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Special Memorandum

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Gorbachev: Selected Statements on Domestic Affairs

FBIS

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Gorbachev: Selected Statements on Domestic Affairs

Introduction

During his career as a national-level leader Mikhail Gorbachev has spoken out publicly on a number of key domestic issues. On economic issues, his main area of responsibility, he has stressed the need for greater reliance on material incentives and other economic levers, criticized excessive central control, and encouraged experimentation with new methods of management to increase individual initiative and efficiency. Since becoming general secretary in March, he has forcefully advocated changing the system of planning and management.

This report provides a collection of Gorbachev statements on key domestic issues, excerpted from his speeches and writings from the time of his promotion to the CPSU Secretariat in 1978 to the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee plenum. A separate collection of Gorbachev's comments on international issues is being published as *Special Memorandum* FB 85-10025 of 30 May 1985, "Gorbachev: Selected Statements on International Affairs." These publications are intended as companion reference volumes to FBIS *Analysis Report* FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, "Gorbachev: A Political Profile."

Introduction

The following report provides a collection of data and information regarding the activities of the Communist Party, USA, in the area of international relations. This information was obtained from the records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Strategic Services, and the State Department. The information is presented in a form which is suitable for use in the preparation of intelligence reports and for the dissemination of information to the public.

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Economic Management

Encouragement of Innovation

Gorbachev has frequently encouraged new approaches to solving economic and sociopolitical problems, endorsing specific innovations and advocating creative thinking. He expressed himself on this subject most forcefully at a December 1984 ideology conference, three months before he became general secretary.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1978

Today the whole country knows the Dynamo method, the Shchekino experiment, and other remarkable initiatives. Like everything new and progressive, their introduction involves a struggle against outmoded views and traditions.¹

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1980

In their organizational work it is now especially important for our leading party and soviet cadres to rely on a wide party and production aktiv, to skillfully use economic levers, and to creatively search for and make use of everything new and advanced. . . . The achievements of scientific-technological progress, advanced experience, and also foreign practice deserve the most intense study and introduction.

Lenin Day Speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 83)

We should everywhere use existing possibilities and reserves more fully, introduce the achievements of scientific-technological progress more energetically, and seek new approaches to management of production, labor organization, and wages. On the initiative of workers themselves in recent years such forms of progressive organization of labor activity and material stimulation as the Shchekino method, the brigade form of labor organization in industry and construction, and the collective contract in agriculture have been introduced.

¹ The Shchekino system, which pays workers for taking on additional responsibilities, is controversial because it could result in layoffs for some workers and pressures on managers and planners to run tighter, more efficient operations.

Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (*Pravda*, 27 Mar 84)

We must give a more dynamic and purposeful character to economic leadership, strengthen and multiply everything new and progressive, comprehensively develop the creativeness and initiative of the masses, and strengthen order, discipline, and good organization.

Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984, (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

We need to constantly search for and promote fresh ideas and proposals, and take active measures to implement them. . . .

Social scientists are still acting slowly and timidly in tackling the key theoretical problems of our development. . . . Responsible tasks face economic science. . . . In recent years many useful works have appeared. But economic science has still not produced a detailed concept of ways to change to a dynamic, highly effective economy and of creating an improved economic mechanism. Not all research organizations are in close touch with practical concerns. Some scholars sometimes cannot give up outmoded ideas and stereotypes. Their theoretical findings often are forced into preconceived schemes and are confined to the realm of scholastic discussion.

Let us turn to such a basic and timely problem as the relationship of present-day production forces and socialist production relations. In our treatment of this we have far from fully overcome dogmatic ideas, which sometimes do a disservice to our theory and practice. . . .

The present stage of development of Soviet society is characterized by deep changes in the whole system of socialist production relations based on qualitative improvements in production forces, which increase the interaction and interpenetration of technical-economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual-ideological factors. This makes it necessary to consider production relations in close connection with forms of organization of labor and production, management and planning, and the system of motivating factors, and in the social context of people's activity in general. . . .

I think that the slowing of economic growth at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's can be explained not only by the coming together of a number of unfavorable factors but also by the fact that the need to change some aspects of production relations was not brought out in time. . . . If there is stagnant retention of outmoded elements of production relations, a worsening of the economic and social situation can occur.

Unfortunately, we do not always succeed in revealing and overcoming growing contradictions in time. Often our efforts are hampered by the force of inertia, conservative thinking, and the inability or unwillingness to change established work forms and to change to new methods that open the door to everything progressive and meet the needs of both today and tomorrow. . . .

Science by its very nature always was the field for active competition of ideas. Its development is unthinkable without debate, free, constructive, creative exchange of opinions. Science is alien to expediency, temporizing, and also to excessive ambition and unwillingness to listen to the voice of colleagues.

Incentives and Cost Effectiveness

To improve economic performance Gorbachev has stressed reliance on material incentives and greater attention to cost effectiveness by managers and workers.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1980

Even from specialists and leaders you cannot always get clear answers on the return on expenditures, on what a centner of fertilizer, a cubic meter of water, or an hour of worktime produces. Apparently some officials still have no real taste for questions of economics.

Article in *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye*, July 1981

Some leaders and specialists of kolkhozes and sovkhoses after the changeover to guaranteed wages and centralized financing have in essence forgotten to count money. When you talk with such officials on the question of return on expenditures you often hear confused, contradictory answers. As a result, financial accountability (*khozraschet*) is

weakened. Now the attention of party organizations and economic leaders should be concentrated on such decisive economic indicators as the rates of growth of labor productivity, yield of fields and productiveness of livestock farms, raising the quality of products, the return on expenditures, and the effectiveness of use of resources, especially land, equipment, fertilizer, and working time.

Speech to Yaroslavl plenum on food program, 16 June 1982 (*Pravda*, 17 Jun 82)

The assimilation of new methods of management is an important task. Each kolkhoz and sovkhov should now, figuratively speaking, earn the money to cover its expenditures, produce more products and raise quality, fight to lower its costs and economize on financial and material resources. . . . The additional funds allocated are not to cover mismanagement and unskillful, thoughtless leadership, but are a powerful lever to raise production and step up labor activity of agricultural workers. The main form of material incentive should be rewards for achieving high end results from work.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1982

It is important to clearly understand that raising purchase prices and adoption of other measures to improve the economic mechanism are not aimed at covering mismanagement in the work of kolkhozes and sovkhovs. They are intended to strengthen the financial-economic position of farms, create conditions for use of financial accountability methods, and strengthen material incentives for labor collectives to raise the output of agricultural products and efficiency. . . .

The time has passed when one could use bank credit without especially worrying about repaying it. Now money for developing enterprises and forming incentive funds must be earned. Now leaders, specialists, and all agricultural workers must have deep understanding of questions of economics and show initiative and enterprising spirit (*predpriimchivost*).

Article in *Pravda*, 10 February 1983

Under the new conditions, when the system of credit is becoming more strict and financial discipline is rising, kolkhozes and sovkhovs will have to base their expenditures on the income from sale of products and

finance expanded production from their own funds. In other words, a farm's economy must be built on the principles of financial accountability, strict observance of economizing and thrift, and raising of the effectiveness and quality of work.

Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (*Pravda*, 27 Mar 84)

Management depends more and more on economic levers to influence production. . . . Some management organs and leading cadres still make inadequate use of economic methods of management. They often ignore such questions as the correlation between the growth of labor productivity and the growth of wages, the return on investment, the use of funds, the quality of products, and the role of these factors in strengthening the economy. Some leaders and specialists fear financial accountability and do not hurry to introduce it. . . .

Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

We are obliged to look at things realistically. Attitudes toward labor at the present stage are based not only on conscientiousness. Without material interest, without precise calculation and nationwide checking on the amount of labor and amount of consumption, without serious accountability for one's assigned task, counting on a conscientious attitude to labor by everyone would be simply utopian.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Moscow, 20 February 1985 (*Pravda*, 21 Feb 85)

Raising the rates of scientific-technological progress is an insistent demand of the time. But another thing is no less important—to use effectively, in a thrifty way, everything that already is available. Life shows that right now, using the same machine tools, the same equipment, the identical land, one can produce more products, of better quality, and with less expenditure. . . . Huge reserves for developing our economy lie here and they must be brought into operation.

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Decentralization

Gorbachev has argued that centralized ministerial controls must be reduced in order to allow managers and workers to show more initiative. Since becoming general secretary, he has spoken urgently about reorganizing economic administration, both in industry and agriculture.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1982

Today this [Lenin's demand] means: orienting the system of management toward final economic results, the optimal combination of territorial and branch principles of administration, [combining] the advantages of centralization with independence and initiative for labor collectives, comprehensively strengthening economic methods of management, ending duplication in leadership, and the maximal encouragement of creative initiative and enterprising spirit (*predpriimchivost*).

Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 83)

With his characteristic scholarly conviction and political passion, Lenin consistently defended centralism as the foundation for organizing the socialist economy, which represents a unified whole. And at the same time he called for making room for creative work and local initiative.

Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

As regards centralism, we also are for its development, which we understand as raising the scientific operation and effectiveness of centralized leadership. This in no way means petty supervision and efforts to regulate everything from the center, rather the opposite. Skilled leadership not only does not limit but on the contrary makes room for initiative for people, labor collectives, and local organs.

Acceptance speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 11 March 1985 (*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

We must continue persistently to improve the economic mechanism and the whole system of management. . . . This means unwavering implementation of planned development of the economy, strengthening socialist ownership, expansion of the rights and raising of the independence and responsibility of enterprises, and strengthening their interest in the final results of work.

Speech to conference of economic managers, Moscow, 8 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 12 Apr 85)

While strengthening centralized planning of the main directions [of the economy], we propose to expand further the rights of enterprises, to introduce genuine financial accountability, and on this basis to raise the responsibility and also the interest both of the collective as a whole and of each worker in the final results of labor. . . .

Genuine independence and responsibility for enterprises and associations obviously can be achieved by correctly defining the rights and obligations of each level of management. We will not resolve the problem of independence if a director in each case must win approval for dozens of things and discuss everything from A to Z. One must not draw the resolution of every question to the center. The level of our economic cadres makes it fully possible to decide many problems locally. One must just remove from them the fetters of bad and excessive instructions, decisively reduce accountability to higher organs, and free ourselves from paperwork—which will simultaneously facilitate reduction of the management apparatus. This concerns both ministries and all-union industrial associations.

The discussion [at the conference] showed how important it is to supplement existing measures with improvements in the organizational structure of management. Higher organs, which have become accustomed to the old style of work, often do not facilitate consistent implementation and development of principles of the management embodied in the economic experiment. This is especially manifest at the level of all-union industrial associations. We must tackle these questions without delay, because if we do not change the methods of management at the level of ministries and all-union industrial associations we will only be marking time.

Another important area where changes are needed in the organizational structures of management is the agroindustrial complex. The speeches showed that we must carry the improvement of management of this important sphere of the economy to its logical conclusion. The agroindustrial sphere, as was determined at the May 1982 CPSU Central Committee plenum, should be planned, financed, and managed as a single entity. We still have not managed to achieve this and, as a result, we are suffering big losses.

Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

What is the cause of the difficulties? . . . Of course, the influence of nature and a number of external factors had an effect. But the main thing, I think, was that we did not in good time properly evaluate the changes in objective conditions for development of production, the need for speeding its intensification, for changes in the methods of management, and, what is especially important, we did not demonstrate persistence in working out and implementing major measures in the economic sphere. . . .

The task of speeding the rates of growth, and by a considerable degree, is fully achievable if we put at the center of all our work intensification of the economy and speeding of scientific-technological progress, reorganize management and planning, structural and investment policy, universally raise organization and discipline, and basically improve the style of work. . . .

No matter what question we consider or from what side we approach the economy, in the final consideration everything depends on the need to seriously improve management and the economic mechanism as a whole. I had occasion to be convinced of this again during my recent meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with workers and economic managers and also during my visit to the Likhachev truck plant. The participants in these meetings spoke with great concern about how troubled they were by how defects in the system of administration, petty regulation, and excessive paperwork complicate working conditions. . . .

Now we have a clearer concept of how to reorganize the economic mechanism. While further developing the centralization principle in resolving strategic tasks, we must move forward more boldly along the path of expanding the rights of enterprises, their independence, and introduce economic accountability, and on this basis raise the responsibility and interest of labor collectives in the final results of work.

The results of the large-scale experiment being conducted are seemingly not bad. But they cannot fully satisfy us. We have reached a line where we must cross over from an experiment to creation of a whole system of management and administration. And this means that we should also begin practical restructuring of the work of higher echelons of economic

management and direct them primarily to resolving long-term socio-economic and scientific-technological tasks, to seeking the most effective forms of combining science and production.

Life presents higher demands on planning, which is the heart of management. It should become an active lever for intensifying production, implementing progressive economic decisions, and ensuring balanced and dynamic growth in the economy. Along with this, plans of associations and enterprises must be relieved of the abundance of indicators, and economic norms that make room for initiative and enterprising spirit must be more widely applied.

It is time to begin improving the organizational structures of management, liquidate excess units, simplify the apparatus, and raise its effectiveness. It is important to do this also because some administrative links have turned into obstacles and have begun to hamper movement. We must sharply limit the number of instructions, statutes, and methodological instructions that sometimes fetter the independence of enterprises by capricious interpretation of party and government decisions. . . .

It is no less important to raise the responsibility of republic and local organs for the management of economic and sociocultural construction, and for satisfying the needs of workers. But for this, of course, we must further expand the rights of local organs, strengthen their initiative and interest in developing production, using resources, and organizing all spheres of services for the public. Hence, they should locally answer fully for resolving all questions within their jurisdiction and more quickly get rid of feelings of being dependent. . . .

The management of the agroindustrial complex also requires further improvement. . . . Under the influence of departmental interests, rayon and oblast associations often cannot properly coordinate decisions of questions of comprehensive development of agriculture and associated branches. If we are firmly convinced that there must be a single master for the land and that agroindustrial associations bear full responsibility for carrying out the Food Program—of which, I think, there is no doubt—then we should implement steps to make it possible to manage, plan, and finance the agroindustrial complex as a single whole at all levels.

Technological Renovation

Gorbachev has increasingly focused on the need for new technology and modernization of industry to revive economic growth rates. He has called for giving a higher priority to machine building in order to modernize the country's industrial plant and improve productivity.

Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 83)

The development of heavy industry was and remains the necessary precondition for resolving all economic and social tasks. . . . What should be put in the forefront here? The speeding up of the development and the raising of the level of machine building as the basis for the technical re-equipment of public production, use of modern technology, and improvement of the quality of products. . . . Therefore, a preferential and comprehensive growth of machine building and the significant improvement of the machinery and equipment produced was and remains the main path for development of heavy industry, strengthening its transforming role in expanding and fundamentally renovating all branches of the national economy.

USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Stavropol, 29 February 1984 (*Pravda*, 1 Mar 84)

The party highly rates the labor and achievements of Soviet machine builders. . . . We must give development of machine building a priority character.

Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

In the 12th Five-Year Plan primary attention should be given to substantially raising the rate of replacement of equipment. The decisive part here is played by machine building. Its development must be given priority and in the 12th Five-Year Plan the rates of growth of this sector must be increased by 50 to 100 percent.

Agriculture

Collective Contracts

Gorbachev has consistently favored the use of material incentives to stimulate initiative in agriculture. His views have been reflected in recent years in his support for the collective contract system of farm labor and earlier in his advocacy of the unregulated link system—both systems organize farmers into units operating autonomously on the basis of contracts with kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

Article in *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye*, July 1981

The question of the unregulated system of labor organization with use of contract-bonus (*akkordno-premialnaya*) pay for final results deserves attention also. Last year this progressive system was applied in 30,000 brigades and links.

Article in *Pravda*, 10 February 1983

Among the complex of measures aimed at raising the effectiveness of production and strengthening financial accountability, transfer to progressive forms of organization and pay of labor is very important. If we don't change these matters, material and financial resources alone cannot produce the desired results. The practice of advanced workers has fully confirmed the high effectiveness of such forms of labor organization and application of material incentives as collective (brigade, link) contracts with use of contract-bonus pay, the shop structure of production, and extension of pay in kind. . . .

