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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/11/2005

**File Folder** NATIONALITIES

**FOIA**

F06-114/8

**Box Number** 28

YARHI-MILO

2815

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description   | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|----------|--------------|
| 10233 | MEMO     | PROPOSED NSDD US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS<br>[ 2 - 4 ]<br><b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>      | 3           | ND       | B1           |
| 10234 | MEMO     | SAME TEXT AS DOC #10233<br>[ 6 - 8 ]<br><b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>   | 3           | ND       | B1           |
| 10235 | MEMO     | SMITH TO MATLOCK RE NATIONALITIES WORKING GROUP MEETING<br>[ 9 - 9 ]<br><b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b>           | 1           | 7/5/1983 | B1           |
| 10236 | MEMO     | PROPOSED NSDD RE US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS<br>[ 10 - 12 ]<br><b>R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8</b> | 3           | ND       | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Not LDX'd -  
Sent by courier  
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- JB

*[Handwritten mark]*

**WASH-FAX RECEIPT**  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ No. Pages 3

FROM: JFSchumaker EUR/SOV 21712 4219  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION NSDD on Nationalities

| <u>TO: (Agency)</u> | <u>DELIVER TO:</u>       | <u>Extension</u> | <u>Room No.</u> |
|---------------------|--------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| <u>NSC</u>          | <u>John Lenczowski</u>   | <u>395-5646</u>  | <u>368</u>      |
| <u>NSC</u>          | <u>Walter Raymond</u>    | <u>395-4682</u>  | <u>372</u>      |
| <u>DOD/OASD/ISP</u> | <u>Douglas J. Feith</u>  | <u>697-9693</u>  | <u>4B659</u>    |
| <u>DOD/OASD/ISP</u> | <u>Elie D. Krakowski</u> | <u>697-3645</u>  | <u>4B659</u>    |
|                     |                          |                  |                 |
|                     |                          |                  |                 |

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: Here is our melded version of the draft NSDD on Soviet Nationalities  
adapted from the versions  
/ produced by DOD and the Nationalities Working Group. Please look this over and phone  
comments/clearance to Jim Schumaker - 632-1712. He will be calling you to set up a  
meeting to discuss this draft early next week.

S/S Officer: \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CJS NARA, Date 7/30/02

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR 106-114/8#10233

BY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/06

Proposed National Security Decision  
Directive Number \_\_\_\_\_

### US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

As set forth in NSDD-75, US policy toward the USSR is to aim at: Containing and over time reversing Soviet expansionism, promoting change within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic system, and reaching agreements with the Soviet Union that protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principles of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. As part of that policy, the USG shall pursue a rejuvenated effort to understand and to influence ethnic and national developments within the Soviet Union.

USG objectives are:

1. To encourage changes within the Soviet Union that foster diversity, pluralism, decentralization, democracy and conformity with internationally-accepted norms of justice and morality.
2. To promote a more accurate understanding of the nature and actions of the Soviet Union by drawing attention to its colonial and expansionist characteristics, and by undermining the notion that the expansion of communist rule is an irreversible phenomenon.
3. To create an institutional structure within the USG, and more broadly in the U.S., to strengthen and sustain our capabilities for understanding and influencing Soviet ethnic and national developments.
4. Consistent with NSDD-75, to increase our presence and activities in the Soviet Union, while ensuring that the resulting benefits are not counterbalanced by drawbacks of any increased presence and activities the Soviets may demand in return.

To realize these objectives, the USG shall develop an action program. This program will be based on the reaffirmation of our commitment to the rights and proper interests of the various ethnic and national groups within the Soviet Union, including (as appropriate) their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional education to their children, to emigrate and to enjoy national independence.

The USG shall:

1. Increase its capabilities for understanding and influencing developments within the Soviet Union affecting ethnic and national groups. As part of this effort, a permanent Soviet

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Nationalities Interagency Group shall be established to undertake the necessary steps to ensure that adequate financial and institutional resources are being devoted to Soviet ethnic and national group developments. This shall include the creation of a Center for the Study of Soviet Nationalities (privately run, but endowed with USG funds), and the establishment of an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists. The Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall also study ways to increase USG public affairs funding to enhance international awareness of Soviet ethnic and national issues, and shall be mandated to participate as appropriate in other USG programs and decisionmaking affecting US policy on Soviet ethnic and national groups.

2. Increase its ability to broadcast radio programs to Soviet ethnic and national groups. Within the context of the decision to modernize and upgrade VOA, REF and RL facilities, the USG shall assign high priority to increasing the number of hours of non-Russian language broadcasting and the number of Soviet languages in which the radios broadcast. In accordance with the priorities that from time to time will be established by the Special Planning Group for Public Diplomacy with the assistance of the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group, expanded efforts will be made to overcome the shortages in qualified linguists and their staff. Renewed consideration shall be given to funding new broadcast sites, strengthening existing transmitter sites and expanding all technical means. Budgetary allocations to existing operating agencies shall reflect their high priority as national security interests.
3. Otherwise increase the flow of information into the USSR. The US shall facilitate the open flow of information into the USSR by employing additional available means such as networks for the distribution of newspapers, books, and cassette tapes. The main goal should be to stimulate the community spirit of ethnic and national groups.
4. Continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
5. Increase UN activities. The USG shall take appropriate steps in the UN to highlight the contradictions between Soviet propaganda and practices. These steps may include raising the issue of Soviet nationalities in statements and debate, especially in the context of Soviet professions of support for self-determination and decolonization. This might best be done by stressing the Soviet Union's status as the last colonial empire; by calling for a single standard for UN treatment of "colonial" questions; by focusing attention on the anomaly of UN membership the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the UN; and by condemning Soviet incorporation of the independent Baltic States.

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6. Work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE Commission, Amnesty International, and other interested religious and political organizations to ensure that adequate attention is paid to Soviet ethnic and national groups at the various human rights meetings that these groups regularly attend.
  7. Explore further the implications of the Afghan resistance movement for its policy toward Soviet Muslim minorities.
  8. Establish a larger U.S. official presence in the USSR. As a means of increasing our information on and ability to influence developments in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, and consistent with NSDD-75, the USG will give active consideration to renewing preparations to open a Consulate in Kiev. Consistent with prior U.S.-Soviet understandings (the Nixon-Brezhnev Communique of July 3, 1974), the USG will also give active consideration to negotiating the opening an additional Consulate in Tashkent. This would give us substantially enhanced access to the largest non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union -- Ukrainians and Muslims. The latter will be one of every three recruits in the Soviet Army by 1990.
  9. Initiate new Cultural, Informational, and Educational Exchanges. As part of our efforts under NSDD-75 to expand US-Soviet exchanges, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall participate in a reevaluation of our present exchanges policy aimed at increasing those exchanges involving non-Russian areas of the USSR.
  10. Increase Public statements on Soviet abuse of ethnic and national groups. The Soviet government's mistreatment of various ethnic and national groups shall, as appropriate, become a more frequent theme of USG public statements. Such statements dealing with that theme, whether prepared for international radio broadcasts, official speeches, or written proclamations, shall be cast in terms of universally accepted norms, especially those norms incorporated in international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and those recognized in the Soviet Constitution. Such public statements may include references to:
    - The plight of the many Soviet human rights activists whose persecution by the Soviet authorities is directly attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their national traditions,
    - The colonial aspects of Soviet rule over non-Russian peoples,
    - The problems of religion in the Soviet Union.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Please make  
file folder:  
Soviet Nationalities

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR F06-114/8#10734

BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

Proposed National Security Decision  
Directive Number \_\_\_\_\_

### US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

As set forth in NSDD-75, US policy toward the USSR is to aim at: Containing and over time reversing Soviet expansionism, promoting change within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic system, and reaching agreements with the Soviet Union that protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principles of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. As part of that policy, the USG shall pursue a rejuvenated effort to understand and to influence ethnic and national developments within the Soviet Union.

USG objectives are:

1. To encourage changes within the Soviet Union that foster diversity, pluralism, decentralization, democracy and conformity with internationally-accepted norms of justice and morality.
2. To promote a more accurate understanding of the nature and actions of the Soviet Union by drawing attention to its colonial and expansionist characteristics, and by undermining the notion that the expansion of communist rule is an irreversible phenomenon.
3. To create an institutional structure within the USG, and more broadly in the U.S., to strengthen and sustain our capabilities for understanding and influencing Soviet ethnic and national developments.
4. Consistent with NSDD-75, to increase our presence and activities in the Soviet Union, while ensuring that the resulting benefits are not ~~counterbalanced~~ by drawbacks of any increased presence and activities the Soviets may demand in return.

To realize these objectives, the USG shall develop an action program. This program will be based on the reaffirmation of our commitment to the rights and proper interests of the various ethnic and national groups within the Soviet Union, including (as appropriate) their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional education to their children, to emigrate and to enjoy national independence.

The USG shall:

1. Increase its capabilities for understanding and influencing developments within the Soviet Union affecting ethnic and national groups. As part of this effort, a permanent Soviet



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Nationalities Interagency Group shall be established to undertake the necessary steps to ensure that adequate financial and institutional resources are being devoted to Soviet ethnic and national group developments. This shall include the creation of a Center for the Study of Soviet Nationalities (privately run, but endowed with USG funds), and the establishment of an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists. The Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall also study ways to increase USG public affairs funding to enhance international awareness of Soviet ethnic and national issues, and shall be mandated to participate as appropriate in other USG programs and decisionmaking affecting US policy on Soviet ethnic and national groups.

2. Increase its ability to broadcast radio programs to Soviet ethnic and national groups. Within the context of the decision to modernize and upgrade VOA, REF and RL facilities, the USG shall assign high priority to increasing the number of hours of non-Russian language broadcasting and the number of Soviet languages in which the radios broadcast. In accordance with the priorities that from time to time will be established by the Special Planning Group for Public Diplomacy with the assistance of the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group, expanded efforts will be made to overcome the shortages in qualified linguists and their staff. Renewed consideration shall be given to funding new broadcast sites, strengthening existing transmitter sites and expanding all technical means. Budgetary allocations to existing operating agencies shall reflect their high priority as national security interests.
3. Otherwise increase the flow of information into the USSR. The US shall facilitate the open flow of information into the USSR by employing additional available means such as networks for the distribution of newspapers, books, and cassette tapes. The main goal should be to stimulate the community spirit of ethnic and national groups.
4. Continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
5. Increase UN activities. The USG shall take appropriate steps in the UN to highlight the contradictions between Soviet propaganda and practices. These steps may include raising the issue of Soviet nationalities in statements and debate, especially in the context of Soviet professions of support for self-determination and decolonization. This might best be done by stressing the Soviet Union's status as the last colonial empire; by calling for a single standard for UN treatment of "colonial" questions; by focusing attention on the anomaly of UN membership the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the UN; and by condemning Soviet incorporation of the independent Baltic States.

- 3
6. Work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE Commission, Amnesty International, and other interested religious and political organizations to ensure that adequate attention is paid to Soviet ethnic and national groups at the various human rights meetings that these groups regularly attend.
  7. Explore further the implications of the Afghan resistance movement for its policy toward Soviet Muslim minorities.
  8. Establish a larger U.S. official presence in the USSR. As a means of increasing our information on and ability to influence developments in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, and consistent with NSDD-75, the USG will give active consideration to renewing preparations to open a Consulate in Kiev. Consistent with prior U.S.-Soviet understandings (the Nixon-Brezhnev Communique of July 3, 1974), the USG will also give active consideration to negotiating the opening an additional Consulate in Tashkent. This would give us substantially enhanced access to the largest non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union -- Ukrainians and Muslims. The latter will be one of every three recruits in the Soviet Army by 1990.
  9. Initiate new Cultural, Informational, and Educational Exchanges. As part of our efforts under NSDD-75 to expand US-Soviet exchanges, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall participate in a reevaluation of our present exchanges policy aimed at increasing those exchanges involving non-Russian areas of the USSR.
  10. Increase Public statements on Soviet abuse of ethnic and national groups. The Soviet government's mistreatment of various ethnic and national groups shall, as appropriate, become a more frequent theme of USG public statements. Such statements dealing with that theme, whether prepared for international radio broadcasts, official speeches, or written proclamations, shall be cast in terms of universally accepted norms, especially those norms incorporated in international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and those recognized in the Soviet Constitution. Such public statements may include references to:
    - The plight of the many Soviet human rights activists whose persecution by the Soviet authorities is directly attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their national traditions,
    - The colonial aspects of Soviet rule over non-Russian peoples,
    - The problems of religion in the Soviet Union.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

July 5, 1983

9  
JL-  
Can you  
attend for  
us?  
JFM

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jack Matlock - NSC  
FROM: Raymond F. Smith - EUR/SOV *RF*  
SUBJECT: Nationalities Working Group Meeting

This is to inform you that a meeting of the Soviet Nationalities Working Group will take place in the European Bureau conference room (room 6226) at 11:00 am Monday July 18. The meeting will be smaller than usual, and involve only about ten people. The subject will be a revised NSDD, based on new DOD comments. Attached is a copy of the new NSDD.

