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JET 5/10/2005

File Folder USSR--GORBACHEV SPEECHES

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F06-114/7

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2613

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9967	PAPER	USSR-U.S. <i>R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</i>	8	8/20/1986	B1
9969	PAPER	USSR: GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON EXTENDING MORATORIUM <i>R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</i>	10	8/18/1986	B1
9968	PAPER	USSR-U.S. <i>R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</i>	4	9/10/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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File
Gorbachev
Speeches

USSR-U.S.

General Secretary Gorbachev's 18 August television address announcing the extension of Moscow's year-old unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing to 1 January seemed designed primarily to play to West European and U.S. critics of the Reagan Administration's rejection of a test ban and generate further pressure on the Administration to modify its position. At the same time, Gorbachev made unusual efforts to justify the moratorium extension to the Soviet public, suggesting that such unilateral moves engender puzzlement at home and that he may face pressures to resume the Soviet testing program. His proposal to sign an agreement on ending nuclear tests at a U.S.-Soviet summit this year gives expression to the demand that such a meeting yield concrete results on arms control, but he did not make it a definitive condition for a summit.

Moscow has played down expectations of rapid progress in arms control, giving scant coverage to recent discussions in Moscow between U.S. and Soviet arms control officials. Media commentators have charged that U.S. leaks concerning President Reagan's recent letter to Gorbachev were designed to create an illusion of forward movement in the U.S. position on major arms control issues when in reality there has been none.

Gorbachev Extends Testing Moratorium, Hedges on Summit

The Gorbachev leadership appears to view the political benefits of extending the moratorium as outweighing any military risks for the USSR. In his televised statement, Gorbachev asserted that the Politburo and the Soviet Government had agreed to continue the moratorium after "comprehensively and scrupulously weighing all the 'pros' and 'cons.'" In an apparent effort to highlight the international benefits of the decision, Gorbachev drew attention to messages of support from groups and individuals in the United States and other NATO countries and to appeals to the Soviet and U.S. Governments from the leaders of the "Delhi Six" states (Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, and Greece) for an end to nuclear testing. Soviet media

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BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13

commentary following the address stressed what it portrayed as the overwhelmingly positive public response to Gorbachev's extension of the moratorium in major Western countries and in the U.S. Congress.

Domestic Pressures While courting Western public opinion, the Gorbachev regime also appears concerned to reassure the Soviet population—including the Soviet military—that it will not allow the pursuit of its arms control policies to endanger the USSR's security. Gorbachev noted the "justified" alarm expressed in "letters and utterances of Soviet people" about the "risk" of the Soviet moratorium in the face of continued nuclear tests by the United States. He reassured his audience that even though Moscow is seeking to encourage "realism" in American policy, the Soviet leaders "know with whom we are dealing." "For us," he added, protecting the USSR's security is a "sacred matter" and a "question of principle."

It was the second time that Gorbachev used the rare vehicle of a televised address to the Soviet people to make such assurances. On 29 March, he made a television speech calling for a special summit to discuss a mutual moratorium on testing. On that occasion, he similarly referred to letters from Soviet citizens expressing concern that a unilateral moratorium may jeopardize Soviet security.¹

An unusual meeting convened on the day after Gorbachev spoke provides further evidence that the decision may have been controversial and that the leadership believes it necessary to offer reassurances concerning the benefits. On 19 August, top officials from "the mass media, central ideological departments, and public organizations" were summoned to the Central Committee and, according to TASS, were given "tasks of information and propaganda work" in connection with Gorbachev's moratorium announcement. That the session had more a domestic than international propaganda focus was suggested by the leaders listed as present: senior Secretary Ligachev (who apparently was the main speaker), Politburo candidate member Yeltsin, and Central Committee Secretaries Zimyanin, Medvedev, and Razumovskiy. As a group, these leaders are much more heavily involved in domestic—or in the case of Medvedev, Soviet bloc—issues than East-West problems. Neither Anatoliy Dobrynin nor Aleksandr Yakovlev, the two secretaries with the heaviest involvement in East-West affairs in recent months, was reported to be present.

¹ See the *Trends* of 2 April 1986, pages 1-4. Gorbachev also used his extraordinary 14 May television address on the Chernobyl nuclear power station disaster to announce the last previous extension of the moratorium. See the *Trends* of 21 May 1986, pages 2-6.

**Earlier Signs
of Concern**

These indications of a desire to rally domestic support for Gorbachev's latest extension of the moratorium follow earlier hints that the moratorium may be a source of concern, especially among the Soviet military:

- In a 6 August interview with the Prague newspaper *Mlada Fronta*, CPSU Central Committee International Department deputy head Vadim Zagladin asserted that the moratorium is a "risky step" since, "when one side continues its tests and the other halts them, it understandably weakens the latter's defense capability to a certain extent."
- General Staff arms control spokesman Col.-Gen. Nikolay Chervov was even more specific in remarks he made in a 14 June interview on Budapest radio. While noting that the "political" benefits of the USSR's moratorium outweigh the "military or economic damage," he also observed that continued testing by "one side" allows it to "continuously gain newer information," while the "other side falls significantly behind" and damages its "military and national economic interests" by "renouncing such experiments."
- In a 17 May Soviet television appearance, outspoken *Izvestiya* political observer Aleksandr Bovin made a rare reference to possible displeasure in the Soviet military with Gorbachev's testing moratoriums. Describing the 14 May extension of the moratorium as a "noble and courageous step" that was "absolutely correct" from a political standpoint, Bovin added that he was "not very sure that our military comrades are happy about it."

Summit

Gorbachev's comments on the prospects for a new U.S.-Soviet summit seemed deliberately ambiguous: he continued to avoid setting specific preconditions for a meeting and encouraged hope that it can take place this year, while at the same time hinting that Washington's attitude toward the test ban issue may ultimately determine whether a summit is held. An agreement on ending nuclear tests, he said, "can be reached rapidly" and subsequently signed "this very year at a Soviet-American summit meeting." The signing of such an agreement, he added, would be "the main real result" of such a meeting and would facilitate "further progress" at nuclear arms talks. Although in his 29 March television address he proposed a special summit meeting to be held in Europe to sign a nuclear test ban agreement "in the nearest future," Gorbachev had not previously referred specifically to the possibility of a summit meeting before the end of 1986. Though he did not say so explicitly, his 18 August remarks suggest that he intends the signing of a test ban agreement to be the centerpiece of a follow-on to the Geneva summit.