In collectives working on contract, the efficiency of labor and production is higher, the personal interests of each worker is better combined with the interests of the enterprise, the tie between labor and wages is strengthened, and land, equipment, and other production funds are better used. With less expenditure of labor and funds, as a rule, they get 20-30 percent more produce per unit of land. Naturally, their earnings are also higher. In recent years the number of unregulated brigades and links in agriculture has grown. . . . However, this progressive form is still being spread too slowly.

Speech at agricultural conference, Belgorod, 19 March 1983 (*Pravda*, 20 Mar 83)

Under the new conditions of management, we need basically different approaches to the organization of production and especially to wages. . . . One of the important methods for resolving this problem is use of the collective contract. . . . The main role in this is played by personal interest of workers not in the amount of different kinds of work done, as is the case with piecework (*sdelnaya*) pay, but in the final result—getting the greatest quantity of high quality produce. . . . Of course, for effective work of contract collectives it is important to respect the requirements of optimal management. The main thing here is to provide independence in resolving a wide range of questions. It is well known that higher results are attained via a proprietary attitude to the land and other resources. But the feeling of being a proprietor (*khozyain*) does not arise by itself as the result of introducing a collective contract. It develops on the basis of active participation of workers in managing production. Expansion of the rights of contract collectives in adopting management decisions is a very important condition for raising operational effectiveness, the development of labor activity and initiative. . . .

Despite the clear advantages of this progressive form of labor organization and wages, the collective contract is still being introduced slowly. . . . year we must start the stage of mass introduction of collective contracts so that in the 11th Five-Year Plan this progressive form of organization and stimulation of labor firmly enters kolkhoz and sovkhov production.

Private Plots

Gorbachev has looked to personal initiative of farmers on their private plots as another practical means for boosting food output. He has defended the legitimacy of private agriculture by arguing that it supplements state production.

USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Stavropol, 2 February 1979 (*Pravda*, 3 Feb 79)

Subsidiary farms of enterprises and organizations and also private plots of the population can play a substantial role. One should assist their development and render them the necessary assistance.

Article in *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye*, July 1981

Private plots of kolkhozniks, workers, and employees require constant attention. Their contribution to forming the country's food fund is noticeable. Now this question is raised on the plane of integrating private plots with public production, the ensuring of a closer collaboration between public and private farming on the basis of the leading role of public production and contract relationships, and of rendering all possible aid to rural residents in more effectively working private plots. . . . Private plots as a supplement to public farming make possible fuller use of labor resources, fodder land, and facilities for livestock.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1982

At the Central Committee plenum attention was devoted to private plots as an organic composite part of socialist agriculture at the present stage. The significance of this sector is not limited only to the economic aspect of the matter. It plays a big social and educational role. The main thing is that private plots permit fuller use of reserves of labor and other possibilities which they possess, and substantially supplement the food fund. At the present time it is important to widen the integration of private plots with public production and create the necessary organizational and economic preconditions for their effective functioning.

Article in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, September 1982

At the same time it is recognized as important to support the population's private plots. Our party regards these as an integral component of socialist agriculture at the present stage, a substantial reserve for supplementing food stocks, and an important condition for the fuller use of manpower and other resources that can help to resolve a number of social tasks. But their potential must not be overestimated. The conjectures being propagated in some places in the West about their "advantages" are built on sand. Here labor productivity is half what it is on kolkhozes and sovkhoses. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the private plot is based on the public sector. . . . The development of the private plot will proceed above all in the direction of further integration with the public sector.

Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

The task is to more fully utilize all reserves for increasing production of food both in kolkhozes and sovkhozes and on private plots and subsidiary farms of enterprises.

Agricultural Investment

Although during the Brezhnev regime Gorbachev echoed standard policy advocating more resources for agriculture, he has increasingly placed his stress on the need for more efficient use of resources.

USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Stavropol, 2 February 1979 (*Pravda*, 3 Feb 79)

The party will continue to hold to its principled line of increasing capital investments in agriculture.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1980

Proceeding from deep scientific understanding of the role of agriculture in communist construction, the July plenum indicated that the party would continue to consistently implement the line of systematically increasing capital investments in this branch so that its share in the general volume of resources allotted to develop the economy in the 11th Five-Year Plan would be no lower than the present level. . . . Along with this, the party gives special significance to raising the return on funds invested in agriculture.

Article in *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1982

Fulfillment of the decisions of the May Central Committee plenum on strengthening the material-technical base of the agroindustrial complex has special significance. Any deviation from this can be only in one direction—in the direction of seeking out additional capital investments and material resources to strengthen the economy of agriculture and related branches, and increase the production of food goods.

Article in *Pravda*, 10 February 1983

The capital investment directed into land improvement is still not producing the proper return. . . . Many officials, carried away by new water project construction, neglect questions of effective use of already existing improved land. . . . It is understandable that work on improving the use of land and raising yield requires the appropriate capital investments.

Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (*Pravda*, 27 Mar 84)

Analyzing the key questions of strengthening the economy of the agroindustrial complex, the reporter stressed that one cannot reduce the process of intensification to just accumulation of funds alone. The main thing in intensification is raising the output of products per unit of present and future material and financial resources. . . .

Big attention should be devoted to use of irrigated and drained land. . . . However, improved lands are not being used effectively enough. In recent years funds have been directed chiefly into new construction projects to improve land. At the same time insufficient resources were allotted to remodeling and maintaining the existing systems in proper condition.

Speech presenting award, Smolensk, 27 June 1984 (*Pravda*, 28 Jun 84)

Our state will continue to allot large amounts of funds to development of the Non-Chernozem countryside, considering this a necessary condition for increasing production and raising the return from the existing economic potential. The task is to be more economical in managing these resources.

Sociopolitical Issues

Public Participation

Recently, Gorbachev has been speaking about the need for greater openness and more participation by the public in the political process.

Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

Our contemporary is a person of heightened culture and education, with a broad scope of spiritual interests, who has seen and experienced much. . . . A person living and working in society with such huge social experience will not accept simplified answers to questions, will quickly catch hypocrisy engendered by lack of ability or the fear of exposing real contradictions in public development and the sources of the problems which concern and agitate him. We must talk with him only in the language of truth, which will not tolerate smoothing over, evasions, or general and stilted phrases. . . .

Let us turn to questions of developing the political system of our society. For example, the profound idea of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on self-management is well known. Marx, Engels, and Lenin thought of the transition to self-management by workers as a practical task of the proletariat from the moment it came to power. They saw the main content of this idea as ensuring the real, practical participation of a greater and greater mass of workers in management—in working out, discussing, adopting, and implementing socioeconomic decisions. Lenin never set Soviet state power against self-management by the people. . . . Nevertheless, in social sciences there still exists a poor and sometimes even one-sided interpretation of self-management. In some of these, self-management is linked to the activities of just certain parts of socialist society (production or territorial); in others, it is set against state management; in yet others, the practical implementation of principles of self-management are put off to the transition to a higher phase of communism. . . .

The scientific working out of such a seemingly traditional problem as the principle of democratic centralism in present-day conditions is very timely. . . .

The party has stood for and stands for the interconnected development of both bases of democratic centralism in the economic and political life of the country, for their optimal combination. This relates first of all to expanding and deepening socialist democracy: the greater, fuller, and deeper the masses' participation in management is, the more firm our achievements and the more dynamic our development will be. . . .

Publicity is an integral aspect of socialist democracy and a norm of all social life. Extensive, timely, and frank information is indicative of trust in people and respect for their intellect and feelings and their capability to understand various events themselves. It increases the activeness of the working people. Publicity in the work of party and state organs is an effective means of struggle against bureaucratic distortions, and it makes people more thoughtful in their approach to decisionmaking and organizing checks on the fulfillment of decisions and also in correcting shortcomings and mistakes.

Closing speech at ideology conference, Moscow, 11 December 1984 (*Pravda*, 12 Dec 84)

It is impossible not to agree with the comrades who have noted that the forms and methods of ideological work under present-day conditions should be more varied and flexible and more fully suited to the innovative character of the tasks to be resolved. Inertia in thinking, as a rule, engenders inertia in practical matters too. Searching and creativeness, sensitivity to new phenomena and processes, decisive rooting out of formalism, red tape, and empty talk are the demands of life for all workers on the ideological front.

We must continue to develop in Soviet people's consciousness a clear understanding of the historical importance of our huge social triumphs and at the same time expose existing difficulties and real contradictions in the life of society and show the work of the party and people in resolving them. In this one must remember that leaving questions unanswered opens a gap for hostile propaganda.

Acceptance speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 11 March 1985 (*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

The party regards as one of the main tasks of internal policy the further improvement and development of democracy and the whole system of socialist self-management of the people. . . . This includes further raising the role of soviets, and activation of trade unions, the komsomol, peoples control, and labor collectives. . . . Deepening socialist democracy is inseparably connected with raising public consciousness. The effectiveness of educational work is manifested primarily in how workers,

kolkhozniks, and intelligentsia participate in resolving big and small problems, how they labor, and how they struggle against shortcomings. . . .

We must further expand openness (*glasnost*) in the work of party, soviet, state, and public organizations. . . . The better informed people are, the more conscientiously they act, the more actively they support the party, its plans and program goals.

Separation of Party and State Functions

Gorbachev has spoken about the need to define more precisely the role of party organizations and to keep them from taking over functions of economic and government organs. This may reflect his stated desire to grant more room for economic managers to exercise initiative and for economic levers to produce the most rational economic decisions.

USSR Supreme Soviet campaign speech, Moscow, 29 February 1984 (*Pravda*, 1 Mar 84)

This goal [raising the responsibility of cadres] is furthered also by precise definition of the functions of party committees on one hand, and state and economic organs on the other, ending the practice where officials of various organizations, departments, and enterprises transfer to party organs questions for which they themselves bear direct responsibility. In Comrade K. U. Chernenko's speech at the February Central Committee plenum this task was raised among those with first rank importance.

Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (*Pravda*, 27 Mar 84)

We should in practice carry out the CPSU Central Committee instruction on more precise definition of the functions of party and soviet organs. It is abnormal when some rayon party committees substitute for agroindustrial associations, when they circumvent the associations to decide current economic questions, and when they interfere in matters which belong in the direct competence of specialists and leaders of farms, thus lowering the responsibility of cadres for their work.

Cadres and Discipline

Since becoming general secretary, Gorbachev has stressed the need to tighten discipline and replace ineffective officials.

Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

The question of reinforcing order and discipline is especially topical today. . . . Life has shown what unanimous approval the people have given to measures to impose order and what weighty results they have produced. But one must directly say that recently attention to this most important question has somewhat slackened. And here one must first of all be more demanding on leaders of collectives who bear personal responsibility for discipline. Often one encounters instances where leaders of enterprises forgive indiscipline in workers in the hope that their subordinates in turn will forgive their blunders. We will not condone such a psychology of mutual forgiveness.

In order to strengthen discipline and order there is also another essential condition. One cannot achieve significant results in any sphere of activity as long as a party official substitutes for an economic leader, an engineer for a messenger, a scholar works at a vegetable collection center, or a textile worker works on a livestock farm. Unfortunately, today this often happens. . . .

Higher demands should be made on the tone, efficiency, and exactingness of the coming rayon, city, oblast, and kray party conferences and union republic party congresses. There must be no place at them, as sometimes occurs, for eulogizing and compliments, or attempts to conceal the essence of matters behind general words, to lay the blame for shortcomings on objective circumstances or departmental misunderstandings. . . .

A party member is evaluated on the basis of his actions and deeds. There are and cannot be any other criteria.

During the course of the reports and elections leading party organs will be formed and replenished with fresh forces and urgent cadre questions will be decided. The recent plenums of party committees have convincingly shown what mature cadres the party has. But at the same time they also

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again confirmed the need for the strictest observance of Leninist principles of selection, assignment, and training of cadres. Where these principles are violated, where officials are advanced on the basis of personal loyalty, servility, or protectionism there inevitably will be fading of criticism and self-criticism and weakening of ties with the masses and, as a result, failures in work.

The Politburo considers it principally important to continue the line of ensuring stability of party leadership and correct combination of experienced and young officials. However, this cannot be accompanied by any kind of stagnation in the movement of cadres. In their letters to the Central Committee, communists have been drawing attention to the fact that some leaders who have held a post for a long time often cease to see the new and become accustomed to shortcomings. There is something to think about here. We must seek ways to more actively move leading cadres. We must more boldly advance women and promising young officials to responsible posts.

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Special Memorandum

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Gorbachev: Selected Statements on International Affairs

FBIS

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Gorbachev: Selected Statements on International Affairs

Introduction

During his relatively brief career as a national political leader, Mikhail Gorbachev has compiled a modest record as a spokesman on international issues. Before he became CPSU general secretary, his comments on foreign affairs generally reflected prevailing policy positions, varying in tone and content according to the audience but normally adhering to formulations commonly used by other leaders. Since he succeeded Konstantin Chernenko in March, Gorbachev has spoken out more frequently on international issues. Like his predecessors, he has focused primarily on East-West relations and arms control.

This report provides a collection of Gorbachev's statements on key international questions, excerpted from his speeches, writings, and statements at meetings with foreign delegations from 1980 through the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee plenum. It is intended as a companion to FBIS *Analysis Report* FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, Gorbachev: A Political Profile. A collection of Gorbachev's comments on domestic issues is being published separately.

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U.S.-Soviet and East-West Relations

Gorbachev has depicted East-West relations during the 1980's in stark terms, attributing the rise in tension to the "crisis of capitalism" and the policies of the Reagan Administration. At the same time, he consistently has voiced support for rebuilding detente and has predicted that "realistic" Western political forces favoring East-West cooperation will eventually prevail. Since becoming general secretary, he has frequently juxtaposed criticism of U.S. policies with expressions of interest in easing tensions with Washington and increasing bilateral cooperation.

Speech to Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) Congress, Ulaanbaatar, 26 May 1981 (*Pravda*, 27 May 81)

The Soviet Union and its Communist Party consistently pursue a line aimed at preserving and expanding the achievements of detente, of all that is valuable and beneficial in international relations, and all that was achieved during many years of unswerving, patient work.

Speech to Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Congress, Hanoi, 28 March 1982 (*Pravda*, 29 Mar 82)

U.S. imperialism is playing the role of organizer of the new crusade against peace and progress. The aggressive and militant forces are threatening to bring mankind to the brink of a world thermonuclear war. The ideologists of the U.S. reactionary forces are calling for an extension of U.S. domination to the whole world. In fact, there is no region on earth where the situation has not become complicated as a result of the actions of Washington and its zealous agents.

Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 83)

The years in which we are living will go down in history as a time of intense class struggle in the foreign arena. Two courses, two diametrically different approaches to international relations confront each other unusually acutely. The main reason for the deterioration of today's

international situation is the adventuristic approach of the most aggressive forces of imperialism to the most important issue of modern times [the issue of war and peace]. . . .

The reactionary tendency has triumphed in U.S. ruling circles. The war party—to use Lenin's expression—has gained the upper hand. It tells itself that force must be used immediately, taking no account of further consequences. The most aggressive circles of imperialism, primarily American imperialism, are trying to get out of the crisis [of capitalism], to find a response to the historic challenge of socialism by means of the arms race and by increasing the threat of war.

The aggressive strivings of imperialism are directed first and foremost against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. Economic sanctions and psychological war, attempts to organize a crusade against communism, interference in the internal affairs of socialist states, up to and including the nurturing of a counterrevolutionary fifth column, as for example in Poland—all this is factual reality, irrefutable facts. Imperialist reaction, as has already happened more than once, is hungrily waiting for a replay of history, to stifle world socialism, to put a brake on the popular liberation movement. In essence they are giving an ultimatum to socialism: Unless it gives up its positions, things will slide toward war. But the alternative—either submission to the dictate of imperialism on a world scale, or a world war—is mad and monstrous in its very basis. . . .

