

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Box: 29

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/12/2005

File Folder NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2902

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10297	CABLE	221517Z APR 85 [1 - 13] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	13	4/22/1985	B1
10299	CABLE	220733Z APR 85 [15 - 22] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	8	4/22/1985	B1
10302	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC #10299 [25 - 32] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	8	4/22/1985	B1
10304	CABLE	292105Z APR 85 [33 - 47] R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8	13	4/29/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/12/2005

File Folder NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

FOIA

F06-114/8

Box Number 29

YARHI-MILO

2902

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10305	CABLE	292033Z APR 85 [41 - 42]	2	4/29/1985	B1
		R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*File
NPT*

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012
SIT896 AN006053

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042659
TOR: 112/1533Z

DISTRIBUTION: ~~IP~~ KIMM SIT /004

Fortier Matlock

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1012/01 1121531
O 221517Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0451
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0234

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 121012

NODIS
NSC EYES ONLY FOR KIMMITT

FOLLOWING HELSINKI 1744 DTD APR 22. SENT ACTION SECSTATE BEING
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.

QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ HELSINKI 01744

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, KNNP, UR, US
SUBJECT: U. S. - SOVIET NPT BILATERALS: HEADS OF
DELEGATION MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 6-114/8 #10297

BY 605 NARA DATE 9/30/08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042659

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN A. M. PETROSYANTS, HEADS OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS, MET ON APRIL 17 TO REVIEW REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (FOCUSSING ON ISRAEL, EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ AND LIBYA), SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA (PAKISTAN AND INDIA), AND ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MORE WILLING THEN IN PAST HEADS-OF-DELEGATIONS MEETINGS TO AVOID POLEMICS AND DISCUSS POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY OPENED THE HEADS-OF-DELEGATION MEETING ON APRIL 17 WITH THE TOPIC OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA WHICH IS OF SUCH CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND USSR. THE U.S. REALIZES THAT MANY ARAB STATES ARE CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) NOR ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT ISRAEL IS CONCERNED THAT SOME ARAB STATES ARE CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. THERE IS AN INCREASING DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH, WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER INSTABILITIES, COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR. FOR OUR PART, HE ADDED, WE HAVE STRONGLY URGED ISRAEL TO JOIN THE NPT OR, AT THE LEAST, TO ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS: WE HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED AS YET. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY COOPERATIVE U.S. - ISRAELI NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL HAS ASKED US TO DO SO UNLESS THEY ACCEPT THE NPT OR FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE URGED FRANCE AND OTHERS NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNLESS ISRAEL, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPTS FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042659

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NEXT TURNED TO EGYPT, UNDERSCORING THE FACT THAT OUR AGREEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY -- WHICH FIRST REQUIRED EGYPT TO SIGN THE NPT -- IS THE MOST STRINGENT WE HAVE AND SERVES AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE SUCH ACCORDS. RE IRAQ AND SYRIA, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY FIRST COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS A PARTY TO THE NPT, ANY COOPERATION WITH THAT COUNTRY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRINGENT CONTROLS AND BE LIMITED TO NON-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, POINTS WE HAVE STRESSED TO FRANCE; THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE FOR SYRIA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT LIBYA IS THE TOUGHEST CASE OF ALL. WHILE THIS COUNTRY HAS JOINED THE NPT, COLONEL QADHAFI HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS: WE BELIEVE HIM. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM, ITALY AND FRANCE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT LIBYA, URGING THEM NOT TO PARTICIPATE WITH LIBYA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE URGE THAT ANY COOPERATION THE USSR UNDERTAKES BE SUBJECT TO THE MOST STRINGENT CONTROLS AND NOT INVOLVE SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.

4. MR. PETROSYANTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY (SCAE), REPLIED AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF MIDEAST PROBLEMS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT HE VIEWS LEBANON AS THE HOTTEST SPOT. RETURNING TO ISRAEL, PETROSYANTS MADE TWO POINTS: NO

UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT ADDRESSING MILITARY ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING AND, SECONDLY THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS THAT THE U. S. HAS UNDERTAKEN MISSILE COOPERATION WITH THE FRG, JAPAN AND ISRAEL. HE ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY TO CLARIFY THESE MATTERS.

5. FIRST OPINION THAT SYRIA ALSO QUALIFIES AS A HOT

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012 DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042659

SPOT, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON AND THAT THE SITUATION IS NORMALIZING. MOREOVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE FOCUS NOT BE ON ONE STATE, BUT ON ALL THE PROBLEM AREAS OF THE REGION; THIS IS THE REASON FOR OUR APPROACH TO ISRAEL -- ONE WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE USED VIS-A-VIS ALL STATES IN THE REGION. IN ADDITION, ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CURRENTLY SUPPORTS A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION. ON THE MATTER OF THE ISRAELI ISSUE AT THE BT

SECRET
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

5

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012
SIT897 AN006054

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042665
TOR: 112/1535Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1012/02 1121531
O 221517Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0452
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0235

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 121012

NODIS
NSC EYES ONLY FOR KIMMITT

IAEA, DG BLIX HAS RECENTLY TALKED WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING. KENNEDY SAID THE U. S. HOPES THIS WILL HELP REMOVE THE ISSUE FROM THE IAEA. REGARDING PETROSYANTS' CONCERN ABOUT MISSILE COOPERATION, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE BUT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS COMMENTED THAT COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ON PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES WOULD ONLY FUEL THE GOI'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMBITIONS; MOREOVER, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE MILITARY AND PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAEL, AND SAID THE U. S. HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS.

6. PETROSYANTS STATED THAT LIBYA WAS A PARTY TO THE NPT, HAD ACCEPTED SAFEGUARDS, AND THE IAEA FOLLOWS ITS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8*102970

SECRET

BY L05 NARA DATE 9/30/08

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

6

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042665

ACTIVITIES. THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS REAFFIRMED TO THE USSR ITS GUARANTEES RELATED TO ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER. MOREOVER, THE USSR IS NOT AWARE OF ANY REAL STEPS TOWARDS ACQUISITION OF A DELIVERY SYSTEM. PETROSYANTS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS IS SOMETHING YOU JUST CANNOT HIDE: THE TALK OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS IS SIMPLY CONJECTURE. FORMALLY, LIBYA'S ACTIVITIES ARE ALL IN ORDER, ISRAEL'S ARE NOT. IN ANSWER TO PETROSYANTS' QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE LIBYANS COULD TAKE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE DIRECTIONS OF THE ISRAELI PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THE U.S. WANTS LIBYA TO REFRAIN FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS AGREED AND ASKED WHAT SPECIFICALLY THE LIBYANS ARE DOING. ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LEWIS DUNN RESPONDED THAT THE PROBLEM LIES IN WHAT THEY COULD DO IN THE FUTURE. PETROSYANTS AGREED WITH DUNN'S STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WITH THE LIBYANS.

7. RE IRAQ, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT WE WOULD URGE THAT STATE -- WITH WHICH WE NOW HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS -- NOT TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. THE U.S. HAS MADE THE SAME POINT WITH EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IN AGREEING, PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT IRAQ HAS ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND IAEA MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES. THE USSR WANTS TO HELP THE IRAQIS DEVELOP A REACTOR SO GOOD THAT THE ISRAELIS WON'T ATTACK IT. CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS A PROGRAM TO REDUCE NUCLEAR FUEL ENRICHMENT FOR SUCH REACTORS; THIS CONCEPT COULD BE USEFUL FOR THE IRAQI RESEARCH REACTOR. IN REPLYING THAT THE SOVIETS AGREE WITH THIS IDEA, PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT THEY HAVE STARTED THIS SAME TYPE OF PROGRAM, BUT FOUND IT DIFFICULT AND REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT. WILL THIS PROGRAM AFFECT THE IRAQI REACTOR, ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY> IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW SOON THE SOVIETS WILL ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

7

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012 DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042665

ON THIS WITH THE IRAQIS, ANSWERED PETROSYANTS, ADDING THAT IT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN WHEN TIME COMES TO RE-SUPPLY THE FUEL. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY COMMENTED THAT THE U. S. IS MOVING FAST ON THIS AND WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE SUBJECT.

