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9945	PAPER	RECENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP SPEECHES: POLITICAL AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE <b>PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	14	3/7/1985	B3
9951	PAPER	USSR: GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA <b>R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</b>	3	3/15/1985	B1
9952	CABLE	181553Z MAR 85 <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	2	3/18/1985	B1
9946	PAPER	USSR NEW PERSONNEL POLICY PRESSED BY GORBACHEV <b>R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	6	4/10/1985	B1
9947	PAPER	ARBATOV ON SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING <b>D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	11	4/24/1985	B1 B3
9953	REPORT	USSR <b>D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	1	9/4/1985	B3
9954	REPORT	USSR <b>D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	2	9/4/1985	B1 B3
9948	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO POINDEXTER RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS <b>R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/7</b>	1	9/12/1985	B1

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9950	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS <i>R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</i>	3	7/7/1985	B1

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

7 March 1985

*Soviet Polit*

*[Handwritten signature]*

0291

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Recent Soviet Leadership Speeches: Political and Policy Significance

Summary

The round of legislative election speeches given by top-ranking Soviet leaders in February provided strong evidence of the disruptive impact of General Secretary Chernenko's health problems on Soviet politics and policies. Changes in election-related protocol rankings, for example, suggest that Chernenko's illness has increased pre-succession maneuvering. These rankings indicate that Mikhail Gorbachev, the party's unofficial second secretary, has widened his advantage over Grigoriy Romanov, one of his presumed rivals for Chernenko's post. Meanwhile, Moscow city party boss Viktor Grishin is associating himself more closely with Chernenko, perhaps to establish himself as a champion of the Politburo's old guard and an alternative candidate to become the next general secretary. [redacted]

The frequency with which Chernenko was mentioned and the praise lavished on him suggest that his Politburo colleagues, despite their concern with his health, currently are not inclined to replace him as general secretary. He nonetheless does not appear to enjoy solid leadership backing. His strongest support, to judge from the variations in the praise he received, still is concentrated among the Politburo's elders, and he has failed to win the enthusiastic backing of younger leaders

This paper was prepared by [redacted]

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promoted during Andropov's tenure. The same barometer suggests that doubts about Chernenko's ability to resume a more active role are undermining his support among such former allies as Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Georgian party leader Eduard Shevardnadze.

The speeches also suggest that preoccupation with political succession may be causing Soviet leaders to mark time on domestic policy issues. References to the consumer goods program, which Chernenko had strongly backed and which was to have been completed by the end of last year, indicate that it is still in the drafting stage. A program for improving economic management, which was reported to be in preparation last year, was not even mentioned. There was no reference to Chernenko's previous announcement that an upcoming Central Committee meeting would be devoted to a discussion of science and technology. This silence lends credence to reports that precedence is being given to preparing for the next party congress, which may be held late this year, and to conserving Chernenko's energies for the party's most essential political business.

On the foreign policy front, Soviet leaders from both ends of the political spectrum seemed to move closer to center. Ukrainian party leader Shcherbitskiy toned down the strong criticism of the United States that has marked many of his past statements, while party secretary Gorbachev, who has usually taken a less harsh line, cast doubts on the seriousness of US intentions at the upcoming arms control talks. In some cases, this strategy may have been adopted to enhance the "tough but reasonable" image the Soviets are trying to project as they prepare for the talks in Geneva. Shcherbitskiy, for example, probably did not wish to appear too antagonistic on the eve of his current visit to the United States. Others, however, may have altered their stance because it served their own political interests to do so. Gorbachev, in particular, may have been intent on enlarging his constituency.

Elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Soviet republics occur every five years. The results are predetermined, but the regime devotes considerable attention to the process, with each member of the Politburo and Secretariat delivering a speech in his assigned electoral district. These speeches typically cover

a broad range of domestic and foreign policies and provide a useful index to leadership thinking on key political issues. The electoral campaign also provides an opportunity for foreign and domestic observers to gauge the political standing of individual leaders; the number of honorary nominations each leader receives and the order in which the leaders speak are among the best indicators we have of their rankings in the hierarchy. (See table at annex.) The accolades accorded the general secretary by his colleagues also provide a measure of the strength of his political support and serve to identify his allies and detractors.\* [redacted]

Chernenko's Status

By 1 February, when party secretaries Nikolay Ryzhkov and Yegor Ligachev began the round of leadership speeches, Chernenko had been absent from public view for more than a month, and numerous Soviet officials had acknowledged in private that he was seriously ill. Throughout the election campaign, however, the other leaders conveyed greetings from him to their constituents and implied that he had recently spoken with them. [redacted]

Chernenko was unable to appear for his own election speech, which was read on his behalf by an unnamed individual, and it was publicly announced that he had chosen not to appear upon the recommendation of his doctors. Still, as the election campaign closed, Soviet television viewers were shown a film clip of Chernenko appearing at a "polling station" to cast his ballot. The attempts to keep Chernenko's name and face before the public show that the Politburo is, as yet, unwilling to replace him as general secretary [redacted]