It is well known that the aggressive tendencies of the ruling circles of the Western camp are being resisted by a more realistic, sober tendency, whose supporters are in favor of detente and cooperation. The development of ties between the Soviet Union and many Western countries shows that we have considerable areas of converging interests. This is a fine basis for the further implementation of Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence in international relations.

Speech to members of Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, 18 May 1983 (*Pravda*, 19 May 83)

We in the Soviet Union are confident that the seventies, which passed under the sign of detente, were not a chance episode in mankind's difficult history. The policy of detente is not a stage that has been traversed and is gone. The term "detente" has become firmly established in political

vocabulary because the future belongs to detente. . . . We for our part will persistently continue the line aimed at preventing the further exacerbation of the international situation and preventing detente's positive potential from being buried.

Speech to Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) Congress, Oporto, 16 December 1983 (*Pravda*, 17 Dec 83)

U.S. imperialism is the originator and strike force of this global policy [of confrontation]. It is U.S. imperialism that has taken upon itself the leadership function in knocking together all detachments of reaction in the struggle against peace, freedom, democracy, progress, and socialism.

The essence of the present U.S. militarist course is to ensure dominating positions in the world for the United States regardless of the rights and interests of other states and peoples. . . .

The historically doomed doctrine of "crusades" has again been raised to the level of the White House's practical policy. People at official levels in the United States consider that normal relations can be conducted with the USSR only when it changes its social system. People in Washington are openly calculating on attaining military superiority over the USSR and the socialist world.

U.S. imperialism is hoping that by means of militarism it will gain a completely free hand in the international arena as a whole. . . .

It is not difficult to imagine with what adventurism and contempt for international law and the life of other peoples the U.S. military clique would act on a global scale under the banner of a "crusade" if it succeeded in attaining its goals, and primarily military superiority. . . .

Imperialism is not omnipotent. Its adventurous plans and actions encounter growing resentment and opposition all over the world and from the most diverse social and political forces. Tens of millions of honest people come out against the threat of war and the arms race regardless of their party affiliation or their political, ideological, or religious views and beliefs.

There is no doubt that sooner or later the ruling elite in the United States will have to take into account the realities of today's world.

Speech to Order of Lenin Award Ceremony, Smolensk, 27 June 1984 (*Pravda*, 28 Jun 84)

The international situation is now tense. The aggressiveness of imperialism's reactionary circles, driven by the Reagan Administration, is being strengthened. They are pushing through more and more new programs for an arms buildup, including in space. From one day to the next, the United States is whipping up an atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and antisocialism and encouraging all sorts of extremist, ultrarightist, essentially profascist forces' activities.

However, having become convinced that their overtly provocative statements are discrediting U.S. policy, the White House rulers are now hypocritically making declarations about devotion to peace and disarmament but in fact staking as before on military strength in the hope of upsetting the military-strategic parity between the United States and USSR, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, in their own favor, at whatever cost.

The more aggressively the ruling circles of imperialism act, the greater resistance they meet from the forces of peace, first and foremost the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole, the international communist movement and other anti-imperialist forces, and the mass antiwar movement in West Europe, Japan, and the United States itself.

The world does not want to and will not live under U.S. diktat. We are convinced that sooner or later the world community of peoples will manage to bring those politicians who, forgetting their responsibilities, are creating a threat to the very existence of mankind, back onto the path of realism. . . .

We do not consider the cause of detente to be irrevocably undermined. Striving to achieve a turn for the better in the development of international life, the USSR . . . comes out in favor of an honest dialogue, filled with real content, as well as serious negotiations on the basis of equality and equal security.

Speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution, Sofia, 9 September 1984 (*Pravda*, 10 Sep 84)

The grim reality of the matter is that the world is at a fever pitch. The threat of war is not subsiding. The practical moves by imperialist reaction, and in the first place, by those who determine the foreign policy course of the United States, are clearly oriented towards further dangerously stepping up international tension. Obsessed with the use of brute force, Washington believes that it is permissible to dictate its will to everyone, everywhere and in everything, and that this goes even as far as overthrowing legitimate governments, establishing a policy of state terrorism, and waging undeclared wars.

Report to Ideology Conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

It is not us but capitalism that has to maneuver and masquerade and resort to wars and terrorism, falsifications, and diversions in order to hold back the inevitable onslaught of time. These are precisely the sources of the global conflict going on between the two systems on an ever broader front and the unceasing attempts at social revanchism, the plans for which are nurtured by the imperialist ruling circles. The weapons stockpiling and whipping up of militarism, material and psychological, and preparations for nuclear war are essentially the acknowledgment by capitalism of the fact that it has lost its historical capability. The general crisis of capitalism is not only the aggravation of its economic, social, and political contradictions. It is also a spiritual, ideological, and moral crisis. . . .

A system without a future does not value either the past or present. This is precisely the source of imperialism's adventuristic policy. . . .

The military-industrial complex has noticeably reasserted its sinister influence and is playing an ever greater role in the policy of the leading capitalist countries. Transnational capital, which strives to prevent the new countries and peoples from taking the path of noncapitalist development and hold the young states within the capitalist orbit, also contributes to the intensification of confrontation. The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and

the steady strengthening of peace-loving foreign policy positions of the socialist community have reached ever sharper contradiction with the aggressive strategic designs of imperialism. . . .

The "crusade" declared against communism is not merely rhetoric, not only verbal abuse, to which Washington politicians are so susceptible. It also includes far-reaching imperial ambitions. The design of the "20th century crusaders" is to secure the global economic, political, and military-strategic goals of imperialism, most of all American imperialism.

Speech to members of British Parliament, London, 18 December 1984
(*Pravda*, 19 Dec 84)

Nobody can dispute the obvious fact that in years of detente, people began to live a calmer life, with greater confidence in their future.

In a word, there was an improvement in the international climate, but no concessions by one side to the other. Here realism, founded on a consideration of the mutual interests of countries with different social systems, was revealed; here the mutual comprehension emerged that you cannot build your security at the cost of causing detriment to the security of others.

In other words, sense won out: The understanding that war is an unsuitable, unacceptable method of solving vexed questions; that in a nuclear war, just as in the arms race and in confrontation, it is impossible to win. It became obvious that the "cold war" is an abnormal state of relations constantly carrying the threat of war. All this formed the basic beginning for the favorable development of international events in the 1970's. On this basis, the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems became more deeply and fully implanted in the whole system of international relations. We also consider now that there is no sensible alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence, nor can there be one. I would like to stress this quite strongly and definitely. . . .

We see it as our aim to solve together, as no one alone could do, the most important problems, which by their nature are common to us: how to prevent war; how to halt the arms race and go over to disarmament; how to settle existing conflicts and crises and avert potential ones; to create a situation in the world that would enable each country to concentrate its

attention and resources on solving its own problems (and show me the country that has none!); how to join forces in solving the worldwide problems of the struggle against starvation and diseases, preserving the environment, and providing mankind with power and raw material resources.

It is our profound conviction that in the present conditions all countries and peoples need constructive dialogue more than ever, a search for solutions to key international problems to find spheres of agreement that can lead to improving trust between countries and to establishing an atmosphere in international relations that would be free from nuclear threat, enmity and suspicion, fear and hostility.

Our country has specified its approach in clear and unambiguous form: to overcome tension, resolve differences and disputed issues not by force and threat but by negotiations, taking each other's legitimate interests into account and not permitting interference in internal affairs. I should put it like this: All must constantly learn to live together, proceeding from the realities of the modern world that is continually changing in accordance with its own laws. . . .

The Soviet Union stands for an improvement in interstate relations. In politics and diplomacy there is always room for reasonable compromises; there is a vast field for developing and strengthening mutual understanding and trust upon a basis of close or coinciding interests. If only there were a desire to cultivate this field!

Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

As regards relations with the capitalist states, I want to say the following: We will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union will always respond to good will with good will, and to trust with trust, but everyone must know that we will never waive the interests of the motherland and its allies.

We value the successes of detente achieved in the seventies and are prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states on principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs.

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Interview in *Pravda*, 8 April 1985

Relations between the USSR and the United States are an exceptionally important factor in international politics, but we do not look at the world solely through the prism of these relations. We realize the importance of other countries in international affairs and take this into account in assessing the general situation in the world.

Are there changes for the better in Soviet-American relations at this time? There is no simple answer to this question. Some things gave grounds for hope, but there continue to be a considerable and even great number of things that inspire anxiety. . . .

On the whole relations remain tense. . . .

It appears that some people in the United States regard this situation as normal, considering confrontation virtually a natural state.

We do not consider this to be the case. Confrontation is not an inborn defect in our relations. Rather it is an anomaly. There is nothing inevitable about its continuation. We regard the improvement of Soviet-American relations as not only extremely necessary but possible. Of course, it is impossible to manage without reciprocity here. . . .

I am convinced that serious impetus must be given to Soviet-American relations at a high political level. We propose to the U.S. Government that matters be conducted in such a way that everyone—our peoples and other countries—can see that the political courses of the USSR and the United States are directed not toward enmity and confrontation but toward the search for mutual understanding and toward peaceful development.

Meeting with Speaker of U.S. House of Representatives Thomas (Tip) O'Neill, 10 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 11 Apr 85)

The world situation is disquieting, even dangerous, and a kind of ice age is being observed in relations between the USSR and the United States (at least, this was so until the most recent time).

The Soviet leadership sincerely hopes that Soviet-American relations return to a normal channel. We do not think that underlying the present-day tensions in these relations is some fatal clash of national interests of both countries. On the contrary, our peoples can gain much from the development of broad and fruitful cooperation. To say nothing of the fact that they are united by the dominating common interest in ensuring security, preserving the very life of our peoples. The difference in the social systems, in the ideology of our countries is no cause for curtailing relations, much less for kindling hatred.

Practical experience has shown that Soviet-American mutually beneficial cooperation is quite possible. A number of fundamental documents signed by both sides in 1972 and 1973 laid the groundwork for fruitful cooperation in various fields. This also contributed to spreading detente in international relations as a whole, and to success of the European conference in Helsinki, in particular. In 1972 the leaders of the USSR and the USA put their signatures under a document saying that peaceful coexistence between our two countries is the sole sensible alternative in this nuclear age.

This concerns, of course, also the recognition of the right of every people to arrange their life as they see fit, without interference in their internal affairs, without attempts to shape other countries according to one's own fashion, to impose one's will on other peoples.

A genuine improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA requires political will on the part of the leaders of these countries. From the Soviet side such a will exists. If it is displayed by the American side as well, then many concrete questions now separating our countries gradually will begin to find their solution.

Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

Through the imperialists' fault the international situation continues to be alarming and dangerous. Mankind has found itself with a choice: either the further fanning of tension and confrontation, or a constructive search for the mutually acceptable accords that would halt the process of material preparation for a nuclear conflict. The responsibility for the existing situation lies, first of all, with the ruling circles of the United

States, and this should be stated in all clearness. They continue to be the initiators of the arms race, and they sabotage disarmament, a fact of which the world community is well aware. On their initiative, more and more types of mass annihilation weapons are created. Now they are trying to extend the arms race to space. Hundreds of U.S. military bases scattered all over the world also destabilize the situation in the world. The United States openly claims the "right" to interfere everywhere; it ignores, and often directly tramples underfoot, the interests of other countries and peoples, traditions of international relations, and existing treaties and agreements. It constantly creates hotbeds of conflicts and military danger, heating up the situation in various parts of the world. Today the United States is threatening the heroic people of Nicaragua with military reprisal, trying to deny them freedom and sovereignty, as was the case on Grenada. Solidarity with forces of progress and democracy, with the countries and peoples fighting for their freedom and independence and against the onslaught of reaction, is a matter of principle for us. Here our line is as clear as it always was. . . .

We invariably advocate the development of normal, equal relations with capitalist countries. Vexing problems and conflict situations should be solved by political means—such is our firm conviction. The Politburo bases itself on the fact that the interstate document of the period of detente, including the Helsinki Final Act, have not lost their significance.

They are an example of how international relations can be built if one is guided by principles of equality and identical security, by the realities that have arisen in the world, if one does not strive for any advantage but looks for mutually acceptable solutions and accords. It would appear that in connection with the 10th anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe it would be useful if, on behalf of the states that signed the Final Act, the will were expressed once again in Helsinki to overcome the dangerous tension, to develop peaceful cooperation and constructive principles in international life.

Our readiness to improve relations with the United States is . . . known, for mutual benefit and without attempts to encroach upon the legitimate rights and interests of each other. There is no sort of fatal inevitability of confrontation between the two countries. If one is to interpret both the positive and negative experience accumulated by the history of Soviet-U.S. relations—both remote and recent history—it should be said that the most rational thing is to look for ways to smooth out relations, to build a bridge of cooperation, but to build it from both sides.

Nuclear War and Arms Control

Following Soviet leadership practice of recent years, Gorbachev consistently has emphasized the need to prevent a nuclear war through arms control agreements while insisting that the Soviet Union will not allow the United States and its allies to upset strategic parity. He has voiced hope that the present U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva will bring results but criticized the U.S. approach to the talks.

Speech to members of Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, 18 May 1983 (*Pravda*, 19 May 83)

A great deal of noise is made in the West about “the Soviet military threat” and “Soviet military superiority.”

What can be said about this? Such allegations do not square with the actual state of affairs. And those political and military leaders in the West who by virtue of their position ought to know the facts know this. So why are these myths being spread? Let me remind you that there were similar instances during the fifties and sixties—first it transpired that the USSR was considerably ahead in terms of bombers, then a large U.S. “missile gap” was detected. After some time had passed these fabrications burst like soap bubbles. But this did not fail to leave its mark. Mistrust of the Soviet Union and its policy was persistently and deliberately sown in people’s minds. On the other hand, irreversible things also happened. Farfetched pretexts were used to develop broad new military programs and sharply crank up the arms race. Nobody can deny that the Soviet Union merely reacted to the challenge made to it: All the main kinds of strategic weapons were not introduced originally in the Soviet Union—we only responded to them. We were compelled to do this by legitimate concern for safeguarding our defense capability, nothing more. It was repeatedly reiterated from our side at the highest level: The USSR does not seek military superiority; we did not and do not have any such intentions.

It must not be hoped that we will close our eyes to the feverish activity to deploy nuclear weapons targeted on the USSR. We will do everything necessary to preserve military strategic parity, which serves as a reliable guarantee of peace. At the same time we are convinced of the erroneousness

of the concept equating the stockpiling of weapons with the strengthening of security. We are consistent and resolute opponents of the arms race. In the complex and dangerous situation that has taken shape our country states: There is no more important task in international politics at this time than to avert the growing threat of nuclear war.

Speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution, Sofia, 9 September 1984 (*Pravda*, 10 Sep 84)

The United States, having embarked upon the deployment of nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries, having broken off the talks in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons and strategic arms, and having essentially rejected constructive dialogue on preventing the militarization of space, is now giving assurances that it is in favor of curtailing the arms race and is allegedly willing to seek appropriate accords with the Soviet Union. Many people in the West echo the United States, asserting that virtually the only obstacle to dialogue is the hard line and obstinacy of the Soviet Union.

Speech to members of British Parliament, London, 18 December 1984 (*Pravda*, 19 Dec 84)

When we speak of war and peace, we ought, in doing so, to bear in mind that the character of present armaments, primarily nuclear armaments, has changed the traditional concept of these problems. Mankind is on the threshold of a new stage in the scientific and technical revolution that will also have an effect on further developing military equipment. Those people who resort to arguments about "limited," "short-duration," or "prolonged" nuclear wars evidently still remain the prisoners of stereotypes that have outlived their time, when war was a great misfortune, but did not threaten the end of mankind, as it does now. Inevitably the nuclear age dictates new political thinking. The most acute and urgent problem that currently disturbs all people on earth is the problem of preventing nuclear war.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech, Moscow, 20 February 1985 (*Pravda*, 21 Feb 85)

Today the world's peoples are showing enormous interest in the forthcoming Geneva talks in the entire range of space and nuclear arms. The Soviet Union is going into the talks with a sincere desire to achieve concrete results. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the Washington Administration's approach. On the eve of the talks, the United States has embarked on activity which sows doubts as to the American side's real intentions in agreeing to hold the Geneva talks. What can we say about this? One thing only: Calculations of this kind are mistaken. Indeed its very approach is unacceptable if there is seriously to be any question of reaching agreements. The world public expects Washington to take a constructive attitude toward the talks based on unswerving observance of the principle of equality and identical security.

Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985 (*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

Never before has such a frightful threat loomed over mankind as in our day. The only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord between the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear race, and the nonallowance of it in space; an accord on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to outplay the other side and dictate its conditions to it; an accord that will help us all to move forward the desired goal: the full destruction and banning forever of nuclear weapons and the full elimination of the threat of nuclear war. We are firmly convinced of this.

Interview in *Pravda*, 8 April 1985

Another conclusion which is equally topical is the need to end the arms race. The development of the international situation has reached a point where the questions arise: Where do you go from here? Is it not time for the figures who determine states' policies to stop, ponder, and not allow the adoption of decisions which would push the world toward a nuclear catastrophe?

There is an urgent need for international cooperation in organizing dialogue and seeking realistic decisions that would ease tension in the world and help bar the way to the arms race.

All states—large and small alike—must participate in this. It is understandable that the nuclear powers and primarily the Soviet Union and the United States have a special role to play. . . .

The new Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons have begun in Geneva. This is a positive fact. Together with the United States, we determined the subject and objective of the talks, and, to put it concisely, we determined them as follows: not to start an arms race in space, to curtail it on earth, and to proceed toward a radical reduction of nuclear arms, with the ultimate objective of totally eliminating them.

This accord must now be implemented. The talks are important. I say this primarily because the question of where the development of Soviet-American relations and developments in the world as a whole go from here is now being decided. The choice is as follows: either an arms race in all areas and the growth of the war threat or the consolidation of general security and a more stable peace for all.

Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

The already concluded first stage of the Geneva negotiations provides grounds for saying that Washington is not holding a course directed at accord with the Soviet Union. This is evident if only from the fact that it is altogether refusing to discuss the question of preventing the arms race from spreading into space at the same time as discussing the question of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. In this way it is violating the accord reached in January on the interlinking of the three directions: preventing the arms race in space; reducing nuclear strategic weapons; and reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. A question arises: How to explain such a position? It is explained by the fact that certain U.S. circles still want to achieve a dominant position in the world, primarily in the military sphere. . . .

One cannot help being surprised, too, at the haste with which the U.S. Administration replies with its standard and customary “no” to our

proposals, which is obvious evidence of the United States' unwillingness to steer the matter toward reasonable results. I will say one thing: An arms race and talks on disarmament cannot be combined. That is clear, if one is not to fall into hypocrisy and aim to deceive public opinion. The Soviet Union will not facilitate such a course, and this should be known by all those who are now engaged in a political game and not in serious policy. We would not want a repetition of the sorry experience of the previous talks. For its part, the Soviet Union will persistently work in Geneva for concrete, mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible not only to end the arms race but also advance the cause of disarmament. Now as never before, political will is needed for the sake of peace on earth, for the sake of a better tomorrow.

West Europe

Gorbachev has devoted considerable attention in his public statements to relations with West Europe. While criticizing U.S. military policies in Europe, he has been comparatively circumspect toward the West Europeans and has emphasized that Moscow must not be preoccupied with the United States in its dealings with the West.

Speech to PCP Congress, Oporto, 16 December 1983 (*Pravda*, 17 Dec 83)

Today we have to say with great alarm that the siting of Pershing II and cruise missiles on FRG, British, and Italian territory has become a fact. It is clear that this is just the starting point of the process of building up the U.S. nuclear missile might on the West European continent. We are talking about a large-scale military-political operation by the U.S. leadership.

R. Reagan's Administration is leading matters toward a fundamental change in the military-strategic and political situation in Europe. And if they get away with it here on European soil, we can imagine the logic of the subsequent actions by the incumbent U.S. politicians and strategists, intoxicated by the feeling that they can get away with anything.

No one will make R. Reagan a gift of nuclear superiority! The fate of socialism and progress will not be dependent on U.S. nuclear tyranny!

People in the West claim that the installation of U.S. missiles will strengthen peace and security in Europe. This is a gross deception. There still are many people in Europe who remember how, returning from Munich in 1938, the British and French political leaders of the time assured their peoples that they had brought them peace. But they brought them war.

The reality prevailing in Europe today is exceptionally difficult and dangerous. The level of security reached on the continent is being consigned to the past together with the loss of many of detente's gains.

Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 83)

The appeal "No to War" is resounding throughout Europe. It has met with a response in the United States, and the other NATO countries are having to take account of the actions of public forces against the arms race and against the deployment of American missiles in West Europe. These actions express a new level of human consciousness and activity of the masses.

Speech to members of British Parliament, London, 18 December 1984 (*Pravda*, 19 Dec 84)

It is well known that Europe in the 1970's became the cradle of the policy of detente. Important trends in cooperation took shape then between the countries of West Europe and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The United States and Canada joined in this process, signing the Helsinki Final Act.

The way relations between states develop in Europe has a great influence on the way the international situation as a whole develops.

We all agree that we live in a vulnerable, fairly fragile, but interconnected world; in a world where, whether you like it or not, it is essential to co-exist with each other. Whatever else divides us we have but one planet. Europe is our common home; a home, and not a "theater of military action."

RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech, Moscow, 20 February 1985 (*Pravda*, 21 Feb 85)

While attaching great significance to the normalization of relations with the United States and to honest talks with it on all the topical problems of international life, at the same time, we never forget for a minute that the world is not limited to that country alone, but is a much bigger place. The Soviet Union has and does devote great and constant attention to its relations with all states that want peace and equal, mutually advantageous cooperation. . . .

Soviet people believe in the good sense of West Europeans and in their interest in preventing Europe, our common home, from being turned into a theater of military actions and a firing range for testing Pentagon doctrines of "limited" nuclear war. We are pleased to note the desire of many West European states for political dialogue. For its part, the USSR has been and remains attached to the policy of good-neighborly relations among all European states.

China

Gorbachev's statements on China before he became general secretary followed closely the prevailing Soviet line, with harsh criticism in the early 1980's giving way to virtual silence after efforts to ease tensions began in 1982. Since assuming the top leadership post, he has underscored Moscow's interest in improving bilateral ties with Beijing and reconfirmed China's status as a "socialist" country.

Speech to MPRP Congress, Ulaanbaatar, 26 May 1981 (*Pravda*, 27 May 81)

While aggravating the international situation the imperialists have found active accomplices—the Beijing leaders who consider the struggle against the socialist community one of the main trends of their foreign policy.

The situation in the vast Asian Continent is tense. The policy of imperialism and Chinese hegemonism directly contradicts the vital interests of the Asian states and threatens their security. . . .

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Everywhere Beijing is closely following this provocative policy, [of the imperialists] ignoring not only the interests of peace but also the interests of the Chinese people itself. This is demonstrated by its hostile policy to its neighboring states, including the Mongolian People's Republic, and by the rough pressure on the Indochinese countries.

Speech to VCP Congress, Hanoi, 28 March 1982 (*Pravda*, 29 Mar 82)

Washington is playing the "China card" in an attempt to make the most of the anti-Sovietism and hegemonism of the Chinese ruling circles to further the global strategy of the United States.

Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985 (*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

We will do everything dependent upon us to broaden interaction with all the socialist states and to enhance the role and influence of socialism in world affairs.

We would like a serious improvement in relations with the PRC and consider that given reciprocation this is fully possible.

Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

Purposefully and persistently the Soviet Union will strengthen mutual links and develop cooperation with other socialist countries including the People's Republic of China. Our stance on this question is known. It remains in force.

The Third World

Gorbachev has hewed closely to standard Soviet formulations regarding the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, blaming economic backwardness on Western "neocolonialist" policies and accusing the United States of threatening the independence of Third World

countries. As general secretary, Gorbachev has offered routine pledges of Soviet support for the developing countries' efforts to increase their independence.

Speech to VCP Congress, Hanoi, 28 March 1982 (*Pravda*, 29 Mar 82)

In the Near East region the United States is encouraging Israel's predatory policy and preventing the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. In southern Africa it is only thanks to imperialism's support that the citadel of racism—the Republic of South Africa—is preserved and that Angola, Mozambique, and other African states are subjected to the racists' attacks.

In the Central American and Caribbean region the U.S. Administration is threatening Cuba, preparing a plot against Nicaragua, and helping the bloody Salvadoran junta to stifle that country's freedom-loving people.

In Asia the U.S. imperialists are frenziedly deploying extremely dangerous activities. . . .

The imperialists who pose as defenders of human rights did not say anything when Pol Pot, a disciple of the Maoists, brazenly massacred hundreds of thousands of his compatriots. And now when the Kampuchean people with the assistance of fraternal Vietnam have revived and are building a peaceful life, they stage-manage the adoption of slanderous resolutions of all kinds while preparing an armed intervention with the participation of traitors to the Kampuchean people, including Pol Pot. Beijing and Washington are inflating the so-called "Kampuchean problem" which does not exist in fact; this problem has been settled for a long time now by the Kampuchean people themselves. . . .

Article in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, No. 10, 1982

Soviet people are well aware of the world's food situation and the difficulties which the people of many countries experience in this connection. Malnutrition and hunger are still the cause of serious illnesses and death for millions of people on various continents on the globe. The

epicenter of the world food crisis lies in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America which have only recently gained liberation from colonial oppression.

The Soviet Union regards this crisis as one of the most important global socioeconomic problems confronting mankind in the second half of this century

The main causes of the existing food situation in the liberated countries are explained by imperialist policy, which has always been aimed at securing economic advantages for monopoly capital. Today this is manifested in the implementation of a neocolonialist policy which hinders the creation of an independent national economy in young states and in particular the creation of a multisector agriculture.

The governments of developing countries and the public in those countries note that the socialist states' support is effective, selfless, and just and is built on fundamentally different principles from those applied by capitalist powers. U.S. imperialism, for instance, has always used food "aid" to establish its influence in various "Third World" countries and secure its own strategic interests there. The U.S. practice of using grain deliveries as an instrument of political pressure has become particularly well known. Those who are unwilling to submit to diktat are cut off from the food market. The blockade on food sales to Cuba has been operating for more than 20 years now. This "punishment" has now been extended to Nicaragua and a number of other states which have secured liberation from colonial domination. Attempts have also been made to apply it to the Soviet Union and certain other socialist countries.

Report to Ideology Conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

The United States has entangled many developing countries in its economic tentacles. Taking root in their economies and sucking out their vital fluids, they doom such countries to protracted backwardness and economic and political dependence. Bank loans at usurious rates are the reason for the enslavement of young nation-states. Imperialism is directly responsible for the starvation and poverty of millions of people in developing countries.

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Economic expansion is accompanied by political and military aggression. What imperialism is doing in Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and South Africa cannot be characterized as anything other than state terrorism, the most flagrant violation of the norms of international law and a manifestation of modern neocolonialism.

Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

The Soviet Union has always supported the struggle of the peoples for liberation from the colonial yoke and today, too, our sympathies are on the side of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that are following the path of strengthening their independence and social renewal. To us they are friends and partners in the struggle for lasting peace, and better, just relations between peoples.

Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

We are advocating the further expansion of many-sided cooperation with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The CPSU and the Soviet state invariably support the right of all peoples, in accordance with their own choice, to determine their own socioeconomic present and to build their future without any outside interference whatsoever. Attempting to refuse the peoples this sovereign right is a hopeless and doomed matter.

Meeting with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, 29 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 30 Apr 85)

Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union was resolutely coming out in defense of the inalienable right of the Nicaraguan people to free, democratic and independent development and was in solidarity with the struggle waged by Nicaragua against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism.

The USSR will continue to give friendly Nicaragua assistance in resolving urgent problems of economic development and also political and diplomatic support in its efforts to uphold its sovereignty. The Soviet

leadership proceeds from the assumption that in the present-day situation broad international solidarity with Nicaragua is an inalienable part of the common struggle for peace and for the right of all the peoples to freedom and independence.

The Soviet participants in the meeting wished the leadership and people of Nicaragua success in their heroic struggle and in accomplishing the complex and responsible tasks facing the country.

International Economics and Trade

Gorbachev's speeches and writings on international issues indicate that he takes a particular interest in the world economy and Soviet foreign economic relations. Although he has used harsh language to score U.S. trade and monetary policies, he has repeatedly reaffirmed Moscow's interest in expanding economic cooperation with the West.

Article in *Problemy Mira i Sotsializma*, No. 10, 1982

The Soviet Union has no intention of renouncing the benefits of the international division of labor and international trade. This too is reflected in the documents of the CPSU Central Committee May plenum. "It is quite natural," it was noted at the plenum, "that the draft program provides for cooperation with foreign countries, primarily socialist countries."

The USSR's cooperation with interested liberated countries will be further developed. While helping them to strengthen their agriculture, we will at the same time be importing the traditional produce of tropical and subtropical farming, which is in demand but is not produced in our country.

The elaboration of the Food Program has revived interest in the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union on the part of a number of firms and organizations in capitalist states. The Soviet stance on this question is well known and has always been characterized by a constructive approach. We favor all-around cooperation and mutually advantageous trade with those who do this without discrimination or

political pressure. The USSR does not intend to cut itself off from mutually advantageous economic relations, but we cannot help drawing conclusions from the actions of U.S. aggressive circles which resort to the policy of sanctions and boycotts.

Report to Ideology Conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (*Zhivoye Tvorchestvo Naroda*, Moscow, 1984)

The attempts to subordinate world economic ties and trade and financial credit relations to the egoistic interests of American monopolies are obvious. Artificially raising interest rates, American monopolies have of late been attracting up to \$100 billion of foreign capital annually to finance their economy. At the same time, the overall sum of direct capital investments by American business in foreign enterprises, according to the latest estimates, has exceeded \$260 billion, and their finished products are assessed at more than \$1 trillion. All of this is having a destabilizing influence on U.S. economic partners.

Speech to British business leaders, London, 20 December 1984 (*Pravda*, 21 Dec 84)

Life itself confirms that the creation of a material base to consolidate and deepen detente is not possible without firm, stable international economic relations

We are confident of our potential to solve for ourselves issues arising from our national economy. At the same time we do not rule out the broadest cooperation with foreign firms

No country or group of countries is able now to have a monopoly of the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution. What is required is broad international cooperation, and, in our opinion, there are opportunities for this to be achieved. Let us have greater realism and mutual trust, gentlemen

We have always stressed that all manner of artificial restrictions in foreign economic ties bring no benefits to the trading partners and contradict the long-term interests of developing cooperation. I think that you, likewise, share this point of view

It is necessary to give trade and economic cooperation a steady and forward-looking momentum and to create an atmosphere that would facilitate this process. It is no secret that certain circles in the West strive to portray the Soviet Union's readiness to take part in the process almost as a sign of weakness. The opponents of "economic detente"—and unfortunately they are still not extinct in the world—try to turn trade with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries into a kind of instrument of political pressure.

The view that trade between East and West benefits socialist countries alone, is, in my view, just as groundless. Businessmen present in this hall know very well that trade can only be mutually advantageous. It has been known from time immemorial that you cannot make a deal without getting mutual advantages. Likewise, there is no side that will agree to trade to its own detriment.

Discrimination in trade harms above all those who initiate it, since it rebounds on them through loss of profitable orders.

Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

There is a broadening and intensification of the economic expansion of the United States. The manipulation of bank rates, the predatory role of the transnational corporations, political limitations on trade, and all sorts of boycotts and sanctions are creating an atmosphere of tension and distrust in international economic relations, disorganizing the world economy and trade, and undermining its legal foundations. There is a strengthening of the exploitation of the ex-colonial countries and a blocking of their economic decolonialization process. Concentrating in its hands a growing amount of the financial and material resources of other countries, the United States directly or indirectly puts them into the service of its gigantic military programs.

