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UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMITS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1955-1967

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SECRET

PREFACE

The Office of the Historian prepared this paper for the Office of Soviet Union Affairs (EUR/SOV) as background material for a possible future summit meeting. At the suggestion of Thomas Simons, Director of EUR/SOV, the paper is limited to the summits between 1955 and 1967. David M. Baehler of the General and European Division wrote Chapters I-III; Ronald D. Landa of that division wrote Chapters IV and V. The paper was reviewed by Charles S. Sampson and Nina J. Noring.

The paper focuses on the origin and preparations for the meetings as well as the course of the discussions and the results, all from the U.S. perspective. No effort has been made to examine the summits from the Soviet point of view.

The main sources used in the preparation of the paper were the Department of State's central files and various conference files, as well as memoirs of the participants.

The Office of the Historian has also prepared Research Project 1342-A, a condensed, unannotated version of this paper.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY

Between 1955 and 1967, U.S. and Soviet leaders met at the summit five times--twice at multilateral conferences and three times bilaterally. These years were a transition between the most intense phase of the cold war and a period of U.S.-Soviet détente. The death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War brought hope for more peaceful and stable U.S.-Soviet relations. The state of those relations, however, shifted repeatedly during the period, moving from moments of relaxation to ones of heightened tension. The meetings, on the whole, had little impact on the vicissitudes of the overall relationship.

The period witnessed several crises--the Taiwan Straits, Suez, Hungary, Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba, Laos--but the summits did not contribute to their resolution or diffusion. Several agreements concluded during the period did lead to a relaxation of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union--the Lacy-Zaroubin Exchange Agreement, the Antarctic Treaty, the Hot Line Agreement, the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty--yet none were initiated or concluded at the summits, and no turning points were recorded there.

Unlike the World War II conferences, the five 1955-1967 summits were not called to settle the great problems of war and peace. Nor did these meetings resemble summits of the later détente era, which were extensions of an ongoing diplomatic process. Rather, they were ad hoc affairs, each originating from a unique set of circumstances and conforming to no particular pattern.

The summits evolved from the World War II pattern of formal multilateral meetings to that of bilateral, less formal meetings. Efforts to convene multilateral heads of government meetings ended with the collapse of the 1960 Paris Summit. The United States not only considered inter-Allied preparations too difficult and time consuming, but also became disillusioned with the results within the multilateral framework.

The United States, for the most part, brought to these meetings limited objectives and restrained anticipation. Four of the five took place at the initiative either of the European Allies or of the Soviet Union. Even the fifth--the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting of 1961--occurred only after

Khrushchev resurrected Kennedy's initial proposal that had seemingly been killed by the Bay of Pigs Affair. In 1955 and 1960, Eisenhower resisted Allied proposals for summits and finally agreed only with reluctance. Although in office for more than 5 years, Johnson met only once with the Soviet leadership in a hastily-arranged affair at Glassboro in 1967.

Eisenhower's approach was issue-oriented, Kennedy's and Johnson's personalized. Preparations for the Eisenhower summits concentrated on the development of position papers on key issues, probably as much the result of Eisenhower's style as the need to develop agreed positions among the Allies for use at a multilateral conference. Preparations for the Kennedy and Johnson summits focused on analyses of the personality and position of the Soviet leadership and discussions of negotiating style. Kennedy and Johnson, more than Eisenhower, viewed these meetings as opportunities to exert personal influence on Soviet leaders and to convey through their own demeanor and actions U.S. determination to confront the Soviet challenge. The bilateral setting reenforced this tendency toward personalized diplomacy.

While the summits offered U.S. leaders the opportunity to gain first-hand impressions of their Soviet counterparts, they provided few gains on substantive issues. Arms control was a topic at all five meetings, but no agreements were reached. The status of Berlin and the German question loomed large in the first four meetings. During the first two summits, understandings were reached that reduced tension in this area, but the 1960 Paris and 1961 Vienna meetings resulted in an increase of tension over Berlin. At the Vienna Summit, progress was made on the Laotian question. Some of the meetings produced modest agreements in the area of East-West exchanges, and at Glassboro Premier Kosygin agreed to transmit a U.S. message to the North Vietnamese Government--to no effect as it turned out.

Three of the five (1955, 1959, and 1967) were moderately successful from the standpoint of U.S. public diplomacy. Eisenhower, Johnson, and the United States benefitted from the peacemaker image commonly associated with summit participation and the positive aura reflected successively in the "spirit" of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro, even though these images were largely a creation of the media.

Confrontation, however, dominated the 1960 Paris and 1961 Vienna Summits, with much different results. At Paris, public hopes were dashed by Eisenhower's refusal to apologize for the

U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and Khrushchev's peremptory withdrawal from the summit. Following the Vienna conference, Kennedy gave journalists perhaps an overly grim picture of Khrushchev's behavior in order to mobilize public support for increased defense spending and a firm stand on Berlin.

The 1955 Geneva and 1960 Paris meetings revealed that summitry offered elements of opportunity and vulnerability. Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal, which temporarily gained the offensive on the peace issue for the United States, probably received greater attention and made more of a substantial public impact than if presented outside the context of a summit. The same could probably be said of Khrushchev's expression of fury over the U-2 affair.

CHAPTER I. EISENHOWER AND BULGANIN AT GENEVA, JULY 1955

The first summit conference since the Second World War opened in Geneva on July 18, 1955, and continued through July 23. Participating were the Heads of Government of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom. Situated in the Palais des Nations, the old League of Nations headquarters, the conference was highly structured, consisting largely of formal statements made consecutively by the participants in the meetings. Four issues made up the agenda:

1. German reunification
2. European security
3. Disarmament
4. Development of East-West contacts

No agreement was achieved on any of these even though the Heads of Government directed their foreign ministers to continue the talks in the fall. However, the conference afforded major world leaders an opportunity to size each other up, acquainted them with the complexities of summitry, and inaugurated a period of temporary détente.

Initiative: Following the British and French Lead

Prime Minister Winston Churchill initiated the idea of a four-power summit following Stalin's death in March 1953. President Eisenhower specifically rejected it at that time, fearing that such a meeting would aid Soviet efforts to disrupt the western defense system, just then in the process of incorporating the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO. The mechanism for achieving this, the European Defense Community (EDC), a pact signed by six European powers in May 1952, was awaiting ratification by the respective parliaments at the time of Stalin's death. The only person within the U.S. Government to argue in favor of a summit meeting in 1953 was C.D. Jackson, a presidential assistant. He believed the Europeans would regard it as a sign of good faith in reaching solutions to problems, and that it would thus remove fear that the EDC would be used as a tool for confronting the Soviets. Key advisers in the Department of State, on the other hand, argued that agreeing to a summit conference would represent movement by the United States toward an alternative to the EDC, thus hampering chances for ratification. Eisenhower took their advice and decided against a summit.[1]

In August 1954, the French Parliament voted not to ratify the EDC treaty, but in September and October 1954, it signed a different set of agreements, the Four-Power and Nine-Power

Pacts, providing for direct incorporation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO. Partly in an effort to ensure their ratification in the French Parliament, the French Government became the prime advocate of holding a summit conference early in 1955. The United States, for fear of demonstrating weakness in the Western resolve to solidify its defense system, resisted issuing an invitation until the agreements were ratified. Once ratification was assured, however, fear of Soviet maneuvering to split the West was reduced, and the main obstacles to convening a summit meeting were removed.[2]

From the U.S. standpoint, there was also a negative reason for assenting to the summit conference in mid-1955. President Eisenhower did not want to be portrayed as an obstructor of the peace process. The Soviet Government launched a "peace offensive" in early 1955, reflected in the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in May. When it became evident that the treaty would be signed, Eisenhower agreed on May 10, 1955, to the issuance of an invitation to the Soviet Government to participate in a Heads of Government meeting. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation on May 26.[3]

Preparations: Problems of Allied Agreement

Preparations for the summit were extensive and methodical. Prior to issuing the invitation to the Soviet Union, a London Working Group consisting of representatives of the three Western powers studied the question of convening the summit.[4] After the invitation, each of the three western participants worked out its own positions. A tripartite Washington Working Group then met June 8-14 to develop common western positions on the summit issues.[5] These were submitted to the three western foreign ministers who met in New York, June 16-17.[6] Chancellor Konrad Adenauer discussed the summit with President Eisenhower in Washington before attending the foreign ministers session in New York. Armed with a common position, the three foreign ministers then travelled to San Francisco to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter. There they met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on June 21 to work out the final arrangements for the summit.[7]

The United States wanted the summit to deal in generalities and to provide primarily a framework for the five foreign ministers, who, it was agreed in advance, would meet at some later point to conduct actual negotiations. The French

and British were more inclined to conduct negotiations at the summit. In the field of disarmament, for example, the British planned to propose formation of a demilitarized zone in Central Europe. The French sought to obtain a commitment for the reduction of arms budgets in each participating country, with the savings to aid developing countries. The United States opposed both schemes partly because they involved too much detailed negotiation among the Heads of Government[8] and partly because, unbeknownst to its allies, the United States intended to introduce the "Open Skies" disarmament proposal and did not want this initiative pre-empted by other initiatives.

The "Open Skies" proposal had its origins in the Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel recommendations of June 10. The panel, convened by President Eisenhower to study ways of best exploiting Soviet weaknesses at the Geneva summit, consisted of eleven individuals from both public and private life. While not using the term "Open Skies", it recommended conclusion of a "convention insuring the right of aircraft of any nationality to fly over the territory of any country for peaceful purposes."[9] In Paris on July 19, a small group of the President's intimate advisers decided to recommend introducing the proposal and concealing it from the other participants at Geneva and from the State Department bureaucracy in Washington.[10]

Other U.S. preparations proceeded in two stages. First, the Eisenhower administration developed the executive branch position on subjects that might arise at Geneva, contained in NSC paper 5524/1, "Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four-Power Negotiations," July 11, 1955. After a lengthy section analyzing Soviet behavior and the appropriate western response, the paper discussed Germany and European security, subjects that ultimately became the first two agenda items at Geneva. It indicated that European security depended on solution of the German problem through implementation of the Eden plan first presented at the Berlin conference of January-February 1954. The Eden plan proposed free elections of a national assembly throughout Germany, and formulation by the national assembly of a constitution for Germany. While the United States clearly preferred German adherence to NATO, it was prepared to forego it, even accepting the possibility of demilitarizing Germany if western military security was not compromised.

NSC 5524/1 then examined, in much less detail, the status of Soviet satellites and the international Communist movement, East-West trade, disarmament, and the Far East. In regard to these issues, the paper indicated that the U.S. position was to secure Soviet troop withdrawal, demand cessation of Soviet control over Communist movements in the free world, undertake

trade with the Soviet bloc only when it was commercially advantageous and did not compromise national security, and oppose discussion of the Far East at the summit, particularly the inclusion of Communist China in the Geneva talks. On disarmament, the paper referred to earlier positions taken by the United States and did not mention the "Open Skies" proposal.[11]

The second stage of preparations was development of a common allied position. A tripartite working group, with West German representatives, met in Paris, July 9-14, and reported to the Foreign Ministers when they convened in Paris on July 15. The resulting report predicted that Germany, European security, and disarmament would be discussed at the summit and outlined the basic western positions on these subjects. The western position on Germany and European security was similar to that contained in NSC 5524/1. On disarmament, the western position was that the West should take the initiative, but keep the discussion general, referring all detailed questions to the United Nations. It concluded by identifying several additional topics that might be introduced by the West or the Soviet Union.[12]

Discussions: Deadlock and Disappointment[13]

The Geneva summit opened on July 18 and closed on July 23, two days later than the United States had hoped. The first day was devoted to formal opening statements by the Heads of Government. Thereafter, the four foreign ministers met in the morning to work out positions to be taken by the principals when they met in the afternoon. The foreign ministers spent the morning of July 19 establishing the following agenda:

1. Germany
2. European security, [indissolubly linked with the former and sometimes combined with Germany as the first agenda item]
3. Disarmament
4. East-West contacts

The additional items that the United States wanted to include -- the status of the Soviet satellites and the activities of international communism -- had been rejected in the opening Soviet statement the day before as inappropriate for discussion.

The principals discussed the first two agenda items in the afternoon with no progress. It became clear that the Soviet Union wanted to conclude a European security pact first, and only then deal with the problem of German reunification. The Western leaders argued that European insecurity resulted from

the division of Germany and that reunification must therefore come first. The July 19 session ended in deadlock. The deadlock continued at the foreign ministers meeting on the morning of July 20 and at the Heads of Government meeting in the afternoon. The Soviet Union circulated a draft security treaty unacceptable to the West because it failed to deal with Germany. The impasse became more evident on July 21, when the foreign ministers tried unsuccessfully to work out a draft communiqué, or Directive, on Germany and European security.

The afternoon session of July 21 was scheduled to discuss disarmament, but the Soviet delegation introduced a paper on the subject of Germany and European security. Eisenhower refused to discuss it, but the other Heads of Government restated their positions on the question. Finally, Bulganin, who chaired the session that day in the regular order of rotation, noticed that it was getting late and called on Eisenhower to put forth the U.S. position on disarmament. Eisenhower at that point made the statement containing the "Open Skies" proposal.