8. RE SOUTH AFRICA, ROLAND TIMERBAEV, SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEGAN BY ASSERTING THAT THIS NATION IS ALSO A PROBLEM, IS NOT A PARTY TO THE NPT, AND THREATENS FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES. MOREOVER, IN THE 1970'S THE U. S. MADE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE IAEA SAFEGUARDS-EFFORTS WHICH FAILED. WHILE AGREEING THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY ADHERENCE TO NPT WERE NOT GOOD, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED TO SOME SUCCESSES THE PAST TWO YEARS: THE SAG HAS ACCEPTED SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES AND HAS RESUMED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IAEA FOR APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS ON ITS SEMI-COMMERCIAL ENRICHMENT PLANT. U. S. INFLUENCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IS DECREASING FOR A VARIETY OF POLITICAL REASONS; OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE INCREASING ISOLATION LESSENS OUR INFLUENCE. SOME OF THE FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES ARE USING THE SAG ISSUE AS AN EXCUSE TO AVOID SIGNING THE NPT; THE U. S. VIEW IS THAT ADHERING TO THE NPT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE FRONTLINE STATES INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE SAG SIGNS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THESE AFRICAN STATES TO JOIN THE NPT AS WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SAG TO JOIN (OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS). TIMERVAEV NEXT RAISED THE MATTER OF U. S. CITIZENS WORKING IN SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES. FIRST OF ALL, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REGRETTED THE WAY THE SOVIET PRESS HAS HANDLED THIS ISSUE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE AMERICANS ARE STILL IN SOUTH AFRICA, NONE OF THEM (NOR ANY OF THE ORIGINAL GROUP) WERE EVER ENGAGED IN PROLIFERATION-RELATED MATTERS: THEY WORKED ON REACTOR SAFETY, REACTOR OPERATION, AND TRAINING ON A SAFEGUARDED POWER REACTOR AT KOEBURG. BECAUSE PERMISSION FROM THE USG IS NECES-

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

8

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012 DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042665

SARY FOR ASSISTING IN CERTAIN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE INDIVIDUALS IN QUESTION HAD NOT OBTAINED SUCH PERMISSION, THEIR ACTIVITIES MAY HAVE VIOLATED U.S. LAW. WE ARE NOW INVESTIGATING THIS SITUATION, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS WORKING AT KOEBURG. AMBASSADOR
BT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012
SIT898 AN006055

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042669
TOR: 112/1538Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1012/03 1121531
O 221517Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0453
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0236

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 121012

NODIS
NSC EYES ONLY FOR KIMMITT

KENNEDY ADDED THAT THE U.S. MAY TRY TO ASSIST THE SAG IN DEVELOPING SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS FOR ENRICHMENT PLANTS. WE HOPE THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE STRESSING TO THE FRONTLINE STATES (AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS) THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY ADHERING TO THE NPT INSTEAD OF WAITING UNTIL THE SAG DOES. AT THIS POINT, AMBASSADOR PETROVSKY (SCAE) INTERJECTED THAT MOZAMBIQUE MAY JOIN THE NPT. WHILE RESTATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKES THIS LINE, TIMERBAEV OPINED THAT IT IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO GET THE SAG TO ADHERE TO THE NPT; A SAG SIGNATURE WOULD SOLVE THE ENTIRE PROBLEM. WHEN PETROSYANTS UNDERScoreD AGAIN THE DANGER THAT OUR MUTUAL APPROACH JUST ISN'T WORKING, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF ANY EQUIPMENT BEING TRANSFERRED TO SOUTH AFRICA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ANSWERED THAT NEITHER U.S. MATERIAL NOR EQUIPMENT ARE ALLOWED TO BE EXPORTED TO SOUTH AFRICA.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

10

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042669

9. SOUTH ASIA. RE PAKISTAN, PETROVSKY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY STRESSING (AS HE DID SEVERAL TIMES SUBSEQUENTLY) THAT RECENT SOVIET INFORMATION SHOWS THE PAKISTANIS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. REFERRING TO A STATEMENT LAST WEEK BY RAJIV GHANDI CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, PETROVSKY UNDERLINED THAT (1) EVEN SINCE THE LAST U.S.-SOVIET NPT BILATERAL IN NOVEMBER THE SITUATION HAS WORSENEDED AND (2) "SOME NEW NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS GOTTEN TO PAKISTAN." THE U.S. ALSO IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM. BUT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION IS QUITE COMPLEX AND THE SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH ARE PART OF THE REASON FOR PAKISTANI EFFORTS ALSO CONTINUE TO GROW. MOREOVER, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE USSR THE MANY STEPS THE U.S. HAS TAKEN. HE NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION, PRESIDENT ZIA HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL SIGN THE NPT AND PUT ITS FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS IF INDIA DOES THE SAME; WE HAVE CALLED ZIA'S STATEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF GHANDI. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO SIGN THE NPT AND ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND URGES BOTH COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY THEN REMINDED THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT ZIA HAS PROPOSED BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WITH INDIA, SUCH AS THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. WE ENCOURAGE THESE STEPS: WHAT IS THE SOVIET POSITION? PETROVSKY ANSWERED THAT IN ALL CONTACTS WITH INDIA HIS COUNTRY STRESSES PRACTICAL MEASURES MORE THAN STATEMENTS. IN ANSWER TO PETROVSKY'S QUESTION ABOUT WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD BELIEVE ZIA WHEN THE AMERICANS DON'T BELIEVE QADHAFI, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THE DISTINCTION THAT THE LEADER OF LIBYA HAS SAID HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS NEEDED, OPINED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, IS A MUTUAL

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042669

PAKISTAN-INDIA ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. WHEN PETROVSKY RETURNED TO THE ALLEGED RAPID TEMPO OF THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE CLEARLY WERE EFFORTS UNDERWAY, THEY WERE NOT AS RAPID AS PETROVSKY ASSERTED. ALSO, THE U. S. AND ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY, AN EFFORT THAT IS LARGELY SUCCESSFUL. WE'VE MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TO ZIA, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY. HOWEVER, INDIA HAS ALREADY EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE; ZIA HAS, IN ESSENCE, STATED THAT HE'LL ACCEPT A POSITION INFERIOR TO INDIA'S IF INDIA WILL AGREE. THE U. S. BELIEVES THIS IS SIGNIFICANT AND WILL CONTINUE MAKING EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES. WE HOPE THE USSR WILL DO THE SAME. UNTIL INDIA RESPONDS TO ZIA'S APPROACHES, IT IS HARD TO KNOW WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE. PETROVSKY REPLIED THAT BECAUSE INDIA IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM AND THAT THIS PROGRAM IS INTENSIFYING, IT IS HARDER FOR INDIA TO DECIDE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY

DOES NOT YET BUT MIGHT IN THE FUTURE HAVE A PROGRAM; WHY SHOULDN'T INDIA WANT TO FREEZE THE PRESENT POSITION? PETROVSKY'S ANSWER WAS THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE IMPORTANT, BUT THAT INDIA HAS NO INTENTION OF CREATING NUCLEAR DEVICES.

10. THE KOREAN PENINSULA. RE NORTH KOREA, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE NEW LARGE RESEARCH REACTOR, NORTH KOREA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING AS YET THE KIND OF FUEL CYCLE CAPABILITIES THAT COULD LEAD TO A NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE U. S. HAS URGED SUPPLIERS TO GET NORTH KOREA TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON THE NEW FACILITY AND TO SIGN THE NPT AS SOUTH KOREA HAS DONE. THE U. S. UNDERSTANDS THAT IF NORTH KOREA WANTED TO ACQUIRE EQUIPMENT IN THE TRIGGER LISTS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

12

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 1012 DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042669

REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IN RESPONSE, PETROSYANTS STATED THAT THE USSR IS CONSIDERING STEPS TO BRING THE NORTH KOREAN REACTOR UNDER SAFEGUARDS. IF NORTH KOREA REQUESTS MATERIAL/EQUIPMENT ON THE TRIGGER LIST, THE USSR WILL CONFIRM THE LONDON GUIDELINES. NYBORG
BT

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

13

PAGE 01
SIT899

SECSTATE WASHDC 1012
AN006056

DTG: 221517Z APR 85 PSN: 042670
TOR: 112/1538Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #1012/04 1121531
O 221517Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0454
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0237

S E ~~C~~ R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 STATE 121012

NODIS
NSC EYES ONLY FOR KIMMITT

UNQUOTE DAM
BT

~~SECRET~~

NODIS
S



SECRET

Department of State

Mat Korte
NPT

S/S-0
INCOMING

14

PAGE 01 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
-----22/2216Z

ACTION OFFICE **EUR-01**

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 INR-01
OES-01 SP-01 SNP-01 ACDA-01 CATB-01 NSC-01 /020 A2 BDS
INR E. O. ABRAMOWITZ, S/P E. O. RODMAN, NSC E. O. KIMMETT (S/S PLEASE PASS
TO NSC VIA COURIER)

////////// CORRECTED COPY - ADDED TEXT: PARA 9 //////////
DISTRIBUTION PER ORIGINAL CABLE - PASSED/PASSED TO MOSCOW BY SWO

DIST AUTH BY

READ BY

DISTRIBUTED BY

EXSEC _____

(S/S-1) _____

DEPEXSEC _____

DATE/TIME _____

REPEATED TO _____

BY _____

DATE/TIME _____

SENSITIVE

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND, IF NOT EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED, BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION, OR DISCUSSED WITH NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.

WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *CS* NARA, Date *7/29/02*

SECRET

NODIS



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0
INCOMING

15

PAGE 02 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----177157 222205Z /40 21

O 220733Z APR 85

FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5407

~~SECRET~~ HELSINKI 01744

NODIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TEXT- PARA 9)

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, KNNP, UR, US

SUBJECT: U. S. - SOVIET NPT BILATERALS: HEADS OF
DELEGATION MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~. - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN A. M. PETROSYANTS, HEADS OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS, MET ON APRIL 17 TO REVIEW REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (FOCUSSING ON ISRAEL, EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ AND LIBYA), SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA (PAKISTAN AND INDIA), AND ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MORE WILLING THEN IN PAST HEADS-OF-DELEGATIONS MEETINGS TO AVOID POLEMICS AND DISCUSS POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.
3. THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY OPENED THE HEADS-OF-DELEGATION MEETING ON APRIL 17 WITH THE TOPIC OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA WHICH IS OF SUCH CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE U. S. AND USSR. THE U. S. REALIZES THAT MANY ARAB STATES ARE CONCERNED THAT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8#10299

BY NOT NARA DATE 9/30/08

NODS-00



SECRET

Department of State

16 S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 03 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578

ISRAEL HAS NOT SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) NOR ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT ISRAEL IS CONCERNED THAT SOME ARAB STATES ARE CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. THERE IS AN INCREASING DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH, WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER INSTABILITIES, COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR. FOR OUR PART, HE ADDED, WE HAVE STRONGLY URGED ISRAEL TO JOIN THE NPT OR, AT THE LEAST, TO ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS: WE HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED AS YET. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY COOPERATIVE U.S. - ISRAELI NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL HAS ASKED US TO DO SO UNLESS THEY ACCEPT THE NPT OR FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE URGED FRANCE AND OTHERS NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNLESS ISRAEL, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPTS FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NEXT TURNED TO EGYPT, UNDERSCORING THE FACT THAT OUR AGREEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY -- WHICH FIRST REQUIRED EGYPT TO SIGN THE NPT -- IS THE MOST STRINGENT WE HAVE AND SERVES AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE SUCH ACCORDS. RE IRAQ AND SYRIA, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY FIRST COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS A PARTY TO THE NPT, ANY COOPERATION WITH THAT COUNTRY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRINGENT CONTROLS AND BE LIMITED TO NON-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, POINTS WE HAVE STRESSED TO FRANCE; THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE FOR SYRIA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT LIBYA IS THE TOUGHEST CASE OF ALL. WHILE THIS COUNTRY HAS JOINED THE NPT, COLONEL QADHAFI HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS: WE BELIEVE HIM. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM, ITALY AND FRANCE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT LIBYA, URGING THEM

NOT TO PARTICIPATE WITH LIBYA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE URGE THAT ANY COOPERATION THE USSR UNDERTAKES BE

SECRET



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0
17 INCOMING

PAGE 04 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
SUBJECT TO THE MOST STRINGENT CONTROLS AND NOT INVOLVE
SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.

4. MR. PETROSYANTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY (SCAE), REPLIED AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF MIDEAST PROBLEMS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT HE VIEWS LEBANON AS THE HOTTEST SPOT. RETURNING TO ISRAEL, PETROSYANTS MADE TWO POINTS: NO UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT ADDRESSING MILITARY ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING AND, SECONDLY THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS THAT THE U.S. HAS UNDERTAKEN MISSILE COOPERATION WITH THE FRG, JAPAN AND ISRAEL. HE ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY TO CLARIFY THESE MATTERS.

5. FIRST OPINION THAT SYRIA ALSO QUALIFIES AS A HOT SPOT, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON AND THAT THE SITUATION IS NORMALIZING. MOREOVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE FOCUS NOT BE ON ONE STATE, BUT ON ALL THE PROBLEM AREAS OF THE REGION. THIS IS THE REASON FOR OUR APPROACH TO ISRAEL -- ONE WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE USED VIS-A-VIS ALL STATES IN THE REGION. IN ADDITION, ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CURRENTLY SUPPORTS A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION. ON THE MATTER OF THE ISRAELI ISSUE AT THE IAEA, DG BLIX HAS RECENTLY TALKED WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING. KENNEDY SAID THE U.S. HOPES THIS WILL HELP REMOVE THE ISSUE FROM THE IAEA. REGARDING PETROSYANTS' CONCERN ABOUT MISSILE COOPERATION, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE BUT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS

COMMENTED THAT COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ON PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES WOULD ONLY FUEL THE GOI'S



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0
18 INCOMING

PAGE 05 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMBITIONS; MOREOVER, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE MILITARY AND PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAEL, AND SAID THE U. S. HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS.

6. PETROSYANTS STATED THAT LIBYA WAS A PARTY TO THE NPT, HAD ACCEPTED SAFEGUARDS, AND THE IAEA FOLLOWS ITS ACTIVITIES. THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS REAFFIRMED TO THE USSR ITS GUARANTEES RELATED TO ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER. MOREOVER, THE USSR IS NOT AWARE OF ANY REAL STEPS TOWARDS ACQUISITION OF A DELIVERY SYSTEM. PETROSYANTS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS IS SOMETHING YOU JUST CANNOT HIDE: THE TALK OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS IS SIMPLY CONJECTURE. FORMALLY, LIBYA'S ACTIVITIES ARE ALL IN ORDER, ISRAEL'S ARE NOT. IN ANSWER TO PETROSYANTS' QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE LIBYANS COULD TAKE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE DIRECTIONS OF THE ISRAELI PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THE U. S. WANTS LIBYA TO REFRAIN FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS AGREED AND ASKED WHAT SPECIFICALLY THE LIBYANS ARE DOING. ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LEWIS DUNN RESPONDED THAT THE PROBLEM LIES IN WHAT THEY COULD DO IN THE FUTURE. PETROSYANTS AGREED WITH DUNN'S STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WITH THE LIBYANS.

7. RE IRAQ, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT WE WOULD URGE THAT STATE -- WITH WHICH WE NOW HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS -- NOT TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. THE U. S. HAS MADE THE SAME POINT WITH EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IN AGREEING, PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT IRAQ HAS ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND IAEA MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES. THE USSR WANTS TO HELP THE IRAQIS DEVELOP A REACTOR SO GOOD THAT

THE ISRAELIS WON'T ATTACK IT. CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT THE U. S. HAS A PROGRAM TO REDUCE NUCLEAR FUEL ENRICHMENT FOR SUCH REACTORS; THIS CONCEPT COULD BE USEFUL FOR THE IRAQI RESEARCH REACTOR. IN REPLYING THAT THE SOVIETS AGREE WITH THIS IDEA,

SECRET



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0

19 INCOMING

PAGE 06 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578

PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT THEY HAVE STARTED THIS SAME TYPE OF PROGRAM, BUT FOUND IT DIFFICULT AND REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT. WILL THIS PROGRAM AFFECT THE IRAQI REACTOR, ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY? IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW SOON THE SOVIETS WILL ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS ON THIS WITH THE IRAQIS, ANSWERED PETROSYANTS, ADDING THAT IT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN WHEN TIME COMES TO RE-SUPPLY THE FUEL. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY COMMENTED THAT THE U. S. IS MOVING FAST ON THIS AND WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE SUBJECT.

8. RE SOUTH AFRICA, ROLAND TIMERBAEV, SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEGAN BY ASSERTING THAT THIS NATION IS ALSO A PROBLEM, IS NOT A PARTY TO THE NPT, AND THREATENS FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES. MOREOVER, IN THE 1970'S THE U. S. MADE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE IAEA SAFEGUARDS-EFFORTS WHICH FAILED. WHILE AGREEING THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY ADHERENCE TO NPT WERE NOT GOOD, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED TO SOME SUCCESSES THE PAST TWO YEARS: THE SAG HAS ACCEPTED SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES AND HAS RESUMED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IAEA FOR APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS ON ITS SEMI-COMMERCIAL ENRICHMENT PLANT. U. S. INFLUENCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IS DECREASING FOR A VARIETY OF POLITICAL REASONS; OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE INCREASING ISOLATION LESSENS OUR INFLUENCE. SOME OF THE FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES ARE USING THE SAG ISSUE AS AN EXCUSE TO AVOID SIGNING THE NPT; THE U. S. VIEW IS THAT ADHERING TO THE NPT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE FRONTLINE STATES INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE SAG SIGNS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THESE AFRICAN STATES TO JOIN THE NPT AS WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SAG TO JOIN (OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS).