Attachment:  
As stated.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F06-114/8 #10235  
BY HOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

Proposed National Security Decision  
Directive Number \_\_\_\_\_

US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

As set forth in NSDD-75, US policy toward the USSR is to aim at: Containing and over time reversing Soviet expansionism, promoting change within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic system, and reaching agreements with the Soviet Union that protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principles of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. As part of that policy, the USG shall strive to understand and to influence ethnic and national developments within the Soviet Union.

USG objectives are:

1. To encourage ameliorative changes within the Soviet Union that foster conformity therein with international norms and elementary notions of justice and morality.
2. To promote a more accurate understanding of the nature and actions of the Soviet Union by drawing attention to the fact that the Soviet Union is less a monolithic entity than a colonial empire; indeed it is the largest such empire surviving. Highlighting the colonial and expansionist characteristics of the Soviet Union may help constrain aggressive Soviet action abroad; it may increase the domestic costs of such action as well as render the international community more resistant. It may also help to undermine the notion that Communist take-overs are irreversible phenomena, thereby affording valuable hope to those who live under communist regimes.

To realize these objectives the USG shall develop an action program to promote ameliorative changes in the USSR. This action program will be based on the reaffirmation of our commitment to the rights and proper interests of the various ethnic and national groups within the Soviet Union, including (as appropriate) their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional education to their children, to emigrate and to enjoy national independence.

The USG shall:

1. Enhance its capabilities for understanding and influencing developments within the Soviet Union affecting ethnic and national groups. As it may be necessary to increase the human and material resources we are devoting to this matter, a new Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group, under the direction of the NSC, shall undertake the necessary studies and steps to ensure adequate development of such resources.

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NLRR Fol6-114/8 #10236

BY NOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

2. Increase our ability to broadcast radio programs to Soviet ethnic and national groups. Within the context of my decision to modernize and upgrade VOA, RFE and RL facilities, the USG shall assign high priority to increasing the number of hours of non-Russian language broadcasting and the number of Soviet languages in which the radios broadcast. In accordance with the priorities that from time to time will be established by the Special Planning Group for Public Diplomacy with the assistance of the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group, expanded efforts will be made to overcome the shortages in qualified linguists and other staff. Renewed consideration shall be given to funding new broadcast sites, strengthening existing transmitter sites and expanding all technical means. Budgetary allocations to existing operating agencies shall reflect their high priority as national security interests.
3. Otherwise increase the flow of information into the USSR. The US shall facilitate the flow of information into the USSR by employing additional available means such as networks for the distribution of newspapers, books, and cassette tapes. The main goal should be to stimulate the community spirit of ethnic and national groups.
4. Increase our UN activities. The USG shall take appropriate steps in the UN to highlight the contradictions between Soviet propaganda and practices. These steps may include reopening the question of membership in the UN for the Ukraine and Belorussia; raising the issue of Soviet minorities more frequently and more pointedly in statements and debate, especially in connection with Soviet professions of support for self-determination and decolonization; and condemning the the Soviet Union's purported annexation of the Baltic states. The USG shall also endeavor to place the question of Soviet ethnic and national groups before the UN decolonization committee.
5. The USG shall continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
6. Appropriate USG agencies shall explore further the implications of the Afghan resistance movement for our policy toward Soviet Muslim minorities.
7. The Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE Commission, Amnesty International, and other interested religious and political organizations to ensure that adequate attention is paid to Soviet ethnic and national groups at the various human rights meetings that these groups regularly attend.

8. The Soviet government's mistreatment of various ethnic and national groups shall, as appropriate, become a frequent theme of USG public statements. Such statements dealing with that theme, whether prepared for international radio broadcasts, official speeches, or written proclamations, shall be cast in terms of universally accepted norms, especially those norms incorporated in international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and those recognized in the Soviet constitution. Such public statement may include references to:

- The plight of the many Soviet human rights activists whose persecution by the Soviet authorities is directly attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their national traditions,
- The colonial aspects of Soviet rule over non-Russian peoples,
- The problems of religion in the Soviet Union.

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INR draft

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NLRR Folio-114/8# 10737

BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

SECRET/SENSITIVE

## US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

As set forth in NSDD-75, US policy toward the USSR seeks to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism and to promote changes within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic and open political system. Consistent with that policy and with underlying American national interests and principles, the USG shall expand its efforts to understand and influence ethnic and national developments within the Soviet Union.

The USG shall:

1. Expand American governmental and academic expertise on Soviet nationality affairs by promoting training in critical non-Russian languages through existing foreign language training support programs and by encouraging both directly and through the private sector the establishment of Soviet nationalities training programs within existing Soviet studies graduate programs at major American universities.
2. Increase its ability to broadcast to Soviet ethnic and national groups by increasing the number of hours of non-Russian language broadcasting at VOA, RFE, and RL facilities and by expanding the staffs in these languages. The USG shall also seek to increase the flow of information into the USSR by seeking to expand cultural, informational and educational exchanges to the non-Russian areas of the USSR.
3. Increase activities at the UN designed to highlight the contradictions between Soviet propaganda and practices in the nationalities and colonial areas.
4. Continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
5. Increase public statements on Soviet abuses of ethnic and national groups.
6. Seek to establish a larger U.S. official presence in the non-Russian areas of the USSR by giving active consideration to renewing preparations to open a consulate in Kiev and to negotiating an additional consulate in Tashkent.

7. Work with appropriate public bodies to further USG goals and to ensure that adequate attention is given to the problems of Soviet ethnic and national groups.
8. Establish a permanent Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group under the Chairmanship of State Department to monitor these efforts, to promote the sharing of expertise within the USG, and to study additional ways to expand public awareness of this issue.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Proposed National Security Decision  
Directive Number \_\_\_\_\_

### US POLICY ON SOVIET ETHNIC AND NATIONAL GROUPS

As set forth in NSDD-75, US policy toward the USSR is to aim at: Containing and over time reversing Soviet expansionism, promoting change within the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic system, and reaching agreements with the Soviet Union that protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the principles of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. As part of that policy, the USG shall pursue a rejuvenated effort to understand and to influence ethnic and national developments within the Soviet Union.

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2. To promote a more accurate understanding of the nature and actions of the Soviet Union by drawing attention to its colonial and expansionist characteristics, and by undermining the notion that the expansion of communist rule is an irreversible phenomenon.
3. To create an institutional structure within the USG, and more broadly in the U.S., to strengthen and sustain our capabilities for understanding and influencing Soviet ethnic and national developments.
4. Consistent with NSDD-75, to increase our presence and activities in the Soviet Union, while ensuring that the resulting benefits are not counterbalanced by drawbacks of any increased presence and activities the Soviets may demand in return.

To realize these objectives, the USG shall develop an action program. This program will be based on the reaffirmation of our commitment to the rights and proper interests of the various ethnic and national groups within the Soviet Union, including (as appropriate) their rights to practice their religions, to provide traditional education to their children, to emigrate and to enjoy national independence.

The USG shall:

1. Increase its capabilities for understanding and influencing developments within the Soviet Union affecting ethnic and national groups. As part of this effort, a permanent Soviet

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/8# 10238

HOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08

Nationalities Interagency Group shall be established to undertake the necessary steps to ensure that adequate financial and institutional resources are being devoted to Soviet ethnic and national group developments. This shall include the creation of a Center for the Study of Soviet Nationalities (privately run, but endowed with USG funds), and the establishment of an Interagency Career Management Committee for Soviet Nationality Specialists. The Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall also study ways to increase USG public affairs funding to enhance international awareness of Soviet ethnic and national issues, and shall be mandated to participate as appropriate in other USG programs and decisionmaking affecting US policy on Soviet ethnic and national groups.

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3. Otherwise increase the flow of information into the USSR. The US shall facilitate the open flow of information into the USSR by employing additional available means such as networks for the distribution of newspapers, books, and cassette tapes. The main goal should be to stimulate the community spirit of ethnic and national groups.
4. Continue to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
5. Increase UN activities. The USG shall take appropriate steps in the UN to highlight the contradictions between Soviet propaganda and practices. These steps may include raising the issue of Soviet nationalities in statements and debate, especially in the context of Soviet professions of support for self-determination and decolonization. This might best be done by stressing the Soviet Union's status as the last colonial empire; by calling for a single standard for UN treatment of "colonial" questions; by focusing attention on the anomaly of UN membership the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the UN; and by condemning Soviet incorporation of the independent Baltic States.

- 6. Work with the appropriate public bodies, such as the CSCE Commission, Amnesty International, and other interested religious and political organizations to ensure that adequate attention is paid to Soviet ethnic and national groups at the various human rights meetings that these groups regularly attend.
- 7. Explore further the implications of the Afghan resistance movement for its policy toward Soviet Muslim minorities.
- 8. Establish a larger U.S. official presence in the USSR. As a means of increasing our information on and ability to influence developments in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union, and consistent with NSDD-75, the USG will give active consideration to renewing preparations to open a Consulate in Kiev. Consistent with prior U.S.-Soviet understandings (the Nixon-Brezhnev Communique of July 3, 1974), the USG will also give active consideration to negotiating the opening an additional Consulate in Tashkent. This would give us substantially enhanced access to the largest non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union -- Ukrainians and Muslims. The latter will be one of every three recruits in the Soviet Army by 1990.
- 9. Initiate new Cultural, Informational, and Educational Exchanges. As part of our efforts under NSDD-75 to expand US-Soviet exchanges, the Soviet Nationalities Interagency Group shall participate in a reevaluation of our present exchanges policy aimed at increasing those exchanges involving non-Russian areas of the USSR.
- 10. Increase Public statements on Soviet abuse of ethnic and national groups. The Soviet government's mistreatment of various ethnic and national groups shall, as appropriate, become a more frequent theme of USG public statements. Such statements dealing with that theme, whether prepared for international radio broadcasts, official speeches, or written proclamations, shall be cast in terms of universally accepted norms, especially those norms incorporated in international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party and those recognized in the Soviet Constitution. Such public statements may include references to:
  - The plight of the many Soviet human rights activists whose persecution by the Soviet authorities is directly attributable to the efforts of these persons to assert their national traditions,
  - The colonial aspects of Soviet rule over non-Russian peoples,
  - The problems of religion in the Soviet Union.



BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS  
AND  
RESEARCH

18  
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CS 7/30/02

~~(U)~~ SOVIET NATIONALITIES SURVEY, No. 1:  
January 1-March 31, 1983

*(This is the first issue of a quarterly publication on developments and trends concerning Soviet nationalities.)*

Highlights

Andropov delivered his initial remarks on nationalities policy at the USSR 60th anniversary celebration in December 1982 and at the Supreme Soviet Presidium meeting in January 1983. They suggest that he views nationality issues as delicate and potentially explosive and will pursue a cautious, pragmatic policy based on economic imperatives and sociological research rather than ideological injunctions.

The promotion of Azerbaijan party chief Geydar Aliyev to full membership in the Politburo and first deputy chairmanship of the USSR Council of Ministers brought for the first time a representative of a Muslim nationality into the Moscow-based Politburo elite. His rise, however, was probably more directly related to his past services in the KGB than to his nationality. His replacement in Baku is not even a CPSU Central Committee member.

A second republic-level slot was opened by the death in January of Politburo candidate member and Belorussian Party Secretary Tikhon Kisilev. In marked contrast to the Brezhnev period, Kisilev's replacement came from outside the republic party organization. The new man, Nikolay Slyun'kov, like Aliyev's replacement, is not a member of the Central Committee.

Among other developments during the first quarter of 1983:

--Forced by demographic change, the Soviet military modified its Russian-only language policy

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Decontrol on 12/31/83

Report 627-AR  
May 26, 1983

and permitted the use of non-Russian languages in non-command situations.

--Moscow stripped the Russian-nationalist Society for the Preservation of Cultural and Historical Monuments of many of its functions.

--A series of recently published volumes suggests that the June 1982 Riga ideological conference was an important source for many of Andropov's ideas on the nationalities question.

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I. Major Trends

Realism Dominates Andropov Remarks on Nationality Problems

Andropov has signaled that his nationalities policy will be determined by the imperatives of economic development and the findings of social science rather than by an ideologically based tilt to either Russian or non-Russian nationalities. His announced plan to increase economic integration and regional specialization throughout the USSR, however, may in fact exacerbate nationality problems.