Starting from the premise that no disarmament scheme would be credible if it did not provide for inspection by the other side, the proposal called for an exchange of blueprints of military installations and mutual surveillance overflights. Although the impact of "Open Skies" on public opinion was no doubt a factor in the decision by some key advisers to recommend its presentation, no evidence exists that Eisenhower himself regarded the idea as principally a propaganda ploy. All of his later actions and statements suggest that disarmament for him was the most important international question and that it could be resolved only with adequate control and verification. "Open Skies" was consistent with these principles, and that Eisenhower repeatedly returned to some version of the ideas demonstrates that he was sincere in presenting the idea at Geneva. Although Eden and Faure had received hints about it, they and Bulganin were caught unawares. Still, the United Kingdom and France supported the idea in their statements; the British added their idea for a demilitarized zone in Central Europe; the French injected their proposal for use of the savings obtained through disarmament to aid underdeveloped countries. The Soviet Union objected to the proposal on grounds that it appeared to legitimize spying.

The morning and much of the afternoon of July 22 were consumed by the foreign ministers' efforts to draft a Directive from the Heads of Government for a future foreign ministers' conference. These efforts failed and cast a pall over the meeting of the principals, which consisted of desultory statements on improving East-West contacts. At the conclusion

of the session, the foreign ministers resumed their efforts. These again failed, and they decided to remit the issue to their principals on the morning of July 23, the last day of the conference.

The Heads of Government meeting on July 23 was a restricted session with the principal, his foreign minister, and two advisers making up each delegation. As it had been throughout the conference, the major sticking point in the discussion of the Directive was the relationship between German reunification and European security. Late in the afternoon, agreement was finally achieved on a text that gave equal weight to each. A closing plenary session was held early that evening, the summit ended, and the President and Secretary of State left immediately for the United States.

Results: Minimal Achievements

Of the four agenda items, German reunification and European security were referred to the foreign ministers, who met unsuccessfully in October and November 1955 at Geneva. The third item, disarmament, was referred to the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament. The fourth issue, East-West contacts, was remitted to a group of experts reporting to the foreign ministers. Apart from delegating responsibility for each of the four issues, however, the Geneva summit cannot claim success in any of the fields of discussion. If there was a positive outcome from the Geneva conference, it was more in the area of the spirit of détente than in concrete results.

One positive result was that the world's leaders got to know each other, and from every indication, all were favorably impressed by President Eisenhower. The Soviet Union seemed especially comforted by Eisenhower's assertion that the United States would never attack it. The United States ascertained that Nikita Khrushchev pulled the strings, despite Bulganin's position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the Geneva conference gave the United States experience in preparing for summits, and particularly in the enormous difficulty of obtaining tripartite western agreement on summit issues.[14]

At best, the Geneva summit of 1955 was a marginal success. The Directive to the foreign ministers on German reunification and European security, laboriously worked out on the last day of the conference, was ignored by Bulganin in his closing statement and by the Soviet delegation at the foreign ministers meeting in the fall of 1955.[15] No disarmament accord on the scale envisioned, much less the "Open Skies" proposal, has yet been concluded. East-West contacts have increased over the

years, but it is difficult to see any link between this development and the Geneva summit of 1955. A limited spirit of détente emerged about this time, but the causes of its emergence went well beyond the Geneva summit. The participants at Geneva regarded the so-called "spirit of Geneva" that pervaded the press and public as exaggerated. Those who knew what had happened during the discussions knew that nothing substantial had been achieved.

CHAPTER II. EISENHOWER AND KHRUSHCHEV AT CAMP DAVID, SEPTEMBER 1959

Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 was arranged mainly as an effort by President Eisenhower to acquaint the Soviet leader with American life. The only substantive talks occurred at Camp David on September 26-27, and these concerned procedures for solving problems in the future, rather than the problems themselves. They discussed the following six subjects:

1. Berlin
2. German reunification
3. Disarmament
4. Trade relations
5. Exchanges and contacts
6. Communist China

The results were mixed. They agreed to expand exchanges into the field of atomic energy, and removed the Soviet deadline for a Berlin settlement, though discussions on that issue were not to be prolonged indefinitely. Disarmament remained as elusive as ever, and none of the other issues was settled. The "spirit of Camp David" that supposedly emerged was ephemeral and perhaps non-existent.

Initiative: A Misunderstanding

Khrushchev's desire to visit the United States first emerged in a conversation between a lawyer from Oklahoma and a junior member of the Soviet diplomatic corps in January 1958. The lawyer submitted an account of the conversation to the White House, and Khrushchev's desire to pay a visit was subsequently discussed in the Department of State. Strong disagreement prevailed in the summer of 1958 about the wisdom of inviting Khrushchev to make a tour of the United States. The Bureau of European Affairs supported the idea if Khrushchev were coming for the UNGA session in September. Since Khrushchev did not come, the idea was shelved.[1]

It was revived in the summer of 1959, when it became clear in a conversation Khrushchev held with a delegation of U.S. governors that he was interested in an exchange of visits with President Eisenhower. In June, Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy orally extended the invitation to Khrushchev through Frol Kozlov, First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, during his visit to the United States.[2]

The invitation to Khrushchev became confused with the possibility of a four-power summit meeting. Eisenhower was

adamant and explicit in his view that no summit should be held in the absence of some progress on the Berlin question at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference then in progress. He left implicit his view that Khrushchev's visit, which he conceived of as a preliminary to a possible summit, should be subject to the same condition. Murphy did not understand this and issued an unconditional invitation through Kozlov.

Eisenhower became aware of the misunderstanding between Murphy and himself at a meeting of July 22, after Khrushchev had already accepted the invitation.[3] Eisenhower had formally extended the invitation in a letter of July 11, in which he did not mention the condition on Berlin. Khrushchev accepted on July 21. After revelation of the misunderstanding on July 22, Eisenhower sought to cut his losses by telling Khrushchev that progress on Berlin at Geneva would facilitate the upcoming talks substantially. Khrushchev rejected this contention, stating that lack of progress on Berlin at the Foreign Minister's Conference would make a summit conference even more necessary; this implied that the lack of progress on Berlin also provided ample justification for its discussion during Khrushchev's upcoming visit.[4]

The visit's main purpose now became to acquaint Khrushchev with the way Americans lived. The Soviet Government issued a reciprocal invitation to President Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union for a similar purpose.

Preparations: Reaffirmation of Previous Positions

Even though the Camp David talks would be bilateral, the subjects to be discussed concerned U.S. allies. In order to allay their anxieties, Eisenhower traveled to Bonn, London, and Paris August 26-September 3, to discuss the meeting with Khrushchev and the questions likely to arise. In Washington, Murphy and Soviet Ambassador Menshikov worked out the procedural arrangements and the State Department began preparing the requisite background documents.[5] Final preparations consisted of a discussion between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, out of which guidance emerged for the foreign ministers, and a meeting between Herter and Gromyko on September 16. The conversation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev on September 15 identified the Berlin question

September 15 identified the Berlin question as the most important agenda item during the Camp David talks, dealt at length with the relative virtues of the American and Soviet press, and touched on confrontational remarks by Vice President Nixon prior to the Khrushchev visit.[6] The Herter-Gromyko meeting produced a proposed agenda of ten items:[7]

1. Germany and Berlin
2. Disarmament
3. Nuclear tests
4. Exchanges and contacts
5. Nuclear reactor information
6. Political treaty and other bilateral questions
7. Laos
8. Trade
9. Possible summit meeting
10. Final communiqué

The set of briefing papers corresponding to these items contained no new U.S. proposals. German reunification and maintenance of the current status of Berlin, which meant retention of western forces there, continued to be U.S. objectives. On arms control, the United States would promise to study Khrushchev's proposal for complete and general disarmament made before the United Nations on September 18, but would express the view that more limited measures were necessary. As was true in 1955, inspection and control remained key elements of any U.S. plan. The President would: (1) approve ideas for collective security, as long as they did not involve the partition of Germany, (2) reject Soviet proposals for an atomic-free zone because this would place the West at a military disadvantage, and (3) resist Soviet pressure for the evacuation of U.S. bases abroad until the U.S.S.R. moved to reduce world tensions.

The United States would strive for a comprehensive test ban, but would settle for a more limited arrangement as long as a firm agreement on inspection was achieved. The President also favored extension of the current exchange agreement through 1961. One aspect of expanded exchanges was the fifth agenda item, nuclear information. The United States favored a program that would provide for exchanges of visits and information and for the conduct of joint projects. The United States intended to oppose conclusion of a non-aggression pact, believing that the U.N. charter offered enough mechanisms for settlement of any bilateral disputes for the time being.

On Laos, the President would urge Soviet restraint in supporting the Pathet Lao in their efforts to destabilize the non-Communist government. To the Soviet claim that the

U.S.S.R. was the victim of U.S. trade discrimination, the President would point out that the Soviet Union discriminated in 100% of its trade and that U.S. trade discrimination occurred only in the case of strategic goods or minor items. Little interest in expanding trade with the Soviet Union would be shown. The United States would attend a subsequent summit conference only if some prior progress were made on the Berlin question. On the last agenda item, issuance of a joint communiqué, the United States, lukewarm toward the idea, recognized its inevitability and prepared a draft that excluded language the Soviet Union might want to include.[8]

In general, preparations for the Camp David meeting were simpler than those for the Geneva summit, despite the fairly elaborate agenda. This was partly because the positions recommended to President Eisenhower merely restated old ideas and concepts. Mostly, however, it was because the United States did not have to coordinate its position with the Allies. President Eisenhower consulted them during his trip to Europe in late August and early September; there was no need to reach formal agreement before entering discussions with Khrushchev.

Discussions: Focusing on the Berlin Crisis

The Camp David summit opened the morning of September 26 and lasted until after noon on September 27. By far, most of the discussion was devoted to the question of Berlin. In November 1958, Khrushchev had precipitated a crisis over the city by claiming that the western powers had violated the Potsdam accords of 1945 regarding Germany, that these accords were consequently null and void, and that a new arrangement regarding Berlin should be worked out. The new arrangement would include increased East German control over access to the city. If this could not be worked out by four-power agreement within six months, the Soviet Union would conclude a bilateral agreement with East Germany, transferring administrative control over Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. Talks between the foreign ministers of the four powers opened in Geneva in May 1959, just prior to the expiration of the Soviet deadline, but the foreign ministers were unable to reach agreement of any sort on Berlin.

From the outset, Eisenhower made solution of the Berlin crisis the key to resolving other problems, stating in his first meeting with Khrushchev that an agreed statement on that question would allow "progress on others up and down the line, such as on disarmament." He agreed with Khrushchev that there

were more important international questions than the status of Berlin, but stated that U.S. popular opinion had adopted Berlin as a symbol. The public, he thought, had the impression that the West operated under "some threat of unilateral action" and "would not understand going on to other problems if this were not resolved." German reunification received attention in the context of settling this problem.[9]

Disarmament, while receiving lip service as the "most important problem" facing mankind, was the subject of only general discussion. Herter and Gromyko discussed it in more detail, but neither side budged from its basic position. Under Secretary Dillon discussed U.S.-Soviet trade with Khrushchev while Eisenhower attended church on Sunday morning, September 27. Dillon pointed out that relaxation of trade controls by the United States depended on improvement of overall relations with the U.S.S.R., including settlement of lend-lease disputes, and Khrushchev agreed that they should be examined.[10]

Eisenhower and Khrushchev discussed East-West exchanges, agreeing in general that they should be expanded. Discussion regarding extension of the Lacy-Zaroubin exchange agreement of January 1958 had progressed by the time of Khrushchev's visit to the point of U.S. "satisfaction" that it would be concluded. The only question remaining was whether it should include exchanges in the field of atomic energy. The heads of the respective atomic energy commissions, John McCone and V.S. Emelyanov, agreed that exchanges of persons and information concerning the nuclear programs should take place, and an agreement of the type envisaged was subsequently reached in the extension of the exchanges agreement.[11]

Khrushchev raised the question of Communist China, drawing a comparison between the China-Taiwan situation and that of Berlin and East Germany. Eisenhower admitted that some parallel existed, but that it was in the area of a desire for peaceful settlement. Neither of the principals brought up nuclear testing, a possible bilateral treaty, or Laos, although Herter and Gromyko discussed the first two items with no result. Discussion of the final communiqué centered almost entirely on Berlin. Khrushchev insisted that any reference to extension of the deadline for resolution of the problem be deleted from the final text, while Eisenhower wanted it included. They finally reached a compromise whereby the President would state at a press conference that the deadline had been lifted, but that negotiations would not be prolonged indefinitely. Khrushchev would then confirm the understanding at a similar press conference. Khrushchev's objection to including the statement in a communiqué was that it would give

Adenauer the chance to trumpet the meeting as a great victory for West Germany.[12]

Results: Modest Achievements

The results of the Camp David talks were modest. On Berlin, Camp David produced an extension of the period of time for negotiating its status. In Eisenhower's view, Berlin was the most important agenda item. The six-month deadline posed by the Soviet Union had passed without any action being taken, and nothing was on record with regard to Soviet intentions concerning Berlin. At Camp David, Eisenhower had aimed to ensure that something was put on the record. He told Khrushchev that not having "to act under duress could be regarded as progress." As long as he was satisfied that duress no longer existed, he would be ready "to go to a meeting at the highest level." The language agreed to was that the negotiations on Berlin "should not be prolonged indefinitely, but that there would be no fixed time limit on them." This is what Eisenhower wanted. Hence, it is surprising that he agreed to its deletion from the communiqué and subsequent pronouncement at a press conference, with Khrushchev confirming the language after returning to Moscow. He did agree to this arrangement, however, and Khrushchev carried out his end of the bargain. From the U.S. standpoint, the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting thus achieved the United States goal on the main issue, although failure to incorporate the agreement in the final communiqué tended to weaken the achievement. In that sense, the summit was a success.