TIMERVAEV NEXT RAISED THE MATTER OF U. S. CITIZENS WORKING IN SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES. FIRST OF ALL, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REGRETTED THE WAY THE SOVIET PRESS HAS HANDLED THIS ISSUE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE AMERICANS ARE STILL IN SOUTH AFRICA, NONE OF THEM (NOR ANY OF THE



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0
20 INCOMING

PAGE 07 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
ORIGINAL GROUP) WERE EVER ENGAGED IN PROLIFERATION-RELATED MATTERS: THEY WORKED ON REACTOR SAFETY, REACTOR OPERATION, AND TRAINING ON A SAFEGUARDED POWER REACTOR AT KOEBURG. BECAUSE PERMISSION FROM THE USG IS NECESSARY FOR ASSISTING IN CERTAIN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE INDIVIDUALS IN QUESTION HAD NOT OBTAINED SUCH PERMISSION, THEIR ACTIVITIES MAY HAVE VIOLATED U.S. LAW. WE ARE NOW INVESTIGATING THIS SITUATION, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS WORKING AT KOEBURG. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ADDED THAT THE U.S. MAY TRY TO ASSIST THE SAG IN DEVELOPING SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS FOR ENRICHMENT PLANTS. WE HOPE THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE STRESSING TO THE FRONTLINE STATES (AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS) THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY ADHERING TO THE NPT INSTEAD OF WAITING UNTIL THE SAG DOES. AT THIS POINT, AMBASSADOR PETROVSKY (SCAE) INTERJECTED THAT MOZAMBIQUE MAY JOIN THE NPT. WHILE RESTATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKES THIS LINE, TIMERBAEV OPINED THAT IT IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO GET THE SAG TO ADHERE TO THE NPT; A SAG SIGNATURE WOULD SOLVE THE ENTIRE PROBLEM. WHEN PETROSYANTS UNDERScoreD AGAIN THE DANGER THAT OUR MUTUAL APPROACH JUST ISN'T WORKING, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF ANY EQUIPMENT BEING TRANSFERRED TO SOUTH AFRICA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ANSWERED THAT NEITHER U.S. MATERIAL NOR EQUIPMENT ARE ALLOWED TO BE EXPORTED TO SOUTH AFRICA.

9. SOUTH ASIA. RE PAKISTAN, PETROVSKY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY STRESSING (AS HE DID SEVERAL TIMES SUBSEQUENTLY) THAT RECENT SOVIET INFORMATION SHOWS THE PAKISTANIS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. REFERRING TO A STATEMENT LAST WEEK BY RAJIV GHANDI CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, PETROVSKY UNDERLINED THAT (1) EVEN SINCE THE LAST U.S. -SOVIET NPT BILATERAL IN

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

21
S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 08 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578

NOVEMBER THE SITUATION HAS WORSENERED, AND (2) "SOME NEW NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS GOTTEN TO PAKISTAN." THE U.S. ALSO IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM. BUT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION IS QUITE COMPLEX AND THE SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH ARE PART OF THE REASON FOR PAKISTANI EFFORTS ALSO CONTINUE TO GROW. MOREOVER, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE USSR THE MANY STEPS THE U.S. HAS TAKEN. HE NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION, PRESIDENT ZIA HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL SIGN THE NPT AND PUT ITS FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS IF INDIA DOES THE SAME; WE HAVE CALLED ZIA'S STATEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF GHANDI. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO SIGN THE NPT AND ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND URGES BOTH COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY THEN REMINDED THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT ZIA HAS PROPOSED BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WITH INDIA, SUCH AS THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. WE ENCOURAGE THESE STEPS: WHAT IS THE SOVIET POSITION? PETROVSKY ANSWERED THAT IN ALL CONTACTS WITH INDIA HIS COUNTRY STRESSES PRACTICAL MEASURES MORE THAN STATEMENTS. IN ANSWER TO PETROVSKY'S QUESTION ABOUT WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD BELIEVE ZIA WHEN THE AMERICANS DON'T BELIEVE QADHAFI, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THE DISTINCTION THAT THE LEADER OF LIBYA HAS SAID HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS NEEDED, OPINED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, IS A MUTUAL PAKISTAN-INDIA ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. WHEN PETROVSKY

RETURNED TO THE ALLEGED RAPID TEMPO OF THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE CLEARLY WERE EFFORTS UNDERWAY, THEY WERE NOT AS RAPID AS PETROVSKY ASSERTED. ALSO, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY, AN EFFORT THAT IS LARGELY SUCCESSFUL. WE'VE MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TO ZIA, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY. HOWEVER, INDIA HAS ALREADY EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE;



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

22 S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 09 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
ZIA HAS, IN ESSENCE, STATED THAT HE'LL ACCEPT A POSITION
INFERIOR TO INDIA'S IF INDIA WILL AGREE. THE U. S.
BELIEVES THIS IS SIGNIFICANT AND WILL CONTINUE MAKING
EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES: WE HOPE THE USSR WILL DO THE SAME.
UNTIL INDIA RESPONDS TO ZIA'S APPROACHES, IT IS HARD TO
KNOW WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE. PETROVSKY REPLIED THAT
BECAUSE INDIA IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE
PAKISTANI PROGRAM AND THAT THIS PROGRAM IS INTENSIFYING,
IT IS HARDER FOR INDIA TO DECIDE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY
DOES NOT YET BUT MIGHT IN THE FUTURE HAVE A PROGRAM;
WHY SHOULDN'T INDIA WANT TO FREEZE THE PRESENT POSITION?
PETROVSKY'S ANSWER WAS THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE IMPORTANT,
BUT THAT INDIA HAS NO INTENTION OF CREATING NUCLEAR
DEVICES.

10. THE KOREAN PENINSULA. RE NORTH KOREA, AMBASSADOR
KENNEDY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO
OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE NEW LARGE RESEARCH REACTOR,
NORTH KOREA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING AS YET THE
KIND OF FUEL CYCLE CAPABILITIES THAT COULD LEAD TO A
NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE U. S. HAS URGED SUPPLIERS TO GET
NORTH KOREA TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON THE NEW FACILITY
AND TO SIGN THE NPT AS SOUTH KOREA HAS DONE. THE U. S.
UNDERSTANDS THAT IF NORTH KOREA WANTED TO ACQUIRE

EQUIPMENT IN THE TRIGGER LISTS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD
REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IN RESPONSE, PETROSYANTS
STATED THAT THE USSR IS CONSIDERING STEPS TO BRING THE
NORTH KOREAN REACTOR UNDER SAFEGUARDS. IF NORTH KOREA
REQUESTS MATERIAL/EQUIPMENT ON THE TRIGGER LIST, THE
USSR WILL CONFIRM THE LONDON GUIDELINES. NYBORG

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

F:6
NPT

23

PAGE 01
EOB946

MOSCOW 5213
AN008128

DTG: 221217Z APR 85 PSN: 043322
TOR: 112/2239Z CSN: HCE869

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01
LEHR-01 MAT-01 /008 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: PUBS EOB
EOB:

ROUTINE
STU6310

DE RUEHMO #5213 1121217
R 221217Z APR 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9683

INFO USIA WASHDC 0787
AMCONSUL Leningrad 2196
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 4661
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4883
UNVIE MISSION VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA 8598

UNCLAS MOSCOW 05213

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KSCA, KNNP, PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET PRESS REPORTS US-SOVIET NON-PROLIFERATION
BILATERALS

REF: HELSINKI 1664 AND PREVIOUS

IZVESTIYA OF APRIL 20 CARRIED A STRAIGHTFORWARD ACCOUNT OF THE US-SOVIET BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON NON-PROLIFERATION IN HELSINKI, APRIL 15-19. THE ACCOUNT IS ESSENTIALLY A REPRODUCTION OF THE PRESS STATEMENT, BRIEFLY MENTIONING THE NPT REVCON, THE IAEA, NPT, AND A WIDE RANGE OF NON-PROLIFERATION MATTERS AS THE SUBJECTS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING. THERE WERE NO COMMENTS OR OTHER ADDITIONS TO THE ARTICLE BEYOND A LISTING OF THE HEADS OF DELEGATION AND SOME OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS. COMMENT: THE SOVIET SIDE IS CONTINUING TO TREAT THESE DISCUSSIONS IN A BUSINESS-LIKE FASHION, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST. END

COMMENT.
KAMMAN
BT

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

MATLOCK
NPT

S/S-0 ²⁴
INCOMING

PAGE 01 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
-----22/2216Z

ACTION OFFICE EUR-01

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 INR-01
OES-01 SP-01 SNP-01 ACDA-01 CATB-01 NSC-01 /020 A2 BDS

INR E.O. ABRAMOWITZ, S/P E.O. RODMAN, NSC E.O. KIMMITT (S/S PLEASE PASS
TO NSC VIA COURIER)

////////// CORRECTED COPY - ADDED TEXT: PARA 9 //////////
DISTRIBUTION PER ORIGINAL CABLE - PASSED/PASSED TO MOSCOW BY SWO

DIST AUTH BY

READ BY

DISTRIBUTED BY

EXSEC _____ (S/S-1) _____
DEPEXSEC _____ DATE/TIME _____

REPEATED TO _____
BY _____ DATE/TIME _____

SENSITIVE

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND, IF NOT EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED, BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION, OR DISCUSSED WITH NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.

ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.

WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By GLS NARA, Date 7/29/02

NODIS



SECRET

Department of State

25 S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 02 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----177157 222205Z /40 21

O 220733Z APR 85
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5407

~~S E C R E T~~ HELSINKI 01744

NODIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED TEXT- PARA 9)

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, KNNP, UR, US
SUBJECT: U. S. -SOVIET NPT BILATERALS: HEADS OF
DELEGATION MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN A. M. PETROSYANTS, HEADS OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS, MET ON APRIL 17 TO REVIEW REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (FOCUSSING ON ISRAEL, EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ AND LIBYA), SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA (PAKISTAN AND INDIA), AND ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MORE WILLING THEN IN PAST HEADS-OF-DELEGATIONS MEETINGS TO AVOID POLEMICS AND DISCUSS POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.
3. THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY OPENED THE HEADS-OF-DELEGATION MEETING ON APRIL 17 WITH THE TOPIC OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA WHICH IS OF SUCH CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE U. S. AND USSR. THE U. S. REALIZES THAT MANY ARAB STATES ARE CONCERNED THAT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8#10302

BY HOS NARA DATE 9/30/08



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0²⁶
INCOMING

PAGE 03 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578

ISRAEL HAS NOT SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) NOR ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT ISRAEL IS CONCERNED THAT SOME ARAB STATES ARE CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. THERE IS AN INCREASING DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH, WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER INSTABILITIES, COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR. FOR OUR PART, HE ADDED, WE HAVE STRONGLY URGED ISRAEL TO JOIN THE NPT OR, AT THE LEAST, TO ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS: WE HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED AS YET. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY COOPERATIVE U.S. - ISRAELI NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL HAS ASKED US TO DO SO UNLESS THEY ACCEPT THE NPT OR FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE URGED FRANCE AND OTHERS NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN JOINING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNLESS ISRAEL, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPTS FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NEXT TURNED TO EGYPT, UNDERSCORING THE FACT THAT OUR AGREEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY -- WHICH FIRST REQUIRED EGYPT TO SIGN THE NPT -- IS THE MOST STRINGENT WE HAVE AND SERVES AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE SUCH ACCORDS. RE IRAQ AND SYRIA, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY FIRST COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS A PARTY TO THE NPT, ANY COOPERATION WITH THAT COUNTRY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRINGENT CONTROLS AND BE LIMITED TO NON-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, POINTS WE HAVE STRESSED TO FRANCE; THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE FOR SYRIA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT LIBYA IS THE TOUGHEST CASE OF ALL. WHILE THIS COUNTRY HAS JOINED THE NPT, COLONEL QADHAFI HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS: WE BELIEVE HIM. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM, ITALY AND FRANCE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT LIBYA, URGING THEM NOT TO PARTICIPATE WITH LIBYA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE URGE THAT ANY COOPERATION THE USSR UNDERTAKES BE



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0²⁷
INCOMING

PAGE 04 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
SUBJECT TO THE MOST STRINGENT CONTROLS AND NOT INVOLVE
SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.

4. MR. PETROSYANTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY (SCAE), REPLIED AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF MIDEAST PROBLEMS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT HE VIEWS LEBANON AS THE HOTTEST SPOT. RETURNING TO ISRAEL, PETROSYANTS MADE TWO POINTS: NO UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT ADDRESSING MILITARY ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING AND, SECONDLY THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS THAT THE U. S. HAS UNDERTAKEN MISSILE COOPERATION WITH THE FRG, JAPAN AND ISRAEL. HE ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY TO CLARIFY THESE MATTERS.

5. FIRST OPINION THAT SYRIA ALSO QUALIFIES AS A HOT SPOT, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON AND THAT THE SITUATION IS NORMALIZING. MOREOVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE FOCUS NOT BE ON ONE STATE BUT ON ALL THE PROBLEM AREAS OF THE REGION; THIS IS THE REASON FOR OUR APPROACH TO ISRAEL -- ONE WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE USED VIS-A-VIS ALL STATES IN THE REGION. IN ADDITION, ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CURRENTLY SUPPORTS A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION. ON THE MATTER OF THE ISRAELI ISSUE AT THE IAEA, DG BLIX HAS RECENTLY TALKED WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING. KENNEDY SAID THE U. S. HOPES THIS WILL HELP REMOVE THE ISSUE FROM THE IAEA. REGARDING PETROSYANTS' CONCERN ABOUT MISSILE COOPERATION, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE BUT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS

COMMENTED THAT COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ON PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES WOULD ONLY FUEL THE GOI'S



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0²⁸
INCOMING

PAGE 05 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMBITIONS; MOREOVER, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE MILITARY AND PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAEL, AND SAID THE U. S. HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS.

6. PETROSYANTS STATED THAT LIBYA WAS A PARTY TO THE NPT, HAD ACCEPTED SAFEGUARDS, AND THE IAEA FOLLOWS ITS ACTIVITIES. THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS REAFFIRMED TO THE USSR ITS GUARANTEES RELATED TO ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER. MOREOVER, THE USSR IS NOT AWARE OF ANY REAL STEPS TOWARDS ACQUISITION OF A DELIVERY SYSTEM. PETROSYANTS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS IS SOMETHING YOU JUST CANNOT HIDE: THE TALK OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS IS SIMPLY CONJECTURE. FORMALLY, LIBYA'S ACTIVITIES ARE ALL IN ORDER, ISRAEL'S ARE NOT. IN ANSWER TO PETROSYANTS' QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE LIBYANS COULD TAKE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE DIRECTIONS OF THE ISRAELI PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THE U. S. WANTS LIBYA TO REFRAIN FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS AGREED AND ASKED WHAT SPECIFICALLY THE LIBYANS ARE DOING. ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LEWIS DUNN RESPONDED THAT THE PROBLEM LIES IN WHAT THEY COULD DO IN THE FUTURE. PETROSYANTS AGREED WITH DUNN'S STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WITH THE LIBYANS.

7. RE IRAQ, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT WE WOULD URGE THAT STATE -- WITH WHICH WE NOW HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS -- NOT TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. THE U. S. HAS MADE THE SAME POINT WITH EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IN AGREEING, PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT IRAQ HAS ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND IAEA MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES. THE USSR WANTS TO HELP THE IRAQI DEVELOP A REACTOR SO GOOD THAT

THE ISRAELIS WON'T ATTACK IT. CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT THE U. S. HAS A PROGRAM TO REDUCE NUCLEAR FUEL ENRICHMENT FOR SUCH REACTORS; THIS CONCEPT COULD BE USEFUL FOR THE IRAQI RESEARCH REACTOR. IN REPLYING THAT THE SOVIETS AGREE WITH THIS IDEA,

NOON
S
NOON
S
NOON
S



SECRET

Department of State

29
S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 06 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT THEY HAVE STARTED THIS SAME TYPE
OF PROGRAM, BUT FOUND IT DIFFICULT AND REQUIRING
CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT. WILL THIS PROGRAM AFFECT THE
IRAQI REACTOR, ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY? IT IS DIFFICULT
TO SAY HOW SOON THE SOVIETS WILL ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS
ON THIS WITH THE IRAQIS, ANSWERED PETROSYANTS, ADDING
THAT IT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN WHEN TIME COMES TO RE-SUPPLY
THE FUEL. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY COMMENTED THAT THE U. S.
IS MOVING FAST ON THIS AND WOULD BE WILLING TO
COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE SUBJECT.

8. RE SOUTH AFRICA, ROLAND TIMERBAEV, SOVIET MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEGAN BY ASSERTING THAT THIS NATION
IS ALSO A PROBLEM, IS NOT A PARTY TO THE NPT, AND
THREATENS FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES. MOREOVER, IN THE
1970'S THE U. S. MADE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE IAEA SAFEGUARDS-
EFFORTS WHICH FAILED. WHILE AGREEING THAT THE PROSPECTS
FOR EARLY ADHERENCE TO NPT WERE NOT GOOD, AMBASSADOR
KENNEDY POINTED TO SOME SUCCESSES THE PAST TWO YEARS:
THE SAG HAS ACCEPTED SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES AND HAS
RESUMED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IAEA FOR APPLICATION OF
SAFEGUARDS ON ITS SEMI-COMMERCIAL ENRICHMENT PLANT.
U. S. INFLUENCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IS DECREASING FOR A
VARIETY OF POLITICAL REASONS; OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE
INCREASING ISOLATION LESSENS OUR INFLUENCE. SOME OF THE
FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES ARE USING THE SAG ISSUE AS AN
EXCUSE TO AVOID SIGNING THE NPT; THE U. S. VIEW IS THAT
ADHERING TO THE NPT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
FRONTLINE STATES INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE SAG SIGNS.
WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THESE AFRICAN STATES TO JOIN
THE NPT AS WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SAG TO JOIN
(OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS).