The treatment accorded Chernenko in his colleagues' speeches also suggests, however, that his poor health may have led some of his former boosters to reassess their political loyalties. For example, First Deputy Premier Geydar Aliyev's speech, according to Pravda's account of it, was less effusive in its references to Chernenko this time than during last year's round of speeches for election to the USSR Supreme Soviet (the national legislature). The same was true of the speech by Georgian party leader Shevardnadze, a longtime Chernenko supporter. Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy also seemed somewhat cooler toward Chernenko than he was last year. [redacted]

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\*The findings in this memorandum are based chiefly on the versions of the speeches that appeared in Pravda. Longer versions, which sometimes appear in the newspapers of the locality where the speech is delivered, had been received by the time of writing only for Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Shcherbitskiy, Chebrikov, and Romanov. [redacted]

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The leadership speeches also suggest that Chernenko has failed to win the enthusiastic backing of younger leaders whose careers had advanced during Yuriy Andropov's tenure as party chief. In comparison with other leaders, Ligachev, Ryzhkov and KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov were sparing in their praise of Chernenko. Ryzhkov said only that Chernenko was making a "great personal contribution" to the party's work, and Chebrikov failed to make any positive reference to him. [redacted]

Chernenko was not without supporters. Members of the Brezhnevite old guard--such as Moscow city party chief Grishin, Kazakh party leader Dinmukhamed Kunayev, and Vice President Vladimir Kuznetsov--were fulsome in their tributes, describing him as an "outstanding figure of the party and state" and praising his leadership qualities. Grishin offered the most glowing praise, calling Chernenko a "purposeful, principled man of great industry" and a "leader of the Leninist type," complimenting him for his "profound knowledge, ability, and exactingness," and noting his "benevolent attitude and personal modesty." [redacted]

#### Other Leaders

The election campaign saw a further improvement in Gorbachev's status in the leadership. He and Tikhonov received more nominations--12 apiece--than any other leader except Chernenko. Gorbachev also was given a constituency in Moscow, a status symbol not accorded to other recent "number two" party leaders. His speech received extensive media coverage, and in a gesture signaling his special status, was attended by fellow Politburo member Grishin and Central Committee Secretaries Ligachev and Ryzhkov. Other than Gorbachev, only Chernenko and Tikhonov had other members of the leadership in attendance at their election speeches. [redacted]

Gorbachev's succession prospects received another boost when senior party secretary Romanov, a potential rival for Chernenko's post, spoke before Party Control Committee Chairman Solomentsev, thus apparently slipping in the leadership rankings. Solomentsev and Russian Republic Premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov are the most recent additions to the Politburo. Although Solomentsev's party position might allow for higher standing than his junior Politburo rank would normally justify, it can hardly explain his outranking Romanov, a senior party secretary. [redacted]

Grishin managed to capture the media spotlight by capitalizing on his role as nominal "host" to the top three leaders--Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gorbachev--all of whom have Moscow constituencies. He also made the announcement that Chernenko would not be delivering his speech, and he showed up at Chernenko's side when he cast his vote. By coming forward as Chernenko's closest associate, Grishin may have been moving to

establish himself as a champion of the old guard and signaling a willingness to contest Gorbachev's bid to become the next general secretary. [redacted]

Economic Policy

Soviet leaders gave less attention to economic issues in this year's speeches than they did last year. Most leaders focused on uncontroversial subjects, such as the campaign to save labor and materials, and avoided specifics when dealing with the potentially divisive issues of economic reform and resource allocation priorities. All speakers portrayed the last two years as particularly good ones in economic terms. Even sectors of the economy that have been perennial laggards--transportation and construction--were accorded some kind words. Romanov, Aliyev and party Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh sounded the only discordant notes, pointing to the slow pace of raw materials extraction, particularly fuels, as a serious problem area. [redacted]

The speeches provided few hints about resource allocation decisions for the next five-year plan. Romanov, the overseer of defense industries, said that the Soviet party and state would "continue to show tireless concern" for strengthening defense capabilities, while Gorbachev merely assured his audience that defense was being maintained "at the proper level." Such differences in tone make it difficult to determine what decision may actually have been made on the issue of defense spending--especially in the absence of the late Defense Minister Ustinov, whose representation of both party and military interests made his statements on defense issues more definitive than most. [redacted]

The speeches also shed little light on the regime's investment plans. All leaders, major and minor, spoke with one voice on the urgency of accelerating scientific and technical progress in order to achieve intensive growth. Most, however, did not go the next logical step and link this to the need for a boost in investment growth. The exceptions were Gorbachev and Romanov, who pushed for more resources for machine building, as they did last year. No mention was made of Chernenko's announcement in November 1984 that an upcoming Central Committee meeting would be devoted to science and technology. This omission lends credence to reports that precedence is being given to preparing for the next party congress, which may be held late this year, and to conserving Chernenko's energies for essential political matters. [redacted]

Soviet leaders were united on the importance of improving living standards, with Chernenko and Tikhonov being the strongest consumer advocates. Rather than promising an increased resource commitment in all consumer-related areas, however, they indicated that resources would be concentrated on selected targets such as housing, education and health. Progress on the consumer goods



program was variously characterized as "being worked out" (Kapitonov and Aliyev) and "being completed" (Gorbachev). According to US Embassy sources, the leaders have so far been unwilling to give the program enough resources to make it impressive enough to promulgate. Several speakers admonished consumers that they would have to "work better to live better."