Berlin consumed the largest portion of the meeting because Eisenhower refused to move beyond it until something was resolved. Accordingly, most of the other issues remained unsettled. Disarmament was mentioned and declared important, but not dealt with. Extension of the exchange agreement into the field of atomic energy was achieved, but not as a direct consequence of discussions between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. In November 1959, the Lacy-Zaroubin Exchange Agreement was extended to 1960 and 1961. Again, however, no direct connection existed between this extension and the Camp David talks, since discussions were well under way prior to the summit.

Finally, a "spirit of Camp David" was immediately discerned by the media. It was defined as a new spirit of détente within which outstanding problems between the United States and Soviet Union could be resolved. The U.S. participants were apprehensive about this proclamation. They recognized that actual achievements were few and that the era of good feeling could as a result be very short-lived.

CHAPTER III. EISENHOWER AND KHRUSHCHEV AT PARIS, MAY 1960

The Paris Heads of Government meeting of 1960 began on May 16 and ended abruptly on May 17. President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and President de Gaulle represented their respective nations. The United States had planned to discuss four issues:

1. Germany and Berlin
2. Disarmament
3. Nuclear testing (without French participation)
4. East-West relations

Before any of these issues could be considered, Khrushchev torpedoed the meeting by demanding that President Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 intelligence flight shot down over the Soviet Union earlier in May. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev would not return to the conference.

Initiative: A Soviet Idea

The Paris summit had its origins in a proposal for a Heads of Government meeting made by First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan during a visit to the United States in January 1959.[1] President Eisenhower repeated several times during the spring of 1959 that he would not participate in a summit unless three conditions were met: (1) withdrawal of the Soviet threat of unilateral action in Berlin, barring conclusion of some agreement on access to the city within six months; (2) the issues to be discussed were clarified at a lower level, and; (3) the Soviets showed some negotiating flexibility. The Geneva foreign ministers conference (May 14-June 20 and July 13-August 5, 1959) and Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September seemed to meet those conditions. Although neither succeeded in resolving anything, the Berlin deadline was extended, the issues clarified, and room for negotiation at least implied.

Discussion of a summit began with exchanges of correspondence between the western Heads of Government following Khrushchev's visit. These led to a western Heads of Government meeting in Paris in mid-December 1959, at which the leaders decided to invite Khrushchev to attend a summit in 1960. Initial difficulty in finding a mutually acceptable date finally gave way to agreement to open a summit in Paris on May 16, 1960.[2]

Eisenhower was reluctant to participate in a summit conference in the absence of a prospect for some success. He

had resisted Soviet calls for a conference during the two-year period prior to the Geneva summit in 1955, and during the 16 months prior to the Paris summit of 1960. It was also true, however, that Eisenhower inclined more and more toward direct communication with the Soviet leadership in an effort to solve international problems. This communication mostly took the form of written correspondence, but as the events of 1955, 1959, and 1960 demonstrated, the President was not averse to face-to-face contact.[3]

Preparations: Developing an Inter-Allied Position

The western Heads of Government met in Paris in December 1959, and decided to establish working groups on Germany (including Berlin), disarmament, and East-West relations. Cessation of nuclear testing was left for more informal consultations, because the French refused to be party to discussions on this issue. The working groups met in early 1960 to devise common western positions on each issue, and the foreign ministers of each participating power reviewed their reports.[4]

Although the Federal Republic of Germany would not be represented at the summit, Chancellor Adenauer was consulted during every stage of the preparations. One of the basic western demands was that a plebiscite be held in Berlin to resolve the crisis, a proposal initially advocated only by Adenauer. Conversely, when Adenauer opposed a disarmament proposal providing for a weapons-free zone in Central Europe, as well as one in Siberia and Alaska, the United States dropped it.[5]

Parallel with these preparations was an extensive exchange of correspondence by the Heads of Government, supplemented by bilateral meetings between the principals.[6] In the course of these contacts, it became clear that the so-called "spirit of Camp David", which referred principally to the extension of the period for solving the Berlin crisis, was waning in the months before the Paris summit. Khrushchev made it clear that he expected movement in the negotiations over Berlin. The British and French were inclined to negotiate on the issue, but the United States, backed by an adamant Adenauer, was not.

Despite these differences, the western powers achieved agreed positions on the issues:

1. Disarmament, regarded by the western powers as the most urgent problem to be dealt with at the summit, would be presented as a staged plan with limited objectives. This contrasted with Khrushchev's call at the United Nations in

September 1959 for complete and general disarmament. The western powers regarded this proposal as a propaganda ploy, rather than as a workable plan.

2. Berlin, still the major crisis spot, would be maintained legally and administratively as it had been since the war. Specifically, the West would refuse any proposal that included a deadline for alteration of Berlin's status, falling back instead on the formula that German reunification would solve the Berlin problem.

3. On East-West relations, western tactics included exploring the distance Khrushchev was willing to go in extending détente, while at the same time demonstrating the strength and solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.

Finally, the British and U.S. representatives agreed that nuclear testing would be brought up later in the conference with Khrushchev. The discussion would exclude the French, a condition on which the latter insisted.

Procedurally, the western powers agreed that the mistake of the 1955 Geneva summit had been the holding of formal meetings with large numbers of advisers present. They opted instead for small meetings consisting only of the Heads of Government and their interpreters. They reasoned that these would be more conducive to real negotiations and less to presentation of formal statements intended primarily for public consumption.

The U-2 incident altered the final preparations for Paris. Shot down by a Soviet missile on May 1, 1960, the U-2 was revealed to be a spy plane on May 7, and to have departed from a base in Turkey, a country allied with the United States. The Soviet Union threatened retaliation against countries providing bases for spy flights. This threat served to increase the pressure for accommodation and tended to split the West on the eve of the summit.[7]

Discussions: Disaster

At the opening session on May 16, Khrushchev, brushing aside Eisenhower's request to make the opening statement, torpedoed the conference by again threatening retaliation and demanding that the United States apologize for the overflight, promise not to do it again, and punish those responsible. Eisenhower refused to accept these humiliating conditions. After a 24-hour recess, the Heads of Government met again, but Khrushchev failed to appear, signalling the collapse of the meeting.[8]

U.S. participants speculated later that the Soviet Union had decided before the conference that it could obtain nothing for the U.S.S.R. and should accordingly sabotage it. The U-2 incident provided a ready pretext. It had become clear in the wake of Camp David that neither Berlin nor disarmament would have an outcome satisfactory to the Soviet Union at the Paris meeting. The United States had adopted an unyielding position on Berlin, and had resurrected "Open Skies", a proposal anathema to the Soviet leadership. With the prospects of real gain so dim, the Soviet Union decided to use the U-2 incident for propaganda purposes and dispense with the summit altogether.[9]

Results: Some Bitter Lessons

The Paris summit yielded no results. It dissolved all vestiges of détente resulting from the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting at Camp David in September 1959. It thrust the world into a new round of cold war recriminations. It left Berlin further than ever from resolution. Finally, it resulted in the withdrawal of the invitation for Eisenhower to visit the Soviet Union beginning June 10.[10]

Seen on a broader scale, the collapse of the Paris summit of 1960 marked the end of an era. The western powers never again tried to convene a quadripartite Heads of Government meeting. The issues that prompted the meeting did not disappear, but to the extent that public relations were important in summit meetings, it was obvious that the West was not winning the word war. Eisenhower was more interested than his successors would be in making substantive progress on the issues discussed, as opposed to scoring propaganda points, but even in this sense the multilateral pattern proved cumbersome. Preparations for a multilateral meeting were enormously difficult for the West, given the need to coordinate the positions of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. All the work for the Paris summit of 1960 had been for naught, both substantively and in the realm of public opinion. Henceforth, summit solutions to the international problems that existed were seen in a bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. context, and the public opinion element was regarded as more easily controllable if the United States did not have to contend with the sometimes differing views of its Allies.

CHAPTER IV. KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV AT VIENNA, JUNE 1961

The meeting between President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in Vienna, June 3-4, 1961, was substantively linked to the aborted Paris meeting the previous year. As in Paris, the status of Berlin was the major subject of discussion, but the conflict in Laos and the general question of disarmament were also on the agenda. The President's major purpose seemed to be to demonstrate to Khrushchev his competence in foreign affairs and his determination, especially in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, not to allow the Soviet Union to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. Having studied records of previous meetings with Khrushchev and having received numerous briefing papers and oral advice from administration officials, Kennedy was extremely well-prepared for the meeting. Yet he was shocked at Khrushchev's intransigence and ordered a buildup of American military power in the wake of the meeting that some scholars believe helped produce the Soviet response of erecting the Berlin Wall. Some also feel that Kennedy overreacted to the verbal drubbing he took at Vienna and assumed an unnecessarily aggressive stance toward Communist insurgency throughout the world, especially in Vietnam.

Initiative: Kennedy's Suggestion Resurrected by Khrushchev

The formal initiative for the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting came from the United States, but there were prior Soviet overtures hinting at the desirability of a meeting.

Shortly after the breakdown of the May 1960 Paris meeting, Khrushchev said that another summit would be needed in six to eight months to discuss his deadline for Western withdrawal from Berlin. The State Department's Policy Planning Staff was opposed to another summit except "where urgency or probability of agreement were very great." The Policy Planning Staff particularly felt that a four-power meeting was "a vestige of wartime and postwar settlement machinery which can hardly last much longer." It noted that when direct contact between the President and the Soviet leader again became desirable, "it should generally be sought in the guise of informal exchanges--e.g., during visits or attendance at the UN--rather than of summit conferences." To minimize adverse public reaction, however, the Policy Planning Staff recommended that the United States not appear negative toward proposals for summit meetings.[1]

Prior to Khrushchev's visit to the United Nations in September 1960, during which he pounded his shoe on the podium

and interrupted remarks by British Prime Minister Macmillan, the Soviet Government had encouraged speculation that Khrushchev and Eisenhower would meet, but neither government took any concrete steps in that direction. In fact, Department of State officials, including former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Charles Bohlen, who was then Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, strongly opposed such a meeting.[2]

The Soviet Government greeted John F. Kennedy's election with restrained approbation and hinted that Khrushchev was interested in meeting with the new President.[3] According to two of his closest advisers, Kennedy came into office convinced that Khrushchev mistakenly believed that the United States would never risk a nuclear war to defend its vital interests, and he wanted to disabuse the Soviet Chairman of this notion. When the possibility of a meeting with Khrushchev was first broached, Kennedy privately stated:

> I have to show him that we can be just as tough as he is. . . . I can't do that sending messages to him through other people. I'll have to sit down with him, and let him see who he's dealing with.[4]

On February 11, 1961, Kennedy reviewed the state of Soviet-American relations with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson, and three former Ambassadors to Moscow--W. Averell Harriman, George F. Kennan, and Bohlen, who all opposed a formal summit meeting, but agreed that an informal, personal meeting might be useful.[5]

Kennedy apparently was ambivalent. On the one hand, he was extremely curious about Khrushchev, and according to one aide, was attracted, like many other heads of state, to the "royal cousins approach to diplomacy." He had also once stated publicly that it was "far better to meet at the summit than at the brink." On the other hand, the President was aware that summitry often raised undue hopes and public attention, thus producing disappointments or unjustified relaxations, and that it "injected considerations of personal prestige, face-saving and politics into grave international conflicts."[6] Before Ambassador Thompson returned to the Soviet Union, the President gave him a letter to deliver to Khrushchev in which Kennedy expressed the hope that "it will be possible, before too long, for us to meet personally for an informal exchange of views," depending on "the general international situation at the time, as well as on our mutual schedules of engagements."[7]

When Thompson delivered the letter on March 11, he told Khrushchev that the President had in mind a meeting during the first week in May, either in Vienna or Stockholm. "Obviously pleased" with the initiative, Khrushchev said that the timing would be all right and expressed a slight preference for Vienna. A Soviet official later informed Thompson that the meeting could be portrayed simply as an opportunity for the two leaders to "get acquainted and review problems of mutual interest."[8]

Soviet interest in a summit was confirmed in late March when Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited President Kennedy and expressed the hope that there would be a personal exchange of views between Kennedy and Khrushchev.[9] Having arranged a visit to France to confer with De Gaulle in late May, Kennedy asked Thompson to propose to Khrushchev that a summit be held in Vienna June 3-4, provided that the international climate was appropriate for a meeting at that time. This would depend mainly on whether there was progress toward a settlement in Laos and whether the Soviet Union had refrained from provoking crises in other areas. After returning to Moscow, Gromyko tentatively approved both the time and the place proposed by the United States.[10]

The prospect of a summit meeting was seemingly dashed by U.S. sponsorship of the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961, and the Soviet Government's bitter public denunciation of the U.S. role in the affair. Yet on May 4 Foreign Minister Gromyko told Thompson that although the Soviet Union "deplored" the Bay of Pigs invasion, it did not consider that an unbridgeable gulf existed between the two countries. He hoped the U.S. Government shared the view that ways should be found "to build bridges." Recent events, Gromyko said, had confirmed the necessity of contacts at the highest level."[11]

Ambassador Thompson strongly urged the President to proceed with the meeting. He acknowledged that there would be some adverse domestic reaction, but thought it could be "divorced from recent events" by revealing the date of Kennedy's initial proposal. Thompson thought a meeting would (1) cause the Soviets to take a more reasonable stand in the short run on issues such as Laos, nuclear testing, and disarmament, (2) allow the United States to influence major decisions in preparation before the Communist Party Congress scheduled later in the year, (3) exacerbate Sino-Soviet relations, and (4) strengthen the U.S. position in world public opinion and put the West in a better position to take a strong stand on Berlin and other matters.[12]