TIMERVAEV NEXT RAISED THE MATTER OF U. S. CITIZENS WORKING
IN SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES. FIRST OF ALL,
AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REGRETTED THE WAY THE SOVIET PRESS
HAS HANDLED THIS ISSUE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE AMERICANS
ARE STILL IN SOUTH AFRICA, NONE OF THEM (NOR ANY OF THE



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0 30
INCOMING

PAGE 07 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
ORIGINAL GROUP) WERE EVER ENGAGED IN PROLIFERATION-RELATED MATTERS: THEY WORKED ON REACTOR SAFETY, REACTOR OPERATION, AND TRAINING ON A SAFEGUARDED POWER REACTOR AT KOEBURG. BECAUSE PERMISSION FROM THE USG IS NECESSARY FOR ASSISTING IN CERTAIN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE INDIVIDUALS IN QUESTION HAD NOT OBTAINED SUCH PERMISSION, THEIR ACTIVITIES MAY HAVE VIOLATED U.S. LAW. WE ARE NOW INVESTIGATING THIS SITUATION, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS WORKING AT KOEBURG. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ADDED THAT THE U.S. MAY TRY TO ASSIST THE SAG IN DEVELOPING SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS FOR ENRICHMENT PLANTS. WE HOPE THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE STRESSING TO THE FRONTLINE STATES (AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS) THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY ADHERING TO THE NPT INSTEAD OF WAITING UNTIL THE SAG DOES. AT THIS POINT, AMBASSADOR PETROVSKY (SCAE) INTERJECTED THAT MOZAMBIQUE MAY JOIN THE NPT. WHILE RESTATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKES THIS LINE, TIMERBAEV OPINED THAT IT IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO GET THE SAG TO ADHERE TO THE NPT; A SAG SIGNATURE WOULD SOLVE THE ENTIRE PROBLEM. WHEN PETROSYANTS UNDERSCORED AGAIN THE DANGER THAT OUR MUTUAL APPROACH JUST ISN'T WORKING, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF ANY EQUIPMENT BEING TRANSFERRED TO SOUTH AFRICA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ANSWERED THAT NEITHER U.S. MATERIAL NOR EQUIPMENT ARE ALLOWED TO BE EXPORTED TO SOUTH AFRICA.

9. SOUTH ASIA. RE PAKISTAN, PETROVSKY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY STRESSING (AS HE DID SEVERAL TIMES SUBSEQUENTLY) THAT RECENT SOVIET INFORMATION SHOWS THE PAKISTANIS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. REFERRING TO A STATEMENT LAST WEEK BY RAJIV GHANDI CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, PETROVSKY UNDERLINED THAT (1) EVEN SINCE THE LAST U.S. -SOVIET NPT BILATERAL IN



SECRET

Department of State

S/S-0 31
INCOMING

PAGE 08 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
NOVEMBER THE SITUATION HAS WORSENERED, AND (2) "SOME NEW
NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS GOTTEN TO PAKISTAN." THE U. S.
ALSO IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM. BUT THE
SITUATION IN THE REGION IS QUITE COMPLEX AND THE
SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH ARE PART OF THE REASON FOR
PAKISTANI EFFORTS ALSO CONTINUE TO GROW. MOREOVER, WE
HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE USSR THE MANY STEPS THE U. S.
HAS TAKEN. HE NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION, PRESIDENT ZIA
HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL SIGN THE NPT
AND PUT ITS FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS IF INDIA DOES
THE SAME; WE HAVE CALLED ZIA'S STATEMENT TO THE ATTENTION
OF GHANDI. THE U. S. CONTINUES TO URGE PAKISTAN AND INDIA
TO SIGN THE NPT AND ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND
URGES BOTH COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE ON NON-
PROLIFERATION ISSUES. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY THEN REMINDED
THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT ZIA HAS PROPOSED BILATERAL
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WITH INDIA, SUCH AS THE
EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. WE ENCOURAGE THESE
STEPS: WHAT IS THE SOVIET POSITION? PETROVSKY ANSWERED
THAT IN ALL CONTACTS WITH INDIA HIS COUNTRY STRESSES
PRACTICAL MEASURES MORE THAN STATEMENTS. IN ANSWER TO
PETROVSKY'S QUESTION ABOUT WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD
BELIEVE ZIA WHEN THE AMERICANS DON'T BELIEVE QADHAFI,
AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THE DISTINCTION THAT THE
LEADER OF LIBYA HAS SAID HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT
IS NEEDED, OPINED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, IS A MUTUAL
PAKISTAN-INDIA ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. WHEN PETROVSKY

RETURNED TO THE ALLEGED RAPID TEMPO OF THE PAKISTANI
NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY EXPLAINED THAT,
ALTHOUGH THERE CLEARLY WERE EFFORTS UNDERWAY, THEY WERE
NOT AS RAPID AS PETROVSKY ASSERTED. ALSO, THE U. S. AND
ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT DIFFI-
CULT FOR PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL AND
TECHNOLOGY, AN EFFORT THAT IS LARGELY SUCCESSFUL. WE'VE
MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TO ZIA, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY.
HOWEVER, INDIA HAS ALREADY EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE;



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0 32
INCOMING

PAGE 09 OF 09 HELSIN 01744 00 OF 04 222156Z C20/20 008110 NOD578
ZIA HAS, IN ESSENCE, STATED THAT HE'LL ACCEPT A POSITION
INFERIOR TO INDIA'S IF INDIA WILL AGREE. THE U.S.
BELIEVES THIS IS SIGNIFICANT AND WILL CONTINUE MAKING
EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES: WE HOPE THE USSR WILL DO THE SAME.
UNTIL INDIA RESPONDS TO ZIA'S APPROACHES, IT IS HARD TO
KNOW WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE. PETROVSKY REPLIED THAT
BECAUSE INDIA IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE
PAKISTANI PROGRAM AND THAT THIS PROGRAM IS INTENSIFYING,
IT IS HARDER FOR INDIA TO DECIDE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY
DOES NOT YET BUT MIGHT IN THE FUTURE HAVE A PROGRAM;
WHY SHOULDN'T INDIA WANT TO FREEZE THE PRESENT POSITION?
PETROVSKY'S ANSWER WAS THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE IMPORTANT,
BUT THAT INDIA HAS NO INTENTION OF CREATING NUCLEAR
DEVICES.

10. THE KOREAN PENINSULA. RE NORTH KOREA, AMBASSADOR
KENNEDY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO
OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE NEW LARGE RESEARCH REACTOR,
NORTH KOREA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING AS YET THE
KIND OF FUEL CYCLE CAPABILITIES THAT COULD LEAD TO A
NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE U.S. HAS URGED SUPPLIERS TO GET
NORTH KOREA TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON THE NEW FACILITY
AND TO SIGN THE NPT AS SOUTH KOREA HAS DONE. THE U.S.
UNDERSTANDS THAT IF NORTH KOREA WANTED TO ACQUIRE

EQUIPMENT IN THE TRIGGER LISTS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD
REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IN RESPONSE, PETROSYANTS
STATED THAT THE USSR IS CONSIDERING STEPS TO BRING THE
NORTH KOREAN REACTOR UNDER SAFEGUARDS. IF NORTH KOREA
REQUESTS MATERIAL/EQUIPMENT ON THE TRIGGER LIST, THE
USSR WILL CONFIRM THE LONDON GUIDELINES. NYBORG

SECRET

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Sitlm } Further
} ~~Mattock~~ 33

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161
SIT519 AN007562

DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057317
TOR: 119/2110Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001

WHSR COMMENT: --PLEASE ADVISE OF ADDITIONAL DISSEM--

~~File~~
NPT

OP IMMED

DE RUEHC #9161/01 1192108
O 292105Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0483

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 129161

NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR BOB KIMMITT

FOLLOWING HELSINKI 1744 DTD 29 APR SENT ACTION
SECSTATE, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE:
~~S E C R E T~~ HELSINKI 01744

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, KNNP, UR, US

SUBJECT: U. S. - SOVIET NPT BILATERALS: HEADS OF
-- DELEGATION MEETING

REF: STATE 127107

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8# 10304
BY WJS NARA DATE 9/30/08

SECRET

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057317

CORRECTED HELSINKI 1744 IS REPEATED BELOW.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN A. M. PETROSYANTS, HEADS OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS, MET ON APRIL 17 TO REVIEW REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST (FOCUSSING ON ISRAEL, EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ AND LIBYA), SOUTH AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA (PAKISTAN AND INDIA), AND ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MORE WILLING THEN IN PAST HEADS-OF-DELEGATIONS MEETINGS TO AVOID POLEMICS AND DISCUSS POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY OPENED THE HEADS-OF-DELEGATION MEETING ON APRIL 17 WITH THE TOPIC OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AN AREA WHICH IS OF SUCH CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. AND USSR. THE U.S. REALIZES THAT MANY ARAB STATES ARE CONCERNED THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) NOR ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. FURTHER, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT ISRAEL IS CONCERNED THAT SOME ARAB STATES ARE CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS. THERE IS AN INCREASING DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH, WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER INSTABILITIES, COULD CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR. FOR OUR PART, HE ADDED, WE HAVE STRONGLY URGED ISRAEL TO JOIN THE NPT OR, AT THE LEAST, TO ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS: WE HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED AS YET. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY COOPERATIVE U.S. - ISRAELI NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL HAS ASKED US TO DO SO UNLESS THEY ACCEPT THE NPT OR FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE URGED FRANCE AND OTHERS NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN JOING NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNLESS ISRAEL,