In these conditions ever-growing interest is aroused in the world by the idea of elaborating and implementing measures to normalize international economic relations and to ensure economic security for states

The Soviet Union advocates fruitful and all-around economic and scientific-technical cooperation built on principles of mutual advantage and excluding any discrimination. It is ready to further expand and

strengthen trade relations, to develop new forms of economic ties, based on mutual interest in the joint development of scientific-technical and technological innovations, in planning and building enterprises, and in the use of raw material resources. In posing the question in this way it is necessary to look attentively into the state of our foreign economic ties, to take a somewhat more profound look at them, taking into account the long-term view. Despite international tension there are favorable opportunities here. The approach to mutually advantageous economic ties and foreign trade should be broad, large scale, and directed toward the future. We are in favor of extensive, mutually advantageous cooperation at many levels with the states of West Europe, Japan, and other capitalist countries.

International Communism

Gorbachev has staked out standard Soviet positions on political issues involving foreign communist parties, insisting that all attempts at ideological innovation and adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to particular "national" conditions must be tempered by a firm commitment to orthodox principles of "socialist and proletarian internationalism."

Speech to PCP Congress, Oporto, 16 December 1983 (*Pravda*, 17 Dec 83)

Under today's conditions the significance of the cohesion of all forces of social progress and democracy, and primarily of the communist movement, is greater than ever before. Our movement was born under the banner of proletarian internationalism. Its inexhaustible strength is contained in loyalty to this principle. Experience has proved that the parties which permit deviations from the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism for the sake of some expedient or transient goals inevitably encounter, in the final analysis, the negative consequences of such actions, difficulties, and at times even such turns of events as lead to the weakening of class positions. Unity and cohesion comprise the main condition for new victories by the forces of socialism, peace, and progress. The relations between the CPSU and the PCP are a worthy example of such unity and international solidarity.

Speech to ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution, Sofia, 9 September 1984 (*Pravda*, 10 Sep 84)

The fraternal countries are assuredly advancing to ever higher stages in their economic and social maturity. International experience has substantially enriched our ideas of the world of socialism, of its general laws, and the special features of the methods and forms in socialist construction, answering the conditions and traditions of the individual countries. The main conclusion here is that fidelity on the part of the communist parties to Marxist-Leninist teaching and the ability to put it into practice are the decisive guarantees of successful development along the path of socialism. The CPSU, along with the other fraternal parties, will continue to take a principled stance on issues concerning the essence of Marxism-Leninism and will decisively defend the purity and revolutionary spirit of Lenin's teaching.

Of course, we do not regard revolutionary theory as something frozen nor do we seek in it universal recipes suitable for all cases in life. Reality enriches the theory with new experience, and experience creatively interpreted in light of Marxist-Leninist science becomes a powerful weapon in the hands of communists

Confronted with the united, cohesive, and internationalist front of the socialist community countries, the imperialist forces are trying in various roundabout ways to weaken it. To this end, the notorious policy of differentiation was set in motion. The imperialists brazenly assert their right to punish some and reward other socialist countries. The crusade against communism and the psychological war that have been proclaimed by the U.S. Administration are indeed aimed at undermining proletarian socialist internationalism, and deep recognition of the unity of the national and internationalist interests of every fraternal country is greater than ever before. No one can remain aloof in the struggle that imperialism is imposing upon our community. The strengthening of the socialist community is a common cause that requires joint and active efforts

Our wide-ranging ties with the socialist states located here [the Balkans] are growing stronger and deeper. I would also like to say that our country favors normalization of relations with the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. With good will on both sides, this issue can be resolved in the interests of the peoples of both states and the cause of peace and socialism.

Defense and Military Preparedness

Gorbachev consistently has vowed that Moscow will do everything necessary to maintain a reliable defense for the Soviet Union and its allies. He also has emphasized that heightened East-West tension underscores the need for a strong military capability.

Speech to MPRP Congress, Ulaanbaatar, 26 May 1981 (*Pravda*, 27 May 81)

The realistic analysis of the international situation once again convinces us of the necessity to maintain the defense of the socialist community at the necessary level. We have a solid shield for peaceful labor of the Soviet people and its allies.

Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (*Pravda*, 23 Apr 83)

The might of the defensive alliance of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty is guarding peace and the gains of socialism. If the situation demands it, the peoples of the socialist community are doing and will do everything necessary in order that their defense should be even stronger; even more effective. Surrounded by the love of the entire people and the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the USSR's Armed Forces are vigilantly protecting the peaceful life of the Soviet people and of the entire community of the fraternal socialist countries.

Speech to Order of Lenin Award Ceremony, Smolensk, 27 June 1984 (*Pravda*, 28 Jun 84)

In the face of imperialism's increased aggressiveness we have to be on our guard, display high vigilance, and strengthen our defense as never before.

Speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution, Sofia, 9 September 1984 (*Pravda*, 10 Sep 84)

Concentrating their efforts on tackling creative tasks, the CPSU and the Soviet state are giving unremitting attention to the strengthening of the defense potential of the country. This diverts no small part of our resources. But the countries of the socialist community cannot act in any other way. We are all obliged to do this in order to reliably guard the socialist gains of our peoples lest anyone try to speak to the socialist world in the language of force.

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Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(*Pravda*, 12 Mar 85)

In a complicated international situation it is important now as never before to maintain the defense potential of our socialist homeland at such a level that potential aggressors will know well that any encroachment on the security of the land of the Soviets and its allies, on the peaceful life of the Soviet people, will be met with a shattering retaliatory blow. Our glorious Armed Forces will continue to have at their disposal everything necessary for this.

Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (*Pravda*, 24 Apr 85)

The achievement of military-strategic balance with the states of the aggressive NATO bloc is an exceptionally important historic gain for the fraternal countries of socialism. This parity must be cherished by all possible means, for the sake of peace. It reliably deters the aggressive appetites of imperialism. Nor shall we in the future spare any effort to ensure that the USSR Armed Forces have all that is required to reliably defend our fatherland and its allies, so that nobody will be able to catch us unawares.

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*File:
Gorbachev
statements*

June 27, 1985

~~Jack FYI~~

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USSR: GORBACHEV'S JUNE 26 COMMENTS ON GENEVA TALKS

Q: What is the U.S. reaction to Gorbachev's comments on the Geneva talks in his June 26 speech, in which he accused the U.S. of "marking time" in the talks, charged that SDI is a "blind wall blocking the way to agreements," and warned that the USSR "cannot allow the talks to be used anew as a decoy, as a cover for military preparations whose purpose is to ensure U.S. strategic superiority?"

A: -- WE ARE ASTONISHED BY MR. GORBACHEV'S DISTORTED CHARACTERIZATION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS, AND BY HIS THINLY-VEILED THREAT TO SUSPEND THE TALKS.

-- AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNJUSTIFIED WALK-OUTS FROM THE INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF 1983, OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS WERE SET BACK BY MORE THAN ONE YEAR.

-- THE SOVIET UNION'S APPARENT THREAT TO SUSPEND THE ONGOING NEW NEGOTIATIONS CASTS DOUBT ON ITS SERIOUSNESS IN THE TALKS, AND ITS READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN JANUARY BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO ESTABLISHING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW TALKS.

-- IT IS THE SOVIET UNION AND NOT THE UNITED STATES THAT IS "MARKING TIME" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALMOST TWO FULL ROUNDS OF TALKS, WE HAVE YET TO SEE ANY CONCRETE NEW PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, OR TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND FLEXIBLE POSITIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES.

-- THEY HAVE ALSO REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION THAT EMERGING

DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES COULD MAKE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE STABLE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, AND TO ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AGREED GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- INSTEAD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS SOUGHT UNILATERALLY TO IMPOSE PRECONDITIONS, LINKING DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS TO PRIOR U.S. AGREEMENT TO SOVIET DEMANDS THAT WE ABANDON RESEARCH UNDER THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

-- THE HYPOCRISY OF THIS POSITION IS ALL THE MORE STRIKING, WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE FACT THAT IT IS THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAS THE WORLD'S ONLY DEPLOYED ABM SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM, WHICH IS UNDERMINING THE ABM TREATY THROUGH CONSTRUCTION OF THE KRASNOYRASK RADAR, AND WHICH HAS BEEN ENGAGED FOR MANY YEARS AND AT A HIGHER LEVEL OF EFFORT IN THE SORT OF RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE NOW BEING UNDERTAKEN UNDER SDI.

-- MR. GORBACHEV'S ALLEGATION THAT THE U.S. IS USING THE GENEVA TALKS AS A "COVER" FOR MILITARY PROGRAMS IS ALSO STRIKING WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE FACT THAT, DURING THE TWO YEARS WHEN THE PREVIOUS INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY, DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES DEPLOYED NO NEW LRINF MISSILES, THE SOVIET UNION ADDED SOME 300 SS-20 WARHEADS TO ITS ARSENAL.

-- U.S. NEGOTIATORS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE BROAD AUTHORITY AND FLEXIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS THAT MEET THE INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO TAKE A SIMILARLY CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, PROGRESS WILL BE POSSIBLE.

USSR

Handling of Gorbachev Speeches Fails To Follow Pattern

Soviet media treatment of General Secretary Gorbachev's speeches has diverged sharply from the predictable pattern that was observed for the previous three general secretaries. The media's seemingly erratic handling of the speeches suggests that no fixed guidelines have been established for broadcast and publication of the new leader's public remarks, which appear to include substantial extemporaneous sections. There are no indications that the anomalies reflect factional infighting.

Since Gorbachev became general secretary, the longstanding pattern of dissemination of the top Soviet leader's speeches has been shattered. Whereas the speeches of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were released in one standard version regardless of the medium, Gorbachev's speeches have repeatedly appeared in two or even three substantially different versions.

So far no precise or predictable pattern has emerged. Sometimes the television or radio versions—especially if they are videotapes of Gorbachev delivering his speech rather than an announcer reading the speech—are the most complete. In other cases, the fullest version appears later in pamphlet form.

Some of the variations may be traceable to Gorbachev's habit of departing from his written text while delivering a speech, a practice that is evident in his televised speeches. Not all variations can be explained in this fashion, however. The irregular handling may, to some extent, also reflect personal editorial whims of the general secretary. Whatever the reason, there have been no indications that the changes reflect any tampering with Gorbachev's speeches against his wishes or any effort to accommodate other leaders' concerns.

During the period from mid-March, when he became party chief, to late September, Gorbachev delivered 28 speeches that were reported in some fashion. Most were short, ceremonial speeches such as at dinners for visiting foreigners. Three (his 18 June speech to media editors, his 1 July plenum

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speech, and his 11 July Minsk speech to military leaders) were mentioned in Soviet media and may have been important but were not published by the central press or broadcast by Soviet radio or television at the time and, as far as can be determined, have not been released subsequently. Nine substantive speeches were given broad media publicity, and it is the handling of these speeches that has manifested a highly irregular pattern:

- **8 April Speech to Economic Managers Conference.** This speech, Gorbachev's first substantive speech after becoming general secretary, was disseminated in unusual fashion but did not appear in more than one version. Initially, *Pravda* and TASS carried only a short report on the conference, including only two or three paragraphs describing Gorbachev's opening speech. Apparently a decision was made later to publicize Gorbachev's sharp comments on economic management in detail. Three days after the speech—on the evening of 11 April—TASS presented an extensive version of his short opening and closing speeches, and this version with minor variations appeared the next morning in *Pravda* and later in the journals *Kommunist* and *Partiynaya Zhizn* (*Party Life*). No pamphlet version of this conference speech has been issued, however.
- **23 April CPSU Central Committee Plenum Speech.** Gorbachev's next important speech—on economic questions—was handled in traditional fashion, with only one version appearing on radio and television and in the press. In keeping with usual Soviet practice for speeches to Central Committee plenums, there was no broadcast of Gorbachev delivering the speech.
- **8 May Speech on World War II Anniversary.** This ceremonial speech was broadcast live and published in *Pravda*, *Kommunist*, *Partiynaya Zhizn*, and in pamphlet form.
- **17 May Speech in Leningrad.** This speech appeared in several variations. Initially, Soviet radio and television on 17 May and *Pravda* and *Leningradskaya Pravda* the next day carried a short summary of his speech, omitting many controversial passages that were subsequently released. Four days later, on 21 May, Moscow radio broadcast a long (50-minute) recorded version. This broadcast, the most complete account of the speech, included numerous personal comments (for example, referring to his dealings with Leningrad leaders) that had been omitted from the earlier version.¹ Later, another long account appeared in pamphlet form and in *Kommunist* and

¹ See the *Trends* of 30 May 1985, pages 6-9.

Partiynaya Zhizn. This published version, however, dropped some of the statements included in the 21 May radio account and added some other remarks. Further complicating the picture, even the initial short *Pravda* version contained some comments not in either of the longer radio or pamphlet versions.

- **11 June Speech to Science and Technology Conference.** Replays of this speech continued the bewildering pattern of differing versions. Soviet television on the 11th broadcast a 73-minute recording of Gorbachev's speech. The version released by TASS and printed by *Pravda* and *Partiynaya Zhizn* was shorter but included sections not in the television version. A few days later a third version appeared in pamphlet form (signed to press on 17 June) and printed in *Kommunist* (signed to press on 19 June). The latter version also included substantial sections not in the television version.

- **26 June Speech in Dnepropetrovsk.** This address was carried on the same day in lengthy recordings on television that differed considerably from the version published in *Pravda* the next day and later in the two party journals. A third account of the speech came out later in pamphlet form (signed to press on 9 July). The *Pravda* version omitted many significant statements about economic policy but at the same time included others not in the television version (for example, that reorganization of administration would start with the agro-industrial complex and machine building).

- **27 June Speech in Kiev.** This speech, which was shorter and less substantive, was handled differently than his Dnepropetrovsk address. Only short recorded excerpts appeared on television, and no version was published in *Pravda*, the local Ukrainian papers, *Kommunist*, or *Partiynaya Zhizn*. Eventually a longer version did appear in pamphlet form (signed to press on 9 July), including an interesting statement that "not the market, not spontaneous forces of competition, but primarily the plan should determine the main aspects of economic development."

- **6 September Speech in Tyumen.** Soviet television telecast a long (79-minute) videotape of Gorbachev's speech on the day of delivery. *Pravda* on 7 September carried a much shorter version, omitting most of his critical remarks.

- **7 September Speeches in Tselinograd.** No version of Gorbachev's first speech in this Kazakh city appeared until three days after the event, when television carried a long (71-minute) videotape of his address. *Pravda* followed

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the next day with a shorter version. A videotape of a second, shorter speech on 7 September was also carried by Soviet television, on 10 September, but nothing was published in *Pravda*. *Pravda* did, however, announce on 15 September that the next issue of *Partiynaya Zhizn* would include versions of both the first Tselinograd speech and his earlier address in Tyumen.

**Other Media
Irregularities**


The appearance of varying versions of speeches in the central media has occurred for at least one other Soviet leader on one occasion since Gorbachev became party chief.² CPSU Secretary Yegor Ligachev's speech to the 26 July CPSU conference of regional organizational secretaries was published in a short version in the 27 July *Pravda*, but longer versions later appeared in *Kommunist* and *Partiynaya Zhizn*—with each journal printing slightly different versions. No pamphlet of Ligachev's speech is known to have appeared. (U/FOUO)

² As in the past, longer versions of speeches delivered outside Moscow by Soviet leaders below the rank of general secretary are often published in the local press. Thus, when Ligachev delivered a speech in Yerevan on 1 June, the local papers carried a much longer version than *Pravda*.

BC-GORBACHEV 2NDLD (WRITETHROUGH)

GORBACHEV OFFERS U.S. 50 PER CENT STRATEGIC ARMS CUT
(EDS: ADDS INFO GRAFS 11 TO END)

Handbook


*File
Gorbachev
state-
ments*

PARIS, OCT 3, REUTER - SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID TODAY THE KREMLIN HAD OFFERED THE UNITED STATES A JOINT 50 PER CENT CUT IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

GORBACHEV MADE PUBLIC THE PROPOSAL, PRESENTED BY SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA, IN A SPEECH AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY THE SPEAKER OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

HE ALSO ANNOUNCED A CUT IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS20 MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES DEPLOYED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE OVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS.