Kennedy indicated that he still wanted a meeting, but he also wanted to wait a week or two to see whether there was progress on resolving the Laotian problem at a conference scheduled to convene in Geneva on May 20. Moreover, "for domestic political reasons," the President wanted to announce specific subjects to be discussed. One obvious subject would be nuclear test talks, but Thompson was asked to suggest others, "with some prospect of progress," to be publicly announced along with the test ban topic.[13]

On May 16, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington delivered a letter to Kennedy from Khrushchev agreeing to a meeting in Vienna on June 3-4. Khrushchev held high hopes that "the bilateral exchange of opinions between the leaders of the USA and the USSR, so fruitfully carried out during the time of Franklin Roosevelt" could bridge "the muddy stream of mistrust and hostility born of the 'cold war'." In his letter, Khrushchev stressed the pre-eminence of the relationship between Washington and Moscow. As the Chairman put it, "the question of easing international tension and consequently the creation of favorable conditions for deciding virtually all important international problems depends to an enormous extent on the improvement of Soviet-American relations."[14]

Prior to announcing the meeting, Kennedy obtained the approval of both De Gaulle and Adenauer. To Adenauer, he admitted that after submitting his proposal in February, "the deterioration in the general situation caused me to suspend active consideration of a meeting with Khrushchev" until the Soviets again raised it with Thompson. Public announcement of the meeting came on May 19.[15] There was considerable skepticism in the press that the timing was right for such a meeting. Kennedy brushed aside such misgivings. He remarked privately that getting involved in what were essentially civil wars in Cuba and Laos was one thing, but it was time to let Khrushchev know that "a showdown between the United States and Russia would be entirely something else again."[16]

Preparations: An Abundance of Conflicting Advice

From various high administration officials, Kennedy received an abundance of conflicting advice on what to expect from Khrushchev and how he should conduct himself. On the one hand, he was urged to adopt a hard line and to make an issue of Soviet support for national wars of liberation. On the other hand, the President heard from most of the Soviet experts that Khrushchev would be conciliatory, keenly interested in a successful meeting, and that the President should not become embroiled in a contest of bluster or sharp words. Between

these two positions stood the formal Department of State briefing papers, particularly one prepared by Bohlen, which counseled a mixture of firmness and moderation.

United Nations Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson recommended that the President concentrate on what he called the "basic question" that governed all others--the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence. This interpretation prohibited Western intervention within the Soviet bloc, where the Soviets had a completely free hand, but encouraged Communist support of "wars of liberation" throughout the world. The President should propose to Khrushchev, he suggested, that no military action be undertaken within either bloc by the other side or in neutral states, even on a small scale. Stevenson thought it would be useful for the President "to lay bare the fundamentals of the problem as you see it and make it quite clear that we propose to deal in the future much more vigorously with those fundamentals rather than inadequately and tardily with surface symptoms or local crises."[17]

A softer line was taken by the Soviet specialists. Ambassador Thompson expressed his belief that Khrushchev wanted the meeting to be a "pleasant" one and that he would emphasize "general and complete disarmament." He warned that the President should be ready for Khrushchev to exploit two weaknesses in the U.S. position: (1) the failure of the United States to carry out elections in Vietnam, and (2) the existence of U.S. bases and military activities on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The Ambassador recommended that the President try to obtain Khrushchev's acceptance of the responsibility for seeing that Laos remain neutral, which would be a gauge of over-all Soviet intentions.[18]

Ambassador in Yugoslavia George F. Kennan furnished the Department of State five pages of comments in which he disagreed with the view that Khrushchev needed to be convinced of the U.S. determination to resist Soviet encroachments. According to Kennan's analysis, Khrushchev knew that the United States would not hesitate to react with determination if challenged. Acknowledging that he differed with many other Soviet experts both within and outside the U.S. Government, Kennan said he believed that Khrushchev was not an absolute dictator within the Communist orbit, that he had a greater interest in a relaxation of tension with the West than did the Chinese Communists, and that "he could well use some help from outside in arguing for a somewhat more moderate and prudent course on the part of communist parties." Not only would the achievement of positive results benefit Khrushchev's standing in the Communist world, it would also help keep such prominent neutral states as Yugoslavia and India from gravitating toward

the more militantly anti-Western elements in the non-aligned world.[19]

Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman submitted written recommendations on what the President should say regarding Laos. Harriman also joined the Kennedy party in Paris and, at a dinner gathering, gave the President advice along the following lines:

> Go to Vienna. Don't be too serious, have some fun, get to know him a little, don't let him rattle you, he'll try to rattle you and frighten you, but don't pay any attention to that. Turn him aside, gently, and don't try for too much.[20]

The U.S. objectives, as stated by the Department of State in the President's briefing book, were to:

1. Improve the prospects for finding an acceptable and workable basis for improving relations with the Soviet Union.
2. Impress on Khrushchev U.S. capacity and resolve to resist Communist encroachments and to stress the dangers involved in continuing sharp confrontations.
3. Communicate to Khrushchev the President's grasp and understanding of the world situation, in an historical as well as immediate sense, and his capacity and intent to influence the course of world events.
4. Gain a clearer understanding of Khrushchev as a man and of Soviet policy and intentions.

The Department recommended that the President make absolutely clear the U.S. Government's determination to resist Communist encroachments by "whatever means are necessary," but without adopting an "ultimative" tone. One convincing way would be "to stress the urgent need and our most serious desire for prompt agreements on disarmament measures and to insist throughout the talks that all other questions, including Berlin and Germany specifically, are secondary to this one." The President was also advised to wait until the end of the first day to bring up the sensitive question of "the Soviet world outlook and the reality of Communist rule within individual countries" so as to "preserve time during the second day for an exposition of our view of a constructive world order, the discussion of matters more capable of resolution and to reserve the possibility of ending the talks on a hopeful note."[21]

Despite the informal nature of the talks, the Department expected Khrushchev to regard the meeting "as far more

important than a mere probing of President Kennedy's views." He would probably be seeking specific agreements, the foremost of which would be a commitment to resume negotiations on Berlin and Germany. Although he would probably prefer that the talks end on a positive note and might make some conciliatory gesture for this purpose, he might, "for effect, strike a note of anger and bluster--particularly in response to strong language on sensitive isues." The Department concluded that Khrushchev

> believes that a détente atmosphere would establish a political deterrent of sorts to forceful U.S. action against Cuba, and against Laos in the event the current negotiations break down. He might also hope that this atmosphere would take some of the steam out of the expanding U.S. arms program.[22]

Kennedy was also furnished an 11-page paper entitled "Khrushchev: The Man, His Manner, His Outlook, and His View of the United States," which dwelt on the contradictions in Khrushchev's personality. For example, the paper noted that the Soviet leader was "simultaneously a handshaking, backslapping, grass-roots politician who could draw a good vote in any democracy, and a shrewd and ruthless manipulator of power in the best totalitarian tradition," and that he was an "uninhibited ham actor, who sometimes illustrates his points with the crudest sort of barnyard humor," but that he was "endowed on occasion with considerable personal dignity." And that Khrushchev was "capable of extraordinary frankness, and in his own eyes unusually honest," but he could also "on occasion be a gambler and a dissembler, expert in calculated bluffing."[23]

Charles Bohlen prepared a special background paper setting forth "certain lines of approach both general and specific which would offer the best possibility of getting through to Khrushchev and enhancing in his mind the credibility of United States positions." He urged the President to emphasize Soviet foreign policy "in its national aspects" and to downplay ideological factors or references to the threat of worldwide communism. The basic starting point of the discussion should be the two nations' community of interest in avoiding nuclear war. Khrushchev should also be informed that Communist-supported wars of national liberation were "a certain path toward world war if consistently followed, in the state of the world today." Kennedy should also emphasize the West's "firm obligations and solemn commitments" in Berlin and that "to give them up or to permit them to be eroded would

constitute a political defeat in Europe, which would be quite intolerable and unacceptable to a great power, no matter what the consequences." Bohlen concluded that the impression to be left with Khrushchev was

> first of all one of utmost seriousness in regard to the current world situation; the desire of the United States to find means to handle our disagreements in such a way as to avoid war and that, to this end, realistic and responsible action on the part of the Soviet Union will be matched by equal responsible and realistic action on the part of the United States; that world peace cannot be preserved by an attempt to inflict political defeats upon great powers and our reciprocal actions should be governed by some form of ground rules in order to avoid the type of actions which can set off an automatic chain of events leading to the end.[24]

According to one aide, the President's greatest concern was that the meeting might create another false "Spirit of Camp David." He told Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, "Let's not build this up into something it isn't. We're not likely to accomplish much over there, and it would be dangerous to stir up false hopes at home."[25] However, Kennedy seemed obsessed with preparing himself for the meeting. He used both his official and spare time to review records of all previous official conversations with Khrushchev, to talk with those people who had met Khrushchev, and to study his personality as well as the issues that were likely to come up. Even in Paris and on the plane to Vienna, the President continued to the last moment to prepare himself for the meeting.[26]

Discussions: Kennedy's Drubbing

The two leaders met formally four times, twice on June 3 at the U.S. Embassy and twice the following day at the Soviet Embassy. Luncheon discussions also took place each day at the respective embassies. In addition, the Austrian Government arranged a sumptuous dinner and ballet at the Schönbrunn Palace on the evening of June 3. At these social affairs there was considerable small talk and banter, but little substantive discussion.

In the formal sessions, the two men discussed the Soviet Union's support of Communist insurgent movements, Laos, Berlin, and a nuclear test ban. Throughout the two days of

discussions, Kennedy, in severe pain from a reinjury to his back a few weeks before, repeatedly admitted mistakes or shortcomings in U.S. policy--verbal concessions that Khrushchev did not reciprocate.

Their entire first meeting--conducted in the presence of Secretary of State Rusk, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and other members of their delegations--centered on the nature of Soviet-American competition and Kennedy's stress on the need to avoid "miscalculations." Kennedy ignored the Department of State's recommendation that discussion of the Soviet world view be postponed until the end of the first day and apparently heeded Ambassador Stevenson's advice. After an exchange of pleasantries, Kennedy began by saying that he was concerned how the two countries, "allied with other countries, having different political and social systems, and competing with each other in different parts of the world" could find "ways and means of not permitting situations where the two countries would be committed to actions involving their security or endangering peace. . . ." Khrushchev agreed, but said there was nothing wrong with competition between the two countries, especially in the economic field, and admitted that the Soviet Union wanted to become richer than the United States.

Khrushchev urged that the United States should recognize de facto the existence of communism and not try, as Secretary of State Dulles had done, to base "his policy on the premise of the liquidation of the Communist system." Kennedy countered that it was the Soviet Union that was trying "to eliminate free systems" in areas associated with the United States. Khrushchev replied that this was not so, that the Soviet Union opposed implanting its system in other countries, and that "as a matter of fact, this would be an impossible task." In some instances, Kennedy said, "minorities seize control in areas associated with us, minorities which do not express the will of the people. Such groups associate themselves with the USSR and act against the interests of the United States." The problem, as the President saw it, was "how to conduct this disagreement in areas where we have interests without direct confrontation of the two countries. . . ." Khrushchev accused the President of wanting "to build a dam preventing the development of the human mind and conscience." The competition should be between the ideas of communism and capitalism, the winner to be determined by which insured better living conditions for people. Kennedy remarked that it was necessary to conduct this struggle without affecting the prestige or vital security interests of the countries. The President said that Khrushchev knew from history that "it is very easy to involve countries in certain actions." Khrushchev said he hoped he had

misunderstood the President's remarks and that Kennedy was not saying that communism should only exist in those countries that already were Communist. He insisted this was impossible because there was no immunization against ideas.

Kennedy said that the main objective was to avoid a miscalculation that would bring great suffering to their two countries. Khrushchev said he was puzzled by the word miscalculation. It looked to him as if the United States wanted "the USSR to sit like a schoolboy with its hands on the desk." But the Soviet Union would always defend its vital interests and would not be intimidated by talk of miscalculation, a word that he said should be stored away. In explaining what he meant by miscalculation, Kennedy said,

> As Mr. Khrushchev knows, history shows that it is extremely difficult to make a judgment as to what other countries would do next. The Soviet Union has surely experienced this, just as the United States has. Western Europe has suffered a great deal because of its failure to foresee with precision what other countries would do.

The first meeting ended with Khrushchev agreeing that the purpose of their talks was to introduce precision into the judgments of the two sides and to obtain a clearer understanding of where they were going.[27]

After lunch, the two leaders met with only their interpreters present. Kennedy suggested that they talk about Laos, Germany, and nuclear tests, but first he reminded Khrushchev of a remark the Soviet Premier had made before lunch about dialectical change in history. He pointed out that the French Revolution had caused great turmoil and that the struggle between Catholics and Protestants had produced the Hundred Years War. "Thus it is obvious," said the President, "that when systems are in transition we should be careful, particularly today when modern weapons are at hand." The President then observed that "even the Russian Revolution had produced convulsions, even intervention by other countries."

Kennedy explained further what he meant by miscalculation; he admitted that he had made a "misjudgment" in regard to the Cuban situation.

Khrushchev said that the basic difference was that the United States always saw Soviet machinations behind popular upheavals in which dictators were overthrown, as in Cuba. For

example, the Soviet Union did not want a revolution in Iran and deliberately refrained from interfering in that country's internal affairs, although he was sure that the Shah would eventually be overthrown. The United States would only alienate the Iranian people, as it had done in Cuba, by supporting a corrupt regime.