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057317

AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPTS FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NEXT TURNED TO EGYPT, UNDERSCORING THE FACT THAT OUR AGREEMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY -- WHICH FIRST REQUIRED EGYPT TO SIGN THE NPT -- IS THE MOST STRINGENT WE HAVE AND SERVES AS A MODEL FOR FUTURE SUCH ACCORDS. RE IRAQ AND SYRIA, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY FIRST COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS A PARTY TO THE NPT, ANY COOPERATION WITH THAT COUNTRY SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRINGENT CONTROLS AND BE LIMITED TO NON-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, POINTS WE HAVE STRESSED TO FRANCE; THE SAME WOULD BE TRUE FOR SYRIA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT LIBYA IS THE TOUGHEST CASE OF ALL. WHILE THIS COUNTRY HAS JOINED THE NPT, COLONEL QADHAFI HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS: WE BELIEVE HIM. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM, ITALY AND FRANCE OUR CONCERNS ABOUT LIBYA. URGING THEM NOT TO PARTICIPATE WITH LIBYA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE URGE THAT ANY COOPERATION THE USSR UNDERTAKES BE SUBJECT TO THE MOST STRINGENT CONTROLS AND NOT INVOLVE SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.

4. MR. PETROSYANTS, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY (SCAE), REPLIED AS HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF MIDEAST PROBLEMS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT HE VIEWS LEBANON AS THE HOTTEST SPOT. RETURNING TO ISRAEL, PETROSYANTS MADE TWO POINTS: NO

UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT ADDRESSING MILITARY ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING AND, SECONDLY THERE HAVE BEEN STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS THAT THE U. S. HAD UNDERTAKEN MISSILE COOPERATION WITH THE FRG, JAPAN AND ISRAEL. HE ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY TO CLARIFY THESE MATTERS.

NOON-11-55

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057317

5. FIRST OPINION THAT SYRIA ALSO QUALIFIES AS A HOT SPOT, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED OUT THAT ISRAELI TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON AND THAT THE SITUATION IS NORMALIZING. MOREOVER, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE FOCUS NOT BE ON ONE STATE, BUT ON ALL THE PROBLEM AREAS OF THE REGION; THIS IS THE REASON FOR OUR APPROACH TO ISRAEL -- ONE WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE USED VIS-A-VIS ALL STATES IN THE REGION. IN ADDITION, ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CURRENTLY SUPPORTS A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN

BT

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057324
SIT520 AN007563 TOR: 119/2112Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #9161/02 1192109
O 292105Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0484

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 129161

NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR BOB KIMMITT

THE REGION. ON THE MATTER OF THE ISRAELI ISSUE AT THE IAEA, DG BLIX HAS RECENTLY TALKED WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING. KENNEDY SAID THE U.S. HOPES THIS WILL HELP REMOVE THE ISSUE FROM THE IAEA. REGARDING PETROSYANTS' CONCERN ABOUT MISSILE COOPERATION, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE BUT THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS COMMENTED THAT COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ON PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE AND NUCLEAR ISSUES WOULD ONLY FUEL THE GOI'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS AMBITIONS; MOREOVER, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEPARATE MILITARY AND PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT ISRAEL, AND SAID THE U.S. HAD SIMILAR CONCERNS.

6. PETROSYANTS STATED THAT LIBYA WAS A PARTY TO THE NPT, HAD ACCEPTED SAFEGUARDS, AND THE IAEA FOLLOWS ITS

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057324

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

ACTIVITIES. THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS REAFFIRMED TO THE USSR ITS GUARANTEES RELATED TO ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH CENTER. MOREOVER, THE USSR IS NOT AWARE OF ANY REAL STEPS TOWARDS ACQUISITION OF A DELIVERY SYSTEM. PETROSYANTS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS IS SOMETHING YOU JUST CANNOT HIDE: THE TALK OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS IS SIMPLY CONJECTURE. FORMALLY, LIBYA'S ACTIVITIES ARE ALL IN ORDER, ISRAEL'S ARE NOT. IN ANSWER TO PETROSYANTS' QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE LIBYANS COULD TAKE, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE DIRECTIONS OF THE ISRAELI PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REPLIED THAT THE U. S. WANTS LIBYA TO REFRAIN FROM DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PETROSYANTS AGREED AND ASKED WHAT SPECIFICALLY THE LIBYANS ARE DOING. ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LEWIS DUNN RESPONDED THAT THE PROBLEM LIES IN WHAT THEY COULD DO IN THE FUTURE. PETROSYANTS AGREED WITH DUNN'S STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WITH THE LIBYANS.

7. RE IRAQ, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT WE WOULD URGE THAT STATE -- WITH WHICH WE NOW HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS -- NOT TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES. THE U. S. HAS MADE THE SAME POINT WITH EUROPEAN FRIENDS TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS. IN AGREEING, PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT IRAQ HAS ACCEPTED FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND IAEA MONITORING OF ACTIVITIES. THE USSR WANTS TO HELP THE IRAQIS DEVELOP A REACTOR SO GOOD THAT THE ISRAELIS WON'T ATTACK IT. CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT THE U. S. HAS A PROGRAM TO REDUCE NUCLEAR FUEL ENRICHMENT FOR SUCH REACTORS; THIS CONCEPT COULD BE USEFUL FOR THE IRAQI RESEARCH REACTOR. IN REPLYING THAT THE SOVIETS AGREE WITH THIS IDEA, PETROSYANTS ADDED THAT THEY HAVE STARTED THIS SAME TYPE OF PROGRAM, BUT FOUND IT DIFFICULT AND REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT. WILL THIS PROGRAM AFFECT THE IRAQI REACTOR, ASKED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY> IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY HOW SOON THE SOVIETS WILL ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

39

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057324

ON THIS WITH THE IRAQIS, ANSWERED PETROSYANTS, ADDING THAT IT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN WHEN TIME COMES TO RE-SUPPLY THE FUEL. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY COMMENTED THAT THE U. S. IS MOVING FAST ON THIS AND WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE SUBJECT.

8. RE SOUTH AFRICA, ROLAND TIMERBAEV, SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BEGAN BY ASSERTING THAT THIS NATION IS ALSO A PROBLEM, IS NOT A PARTY TO THE NPT, AND THREATENS FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES. MOREOVER, IN THE 1970'S THE U. S. MADE EFFORTS TO ARRANGE IAEA SAFEGUARDS-EFFORTS WHICH FAILED. WHILE AGREEING THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY ADHERENCE TO NPT WERE NOT GOOD, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY POINTED TO SOME SUCCESSES THE PAST TWO YEARS: THE SAG HAS ACCEPTED SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES AND HAS RESUMED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IAEA FOR APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS ON ITS SEMI-COMMERCIAL ENRICHMENT PLANT. U. S. INFLUENCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA IS DECREASING FOR A VARIETY OF POLITICAL REASONS; OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE INCREASING ISOLATION LESSENS OUR INFLUENCE. SOME OF THE FRONTLINE AFRICAN STATES ARE USING THE SAG ISSUE AS AN EXCUSE TO AVOID SIGNING THE NPT; THE U. S. VIEW IS THAT ADHERING TO THE NPT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE FRONTLINE STATES INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE SAG SIGNS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THESE AFRICAN STATES TO JOIN THE NPT AS WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SAG TO JOIN (OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS). TIMERVAEV NEXT RAISED THE MATTER OF U. S. CITIZENS WORKING IN SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES. FIRST OF ALL, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REGRETTED THE WAY THE SOVIET PRESS HAS HANDLED THIS ISSUE. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE AMERICANS ARE STILL IN SOUTH AFRICA, NONE OF THEM (NOR ANY OF THE ORIGINAL GROUP) WERE EVER ENGAGED IN PROLIFERATION-RELATED MATTERS: THEY WORKED ON REACTOR SAFETY, REACTOR OPERATION, AND TRAINING ON A SAFEGUARDED POWER REACTOR AT KOEBURG. BECAUSE PERMISSION FROM THE USG IS NECES-

~~SECRET~~

40

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057324

SARY FOR ASSISTING IN CERTAIN NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND THE INDIVIDUALS IN QUESTION HAD NO OBTAINED SUCH PERMISSION, THEIR ACTIVITIES MAY HAVE VIOLATED U.S. LAW. WE ARE NOW INVESTIGATING THIS SITUATION, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, AND NOTED THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS WORKING AT KOEBURG. AMBASSADOR
BT

NO
DD
IS

NO
DD
IS

NO
DD
IS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057328
SIT522 AN007565 TOR: 119/2115Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #9161/03 1192109
O 292105Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0485

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 129161

NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR BOB KIMMITT

KENNEDY ADDED THAT THE U. S. MAY TRY TO ASSIST THE SAG IN DEVELOPING SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS FOR ENRICHMENT PLANTS. WE HOPE THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE STRESSING TO THE FRONTLINE STATES (AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS) THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEST SERVED BY ADHERING TO THE NPT INSTEAD OF WAITING UNTIL THE SAG DOES. AT THIS POINT, AMBASSADOR PETROVSKY (SCAE) INTERJECTED THAT MOZAMBIQUE MAY JOIN THE NPT. WHILE RESTATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKES THIS LINE, TIMERBAEV OPINED THAT IT IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO GET THE SAG TO ADHERE TO THE NPT; A SAG SIGNATURE WOULD SOLVE THE ENTIRE PROBLEM. WHEN PETROSYANTS UNDERScoreD AGAIN THE DANGER THAT OUR MUTUAL APPROACH JUST ISN'T WORKING, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE U. S. WAS AWARE OF ANY EQUIPMENT BEING TRANSFERRED TO SOUTH AFRICA. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ANSWERED THAT NEITHER U. S. MATERIAL NOR EQUIPMENT ARE ALLOWED TO BE EXPORTED TO SOUTH AFRICA.