[redacted]

Most leaders gave little attention to agriculture and even less to the new long-term land reclamation program that was the subject of a Central Committee meeting held last October. Gorbachev, who is responsible for overseeing agriculture and has been highly critical of land reclamation in the past, failed even to pay lip service to the program. The program was mentioned only by Chernenko, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, the party boss of a region strongly dependent on irrigation, and by Dolgikh, Demichev and Solomentsev, leaders with no responsibility for agriculture. The latter three may have alluded to the program simply to demonstrate their support for Chernenko. Premier Tikhonov, an ally of Chernenko's, made no mention of land reclamation but did refer to the importance of the October meeting.

[redacted]

All of the major leaders vaguely noted the need to improve economic management, and most claimed that the "five-ministry experiment," a limited expansion of enterprise autonomy launched in 1984, is yielding positive results. Ryzhkov, who as party secretary for economic management would presumably develop and present any new reforms, emphasized that the purpose of the five-ministry experiment was to give enterprises greater economic autonomy "within the framework of our centralized plan-managed economy"--a remark that is indicative of the leadership's reluctance to embark on bolder reforms.

[redacted]

In contrast to the election speeches of a year ago, the speakers no longer claimed that reform is one of the prerequisites for a successful transition to intensive growth. Their remarks also lacked the sense of urgency conveyed last year, when work was reported to be in progress on a "program for the comprehensive improvement of the entire management mechanism." This program was not mentioned at all in this year's speeches although Gorbachev said that improvement of the economic mechanism and management is "on the agenda."

[redacted]

#### Foreign Affairs

The speakers who dealt with international issues almost all focused on the upcoming Geneva arms control talks with the United States. In doing so, leaders from both ends of the political spectrum seemed to move somewhat closer to center. For example, Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy refrained from expressing the strong criticism of the United States that has marked many of his past statements, probably to avoid clouding the atmosphere for his

current US visit. Instead, he cited recent remarks by Chernenko that success in the talks requires good will and expressed the "hope" that the United States would act accordingly. [redacted]

On the other hand, Gorbachev, who has taken a less harsh line in the past, expressed strong skepticism about US intentions toward the Geneva talks, perhaps in an effort to enlarge his political constituency. In an effort to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, he also paid tribute to the "good sense" of West Europeans in wanting to prevent their and Moscow's "common home" from being turned into a "firing range" for the Pentagon. [redacted]

Foreign Minister Gromyko, who devoted the most attention to the talks, was particularly skeptical regarding US intentions and critical of US policy. He alleged that "certain US circles" were trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR and that US plans to militarize space undermined the prospects for success in Geneva. On the other hand, Gromyko set no preconditions for the talks and did not state, as he has in the past, that they would be jeopardized by continued US deployment of INF missiles in Europe or by further US testing of ASAT components. [redacted]

Romanov, who treated international affairs at great length, described the current state of East-West relations as "extraordinarily dangerous," a characterization that TASS watered down in its English-language treatment of his speech. He also alleged that Western efforts to attain military superiority had brought mankind "close to the brink of thermonuclear catastrophe." Still, Romanov was restrained in his comments on the Geneva talks and claimed that the USSR is ready for "the most radical decisions." [redacted]

Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo who oversees the Central Committee's International Department, claimed the USSR is prepared for "radical" steps in Geneva, but expressed greater skepticism than Romanov as to US intentions. He said that the United States was lying when it claimed that its research related to the Strategic Defense Initiative was not threatening to the USSR. Perhaps to embellish the achievements of his department, which is responsible for relations with communist parties in the West and dealings with the non-communist left, Ponomarev spoke repeatedly of the "increasing" strength of the antiwar movement. [redacted]

Chernenko presented the most upbeat assessment of the prospects for reaching an agreement at Geneva. Unlike several other leaders, he refrained from charging that the United States was not sincere in its approach to the talks and from attacking the US position on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Moreover, he averred that despite a divergence of views between the two sides and "gloomy forecasts," which he disavowed, agreement is both "necessary" and "possible." [redacted]

Several speakers who discussed international affairs concentrated on issues other than the Geneva talks. KGB Chairman Chebrikov and party Secretaries Petr Demichev and Mikhail Zimyanin--all of whom have special responsibilities for ideological matters--stressed the need for Soviet citizens to be vigilant against "subversive" efforts from outside. Chebrikov devoted particular attention to this theme, alleging that there was a widespread Western campaign of "ideological sabotage." Addressing his constituents in Vladivostok, Chebrikov also paid particular attention to Soviet relations with countries of East and Southeast Asia, declaring that the USSR favors further progress in Sino-Soviet relations--a point also made by Chernenko. [redacted]

Political Issues

All speakers touched on the importance of strengthening discipline and law and order, goals strongly associated with the Andropov period. Chernenko pledged full compliance with the discipline campaign, while acknowledging that much remained to be done. Some of the toughest statements on the subject, however, were made by leaders whose careers prospered under Andropov--Aliyev, Gorbachev, Romanov, Vorotnikov, and Solomentsev. [redacted]