The general thrust of Andropov's nationalities policy was made clear in his statement at the 60th anniversary celebration (December 21, 1982) of the formation of the USSR and his address to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on January 12, 1983. He called for the elaboration of a "well-thought-out, scientifically substantiated nationalities policy," conceding that "problems of relations among nations have not been removed from the agenda." He also implied that much current Soviet thinking in this area was inadequate.

Arguing that the parts benefit as the whole develops, Andropov pointed to a nationalities policy based on centrally determined economic requirements and consisting of a series of cautious initiatives in specific areas rather than a broad-gauged attack. Such an approach might appear to benefit the Russians over the other nationalities, but Andropov's comments were remarkable for their relatively modest praise of the Russians and for their concern for non-Russian groups--including even such peoples as the Germans, Poles, Koreans, and Kurds, who lack Soviet national statehood.

In support of his approach, Andropov seized the ideological initiative on the national question, thereby effectively ending Soviet academic debate in this area and opening new fields to concrete sociological research.

--He demanded recognition of the fact that nations were going to survive for "a long time" and that the "growth" of national self-awareness under socialism was "a logical, objective process." This proposition permits researchers to report and policymakers to use information on national identity and assertiveness without ideological risk.

--He argued that "negative phenomena" in the nationalities field cannot be attributed "solely to vestiges of the past. They are sometimes nourished by our own mistakes." Consequently, he suggested, party and state workers must exercise caution lest their actions provoke an unwanted backlash.

--He reasserted the Leninist idea of a "merger" of nationalities as the goal of Soviet society.

Andropov's use of the term "merger" (sliyaniye) has drawn a great deal of attention in the West, but it should not be taken out of context. First, he placed it in the distant future: it is the "ultimate goal," but "the Party knows very well that the path to this goal is a long one." Further, if one accepts the gloss provided at the Riga conference (below) by Richard Kosolapov, the editor of Kommunist and an apparent source for many of Andropov's ideas in this area, the term no longer carries a biological threat to any national group. Kosolapov decried that earlier understanding as a "vulgar-utopian" idea without any validity. Thus, Andropov's reintroduction of this concept effectively removed it from both academic and political debate, defusing something that was potentially explosive.

#### Riga Conference Publications Reflect Pervasiveness of Nationality Problems

The unprecedented set of publications based on the proceedings of the June 1982 Riga ideological conference suggests that it may be an authoritative source for new directions in the field of nationalities. Andropov has evidently drawn many of his ideas on nationalities policy from it. Staged by the CPSU Central Committee at a time when Andropov was the senior party secretary responsible for ideology, the three-day conference on "The Development of Nationality Relations Under Conditions of Mature Socialism" drew more than 250 senior party and state officials, military officers, and academic specialists. In contrast to earlier Soviet meetings on the subject, the Riga conference had a distinctly practical orientation: its participants met in 11 sections and made specific policy recommendations for each.

Initial press coverage of the conference was limited to Brezhnev's greeting, speeches by Politburo candidate member Boris Ponomarev and Latvian First Secretary August Voss, and a brief resumé of conference activities. In an unusual move reflecting both the seriousness of the problem and the practical importance of the recommendations, however, Moscow announced that the proceedings would be published in a series of 12 volumes, a summary volume for the plenary sessions and one for each of the 11 functional sections.



Eight volumes have been received in the West thus far, the one covering the plenary sessions and those for the sections on party work, social policy, legal questions, trade unions, the military, the media, and relations with socialist countries. Four more have been announced--for the sections on economics, youth, culture, and countering bourgeois propaganda. Each volume contains the major speeches, a summary of the discussion, and policy recommendations.

A further indication of the importance of these publications is that they are being issued in press runs of up to 50,000 copies by the publishing houses that normally serve the functional areas involved. Thus, the proceedings of the section on military questions were issued by Voenizdat and those of the section on culture by Sovetskiy Pisatel'.

Given Andropov's probable involvement in the organization of this conference and his use of certain ideas elaborated there, the specific policy proposals made at Riga take on added interest. The most striking proposals are the following:

- The establishment of councils for the study of nationality relations in all oblast, kray, and republic party committees and the organization of sociological research centers in all republics.
- The recognition that any violation of Leninist principles in cadres policy may be a source of nationalist resentment.
- A call for "scientifically based recommendations" for the administration of a migration policy designed to increase inter-republic labor mobility for all social groups.
- The improvement of Russian-language training for non-Russians and "all possible" assistance to non-indigenous nationalities to learn the language of the republics in which they live.
- Opposition to "any attempts at 'reanimation' of historical disputes and conflicts over territory, cultural primacy, or inheritance."
- An increase in the "critical analysis" of foreign radio broadcasting and in counterpropaganda against Western efforts to exploit nationality issues in the USSR.

New Role for Non-Russian Languages in Soviet Military

The demographic explosion in the Muslim republics has forced the Soviet military to abandon its Russian-language-only policy because an increasing percentage of Soviet recruits do not have a

functional knowledge of that language. Military party organizations are now using various native languages of recruits in non-command situations, and Soviet soldiers have been permitted to subscribe to native-language journals regardless of where they are serving. Russian, however, remains the language of command. Until recently, all collective activities of Soviet military personnel were conducted in Russian, and much time and energy were devoted to improving the Russian-language skills of non-Russian soldiers. Sometimes, as one general recently complained, such language training cut into the time available for military and political instruction.

There has been no indication that Russian-language instruction will be curtailed, but the military authorities have taken three additional steps which suggest the seriousness of the language problem and which give broader scope to non-Russian languages in non-command situations.

- Military party organizations are now considering nationality factors in formats for meetings and are conducting many activities in the native languages of the soldiers involved. According to a February 1983 article in Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye, this practice permits the organizations "to explain more thoroughly the tasks of military service and to integrate the soldiers more rapidly into the life of army and fleet collectives."
- Non-Russian soldiers now can subscribe to newspapers and journals in their native languages even when they are serving outside their home republic. All Soviet citizens have been given this privilege beginning with 1983 subscriptions. The Soviet military newspaper Krasnaya zvezda had called at least two years ago for this privilege to be extended to non-Russian Soviet soldiers.
- Soviet commanders have been told to display greater sensitivity to national differences and traditions. At the Riga nationalities conference, Lt. Gen. A. D. Lizichev said: "What is required from each officer is the consideration of national differences and customs, aspects of character, a knowledge of the literature and art of various peoples, and the ability to form up and organize all soldiers, direct their energies toward the resolution of tasks confronting subunits, units and ships."

Soviet propagandists frequently point to the army as a major force in the consolidation of the Soviet people. As two senior officers wrote in a December 1982 issue of Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, "...it is precisely in the army that the individual gets the especially strong feeling of being a particle in that great community which we call the Soviet people." The changes outlined above suggest that in today's Soviet military other strong feelings are being activated too.

Generational Change in Soviet Muslim Leadership Completed

Because of its youth and relative isolation from local congregations, the new generation of Soviet Muslim leaders is likely to be less effective than its predecessors in controlling unregistered communities at home and in representing the Soviet Government to conservative Muslim states with which Moscow does not have diplomatic relations.

The mid-October 1982 election of a new chairman for the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan completed a generational change in the official Muslim supervisory bodies. Since November 1979, all four Muslim Spiritual Directorates have elected new leaders whose average age (35) is more than 30 years younger than that of their predecessors, something that would appear to guarantee them long tenures. In addition to their youth, the four new chairmen are distinguished by their advanced secular training, extensive foreign language skills, and almost exclusive service as administrators rather than as leaders of local congregations. This combination will reduce the Spiritual Directorates' ability to act as Moscow's representatives to conservative Muslim states, whose leaders have a traditional respect for age and pastoral work. It will also render them less able to reach out to and control unregistered Muslim groups in the USSR, many of whose members have similar values.

The chairman of the Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan is likely to assume a dominant position among the new leaders. Both his father and grandfather had served as Tashkent mufti, and he is responsible for the largest Muslim community in the USSR. Shamsutdinkhan Babakhan (45) received his education at the Tashkent Foreign Languages Institute and at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies. He also studied at the Al-Alzhar academy in Cairo, but there is no indication that he attended the Tashkent Islamic Institute or ever served as the leader of a local Muslim congregation. He first came to public notice in 1979 when, as rector of the Tashkent Islamic Institute, he began to speak at religious conferences. In October 1982, his father, who had been mufti since 1957, retired because of ill health--he died in December--and Shamsutdinkhan was elected over his father's three deputies, the average age of whom was 66. His wife is an English-language instructor at Tashkent State University.

The other new chairmen include:

--Tal'at Tazeyev (34) who was elected in July 1980 as chairman of the Ufa directorate and who is responsible for the Muslim communities of the European regions of the USSR and Siberia.

- Makhmud Gekkiyev (47) who is chairman of the Makhachkala directorate with responsibilities for the Muslims of Daghestan and the North Caucasus. He was elected in November 1979.
- Allashukur Pashayev (33) who is chairman of the Baku directorate which is responsible for all Shiia Muslims of the USSR and for Sunni Muslims in the Transcaucasus. He took office in July 1980.

#### Functions of Semi-Official Russian Nationalist Group Reduced

Moscow has decided to concentrate authority for cultural and historical monuments in the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, thus reducing the role of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Culture and Historical Monuments, a 14-million-member group with Russian nationalist overtones. In December 1982, the USSR People's Control Commission criticized the society's central apparatus for serious financial irregularities. And on January 18, 1983, the RSFSR Council of Ministers stripped the society of its most important functions by deciding to "concentrate leadership of the registration, preservation, use, restoration and propaganda" of Russian cultural and historical monuments within the RSFSR Ministry of Culture. This blow to the society was softened somewhat by a directive issued at the same time to RSFSR government bodies to "provide in their plans for the apportionment of materials" to preservation projects. The failure of these bodies to do so in the past had drawn the fire of society officials throughout 1982.

The future of the society is unclear, but its history has been quite remarkable. Founded in 1966 to educate the public on cultural and historical monuments, to generate public support for preserving such monuments, and to cooperate with government bodies on actual projects, the society had grown to 14.7 million individual and 48,000 collective members by the end of 1982. In the past, it oversaw a variety of preservation projects and operated five production enterprises, a restoration workshop, and a store. Among its most active supporters have been the Russian nationalist painter Il'ya Glazunov and Russian nationalist writer Vladimir Soloukhin. Members of the society often have taken public positions which have been sharply criticized by more orthodox Soviet officials.

The society appears likely to survive--an interview with one of its leaders in the March 1983 issue of the anti-religious journal Nauka i religiya is full of confidence--but the Andropov regime appears to have served notice that it will not ignore financial or other irregularities among Russian nationalist groups.

## II. Current Developments

### All-Union

Chernenko Woos Nationalities. In a possible attempt to curry favor in the non-Russian republics, Politburo member and senior party secretary Konstantin Chernenko recently argued that Soviet nationalities policy has always permitted a "multiplicity" of forms and methods and that these have conformed to the "specific features" of each region's culture and history. Writing in the December 1982 Problemy mira i sotsializma--signed to press on November 24, 1982, nearly a month before Andropov's anniversary speech--Chernenko also reintroduced Lenin's concept of "merger" as the ultimate goal of communist society.

Azerbaijan First Secretary Promoted to Moscow Post. Ten days after Andropov was named CPSU General Secretary, Geydar Aliyev (59) First Secretary of the Azerbaijan party, was promoted from candidate to full membership in the Politburo. The next day he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Aliyev, who worked for many years under Andropov, probably received his promotion more as a result of this connection than for his effectiveness as a republic party leader or his Muslim nationality.

Muslim Workers Offered Greater Incentives To Move to RSFSR. Moscow has stepped up its efforts to encourage workers in Central Asia and Azerbaijan to move to labor-short regions in the RSFSR. In a recent series of articles appearing in the republic-level press, workers have been offered increasingly favorable benefit packages if they will move to and remain in the RSFSR.

Nations May Be "Forever," Philosophy Journal Concludes. In the November-December 1982 Nauchnyy kommunizm, Soviet philosopher G. L. Kobko quotes with approval Anatoliy Lunacharskiy's observation that "...humanity is moving unceasingly along the path toward the internationalization of culture. The national basis will remain for a long time, perhaps forever; but internationalism does not presuppose the destruction of national motifs in the all-human symphony but only their rich and free harmonization."

### Western Republics

Belorussia: Outsider Named New Head of Republic Party Organization. When Belorussian First Secretary Tikhon Kiselev died suddenly in January 1983, his replacement was not drawn from the ranks of the republic party hierarchy as had been the rule in republic party successions under Brezhnev. The new First

Secretary, Nikolay Nikitovich Slyun'kov, a 53-year-old Belorussian, had been a deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan in Moscow since 1974; as such, he was not part of the Mazurov-Masherov clique which has dominated Belorussia since the 1960s.