The President said he agreed that unless living conditions were improved in Iran, "important changes" would occur. Nor did he hold any brief for Batista." But he viewed Castro as a threat because he had vowed to make Cuba a base for Communist operations in the western hemisphere. Castro might have received U.S. approbation if he had acted in the spirit "of free choice for all peoples." Kennedy reiterated that changes in government should be peaceful and that it was vitally important that those changes which affected the balance of power "take place in a way that would not involve the prestige or the treaty commitments of our two countries."

Khrushchev again criticized the United States for supporting reactionary regimes and expressed the hope that it would seek improvement in its relations with Cuba, particularly in trade. For its part, the Soviet Union had not been upset about recent changes of government in Turkey and South Korea, but "of course, if South Korea did something in North Korea, the latter will act and the USSR will support it." Khrushchev admitted that the Soviet Union was supplying arms to the Pathet Lao, but he accused the United States of overthrowing Souvanna Phouma and using its arms against the Laotian people, just as it had done in China. Khrushchev warned that if the United States continued to back "old, moribund reactionary regimes, then a precedent of internal intervention will be set, which might cause a clash between our two countries."

Kennedy said he wanted to explain the logic of the U.S. position, "not in order to defend any of our actions, but simply to explain things as we saw them." Kennedy said that his administration regarded the present power configuration "between Sino-Soviet forces and the forces of the United States and Western Europe as being more or less in balance." One of the United States' major concerns was that this balance not be greatly disturbed in the next decade. Another concern was that all nations would have the right freely to choose their governments. When Khrushchev complained that he could not understand how the United States could denounce the lack of free elections in Cuba while saying nothing about Spain, Kennedy replied that U.S. interest in Spain was of a strategic nature. If Franco should be replaced, said the President, and "the new regime were to associate itself with the Soviet Union,

the balance of power in Western Europe would radically change." The President conceded that Spain was a dictatorship, but claimed that it did not contribute to American strength. Khrushchev pointed out that the United States maintained bases in Spain, but the President said the bases "were moving into history." Khrushchev countered that they were nevertheless there.

The President referred to the Laotian situation and said, "speaking frankly, U.S. policy in that region had not always been wise," but that while this country was relatively unimportant strategically, "it was included under the protocol to the SEATO agreement in the Treaty Area, and thus we have treaty commitments in that area." Kennedy urged that the two powers support the International Control Commission in supervising a ceasefire in order to create an independent and neutral Laos.

Khrushchev reverted to his criticism of U.S. support of "rotten and anti-popular" regimes--such as in Pakistan and certain Latin American countries, its lack of understanding of guerrilla warfare, and its support of colonialist powers in Africa. Kennedy claimed the United States had supported the "liberation movement" in Africa and had voted with the Soviet Union in the United Nations on the Angola question and had supported U.N. actions which sought to curtail Belgian influence in the Congo. Khrushchev admitted that this was true, but claimed that U.S. anti-colonialism was timid, uneven, and tactical.

Kennedy brought up Khrushchev's speech of January 6 pledging Soviet support to wars of national liberation. In doing so, the President made it clear he wanted no part of a direct Soviet-American clash in Southeast Asia.

Kennedy inquired how the Soviet Union would react if the balance of power were upset by the establishment in Poland of a pro-western government. If the people of Poland were given a free choice in determining their government, it was conceivable that they would not support the present regime. Khrushchev said it was "not respectful" of the President to speak that way about a government with which the United States maintained diplomatic relations. Moreover the Polish electoral system was more democratic than that in the United States. When Kennedy pointed out that in the United States the people could choose from among different political parties, Khrushchev said that was a delusion and there were really no differences among the parties. The Soviet Premier suggested that the United States withdraw its troops from countries like Taiwan and the Soviet Union withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe, after

which it would be possible for the people in these countries to decide their form of government without any semblance of pressure. Kennedy did not respond to this suggestion, but reiterated his recommendation that the quickest way to a solution of the Laotian problem was for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to an International Control Commission investigation of charges of cease-fire violations. When Khrushchev said that it was necessary to have agreement from the contending indigenous forces, Kennedy suggested that the two countries use their influence to bring about such cooperation.

The President suggested that they discuss the question of nuclear tests at dinner that evening so that the entire next day could be devoted to a discussion of Germany. Khrushchev said he wanted to discuss the questions of nuclear testing and disarmament together. The meeting ended with Khrushchev warning that if the United States refused to sign a German peace treaty, the Soviet Union would do so and "nothing will stop it."[28] After the meeting, Kennedy turned to Thompson and Bohlen and asked whether meetings with Khrushchev were always like this. They replied that it was about "par for the course."[29]

When they met the next morning at the Soviet Embassy, with their full delegations present, the President began by reiterating his interest in securing a settlement in Laos which he declared had no strategic importance for the United States but to which the United States had "treaty and other commitments." Khrushchev objected to the implication that the United States had vested interests in Laos, an attitude that he said derived from "megolomania" or "delusions of grandeur."

Kennedy said that commitments in Laos had been made by the previous administration, but he himself wanted to reduce the American commitment there. Khrushchev referred to recent press reports that the United States was considering sending the Marines to Laos and observed that "Westerners were much better than the Easterners at making refined threats." But if the Marines were sent, he said, "other countries might respond with their own Marines or with some other forces. Thus another Korea or an even worse situation might result." Kennedy explained that talk of sending the Marines to Laos had been made for tactical diplomatic reasons, to prevent the negotiations on a cease-fire from deterioriating further and "to ensure a more favorable situation in which the peace conference could proceed." When Khrushchev observed that they should turn to the questions of disarmament, nuclear tests, and Germany before they ran out of time, the President said he

wanted to make one more comment on the Laotian situation. He said he was "anxious" to withdraw U.S. military forces from Laos. He had not been in favor of sending the Marines and had been reluctant even to consider the question. Since he and Khrushchev seemed to be in general agreement on the need for an effective cease-fire in Laos, the President suggested that Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko discuss the question further at lunch.

Khrushchev then turned the discussion to nuclear weapons testing and disarmament. He said the Soviet Union would be willing to sign a test ban treaty if a three-man inspection team, with one representative each from the West, the East, and a neutral country, were established to ensure implementation of the treaty. He suggested that other international bodies be organized along the same lines.

Kennedy countered that the Senate would not ratify a test-ban treaty unless it contained a nearly fool-proof control system to compensate for the U.S. Government's disadvantage because of the open way it conducted business. Khrushchev retorted, "But what about Allen Dulles? Isn't that secret?" The President replied that he wished it were.

Khrushchev said the Soviet Government would drop the troika proposal if the United States would agree to link a ban on nuclear testing with acceptance of complete disarmament. A nuclear test ban alone, he declared, would not be very important to mutual security since the development of nuclear energy, missiles, and bombs would continue unabated. Kennedy replied that a test ban at least would slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Admitting that there was some logic in the President's position, Khrushchev observed nonetheless that while the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain were negotiating in Geneva on arms control, "France simply spits at them and goes on testing." Without a link between general disarmament and a nuclear test ban, other countries might be tempted to imitate France. For the Soviet Union, acceptance of the control system proposed by the United States in the absence of complete and general disarmament would be tantamount to permitting U.S. "espionage" within Soviet borders. After extensive and often repetitive comments, Kennedy said the United States would not agree to link the two questions unless agreement on disarmament could be reached speedily.

Khrushchev then raised the German question, stating the reasons for the Soviet belief that a German peace treaty should be concluded soon. He said that "a line should be drawn under

World War II" and the President should understand him correctly. The Chairman, emphasizing the words "with you," said he was keenly interested in concluding an agreement with Kennedy. If the United States failed to agree, he would still sign the treaty with the German Democratic Republic. In such a situation, all access rights to Berlin would cease because the state of war would end, although the Soviet Union would consider Berlin a free city and U.S. troops might be allowed to remain under certain conditions.

Kennedy observed that it was necessary to talk not only about the legal status of Berlin but about practical matters that affected U.S. national security. He reminded Khrushchev that they were talking about a subject which, unlike Laos, was of the "greatest concern to the United States." Kennedy summed up the U.S. position:

> We are in Berlin not because of someone's sufferance. We fought our way there, although our casualties may not have been as high as the USSR's. We are in Berlin not by agreement of East Germany but by contractual rights. This is an area where every President of the U.S. since World War II has been committed by treaty and other contractual rights and where every President has reaffirmed his faithfulness to his obligations. If we were expelled from that area and if we accepted the loss of our rights no one would have any confidence in U.S. commitments or pledges.

Khrushchev interrupted to say that the President's concern for U.S. national security meant that the United States "might wish to go to Moscow because that too would, of course, improve its position." The United States, the President replied, was not asking to go anywhere. "What we are talking about is that we are in Berlin and have been there for 15 years. We suggest that we stay there." Kennedy admitted, however, that the Berlin situation was unsatisfactory, but because "conditions in many areas of the world are not satisfactory today it is not the right time now to change the situation in Berlin and the balance in general."

Khrushchev stated the Soviet Union merely wanted to perform an operation on the most dangerous sore spot in the world, what he called a thorn or an ulcer. Khrushchev claimed that Hitler's generals were "high commanders in NATO" and were bent on revising Germany's boundaries, a charge Kennedy did not attempt to refute. According to Khrushchev, a peace treaty would prevent a revision of the German boundaries, and no force in the world could keep the Soviet Union from signing such a

treaty. He alluded to the great sacrifices the Soviet people had made during World War II; he and Mikoyan had lost sons, Gromyko had lost two brothers.

Kennedy assured Khrushchev that the United States opposed any military buildup in West Germany that would threaten the Soviet Union. The President remarked that he himself had lost a brother during the war "when the United States came to Western Europe's assistance" and that they were now talking about the U.S. relationship not only to Berlin, but also to Western Europe.

Khrushchev replied that the Soviet Union merely wanted to formalize the situation existing at the end of World War II and recalled President Roosevelt's remark that U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Europe within two years of the war's end. He complained further that the United States unilaterally had deprived the Soviet Union of its rights and reparations in West Germany and had signed a peace treaty with Japan.

If the United States allowed itself to be driven out of Berlin, answered the President, "we would lose all our ties in West Europe and would lose all our friends there." After all, Kennedy said, "we do not wish to act in a way that would deprive the Soviet Union of its ties in Eastern Europe." The morning discussion concluded when Khrushchev gave the President an aide-mémoire on the Berlin question before they adjourned for lunch.[30]

The luncheon was supposed to be the final get-together between the two men, but after lunch Kennedy said he wanted to talk with Khrushchev privately. As they walked in the garden on the Soviet Embassy grounds accompanied only by their interpreters, the President expressed the hope that "in the interests of the relations between our two countries," which he wanted to improve, Khrushchev would not create a situation in Berlin that deeply involved U.S. national interests. While acknowledging that Khrushchev would obviously decide in light of what he considered to be the best interests of the Soviet Union, the President reiterated his hope that a direct confrontation could be avoided.

Khrushchev said he appreciated the frankness of the President's comments, but he would not allow the Soviet Union to be humiliated. He would, however, be happy if the United States accepted an interim agreement for six months, after which the U.S. forces would have to withdraw. When Kennedy said it seemed that Khrushchev was presenting the United States with a choice between "accepting the Soviet act

on Berlin or having a face-to-face confrontation," Khrushchev backed down somewhat and said that it might be possible to allow token Western troops, along with Soviet troops, in West Berlin. This arrangement, however, would not be based on occupation rights, but on "an agreement registered with the UN." Access to the city would be controlled by East Germany. Failure by the United States to accept this arrangement would mean war, since "the USSR will have no choice other than to accept the challenge." The Soviet decision to sign a peace treaty was "firm and irrevocable," and the Soviet Union would sign the treaty in December if the United States refused the interim agreement. The conversation ended with Kennedy remarking that "it would be a cold winter."[31]

Results: Overreaction or Calculation?

There is considerable dispute about the results of the Vienna summit. No one claims that the meeting produced any major concrete accomplishments, although there was some progress toward a resolution of the Laotian problem. The prevailing view is that while Kennedy may have been badgered by Khrushchev, at least he learned first-hand what it was like to deal with the Soviet leader and that this served him well in the Cuban missile crisis the following year. Some scholars and journalists argue, however, that the President overreacted to Khrushchev's tirades and took an unnecessarily rigid position in dealing with various sources of tension in the world, especially in Germany. Kennedy's defenders counter that the President really was not that upset, but that he tried to paint a grimly realistic, and perhaps overly dramatic, picture in order to rally American public opinion to support a needed strengthening of the U.S. military effort.

Following the last meeting, Kennedy talked privately with New York Times columnist James Reston. The President, who appeared genuinely shaken, said the meeting had been the "roughest thing in my life." Kennedy explained how he had wanted to avoid Eisenhower's practice of referring to Dulles whenever a serious question came up. So he had decided to meet with Khrushchev alone, to prove that he could get along without his advisers, but this tactic had failed to prevent Khrushchev's tirades. Kennedy told Reston:

> I've got two problems. First, to figure out why he did it, and in such a hostile way. And second, to figure out what we can do about it. I think the first part is pretty easy to explain. I think he did it because of the Bay of Pigs. I think he thought that

> anyone who was so young and inexperienced as to get into that mess could be taken, and anyone who got into it, and didn't see it through, had no guts. So he just beat hell out of me. So I've got a terrible problem. If he thinks I'm inexperienced and have no guts, until we remove those ideas we won't get anywhere with him. So we have to act.