Almost all the leaders shied away from the more sensitive issue of corruption in high places, a problem that Andropov had tackled but that has been dealt with only fitfully during Chernenko's tenure. According to the version of his election speech printed in the Georgian press, Georgian party chief Shevardnadze said that voters had refrained from renominating some unnamed incumbents "because of errors, serious oversights, and failings committed by them." Gorbachev was quoted in a local Moscow newspaper as warning that strict discipline would be "expected for all" and that "no exceptions" would be made. The fact that these passages were struck from Pravda's account of the speeches suggests that some Soviet leaders considered them too pointed. [redacted]

All speakers referred to the upcoming 27th Party Congress, but only Shevardnadze said that it would be held this year, as several recent reports have suggested. Most speakers also mentioned that a new edition of the CPSU program would be approved by the congress. Grishin said that the program was being drafted under Chernenko's "direct leadership." Chernenko himself went further than any of the others in alleging progress, claiming that preparation of the program was "entering the final stage." This remark seems to be consistent with recent reports that a Central Committee meeting soon will be convened to set a date for the congress and unveil the party program for public discussion. [redacted]

Few Soviet leaders made reference to plans to discuss possible amendments to the party rules. Chernenko had raised this subject in a speech last October, but he made no mention of it in his

election speech. Party Secretary Ligachev was the only leader to indicate what the general thrust of the rule changes might be. According to Ligachev, "additions to the party rules should serve to consolidate discipline, which is severe and equal for all communists...." Their silence on this issue suggests that others in the leadership, particularly members of the old guard, may see such changes as possible threats to their own positions.

Political Standings of Soviet Leaders as Revealed in 1985 Election Speech Schedule\*


Last Year	This Year	Comment
Chernenko	Chernenko (in absentia)	Topmost slot, as expected
Tikhonov	Tikhonov	Traditional slot for premier
Gorbachev	Gorbachev	Senior secretary under Chernenko
Ustinov		Died on 20 December 1984
Gramyko	Gramyko	Foreign Minister...top ranking government leader after Premier Tikhonov
	Kuznetsov	Candidate member of Politburo...spoke out of turn this year due to illness
Grishin	Grishin	Moscow party leader...continues to outrank other regional chiefs
Romanov	Solomentsev	Heads party discipline unit...unusually high ranking for recently elected (1983) full member of the Politburo
Shcherbitskiy	Romanov	Senior secretary...now far outranked by Gorbachev
Solomentsev	Aliyev	First Deputy Premier...moved up
Ponomarev		Spoke out of turn last year due to illness
Kunayev	Shcherbitskiy	Ukrainian party chief...slipping: preceded Grishin in 1979 and Solomentsev last year
Aliyev	Kunayev	Kazakh party chief...moved down
Vorotnikov	Vorotnikov	RSFSR Premier...junior and lowest ranking full member of Politburo
	Ponomarev	Secretary and senior among candidate Politburo members
Kuznetsov		Vice President equivalent
Dolgikh	Shevardnadze	Georgian party chief...moved up a notch among candidate members
Shevardnadze	Dolgikh	Candidate Politburo member and party secretary...slipped a notch
Chebrikov	Chebrikov	KGB Chief and candidate Politburo member
Demichev	Demichev	Culture Minister and candidate Politburo member
Ryzhkov	Rusakov	Secretary for bloc relations, former Brezhnev aide...moved up
Kapitonov	Zimyanin	Secretary for propaganda and ideology...moved up
Zimyanin	Kapitonov	Secretary for light industry and consumer goods...slipped a notch
Rusakov	Ligachev	Secretary for cadres...moved up
Ligachev	Ryzhkov	Secretary and head of Central Committee's Economics Department...slipped substantially


\*Note: Leaders are listed in the reverse order from that in which they spoke. By long established tradition, the lowest ranking leader speaks first and the highest ranking leader speaks last.

- 31 - Mr. Richard Combs  
Director, Office of East European Affairs  
Bureau of European Affairs  
Department of State  
Room 4217
- 32 - Mr. Steve Coffey  
PM/SNP  
Department of State  
Room 7317 State
- 33 - Honorable Michael H. Armacost  
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
Department of State  
Room 7240
- 34 - Mr. Richard Burt  
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Department of State  
Room 6226
- 35 - Mr. Bill Courtney  
Special Assistant, Office of Under-Secretary  
for Political Affairs  
Department of State  
Room 7240
- 36 - Mr. W. D. Howells  
Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis INR/PMA  
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- 37 - Mr. Donald Graves  
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Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and  
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Department of State  
Room 4758
- 39 - Ms. Martha C. Mautner  
Deputy Director  
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Department of State  
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- 40 - Mr. Morton Abramowitz  
Director/INR  
Department of State  
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- 41 - Mr. Mark Palmer  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for European Affairs  
Department of State  
Room 6219
  
  - 42 - Mr. Thomas W. Simons, Jr.  
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
Bureau of European Affairs  
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Room 4217
  
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Director, Political-Military Affairs  
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Room 391
  