"A FEW DAYS AGO, WE ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES A PROPOSAL TO AGREE ON A COMPLETE BAN ON BOTH SIDES OF OFFENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS AND A TRULY RADICAL REDUCTION OF 50 PER CENT IN NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE," HE SAID.

GORBACHEV SAID THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS TO STOP THE ARMS RACE AND CREATE A BREAKTHROUGH FOR PEACE.

HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE TO REACH A SECOND SOVIET-AMERICAN ACCORD ON THE REDUCTION OF MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE "WITHOUT THE DIRECT LINK WITH THE PROBLEM OF SPACE AND STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS."

UP TO NOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS INSISTED THAT THE THREE SUBJECTS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN GENEVA TALKS MUST BE TREATED AS A SINGLE PACKAGE.

GORBACHEV SAID MOSCOW WAS PREPARED FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH FRANCE AND BRITAIN ON THE PLACE OF THEIR NUCLEAR DETERRENTS IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF FORCES.

"THIS POTENTIAL IS GROWING FAST AND WE CANNOT CLOSE OURE EYES TO IT", HE SAID.

GORBACHEV RECALLED THE SOVIET UNION'S MORATORIUM ON THE INSTALLATION IN EUROPE OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AND ADDED: "THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL SS20 MISSILES WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE IS NOW 243."

GORBACHEV SAID THIS NUMBER WAS THE SAME AS IN JUNE 1984, WHEN MOSCOW BEGAN TO INSTALL EXTRA MISSILES IN RESPONSE TO SIMILAR U.S. DEPLOYMENTS OF CRUISE AND PERSHING WEAPONS.

"THE SS-20 MISSILES WHICH WERE THEN DEPLOYED IN A SUPPLEMENTARY WAY ARE NOW WITHDRAWN FROM OPERATIONAL SERVICE AND THE FIXED INSTALLATIONS OF THESE MISSILES WILL BE DISMANTLED IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS," GORBACHEV SAID.

GORBACHEV SAID, HOWEVER, THAT OTHER SOVIET COUNTER-MEASURES ANNOUNCED EARLIER TO PERSHING AND CRUISE DEPLOYMENTS, AND AFFECTING U.S. TERRITORY, WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE.

AN OLDER GENERATION OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THE SS-5, HAD BEEN COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN FROM SERVICE AND THE KREMLIN WAS DOING THE SAME WITH ITS SS-4 MISSILES.

"THIS MEANS THAT ALTOGETHER THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE OF THE USSR IS MUCH LOWER THAN IT WAS 10 OR 15 YEARS AGO," HE SAID.

GORBACHEV ALSO SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO BAN THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, USING THE SAME METHOD AS THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH BANS THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALSO READY TO ESTABLISH A ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE FREE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND SAID THE PROBLEM OF RELIABLE VERIFICATION COULD BE SOLVED.

BUT GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SEARCH FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY THROUGH NEW WEAPONS UNDER A PROGRAM FOR "STAR WARS" WAS "AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS ILLUSION."

HE SAID EUROPEAN SECURITY DEPENDED ON "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, DETENTE, DISARMAMENT, AND THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION."

HE SAID SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WERE READY TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL BY NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AT THE STOCKHOLM EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

"WE ARE READY TO ACCEPT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD HELP TO OVERCOME MISTRUST AND BLOCK INSIDIOUS PREPARATIONS FOR WAR," HE SAID.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9

NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK

FROM: KARNA

You probably have this - but just for
the file, it's the translation of
Gorbachev's speech to the French
Parliament (CBS sent it over).

74

*File
Gorbachev
speeches*

48

*My K...
I do not know
who did English
translation - best
Joe Ferguson*

**EVE
NEWS IN
WASHINGTON
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659-2586**

Speech in the French Parliament
October 3, 1985

ATTN: PETER HENBALL

Mr. Chairman,
Esteemed Deputies and Senators,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am gratified by the opportunity to speak in the parliament of France, to meet with you - elected representatives of the French people. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity and to thank the President of the Republic for the kind invitation to visit your country.

Today is the second day of our delegation's visit. Important meetings have been held and an exchange of views has been started on topical questions of bilateral relations and international affairs. Of course, it is yet early to sum up the results of the talks with President Mitterrand and other statesmen of France. But it is obvious already that both sides are showing desire to impart a new impulse to the development of relations between our countries and, with due account to the existing realities, to bring closer our positions on international problems.

When talking with the President of the Republic and when addressing you today I strive, naturally, for the essence, the main directedness of the Soviet state's foreign policy to be understood better, to a fuller extent in France. Like the foreign policy of any state, it is determined first of all by internal requirements.

Permit me to dwell briefly on this question. I believe you know what a long and in many respects difficult road has been traversed by my country in the years of existence of Soviet government. From tsarist Russia we inherited extreme economic backwardness. Three quarters of the population were illiterate. Within a very short period of time, if the yardstick of history is applied, the USSR turned into a mighty, in all respects modern power with a high level of the people's culture. We put an end to unemployment and ensured for the population such social boons as free provision of housing, medical services and education. I will name a few figures illustrating the country's economic development. In the post-war years alone our national income grew more than 16 times while industrial output increased 24 times over. During the same time the real incomes of Soviet people increased six-fold.

Pride in our successes does not make us complacent. We see that at the present stage society's increased maturity sets before us much more scopeful tasks which in many ways are new ones by their content. We are fully aware also of the shortcomings that exist in our work, of the existing difficulties and problems, quite often sufficiently serious ones. The main task that we set ourselves today can be expressed in a brief formula: to accelerate society's social and economic development.

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This requires that many things be raised to a higher level - the scientific and technical base of the national economy, the methods of management and man himself, his consciousness, skills and qualification. In short, we have set off on the road to achieving a new qualitative state of society.

Our main task is to make the economy more efficient and dynamic, to make the life of people spiritually richer, more full-blooded and meaningful, to develop the socialist self-government of the people.

It is not difficult to understand that not only reliable peace but also a calm, normal international situation are a paramount condition of attaining these aims. And it is these priorities that determine our foreign policy, a policy in which, naturally, we strive to take into account in full measure the interests and requirements of other peoples, all the realities of the present epoch.

Our world, a multifaced and contradictory world, is rapidly approaching the end of the century and the millenium. It has more than its fair share of complex problems of a political, economic and social nature. The co-existence on our planet of two social systems, each of which is living and developing according to its laws, has long become a reality.

But one must see the other reality as well. And this reality is that the inter-connection and inter-dependence of countries and continents is becoming increasingly closer. This is an inevitable condition of the development of the world economy, of scientific and technological progress, the acceleration of the exchange of information and the movement of people and things - on land and even in outer space. In short, the entire development of human civilisation.

Alas, it is not always that the gains of civilisation are a boon for people. All too often and too vigorously the achievements of science and technology are being used also for the creation of means of annihilating humans, for the development and stockpiling of ever more terrible types of weapons.'

In these conditions Hamlet's famous question, "To be, or not to be" is being set already not before a single individual but before mankind. It develops into a global problem. There can be only one answer to it - mankind, civilisation must survive at all cost. But this can be ensured only if we learn to live together, to get along on this small planet by mastering the difficult art of showing consideration for each other's interests. This we call the policy of peaceful coexistence.

We are strong enough to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt to encroach on our people's security and peaceful work. But we hold that it is not by force of arms but only and exclusively by force of example one must prove the correctness of one's ideology, the advantages of the system that each people has chosen of its own will. Such is our firm conviction.

Gorbachev A-C

-3-

I spoke yesterday to the President about our perception of the main axis of contradictions, the struggle of the two tendencies in world politics. We regard as extremely dangerous the view, no matter how it is being justified, that the tasks facing the international community can be solved by the creation and stockpiling of ever new and more destructive types of arms - on Earth and in outer space. We regard as dangerous also actions that preserve and aggravate international tension. It is incandescent as it is. It is so incandescent that now it has become extremely difficult to reach agreement not only on complex, urgent matters but also on relatively simple problems. If we do not stop the present tendencies, tomorrow we will not be able to overcome their monstrous inertia. It will become even more difficult to talk.

That is why we consider it so important already now, immediately, before it is too late to stop the "infernal train" of the arms race, to start the reduction of arms, improve the international situation and develop peaceful cooperation among peoples. This is in mutual interest, this is everybody's task. Nobody can permit himself to sit it out on the sidelines.

The Soviet Union, as you probably know, not only issues calls but also acts in this direction.

We have unilaterally suspended the further deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe and called on the United States to respond in kind. We stopped all nuclear explosions and called on the United States to respond in kind. Quite naturally, we address this call to the other nuclear powers as well.

The Soviet Union proposes to start a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of both sides in Central Europe - and to start with a reduction of Soviet and American troops. Moreover, we are prepared to reduce more troops than the Americans.

As for outer space, we are for its use exclusively for peaceful purposes and persistently call for the reaching of agreement on this because a transfer of the arms race into outer space will make the reduction of nuclear arsenals objectively impossible. As you know, we have submitted to the United Nations Organisation a proposal on peaceful cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space.

And now I would like to inform you of the new steps taken by the Soviet Union. They pursue the same aim: to stop the baleful process of the arms race and ward off the war danger overhanging mankind.

First. A few days ago we proposed to the government of the United States to come to terms on the total prohibition of space strike arms for both sides and to reduce really radically, by 50 per cent, the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. //

In other words, we propose a practical solution to the very same tasks that were agreed upon by both sides early this year as being the aims of the Geneva talks: not only to stop the arms race but also to drastically lower the level of armaments and at the same time avert an arms race in outer space.

There is hardly any need to say how all this would strengthen strategic stability and mutual trust.

I can inform you that our delegation in Geneva has been instructed to present concrete proposals on this question and authorised to give the partners exhaustive explanations.

I am saying all this because a multitude of versions and false rumours are already circulating in the West concerning our proposal, and it is time for some clarification.

Second. Concerning medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. With the aim of making easier agreement on their speediest mutual reduction (as we are often told, in Western Europe, too, there is great interest in this) we consider it possible to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, outside of direct connection with the problem of space and strategic arms. This road, as it appears to us, may turn out to be practical.

In this connection I consider it important to explain our position on such a question as the place of the nuclear potential of France and Britain in the European balance of forces. This potential is growing rapidly and we can no longer ignore it. It was said from the French side that the nuclear forces of France are not subject to discussion without her participation. This stands to reason. It follows from this that it is time to start between us a direct dialogue on this theme and try to find an acceptable way out through joint effort. The Soviet Union is prepared for such a direct dialogue with France just as with Britain, of course.

Here I want to stress that we will take into account the security interests of France in the most attentive manner. And today, as it appears to us, the question of a reduction of her armaments does not stand.

Third. You know that we have announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The number of SS-20 missiles that the Soviet Union has on standby alert in the European zone is now 243. This means that it precisely accords with the level of June 1984 when the additional deployment of our missiles was started in response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. The SS-20 missiles that were additionally deployed in the process have been withdrawn from standby alert and the stationary installations for housing these missiles will be dismantled within the next two months. As to our reply measures in respect of the territory of the United States itself they continue to remain in force.

I would also wish to explain the meaning with which we invest the term "European zone" in this case. This is the zone in which medium-range missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of Western Europe are deployed.

It should be added to this that we have already totally phased out the old, and very powerful, SS-5 missiles and are continuing to phase out SS-4 missiles. This means that on the whole the number of medium-range carrier missiles in the European zone of the USSR is now much smaller than ten or even fifteen years ago. In accenting this self-limitation we proceed from the broad interests of European security. I think Europe is now entitled to expect a reply step by the United States - the termination by it of the further deployment of its medium-range

Gorbby A-C

-5-

missiles on the European continent.

You see what serious steps the Soviet Union is taking. In combination with the previous actions our latest proposals, as it seems to us, are a package of constructive and realistic measures the implementation of which would bring about a genuine breakthrough in the development of international relations. A breakthrough in favour of peace, security and cooperation among peoples.

This, if you please, is our programme of improving the explosive international situation that threatens peace. We expect that in response to our proposals the West too will traverse its part of the road.

I would like to stress that the realisation of the programme proposed by us would also signify substantial advance to an aim that is so desired by all the peoples and is so important to them - the prohibition and total liquidation of nuclear arms, the total delivery of mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

There can be no victors in a nuclear war. It seems that all responsible politicians are in agreement on this. It is time to draw a practical conclusion from this - to stop the nuclear arms race. And we believe that this demand will be supported by all honest, realistically thinking political forces, public figures, all people who cherish their homeland, their life, the life of their children and grandchildren.

The task of totally prohibiting chemical weapons and liquidating their stockpiles is becoming ever more urgent. At the conference on disarmament in Geneva the Soviet Union is actively taking part in the drafting of a relevant convention. We are meeting our partners in the talks half-way in a number of substantial aspects, including in respect of verification. I am sure that it is quite possible to reach agreement on reliable verification.

Incidentally, the following thought also prompts itself here. If it was possible to reach agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms why not apply the same method in respect of chemical weapons? This would be in the general channel of efforts to achieve their total prohibition. The Soviet Union would be prepared to take part in the drafting of an international accord on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons. We are also prepared to do everything depending on us for the creation of a zone in the centre of Europe free from chemical weapons.

As I speak here, in Paris, in the heart, it can be said, of Western Europe, I cannot but speak about some substantial problems of European security, about how we in the Soviet Union see them.

I will start with the most general question. What, after all, is security in Europe? It is absence of war and war danger. The inter-dependence, the intertwining of the destinies of peoples, despite the difference of the social roads chosen by them, is felt in Europe with special force. Because of geographical density, over-saturation with armaments Europe, like no other continent, is vulnerable to an armed conflict, the more so a nuclear one.

Gorbys A-C

- 5 -

This means that Europe's security cannot be ensured by military means, by military force. This is an absolutely new situation and means a departure from traditions, from a mentality and manner of action that took centuries, even milleniums to form. It is not at once that human thought adjusts itself to something that is new. This applies to all. We are feeling this. We have started the rethinking, the adjustment to full conformity with the new realities of many customary things, including in the military and, naturally, the political fields. We would want such a rethinking to take place both in Western Europe and beyond it.

So far fear of unacceptable retribution is one of the obstacles to war, to the use of military force. But everybody understands, however, that it is impossible to build a lasting peace on fear alone. But the entire question is where to search for the alternative to fear or, to use military language, deterrence?

We see what attempts are now being made to find a way out - by using new arms in the so called 'star wars'. This is an illusion, and an extremely dangerous one at that. It is naive in general to search for a solution of the problem of security in the perfection of the shield and the sword. Security in Europe, just as international security as a whole, can be achieved only on the road of peaceful coexistence, relaxation of tension, disarmament, strengthening of trust and development of international cooperation.

This is a long and difficult road, the more so that it requires the overcoming of mutual suspicions, mistrust and prejudices accumulated over decades. But there is no other road, if we want to live. And like any long road, it begins with the first steps which often are the most difficult ones to make. We understand this and want to help ensure the solution of the task - for ourselves and for you. It is this that motivates the proposals that I have already mentioned.

This applies also to the conference in Stockholm which is discussing the important problem of mutual trust in the military field. As it appears to us, the contours of future accords are gradually beginning to take shape there. They include making more concrete and imparting maximum effectiveness to the principle of the non-use of force. They include a definite set of confidence-building measures in the military field, these so to say safety fuses to prevent an erroneous interpretation of the actions of the other side in conditions of an aggravation of the military confrontation. A number of states, first of all neutral ones, propose to reach agreement on mutual exchanges of annual plans of military activity subject to notification. We are prepared for such an accord in the hope that it will help overcome suspiciousness and impede covert preparations for war.

The ideas of setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, including on our continent - in the north of Europe and in the Balkans, are spreading ever more wider. We support these ideas, are ready to take part in the appropriate guarantees where this is required. We view as useful the idea to create a corridor free of nuclear arms along both sides of the line dividing the two military-political groupings. We also hold that states that do not possess nuclear arms and do not have them on their territory have full right to reliable guarantees of their security based on international law, guarantees that nuclear arms will not be used against them.