Gorbachev has during 1986 repeatedly linked a summit with a test ban agreement. In addition to his proposals in March and May for a special summit to sign such an accord, Gorbachev also cited this issue and INF at the CPSU congress in February as matters on which agreement could be reached at a summit. His other statements about a summit have not specified issues to be discussed, but he has repeatedly insisted that a new meeting must contribute to concrete progress toward arms control. In his 28 July speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev stressed that he did not view his agreement with President Reagan at last November's Geneva summit merely as a "promise to meet in the future." The agreement meant, he said, that both sides had committed themselves to "speed up" negotiations on arms reduction, adding that "this is what a new meeting should serve as well." (U/FOUO)

USSR Plays Down Moscow Arms Talks, Hits New U.S. Proposals

Gorbachev's failure to mention the 11-12 August arms control talks in Moscow during his 18 August television address is consistent with the circumspect approach that the USSR has taken toward the meeting. Moscow's only official comment to date on the talks came in two press conferences by Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov on 12 and 14 August. According to the *Izvestiya* account of his remarks on the 12th, Gerasimov characterized the talks as intended to give "an extra boost" to the Geneva arms control talks and as part of broader preparations for the upcoming meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.² He gave no details of the substance of the talks, noting only that they were held in a cottage on the outskirts of Moscow.

Gerasimov described the atmosphere as "businesslike," a term frequently used to characterize meetings with Western countries. According to the TASS account of his remarks on the 14th, Gerasimov again avoided commenting on the substance of the discussions, noting only that it would be "premature" at this point to "sum up the results." He added that it had been agreed to hold a second round in Washington but gave no dates.

² In keeping with Soviet official practice, Gerasimov avoided describing the 19-20 September meeting as preparatory to a summit. In a 17 August Soviet television commentary, however, *Izvestiya* political observer Aleksandr Bovin acknowledged that the September meeting will focus on a "range of issues connected with a possible meeting between Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan."

Confidentiality Moscow's interest in showcasing its own commitment to preserving confidentiality was highlighted by Gerasimov's 12 August press conference criticism of U.S. public discussion of the meeting. According to TASS, he said that while Washington professes to "favor" confidentiality, U.S. officials have violated it in practice. He specifically cited remarks by White House communications director Buchanan on the delegation's negotiating posture, which, he charged, "undermine the U.S. thesis about confidentiality."

Continued Reticence In an apparent demonstration of Moscow's desire to avoid drawing attention to the talks and raising expectations, Soviet media sharply limited their coverage of the two-day meeting. Soviet media are not known to have even reported on the opening or closing of the talks, which it has done for other confidential talks, or on the arrival or departure of the U.S. delegation, which it also routinely does. On 6 August, TASS briefly reported that talks on the "level of experts on questions of space and nuclear weapons" would take place in Moscow on 11 and 12 August, and in an equally brief dispatch the following day, TASS reported the composition of the U.S. delegation.

Media commentary prior to the 11th also generally avoided mention of the talks. The one known exception, Moscow domestic radio's *International Observers Roundtable* program on 10 August, projected pessimism. On that occasion, Gerasimov, appearing in his capacity as political observer, referred to the upcoming meeting as designed to "look jointly at the possibilities" for advancing the "common goal" reached at the Geneva summit. Apparently seeking to dampen expectations of progress, he said that while "it would be very good if ideas could be found," he asserted that the last meeting between U.S. and Soviet experts, on the question of nuclear tests, had "given rise to disappointment" because of U.S. unwillingness to discuss "the essence of the matter." Appearing with Gerasimov on the program, *Izvestiya's* Bovin characterized the members of the U.S. delegation as "great experts and very experienced people" but added that "they have spent more time arming than they have disarming."

Soviet commentary following the meeting was similarly pessimistic. In a 17 August Soviet television commentary, Bovin said that the U.S. delegation's description of the meeting as "serious, businesslike, and frank" actually meant that "there was no rapprochement in positions." While he did not claim any knowledge of the content of the talks, Bovin asserted that "it is not difficult to

imagine" that the U.S. position "still leaves no room for compromise." The same day, Institute of the USA and Canada researcher Sergey Plekhanov, participating in the weekly *Top Priority* radio discussion program broadcast to North America, said that the U.S. delegation "didn't seem to have brought anything worth discussing."

**Criticism of
Reagan Letter**

Apparently in a further effort to minimize expectations of significant progress during the Moscow discussions, Soviet media issued several commentaries on the eve of the talks by senior commentators that attacked the most recent U.S. proposals as presented in the Western press. These commentaries accused the Reagan Administration of deliberately leaking elements of the President's letter responding to Gorbachev's 16 June arms control proposals in an effort to inflate hopes of a breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet relations without real movement by the Administration toward compromise:

- In an 8 August *Pravda* article, political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov charged that the leaks were part of a "patently stage-managed" campaign of "orchestrated optimism" on the prospects for a second summit meeting. He warned, however, that the new U.S. proposals, as outlined in the American press, offer few grounds for optimism. President Reagan's letter, he said, in contrast to "Moscow's major new compromise proposals," contains "no countermovement," and upholds neither the "principle of equal security" nor the task of "ending the arms race on earth and preventing it in space."
- In a 10 August *Izvestiya* article, Bovin asserted that despite "official and semiofficial optimism" over the prospects for an upturn in U.S.-Soviet relations in the wake of President Reagan's letter, there is in fact "little ground for rejoicing." The President's letter as described in Western reports, he said, "can in no way be viewed as movement toward accord, toward compromise, toward a reasonable balance of interests." He observed that on the issue of SDI, the President's letter offers the USSR "nothing" but the chance to "express with our own signature our assent to the U.S. 'Star Wars' program."
- In an extraordinary broadcast of Soviet television's *Studio Nine* international affairs discussion program orchestrated particularly to respond to Western reports on the President's letter, Bovin, political observer Valentin Zorin, and Vitaliy Zhurkin, a deputy director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada, all lambasted the U.S. proposals purportedly outlined in the letter. Program moderator Zorin, who claimed that

leaks in Washington about the contents of the letter had "compelled" the commentators to appear on television, described the new U.S. proposals as a "trick."