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Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
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  - 45 - Mr. Raymond Firehock  
Chief, Intelligence Division  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Room 6510A, NS Annex
  
  - 46 - Mr. Jay Kalner  
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Department of State  
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  - 47 - The Honorable Richard Perle  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
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  - 48 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle  
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
Rm 4E830  
Pentagon
  
  - 49 - Ms. Linda Wetzel  
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO  
Department of Defense  
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- 51 - General William Odom  
HQDA (DAMI-ZA)  
Department of the Army  
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- 52 - MG James C. Pfautz, USAF  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Department of the Air Force  
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## USSR

### New Personnel Policy Pressed by Gorbachev

*The Gorbachev regime is giving high priority to the implementation of a cadre policy adopted last October. As cadre supervisor under Chernenko, Gorbachev probably played an important role in formulating the policy and now, as general secretary, he appears to be trying to use it to accelerate the pace of personnel changes.*

Since Gorbachev became general secretary on 11 March, numerous regional plenums on cadre policy have been held and have stressed the need for new, higher leadership standards. A few of these plenums were held before Chernenko's death, but since the March CPSU plenum, 12 republics and numerous provincial party organizations have addressed the issue. Accounts of the recent meetings have been replete with tales of abuses, errors in cadre selection, and leadership shortcomings; in some cases, officials have been replaced. Several accounts have cited statements at the March plenum to justify a more aggressive approach to personnel matters.

The new policy was initially adopted at the 18 October meeting of the Politburo. According to the *Pravda* account the next day, Chernenko raised "several questions of present-day cadre policy," while the Politburo ordered an improvement of cadre work and called for the promotion of younger leaders, women, and rank-and-file workers. The report on the meeting was balanced with an admonition that young officials must learn from "experienced cadres of the older generation" in order "to gain experience and acquire necessary tempering." According to *Pravda* the Politburo called on local party organizations to develop concrete measures to improve cadre work. Chernenko revealed in a 5 November speech to Soviet bloc youth leaders that the Politburo had adopted a formal decision on personnel matters.

Although the Politburo decision was never published, subsequent commentary indicated that the new cadre policy called for more aggressive promotion of new leaders and less tolerance of incompetent officials. For example, a 19 November *Pravda* editorial on the subject stated that "higher demands" of

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Now the North seems to have gone further in redefining the relationship between the two sets of talks, possibly to enhance its flexibility in developing a North-South dialogue even in the absence of progress in tripartite talks. In his speech, Ho Tam argued that even though Korean questions cannot be solved "completely" without holding tripartite talks, it was necessary to take "every" step possible in the direction of a settlement. "We should make no bones about a get-together of the North and the South," he said. He asserted that parliamentary talks would "speed up" implementation of tripartite talks by demonstrating agreement between the two Koreas and overcome U.S. "suspicions" of the proposal for three-way talks.

The new North Korean proposal also moves one of the major agenda items from the proposed tripartite talks—a North-South declaration of nonaggression—to the inter-Korean dialogue. By putting talks on this issue in a strictly bilateral setting, Pyongyang appears to be signaling that the nonaggression declaration is no longer bound to a U.S.-DPRK peace agreement, as it was in the proposal for tripartite talks. Shifting the forum for discussion of the nonaggression declaration also appears to mark a fundamental change in the North's stance on the South's authority to negotiate on military-related issues. Previously, Pyongyang had argued that the nonaggression declaration had to be discussed in a tripartite forum because the South does not have the power, on its own, to settle such questions. (U/FOUO)

competence are now being applied to cadres because the tasks that face leaders are becoming increasingly complex. It sharply criticized party organizations that continue to tolerate shortcomings and strongly condemned selection of cadres based on personal ties or nepotism.

Definition of the new cadre policy became sharper after Gorbachev's election. A 2 April *Pravda* editorial linked the need to improve cadre work with the March plenum, stressing that practical results should be the main criterion in judging cadres and insisting that leaders must demonstrate "initiative," a "feeling for innovation," and an understanding of economics. Similarly, party Secretary Romanov told the Hungarian party congress on 26 March that the CPSU is now demanding "greater responsibility" from cadres as well as greater "creativity and initiative."

Prior to Chernenko's death, there was some evidence of dissatisfaction with the pace of change in personnel. The Russian republic paper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* appeared to signal its concern in its treatment of remarks by Chernenko on cadres in a December *Kommunist* article. Chernenko had stated that a "constant intake of fresh forces" is needed along with "skillful combining of experienced cadres of the older generation with young promising officials." A 4 January *Sovetskaya Rossiya* editorial on his article ignored half his formula, asserting that "the Central Committee demands . . . the constant intake of fresh forces and bold promotion of promising young officials," with no mention of the older generation. Under Andropov and Chernenko, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* had published articles urging faster promotion of members of the younger generation.<sup>1</sup>

**Personnel Changes** The new cadre policy has been evident in a surge of personnel changes that have taken place since the October decision. Many of the most significant changes involved installation of outsiders, often a sign of dissatisfaction with the incumbent leaders. Starting in December a large number of ministers and oblast first secretaries and executive committee chairmen in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other republics were retired. More recently the changes have included higher-level officials:

- The USSR Petroleum Industry Minister N. A. Maltsev was ousted and put on pension at the early age of 56 on 12 February. Maltsev's disgrace was evident when he failed to receive the customary expression of thanks from the

<sup>1</sup> Previous *Sovetskaya Rossiya* articles on this theme are discussed in the *Trends* of 20 June 1984, pages 11-12.