The President told Reston he would increase the military budget and send another division to Germany. Kennedy also said that Vietnam was the place where the United States could make its power credible. Reston later felt that Khrushchev's "bullying" of Kennedy at Vienna was a crucial factor in the subsequent increased U.S. presence in Vietnam.[32]

It is a subject of controversy as to how shaken Kennedy was by his experience in Vienna. One of his close friends recalls that for weeks after, the President talked of little else and carried the records of his conversations with Khrushchev with him wherever he went, frequently reading extracts aloud. One scholar has argued that Kennedy had ample reason to be shaken by his encounter with Khrushchev, given the advice he had received from the Central Intelligence Agency, among others, that Khrushchev was a much more flexible man than his public image suggested.[33]

But one of Kennedy's aides contends that the President had not been rattled or discouraged by the talks, but had deliberately exaggerated the grimness of the talks in his conversation with Reston. In agreeing to meet with the New York Times columnist, the President told this aide:

> I'd like to get across to the people at home the seriousness of the situation, and the New York Times would be the place to do it. I'll give Scotty a grim picture. But actually, as De Gaulle says, Khrushchev is bluffing and he'll never sign that treaty. Anybody who talks the way he did today, and really means it, would be crazy, and I'm sure he's not crazy.[34]

There is some evidence, however, that Kennedy's commitment to Berlin may not have been as firm as he tried to make it appear. In short, the President may have been engaged in a bluffing game of his own. On the flight from Vienna to London, where he was to confer briefly with British Prime Minister Macmillan, Kennedy confided:

> God knows I'm not an isolationist, but it seems particularly stupid to risk killing a million

> Americans over an argument about access rights on an Autobahn in the Soviet zone of Germany, or because the Germans want Germany reunified. If I'm going to threaten Russia with a nuclear war, it will have to be for much bigger and more important reasons than that. Before I back Khrushchev against the wall and put him to the final test, the freedom of all Western Europe will have to be at stake.[35]

After stopping briefly in London, Kennedy returned to the United States, where on June 6 he made a televised report to the nation on his European trip. The meeting in Vienna he characterized as a "very sober two days" and he did not want to mislead the American people as to what had been accomplished. The "most somber talks" had dealt with Germany, but the President reiterated his determination to defend western access rights to Berlin.[36]

Kennedy's aides have written that the meeting had positive results. Sorenson says that it was "useful," just as the President had hoped. Salinger feels that Khrushchev's bullying tactics backfired:

> Khrushchev, sensing the time was right to force important American concessions on the German question, came to Vienna not to negotiate but to dictate to the young American President. It was not one of his wise moves. Within two months it was he, not JFK, who was backing down on Berlin. . . .[37]

Schlesinger, too, considered the meeting useful, since Kennedy discovered "how Khrushchev thought and where he stood, and that was invaluable." Schlesinger also had the impression that Kennedy felt "he had tested himself and had proven more than equal to the test." Schlesinger cites Khrushchev's comments to Ambassador Thompson and a story told him by a Soviet Embassy official to prove that Kennedy had made a favorable impression on Khrushchev, and concludes: "Each man came away from Vienna with greater respect for the mind and nerve of his adversary."[38]

CHAPTER V. JOHNSON AND KOSYGIN AT GLASSBORO, JUNE 1967

The meeting between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey on June 23 and 25, 1967, was a hastily-arranged affair, organized at Soviet behest and only after considerable haggling over a suitable location. It was appended to Kosygin's visit to the United Nations where he had come to support the Arab nations' proposals for ending the conflict that had erupted earlier that month in the Middle East. Although a number of U.S. officials anticipated some conciliatory gestures on the part of Kosygin, the summit meeting produced no concrete results in the three main areas under discussion: Vietnam, the Middle East, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, a Soviet offer during the meeting to serve as an intermediary with North Vietnam to negotiate a bombing halt eventually led to nothing. The President primarily sought Soviet agreement to begin discussions on limiting the further development of anti-ballistic missiles, but Kosygin was more interested in negotiating a settlement in the Middle East and in discussing Vietnam. For the most part, the two men talked past one another. Perhaps recalling the drubbing Kennedy had received at Vienna, as well as Kennedy's successfully "staring down" Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis, Johnson seemed anxious to impress Kosygin with his toughness. The President also seemed intent on exaggerating, for domestic public consumption, the degree of accord reached with Kosygin during the meetings.

Initiative: A Meeting Hastily Called by the Soviets

The initiative for the meeting came from the Soviet Government. In the midst of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, a Soviet Embassy official confided to Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Carl Rowan that it was almost certain that Premier Kosygin would be coming to New York to attend the emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly, in order to dramatize Soviet support for the Arab position. His secondary purpose was to conduct bilateral talks with President Johnson, preferably in New York, because the Arabs and the Chinese Communists would be upset if Kosygin went to Washington.[1]

Kosygin arrived in New York on June 17 and addressed the General Assembly on June 19. When speculation developed that a Kosygin-Johnson meeting was in the making, the President took

the public position that he was willing to see Kosygin but did not want to become involved in the session of the General Assembly. Instead of focusing on the Middle East situation, Johnson made it clear he wanted a discussion over a broad range of topics. Johnson was very disturbed over press reports that U.S. officials were assuming that a meeting would take place.[2]

In the meantime, Soviet officials in New York and Washington continued to speak privately of Kosygin's strong interest in a meeting, but indicated that the Premier could not be expected to travel "220 long political miles" to Washington because the Arabs would then argue that the U.N. visit was merely a pretext for an opportunity to arrange a meeting with the President. Soviet officials let it be known that if the President was not prepared to come to New York, the Philadelphia vicinity would be acceptable.[3]

The final decision regarding the time and place of the meeting was reached by Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on Thursday, June 22. The Soviets had rejected a U.S. compromise proposal that the meeting take place at Maguire Air Force Base in New Jersey because of their fears that people might think the Americans were trying to impress Kosygin with "guns and rockets." The stalemate was broken when New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes suggested that the meeting be held at Glassboro State College, located in a small town approximately midway between Washington and New York. On the evening of June 22, the White House informed reporters that a summit meeting would take place the following day at Hollybush, the home of the college's president. Preparations were made in great haste. Overnight air conditioners were installed, security arrangements were made, and accommodations and meals were planned for the participants and the media.[4]

Preparations: Counting on Soviet Flexibility

From the moment that the Soviet Government first expressed interest in a meeting, briefing papers were prepared for possible use by the President. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State argued that Kosygin's position within the Soviet Government was eroding. The CIA cited reports since the beginning of the year that Kosygin was "losing ground" to Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and that relations between the two men were "not cordial." The Department pointed to fundamental Soviet domestic and foreign constraints, namely that the economy was "inadequate to support Soviet requirements and political ambitions." Moreover, there

had been a series of foreign policy setbacks in the first half of the year, which would induce the Soviet Government to seek compensatory gains in the second half as part of the buildup for the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. While the Department felt the Soviet Government was concerned over an apparently increasing U.S. belligerence and a willingness to resort to arms against popular liberation movements, there seemed little chance that Kosygin would seek broad accommodation based on cooperative efforts. There was a chance, however, that

> the Soviet Union and Kosygin in particular, will be exploring the possibility for some degree of pragmatic parallelism by 'mutual example' based on a clearer understanding of U.S. and Soviet interests, requirements, and flexibility of tactics in practical terms. If there is movement in this direction, it will be motivated by a desire to ease some of Moscow's problems, not from any slackening of basic hostility to the U.S. which, if anything, is sharper than ever at this moment."[5]

On the assumption that Kosygin would be influenced by "a sense of humiliation and frustration" over the Soviet Union's internal and external problems, Zbigniew Brzezinski of the Policy Planning Staff recommended that the President make some conciliatory gesture to disabuse Kosygin of the notion that the United States was anxious "to humiliate the Soviet Union and is currently engaged in a broad political offensive directed against it." At the same time, Brzezinski cautioned that Kosygin should not leave "with the erroneous impression--which apparently Khrushchev took home with him from the Vienna meeting with President Kennedy--that a policy of bluff and bluster will get the Soviet Union anywhere." To disabuse Kosygin of this notion, Brzezinski recommended that the President spell out concretely and specifically what U.S. interests were in the Middle East and Vietnam.[6]

Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy Kohler was less optimistic that any meaningful negotiations would take place. He believed that Kosygin would be able only to exchange pro forma statements of position with the President, since several of the orthodox members of the Politburo were probably opposed to the meeting because it looked bad for the leading Communist state to be talking with the country that was committing aggression against the fellow Communist nation of Vietnam.[7]

Discussions: Talking Past One Another

On Friday, June 23, shortly before 11 a.m., Johnson and his party landed by helicopter at the Glassboro State College football field. Kosygin and the Soviet delegation, delayed by traffic on the New Jersey Turnpike, arrived in Glassboro about a half-hour later. As Johnson waited in front of the college President's home, Hollybush, the President's secretary noted that he "stood without his glasses, because television cameras were covering him all the time, and held his hands behind his back. The President's face was tense--and his hands would open and close--clenching them into a fist."[8]

Johnson later tried to convey the impression that he had been tough with Kosygin, but neither the records of the conversations nor the recollections of one of the U.S. interpreters bear this out. The records do reveal a President keenly interested in obtaining Soviet agreement to begin talks on limiting anti-ballistic missiles, an agreement Johnson wanted to announce immediately. From these remarks, and from the President's public comments during the course of the discussions, he seems to have wanted to create the impression that he was a peacemaker, willing to go to great lengths to resolve global conflicts, such as those in Vietnam and in the Middle East. On the other hand, Kosygin tended to focus instead on the need for Israeli concessions in the Middle East and a definite commitment by the United States to negotiate with North Vietnam.

In their first meeting, after an exchange of pleasantries and affirmations of their commitment to world peace, Kosygin charged that the United States had reneged on an agreement reached on the Hot Line (the first time the Hot Line had been used) earlier in the month at the outset of the war in the Middle East. Johnson said he was not aware of any change in the U.S. position. The President observed that while both countries had not been able to prevent the fighting from breaking out, they had acted like "big brothers" after it had started. Kosygin said the Soviet Union had done everything in its power to restrain the Arab countries, but the United States had apparently been unable to have any influence on Israel. The President replied that the Soviet Union had not been very successful with the Arabs either, since they had closed the Straits of Tiran, had undertaken military action on Israel's borders, and had proclaimed their intention to liquidate Israel. Johnson said the proposal he had made at the United Nations for a full disclosure on arms shipments to Middle Eastern countries, and an agreement not to furnish more arms,

would serve as a control on the situation.

The President then interjected an anecdote about the English author Charles Lamb, the point of which was that familiarity breeds fondness, and that he and the Premier, "in getting to know each other better. . .were also getting to like each other."

Kosygin replied that he thought Johnson's arms proposal was unrealistic. Instead he wanted to explain what he had meant about the Hot Line communications. The Soviet Government had understood the first exchange of messages as meaning that the United States and the Soviet Union would call for a cease-fire and a return by the belligerents to the original armistice line. But four hours later, in another message, the President had apparently altered his view. The President firmly denied that there had been any change and declared that the United States had consistently stood for the preservation of the territorial integrity of all nations. The President said that if no arms had been supplied to the Middle-Eastern nations, the war would not have broken out. He used this remark to change the subject by pointing out that this was why the United States wanted to explore the possibility of limiting the development of anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The $40 or $50 billion spent on an ABM system could then be devoted to peaceful uses in the United States. The specific issues the President wanted to discuss were "measures for arms control, ABM control, Vietnam, Middle-East, and some steps for a solution to certain problems of mutual interest in Europe."

Kosygin said he wanted to return to the Middle East question, pointing out that the Soviet Union, with vast oil reserves of its own, had no selfish commercial interests in the Middle East, as did Great Britain, for example, and was interested only in raising the standard of living of the people. He insisted that unless Israeli forces withdrew to the original armistice line, hostilities would again break out.

Johnson made a curious rejoinder. He asked Kosygin to recall the last three years of his presidency, during which the United States had not formed any new military alliances, but had concluded with the Soviet Union a cultural agreement, a civil aviation agreement, a consular agreement, and an agreement on peaceful exploration of outer space. The President said he now hoped that they could announce publicly after the meeting that they had agreed to table a non-proliferation agreement and to begin talks soon on limiting ABMs. Even if there were disagreement on the ABM issue, discussions in themselves would be a step in the right

direction.

Kosygin agreed that the two nations should not devote so much of their resources to weapons, but insisted that the Soviet Union was merely trying to keep up with increases for weapons in the U.S. budget. Moreover, it was offensive weapons, he said, not anti-ballistic missiles, that were "the root and cause of trouble and tension in the world."

Johnson pointed out that many Americans favored spending the $40 billion required for an ABM system. But before reaching a decision, the President wanted to explore every possibility of avoiding an arms race with the Soviet Union. That was why he had asked Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to come to Glassboro, so that he could discuss the ABM issue with Soviet military representatives. He hoped the two sides could exchange drafts on how to deal with the ABM question. "This could be announced today," remarked the President, "as one of the results of the present meeting." Johnson also hoped they could announce their readiness to table a non-proliferation treaty. If these announcements were made, he felt people throughout the world who were "already recognizing the initiative" that had led to the meeting "would salute the two leaders for what they had accomplished."

The President then turned to the question of Vietnam and drew a sketch of North and South Vietnam separated by the demilitarized zone (DMZ). He explained that U.S. planes were bombing North Vietnam not to conquer that country, but to discourage the North Vietnamese from crossing the DMZ into the south. If North Vietnam's aggression against the South would stop, then the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Accords could supervise free elections in South Vietnam. Johnson said, "If the three billion people of this world could be informed today that Chairman Kosygin and President Johnson had made some progress in the direction of resolving some of the problems between them, this would represent a great step forward and would be universally acclaimed."