Soviet media continued this line of attack after the Moscow meeting was completed. In a 13 August *Pravda* article, for example, observer Tomas Kolesnichenko, again citing Western press reports, described U.S. official optimism in the wake of the President's letter as a "surprising stance." In response to the USSR's "reasonable compromise proposals," he said, the Administration has "not responded in kind" and has "not budged from its positions" on arms control, including its plans to develop space-based weapons. Noting that the U.S. position does not offer "good prospects for the continuation of the Geneva dialogue," he stated that bilateral dialogue must be "constructive, open, and honest," and not based on a "screen painted in optimistic colors."

Similarly, political observer Nikolay Shishlin, usually one of the more optimistic Soviet commentators on U.S.-Soviet relations, wrote in the weekly *New Times* that the latest U.S. proposals constitute "nothing but a deception" designed to cover continuing efforts to prepare for the deployment of "sophisticated weapons in space." He charged that despite statements by U.S. leaders on the possibility of reaching a "great compromise," there "is not the slightest sign of any reassessment" by the Administration. Shishlin reiterated that the USSR "is for holding a new Soviet-U.S. summit," but insisted that "it must achieve progress toward serious agreements on truly important questions of consolidating international security."

Soviet coverage of President Reagan's press conference of 12 August has also suggested Soviet pessimism. The 13 August TASS report on the press conference avoided any mention of his optimistic remarks on the prospects for arms control.

**Views of
Administration**

While they have been fairly uniform in condemning the proposals reported in press accounts of the President's letter, Soviet commentators have differed in interpreting U.S. motives, revealing contending views on the nature of the Reagan Administration that may mirror debates in Soviet official circles. The 10 August *Studio Nine* discussion of the Reagan letter, for example, prompted an unusually open disagreement over whether there are forces within the Administration sincerely in favor of arms control. Program moderator Zorin portrayed the Administration as unified in its opposition to arms control

agreements with Moscow, asserting that leading figures within the Administration "occupy a fairly monolithic position." He accused the Administration of playing a "political game" by exaggerating differences between Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger in order to "deceive" U.S. and world public opinion.

Zorin's argument was directly contradicted by Zhurkin, who argued that "in dealing with the Reagan Administration we are not dealing with a monolith but with an administration in which there is a struggle between various trends." On one side, he suggested, are those who continue to seek military supremacy, while on the other are those who realize the dangers of nuclear confrontation and therefore realize that bilateral "relations must somehow be put in order." Bovin, asserting that he "cannot agree that this is a political game," went on to say that differences of view in Washington are "very serious" and are not restricted only to the Reagan Administration. He went on to outline a number of political pressures, such as those from Congress and the Western allies, that the President is forced to "take into consideration" in formulating international policies. (U/FOUO)

USSR: GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON EXTENDING MORATORIUM

TAKE 1 OF SEVERAL -- GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON MORATORIUM

FM181551 MOSCOW PRAVDA IN RUSSIAN 19 AUG 86 FIRST EDITION P 1

("STATEMENT BY M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE." -- PRAVDA HEADLINE; PASSAGES BETWEEN SLANTLINES ARE PRINTED IN BOLDFACE)

(TEXT) GOOD EVENING, DEAR COMRADES*

AT MY MEETING WITH YOU TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT ONE OF THE KEY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

A FEW DAYS AGO -- ON 6 AUGUST -- THE SOVIET UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS, TO WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ADHERED STRICTLY FOR A YEAR, EXPIRED.

WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THIS DECISION, WHAT WAS IT THAT DICTATED THIS DECISION, WHICH WAS NOT EASY, WAS EXTREMELY RESPONSIBLE AND INDEED, I WOULD SAY, WAS HARD FOR US TO TAKE?

IN A NUTSHELL, IT WAS THE REALITIES OF THE NUCLEAR-SPACE AGE.

WHAT DO THEY CONSIST IN? HOW DO WE SEE THEM?

/FIRST./ MOUNTAINS OF NUCLEAR AND ALL KINDS OF OTHER WEAPONS HAVE BEEN PILED UP, AND YET THE ARMS RACE IS STILL NOT SLOWING ITS PACE BUT ACCELERATING; THE DANGER HAS EMERGED OF ITS TRANSFER INTO SPACE; AND INTENSIVE MILITARIZATION IS IN PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THROUGHOUT THE NATO BLOC. IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT THE PACE OF DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IS SO RAPID THAT IT IS LEAVING PEOPLES, STATES, AND POLITICIANS LESS AND LESS TIME TO COMPREHEND THE REAL DANGER AND IS REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY FOR MANKIND TO HALT THE SLIDE TOWARD THE NUCLEAR ABYSS. WE CANNOT DELAY, OTHERWISE SUCH REFINED ARMS SYSTEMS WILL EMERGE THAT IT WILL BE COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CONTROLLING (KONTROL) THEM.

THE SITUATION IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY INTOLERABLE. IT IS NO LONGER ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN EXISTING TREATIES: MAJOR PRACTICAL STEPS ARE NEEDED THAT CAN BAR THE WAY TO MILITARISM AND TURN THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN A BETTER DIRECTION. THE "BALANCE OF TERROR" IS CEASING TO BE A DETERRENT FACTOR. AND NOT ONLY BECAUSE TERROR ITSELF IS A POOR COUNSELOR THAT CAN PROMPT ACTIONS WITH UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES. THAT TERROR IS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THE ARMS RACE: INTENSIFYING MISTRUST AND SUSPICION, IT FORMS A VICIOUS* CIRCLE OF GROWING TENSION. THERE ARE MANY EXAMPLES OF THIS.

IT HAS BECOME UTTERLY CLEAR TO EVERYONE NOW THAT THE OLD NOTIONS ABOUT WAR AS A MEANS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL AIMS HAVE HAD THEIR DAY. IN THE NUCLEAR ERA THESE OUTDATED DOGMAS FEED A POLICY THAT COULD LEAD TO UNIVERSAL CONFLAGRATION.

/SECOND./ OUR MORATORIUM DECISION WAS BASED ON THE ADHERENCE OF SOCIALISM AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND A PROFOUND UNDERSTANDING OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTINY OF CIVILIZATION. AS A SOCIALIST STATE AND A NUCLEAR POWER THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS IT ITS LOFTY DUTY TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO PRESERVE A PEACEFUL FUTURE FOR THE PLANET.