Politburo and his ministry was sharply criticized by CPSU Secretary Dolgikh on 15 February for poor work in developing oil production. Maltsev was replaced by 61-year-old Gas Industry Minister V. A. Dinkov.

- An official from Moscow was sent to take over leadership of the Altay party organization on 18 February following the "sudden" death on 29 January of the 57-year-old Altay first secretary, N. F. Aksenov. The transfer of power took place amidst signs of disfavor with local leaders. The management of agriculture in Altay had been sharply criticized at a Supreme Soviet Presidium session, reported in the 15 January *Izvestiya*, and concern about the Altay leadership had been suggested by a visit there in early January by cadres Secretary Ligachev, reported in the 13 January *Pravda*. Ligachev was accompanied on the visit by 55-year-old RSFSR Housing and Municipal Services Minister F. V. Popov, who was selected as Altay party leader following Aksenov's death.
- The premier of Turkmenistan was demoted to the minor post of chairman of the republic committee on prices on 28 February. On 18 March he was replaced by S. A. Niyazov, who had been a candidate member of the republic bureau until September 1984, when he lost his positions in the republic and went to another unspecified post.
- An inspector from the CPSU Central Committee, V. V. Bakatin replaced 70-year-old Kirov Province First Secretary I. P. Bepalov on 21 March.
- Following several years of sharp criticism of his ministry, P. S. Neporozhnyy was finally retired as USSR Minister of Power and Electrification on 24 March. Although the 75-year-old minister retired on grounds of poor health, the failure of the Politburo to thank him for his 20 years of service suggested that he was leaving under a cloud. Over the past year there have been exposures of corruption in his ministry and his first deputy was fired and expelled from the party.<sup>2</sup> His replacement was 56-year-old A. I. Mayorets, who, as Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry, has been one of the leaders of the regime's economic experiment.
- On 26 March RSFSR Premier Vorotnikov shook up the top leaders of his RSFSR government, replacing several aging deputy premiers with outsiders.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See the *Trends* of 5 December 1984, page 17.

<sup>3</sup> See the *Trends* of 3 April 1985, pages 10-11.

- A woman with minimal experience was selected over many more senior officials on 27 March to be the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium—the republic’s second-ranking position. The new president, 50-year-old Valentina S. Shevchenko, replaced Aleksey Vatchenko, who died on 22 November. Shevchenko previously held primarily ceremonial posts: deputy chairman of the presidium, and chairman of the Ukrainian Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Unlike her predecessor, who was a Shcherbitskiy protege and a powerful political figure, Shevchenko has no power base and little experience in party politics. She is the only woman currently holding one of the top leadership positions in a Soviet republic and her selection may be a response to the call for advancing women in the new cadre guidelines. At a 25 March republic plenum on cadres that added Shevchenko to the Politburo, Shcherbitskiy appeared to associate himself with her promotion by sharply criticizing those who show “unfounded timidity” in advancing women. (U/FOUO)

## Hungary

### Broad Personnel Changes Made at 13th Party Congress

*Personnel changes announced at the 25-28 March 13th MSZMP Congress appear to reflect the party's efforts to solve problems raised by an aging party leader, prepare the next generation of party leaders and reorder responsibilities in the Secretariat.*

The most significant organizational change at the congress was the creation of a new post of deputy general secretary. The job was given to 62-year-old cadres Secretary Karoly Nemeth, who has been a member of the Politburo since 1970, longer than any other leader except Kadar and trade union leader Sandor Gaspar. Nemeth appears to have retained his other responsibilities, having been reappointed to the chairmanships of the Central Committee advisory groups on party work and youth.



*Deputy General Secretary  
Karoly Nemeth. (Nepszava,  
26 March)*

The position of deputy general secretary may have been created to ease the burden on 72-year-old Janos Kadar, who has limited his public activities in recent years. Restrictions on his activities were evident at the congress. At previous congresses he has delivered the lengthy Central Committee report, but this time the report was distributed in written form and Kadar only gave short supplemental remarks.

The party reversed a trend of recent years by reducing the size of the Central Committee to 105 members. Since the 1962 congress, the size of the Central Committee had steadily increased from 81 members to a peak of 127 members elected at the 1980 congress. At the current congress, one-third of the members were not reelected.



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INTELLIGENCE

(U) USSR: GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL AGENDA

Summary

The new Soviet General Secretary must tackle a number of major domestic issues in the months ahead. His first priority will be to staff key posts in the party and government with his own people. To that end, Gorbachev is likely to organize a plenum sometime this spring for revamping the Politburo and the Secretariat. The plenum may also convene a party congress in December which in turn would clear the way for a shake-up of local party fiefdoms and the CPSU Central Committee.

