. You may draw upon this as you see fit in your contacts with press, public, diplomats, etc.

We are also sending this by cable to our posts and commands overseas, making clear to them that at least for now Geneva should be treated as part of these broader points on arms control. We are asking posts not to go into further detail about Geneva, beyond the themes and Bud's Backgrounder, until we send further guidance after the meetings.

Attachment

Points to Make: Arms Control

Basic Message

We seek a constructive and realistic long-term relationship with the Soviet Union, and have made a major effort to improve relations across the board.

Resuming the nuclear arms reduction negotiations is only one part -- but an important part -- of that overall effort.

We also have an active dialogue in other major areas, including regional issues, human rights, and bilateral issues.

U.S. Approach to Arms Control

Our objective continues to be balanced and verifiable arms control agreements which reduce the levels of armaments on both sides and strengthen stability.

--The purpose of the meeting in Geneva is to break the arms control logjam, and reach a common understanding on the subject and objectives of further negotiations on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms.

--Realism, flexibility and resolve are the hallmarks of our approach. We

- o do not expect results overnight -- recognize that the negotiating process is likely to be long and complex;
- o are ready to be flexible;
- o are determined to move the arms control process forward.

-- In short term, talks could help clarify our differences and begin more productive dialogue. Over longer-term, such dialogue can help resolve substantive and procedural issues.

-- We will be ready to discuss full range of arms control issues, including relationship between offensive and defensive forces. U.S. will have concrete suggestions to advance the process of arms control, and will listen carefully to what the Soviets have to say.

-- Time is right for negotiations:

- o we are strong both economically and militarily -- our modernization program is underway and provides important incentives for Soviets to negotiate seriously;
- o our allies fully support our efforts to get negotiations going;
- o since West has held firm, Soviets have gained nothing by walking away and staying away from the negotiating table for a year.

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Reductions in Offensive Nuclear Arsenals

Basic Message

Most important task is to resume negotiations to reduce offensive nuclear forces. We were flexible at the START and INF negotiations, and are prepared to resume talks in that same spirit.

START

-- U.S. objective in the area of strategic nuclear weapons remains substantial, stabilizing reductions in strategic arsenals through sound, equitable and verifiable agreements.

-- In START negotiations, U.S. proposed deep reductions in deployed strategic ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles, and limits on bombers and ALCMs. U.S. offered to discuss trade-offs between areas of U.S. and Soviet advantage.

-- For over a decade, Soviets have been building more and newer weapons, while the U.S. has exercised restraint and even made reductions in the number and overall yield of its nuclear stockpile. Soviets have destabilizing advantage in key areas of strategic balance -- notably in land-based ICBMs which threaten U.S. deterrent forces.

U.S. strategic modernization program -- particularly the MX -- is designed to restore stable balance, and provide important incentives for Soviets to negotiate seriously for genuine arms reductions.

Cannot expect Soviets to agree to reductions to equal levels unless they are convinced U.S. is prepared to maintain strength and effectiveness of its own forces.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

-- U.S. had proposed complete elimination of longer-range land-based INF missiles, or their reduction to lowest possible equal US - Soviet level.

-- Soviets broke off negotiations in November 1983 when NATO allies' remained on course with deployments of U.S. LRINF. The NATO decision to deploy while seeking simultaneously significant Soviet reductions was taken in response to the dangerous buildup of Soviet modern, mobile, triple-warhead SS-20s. The Soviets deployed over a hundred triple warhead SS-20s during two years of INF negotiations, and they continue to deploy SS -20s.

-- Soviets have deployed at least 387 SS-20s and are building more.

-- We remain prepared to halt, reverse, modify or dispense altogether with NATO LRINF missiles as part of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement with the Soviets.

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Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms Control

Basic Message

Despite difficulties, U.S. is ready to discuss equitable and verifiable arms control measures, including anti-satellite weapons. Soviet advantage in possessing the world's only operational ASAT is a destabilizing reality that must be taken into account.