Kosygin did not respond to the President's remarks, but asked whether the President knew of the conversation the previous night between Secretary of State Rusk and the Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister. Kosygin said that Rusk had been told that Egypt would abide by an International Court of Justice decision that the Gulf of Aqaba remain open. This was a courageous position for Nasser to take privately, and Kosygin asked the President to keep it confidential. What was needed, however, was an Israeli troop withdrawal to the original armistice line before discussions could begin. Kosygin emphasized that the Arabs were an explosive people and it was

necessary to support Nasser because otherwise the situation would be worse. Johnson said that the Israelis, because of their bitter experience and their need for security, wanted to talk first before withdrawing their forces. Johnson reiterated his recommendation that the United States and the Soviet Union stop arms shipments to the Middle East, in which event the combatants would have to fight with their hands. Kosygin replied that the Middle Eastern countries would find someone to sell them arms no matter what the great powers did. On that point, the morning meeting adjourned for lunch.[9]

During lunch, the substantive discussion continued. Kosygin deplored the tendency of all governmental and international bodies to become overly bureaucratized, something which he said had helped bring about the demise of the League of Nations. To prevent the same thing from happening to the United Nations, he suggested that there be a meeting of the Heads of State or Heads of Government at the United Nations every year or two. At President Johnson's request, Secretary of Defense McNamara then elaborated on the U.S. Government's belief that a cap should be put on both countries' development of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Kosygin responded by criticizing a speech MacNamara had given in which, according to Kosygin, the Secretary had called for a halt to the production of defensive weapons because they were too costly, but had favored the growth of offensive weapons. This was a commercial approach, charged Kosygin, to a moral problem. McNamara's protestations that Kosygin had misunderstood his position seemed to have little effect on the Soviet Premier.

After lunch, the two leaders again met with only their interpreters present. Kosygin said, "in strictest confidence," that two days ago he had contacted Hanoi to ask what he could do in the meeting with the President to help bring an end to the war in Vietnam. A reply from Hanoi had just been received during lunch, which in effect said that if the United States stopped the bombing, the North Vietnamese would go to the conference table. Kosygin strongly supported this proposal, reminding the President that De Gaulle had fought in Algeria for seven years but had wound up at the conference table. In Kosygin's view, Vietnam was the greatest problem the two men could resolve that day.

In response to the President's question, Kosygin admitted that he did not know whether the North Vietnamese would stop fighting if the talks were begun, but he asked whether the President could imagine "the great sighs of relief" that would be heard throughout the world if he took such a truly historic step at this time. Kosygin said he would be in New York

through Sunday, June 25, and would be glad to pass on Johnson's reply to Hanoi.

Johnson declared that U.S. military authorities thought that if the bombing were halted, five North Vietnamese divisions above the DMZ would attack the U.S. forces immediately south of the line. Kosygin should surely realize that if this happened, Johnson would be "crucified" in the United States for having halted the bombing.

Johnson asked whether Kosygin could and would provide assistance at such a conference in obtaining self-determinaion for South Vietnam. The Premier could not say without consulting Hanoi, but he would transmit the President's views if he could receive them by the following evening. Kosygin suggested that the President formulate his question regarding self-determination for South Vietnam in a brief and clear manner, without reference to the Soviet Union or to himself. Johnson said that they should hold another meeting at Glassboro on Sunday, June 25, so that he might be able to give such a message to Kosygin.

But the President also wanted to discuss a number of other issues. He felt that Kosygin had misunderstood Secretary of Defense McNamara at lunch, pointing out that it was McNamara who exercised a restraining influence on the ABM development, and that the United States intended in the ABM discussions to deal with both defensive and offensive weapons. Kosygin said he was still shocked by McNamara's address in which he had said that offensive weapons were cheaper than defensive ones. Johnson again urged that McNamara be allowed to begin talks on the ABM issue immediately and that the non-proliferation treaty be tabled, if necessary leaving aside the question of who would exercise control. When Kosygin said he could not understand why the United States insisted on inspection by EURATOM rather than IAEA, Johnson proposed that Gromyko and Rusk discuss the question further that weekend. As for a meeting on the ABM issue, Kosygin said he would consult with Moscow and give the President an answer. He stressed that all problems between the two countries could be resolved if Vietnam and the Middle East were settled. He again alluded to De Gaulle's experience in Algeria and how the General's prestige had risen after French withdrawal. He also reminded the President that there were forces in the world, apparently referring to the Chinese, who wanted to cause a clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. The two men then agreed on a joint statement to be read to the press indicating that the discussions would be resumed Sunday afternoon, June 25.[10]

Upon leaving, Johnson told reporters and onlookers that the meeting had been "very good and very useful." He mentioned the topics that had been discussed and said, "We agreed that it is now very important to reach international agreement on a non-proliferation treaty." He indicated that the discussions would be continued on Sunday afternoon. Kosygin said he had nothing to add and that the President's statement had been "very correctly drawn up."[12]

That evening the President flew to Los Angeles to speak at a Democratic Party fundraising dinner. On board Air Force 1, he told reporters that he had used body language to convince Kosygin of his toughness. He had given Kosygin a "crusher handshake" and had tried to hover over the Premier who was several inches shorter. According to one of the correspondents, Johnson said he had followed advice his father had given him:

> Convinced that eye contact was a measure of a man's determination, Johnson locked eyes with Kosygin at one crucial point. Needing a sip of coffee, L.B.J. felt for his cup on the table rather than release his visual grip on Kosygin, who finally blinked and looked away. Johnson thought this singular human triumph was important.[12]

However, Johnson's interpreter, the only other American present during the meeting, could not recall anything unusual about the President's behavior and did not have the impression that Johnson was trying to intimidate Kosygin.[13]

The President devoted more than half his address in Los Angeles to a discussion of the meeting with Kosygin, saying that he had gone to Glassboro in no partisan spirit, but to serve "a great national purpose, the purpose of peace for human beings." Apparently referring to the discussion of the ABM issue, he said, "We reached no new agreements--almost, but not quite." He was not going to raise false hopes, but he believed "it does help a lot to sit down and look a man in the eye all day long and try to reason with him, particularly if he is trying to reason with you. That is why we went to Hollybush this morning and reasoning together there today was the spirit of Hollybush."

Johnson alluded to protesters outside the building who were criticizing his unwillingness to negotiate an end to the Vietnam conflict:

> There is no human being in the world who wants to avoid war more than I do. There is no human being in the world who wants peace in Vietnam or in the Middle East more than I do. When they tell me to negotiate, I say, "Amen." I have been ready to negotiate and sit down at a conference table every hour of every day that I have been President of this country, but I just cannot negotiate with myself. And these protesters haven't been able to deliver Ho Chi Minh any place yet. . . . But I am going--as I have said so many times--any time, any place, anywhere, if, in my judgment, it can possibly, conceivably serve the cause of peace. That is why I went to that little farmhouse way up on the New Jersey Pike today to spend the day.[14]

The two men returned to Glassboro to continue their discussion during lunch on Sunday, June 25, with other members of their delegations present. The conversation consisted mainly of pleasantries and a repetition of points made on Friday. Kosygin said he had enjoyed his trip to Niagara Falls the day before, particularly seeing the power plant there. He boasted that the Soviet Union had the largest power station in the world and the following year an even larger station would be started up. The President remarked that Kosygin had made a very favorable impression on the American people and the press. Generally speaking, Johnson said, the great wish of the American people was that "Americans and Russians would find a way to like each other rather than hate each other and to this end the Chairman's visit had contributed significantly."

Kosygin said he was perplexed by Johnson's remarks in Los Angeles the previous night indicating that while socialist and capitalist systems existed in the world, tensions would remain. Johnson replied that he must have been quoted out of context because he had spoken of a new era of friendship between the two countries. Johnson again expressed the hope that the two countries would be able to reduce their military budgets to devote more resources to peaceful purposes. He said that during the three years of his presidency, expenditures for health and education had been tripled. Kosygin observed that a discussion of reducing military expenditures would be academic so long as the United States was spending more than $20 billion on the Vietnam war alone. The President said reductions could be effected if the Soviet Union would cut back or eliminate its military support of North Vietnam and the United States would de-escalate the struggle in South Vietnam.

When Johnson reiterated his interest in an ABM agreement and disarmament negotiations, Kosygin observed that he could not see genuine possibilities for agreement so long as the war in Vietnam continued and the Middle East remained unsettled. The two men then repeated the positions they had taken in Friday's discussion regarding the Middle East, before they returned to the study where they met privately with only their interpreters.[15]

Johnson had expressed dissatisfaction with the State Department's interpreter on Friday and had asked the Department to summon Alexander Akalovsky, who had interpreted for Eisenhower and Kennedy and who was then a First Secretary in the Embassy in Moscow. Akalovsky was flown in from Moscow on Saturday and served as interpreter for the meeting after lunch on Sunday.[16]

At Kosygin's suggestion the two men discussed several questions more specifically during this afternoon meeting, which lasted three and a half hours. The President again insisted that the "controlling" issue was the armaments race, reiterating the willingness of the United States to discuss all issues relating to armaments. Name a time and place, he said, and the United States would be ready to meet. Kosygin noted that the United States had brought up the arms question, but the Soviet view was that the Middle East and the war in Vietnam had to be discussed first. Armaments could not be reduced while these two problems continued.

Johnson said that common ground must be found in the Soviet and U.S. positions on the Middle East, but Kosygin clung to the view that further discussion had to await Israeli withdrawal to the original armistice line. Kosygin cited the mutual withdrawal in the India-Pakistani conflict that the Soviet Union helped negotiate at Tashkent as a useful model for the Middle East. Johnson pointed out that the withdrawal of forces in that conflict was accompanied by the termination of outside arms support. The President said the United States greatly appreciated "the good job that Mr. Kosygin had done at Tashkent." Kosygin replied that it was not a question of what he personally had done, "but rather one of principle." After uncompromising reiteration of their views on the Middle East, Kosygin said he would have to make a public statement later that day indicating only that he and the President had discussed the Middle East, that the Soviet Union still held Israel to be the aggressor, and that Israel should immediately withdraw to the armistice line. Upon his return to Moscow, however, Kosygin said he would be forced to describe with regret "all the differences between the two sides and the

seriousness of the situation."

Johnson then returned to the question of the non-proliferation treaty. Kosygin indicated that the French Government the day before had said it no longer objected to IAEA safeguards; Secretary Rusk, who joined the conversation at this point, said that the French Government was insisting on EURATOM controls, and that this insistence was influencing other members of that organization. McGeorge Bundy and Gromyko also joined the discussion, and the President read to them the draft of the statement he was planned to make at the conclusion of the meeting. The purpose of the President's statement was "to narrow the differences rather than to increase them." The President thought the statement Kosygin had talked of making "might be appropriate for use in his capital or at the UN, but would not be helpful right after the meeting." Kosygin at first was quite reluctant to join the President in such a statement, claiming he could not say anything at the end of the meeting different from what he would say later. When the President agreed to delete specific references to the subjects discussed from his own statement, however, Kosygin agreed to make a separate statement about the general usefulness of the talks.

The President then raised what he called "an extremely important matter," Cuba's encouragement with Soviet-made weapons of guerrilla operations in seven Latin American countries, and said that "Castro should be convinced to stop what he was doing." Kosygin did not respond.

After Rusk, Gromyko, and Bundy had left, the President gave Kosygin in "complete confidence" the text of a message to be transmitted to North Vietnam, indicating that the United States was ready to halt the bombing of North Vietnam if negotiations could be initiated immediately afterward "in Geneva, Moscow, Vientiane, or any other suitable location." In response to Johnson's question, Kosygin reiterated his understanding that the North Vietnamese were prepared to begin negotiations within "a day or two" after a U.S. bombing halt. Kosygin said that although the U.S. message contained certain qualifications, it seemed all right to him "on the whole."

Before closing the meeting, the two men went over their basic positions on the Middle East. Kosygin pointed out that China wanted to promote Soviet-American friction and cited the "hullabaloo" raised by Peking in connection with Kosygin's trip to the United States. The Chinese Government had claimed that the Soviet Premier had come to sell someone out. Kosygin said that he wished they had more time to discuss recent nuclear

tests, apparently a reference to those conducted by the Chinese Government. Johnson agreed that they would have to talk about these explosions, and the President "knew exactly what Kosygin had in mind." The President suggested that they hold such meetings annually, and urged Kosygin to agree on the spot that a week be set aside every year to discuss all problems. Kosygin replied that they could always use the Hot Line whenever necessary. When they had recently used it, Kosygin felt they had accomplished "more on that one day than others could accomplish in three years."