Ukraine: Idea of Ukrainian National Religion Scored. The activities of the underground Ukrainian Uniate Catholic Church and its exiled leader, Joseph Cardinal Slipyy, have long been the target of Soviet ideological attacks. The November 11, 1982, Ukrainian-language agricultural paper Sil'ski Visti once again accused Slipyy--and by extension, all Uniates--of seeking to portray Uniatism as the "national religion" of the Ukraine and the Uniate Church as the "defender and mother of the Ukrainian people." These false ideas, the paper concluded, play into the hands of the Vatican and "imperialism."

Ukraine: New Republic Komsomol Head Named. A March 4, 1983, Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee plenum elected V. I. Mironenko, who had been Second Secretary, as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Komsomol, following the election of the previous First Secretary, A. I. Korniyenko, as First Secretary of the Ternopol Oblast party committee.

### Baltic Republics

Estonia: Party Chief Attacks Western Subversion. In the March 1983 Kommunist, Estonian First Secretary Karl Vayno attacked Western radio broadcasts and intelligence services for attempting to incite Estonian citizens to take part in strikes similar to those in Poland. He asserted that these attempts had been completely rebuffed by Estonians.

Estonia: Civil Rights Activists Arrested. According to the Stockholm-based Aid Center for Political Prisoners in Estonia, Soviet security organs in Estonia have arrested more than a dozen Estonian civil rights activists in recent months and have sought to confiscate all copies of the Estonian Underground Chronicle, a samizdat publication which has appeared since 1978. More than 600 pages from the chronicle have reached the West.

Estonia: Major Agricultural Reorganization. On March 25, 1983, the ESTonian SSR Supreme Soviet created a Union-Republic Agroindustrial Association to replace the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Committee for Land Reclamation and the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture which were abolished. The head of the association is Heyno Tynisovich Veldi, who had been Minister of Agriculture. These changes parallel those announced earlier in Georgia and are part of new initiatives being tried by the Andropov regime to improve the economic sector.

Baltic Republics  
(cont'd)

Latvia: New Latvian Cardinal Has Broad Responsibilities. By tradition, the newly named cardinal of the Riga eparchate has responsibilities for all Roman Catholic communities in the USSR outside Lithuania. Bishop Julijans Vaivods (87) was named to the College of Cardinals in January 1983 by Pope John Paul II, making him the only cardinal living in the USSR whose appointment has been publicly announced by the Vatican. (According to Vatican rumor, Lithuanian Bishop Juliujonas Stepanavicius was named cardinal in pectore some time ago; his appointment has not been announced lest he be subject to civil persecution.) In the late 1950s, Vaivods spent two years in Moldavian labor camps for his religious activities; but since 1962 he has been bishop in Riga. Despite his advanced age, he is in good health.

Lithuania: Bishops Visit Rome. For the first time since the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940, four Roman Catholic bishops from Lithuania were permitted to visit the Vatican in early April 1983. Their visit came at a time when rank-and-file Lithuanian clergy were under increasing attack for their role in the human and national rights movements. Permission for their trip may reflect an attempt by Moscow to divide the church hierarchy from these movements, forestalling a potentially explosive combination like that in Poland.

Caucasus

Armenia: Drastic Decline in Emigration. Only 400 Armenians received permission to emigrate to the West in 1982, compared with 2,450 in 1981. More than half of the 1982 group were wives or elderly parents of Armenians residing abroad; younger relatives of earlier emigrants apparently are no longer able to secure permission to leave. In contrast to the experience of Jewish groups, however, Armenian applicants who have been refused permission have not suffered discrimination.

Azerbaijan: New First Secretary Elected. Following Aliyev's move to Moscow, Kyamran Mamed ogly Bagirov was elected First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee at a plenum on December 3, 1982. Bagirov (49) had been a secretary of the Azerbaijani party and a member of its Central Committee bureau. His responsibilities appear to have been in the ideological and cultural spheres, but his earlier work had been in construction and industry. At present, he is not a member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Azerbaijan: New Iranian Consul General in Baku. On March 6, 1983, the newly appointed consul of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

Caucasus  
(cont'd)

Ahmad Quza'i, met with Kurban Khalilov, chairman of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Taira Tarova, republic Foreign Minister. The Iranian consulate in Baku was established in the early 1970s to facilitate trade between the two countries.

Georgia: New Republic Prime Minister Named. Dmitriy Levanovich Kartvelishvili, former chairman of the Georgian SSR State Planning Commission, was named Prime Minister following the July 1982 death of Zurab Pataridze in an automobile accident.

Georgia: Major Agricultural Reorganization. On March 12, 1983, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet abolished the republic Ministries of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and the State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture. They were replaced with a Union-Republic State Committee for Agricultural Production headed by former agriculture minister Guram Davidovich Mgeladze.

Georgia: Drug Problems at Tbilisi State. Two third-year students at Tbilisi State University were expelled in January 1983 for drug addiction. In a move suggesting that drug problems are widespread in Georgia, the Georgian authorities announced this step at an expanded session of the republic Komsomol Central Committee.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan: Special Russian Classes for Non-Russian Inductees. Recognizing that two-month preinduction Russian-language courses do not adequately prepare Kazakhs for military life, a Kazakh school has introduced basic military terminology into Russian-language courses given to ninth and tenth-grade Kazakh students.

Kirghiziya: Prosecutor Receives Death Penalty. A Kirghiz prosecutor, Urushbek Koychumanov, was executed in March 1983 for taking more than 40,000 rubles in bribes to protect meat combine officials.

Kirghiziya: New Novel on Basmachi Criticized. A March 2, 1983, Sovetskaya Kirghiziya review attacked J. Jenchurayev's recent Russian-language novel "The End of the Wolf Pack" for distortions and factual errors in its depiction of the history of the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian Basmachi movement in Central Asia.



Central Asia  
(cont'd)

Turkmenistan: Failure To Reopen Historical Museum Draws Complaints. On January 19, 1983, Turkmenskaya iskra published a reader's letter complaining that the republic Ministry of Education had failed to reopen the local historical museum as it earlier had promised. The museum closed when the Ashkhabad Historical Society was shut down a year ago.

Turkmenistan: Tougher Penalties for Vagrants. A January 1, 1983, republic decree increased the punishment for those convicted of vagrancy or begging from one year to two, and of parasitism from two years to three. Laws of this type have often been directed against unofficial Muslim groups.

Uzbekistan: New Afghan Consulate in Tashkent. An Afghan consulate general opened in Tashkent in December 1982; its first consul general, Mohammed Nasim Juya, was received by the Uzbek Foreign Minister, Bakhodir Abdurazakov. The opening of the consulate is an additional indication of the large number of Afghan nationals now resident in Soviet Central Asia.

RSFSR and Siberia

RSFSR: Russian Nationalist Sentenced. Valeriy Senderov, a self-proclaimed member of the Russian emigré group NTS, was sentenced on February 28, 1983, to seven years in a labor camp and five years of internal exile for disseminating "anti-Soviet" literature. His arrest and conviction are part of the broader Soviet crackdown against any form of dissent.

(Note: In future editions, this section will include materials on the non-Russian nationalities of the RSFSR and Siberia, as well as on Russian nationalism.)

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III. Chronology: Personnel Changes

Caucasus

Armenia

- Jan. 28, 1983      Shakhbazyan, Rafik Tatevosovich appointed Minister of Procurement vice Onik T. Ovakimyan.
- Feb. 4, 1983      Stepanyan, Sabia Nikolayevich appointed Chairman, State Committee for Gas Supply, vice Rafik T. Shakhbazyan.
- Feb. 4, 1983      Shakverdyan, Aleksey Nikolayevich appointed Chairman, State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture, vice Suren S. Oganessian.
- Feb. 16, 1983     Mirzoyan, Gayriko Bagrati appointed Minister of Communications vice Tatevos S. Minasyants.

Azerbaijan

- Nov. 22, 1982     Aliyev, Geydar Ali Rza ogly promoted to full membership of All-Union Politburo and on November 23 elected First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers.
- Dec. 3, 1982      Bagirov, Kyamram Mamed ogly elected First Secretary, Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee, vice Geydar Aliyev.
- Jan. 5, 1983      Kuliyeu, El'Shad ogly appointed Chairman, State Committee for TV and Radio Broadcasting.
- Jan. 8, 1983      Gasanov, Sh. N. appointed Minister of Rural Construction.
- Feb. 1983         Isayev, G. I. appointed Chairman, State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education, vice Tofik A. Allahverdiyev.

Georgia

- July 1982         Kartvelishvili, Dmitriy Levanovich replaced Zurab Pataridze (killed in car accident) as republic Prime Minister.

Georgia  
(cont'd)

Mar. 12, 1983      The Ministries of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and the State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture amalgamated into the Union-Republic State Committee for Agricultural Production. Top officials appointed were:

Chairman - Mgeladze, Guram Davidovich, former Minister of Agriculture

First Deputy Chairmen -  
Gadeliya, G. B., former Minister of Land Reclamation  
Sarishvili, D. Ye., former Chairman, State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture  
Pantskhev, R. D., previous position unknown

Baltic

Estonia

May 14, 1982      Kudryavtsev, Aleksandr Ivanovich elected to replace Konstantin Vasilyevich Lebedev as Second Secretary, Estonian Communist Party.

June 1982          Kortelyan, Karl Yefremovich appointed KGB chief vice August Petrovich Pork (retired).

Mar. 25, 1983      The Ministry of Agriculture and the State Committee for Land Reclamation and the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture amalgamated into the Estonian SSR Agroindustrial Association--"a union-republic central organ." Top officials appointed were:

Chairman (with rank of Minister) - Veldi, Heyno Tynisovich, former Minister of Agriculture

Deputy Chairmen (with rank of Minister) -  
Kind, Vello Nikolayevich, former Minister of Agriculture  
Nakhur, Arvid Yaanovich - former Chairman, State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture

Latvia

- Jan. 1983 Bishop Julijans Vaivods appointed Cardinal by Pope John Paul II.
- Feb. 16, 1983 Kulseshov, S. S. appointed Minister of Construction Materials Industry vice N. I. Dorofeyev.

Lithuania

- Jan. 1983 Spurga, Valentinas Pyatrovich appointed Minister of Education vice Antanas S. Rimkus.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan

- Jan. 11, 1983 Mukhayev, I. M. appointed Chief, Main Administrator for Fuel Supply to the Public Municipal Consumer Enterprises and Establishments.
- Feb. 26, 1983 Zhakupov, A. K. elected First Secretary, Dzhambol Oblast party committee, vice Kh. Sh. Bekturganov (retired).
- Mar. 19, 1983 Izyumnikov, V. K. appointed Administrator of Affairs, Council of Ministers, vice V. P. Kondratovich (retired).

Kirghizia

- Dec. 7, 1982 Aldasheva, Shakira Baygaziyeвна appointed Minister of Consumer Services.
- Feb. 24, 1983 Abdyraliyev, Askar appointed Minister of Justice vice Dzhumabkek Abakirov.
- Mar. 9, 1983 Aldasheva, Shakira Baygaziyeвна appointed Minister of Consumer Services.

Tadzhikistan

- Jan. 13, 1983 Khisamutdinov, Akhmedzhan B. appointed Chairman, State Committee for Forestry Industry, vice Vasiliy Ye. Zakhvatov.
- Jan. 17, 1983 Khayeyev, Izatullo appointed First Secretary, Kulyab Oblast party committee, vice Akhmedzhan B. Khisamutdinov.

Tadzhikistan  
(cont'd)

Feb. 2, 1983 Myrzayev, Talyp appointed Minister of Meat and Dairy Industry vice Izatullo Khayeyev.

Uzbekistan

mid-Oct., 1982 Babakhan, Shamsutdinkhan, quartered in Tashkent, elected chairman for the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, replacing his father who had held the position since 1957.

Jan. 14. 1983 Kuksenko, Vitalliy Pavlovich appointed Minister of Consumer Services vice Anna Ivanovna Brodova.

Feb. 3, 1983 Radzhabov, Nazir Radzhabovich appointed Minister of Construction vice Server Abdullayevich Omerov.

Feb. 8, 1983 Kurbanov, Nabizhon G. appointed Minister of Rural Construction vice Nazir R. Radzhabov.

Feb. 17, 1983 Baymirov, Tukhtamysh appointed Chairman, State Commission for Water Resources Construction, vice Nabizhon Kurbanov.

Feb. 18, 1983 Nugmanov, Pulat Kadyrovitch appointed Minister of Installation and Special Construction Work vice Khabibulla A. Bhagazatov.

Western Republics

Belorussia

Jan. 13, 1983 Slyun'kov, Nikolay Nikitovich elected First Secretary, Central Committee Secretariat, vice Tikhon Ya. Kisilev, who died January 11, 1983.