Many aspects of European cooperation are recorded in the Helsinki Final Act. We hold that it is a serious achievement and fully retains its importance. When the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki accords was marked, all the participants in the all-European process declared for its continuation. The Soviet Union is prepared to take the most vigorous part in this. Every European country has contributed a share of its national experience to the Helsinki process. This is a common asset of the peoples of Europe, and it should be protected and multiplied by joint effort.

The political climate in Europe depends in no small measure on the development of economic ties between the West and the East. Here, too, an innovative approach is necessary. The solution of the tasks of industrial, technical and scientific progress that face each country today could be made much easier by an effective utilisation of the international division of labour. We in the Soviet Union are prepared for this, including for the search of new forms of co-production and cooperation. It goes without saying that this implies principles of mutual advantage, equality and a serious approach.

The establishment of more businesslike relations between the CMEA and the EEC also appears to be useful to us. The countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance have displayed in this respect a constructive initiative which appears to have been met favourably. It is important for it to produce concrete results. Here, as it has already been stated, in the measure in which the EEC countries come out as a "political unit", we are prepared to find a common tongue with them on concrete international problems as well. This could be done in various forms, including also parliamentary ties, among them with those who represent the European Parliament.

Without uniting the efforts of all European countries it will not be possible really to solve also such an acute problem as preserving and improving the environment on our continent. In many of its areas, figuratively speaking, the land is beginning to burn under the feet, the rain falling from the sky is an acid one, if not fiery, while the sky itself cannot be seen because of smoke. European rivers and seas are acquiring a pitiful state. In our time, it seems, we did not act with sufficient far-sightedness and generated such problems that now simply defy solution within national frameworks. Here truly there is a field in which we all must become aware of the continent's common destiny.

Gorbys A-C

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Much can be done in the broad sphere that is called the "humanitarian" one. The preservation by common effort of the cultural values of the past, cultural exchanges that mutually enrich one of the cradles of mankind's spiritual values - Europe - does this not deserve the closest attention? It is with interest that we are preparing for such an out of the ordinary event as the "Cultural Forum" opening in a few days in Budapest. Also belonging to this sphere is the expansion of information about each other's life, cultivation of feelings of mutual sympathy and respect. The mutual study of each other's languages is of much importance from this point of view. Extensive exchanges of school pupils, students and teachers is a promising thing. It is very important for the young generations to have correct perceptions of each other because it is for them to build peaceful Europe. The pooling of efforts in the struggle against diseases - old and new ones - is a task of immense importance.

The Soviet Union attaches the most serious importance to ensuring human rights. It is only necessary to free this problem from hypocrisy and speculations, from attempts at interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Such problems are rather acute in present-day Europe as the position of migrant workers, mixed marriages, qualifications of families. We are for approaching such problems in a positive and humane spirit with full respect for the sovereign rights of all states.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I believe that in the present situation it is especially important not to emulate medieval fanatics and not to spread ideological differences to inter-state relations. Stability in these relations, their lesser susceptibility to political situations will strengthen also stability in Europe as a whole.

We do not think, for instance, that there is a taboo for life on the possibility of establishing contacts in some form between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance as organisations. Not to speak of overcoming Europe's division into opposing groupings in a more or less foreseeable future. As is known, this is exactly what we and our allies are proposing. But, as we see it, even in conditions of the existence of the two blocs it is possible to create such a *modus vivendi* which would blunt the acuteness of the present confrontation.

And, of course, it is more important today than ever before to develop a more intensive political dialogue between the East and the West, to use all the already established forms of this dialogue - regular meetings at various levels, including of course the highest one, political consultations, broad contacts of the scientific and cultural communities.

We regard the development of parliamentary ties as a very important matter as well. I would like to stress this particularly as I am speaking within these walls. This includes, naturally, also the development of parliamentary ties with France. Deputies of the National Assembly and Senate of France can be assured that they are welcome guests in Moscow. I state this on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Gorbachev A-C

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Such, in most general outline, are our views on how really it is possible to achieve, and within a comparatively short period of time at that, an improvement of the situation on our continent and to increase Europe's role in overcoming the present stretch of confrontation.

I will add yet one moment. The need of more active interaction to eliminate the seats of conflict and tension existing in various areas has never been felt more than now. The fact that the Soviet Union and France, despite their belonging to opposing military-political groupings, have much in common in the approach to a number of presently existing regional problems and situations is one of the examples of the possibilities of such interaction. For instance, the situation in the Middle East, in Central America, South Africa, and so on. Our contacts with the French leaders confirm this.

When proposing an expansion of goodneighbourhood and cooperation with Western Europe we have no intention at all to belittle the importance of a possible contribution to this by Canada which belongs to NATO and at the same time has signed the Helsinki Act. Neither does our European policy have an anti-American directedness.

Since one hears numerous speculations on this theme permit me to dwell on it in greater detail. The very way the question is posed - that by improving relations with Western Europe we want to drive a wedge, to set it at loggerheads with the United States - is absurd. Firstly, we want to have good relations not only with Western Europe but also with the United States. Just as for that matter also with China, Japan and other countries. We are not pursuing a metternich-like policy of "balance of forces", of setting one state against another, knocking together blocs and counter-blocs, creating "axes" and "triangles", but a policy of global detente, of strengthening world security and developing universal international cooperation. Secondly, we are realists and we understand how strong are the ties - historical, political and economic - linking Western Europe and the United States.

Esteemed Deputies,

The best minds of mankind have warned about the danger of our consciousness lagging behind the rapidly changing life. This is especially topical today. Man is already appearing in the galaxial distances. But how much remains undone on Earth! Not a single nation, not a single state is capable of solving the existing problems alone. But the old baggage of disunity, confrontation and mistrust impedes unification.

I know that by far not everybody in this hall accepts our world outlook, our ideology. Being a realist I am not trying to convert anyone into our creed. Any philosophy is approached by individuals and peoples themselves, only achieving it through much suffering, only on accepting it with their minds and hearts. But despite all differences in political and philosophical views, in ideals and values we must remember one thing: we all are keepers of the fire of life handed down to us by the previous generations.

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Gorbunov A-C

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Each had its own mission and each in its own way enriched world civilisation. The giants of the Renaissance and the Great French Revolution, the heroes of the October Revolution in Russia, of Victory and the Resistance - they all have fulfilled their duty to history.

And what about our generation? It has made great discoveries but it has also found recipes for the self-destruction of the human race. On the threshold of the third millennium we must burn the black book of nuclear "alchemy". May the 21st century become the first century in life without fear of universal death.

We will fulfill this mission if we unite our efforts. The Soviet Union is prepared to make its contribution to ensuring a peaceful, free and flourishing future of Europe and all the other continents. We will stint nothing for this.

Thank you for your attention.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 14649

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, PROP, UR
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE OCTOBER 15 PLENUM

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: GORBACHEV DELIVERED THE MAIN REPORT AT OCTOBER 15 CPSU PLENUM, A SHORT AND RATHER BLAND SPEECH. HE ACCUSED UNNAMED CADRES OF INERTIA, ADMITTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING THE GUIDELINES FOR THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN BUT NEVERTHELESS ANNOUNCED AN AMBITIOUS GOAL OF ALMOST DOUBLING NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCTION IN 15 YEARS. GORBACHEV ALSO CRITICIZED THE 1961 PARTY PROGRAM, AND SUGGESTED A NEW VIEW OF THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO COMMUNISM. IN A DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN EXPANSIONIST VECTION ON FOREIGN POLICY, HE DESCRIBED PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS THE BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND MENTIONED FORMULATION ON SOCIALIST UNITY WHICH RECOGNIZES A DEGREE OF DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. LITTLE INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED ON THE REVISIONS TO THE PARTY BY-LAWS. IN STYLE AND APPROACH, PARTICULARLY TO THE NEW ECONOMIC PLAN, THE SPEECH HARDLY SEEMED NEW. END SUMMARY.

INTRODUCTION

3. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE PLENUM ON OCTOBER 15 WAS BRIEF BY COMPARISON TO OTHER SPEECHES HE HAS MADE RECENTLY, AND MAY REFLECT SOME EDITING OF HIS REMARKS. THE PLENUM, HOWEVER, WAS APPARENTLY BRIEF: CC MEMBERS CARS HAD ALL DEPARTED BY 2 P.M. THE SPEECH CONTAINED LITTLE NEW OR STARTLING, AND IN THE MAIN WAS A REPETITION OF KNOWN GORBACHEV POSITIONS. HIS REMARKS WERE DIVIDED THEMATICALLY INTO THREE PARTS CORRESPONDING TO THE THREE DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE PLENUM: THE NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY PROGRAM; THE MAIN GUIDELINES FOR THE 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN (FYP) AND FOR THE PERIOD TO 2000; AND THE REVISIONS TO THE PARTY BY-LAWS. NONE OF THESE DOCUMENTS HAS YET APPEARED IN THE PRESS.

ECONOMIC PLANS

4. GORBACHEV WAS MOST CANDID WHEN DISCUSSING THE FYP. HE LED OFF BY ACCUSING UNNAMED CADRES OF "INERTIA" AND INABILITY TO ADAPT TO CHANGED CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT, THE ORIGINAL XII FYP WAS FLAWED: IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, TO CORRECT "MUCH" AND 3IN THE MAIN" THE FYP'S OUTLINE WAS IN KEEPING WITH "REQUIREMENTS". GORBACHEV CALLED FOR AN ALMOST DOUBLING OF NATIONAL INCOME WITHIN 15 YEARS. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD IMPLY A SUSTAINED GROWTH RATE OF ABOUT 4.6 PERCENT ANNUALLY WHICH APPEARS UNREALISTIC IN VIEW OF PAST SOVIET PERFORMANCE AND CURRENT PROBLEMS. END COMMENT.) THIS IS TO BE REACHED BY CONCENTRATING CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN: MACHINE BUILDING, AND THE CHEMICAL, ELECTRONIC AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES -- BUT HE FAILED TO MENTION ENERGY, AGRICULTURE OR THE FOOD AND CONSUMER PROGRAMS IN HIS LIST OF PRIORITIES -- AND INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY BY 130-150 PERCENT ("V 2.3-2.5 RAZA"). GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED PAST PROBLEMS WITH SUCH AN APPROACH, WHEN HE CALLED FOR "MORE ENERGETIC IMPLEMENTATION THAN IN THE PAST OF RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMY AND THE CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN PRIORITY DIRECTIONS...." GORBACHEV URGED THAT THE ACTUAL FYP ITSELF BE WORKED OUT AS THE GUIDELINES ARE DEBATED DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE CONGRESS, ALLOWING THE PLAN TO BE "AFFIRMED" SOON AFTER THE CONGRESS.

NEW PARTY PROGRAM

5. GORBACHEV DEVOTED THE LARGEST PORTION OF HIS REMARKS TO THE NEW PARTY PROGRAM. HE CLAIMED THAT THE 1961 PROGRAM WAS BASICALLY CORRECT, BUT IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED IT ON A NUMBER OF POINTS: IT WAS EXCESSIVELY DETAILED, CONTAINED "GROUNDLESS FANTASY", "BOOKISH PEDANTRY", AND PLAYED WITH DEFINITIONS. THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE A "CLEAR AND PRECISE STATEMENT" OF THE PARTY'S GOALS. IN A RATHER CURIOUS STATEMENT, GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE POLITBURO CONSIDERED THAT THE DRAFT REVISION "ON THE WHOLE" MET THIS DEMAND.

6. IN HIS OUTLINE OF THE PROGRAM'S DOMESTIC GOAL GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED NOW-FAMILIAR THEMES: INCREASING EFFICIENCY, MORE OPENNESS, BETTER "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY" INCREASING LIVING STANDARDS AND THE GENERAL WELFARE.

7. GORBACHEV DEVOTED MORE ATTENTION TO IDOLOGY THAN NORMAL. ADDRESSING THE MOST DISCREDITED SECTION IN THE 1961 PROGRAM, HE BRIEFLY OUTLINED WHAT APPEARS TO BE A NEW VIEW OF THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO BT

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ECON, PGDV, PINR, PINS, PREL, PROP, UR
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE OCTOBER 15 PLENUM

COMMUNISM: I.E., THERE IS NO PRECISE BOUNDARY AND, INDEED, SOCIALISM IS NOT AN "INDEPENDENT ENTITY". FOR ELABORATION, WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE PROGRAM'S PUBLICATION.

8. GORBACHEV ALSO BRIEFLY ADDRESSED THE NATURE OF "REAL SOCIALISM", A SUBJECT OF KEEN INTEREST TO YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES. GORBACHEV NOTED THE "ASPIRATION" TO PROMOTE "THAT DIALECTIC UNITY OF DIVERSITY WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE WHOLE LIVING FIBER OF THE REAL SOCIALIST WORLD". THIS COMPLEX FORMULATION, WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL IN THE PROGRAM ITSELF, MAY BE AN ATTEMPT TO ACCOMMODATE SOME DIVERSITY AMONG MOSCOW'S FRIENDS AND ALLIES WHILE PROMOTING "UNITY" (I.E., THE SOVIET POSITION) TO THE GREATEST EXTENT PRACTICABLE.

9. GORBACHEV'S DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IS NOTABLE FOR ITS DEFENSIVENESS. IN AN ADDRESS WHICH PROVIDES BASIC GUIDANCE ON PARTY IDEOLOGY, GORBACHEV MAKES NO CLAIM THAT COMMUNISM IS SPREADING OR WILL SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. HIS EMPHASIS INSTEAD IS ON THE DANGEROUS POLICIES OF "IMPERIALISM", PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, AND ON THE CONSEQUENT NEED TO PREVENT WAR. HE DESCRIBES "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN THE TWO OPPOSING SYSTEMS" AS THE BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. HE USES WORDS LIKE "REALISTICALLY" AND "FLEXIBLY" TO CHARACTERIZE THE MANNER IN WHICH THAT POLICY SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

PARTY STATUTES

10. GORBACHEV OFFERED LITTLE CONCRETE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CHANGES IN THE PARTY BY-LAWS. HE SAID BOTH THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTY MEMBERS WILL BE INCREASED, AND HINTED THAT SOME REVISIONS IN PARTY-STATE RELATIONS ARE IN THE OFFING: EACH MUST CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTIONS, BUT THE PARTY MUST ACTIVELY

11. COMMENT: THIS SPEECH IS BLAND BY COMPARISON WITH GORBACHEV'S PREVIOUS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. GORBACHEV'S CADRE COMMENTS PROBABLY FORESHADOW FURTHER PERSONNEL CHANGES, ESPECIALLY IN THE CENTRAL MINISTRIES. THE ECONOMIC GOALS STRIKE US AS VERY AMBITIOUS, AND IT WILL TAKE A REMARKABLE IMPROVEMENT IN BOTH MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE TO ACHIEVE THEM. THESE IMPROVEMENTS HAVE ELUDED THE SOVIETS IN THE PAST, AND MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER GORBACHEV IS WILLING OR ABLE TO UNDERTAKE MEASURES TO CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM. TO ALL APPEARANCES, THIS DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE.

12. "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" IN THE SOVIET LEXICON MEANS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SIDE, COMPETITION BY MEANS SHORT OF WAR. IT IS HARDLY A PASSIVE APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, GORBACHEV'S EMPHASIS IN THIS SPEECH, WHICH THE PARTY PROGRAM WILL PRESUMABLY MIRROR, SUGGESTS THAT HE WANTS TO APPLY MARXIST IDEOLOGY PRAGMATICALLY IN PURSUIT OF MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE AT LEAST A RHETORICAL RETREAT FROM THE OPTIMISTIC BOMBAST OF THE 1961 PARTY PROGRAM AND EVEN THE OFT-STATED CLAIM OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS THAT THE WORLD "CORRELATION OF FORCES" HAD ALREADY SHIFTED IN FAVOR OF SOCIALISM. END COMMENT.
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FOR EUR/SOV: MARK PARRIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: 1/1/86
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GORBACHEV TV ADDRESS

EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL SOVIET TRANSLATION
OF GORBACHEV REMARKS FOR U. S. TELEVISION ON JANUARY 1.
BEGIN TEXT:

2. ADDRESS
BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES

3. DEAR AMERICANS,

4. I SEE A GOOD AUGURY IN THE WAY WE ARE BEGINNING
THE NEW YEAR WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED THE YEAR OF PEACE.
WE ARE STARTING IT WITH AN EXCHANGE OF DIRECT MESSAGES--
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND MINE TO
YOU.