Naming a new premier at a spring meeting of the Supreme Soviet would allow Gorbachev to put his own stamp on the next Five-Year Plan (1986-90), which Premier Tikhonov's inner cabinet is now drafting. The government ministries under the premier also require new blood if Gorbachev is to be able to deepen the industrial management experiment which he clearly favors. Finally, Gorbachev may wish to assume the "Presidency" at an early date in order to enhance his stature and authority internationally.

\* \* \* \* \*

Politburo and Secretariat Revamping

Chernenko's death has reduced the ruling Politburo to 10 voting members (two based far from Moscow); it usually has 12-15. If Gorbachev is to have a stable working majority in the Politburo, he must bring into that body a number of allies, mostly from the ranks of Politburo candidates and central party secretaries. They would likely include Vladimir Dolgikh (Politburo candidate and secretary for heavy industry); Yegor Ligachev (secretary for party organization); and Nikolay Ryzhkov (secretary

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for economics). Ligachev, a vocal advocate of the rejuvenating of cadres, would then be eligible to take over Gorbachev's now-vacated portfolio covering personnel and ideology. A new CPSU secretary for agriculture might also be named at a spring plenum.

Inasmuch as Premier Tikhonov will be 80 in May and has resisted major changes in management procedures, Gorbachev presumably wishes to retire him posthaste. A Supreme Soviet session following the next party plenum could be the occasion to award that top government post to either of two reputed backers of Gorbachev: USSR first deputy premier Geydar Aliyev (61) or Russian Republic premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov (59), who stood next to Gorbachev at Chernenko's bier on March 11. Either of these figures could be relied upon to hack away at the deadwood in the higher economic bureaucracy. Neither has shown much liking for the land improvement scheme that Chernenko announced last October despite Gorbachev's known misgivings about such overly ambitious projects.

#### Party Congress

Recent rumors have it that the 27th CPSU Congress will be held in late 1985 rather than spring 1986. Gorbachev's accession makes that prospect even more likely. An earlier congress would allow him to solidify his position more rapidly. The General Secretary, after all, delivers the congress keynote report, which makes him the arbiter of the proceedings and source of ideological guidelines for the future.

The role of General Secretary as formulator of ideology will be accented at the 27th Congress, because it is scheduled to enact a new edition of the party's program. Gorbachev may well disagree with the traditionalist guidelines that Chernenko laid down for this exercise and may seek to change them. He may also have his own ideas about the changes in the party by-laws which the 27th Congress is to ratify.

Equally if not more important is the fact that a party congress allows the General Secretary to build political support via the promotion of party careerists to the Central Committee. This body of 320 or so voting members has as its backbone 80 first secretaries of regional party committees--the real centers of local government in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev doubtless will want to oust many of the oldtime party barons who are entrenched in posts that carry membership in the Central Committee. The cycle of regional party committee election meetings that precede the party congress, along with special local plenums, would be the occasion for Gorbachev to renovate the bureaucratic pyramid if he can pull it off.

The "Presidency"

In Soviet law, this is a collective body--the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. It lacks the vast prerogatives of an American chief executive. Nevertheless, the chairman of the Presidium is effectively "head of state" and enjoys the high profile that attaches to what in the Soviet Union is a largely ceremonial office. Since 1977, each party chief sooner or later has occupied the chairmanship.

Gorbachev almost certainly will be impelled to follow in the footsteps of his recent predecessors on this score. One reason has to do with the USSR Defense Council, which sets military-strategic priorities. The General Secretary invariably heads the Council while the Supreme Soviet Presidium is technically entitled to determine its composition. Divided authority in this key area could work against Gorbachev's control of the system. A second reason is the ability to represent the USSR in international dealings. Summitry and VIP visits would require Gorbachev's having the rank of head of state if international agreements were to be signed.

Other Duties

Aside from having to negotiate all such matters with his Politburo colleagues, Gorbachev will have to become personally involved in the day-to-day operations of governance if he is to dominate the scene. Indeed, one of the pressures for a shift of power away from the old guard presumably was a recognition that the Soviet system cannot function long without an energetic man at the top to kick the inert bureaucracies into action and arbitrate the constant jurisdictional and substantive squabbles that plague them. Thus, Gorbachev's strictly operational tasks in the near term promise to be formidable. They may become even more so should a power conflict erupt with the surviving Chernenkoists or other younger leaders, such as Romanov, trying to block him.

Prepared by Sidney Ploss  
632-9186

Approved by Martha C. Mautner  
632-9536



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*Soviet  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 03339