OUR DESIRE TO SHIFT THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ONTO THE RAILS OF DETENTE ACCORDS WITH OUR PHILOSOPHY AND OUR SOCIALIST MORALITY. BUT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE SAVING THE EARTH FROM ATOMIC DESTRUCTION IS A TASK FOR THE WHOLE OF MANKIND AND THE CONCERN OF ALL PEOPLES.

/THIRD./ THE MODERN WORLD IS COMPLEX, MULTIFARIOUS, AND CONTRADICTIONARY. AND AT THE SAME TIME IT IS OBJECTIVELY BECOMING INCREASINGLY INTERDEPENDENT AND INTEGRATED. THIS FEATURE OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY IS BOUND TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FOREIGN POLICY IF IT IS REALISTICALLY CONSTRUCTED. OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE NO NORMAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WILL BE DOOMED TO PROCEED IN A FEVERISH WAY AND LEAD ULTIMATELY TO CATASTROPHIC CONFRONTATION.

(MORE)

18 AUG 1986 12 PM

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 86-1147 #9969

BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13

<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 860818124934

<TEXT>FBIS 092
USIA ALERT
TAKE 2 OF 5 RPT 5 -- 090 (GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON MORATORIUM)
///TO CATASTROPHIC CONFRONTATION.
PM181608

(TEXT) PRENUCLEAR THINKING ESSENTIALLY LOST ITS MEANING ON 6 AUGUST 1945. TODAY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ENSURE ONES OWN SECURITY WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE SECURITY OF OTHER STATES AND PEOPLES. THERE CAN BE NO GENUINE SECURITY THAT IS NOT IDENTICALLY EQUAL AND ALL-EMBRACING. TO THINK ANY OTHER WAY MEANS INHABITING A WORLD OF ILLUSIONS, A WORLD OF SELF-DECEPTION.

THE NEW KIND OF THINKING THAT THE MODERN WORLD NEEDS IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH NOTIONS ABOUT ITS BEING SOME KIND OF PATRIMONY AND WITH ATTEMPTS TO "FAVOR" OTHERS WITH ONES PATRONAGE AND WITH SERMONS ABOUT HOW THEY OUGHT TO BEHAVE AND WHAT PATH -- SOCIALIST, CAPITALIST, OR OTHER -- THEY OUGHT TO CHOOSE. THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THAT EVERY PEOPLE AND EVERY COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF ITS OWN FATE AND ITS OWN RESOURCES, TO SOVEREIGNLY DETERMINE ITS OWN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, TO DEFEND ITS OWN SECURITY, AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ALL-EMBRACING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.

THE EXACERBATION OF GLOBAL PROBLEMS IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD. THEY CANNOT BE SOLVED WITHOUT POOLING THE EFFORTS OF ALL STATES AND PEOPLES. THE OPENING UP OF SPACE AND THE OCEAN DEPTHS, ECOLOGY AND EPIDEMICS, POVERTY AND BACKWARDNESS -- ALL THESE ARE REALITIES OF THE AGE REQUIRING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. THUS MANY NEW WORLD PROBLEMS ARE LINKED TOGETHER IN A TIGHT KNOT. AND HERE DISARMAMENT SHOULD PLAY A TREMENDOUS ROLE BY RELEASING A CONSIDERABLE PROPORTION OF RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL AND TECHNICAL POTENTIAL FOR CREATIVE NEEDS.

OUR FOREIGN POLICY IS INSPIRED BY THE FACT THAT THERE IS A CONVICTION BECOMING INCREASINGLY FIRMLY ESTABLISHED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLES AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES OF THE MOST DIVERSE LEANINGS AND PHILOSOPHY -- THE CONVICTION THAT THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES IS NOW AT STAKE AND THAT THE TIME FOR RESOLUTE AND RESPONSIBLE ACTION HAS COME. IT DEMANDS THE UTMOST MOBILIZATION OF REASON AND COMMON SENSE.

TWO TRAGEDIES BOUND UP WITH THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE NUCLEAR-SPACE ERA OCCURRED RECENTLY: THE LOSS OF THE CREW OF CHALLENGER AND THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL AES. THEY INCREASED ANXIETY AND BRUTALLY REMINDED US THAT PEOPLE ARE STILL ONLY LEARNING TO HANDLE THE FANTASTICALLY POWERFUL FORCES THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE BROUGHT TO LIFE, ARE STILL ONLY LEARNING HOW TO PLACE THEM AT THE SERVICE OF

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL STATES, BUT ESPECIALLY STATEMENTS, DRAW SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE LESSONS FROM IT. THE CHIEF AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT LESSON IS THAT THE WEAPONS CREATED BY MANKIND MUST NEVER BE USED AND THAT IT IS SIMPLY SUICIDAL TODAY TO BUILD INTERSTATE RELATIONS ON THE ILLUSION OF ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY IN THESE AWESOME INSTRUMENTS OF ANNIHILATION.

ELIMINATING THEM COMPLETELY IS THE SOLE PATH TOWARD GENUINE PEACE. EMBARKING ON SUCH A PATH IS TANTAMOUNT TO PASSING A MATURITY TEST. THAT CONCERNS ALL POLITICAL LEADERS ON WHOM SUCH A LOFTY MISSION COMMON TO ALL MANKIND HAS FALLEN.

IT IS NECESSARY TO LEARN TO COURAGEOUSLY LOOK THE FACTS IN THE FACE: SPECIALISTS HAVE CALCULATED THAT THE DETONATION OF THE SMALLEST NUCLEAR CHARGE IS EQUIVALENT IN ITS STRENGTH OF RADIATION TO THREE CHERNOBYLS. THAT IS MOST PROBABLY RIGHT. AND, IF SO, THAT MEANS THAT THE DETONATION OF EVEN A SMALL PROPORTION OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL STOCKPILED WILL BE NOTHING LESS THAN A CATASTROPHE, AND A CATASTROPHE THAT IS IRREMIABLE. AND IF SOME PEOPLE NEVERTHELESS DECIDE TO DELIVER A FIRST STRIKE, THEN THEY WILL CONDEMN THEMSELVES TO AN AGONIZING DEATH -- AN AGONIZING DEATH RESULTING NOT EVEN FROM A COUNTERSTRIKE BUT FROM THE EFFECTS OF THE EXPLOSION OF THEIR OWN WARHEADS.