ASATs

-- It is disingenuous for the Soviets to speak of "preventing the militarization of space": military use of space began four decades ago when the first ballistic missiles were shot through space.

-- For over a dozen years, the Soviet Union has had the world's only proven anti-satellite weapon system, and has other systems capable of threatening U.S. satellites and deterrent forces which depend on them.

-- The US is developing an anti-satellite weapon for defensive reasons: to deter threats to US and Allied space systems and to counter Soviet space-based systems that could support hostile military forces.

-- The U.S. ASAT system will redress an existing imbalance and provide important incentives for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for meaningful ASAT arms control.

-- We need to recognize the difficulties inherent in ASAT arms control -- i.e. defining an ASAT for arms control purposes, verifying an agreement and deterring breakout from an agreement.

-- There is an existing extensive body of international law and treaties concerning space.

-- We are prepared to discuss during talks what measures of mutual restraint both sides might take, but we cannot agree to a moratorium as a precondition for talks.

-- The problem of weapons in space cannot be considered in isolation from the overall strategic relationship. Offensive ballistic missiles constitute the most dangerous and threatening use of space by nuclear weapons. Resuming negotiations to reduce offensive nuclear arsenals is therefore an urgent task.

Arms Control: Other Issues

Basic Message

Despite the Soviet walkout last year from the nuclear arms reduction negotiations, various important multilateral negotiations have continued. In all of these, the U.S. and our Allies have been making concrete efforts to reduce force levels and strengthen confidence and security.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

-- Goal is to reduce conventional forces in Central Europe.

-- NATO made new proposals in April 1984 to break the East-West negotiating impasse over the data issue. Soviets have not yet responded positively.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe

-- Objective is to reach agreement on measures to build mutual confidence and reduce the risk of surprise attack in Europe. U.S. and Western allies have proposed 6 specific measures to achieve those objectives.

-- In June 1984, President Reagan announced U.S. would be willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration on non-use of force, if Soviets will negotiate measures to give concrete meaning to that principle. Soviets have not yet been willing to address seriously this U.S. initiative taken in response to their expressed concerns.

Chemical Weapons

-- In April 1984, Vice President Bush presented U.S. draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and a far-reaching inspection system to verify it. So far, Soviets have not responded positively.

Nuclear Testing

-- The U.S. has on numerous occasions proposed talks with the Soviets on improving the means for verifying the unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Soviets have rejected those offers.

-- President Reagan, in his UNGA Speech, proposed a reciprocal exchange of experts to visit each others' nuclear weapons test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapon tests as an initial step toward improving verification of the TTBT and PNET.

-- A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term U.S. goal. It must be considered in the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and the maintenance of an effective deterrent.

Hotline Improvements

In July, U.S. and USSR exchanged notes to upgrade the Hotline. We are also pursuing additional U.S. initiatives in this area.

Compliance

--If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them,

--After careful review and numerous diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union, the US determined in January 1984, that the Soviet Union had violated or probably violated a number of legal obligations and political commitments in seven areas of the arms control field.

-- The Administration is continuing to seek clarification and corrective action from the Soviet Union on these and other issues. A second Administration report will be provided to the Congress on February 1.

--Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future.

--The U.S. is determined that any agreement signed contain provisions for effective verification.

Arms Control and Defensive Systems

Basic Message

While we pursue efforts to negotiate offensive nuclear arms reductions, we are also examining the future potential for new technologies to strengthen deterrence through scientific research to find a defense against ballistic missiles. These efforts are complementary, and we believe it is important to discuss the offense-defense relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has long been engaged in extensive strategic defense research and has deployed the world's only existing ABM system.

SDI

-- The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a long-term research effort to explore the potential of new technologies to defend against ballistic missiles. By our pursuing SDI research now, a future President and Congress will be able to make a knowledgeable decision about deployment of such systems.

-- The Soviets have long been believers in defense: they have the world's only ABM system deployed around Moscow, which they are upgrading. They have long been conducting research into advanced technologies -- such as lasers and neutral particle beams -- with ABM applications.