Johnson concluded by saying that he was certain that Kosygin did not want confrontation or war with the United States, and he wanted to assure the Premier that the United States had similar feelings. The President said he personally would do everything possible to remove tensions between the two countries.[17]

Results: Unfulfilled Expectations

In his memoirs, Johnson states that he was quite optimistic at the conclusion of the talks that there would be progress in negotiating an end to the Vietnam war and in arranging a conference to limit anti-ballistic missiles.[18] Immediately following the meeting, he told reporters that the talks had been "very good and very useful." Kosygin was less upbeat. The Soviet Premier merely indicated that there had been an exchange of views on several international issues and a general review of bilateral relations. Kosygin noted that the meetings had provided the two governments "an opportunity to compare their positions on the questions under discussion, and this both sides believe is useful."[19]

The President flew back to the White House, and in a nationwide television and radio address on the evening of June 25, said that regarding some of the problems discussed, particularly that of arms limitation, "great progress" was made "in reducing misunderstanding. . .and in reaffirming our common commitment to seek agreement." The President admitted that no agreement was in sight in the Middle East and there was even less chance of agreement regarding Vietnam. He pointed out, however, that even on these subjects small beginnings might have been made toward resolution. With regard to Vietnam, Johnson said he had made it clear "we will match and we will outmatch every step to peace that others may be ready to take." He repeated his remarks from Friday that it was very helpful to "look a man right in the eye and try to reason with him, particularly if he is trying to reason with you."[20]

As the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research remarked, Kosygin seemed intent on downplaying the results of the conference. The Soviet press gave an even stiffer version of his post-conference remarks. It was possible, speculated the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, that Kosygin had become concerned over the extensive and generally friendly press coverage afforded the meeting, or that he had been reminded by others in the Soviet Government about the "proprieties" of dealing with the United States.[21] A Soviet official who had been in Kosygin's entourage said that Kosygin had been "satisfied" with the talks, but had felt that the "hawk" Rusk prevented the President from reaching any agreements and counteracted the influence of the "dove" Thompson.[22]

The Department of State itself was closer to the Soviet Government's restrained view of the meeting's results than it was to the President's more optimistic analysis. It informed overseas missions that the two men had a "useful" exchange of views, but had reached no agreements, and that history would judge the success or failure of the conference by what happened during the coming weeks and months.[23]

By this standard, the conference was a failure. Johnson later said that he thought a meeting to discuss ABM limitation would take place within a month after Glassboro, perhaps even as soon as the following week, but the two governments haggled for more than a year. Before an announcement of the meeting could be made, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 precluded further discussion of the issue.[24]

The Glassboro meeting did not lead to any progress in resolving the Middle East and Vietnam conflicts. The President never received a reply, either from Moscow or Hanoi, to his offer to end the bombing in return for North Vietnamese willingness to begin negotiations.[25] The U.N. discussion of the Middle East conflict dragged on through the fall of 1967, showing no apparent effect of the Glassboro meeting.[26]

NOTES

Chapter I

[1]Walt W. Rostow, Europe After Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decisions of March 11, 1953 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), Appendix C.

[2]Memorandum from Mendès-France to Eisenhower, January 5, 1955, transmitted in telegram 2847 from Paris, same date. (396.1/1-655) (S)

[3]Department of State, Background of Heads of Government Conference, 1960 (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 1-4.

[4]Telegram 4949 to London, March 28, 1955. (396.1/3-2855) (S)

[5]Undated memorandum of conversation of May 20, 1955, among several U.S. officials. (Conference Files, Lot 63 D 123, CF 471) (S)

[6]Report by the Washington Working Group, June 14, 1955. (Conference Files, Lot 63 D123, CF 472) (S)

[7]Memorandum of Conversation Among Representatives of the Four Summit Powers at San Francisco, June 21, 1955. (Conference Files, Lot 63 D 123, CF 437) (S)

[8]Memorandum of Conversation Between U.S. and British Representatives, July 1, 1955. (640.0012/7-155) (S)

[9]Memorandum from Rostow to Rockefeller, June 10, 1955. (S/S-NSC Files, Lot 66 D 148) (S)

[10]Walt W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 135-136.

[11]NSC 5524/1, "Basic U.S. Policy in Relation to Four Power Negotiations," July 11, 1955. (S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, 5524 Series) (S)

[12]Report of the Paris Working Group, July 15, 1955. (Conference Files, Lot 63 D 123, CF 437) (S)

[13]The following section is based largely on Livingston

Merchant, Recollections of the Summit Conference, Geneva 1955, (Washington, 1957). (396.1GE/7-1855) (S)

[14]U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy, study prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, 1979), pp. 322-325.

[15]Merchant, Recollections, pp. 53-54.

Chapter II

[1]Extract from a Report by John Currey of a conversation of January 22, 1958, with Yuri Gvosdev of the Soviet Embassy in Washington (033.6111/1-2458); and Memorandum from Foy Kohler to Frederick Reinhardt, "Possible Visit of Khrushchev to the United States," August 11, 1958. (033.6111/8-1158) (C)

[2]Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York, 1965), p. 405.

[3]Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 22, 1959. (Eisenhower Papers as President, Diary Series, Eisenhower Library) (S)

[4]Letter from President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, July 11, 1959. (Eisenhower Papers as President, International file, Eisenhower Library) (C); letter from Chairman Khrushchev, July 21, 1959 (033.6111/7-2159) (C); letter from President Eisenhower, July 21, 1959 (033.6111/7-2959) (C); letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, July 31, 1959, transmitted in telegram TOCAH 222 to Geneva, August 1. (711.11/-I/8-159) (C)

[5]Records of sixteen conversations between Murphy and Menshikov in August and September 1959 are in file 033.6111 (S). The background documents prepared in the Department of State are in the Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459-1462 (S).

[6]Two Eisenhower-Khrushchev conversations occurred on September 15. The first, which is substantive and included the respective foreign ministers, is in file 033.6111/9-1559 (S). The second, in which only the principals and their interpreters were present and is non-substantive, is recorded in Presidential Memcons, Lot 65 D 95 (S).

[7]Memorandum of Conversation, September 16, 1959. (033.6111/9-1659) (S)

[8]The briefing papers for the Camp David meeting are in the Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, CF 1459-1462 (S).

[9]Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev, Camp David, September 26, 1959. (762.00/9-2659)

[10]Ibid.; a memorandum of the Herter-Gromyko conversation, September 26, is in the Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, CF 1475 (S); the Dillon-Khrushchev conversation of September 27 is recorded in a memorandum, ibid. (C)

[11]The Lacy-Zaroubin Exchange Agreement, January 27, 1958, is in 9 UST 13. The extension of this agreement to 1960 and 1961, November 21, 1959, and the memorandum on atomic energy exchanges, November 24, 1959 are in 10 UST 1934. A memorandum of conversation between McCone and Emelyanov, September 15, 1959, is in the Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, CF 1472 (C).

[12]Memorandum of Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev, Camp David, September 27, 1959. (Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, CF 1463) (S)

Chapter III

[1]Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1959 (New York, 1960), p. 146.

[2]Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background of Heads of Government Conferencee, 1960, (Washington, GPO, 1960), pp. 474-478.

[3]Elmer Plischke, "Eisenhower's 'Correspondence Diplomacy' with the Kremlin: A Case Study in Summit Diplomatics," Journal of Politics, 30, pp. 137-158.

[4]Memorandum of Conversation among Herter, Lloyd, Couve de Murville, and Adenauer, Paris, December 21, 1959. (Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569) (S)

[5]See, for example, a Memorandum of Conversation between Herter and Adenauer, March 16, 1960, on the occasion of Chancellor Adenauer's visit to the United States. (Conference Files, Lot 64 D 559, CF 1610) (S)

[6]Letter from British Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary Herter, March 24, 1960 (Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204) (C); and a Memorandum of Conversation between President

Eisenhower and General de Gaulle, April 25, 1960. (Conference Files Lot 64 D 559, CF 1631) (S)

[7]Soviet Note to the United States, May 10, 1960, in Richard P. Stebbins, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 117-121.

[8]Statement by Secretary of State Herter before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 27, 1960, in ibid., p. 132.

[9]Ibid., p. 134.

[10]Ibid., p. 131-132.

Chapter IV

[1]"The Future of Summitry," PPS 1960-2, June 29, 1960; transmitted to the President as an enclosure to a memorandum from Herter, July 14, 1960 (396.1/7-1460) (S)

[2]Charles S. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), p. 472.

[3]"Soviet Aims and Expectations," PMK-D/2, May 25, 1961. (Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905) (C, Declassified 1978)

[4]Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John F. Kennedy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 286.

[5]Eugene A. Bratek, "The Kennedy-Khrushchev Meeting in Vienna, June 3-4, 1961," Kennedy Library Seminar Paper, August 8, 1975, pp. 2-3.

[6]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 305; Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 610.

[7]Letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev, February 22, 1961. (Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF 1906) (S)

[8]Telegrams 2135 and 2136 from Moscow, March 10, 1961. (611.61/3-1061)(S)

[9]Telegram Tosec 32 to Bangkok, March 27, 1961. (751j.00/3-2761) (S)

[10]Telegram 1673 to Moscow, April 5, 1961; telegram 2441

from Moscow, April 10, 1961.(711.11-KE/4-561) (711.11-KE/4-1061)(S)

[11]Telegram 2710 from Moscow, May 4, 1961. (611.61/5-461)(S)

[12]Telegram 2714 from Moscow, May 4, 1961. (611.61/5-461)(S)

[13]Telegram 1919 to Moscow, May 6, 1961. (611.61/5-661)(S)

[14]Letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy, May 12, 1961, an unofficial translation of which was quoted in telegram Tosec 121 to Geneva, May 16, 1961. (761.13/5-1661)(S)

[15]Telegram 2041 to Bonn, May 16. 1961. (611-61/5-166) (S)

[16]O'Donnell and Powers, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye", p. 286.

[17]Memorandum from Stevenson to Kennedy, May 24, 1961. (Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF 1906) (C)

[18]Telegram 2941 from Moscow, May 27, 1961. (611.61/5-2761) (S)

[19]Telegram 981 from Belgrade, June 2, 1961. (611.61/6-261) (C)

[20]Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, p. 75.

[21]"Scope Paper," PMK-A/1, May 23, 1961, drafted by Armitage (EUR/SOV) and cleared by Kohler (EUR). (Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF 1905) (C, Declassified 1978)

[22]"Soviet Aims and Expectations," PMK-D/2, May 25, 1961, drafted by Shaw (INR/RSB) and cleared with Keppel (INR/RSB), Evans (INR), and Guthrie (EUR/SOV). (Ibid.) (C, Declassified 1978)

[23]"Khrushchev: The Man, His Manner, His Outlook, and His View of the United States." PMK-D/16 May 25, 1961. (Ibid.) (S)

[24]"Line of Approach to Khrushchev," June 1, 1961. (Ibid.) (Secret Limited Distribution, Declassified 1978)

[25]Salinger, With Kennedy, pp. 175-176.

[26]Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 543.

[27]Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, June 3, 1961. (Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901) (S)

[28]Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, 3:00-6:45 p.m., June 3, 1961. (Ibid.) (S)

[29]Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 365.

[30]Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m. (Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110, CF1901) (S)

[31]Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky, 3:15 p.m., June 4, 1961. (Ibid.) (S)

[32]Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp. 76-77.

[33]Benjamin C. Bradlee, Conversations With Kennedy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 125; Donald C. Lord, John F. Kennedy: The Politics of Confrontation and Consultation (Woodlay, New York: Barron's, 1977), p. 208.

[34]O'Donnell and Powers, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye," p. 298.

[35]Ibid., p. 299.

[36]Radio and television report, June 6, 1961; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 441-446.

[37]Sorenson, Kennedy, p. 543; Salinger, With Kennedy, p. 175.

[38]Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 377-378.

Chapter V

[1]Memorandum from W. Rostow to the President, June 14, 1967. (Conference Files, Lot 68 D 453, CF 200)(U)

[2]Memorandum from O'Donohue (S/S) to Steigman (S), June 20, 1967. (Ibid.)(C)

[3]Telegrams 5817 and 5825 from the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, June 21, 1967 (S); memorandum by Davis

(EUR/SOV) of his conversation with Vorontsov (Soviet Embassy), June 20, 1967. (POL 7 US)(LOU)

[4]Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 481-483.

[5]"Kosygin's Base for Negotiations," AKV/G-1, June 16, 1967, drafted by Toumanoff (EUR/SOV) and cleared by Ambassador Thompson, Toon (EUR/SOV), Kohler (G), and Stoessel (EUR). (Conference Files, Lot 68 D 453, CF 200)(S)

[6]Memorandum by Kohler (G) of his conversation with Lilienfield (German Embassy), June 20, 1967; memorandum by Stabler (EUR/SOV) of Kohler's conversation with Ortona (Italian Embassy), June 23, 1967. (POL 7 US)(C)

[7]"Kosygin's Mood and Perspective," AKV/G-2, June 17, 1967, drafted by Brzezinski (S/P). (Conference Files, Lot 68 D 453, CF 200)(S)

[8]The President's Daily Diary, June 23, 1967. (Lyndon B. Johnson Library) (Microfilm Edition) (U)

[9]Memorandum of Conversation by Krimer (L/S), June 23, 1967, 11:15 a.m.-1:30 p.m. (POL 7 US)(S)

[10]Memorandum of Conversation by Krimer (L/S), June 23, 1967, 3:15-4:30 p.m. (Ibid.)(S)

[11]Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), vol. I, pp. 644-645.

[12]Hugh Sidey, "Locking Eyes at the Top," Time, November 22, 1982, p 75.

[13]Interview by Landa (PA/HO) with Krimer (L/S, retired), November 26, 1982. (POL 7 US)(LOU)

[14]Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, vol. I, pp. 645-650.

[15]Memorandum of Conversation by Krimer, June 25, 1967. (POL 7 US)(S)

[16]Memorandum by Landa (PA/HO) of his conversation with Krimer (L/S, retired), November 28, 1982. (POL 7 US)

[17]Memorandum of Conversation by Akalovsky (Embassy Moscow), June 25, 1967, 3:00-6:30 p.m. (POL 7 US)(S)

[18]Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 485.

[19]Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, vol. I, pp. 650-651.

[20]Ibid., pp. 651-652.

[21]Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Sino-Soviet Affairs, 1967, no. 7, pp. 4-5. (S)

[22]Memorandum by Garthoff (G/PM) of a conversation with Sedov (Soviet Embassy), June 28, 1967. (POL 7 US)(S)

[23]Circular telegram 217511, June 27, 1967. (Ibid.)(S)

[24]Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 485-486.

[25]Ibid., p. 256.

[26]The Department of State During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Chapter III, Part E. (S)