THAT IS NOT PROPAGANDA, POLITICAL IMPROVIZATION, OR "FEARMONGERING" BUT A REALITY THAT IS UNDENIABLE AND THAT IS SIMPLY IRRESPONSIBLE AND CRIMINAL TO DISREGARD.

OBJECTIVE AND HONEST ANALYSIS OF THE REALITIES DICTATES DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND A DIFFERENT WORLD POLICY. THESE FORM THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLED CONCLUSIONS WHICH WE HAVE COME TO RECENTLY, PARTICULARLY AT THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS.

/SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT, IS BUILT ON AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROFOUND CHANGES IN THE WORLD./

WE CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS MADE ON 15 JANUARY THIS YEAR ON ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD BY THE YEAR 2000 ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE DEMANDS OF OUR ERA.

WE HAVE SHOWN READINESS TO SEEK COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THAT AROUSE DISPUTE AND SUSPICION.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS PUT A PACKAGE OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMAMENTS.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR WARSAW PACT ALLIES WE HAVE SUBMITTED A PACKAGE OF MEASURES TO CUT ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. AND WE WANT PROGRESS -- CONCERTED AND CONSISTENT PROGRESS -- IN THAT SPHERE TOWARD A LOWER AND LESS DANGEROUS LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

(MORE)

18 AUG 1648Z PM

<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 860819125935

<TEXT>FBIS 093

USIA ALERT

TAKE 3 OF 5 -- 090 (GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON MORATORIUM)

///OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

PM191610

(TEXT) NEW PROPOSALS CONCERNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED THAT, IN OUR OPINION, MAKE IT POSSIBLE BY AS EARLY AS THE END OF THIS YEAR OR NEXT TO SIGN A CONVENTION BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ELIMINATING THE STOCKS OF THEM AS WELL AS THEIR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BASE. AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, COOPERATING CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS, HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL TO FIND SOLUTIONS (RAZUYAZKI) ON KEY QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE NONUSE OF FORCE, THE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES AND TROOP MOVEMENTS, THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND VERIFICATION (PROVERKA).

WE HAVE PUT FORWARD A BROAD PLATFORM FOR ENSURING SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC REGION AND WE INVITE EVERYONE TO TAKE PART IN THIS PROCESS.

WE HAVE DISPLAYED INITIATIVE ON COOPERATION WITH ALL INTERESTED STATES WITH REGARD TO CREATING INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES (REZHIM) FOR THE SAFE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY.

RECENTLY, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE "STAR WARS" PROGRAM, WE SUBMITTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS A PROGRAM FOR BUILDING "STAR PEACE" AND CREATING A WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION.

THE 27TH CONGRESS FORMULATED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AN ALL-EMBRACING SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THAT IS THE MOST GENERALIZED EXPRESSION OF OUR NEW APPROACHES IN FOREIGN POLICY. AND A FEW DAYS AGO THE GROUP OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OFFICIALLY REFERRED THE QUESTION OF CREATING SUCH A SYSTEM FOR CONSIDERATION BY A ROUTINE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION.

AT THE SAME TIME I WANT TO STRESS THAT, NO MATTER HOW IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT OUR PROPOSALS ARE AND NO MATTER HOW COMMITTED TO THEM WE ARE, WE REALIZE THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DO EVERYTHING BY

OURSELVES. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IS A COMMON PROBLEM AND THEREFORE A COMMON CONCERN AND A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY.

WE STUDY AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWPOINTS AND INITIATIVES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS WHEN WE FORMULATE OUR PROPOSALS. WE CAREFULLY SEE TO IT THAT EQUAL SECURITY IS ENVISAGED FOR EVERYONE AT EACH STAGE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROPOSALS. NONETHELESS, WE BY NO MEANS REGARD THEM AS DEFINITIVE AND AS NOT SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION. THE ROAD TO OVERCOMING THE IMPASSES OF CONFRONTATION LIES VIA DIALOGUE, CONTACTS, DISCUSSION, AND TALKS. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY TO MELT THE ICE OF MUTUAL DISTRUST AND TO ACHIEVE PRACTICAL RESULTS.

IT IS THIS THAT ALSO DETERMINES OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION (KONTROL) IN RESOLVING ALL DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS. FOR INSTANCE, WHEN WE PUT FORWARD OUR PROPOSAL ON ENDING ANY NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIONS WE STATED THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION (KONTROL). OUR CONSENT TO THE INSTALLATION OF AMERICAN MONITORING APPARATUS NEAR SEMIPALATINSK IS CLEAR PROOF OF THAT. YOU

4. OBSTACLE TO THE REACHING OF AGREEMENTS. HOWEVER, IT IS STILL
STUBBORNLY EXPLOITED IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THE REAL POSITION --

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RELUCTANCE TO DISARM.

PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL WELCOMED OUR DECISION ON A MORATORIUM ON
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. WE HEARD WORDS OF APPROVAL AND SUPPORT FROM ALL
PARTS OF THE WORLD. POLITICIANS, PARLIAMENTARIANS, PUBLIC FIGURES,
AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS SAW THIS ACTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE CORRECT
APPROACH TOWARD CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS AND AS A HOPE OF DELIVERANCE
FROM THE FEAR OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. THE SOVIET MORATORIUM WAS
APPROVED BY THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY -- THE WORLDS MOST
REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF STATES.

WE WERE SUPPORTED BY OUTSTANDING SCIENTISTS -- PHYSICISTS AND
PHYSICIANS WHO PROBABLY HAVE MORE IDEA THAN ANYONE OF THE DANGERS
LURKING IN THE ATOM. OUR MORATORIUM -- AND I SAW THIS FOR MYSELF
DURING MY RECENT MEETING WITH SCIENTISTS IN MOSCOW -- IN
MEMBERS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES --
VIGOROUS ACTION.