~~SECRET~~

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

44

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057328

NO
DI
S

NO
DI
S

NO
DI
S

NO
DI
S

9. SOUTH ASIA. RE PAKISTAN, PETROVSKY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY STRESSING (AS HE DID SEVERAL TIMES SUBSEQUENTLY) THAT RECENT SOVIET INFORMATION SHOWS THE PAKISTANIS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. REFERRING TO A STATEMENT LAST WEEK BY RAJIV GHANDI CRITICAL OF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, PETROVSKY UNDERLINED THAT (1) EVEN SINCE THE LAST U. S. -SOVIET NPT BILATERAL IN NOVEMBER THE SITUATION HAS WORSENERED, AND (2) "SOME NEW NUCLEAR MATERIAL HAS GOTTEN TO PAKISTAN." THE U. S. ALSO IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM. BUT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION IS QUITE COMPLEX AND THE SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH ARE PART OF THE REASON FOR PAKISTANI EFFORTS ALSO CONTINUE TO GROW. MOREOVER, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE USSR THE MANY STEPS THE U. S. HAS TAKEN. HE NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION, PRESIDENT ZIA HAS CLEARLY STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL SIGN THE NPT AND PUT ITS FACILITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS IF INDIA DOES THE SAME; WE HAVE CALLED ZIA'S STATEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF GHANDI. THE U. S. CONTINUES TO URGE PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO SIGN THE NPT AND ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AND URGES BOTH COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY THEN REMINDED THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT ZIA HAS PROPOSED BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES WITH INDIA, SUCH AS THE EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL. WE ENCOURAGE THESE STEPS: WHAT IS THE SOVIET POSITION> PETROVSKY ANSWERED THAT IN ALL CONTACTS WITH INDIA HIS COUNTRY STRESSES PRACTICAL MEASURES MORE THAN STATEMENTS. IN ANSWER TO PETROVSKY'S QUESTION ABOUT WHY THE SOVIETS SHOULD BELIEVE ZIA WHEN THE AMERICANS DON'T BELIEVE QADHAFI, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THE DISTINCTION THAT THE LEADER OF LIBYA HAS SAID HE WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHAT IS NEEDED, OPINED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY, IS A MUTUAL PAKISTAN-INDIA ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. WHEN PETROVSKY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

45

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057328

NOV-85

RETURNED TO THE ALLEGED RAPID TEMPO OF THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE CLEARLY WERE EFFORTS UNDERWAY, THEY WERE NOT AS RAPID AS PETROVSKY ASSERTED. ALSO, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR PAKISTAN TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY MATERIAL AND TECHNOLOGY, AN EFFORT THAT IS LARGELY SUCCESSFUL. WE'VE MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TO ZIA, CONTINUED AMBASSADOR KENNEDY. HOWEVER, INDIA HAS ALREADY EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE; ZIA HAS, IN ESSENCE, STATED THAT HE'LL ACCEPT A POSITION INFERIOR TO INDIA'S IF INDIA WILL AGREE. THE U.S. BELIEVES THIS IS SIGNIFICANT AND WILL CONTINUE MAKING EFFORTS ON BOTH SIDES. WE HOPE THE USSR WILL DO THE SAME. UNTIL INDIA RESPONDS TO ZIA'S APPROACHES. IT IS HARD TO KNOW WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE. PETROVSKY REPLIED THAT BECAUSE INDIA IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED WITH THE PAKISTANI PROGRAM AND THAT THIS PROGRAM IS INTENSIFYING, IT IS HARDER FOR INDIA TO DECIDE. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY REITERATED THAT IT WAS INDIA WHICH HAD EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT YET BUT MIGHT IN THE FUTURE HAVE A PROGRAM; WHY SHOULDN'T INDIA WANT TO FREEZE THE PRESENT POSITION> PETROVSKY'S ANSWER WAS THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE IMPORTANT, BUT THAT INDIA HAS NO INTENTION OF CREATING NUCLEAR DEVICES.

10. THE KOREAN PENINSULA. RE NORTH KOREA, AMBASSADOR KENNEDY NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE NEW LARGE RESEARCH REACTOR, NORTH KOREA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DEVELOPING AS YET THE KIND OF FUEL CYCLE CAPABILITIES THAT COULD LEAD TO A NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE U.S. HAS URGED SUPPLIERS TO GET NORTH KOREA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

46

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 9161 DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057328

TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON THE NEW FACILITY AND TO
SIGN THE NPT AS SOUTH KOREA HAS DONE. THE U. S.
UNDERSTANDS THAT IF NORTH KOREA WANTED TO ACQUIRE
EQUIPMENT IN THE TRIGGER LISTS, THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD REQUIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IN RESPONSE,
PETROSYANTS STATED THAT THE USSR IS CONSIDERING
STEPS TO BRING THE NORTH KOREAN REACTOR UNDER
BT

~~SECRET~~

NO DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47

PAGE 01
SIT523

SECSTATE WASHDC 9161
AN007566

DTG: 292105Z APR 85 PSN: 057330
TOR: 119/2115Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM /001

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #9161/04 1192109
O 292105Z APR 85 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 0486

S E ~~C~~ R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 STATE 129161

NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR BOB KIMMITT

SAFEGUARDS. IF NORTH KOREA REQUESTS MATERIAL/
EQUIPMENT ON THE TRIGGER LIST, THE USSR WILL
CONFIRM THE LONDON GUIDELINES.
NYBORG UNQUOTE SHULTZ
BT

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

41

PAGE 01 OF 02 QUITO 4548
SIT521 AN007564

DTG: 292033Z APR 85 PSN: 057314
TOR: 119/2108Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM VP SIT EOB /005

OP IMMED /ROUTINE

STU6985

DE RUESQI #4548 1192054

O R 292033Z APR 85

FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7368

INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1047

AMEMBASSY LONDON 279

AMEMBASSY PARIS 392

AMEMBASSY ROME 213

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 112

AMEMBASSY BONN 164

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 110

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 581

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2165

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2971

AMEMBASSY LIMA 7447

AMEMBASSY MEXICO 718

AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 440

AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4082

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6488

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ QUITO 4548

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EFIN, PREL, AR

SUBJECT: CARTAGENA GROUP PETITION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8#10305

BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

42

PAGE 02 OF 02 QUITO 4548

DTG: 292033Z APR 85 PSN: 057314

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS CORREA CALLED IN AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES OF SEVEN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN BONN ECONOMIC SUMMIT AT 16:00 ON APRIL 26 TO PRESENT COPY OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SANGUINETTI TO THEIR CHIEF OF STATE.

3. IN REMARKS PRECEDING THE PRESENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT, CORREA EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOE IN NO WAY SUPPORTS A COLLECTIVE DEBT RESCHEDULING, NOR, HE UNDERLINED, WOULD IT SEEK TO POLITICIZE THE DEBT ISSUE. HE SAID THE GOE HAD EXERTED ITS INFLUENCE WITHIN THE CARTEGENA GROUP ON BEHALF OF A MODERATE APPROACH TOWARD THE DEBT ISSUE, AND HE STATED THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAD ACCEPTED THE GOE'S VIEWS. THE GOE REGARDED THE COOPERATION OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AS ESSENTIAL IN SOLVING THE DEBT PROBLEM, HOWEVER. POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM DEBT PAYMENT ARE DIFFICULT FOR MANY COUNTRIES TO MANAGE, AND THE MAJORITY OF RESOURCES OF CARTAGENA GROUP MEMBER COUNTRIES SHOULD GO TO PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT RATHER THAN TO DEBT SERVICE. CORREA CLOSED HIS REMARKS BY STATING THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO TREAT THIS MATTER DELIBERATELY AND SERIOUSLY. FOR ITS PART, THE GOE WOULD PUBLICIZE NEITHER THE LETTER NOT THE MEETING AT WHICH COPIES WERE PRESENTED IN QUITO.

FITZGERALD

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~