Ukraine

Feb. 3, 1983 Kachalovskiy, Yevgeniy Viktorovich appointed First Deputy Chairman, Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

Feb. 4, 1983 Boyko, Viktor Grigoryevich elected First Secretary, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast party committee, vice Yevgeniy V. Kachalovskiy.

Ukraine  
(cont'd)

- Feb. 25, 1983      Korniyenko, Anatoliy Ivanovich elected First Secretary, Ternopol Oblast party committee vice Ivan M. Yarkovoy.
- Mar. 3, 1983      Taratuta, Vasiliy N. , First Secretary of Vinnitsa party committee, assigned as Ambassador to Algeria. He will be replaced by Krivoruchko (first name not given).
- Mar. 4, 1983      Mironenko, V. I. elected First Secretary of Ukrainian Komsomol.

Major Official and Traditional Holidays and Anniversaries  
(May 1-July 31, 1983)

May

- 1 Kiev Spring Festival
- 18 Shavuoth - Jewish Feast of Weeks
- 20 Buddha's Birthday
- 22 Christian Pentecost (Whitsunday)
- 25 Day of Liberation of Africa
- 27 (1920) Establishment of Tatar ASSR
- 28 Day of Border Forces
- 28 (1923) Birthday of Karl G. Vayno, First Secretary,  
Estonian Communist Party Central Committee

June

- 1 (1922) Establishment of Gorno-Altai Autonomous  
Oblast
- 1 Leningrad White Nights Festival
- 3 Buddha's Cremation Day
- 15 Beginning of two-month Riga Music Festival
- 15 (1914) Birthday of Yuriy V. Andropov
- 24 (1920) Establishment of Chuvash Autonomous Oblast;  
(1924) changed to Chuvash ASSR
- 26 (1920) Establishment of South-Ossetian Autonomous  
Oblast
- 28 Feast of Tammuz (Jewish)

July

- 7 (1882) Birthday of Janka Kupala, Belorussian  
national poet.

July  
(cont'd)

- 11 Muslim Ramadan/Ramazán (Id Al-Fitr)
- 15 (1557) Anniversary of Kabardino-Balkharia's  
"voluntary" union with Russia
- 19 Fast of Ab (Tisha B'Av) Commemoration of the  
Temple (Jewish)
- 19 (1924) Birthday of Pyatras Grishkyavichus, First  
Secretary, Lithuanian Communist Party Central  
Committee
- 21 (1940) Reestablishment of Soviet power in Latvia,  
Lithuania, Estonia
- 25 Buddhist Lent (Khao Phansa/Khao Vatsa)
- 27 (1922) Establishment of Adygey Autonomous Oblast



Conferences and Symposia

Soviet Union

Conferences Honoring the 60th Anniversary of the USSR

- Oct. 8, 1982 Kishinev: Scientific conference, "Soviet Moldavia in the Fraternal Family of Nations of the USSR."
- Oct. 28, 1982 Kishinev: Republic scientific-theoretical conference, "The Formation of the USSR and Its Role in the Development of the Soviet Republics."
- Nov. 29-30, 1982 Vilnius: All-Union scientific conference, "The Internationalization of Spiritual Life of Soviet Peoples in the Context of Mature Socialism."
- Nov. 30, 1982 Tbilisi: Joint jubilee scientific session honoring the 60th anniversary.
- Dec. 14-16, 1982 Yurmala, Latvia: All-Union scientific conference, "The Soviets of National Rayons on the Path Towards the Establishment of the USSR."
- Dec. 16, 1982 Moscow: Scientific conference, "The Friendship and Brotherhood of the Nations of the USSR - the Source of the Might of the Soviet Armed Forces."

Other Conferences

- June 28-30, 1982 Riga: All-Union scientific-applied conference, "The Development of National Relations Under the Conditions of Mature Socialism."
- Sept. 1982 Makhachkala: Scientific-theoretical conference, "Pressing Problems in the Development of Socialist National Artistic Cultures Under the Conditions of Mature Socialism."
- Sept. 1982 Moscow: Inter-republic coordinational conference, "Steps To Intensify the Struggle Against Narcotics."

Soviet Union  
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- Sept. 1982                      Fergana: All-Union scientific-creative conference, "Soviet Multinational Literature in the Spiritual World of Our Contemporary Life."
- Oct. 1982                        Tallin: All-Union ideological conference, "The Exacerbation of Ideological Struggle in the World Arena and the Political Education of the Toilers."
- Oct. 26-29, 1982                Kiev: All-Union scientific conference, "Problems of Contemporary Demographic Policy." (Included demographers from Moscow, Leningrad, other Soviet cities, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.)
- Early 1983                        Tashkent: Scientific conference, "The Protection and Conservation of Archaeological Monuments in Central Asia."
- Feb. 16, 1983                    Tashkent: All-Union scientific-theoretical conference, "The Fraternal Cooperation Between USSR's Peoples at the Stage of Mature Socialism."

Western Countries

Conferences (first quarter 1983)

- Jan. 13, 1983                    Oxford: Society for Central Asian Studies conference, "The Russian and Soviet Experience With Muslim Guerrilla Warfare."
- Jan. 22-25, 1983                La Jolla, Calif.: Fifth American-Soviet Conference on Asia. (Eleven Soviets attended, including Academician Eugene M. Primakov.)
- Mar. 10-11, 1983                Washington, D.C.: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Conference on the Study of Central Asia.
- Mar. 16, 1983                    New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar Series, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability in the USSR": Seminar No. 1 - "The National Question in Soviet Doctrine: From Lenin to Andropov."

Western  
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- Mar. 23-25, 1983 Chicago: University of Chicago Centre for Balkan and Slavic Studies, "The Third International Conference on the Non-Slavic Languages of the USSR."
- Mar. 25-26, 1983 Montreal: University of Quebec Inter-University Center for European Studies, "Artificially Created Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33."
- Mar. 26, 1983 Chicago: University of Chicago Centre for Balkan and Slavic Studies, "A Conference on the Cultures of the Caucasus."
- Apr. 14-16, 1983 Palo Alto: Hoover Institution conference, "The Last Empire - Nationality and the Soviet Future."
- Apr. 19, 1983 New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar No. 2 - "The Management of Nationality Problems."
- May 12, 1983 Berkeley: Working conference, "Siberia and Russians in the Far East: Sources, Historiography, and the Present State of Study."
- May 19-22, 1983 Bloomington: University of Indiana, "The First International Conference of Turkic Studies."

Conferences (forthcoming 1983)

- May 24-27, 1983 Paris: Centre d'Etudes sur l'URSS and the Laboratoire de Slavistique, "International Colloquium on Siberia." Contact: Boris Chichlo, 9 Rue Michelet, 75006 Paris. Telephone: (1) 326 50 89 or 329 76 38.
- May 25, 1983 New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar No. 3 - "The Rise of Ethnonationalism in the USSR."
- June 10-13, 1983 Stockholm: Baltic Institute and Center for Baltic Studies Seventh Conference on Baltic Studies, "National Moments in the Baltic Countries During the Latter Half of the 19th Century." Contact: Prof. A. Loit, Baltiska Institutet ox 16273, S-103, 25 Stockholm, Sweden.

Western  
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- June 15-17, 1983      Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois conference, "History of Ukraine: Contemporary Perspectives and Analyses." Contact: Dmytro M. Shtohryn, Russian and East European Center, 1208 West California Ave., Urbana, Ill. 61801. Telephone: 217 333-1244.
- June 21-  
July 6, 1983      Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago will sponsor Second Lithuanian World Festival.
- Aug. 20-25, 1983      Vancouver: University of British Columbia will host Eleventh International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (ICAES). Contact: Executive Secretary, ICAES, Dept. of Anthropology, University of British Columbia, 6303 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver, B.C., V6T2B2. (Soviet delegation will consist of about 40 scientists.)
- Oct. 17-20, 1983      Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University conference, "Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective." Contact: Dr. Peter Potichniy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, L9H3S1. Telephone: 416 525 9140.
- Oct. 22-25, 1983      Kansas City, Mo.: Fifteenth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.
- Fall 1983      New York: Lehrman Institute Seminar No. 4 - "Ethnonationalism and Soviet Political Stability."

New Research

Soviet Union

Riga Conference Publications (the following volumes of the proceedings of this conference are available in INR/SEE, 632-3230):

Vospityvat' ubezhdennykh patriotov-internatsionalistov (Educate Convinced Patriots-Internationalists). Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. 335 pp.

Sotsialisticheskiy internatsionalizm v deystvii (Socialist Internationalism in Action). Moscow: Nauka, 1982. 144 pp.

My druzhboy leninskoy sil'ny (By Lenin's Friendship Are We Strong). Moscow: Izvestiya, 1982. 160 pp.

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USSR Nationalities



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(U) SOVIET NATIONALITIES SURVEY, No. 11

Highlights

The new party program adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress last February fails to define a new direction for Soviet nationality policy. Instead, its provisions reflect a potentially unstable compromise between the Russians and non-Russians. The discussion preceding the program's adoption saw the sharpest public exchange of views on the nationality question since the 1970s.

Moscow's sudden cancellation last July of a long-planned Diaspora Armenian Festival suggests that the Soviet authorities may be rethinking the USSR's traditional close relationship to the Armenian emigration.

Authorities in the two Muslim nationality republics bordering Iran published in 1985 large editions of a remarkably objective handbook on Islam in their respective local languages. Translated from a 1983 Russian-language original, these books appear designed to counter recent increases in the two republics in popular interest in Islam, increases that may have been stimulated by Iranian religious broadcasting.

In other developments:

- Moscow has canceled plans to divert Siberian river water to Central Asia and has put on hold river diversion schemes in European Russia.
- Russians and non-Russians are sharply divided on ecology questions. Most Russians living in non-Russian areas favor economic development over environmental protection. Most non-Russians feel just the opposite.

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--Serious labor shortages in the USSR's western republics have undermined the ability of plant managers to control workers.

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## I. Major Trends

### Nationality Tensions Reflected in New Party Program

The party program adopted last February gives no new direction for Soviet nationality policy. Instead, its provisions reflect an unstable compromise between Moscow-based advocates of greater centralization and supporters--mostly in the republics--of expanded autonomy for the non-Russian nationalities. In the program itself, these conflicts are largely papered over. In the public discussion preceding its adoption, however, they broke out with a force not seen since the early 1970s. Both the document and the debate around it highlight the sensitivity of nationality issues and underscore the difficulties Gorbachev faces in dealing with them.

Changes Since 1961. The tensions inherent in the new program are reflected in what has been retained from the 1961 version as well as in what has been changed. Three major propositions have remained the same:

- Both the 1961 and the 1986 programs claim that the national question has been solved in the USSR and that national equality has been achieved.
- Both insist that Soviet language policy promotes the complete equality of all national languages and Russian bilingualism among non-Russian groups.
- They advance the same formula for future ethnic development: the "flowering" (rastsvet) and "rapprochement" (sblizheniye) of nations, leading to their "complete unity" (pol'noye yedinstvo).

While retention of the first proposition should come as no surprise, the absence of change in the second and third is striking. Moscow's recent efforts to expand Russian bilingualism in non-Russian areas might have been expected to have received more official support in the program. That they did not represents not only a concession to non-Russian sensibilities but also the lack of consensus at the center on just what form that expansion might take. At the same time, the absence of any doctrinal change does not presage any lessening of the Russian-language push.

The situation with respect to the ethnic development formula is somewhat more complicated. Of concern here is the absence of the term "merger" (sliyaniye), which had been reintroduced by Andropov and pushed by many Soviet theoreticians on the nationality question. Although Khrushchev used the term in his speech on the 1961 program, it did not appear in that document itself. Its absence from the new version as well is not only a concession to both Russians and non-Russians but also a consequence of the leadership decision to limit the new program's applicability to the time period leading up to the complete construction of communism. Most advocates of the sliyaniye concept envisage its achievement only in the period of mature communism (which the 1961 program also treated); hence its use in the new version would have represented a radical anomaly in the party's general approach.

The differences between the two versions of the program highlight these tensions still further. There are five major deletions and three significant additions. The deletions are:

- The new program contains no special praise for the Great-Russian people, the first time such praise has been absent from a major party document touching on the nationality question since 1934, and an obvious slap at the Russian nationalists in Moscow.
- All references to "formerly backward peoples" have been eliminated, another concession to the non-Russians.
- The new program drops any reference to an expansion of the powers of republic-level institutions and lacks an explicit defense of national statehood. Although the inclusion of these provisions in 1961 was obviously part of Khrushchev's destalinization effort, their elimination now carries an implicit threat to the non-Russian republics.
- There is no discussion of the declining importance of republic frontiers. While this deletion may hearten some non-Russians, especially as a counter to the dropping of a defense of national republics, it is unclear what direct policy consequences the change might have.
- The new program also drops Khrushchev's proposal for the creation of regional economic institutions--even though Gorbachev has appeared to push a variant of this idea.