--The Soviets have devoted far more resources than we have to defensive programs. Indeed, they have spent about as much money for strategic defenses as strategic offense, and both amounts are extremely large.

--By pursuing SDI research now, we are taking the initial steps toward a prudent hedge against the possibility of a Soviet scientific breakthrough or breakout of the ABM treaty.

-- Soviets have almost certainly violated the ABM Treaty with their construction of their large phased-array radar in Eastern Siberia, and we have additional concerns about their compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Arms Control and Defensive Systems

-- We have offered to discuss the implications of strategic defense and the offense-defense relationship with the Soviets, and are prepared for an in-depth discussion.

-- The U.S. and Western aim is not to achieve superiority, but to achieve a safer balance, taking account of Soviet developments;

--SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, be a matter for negotiation;

--Overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence.

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PASS TO BERNARD KALB

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SOPN
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF JANUARY 5 TV NEWSCASTS

A. ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

1. SHULTZ - GROMYKO MEETING - SECRETARY SHULTZ LEFT WASHINGTON TONIGHT FOR GENEVA WHERE HE WILL MEET WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ON MONDAY. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CURRENT THAW IN U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS BUT THEY WARNED THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD FOR A BREAKTHROUGH. (KATHLEEN SULLIVAN)

SHULTZ WILL BE GAUGING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MAKE DEEP CUTS IN OFFENSE WEAPONS AND GROMYKO WILL BE TESTING AMERICA'S WILLINGNESS TO BAN WEAPONS FROM SPACE. BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGE THE ROAD AHEAD WILL NOT BE EASY.

OF ALL THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED IN GENEVA, NONE HAS DRAWN MORE FIRE FROM THE SOVIETS THAN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STAR WARS DEFENSE PLAN EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOTHING MORE THAN A RESEARCH PROGRAM. PAUL WARNKE: "IT'S A BARGAINING CHIP, IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN. OBVIOUSLY IF THERE IS SOMETHING YOU CAN DO THAT THE OTHER SIDE DOESN'T WANT YOU TO DO THAT GIVES YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BARGAINING POWER". AT THIS

ROUND OF TALKS THE U.S. IS NOT EXPECTED TO GIVE GROUND ON THE QUESTION OF WEAPONS IN SPACE. INSTEAD, IT IS ANTICIPATED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL USE THE ISSUE AS LEVERAGE TO GET THE SOVIETS BACK TO THE BARGAINING TABLE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD TO DISCUSS LIMITING ALL KINDS OF WEAPONS. (JOHN MCWETHY, GENEVA)

2. KENNEDY IN SOUTH AFRICA - TODAY SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY BEGAN A WEEK LONG TOUR OF SOUTH AFRICA. THERE WAS A MIXED WELCOME AT THE AIRPORT LOBBY WITH A NUMBER OF BLACKS

PROTESTING HIS VISIT AS POLITICAL GRANDSTANDING. KENNEDY IS VISITING THE COUNTRY TO GET A FIRST HAND LOOK AT THE RACIAL TENSION THERE AND TO DEMONSTRATE HIS OPPOSITION TO ITS HARSH TREATMENT TO BLACKS. BISHOP TUTU WILL BE KENNEDY'S HOST FOR HIS STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA. (JIM OOOTEN, JOHANNESBURG)

B. CBS EVENING NEWS

1. SHULTZ - GROMYKO MEETING - SECRETARY SHULTZ LEFT WASHINGTON TODAY FOR GENEVA. NO HINT YET AS TO WHETHER THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WILL BE WARM OR CHILLY.