(MORE)

18 AUG 1650Z PM

<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 860818130719

<TEXT>FBIS 094
(USIA ALERT)
TAKE 4 OF 5 -- 090 (GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON MORATORIUM)
///TAKE VIGEROUS ACTION.
PM181612

(TEXT) HOWEVER, IN CONTRAST TO ALL THESE OBVIOUS,
ENCOURAGING
MANIFESTATIONS OF THE NEW WAY OF THINKING THERE IS -- ABOVE ALL IN
THE UNITED STATES -- THE MILITARIZATION OF POLITICAL THINKING, WHICH
IN ANY CASE, AMONG WESTERN RULING CIRCLES, LAGS DANGEROUSLY BEHIND
THE PROCESS OF PROFOUND CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE, WHILE
PROGRESS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FORGES ON AHEAD OF SOCIAL AND
MORAL PROGRESS.

THE RIGHT WING MILITARIST GROUPING IN THE UNITED STATES,
REPRESENTING THE MIGHTY MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, IS SIMPLY CRAZY
ABOUT THE ARMS RACE. THE INTEREST HERE IS PROBABLY THREEFOLD: NOT

BY LIFE U.S. MILITARY SUPERIORITY; TO ATTEMPT TO DRAIN THE SOVIET UNION ECONOMICALLY AND WEAKEN IT POLITICALLY; AND, ULTIMATELY, TO SECURE COMMANDING POSITIONS IN THE WORLD, FULFILL ANCIENT IMPERIAL AMBITIONS, AND CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE POLICY OF PLUNDER WITH REGARD TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

HENCE THE FOREIGN POLICY WHICH FOR ALL ITS TWISTS AND TURNS AND VERBAL ADORNMENTS IS BASED ON DANGEROUS MISCONCEPTIONS: ON THE UNDERESTIMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, AND THE LIBERATED STATES AND ON THE OVERESTIMATION OF THEIR OWN POTENTIAL, WHICH IN TURN FOSTERS TECHNOLOGICAL SELF-ASSURANCE AND POLITICAL LICENSE.

THE FACT THAT WE ARE TAKING PART IN TALKS IS INTERPRETED BY CERTAIN AMERICAN POLITICIANS AS THE RESULT OF THE GROWTH OF U.S. MILITARY MIGHT AND THE DEVELOPMENT (RAZRABOTKA) OF THE SDI PROGRAM. THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION CANNOT TAKE THE PATH OF HONEST AGREEMENTS OR THE NORMALIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. IT BASES ITS POLICY ON SUCH FALSE PREMISES. ALL THE SAME, WE WILL HAVE TO RECKON WITH THE REALITIES OF LIFE. YOU CANNOT GET AWAY FROM THEM.

AS FOR OUR PROPOSALS, I REPEAT, THEY ARISE FROM THE REALITIES OF THE MODERN WORLD AND ARE DICTATED NOT BY WEAKNESS, BUT BY AWARENESS OF A LOFTY RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANKINDS FATE.

THIS IS THE SITUATION AT PRESENT.

ON THE ONE HAND, OUR MORATORIUM IS IN FORCE AND OUR LARGE-SCALE COMPROMISE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED AND PLACED ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AT VARIOUS FORUMS. THE PRESSURE OF PEACE-LOVING FORCES HAS INCREASED CONSIDERABLY AND THERE IS HEIGHTENED ATTENTION TOWARD THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE PART OF POLITICAL CIRCLES, INCLUDING OFFICIAL CIRCLES, WHICH ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE THE REFUSAL TO STOP NUCLEAR TESTS, STUBBORN RESISTANCE TO PEACE-LOVING INITIATIVES, OSTENTATIOUS CONTEMPT FOR THE PUBLICS DEMANDS AND THE OPINION OF MANY AUTHORITATIVE PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS, AND DISREGARD FOR THE CONCERN EVEN OF YOUR OWN ALLIES AND YOUR OWN PEOPLE.

THIS IS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS WITH WHICH WE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, ARE DEALING AT THE MOMENT OF OUR MORATORIUMS EXPIRY.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO? WHAT IS THE CHOICE? WHAT DECISION WILL BE THE MOST CORRECT, THE MOST APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION? WHAT WOULD DO MOST TO PROMOTE POSITIVE PROCESSES AND LESSEN THE THREAT OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION?

OUR PEOPLE RESOLUTELY SUPPORT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET STATE AND DEMAND THE PERSISTENT CONTINUATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF THE 27TH PARTY CONGRESS. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE LETTERS AND UTTERANCES OF SOVIET PEOPLE THERE IS A JUSTIFIED NOTE OF ALARM: IS IT EXPEDIENT TO MAINTAIN THE MORATORIUM, WHEN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CONTINUE TO RING OUT ONE AFTER ANOTHER IN NEVADA? IS NOT THE RISK TOO GREAT, IS NOT TIME WORKING AGAINST THE COUNTRIES

SECURITY? INDEED, THE UNITED STATES, HAVING REMAINED CHAMPIONS IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS FOR 40 YEARS, HAS EXPLODED ANOTHER 18 NUCLEAR DEVICES IN THE YEAR OF THE SOVIET MORATORIUM. I REPEAT -- 18, 3 OF WHICH WERE NOT ANNOUNCED. AND AS A RULE, THEY DID

THIS OSTENTATIIOUSLY, TIMING THE TESTS TO COINCIDE EITHER WITH OUR LATEST STATEMENT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE MORATORIUM OR WITH SOME NEW SOVIET

INITIATIVE OR OTHER. MOREOVER, THEY INVITED US TO NEVADA TO SEE HOW IT IS DONE. IT SHOULD BE ADDED THAT THE PRESENT U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS IMPLEMENTING THE BROADEST MILITARY PROGRAMS.


IN A WORD, THE SOVIET UNION CERTAINLY HAS SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR RESUMING ITS OWN NUCLEAR TESTS. ALL THE SAME, WE ARE EVEN NOW CONVINCED THAT THE ENDING OF NUCLEAR TESTS NOT ONLY BY THE SOVIET

TOWARD HALTING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND WOULD ACCELERATE THE
-ELICTION OF THOSE ARMS. THE LOGIC IS SIMPLE: IF THERE ARE NO
TESTS, THERE WILL BE NO IMPROVEMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS, OF WHICH BOTH
SIDES HAVE ALREADY STOCKPILED MORE THAN ENOUGH.