At the same time, there are three major additions:

- The 1986 program includes the term "Soviet people" (Sovetskiy narod), defining it as a "new social and international community." Khrushchev had employed the term in his 1961

speech, but like sliyaniye it did not appear in the party program at that time.

- New stress is placed on all-union economic integration and on the subordination of republic activities to all-union tasks. This is a sharp reversal of the decentralizing tendencies of the 1961 document and a clear challenge to the powers of the republics.
- For the first time, the new program contains a section on atheistic training, obviously inserted because of the increasingly tight linkage between religion and nationalism in many regions of the country.

A Heated Debate. The intensity and seriousness of the public discussion on the new program's nationality provisions can be best seen in the following incident. Pravda on January 9 carried in its first edition a letter from a Greek archivist in Sukhumi with the following passage:

"We are all first and foremost citizens of the USSR and only subsequently, depending on where we are living when we obtain our passports, do we become citizens of a national state unit comprising the state. For all the question's seeming lack of importance at first glance, the introduction of a unified passport will have a psychologically catalyzing role in molding the community that is the Soviet people."

Twelve hours later, the second edition of the paper appeared with an innocuous paragraph replacing the one touching on this most sensitive issue of national identity.

While this incident reflects the sensitivity of the questions involved, alone it fails to capture either the diversity of issues raised in the related debate or the scope of public participation. Between November 1 and the opening of the 27th Party Congress in February, Soviet newspapers in Moscow and the republics carried several hundred letters on this section of the program. These letters came from every region and social group of the USSR and focused on issues ranging from the nature of the Russian empire in the 19th century to the status of economic planning in republic capitals. Although none of the proposals was ultimately incorporated into the final version of the program--itself an indication of their controversial quality--taken together, they clearly reveal numerous and deep divisions on nationality issues within the Soviet population.

The discussions in the press centered on five major topics:

1. The Nature of Soviet Federalism. Debates here concerned both the past and the future. On the past, one Uzbek wanted the

program to discuss the history of Russian oppression of non-Russians (Pravda Vostoka, November 15, 1985); the USSR's leading ethnographer Yulian Bromley (a Russian) pointedly argued that oppressed peoples have only severely limited rights to a nationalist movement (Pravda, January 4, 1986).

On the future, Russians and non-Russians split again: Russians and small nationalities without any statehood argued that federalism had largely played out its role (Pravda, January 9, 1986; Pravda, December 20, 1985); republic nationalities called for preservation of existing republics into the foreseeable future (Pravda, November 13, 1985; Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 2, 1986; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, December 25, 1985).

These concerns spilled over and took the same shape in discussions of economic planning and demography. (See, for example, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, January 12, 1986; Pravda, January 18, 1986; Turkmenskaya iskra, November 30, 1985; Sovetskaya Moldaviya, January 15, 1986; Sovetskaya Latviya, January 15, 1986; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, November 12, 1985.)

2. The Status of the Russian Language. Ethnic Russians and non-Russians with functional responsibilities in education called for upgrading the program's provisions on Russian bilingualism (Pravda, December 29, 1985; Pravda, January 2, 1986; Turkmenskaya iskra, December 11, 1985; Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 11, 1985). No non-Russian not functionally involved with education advocated an expansion in Russian bilingualism; many called for extensive expansion of the use of local languages (Kommunist, January 5, 1986; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, November 3, 1985; Sovetskaya Estoniya, November 19, 1985).

3. Counterpropaganda Against Religion and Nationalism. With rare exceptions, all support for these provisions came from the western areas of the USSR rather than from the RSFSR, Central Asia, or the Caucasus. (See, among others, Sovetskaya Latviya, November 17, 1985; Pravda, December 20, 1985; Sovetskaya Moldaviya, January 9, 1986; Sovetskaya Moldaviya, December 13, 1985; Sovetskaya Belorussiya, November 11, 1985; Sovetskaya Litva, December 20, 1985; Bakinskiy rabochiy, November 27, 1985.) The only support from a Muslim nationality republic was from Azerbaijan--and that consisted of a single article (Bakinskiy rabochiy, December 17, 1985). The other Muslim republics were significantly silent. Indeed, many writers in these and other republics went out of their way to defend the very local traditions that counterpropaganda might be directed against (see Bakinskiy rabochiy, December 4, 1985; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, January 16, 1986; Komsomolets Tadzhikistana, December 22, 1985; Sovetskaya Latviya, November 16, 1985).



4. Definition of "Soviet People." Complaints were voiced in every republic that this term had been left undefined, but not one writer offered a full definition on his own. (See, among others, Pravda Ukrainy, January 21, 1986; Pravda, November 29, 1985; Bakinskiy rabochiy, December 17, 1985; Pravda Vostoka, January 9, 1986.) Writers did, however, differ on the status of the "national" within a supraethnic community. Kazakhs and Estonians were especially concerned that the survival of the "national" be made explicit (Kazakhstanskaya pravda, January 16, 1986; Sovetskaya Estoniya, November 19, 1985). Other groups--especially Russians--downplayed the "national" concept (Pravda, November 29, 1985; Bakinskiy rabochiy, November 17, 1985).

5. "Sliyaniye" and the Direction of Ethnic Development. All writers who expressed themselves on this issue agreed that sblizheniye, not sliyaniye, is the dominant form of ethnic development in the USSR today; but they split between the Russians, who stressed the "complete unity" part of the equation (Pravda, December 20, 1985), and other groups which emphasized "flowering" (Kommunist, November 14, 1985). Only two writers--one in Uzbekistan (Pravda Vostoka, January 9, 1986) and an Armenian in Moscow (Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 2, 1986)--directly raised the issue of sliyaniye, and both pushed it off into the distant future.

The most important result of this inconclusive debate is likely to be not a shift in nationality policy but, rather, a reaffirmation of what is already being done. By demonstrating how little agreement there is for any new move, the debate is likely to make Gorbachev and the rest of the leadership especially cautious. If so, then the new program will mark even less of a turning point than a first glance might suggest.

A New Soviet View of Armenians Abroad?

Moscow late last July abruptly canceled an unprecedented Diaspora Armenian Festival scheduled to open in Yerevan on August 20. No explanation was given for this unusual move, but officials at the Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations With Armenians Abroad reportedly told several visitors to Yerevan that overcrowding from the Moscow Youth Festival, held in August 1985, was the principal reason. The Soviet Armenian wire service, Armenpress, later claimed that the festival would be rescheduled in 1986 but did not set a date.

This is certainly not the whole story. The size of the Moscow Youth Festival was known well in advance, and more plausible explanations suggest themselves:

- Moscow may have been concerned about the possible impact of a sudden influx of Armenian youth from abroad into what already

was a tense local situation. Less than three months earlier, Armenians in Yerevan publicly protested against the war in Afghanistan.

--Moscow may have been responding to recent negative coverage in the Armenian emigre press of Soviet human rights violations in the Armenian SSR.

--Concern for relations with Turkey may have persuaded Moscow to downplay for the moment connections with Armenians abroad.

In any case, this unexpected action is likely to cost Moscow friends in the Armenian diaspora by demonstrating that the USSR is no longer the uncritical patron of this group.

#### Deported Nationality Allowed To Return Home

Moscow decided, shortly after Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, to allow the Meskhetians--one of the nations deported to Central Asia during World War II--to return to their homeland in the Georgian Republic. This decision raises the possibility that the status of the two other major ethnic groups still in exile--1.9 million Volga Germans and 300,000 Crimean Tatars--is under discussion.

The April 1985 decision may mark the beginning of the end of one of the darkest chapters in Soviet history. During World War II, Stalin deported a dozen nationalities from European Russia and the Caucasus to Central Asia. Most of these groups--including the Crimean Tatars and Germans--were accused of collaborating with the Nazis. Others--such as the Meskhetians, a Turkic-speaking Islamic people living in southern Georgia--were simply in the way: They lay along the route the Soviet Army might have had to use to invade Turkey and retake the Kars and Ardahan provinces Russia lost after World War I. Between one-third and one-half of the more than 2 million people deported died in the process. During destalinization, all were exonerated; most were allowed to return to their home territories--including, in 1958-59, the Karachay and Cherkess to Gorbachev's own Stavropol Kray.

But the Meskhetians, Crimean Tatars, and Volga Germans were not allowed to return, and as a result, national movements arose in all three groups. That of the Meskhetians, who today number only 100,000, was the smallest but certainly the most intense. Since the late 1950s, they have regularly demonstrated, circulated petitions, and forced meetings with senior officials in Moscow, Tashkent, and Tbilisi. Now they appear to have won a victory, although it may prove a somewhat hollow one. Georgian-language press accounts suggest that the Meskhetians will be allowed to return to Georgia gradually but not to their home villages. Further, once

in Georgia, they will be expected to learn Georgian, use Georgian names, and identify as Georgians in the census. The Georgian press claims that Meskhetians already there have accepted these conditions enthusiastically; those Meskhetians still in Central Asia are unlikely to find them attractive.

Other specific conditions, however, may be behind the decision to allow the Meskhetians to return now. During the past year, Shevardnadze and other Georgian officials repeatedly expressed concern about the slow growth of the Georgian nation. The return of a rapidly growing Islamic people whom many Georgians view as actually Georgian could help solve that problem. Another possible explanation for the shift may be Moscow's desire to woo Turkey by eliminating the 1945 suggestion of a possible invasion. Or this decision could simply reflect Gorbachev's desire to resolve a lingering problem.

To the extent that the latter consideration played a role, the future of both the Crimean Tatars and the Germans may be under consideration, but the problem here is more difficult. First, both of these nationalities were accused of collaboration. Second, they are far larger, and their return--or in the German case, departure from Central Asia--would be more disruptive. And third, unlike the Meskhetians, they have no apparent patrons at the center. At the same time, a reconsideration of their status could lead to changes short of population shifts. In fact, that may already be happening: For the first time since World War II, the Crimean Tatars this year were allowed to claim in print that they have their own distinct language, a not-unimportant consideration in a country where language is usually at the foundation of the definition of a nation.

Turkic-Language Handbooks To Counter Islam, Iran.

State publishing houses in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have announced the release of local-language editions of the 1983 Russian-language volume, Islam: A Concise Handbook. That 160-page book was prepared by the USSR's leading Islamicists and has impressed both Soviet and Western scholars as remarkably detailed and objective. It consists of four parts: a brief history of Islam and its doctrines, a dictionary of key terms and practices, a guide to Muslim international organizations, and a country-by-country description of Muslim communities abroad. The Russian edition was issued in 50,000 copies, a respectable figure for a semi-popular book but clearly one insufficient for either the USSR's agitation and propaganda apparatus or Soviet Muslims interested in their religion and culture.

The new Azerbaijani-language edition reached the West in late 1985. (To date, the Turkmen one has not.) Signed to press

on July 18, 1985, the Baku volume is a faithful translation of the Russian original. Its only striking feature is the size of the edition: 100,000 copies. That equals 1 for every 60 Azerbaijanis and is far larger than normal agitprop publications in Azerbaijan. One recent pamphlet on Western broadcasts to Soviet Muslims, for example, was specifically directed to the agitprop network and was published in only 6,000 copies. Clearly, the new publication is intended for a larger audience.

The precise target of these new translations was suggested by a series of local ideological conferences held in spring 1985 in Azerbaijani and Turkmen rayons bordering Iran. Organized by the Moscow Council on Religious Affairs and local ideological officials, these conferences focused on growing local interest in Islam. Although Soviet media reports did not say so, at least some of this growth may be traceable to Iranian religious broadcasts. Consequently, the new books may be intended to blanket these regions. On the one hand, they certainly provide reliable information on Islam for party officials who must deal with the consequences of this popular interest. On the other, they represent what appears to be a creditable Soviet response to and explanation of Iranian Islamic appeals. Indeed, by suggesting a certain Soviet understanding of and sympathy for Islam, these volumes might undercut one of the most frequent Khomeini-sponsored appeals to Soviet audiences.

#### National Homelands for Soviet Germans, Poles Unlikely

The London Observer reported on February 2 that Moscow may soon set up autonomous republics for the USSR's 2 million ethnic Germans and 1.2 million ethnic Poles. Such actions are extremely unlikely. Although they might undercut some emigration demands, they certainly would prompt greater activism among other groups without homelands--such as the Crimean Tatars--and irritate both Poland and the German Democratic Republic.

According to the Observer, "if the idea gets the go-ahead," the German republic would be established near the city of Slavgorod on the Mongolian border and the Polish unit somewhere along the Polish frontier. The creation of such a German Birobidzhan certainly would not attract many Germans from Kazakhstan or lessen demands for emigration. And the establishment of a permanent irritant to Soviet-Polish relations might well increase rather than decrease Polish influence in the Soviet west. Consequently, it seems unlikely that any discussions on this point have actually occurred.