5. THIS, I BELIEVE, IS A HOPEFUL SIGN OF CHANGE
WHICH, THOUGH SMALL, IS NONETHELESS A CHANGE FOR THE
BETTER IN OUR RELATIONS. THE FEW MINUTES THAT I WILL
BE SPEAKING TO YOU STRIKE ME AS A MEANINGFUL SYMBOL
OF OUR MUTUAL WILLINGNESS TO GO ON MOVING TOWARD EACH
OTHER WHICH IS WHAT YOUR PRESIDENT AND I BEGAN DOING
AT GENEVA. FOR A DISCUSSION ALONG THOSE LINES WE
HAD THE MANDATE OF OUR PEOPLES. THEY WANT THE
CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TO CONTINUE UN-
INTERRUPTED AND TO YIELD TANGIBLE RESULTS.

6. AS I FACE YOU TODAY, I WANT TO SAY THAT SOVIET
PEOPLE ARE DEDICATED TO PEACE-- HAT SUPREME VALUE
EQUAL TO THE GIFT OF LIFE. WE CHERISH THE IDEA OF
PEACE, HAVING SUFFERED FOR IT. TOGETHER WITH THE
PAIN OF UNHEALING WOUNDS AND THE AGONY OF
IRRETRIEVABLE LOSSES, IT HAS BECOME PART AND PARCEL
OF OUR FLESH AND BLOOD. IN OUR COUNTRY THERE IS

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By als NARA, Date 7/14/02

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NOT A SINGLE FAMILY OR A SINGLE HOME THAT HAS NOT KEPT ALIVE THE MEMORY OF THEIR KITH AND KIN WHO PERISHED IN THE FLAMES OF WAR--THE WAR IN WHICH THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PEOPLES WERE ALLIES AND FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE.

7. I SAY THIS BECAUSE OUR COMMON QUEST FOR PEACE HAS ITS ROOTS IN THE PAST, AND THAT MEANS WE HAVE A HISTORIC RECORD OF COOPERATION WHICH CAN TODAY INSPIRE OUR JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE SAKE OF THE FUTURE.

8. THE MANY LETTERS I HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU AND MY CONVERSATIONS WITH YOUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN--SENATORS, CONGRESSMEN, SCIENTISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND STATESMEN--HAVE CONVINCED ME THAT IN THE UNITED STATES, TOO, PEOPLE REALIZE THAT OUR TWO NATIONS SHOULD NEVER BE AT WAR, THAT A COLLISION BETWEEN THEM WOULD BE THE GREATEST OF TRAGEDIES.

9. IT IS A REALITY OF TODAY'S WORLD THAT IT IS SENSELESS TO SEEK GREATER SECURITY FOR ONESELF THROUGH NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS. AT PRESENT, EVERY NEW STEP IN THE ARMS RACE INCREASES THE DANGER AND THE RISK FOR BOTH SIDES, AND FOR ALL HUMANKIND.

10. IT IS THE FORCEFUL AND COMPELLING DEMAND OF LIFE ITSELF THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE PATH OF CUTTING BACK NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND KEEPING OUTER SPACE PEACEFUL. THIS IS WHAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING ABOUT AT GENEVA, AND WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE THOSE TALKS TO BE SUCCESSFUL THIS YEAR.

11. IN OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY AN AWARENESS OF THE FACT THAT TODAY HISTORY HAS WILLED OUR TWO NATIONS TO BEAR AN ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PEOPLES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND, INDEED, THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, FOR PRESERVING LIFE ON EARTH. OUR DUTY TO ALL HUMANKIND IS TO OFFER IT A SAFE PROSPECT OF PEACE, A PROSPECT OF ENTERING THE THIRD MILLENIUM WITHOUT FEAR. LET US COMMIT OURSELVES TO DOING AWAY WITH THE THREAT HANGING OVER HUMANITY. LET US NOT SHIFT THAT TASK ONTO OUR CHILDREN'S SHOULDERS.

12. WE CAN HARDLY SUCCEED IN ATTAINING THAT GOAL UNLESS WE BEGIN SAVING UP, BIT BY BIT, THE MOST PRECIOUS CAPITAL THERE IS--TRUST AMONG NATIONS AND

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FOR EUR/SOV: MARK PARRIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: 1/1/86
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GORBACHEV TV ADDRESS

PEOPLES. AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO START
MENDING THE EXISTING DEFICIT OF TRUST IN SOVIET-
AMERICAN RELATIONS.

13. I BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE MAIN RESULTS OF MY
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IS THAT, AS LEADERS
AND AS HUMAN BEINGS, WE WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE FIRST
STEPS TOWARD OVERCOMING MISTRUST AND TO ACTIVATE
THE FACTOR OF CONFIDENCE. THE GAP DIVIDING US IS
STILL WIDE, TO BRIDGE IT WILL NOT BE EASY, BUT WE
SAW IN GENEVA THAT IT CAN BE DONE. BRIDGING THAT GAP
WOULD BE A GREAT FEAT--A FEAT OUR PEOPLE ARE READY
TO PERFORM FOR THE SAKE OF WORLD PEACE.

14. I AM REMINDED OF THE TITLE OF A REMARKABLE
WORK OF AMERICAN LITERATURE. THE NOVEL "THE
WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT." IN THAT PHRASE LET ME
JUST SUBSTITUTE HOPE FOR DISCONTENT. AND MAY NOT
ONLY THIS WINTER BUT EVERY SEASON OF THIS YEAR
AND OF THE YEARS TO COME BE FULL OF HOPE FOR A BETTER
FUTURE, A HOPE THAT, TOGETHER, WE CAN TURN INTO
REALITY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHALL SPARE NO
EFFORT IN WORKING FOR THAT.

15. FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THE YEAR 1986 MARKS THE
BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE IN CARRYING OUT OUR
CONSTRUCTIVE PLANS. THOSE ARE PEACEFUL PLANS: WE
HAVE MADE THEM KNOWN TO THE WHOLE WORLD.

16. I WISH YOU A HAPPY NEW YEAR. TO EVERY AMERICAN
FAMILY I WISH GOOD HEALTH, PEACE AND HAPPINESS.
END TEXT. COMBS
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9 April 1986

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USSR-U.S.-West Europe

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BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13

Gorbachev Assails U.S. Policy, Stresses Adherence to Dialogue

General Secretary Gorbachev's 8 April speech sharply condemning U.S. and West European arms control policies appears to reflect growing Soviet frustration with the absence of substantive progress in East-West relations. However, while contending that improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is unlikely without a change in Washington's attitude toward the Soviet Union, Gorbachev gave no indication that he intends to reverse his public commitment to a continuing dialogue with the United States.

In a speech in the industrial city of Togliatti, Gorbachev voiced frustration with the state of East-West relations and expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of progress, particularly on arms control issues, since the Paris and Geneva summits. In addition to repeating familiar criticism of specific U.S. positions on nuclear testing, SDI, and INF, he accused the Administration of staging a series of provocative actions that he characterized as designed to undermine the "spirit of Geneva":

- The U.S. demand that Moscow reduce its UN staff by 40 percent.
- The dispatch of U.S. naval forces off the Crimean coast in the Black Sea.
- An attack on Libyan forces "to demonstrate America's might."
- A "provocative" nuclear test on the eve of the expiration of the unilateral Soviet test moratorium and Washington's prompt rejection of Moscow's proposal for an urgent summit to discuss a test ban.

Gorbachev argued that the Reagan Administration's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations rested on basic misperceptions and that any significant improvement in bilateral ties depends on a reassessment in U.S. thinking. At a time when the world situation demands an "entirely new way of thinking," the U.S. leadership, he claimed, "cannot yet drop old habits." He added that "to all appearances" the Administration "does not want to reckon with the reality of the Soviet Union."

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**Implications for
Summit**

Despite his negative assessment of U.S. policy, Gorbachev reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to pursuing a policy of dialogue with Washington. Consistent with the position he elaborated at the party congress in February, he stated that Moscow is seeking "a way out of confrontation," arguing that "we have no alternative." Recognition of the necessity of accommodation, he noted, is what motivated Soviet arms control initiatives, led to the summits in Paris and Geneva, and gave impetus to Soviet efforts to implement the accords reached at Geneva.

[Worker] About your meeting with President Reagan in the near future—when is it to take place, or . . .

[Gorbachev, interrupting] We put the question like this—the meetings must continue, we must meet, we must converse, we cannot let things reach collision-point. But it must be done in such a way that these meetings bring some sort of benefit, that there is some sort of progress. If we just meet like that, exchange pleasantries and handshakes, while all the military programs are implemented—who needs meetings like that? It would be a fraud. We have said this quite plainly.

Gorbachev, conversation with automotive workers in Togliatti, Kuybyshev region, Soviet television, 8 April 1986

On the question of a "new meeting" with President Reagan, Gorbachev said that he wished to make "absolutely clear" that he favored holding such a meeting and that the Soviet Union attached "no preconditions" to it. At the same time, however, he reiterated past pronouncements linking the next summit to specific results, noting that such a summit should mark a "step forward" and produce "practical results" toward curbing the arms race. However, Gorbachev did not repeat earlier suggestions that INF and a nuclear test moratorium represented areas where agreement could be reached quickly. Adding "one more thing," he asserted that the next summit "can take place if the atmosphere of Geneva is preserved, or it would be more correct today to say revived."

Gorbachev's statement represents his most forceful expression of Moscow's public commitment to a second summit. His discussion of the summit question in his 25 February report to the party congress was characterized by an

apparently deliberate ambiguity that seemed intended to cast doubt on the utility of a second summit in the absence of substantive progress on arms control issues. This ambiguity, subsequently reinforced by statements from a number of lower level officials, appeared calculated to press the Administration for progress on arms control without openly threatening to a special summit in Europe to discuss the question of banning nuclear tests, but Moscow signaled that this was not intended to substitute for a Washington summit in 1986 as agreed in Geneva.

**Criticism of
West Europeans**

Gorbachev's Togliatti speech also signaled unhappiness with the West European reaction to his 15 January disarmament proposals and apparent pessimism about the prospects for West European support for the Soviet plan. For the first time since offering the proposals, he specifically accused the British and French governments of failing to display a "serious abandon the summit. In his 29 March television address Gorbachev called for approach" on the INF issue. London and Paris, he charged, are falsely claiming that acceptance of the Soviet proposals would, on the one hand, allow Moscow to shift its Europe-based intermediate-range missiles to Siberia from where they could be "promptly carried back" to Europe and would, on the other hand, leave West Europe exposed to superior Soviet conventional forces. In fact, Gorbachev insisted, Moscow is proposing both the "elimination" of Soviet intermediate-range missiles based in the European USSR and "reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces."¹

Gorbachev's speech also seemed aimed at putting pressure on the West European governments that have recently signed agreements with the United States for cooperation on SDI. He warned that through involvement in that "disastrous plan," West European governments were becoming "participants in a new, even more dangerous round of the arms race." His comments followed the delivery of a "statement" from the Soviet Embassy in Rome to the Italian Foreign Ministry at the end of March criticizing the Italian Government's recent agreement with Washington concerning Italian participation in SDI and the presentation of a much stronger statement to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher by the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on 4 April in connection with the 27 March signing of the U.S.-West German agreement on SDI cooperation.

¹ In his 28 February address to the 27th CPSU Congress, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze chastised "statesmen from NATO countries" for "losing their enthusiasm" for removal of U.S. and Soviet INF from Europe and for "resorting to more and more reservations" following the presentation of the Soviet proposal, but he did not mention any West European state by name.

Soviet pressure on West Germany over Bonn's participation in SDI was also apparent in Premier Ryzhkov's 8 April remarks to visiting FRG Economics Minister and Free Democratic Party leader Martin Bangemann. By signing "secret agreements" with the United States on SDI the Bonn Government, Ryzhkov declared, is assuming "grave responsibility for the escalation of the arms race," and this, along with its participation in Western trade embargoes "cannot but burden the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union."

Domestic Concerns Gorbachev's remarks appeared intended, in part, to allay domestic concern over Soviet arms control policies. He observed that the Central Committee had received "numerous letters" from Soviet citizens who he said had expressed concern that the West is using talk about peace and "fruitless negotiations" to outstrip the Soviet Union in developing arms. This, he stated, "is not going to happen." Washington, he said, is not dealing with "faint hearts" in the USSR. Despite all U.S. pressures, he emphasized, "the arms race will not wear us out, we will not be removed from space, and we will not be overtaken in technology."

Gorbachev stressed that SDI posed neither an insurmountable military nor technological threat to the Soviet Union. If the United States pushes ahead with its plans, he said, the Soviet Union will find a "convincing answer and not necessarily in outer space." Moscow's call for a ban on "space strike weapons," he added, rests not on a "fear of lagging behind" but on an understanding of its "responsibility."

Gorbachev's remarks appeared to reflect sensitivity to the need to maintain domestic support for Moscow's arms control policies, whose unilateral aspects appear to have generated domestic concern and, possibly, opposition, particularly among the military. His speech in Togliatti, which was broadcast in full on Soviet television, came less than two weeks after his nationally televised 29 March address to the Soviet people to announce the latest Soviet proposal on nuclear testing. On that occasion as well he responded to letters to the Central Committee by pledging that the Kremlin would not neglect the security interests of the country. In the past, Gorbachev had been careful to point to popular support for Moscow's arms control policies and to stress that Soviet policy is made by the political leadership and is not based solely on military concerns.²

² Gorbachev's efforts to stress the collective nature of Soviet arms control policies, together with evidence of domestic concern, particularly on the question of Moscow's unilateral test moratorium, are discussed more fully in the *Trends* of 2 April 1986, pages 1-4.

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FBIS TRENDS

9 April 1986

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File

USSR-U.S.-West Europe

~~Auto~~
~~W.H.S.~~

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Beijing-Pyongyang-Moscow

Pyongyang Plays Down Kim Chong-il's Role in Ties to Beijing

Pyongyang appears to be making a special effort to distance Kim Il-song's son and chosen successor, Kim Chong-il, from relations with Beijing, a trend that contrasts with the younger Kim's continuing visibility in Soviet-North Korean affairs.

North Korean media treatment of Chinese party chief Hu Yaobang's 1 April meeting with a Korean delegation headed by the new *Nodong Sinmun* editor-in-chief, Yi Song-pok, is probably related to the general chill evident in Sino-Korean relations over the past two years. According to a 3 April KCNA report on the meeting, Yi extended greetings to the Chinese leadership only from Kim Il-song, and not also from Kim Chong-il. Last August—the last time Hu received a North Korean delegation—Pyongyang media had similarly departed from their usual practice of reporting greetings from both Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il.

It is not clear how the junior Kim figures in Sino-Korean relations, but there does seem to be a correlation between Pyongyang's portrayal of his role and the warmth of North Korea's ties to China. In 1983, after Kim went to China on an "unofficial" visit—his first, and to date, only publicized foreign travel—North Korean media highlighted Kim's part in cementing ties with Beijing. However, in 1985, a year after the chill in Sino-Korean ties began, Pyongyang began to downplay Kim Chong-il's role in the relationship. Coinciding with this development, Kim began assuming a prominent role in Soviet-Korean affairs.

Kim's notably reduced role in Sino-Korean relations is reflected in his failure to meet publicly with any visiting Chinese delegation since May 1985. He was conspicuously absent when Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng led an unusually high-level PRC delegation to Pyongyang for the 35th anniversary celebrations of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean war last October.

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