IF THE SOVIETS AND U.S. OFFICIALS DO DECIDE TO HOLD SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THE BARGAINING THAT WILL GO ON BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL ONLY BE ONE PART OF THE PROCESS. SOME OF THE TOUGHEST NEGOTIATING WILL GO ON WITHIN EACH GOVERNMENT AS VARIOUS FACTIONS TRY TO AGREE ON WHAT THEIR COUNTRY'S POSITIONS OUGHT TO BE. (BOB SCHEIFFER)

WHEN THE TALKS BEGIN MONDAY THE POSITIONS OF THE SOVIETS AND THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY ESTABLISHED; BUT SUBSTANTIAL RIFTS REMAIN INSIDE THE TWO NEGOTIATING

66
TEAMS. ON THE AMERICAN SIDE THERE IS THE HARD LINE POSITION REPRESENTED AT THE TABLE BY THE PENTAGON'S RICHARD PERLE. THIS HOLDS THAT NO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO COMPROMISE AMERICAN SECURITY. THE MODERATE VIEW HELD BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT HOLDS THAT THERE MUST BE GIVE AND TAKE BY BOTH SIDES. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS FORCED A COMPROMISE OF THESE TWO POSITIONS BY CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS VIOLATIONS OF PAST TREATIES WHILE AGREEING TO BARGAIN ON FUTURE ARMS REDUCTIONS. SHULTZ: "WE ARE GOING THERE WITH A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE AND WE DO HOPE THAT SOMETHING WORTH WHILE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED."

ON THE SOVIET SIDE THE SPLITS ARE NO LESS DEEP, BUT WITH THE SOVIET CAPACITY FOR SECRECY THEY ARE LESS OPENLY DISPLAYED. THE CHIEF SOVIET NEGOTIATOR GROMYKO CLEARLY REPRESENTS THE HARD LINED TRADITIONAL SOVIET VIEWPOINT THAT WANTS SHARP CUTS IN AMERICAN MISSILE NUMBERS, ESPECIALLY MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE MODERATE SOVIET VIEW IS REPRESENTED BY GORBACHEV AND HIS YOUNGER COLLEAGUES. GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WON'T BE IN GENEVA, BUT THEIR PRESENCE WILL BE FELT THERE. THE MODERATE SOVIET LINE STRESSES THE NEED TO CONTAIN AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY, PARTICULARLY IN SPACE DEFENSES. WESTERN

SOVIET EXPERTS SAY THE RUSSIANS, SLOWED BY THEIR OVERWEIGHT BUREAUCRACY AND THEIR DOMESTIC LABOR TROUBLES, NEED TIME TO CATCH UP WITH AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY. SOME OF THESE CONFLICTING VIEWS WILL BE RESOLVED NEXT MONDAY OR TUESDAY IN GENEVA. ALL THAT MAY BECOME APPARENT IS THE SHAPE OF THE HARD BARGAINING THAT LIES AHEAD. THE TALKS WILL BE PLAYED OUT IN A LARGER CONTEXT OF DEEP SPLITS WITHIN THE POWERFUL SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TORN BY CONFLICTS OVER HOW TO TAKE ON THE U.S., MODERNIZE FAST, OR STONEWALL. (DAVID ANDELMAN, GENEVA)

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PASS TO BERNARD KALB

IN A STATEMENT RELEASED TONIGHT PRESIDENT CHERNENKO SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS READY FOR "URGENT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES" TO CONTROL THE ARMS RACE AND IS PREPARED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION. BUT THERE IS NO SIGN IN THIS STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE READY FOR COMPROMISE ON ANYTHING AS HE AGAIN CALLED ON THE UNITED STATES TO ADOPT SOVIET ARMS PROPOSALS. (BOB SCHEIFFER)

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS WAS PREEMPTED BY SPORTS PROGRAMMING.
DAM
BT

JM: I have gone through our pending file and have come up with the following schedule of tentative engagements for next year.

JANUARY

~~7-8[?] Trip to GERMANY~~

~~Trip to Europe~~

5-9 GENEVA

26-Feb 2 - Reserve for MCF trips -

FEBRUARY

5 Invitation to Speak on the Hill at Congressional Roundtable

9-10 Aspen - Wye

12 Lecture at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

15-16 Lecture at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH

[20 - Thatcher visit]

MARCH

1-3 American Ditchley Foundation, Conf. Ditchley Park, England

9-10 Aspen - Wye

28-31 - American - German Conf, Dallas -

APRIL

10 - Harvard

30 - May 12 - Pres trip to Europe

MAY

9 - Bilderberg Mtg at Arrowwood in Rye Brook, N.Y.