THIS IS INDICATED BY THE APPEALS ADDRESSED TO THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION BY A SIGNIFICANT AND AUTHORITATIVE SECTION OF
THE WORLD COMMUNITY OF STATES. AMONG THEM ARE THE "DELHI SIX" -- A
STANDING FORUM OF LEADERS OF COUNTRIES FROM FOUR CONTINENTS,
ARGENTINA, GREECE, INDIA, MEXICO, TANZANIA, AND SWEDEN. THE OTHER
DAY, AT A MEETING IN IXTAPA, THEY ADOPTED THE "MEXICAN DECLARATION,"
WHICH ONCE AGAIN CONTAINS AN APPEAL FOR AN END TO ALL NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS. THAT IS ALSO THE DEMAND OF THE MAJORITY OF THE
STATES
PARTICIPATING IN THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT.

(MORE)

18 AUG 1650Z CLB



<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 860818131736

<TEXT>FBIS 095

USIA ALERT

TAKE 5 OF 5 -- 090 (GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON MORATORIUM)

///THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT.

PM181614

(TEXT) WE HAVE RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FIGURES, PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, AND ORGANIZATIONS IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO STATES. THEY ALSO APPEAL FOR THE NONRESUMPTION OF NUCLEAR TESTS AND FOR YET ANOTHER CHANCE FOR THOUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO THOSE WHO ARE INSISTING ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

OF COURSE WE KNOW, AND I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT THIS, THAT THERE ARE FORCES ACTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES THAT IN NO WAY WANT TO DISARM. MOREOVER, THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING TO DRAG US INTO MORE AND MORE SPIRALS OF THE ARMS RACE AND PROVOKE US INTO SLAMMING THE DOOR ON TALKS.

BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT REALISM AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO JOINTLY SEEK WAYS TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, END THE SENSELESS ARMS RACE, AND ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL GAIN THE UPPER HAND IN AMERICAN ASSESSMENTS AND ACTIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME WE KNOW WITH WHOM WE ARE DEALING. THEREFORE THE COUNTRYS SECURITY IS A SACRED MATTER FOR US. THIS MUST BE CLEAR TO EVERYBODY. THIS IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE.

WE PROCEED FROM THIS WHEN RESPONDING TO ANY U.S. CHALLENGES, INCLUDING THE NOTORIOUS SDI. LET THERE BE NO COUNTING HERE ON INTIMIDATING US OR PUSHING US INTO UNNECESSARY EXPENDITURE. IF NECESSARY WE WILL RAPIDLY FIND A RESPONSE -- AND IT WILL NOT BE THE ONE EXPECTED BY THE UNITED STATES (PRICHEM BUDET ON NE TAKIM, KAKIM EGO OZHIDAYUT V SSHA). BUT IT WILL BE A RESPONSE THAT WILL NEGATE THE VALUE OF (OBSTSEMIT) THE "STAR WARS" PROGRAM. I HAVE ONE OBJECTIVE IN SAYING THIS: LET THE REAL VALUE OF NEW MILITARY PROGRAMS AND THE ARMS RACE AS A WHOLE BE WEIGHED AGAIN AND AGAIN IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. FOR THE MAIN HARM OF SDI ESSENTIALLY LIES IN THE FACT THAT IT UNDERMINES THE PROSPECTS FOR TALKS AND BROADENS THE ZONE OF MISTRUST. THIS IS THE WHOLE PROBLEM. IT IS NO LESS POLITICAL THAN MILITARY. THIS IS WHY WE AGAIN CALL FOR MOVEMENT AWAY FROM A WORLD ARMED TO THE LIMIT TO A WORLD WITHOUT WEAPONS.

THUS, COMRADES, HAVING COMPREHENSIVELY AND SCRUPULOUSLY WEIGHED ALL THE PROS AND CONS AND GUIDED BY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF PEACE, THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO AND GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ADOPTED A DECISION /TO CONTINUE THE UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS UNTIL 1 JANUARY 1987./

IN TAKING THIS STEP WE BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE IN ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, POLITICAL CIRCLES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC WILL CORRECTLY ASSESS THE PROTRACTED SILENCE AT SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST SITES.

ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE I APPEAL TO THE REASON AND DIGNITY OF THE AMERICANS -- NOT TO MISS ONCE AGAIN A HISTORIC CHANCE ON THE PATH TOWARD ENDING THE ARMS RACE

I APPEAL TO U.S. PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ONCE AGAIN MAKE A DISPASSIONATE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED, DISCARD EVERYTHING SUPERFICIAL, AND OVERCOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

THE SOVIET UNION IS CONFIDENT THAT AN AGREEMENT ON ENDING NUCLEAR TESTS CAN BE REACHED RAPIDLY AND SIGNED /THIS VERY YEAR AT A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING./ THIS EVENT WOULD WITHOUT ANY DOUBT BE /THE MAIN REAL RESULT OF THE MEETING/ AND A SIGNIFICANT STEP ALONG THE PATH OF ENDING THE ARMS RACE. IT WOULD BE A KIND OF PROLOGUE TO FURTHER PROGRESS AT THE TALKS ON NUCLEAR ARMS AND THEIR ELIMINATION AND TO A RADICAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE ENTIRE SITUATION IN THE WORLD.

BEING AN ACTION, NOT JUST A PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET UNIONS MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS PROVES IN PRACTICE THE SERIOUSNESS AND SINCERITY OF OUR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PROGRAM AND OUR APPEALS FOR A NEW POLICY -- A POLICY OF REALISM, PEACE, AND COOPERATION.

MORE THAN HALF OF 1986 -- PROCLAIMED PEACE YEAR BY THE UNITED NATIONS -- IS BEHIND US. IN EXTENDING ITS UNILATERAL MORATORIUM THE SOVIET UNION IS MAKING YET ANOTHER WEIGHTY CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON ASPIRATION TO ENSURE THAT THIS YEAR GOES DOWN IN HISTORY AS A YEAR WORTHY OF ITS NAME.

THIS IS THE POINT OF THE SOVIET UNIONS NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE.

THIS IS THE MESSAGE THAT OUR COUNTRY IS SENDING TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, AND PRIMARILY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THANK YOU. GOOD NIGHT.