The unprecedented March 30 visit of Gen. Jaruzelski to Vil'nius--the first since 1945 by a Polish leader to a Soviet city with a large Polish minority--reflected Moscow's confidence in its

Polish minority but highlighted the improbability of the establishment of any Polish entity in the USSR.

Although the Observer story is almost certainly untrue (the paper provided no source), its currency now reflects three recent developments:

- A new debate on Soviet federalism. During the past year, Soviet legal specialists have renewed the late-1960s debate on national autonomy in the USSR. One piece of common ground that has emerged this time is agreement that national languages may be the basis for administrative divisions even if not for sovereignty. Such a position implicitly provides support for anyone who seeks the creation of national-territorial units below the ASSR level.
- Public support for nationalities without homelands. Since Andropov singled them out for special praise in December 1982, Soviet nationalities lacking a political unit within the Soviet federal system have been routinely lauded in the Soviet press. Although the message of this to nationalities with political units may have been threatening, it apparently was taken by the homeless to mean that they could agitate for their own national statehood.
- Resolution of the Meskhetian problem (see p. 6). Gorbachev has permitted members of the Meskhetian community exiled at the end of World War II to return to Georgia. Perhaps significantly--at least as a basis for the German part of the Observer story--they have not been allowed back to the precise region from which they came.

Such developments are a long way from the creation of autonomous units for nationalities with more than 1 million members each. And there is no evidence that Moscow has even begun to make plans for new homelands.

Moscow Adopts Differentiated Approach to War Criminals

As part of its counterpropaganda effort in the USSR's western republics, Moscow has played up supposed American protection of Nazi war criminals. This media campaign is likely to peak at the upcoming trial of the first alleged war criminal to be deported from the United States to the Soviet Union. At the same time, a Russian emigre paper reports, Moscow has permitted a known Nazi death squad member to serve in high party and state posts in Latvia.

One Charged. A Ukrainian official has written Holocaust survivors in the US that Soviet authorities are preparing to try

Fedor Fedorenko, a former Nazi camp guard who was deported in December 1984 (Associated Press, August 24, 1985). This announcement is part of a general Soviet campaign at home and abroad to depict the US as the chief protector of Nazi war criminals. (See, for example, New Times, No. 35, 1985, pp. 19-21; Zvyazda in Belorussian, June 16, 1985; Sil'ski visti in Ukrainian, January 11, 1985; Pravda Ukrainy, February 7, 1985; and Sovetskaya Belorussiya, May 22, 1985.)

One Protected. An article in the New York-based Novoye russkoye slovo on October 3, 1985, describes the career of Ivan Fedorovich Pugachev, now the head of the Riga post office. During World War II Pugachev was a member of the Nazi-sponsored polizei unit in Rezekne. In that capacity, he participated in the destruction of the local Jewish community. This article is consistent with other emigre accounts on Pugachev and with past Soviet practice in the Baltic republics. Because of the dates and relatively low level of the positions involved, however, the article's specifics cannot be confirmed.

When the Germans retreated from Latvia in 1944, Pugachev attempted to cover his past by joining the Red partisans. The ploy worked, and after the war he served as a bookkeeper and then department head in the Rezekne soviet. Still later, he was able to join the communist party and become a nomenklatura official. In the late 1950s, he was named secretary of the Rezekne rayon party committee; in 1960 he became secretary of the party organization in Yurmala, an important resort city. While in Yurmala, and apparently feeling secure from any exposure of his past activities, Pugachev systematically excluded the remaining local Jews from any important job in the city.

Evidently sometime in the 1960s, Pugachev was finally denounced to republic authorities and removed from his post by the Latvian CP Central Committee. Following an investigation, he was given a "strict" reprimand but not expelled from the party or turned over to the judicial authorities for trial--supposedly because of a "lack of reliable evidence." Instead, he was allowed to resume his career as a bookkeeper and, in 1978, was promoted to head the Riga post office.

#### Siberian River Diversion Plan Canceled

Moscow has shelved plans to divert Siberian river water to Central Asia and has put on hold river diversion projects in European Russia, a senior Gosplan official announced (Baltimore Sun, March 5, 1986). These decisions appear to be less a concession to Russian nationalist objections than a reflection of Gorbachev's opposition to big-ticket items with doubtful prospects of success. Failure to proceed with these projects, however,

## II. Current Developments

### All-Union

Mixed-Marriage Rate Falls in Three Republics. Despite increases in interethnic contacts and in Russian-language knowledge among non-Russians, the percentage of mixed-nationality marriages fell during the 1970s in the three Muslim-nationality republics of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and rose only slightly elsewhere (Sotsiologicheskkiye issledovaniya, No. 3, 1985, p. 33). This pattern reverses an earlier trend, highlights the continuing strength of ethnic attitudes in this intimate sphere of life, and undercuts Soviet optimism about rapid ethnic change in the USSR.

War Blamed for Recent Declines in Life Expectancy. A Belorussian demographer has acknowledged that "After a long period characterized by falling death rates and increases in the number of those leading a long life, today we are again talking about a lowering of the life span." (From a review of L. P. Shakhot'ko's Vosproizvodstvo naseleniya Belorusskoy SSR--Population Reproduction in the Belorussian SSR--Minsk: Nauka i Tekhnika, 1985, in Kommunist Belorussii, No. 7, 1985, pp. 94-96.)

Shakhot'ko blamed the decline in life expectancy on increases in cardiovascular disease, cancer, and industrial accidents, themselves the products of an increasingly sedentary way of life, stress, environmental pollution, alcoholism, and smoking. In addition, he claimed that "The increase in mortality among the older age groups is also affected by the fact that virtually all people over 40 endured the ruinous influence of the war, even if they did not take part in military operations directly."

New Measures To Promote Russian Bilingualism. Republic governments must expand Russian-language schooling and publishing if the party's policy of full national-Russian language bilingualism is to be achieved, according to Mikhail Guboglo, academic secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on Nationality Problems and the country's leading specialist on bilingualism. (Sovetskaya Estoniya, February 26, 1985. For a fuller presentation of his views, see his Sovremennyye etnoyazykovyye protsessy v SSSR--Contemporary Ethnolinguistic Processes in the USSR--Moscow: Nauka, 1984; and Ann Sheehy, "Call for More Education and Publications in Russian in the Non-Russian Republics," Radio Liberty Research, RL 121/85, April 17, 1985, 8 pp.)

Guboglo's remarks--which appear to have been made for a special Estonian conference on Russian-language schools (Sovetskaya

means that Moscow will have to find other ways of coping with the increasingly severe water shortages in the Soviet sun belt. The most likely approach would be greatly expanded use of desalinization plants to purify existing ground water supplies.

Soviets Launch Jewish Literary Almanac

As part of its continuing anti-Zionist campaign, Moscow has announced the creation of a new literary yearbook for the USSR's Yiddish-language writers. To be published in Russian, English, and French, Year After Year will consist of articles drawn from Sowjetisch Heimland, the Soviet Union's notoriously anti-Zionist Yiddish-language journal. As such, the new publication can be expected to push the line that all Soviet Jews are happy and that emigration is therefore unnecessary. (Argumenty i fakty, No. 7, 1986, pp 5-6.)



Estoniya, March 31, 1985)--undoubtedly were read by many Estonians as presaging yet another Moscow-sponsored drive at linguistic russianization in their republic and elsewhere.

Iran, Afghanistan Prompt Research on Islam. Soviet research on Islam abroad has expanded dramatically since 1979, according to a recent review of the literature by the USSR's leading specialist on Islam in Southeast Asia (A. I. Ionova, "Izucheniye Sovetskimi uchenymi Islama na zarubezhom Vostoke, 1970-1982"--The Study of Islam in the Foreign East by Soviet Scholars, 1970-1982--Religii mira 1984, Moscow: Nauka, 1984, pp. 256-73). Between 1970 and 1978, Soviet scholars published an average of eight works per year on the subject; between 1979 and 1982 (the last year of the survey), an average of more than 21 annually. Further, in the course of this period, the primary focus of Soviet research shifted from historical questions to current developments, thus providing Moscow with a sizable reservoir of expertise on the Muslim world.

Role of National Units in Soviet Army Recalled. The 40th anniversary of the end of World War II provided the occasion for the most detailed Soviet discussion ever of the contribution made by non-Russian nationality units in that conflict (N. A. Kirsanov, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya: Organizator natsional'nykh voinskikh formirovaniy v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny"--The Communist Party: Organizer of National Military Formations During the Great Patriotic War--Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta, seriya 8. Istoriya, No. 3, 1985, pp. 13-23).

National units were established during the Russian Civil War in order to mobilize more quickly non-Russian nationalities that did not speak Russian. Such units were retained as part of the territorial militia system until 1938, but they never formed a large percentage of Soviet military manpower. During World War II, however, they were quickly reestablished, first for the Baltic peoples and then for nationalities from the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the words of their historian, these units "permitted the more rapid preparation for battle of those soldiers who knew Russian poorly or not at all," a problem with which Soviet commanders must still cope.

Better Preparation for Natural Disasters Needed. In an article that appears to reflect local unhappiness with handling of disaster relief following recent earthquakes in Central Asia and the Caucasus, two Azerbaijani writers have called on republic-level officials to do more to prepare for such natural calamities and to coordinate their responses. (Kommunist Azerbaydzhana, No. 6, 1985, pp. 91-96.)

Continuing "Objective Basis" for National Identity. The impact of national self-consciousness on Soviet social and

economic policies was surveyed at a 1984 Tallinn conference on "The Nation and Culture" (Sotsiologicheskkiye issledovaniya, No. 2, 1985, pp. 188-89). Among its key findings:

- "The objective basis of national self-consciousness is not disappearing; it is simply changing its form" in the course of Soviet development.
- Overly rapid mixing of nationalities "stimulates the rebirth of old and outmoded elements of culture that begin to fulfill 'self-defense' functions," undercutting efforts to promote international friendship.
- Schools rather than families exert the greatest influence on choice of nationality by children of mixed-nationality marriages.

This last point is one of the reasons Soviet officials are currently pushing so hard for the expansion of Russian-language schools in the non-Slavic republics.

Many Republic Enterprises "Wasting" Electricity. "A wasteful attitude toward electricity is frequently observed in regions where it is in the shortest supply," according to an article in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta (No. 34, 1985, p. 7). Among the guilty republics are five of the six Muslim-nationality SSRs. Only Kazakhstan stayed within the plan; but even there, the paper reported, firms in eight oblasts used too much electricity. Enterprises in Estonia, Latvia, and Armenia also failed to keep energy consumption down. This attack may presage additional transfers of republic-controlled firms to all-union ministries, a shift provided for in the April 1985 decree on economic reorganization. (See above, "Gorbachev's Nationality Policy Takes Shape.")

Fewer Slavs in Central Asia, More in Baltic States. Between 1979 and 1984, the RSFSR and the three Baltic republics experienced large net immigrations--an influx of 747,000 people in the Russian republic and a combined total of 121,000 for the Baltic ones. At the same time, the six Muslim-nationality republics had a large net outmigration--totaling some 600,000 people. Because most of the migrants, in and out, are Slavs, these shifts have important economic and political consequences. On the one hand, they mean more Slavic workers for the labor-short RSFSR and an expanded Slavic presence in the Baltic region. On the other, they mean that there are now fewer Slavs in the rapidly growing Muslim republics, a decline that may make central control of those areas more difficult. (Ann Sheehy, "Population Trends in the Union Republics, 1979-1984," Radio Liberty Research, RL 166/85, May 21, 1985, 7 pp.)

Little Demand for Atheist Publications. Soviet bookdealers and librarians reported that there is little popular interest in most antireligious literature, according to an informal survey conducted for Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye (No. 7, 1985, pp. 138-42). Most of the literature is overly schematic, abstract, and irrelevant. The situation could be improved, the article concluded, if publishers of such materials used polls to determine what readers want and which books actually sell.

Countering Western Interest in Ukrainian Famine. Moscow has launched a propaganda campaign against recently expanded Western interest in the man-made famine in the Ukraine during collectivization in the 1930s. Its probable direction is signaled in a new book written by a "former Chekist," Diversion Under the Flag of Help (A. A. Polyakov, Diversiya pod flagom pomoshchi, Moscow: Politizdat, 1985, 237 pp., 300,000 copies). The book focuses on the 1921 famine caused by the revolution and civil war, thus blurring the distinction between that famine and the one orchestrated a decade later by Stalin. It argues that all Western efforts to help were in fact a thinly disguised effort to penetrate the USSR and destabilize Soviet power.