1 - 12 (Pres trip to Europe)

ROOM AND VEHICLE ASSIGNMENTS
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL
GENEVA

Due to strict Swiss government limitations on vehicle access to the tarmac at Cointrin airport, arrival and departure motorcades will be as listed. Vehicle assignments and other motorcade configurations will be provided at the hotel.

	<u>Room</u>	<u>Vehicle</u>
Secretary Shultz		Limo w/Amb. Lodge
Mr. McFarlane	1627	No. 1 w/Amb. Carmen
Mrs. McFarlane	1627	No. 2 w/Mrs. Lodge and Mrs. Carmen
Mr. Adelman	1613	VIP Bus
Mr. Bean	1710	Staff Bus
Mr. Begleiter	1122	Press Bus
Ms. Bova	1807	Staff Bus
Mr. Burt	1727	VIP Bus
Gen. Chain	1705	VIP Bus
Ms. Clark-Stanton	1806	Staff Bus
Mr. Clarke	1714	Staff Bus
Mr. Countryman	1722	-
Mr. Gaiani	1721	-
Mr. Gannon	1604	-
Mr. George	1614	VIP Bus
Mr. Haag	1605	-
Amb. Hartman	1706	VIP Bus
Mr. Hill	1804	Spare
Mr. Hudspeth	1208	-
Mr. Kalb	1609	VIP Bus
Dr. Lehman	1709	VIP Bus

	<u>Room</u>	<u>Vehicle</u>
Amb. Matlock	1712	VIP Bus
Mr. McGuire	1607	-
Ms. Milne	1703	Staff Bus
Adm. Moreau	1702	VIP Bus
Mr. Myers	1412	Press Bus
Ms. Nesmith	1805	Staff Bus
Amb. Nitze	1716	VIP Bus
Mr. Oberdorfer	1408	Press Bus
Mr. O'Brien	1608	-
Dr. Oliphant	1619	Spare
Mr. Palmer	1707	VIP Bus
Mr. Pemstein	1121	Press Bus
Mr. Perle	1602	VIP Bus
Amb. Rowny	1713	VIP Bus
Mr. Scally	1421	Press Bus
Mr. Schweid	1119	Press Bus
Mr. Simons	1618	VIP Bus
Ms. Stein	1711	Staff Bus
Mr. Twohie	1622	-
Mr. Zawistowski	1505	-
S Staff Office	1811/12	
S/S Office	1813	
Senior Staff Offices	1718-25	
Mission Control Room	1616/17	

SECRETARY SHULTZ'S MEETINGS
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
January 6, 1985
Geneva

SCENARIO

Airport Arrival

- 9:25 a.m. Wheels down.
- 9:26 a.m. Motorized steps move in to place at front and rear doors of aircraft. Rear door of plane opens and SY agents disembark for assignments. Baggage vehicle proceeds to baggage hatch.
- 9:27 a.m. Secretary, Mr. and Mrs. McFarlane deplane and are greeted by Chief of Protocol and Mrs. Robert Vieux, Ambassador and Mrs. Lodge, and Ambassador and Mrs. Carmen.
- Rest of delegation bypasses receiving line and assembles behind the microphone.
- 9:28 a.m. Secretary walks 75 feet to the right of the aircraft to microphone in front of local press area. Once the Secretary reaches microphone, Secretary's limousine will move to position 15 feet from microphone.
- 9:30 a.m. Arrival statement. (If weather is inclement, rain or light snow, umbrellas will be provided).
- 9:40 a.m. Secretary proceeds to limousine. Depart for hotel.
- 9:50 a.m. Arrive at Intercontinental Hotel. Secretary is met inside door by General Manager Herbert Schott, and escorted to elevator. Proceed to 18th floor accompanied by Mr. Schott and Ambassador Lodge.
- 9:53 a.m. Arrive 18th floor. Brief photo opportunity at elevator, then proceed to Secretary's suite.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By AS NARA, Date 7/29/07