(MORE)

18 AUG 1658Z PM

*Fidi:
Gorbachev
speeches*

USSR-U.S.

Gorbachev Pushes Moratorium, Talks Tough on Summit

General Secretary Gorbachev's 8 September interview with the Czechoslovak newspaper Rude Pravo appeared designed to maintain public pressure on Washington to compromise on nuclear testing and to reinforce his longstanding demand that a summit meeting must produce concrete results in arms control. He denounced U.S. policies in unusually harsh terms, scoring the Reagan Administration's alleged lack of commitment to arms control and hinting that Washington's continued intransigence could lead ultimately to war. At the same time, Gorbachev reaffirmed Moscow's intention to persist in pursuing a dialogue with the Administration.

Gorbachev's interview with *Rude Pravo*, broadcast over Soviet television on 8 September and published in *Pravda* the next day, was clearly intended to project an image of Soviet responsibility and flexibility on arms control issues, particularly on the issue of nuclear testing. Citing the testing issue as a litmus test of international intentions, Gorbachev argued that willingness to quickly prepare a treaty on "total prohibition" of nuclear tests "has become a most cogent indicator of how seriously each of the biggest nuclear powers does in fact regard disarmament" and is also a test of "historical maturity."

Gorbachev's interview seemed aimed at increasing pressure on the Administration to modify its position on a range of arms control issues. He accused the United States of intransigence and repeatedly assailed the Administration for failing to respond positively to the Soviet unilateral testing moratorium. He charged that "at least in the entourage of the President, there is, for the moment, no serious thought being given to the elimination of the nuclear threat." He indicated that Moscow's latest extension of the moratorium may be creating domestic and international pressure on the Administration to alter its position. "So far as can be judged," he said, public opinion in the United States, together with a "considerable proportion of the Congress," favors ending nuclear tests. He also noted that "numerous" public

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groups and "authoritative" political parties, such as the West German Social Democrats and the British Labor Party, have come out in favor of the moratorium and have "appealed to America to follow the USSR's example."

Gorbachev painted a gloomy portrait of bilateral relations and held out little prospect of progress in the absence of a shift in the U.S. position on arms control. Despite all Soviet efforts, he said, since the November summit "we have not moved an inch closer to an arms reduction agreement." He placed the blame for this failure squarely on the United States, accusing it of taking actions that run directly counter to the spirit of the November summit in Geneva. Reciting a litany of charges, he pointed to the buildup of U.S. strategic forces, "statements about abandoning" SALT II, "actions undermining the ABM Treaty" including SDI and the testing of ASAT weapons, "fantastic" military appropriations, "strong-arm marauding neoglobalist actions" against Libya and Nicaragua, and "challenging military maneuvers" near the Soviet Union that have "no parallel since the 1950's" as actions that "create an alarming picture."

Reinforcing this negative portrait of U.S. policy and its impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, Gorbachev hinted darkly that the Administration is pursuing a course that ultimately could lead to nuclear war. He characterized the Administration's course as "material and psychological preparation for a world war" and said that the "public is rightfully beginning to ask" whether the United States is "preparing to fight." There is, he added, growing "alarm over the fact that a catastrophe really could occur."¹

Summit Gorbachev maintained the posture of deliberate ambiguity on the summit question that he has staked out through most of 1986, but added one of his harshest attacks on U.S. actions that in Moscow's judgment have jeopardized prospects for a new meeting. While reiterating that the Soviet Union in principle favors the holding of a second summit, he repeated his familiar linkage of a summit to progress on arms control, asserting that such a meeting "should be marked by perceptible progress in resolving at least one or two significant problems of international security." He went on to warn, however, that in an "atmosphere

¹ The danger of war was depicted more starkly in a 7 September Moscow radio broadcast to North America in which Sergey Plekhanov, a sector chief at the Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada, warned that if the United States continues to pursue its policy of military buildup, "we may be faced with the very real possibility of a nuclear war within the next, perhaps, decade and a half," adding that possibly the world may "not be able to survive."

of a frantic arms race, fueling of tension, and demolition of existing treaties, a summit meeting is hardly going to be of any use." He accused the Administration of generating a sense of "false optimism" and of deliberately "creating the impression that preparations for a meeting are in full swing."

At the same time Gorbachev held out the prospect of possible compromise and reaffirmed the USSR's interest in dialogue with the Reagan Administration. Asserting that Moscow seeks to "bring our positions closer on a wide range of problems," he rejected an "all or nothing" approach to a summit. He went on to reject what he characterized as arguments that Moscow should wait until the end of the Reagan Administration before seeking to pursue arms control agreements with Washington. "We attach too much importance to the time factor," he said, to decide to "mark time for two and a half years," adding that "to wait, to delay would be an inexcusable error." The Soviet Union, he said, "will continue to use every opportunity for constructive dialogue," adding that, "however much we are provoked, we do not break the threads of contacts with the American Administration . . . we do not slam the door."

Gorbachev's continued ambiguity on the summit issue suggests that the Soviet leadership is delaying a decision as long as possible in order to assess the amount of give in U.S. positions on arms control issues. Gorbachev indicated that the forthcoming meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be a key factor in determining the fate of the next summit, noting that the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting will "help to clarify where we stand at the moment, whether the Soviet-American dialogue has a chance of progress."

Background

Gorbachev's endorsement of continued dialogue with the Reagan Administration comes against a background of apparent debate among senior Soviet commentators and specialists over the nature of the Administration and, implicitly, the prospects for reaching agreement on arms control. In early August, for example, participants in Soviet television's *Studio Nine* international affairs discussion program openly disagreed over whether there were forces within the Administration that sincerely favored arms control.²

More recently, in a 24 August television commentary, outspoken *Literaturnaya Gazeta* political observer Fedor Burlatskiy offered an unusually optimistic assessment of the chances of reaching agreement with the

² See the Trends of 20 August 1986, pages 4-8.

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Administration. He disputed the argument, attributed to unnamed figures in the West, that "disarmament negotiations with the present leader of the White House are altogether useless and hopeless" and that Moscow should "wait a little more than two years" for a new administration when "new possibilities for disarmament agreements will surely open up." He countered that "every opportunity—even the smallest one—for negotiations" on arms control should be seized, adding that many presidents who came into office opposed to arms control "entered into serious agreements." (U/FOUO)