Possible Controversy at Turkological Congress. Unusual media coverage of the Fourth All-Union Turkological Congress (Ashkhabad, September 1985) suggests that its 250 participants were sharply divided on the politically sensitive issues of the origin and unity of Turkic-speaking peoples. The Russian-language press in both Moscow and Turkmenistan virtually ignored the meeting even though it attracted numerous high-powered academics from the center. The local-language press gave fuller coverage but, in contrast to media coverage of the 1980 Tashkent meeting, provided few specifics on the debates. It did, however, hint at controversy by noting that a number of Azerbaijani scholars had not attended and by discussing in some detail the doctrine of pan-Turkism, an ideologically unacceptable doctrine purportedly raised by foreign scholars at recent international meetings. (Sovet Turkmenistani in Turkmen, September 10, 11, and 14, 1985.)

### Western Republics

Belorussia: Grodno Lithuanians Decry Oppression. In an unusual "Appeal to Lithuanians Abroad," some of the more than 300,000 Lithuanians in Belorussia's Grodno Oblast have protested their systematic oppression by the Soviet authorities. They report that following the arrival of Soviet troops in the area in 1944:

"...Lithuanian schools and other institutions were closed, Lithuanian children were herded into Russian and Byelorussian schools, in which not a single word was spoken in Lithuanian. Lithuanians were barred from the organs of local

administration; their place was taken by Poles who were listed as Byelorussians in their passports.... Anti-Lithuanian activity and the persecution of Lithuanians were intensified, and...all contacts with Soviet Lithuania were forbidden. Lithuanian books were removed from all Lithuanian village libraries and destroyed.... Post offices were forbidden to accept subscriptions for periodicals published in the Lithuanian SSR."

They go on to report that:

"...To this very day, the local government organs refuse to permit any Lithuanian amateur ensembles from Soviet Lithuania to visit Soviet Byelorussia. Tourists, students, and ethnographers from Soviet Lithuania are forbidden to visit, either in organized groups or individually. The local militia, security organs, and local authorities often detain visitors from Lithuania, interrogate and search them, destroy film, and seize books published in Lithuania. Those young people from the Lithuanian-inhabited areas who manage to escape to Soviet Lithuania and to complete their studies there are then forbidden to work in their native area...."

(Ausra in Lithuanian, No. 42, 1984, as reported in ELTA Information Bulletin, No. 4, 1985.)

Belorussia: Grain Imports Acknowledged. In June 1985, Belorussia became the second Soviet republic--Moldavia was the first--publicly to acknowledge that the USSR was importing grain from the West (Zvyazda in Belorussian, June 9, 1985). It had done so, the paper said, because "this topic is constantly harped on in Western radio broadcasts beamed at a Soviet audience."

Belorussia: Labor Shortages Weaken Management Control. A tight labor market, itself the product of Belorussia's worsening demographic situation, has changed the balance of power between labor and management there. The republic's internal affairs minister, V. A. Piskarev, provided an example of this new situation in an article for the Moscow Izvestiya (April 16, 1985). At one plant, two men who had been arrested for drunkenness were nevertheless given bonuses, and two others guilty of the same offense were permitted to take their vacations during the prime summer months. Why? Because "the plant's leaders did not want to spoil relations with these drunkards: otherwise they might suddenly take offense and leave." Although Piskarev decried a particular case, the demographics of the situation suggest that such incidents may become increasingly common.

Ukraine: Serbskiy Institute Branch Opens in Kiev. A branch of the notorious Serbskiy Psychiatric Institute was opened in Kiev

in late 1984, according to its director, Anatoliy Denisovich Ravenok (Pravda Ukrainy, June 20, 1985). He claimed that it had been established as part of Moscow's campaign against alcoholism and narcotics abuse, but any branch of an institute whose name has become synonymous with the political abuse of psychiatry seems likely also to be used against local dissidents. Analogous institutions may now be set up in other republic capitals.

### Baltic Republics

Estonia: One Estonian in Three Avoids Komsomol Activities. One-third of all young Estonians do not participate in the Komsomol, preferring to spend time with family and friends, according to researchers at the Estonian Central Committee's Section of Sociological Research and the Study of Public Opinion (Galina Sillaste, Mysli i dela molodezhi--Thoughts and Actions of Youth--Tallinn, 1985). The first republic-level report on an all-union study of youth attitudes, the Sillaste book highlights the continuing strength of religion among Estonian young people and their growing isolation from officially sponsored public activities.

Estonia: Tallinn Estonians Buck Trend, Read Less. In contrast to the indigenous nationalities of the republic capitals of Tbilisi, Kishinev, and Tashkent, Estonians in Tallinn in 1980 were significantly less likely to read artistic literature on a regular basis than they had been a decade earlier, according to a survey by Soviet ethnographer V. Arutyunyan (Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, No. 3, 1985, p. 32). He offered no explanation for this trend, but it may well reflect both the changing age structure of the Estonian population and local dissatisfaction with official Soviet culture--especially given the opportunities Estonians have to listen to foreign radio and TV broadcasts.

Estonia: No Computers for Estonian-Language Schools. In the current academic year, computer literacy classes have been introduced in the republic's Russian-language schools but not in the Estonian-language ones (Noukoguda Opetaja in Estonian, May 18, 1985). This not-so-subtle form of discrimination appears designed to put additional pressure on Estonian parents to send their children to Russian-language schools.

Estonia: Estonians, Russians Split on Environmental Concern. A recent USSR Academy of Sciences poll shows that Estonians and Russians disagree sharply on the need for environmental protection. Ninety percent of the Estonians questioned agreed with the statement that "Environmental problems are so critical and significant that immediate remedies must be taken." A much larger but unspecified number of Russians did not. Further, the Russians explicitly stated that ecological issues were properly global

matters rather than local concerns. (Eesti Loodus in Estonian, June 1985.) The Estonian attitude reflects both local experience with shale-oil development and extensive republic media coverage of ecological questions (for example, see Sovetskaya Estoniya, May 21, 1985); the Russian, a traditional concern with economic development rather than environmental protection.

Latvia: Cardinal Given Birthday Award. The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium awarded Julian Cardinal Vaivods an honorary diploma on his 90th birthday for his "patriotic activities in defense of peace and propaganda of humane relations between individuals, peoples and countries." (TASS in English, August 19, 1985, in FBIS USSR Daily Report, August 20, 1985, p. R5.) Head of the Latvian church since 1982, Vaivods is also the spiritual leader of all Roman Catholics in the USSR except for those in Lithuania.

#### Caucasus

Armenia: Thirtieth Jubilee of Catholicos' Enthronement. Armenian churchmen from throughout the world met in Echmiadzin at the end of September 1985 to mark the 30th anniversary of the enthronement of Vazken I, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of all Armenians. During the celebrations, the 139th leader of the Armenian church provided details on the current state of religion in the USSR. He noted that some 100 priests had been ordained in Armenia during the last 30 years, that the Mother See now has 230 fulltime employees, and that as a result of Armenian generosity at home and abroad the Catholicate was in a sound financial position and able to maintain a "sizeable account at the Union des Banques Suisse." (Armenian Reporter, October 24, 1985, p. 18.)

Azerbaijan: Iran Blocks Soviet Azerbaijani Materials. To limit Soviet influence among Iran's Azerbaijanis, Iranian officials have returned to Baku Azerbaijani-language letters and publications sent from the USSR. According to a Soviet Azerbaijani literary journal, this interdiction is especially troubling because it comes at a time when Tehran authorities are moving against all indigenous Iranian Azerbaijani publications as well. (Adabiyat va injasanat in Azerbaijani, April 12, 1985.)

Azerbaijan: Sobriety Campaign "Devastates" Wineries. Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign has had a "devastating effect" on Azerbaijan's economy, according to Western press reports (The Guardian, October 31, 1985). Republic wineries were effectively closed in August--they lacked the machinery to convert to juice production--and most of the 1.8 million tons of grapes harvested last year went to waste. Hardest hit were members of collective farms who now have no money to spend in other sectors of the economy.

Georgia: "Unregistered Mullahs" Behind Islamic Revival. "Numerous groups of so-called unregistered and 'wandering' mullahs" are behind attempts to revive Islamic cult practices among Muslim communities in Georgia, according to the first-ever study of Georgian Islam. (R. Andrishvili, Islamism Gadmonashtebi Sakartveloshi in Georgian--Survivals of Islam in Georgia--Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1985; reviewed in Sakartvelos Komunisti in Georgian, No. 4, 1985.) Tracing Islamic history there, the book proudly noted that the spread of Islam was blocked by a powerful Christian civilization. It also provided new ethnographic data on Muslims in Adjara, Abkhazia, and elsewhere in the republic.

Central Asia

General: Moscow Reverses Kirghiz, Tajik Courts. In 1984, the USSR Supreme Court overturned more than 8 percent of all Kirghiz SSR Supreme Court decisions, according to a central commentator (Byulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR, No. 3, 1985, pp. 9-12). Although a slight improvement from the year before, this reversal rate was still far too high. In addition, the central authorities found that the Tajik high court had committed "many mistakes."

General: New Recognition for Crimean Tatar Language. A Moscow publishing house has released a collection of short stories "translated from the Crimean Tatar." (Shamil' Alyadin, "Teselli" in Russian ["Longing" in Crimean Tatar], Moscow: Sovetskiy pisatel', 1985.) This is the first time since 1944, when the Crimean Tatars were deported, that a Russian translation of one of their authors has been identified as being from Crimean Tatar. As such, the book represents a further step toward official recognition of their distinctive status.

Tajikistan: Almanac on Afghan Border Region. The Tajik Academy of Sciences has released the first of a planned annual volume on the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous oblast. Pamirovedeniye (Pamir Studies) has already drawn fire for failing to cover Russian involvement in this region and current problems there. (Kommunist Tadzhikstana, July 19, 1985, p. 3.)

Tajikistan: Believers Found in Majority of Families. More than half of all Tajik families include at least one believing Muslim, according to a Moscow Institute of Sociological Research poll conducted in Leninabad Oblast in 1984. At the same time, the survey found that only 18 percent of the adult respondents counted believers among their friends, suggesting that most believers are to be found among the older generations of the extended families still typical of that region. Nevertheless, Tajik ideological workers are concerned: Grandparents play an important role in the socialization of young people, and believers among them help to

keep Islam alive into the future. (Agitator Tadzhikistana, No. 3, 1985, pp. 24-26.)

Tajikistan: Yagnob Deportation Termed "Voluntary." In 1969 the Soviet authorities resettled the Yagnobs, a small mountain people descended from the Sogdians, into the supposedly "more hospitable" Tajik valleys. The Soviets now claim that this settlement was entirely "voluntary." (Actualites sovietiques, No. 481, 1984.) Samizdat reports suggest, however, that the Yagnobs resisted, that the militia had to be brought in, and that many Yagnobs have died because of the change in environment. (Khronika tekushchikh sobytiy, No. 48, 1978, as cited in Est-Ouest, No. 16, 1985.)

Uzbekistan: Material Incentives Have Less Impact on Uzbeks. The cultural divide between Russians and Uzbeks and its economic consequences were highlighted in a recent study by the Moscow Institute of Ethnography (Sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniya, No. 3, 1985, p. 30). In response to an open-ended question on what they valued most, representatives of both nationalities named the family first but diverged markedly on what they rated next. Russians listed "interesting work" and "material sufficiency," whereas Uzbeks said "the respect of those around them" and a "peaceful life." These deeply rooted cultural differences suggest that economic incentives that would work with Russians might not with Uzbeks--a pattern raising serious questions about Moscow's ability to reach its goals in Central Asia without the use of coercion.

Uzbekistan: First Uzbek-Language Ethnography. The Ukituvchi publishing house in Tashkent has published I. Jabbarov's Ethnography of the People of the World (in Uzbek, 280 pp.). A Moscow reviewer praised the work for its detail on the various peoples living in the countries bordering Soviet Central Asia--Iran, Afghanistan, and China. (Voprosy istorii, No. 8, 1985, pp. 94-96.)

#### RSFSR

RSFSR: Neofascist Youth Groups Resume Activity. Young people wearing znachki (buttons) featuring swastikas and portraits of Hitler--perhaps the most offensive possible symbols for Soviet adults--have reappeared in certain Moscow cafes, according to samizdat reports (Posev, No. 7, 1985, p. 5; Russkaya mysl', May 23, 1985). So far, these disaffected youths appear more interested in shocking their elders than in making a political statement and have not organized public demonstrations similar to those held in Moscow, Sverdlov, and other Soviet cities in the early 1980s. (For background on these groups and their extremely problematic



relationship to Russian nationalism, see Yu. Vishnevskaya,  
"Neo-natsisty v Sovetskom Soyuze"--Neo-Nazis in the Soviet  
Union--Radio Liberty Research RS 102/85, June 3, 1985, 10 pp.)

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