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GROMYKO'S NOMINATING SPEECH OF GORBACHEV  
AT MARCH 11 CPSU PLENUM

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A BROCHURE OF MATERIALS ON THE MARCH 11 PLENUM INCLUDED THE TEXT OF THE GROMYKO NOMINATION SPEECH, WHICH HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS. FOREGOING ANY PRAISE OF THE LATE CHERNENKO, GROMYKO LAUNCHED INTO A WARM, LENGTHY ENDORSEMENT OF GORBACHEV THAT STRIKES THE OBSERVER AS DESIGNED ACTUALLY TO PERSUADE PLENUM PARTICIPANTS THAT HE WAS THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE JOB. HERE WAS NO CUT-AND-DRIED ENDORSEMENT, AND IT RAISES THE INTRIGUING POSSIBILITY THAT THE POLITBURO WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME DOUBTERS AMONG THE BREZHNEV-CHERNENKO COTERIE IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. PERHAPS WITH AN EYE TO THE FOREIGN AUDIENCE, GROMYKO'S ENUMERATION OF GORBACHEV'S VIRTUES EMPHASIZED HIS ABILITY TO FIND A COMMON GROUND AND HIS ABILITIES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE BROCHURE DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPEAKERS OTHER THAN GORBACHEV AND GROMYKO, SUGGESTING EITHER THAT NO NEW "SECOND SECRETARY" HAS BEEN CHOSEN OR THAT HIS IDENTITY IS FOR THE MOMENT BEING CONCEALED. END SUMMARY.

3. GROMYKO'S NOMINATION DEPARTED STRIKINGLY FROM THE USUAL DRY RECITATION OF CAREER ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH HAVE IN THE PAST COMPRISED FORMAL NOMINATING SPEECHES.

GROMYKO REVEALED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN DIRECTING THE SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS CHAIRING THE POLITBURO SESSIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF CHERNENKO WHILE SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD BEEN PRIVATELY INDICATING THAT THIS WAS THE CASE FOR SOME TIME, IT IS NONETHELESS EXTRA-ORDINARY THAT THIS WOULD BE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED, EVEN EX POST FACTO.

4. GROMYKO SEVERAL TIMES INVOKED HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION IN ASSESSING GORBACHEV'S WORTHINESS TO ASSUME THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP. HE PRAISED, IN PARTICULAR, THE LATTER'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE COUNTRY. GORBACHEV, HE WENT ON, HAD THE CAPACITY FOR FINDING THE RIGHT SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS THAT WERE INHERENTLY COMPLEX; AND HAD THE GIFT OF WORKING OUT MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISES. GROMYKO ALSO STATED --PERHAPS WITH AN EYE TO THE MILITARY-- THAT GORBACHEV UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY OF "KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY."

5. THE LENGTHS TO WHICH GROMYKO WENT TO ENDORSE GORBACHEV MAY INDICATE THAT THERE WERE MISGIVINGS, IF NOT OPPOSITION, WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO HIS ELECTION. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S COLLECTIVE FEATHERS MAY HAVE BEEN IN PARTICULAR NEED OF SMOOTHING OVER THE FASHION IN WHICH THE PLENUM WAS CONVENED. THE UNPRECEDENTED RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE PLENUM WAS STAGED MUST HAVE ALLOWED FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF ONLY A FRACTION OF THE WHOLE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

6. SUPPORT FOR THIS INTERPRETATION MAY BE FOUND PERHAPS IN GROMYKO'S WARNING THAT THE OUTSIDE WORLD CONSTANTLY SEEKS TO UNCOVER SPLITS WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP,

AND HIS APPEAL TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO SHOW UNANIMITY IN SELECTING GORBACHEV. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ELECTED GORBACHEV "YEDINODUSHNO" RATHER THAN "YEDINOGLASNO"--WHICH WAS THE FORMULATION USED IN THE PLENUM REPORTS OF BOTH THE CHERNENKO AND ANDROPOV ELECTIONS. WHILE BOTH WORDS CAN BE TRANSLATED AS UNANIMOUSLY, "YEDINOGLASNO" CARRIES A MORE PRECISE MEANING AND CONNOTES THAT A VOTE WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE USE OF THE WORD "YEDINODUSHNO" THIS TIME AROUND INDICATES THAT AN ACTUAL VOTE WAS NOT TAKEN ON GORBACHEV'S ELECTION BUT RATHER THAT HE WAS DECLARED THE GENERAL SECRETARY BY ACCLAMATION. (THE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE JUNE 1983 PLENUM PROVIDES A POSSIBLY REVEALING DISTINCTION BT

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*CS 7/18/02*

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES ROSEBUSH

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet November Meeting

Mrs. Reagan has indicated to Bud that she would like to receive relevant reading material for the upcoming November meeting. Attached at Tab A are classified and unclassified versions of Mrs. Raisa Gorbachev's biography which will be of interest to Mrs. Reagan.

Attachment  
Tab A Mrs. Raisa Gorbachev's Bio

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

September 12, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>AD</sup>SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated  
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations (S)

Per our conversation, I have attached a follow-up memo from you to Mike Armacost reaffirming our policy on proposed travel to the U.S. by activists affiliated with the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. As you will recall, the President approved the continued implementation of our present policy on a case-by-case basis (Tab II). Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to Armacost which clarifies our policy. (S)

Ken DeGraffenreid <sup>kd</sup> concurs. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum a Tab I. (S)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Armacost  
Tab II Memo from McFarlane to President w/approval

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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September 12, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Department of StateSUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S by Activists Affiliated  
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations (S)

Over the past few months, the Department of State has forwarded us various visa application requests by members of the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. State has also expressed concern that the present policy has come under increasing congressional and judicial challenge. (S)

The President has reviewed our policy on handling visa requests by members of the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. He has reaffirmed the present policy which has been to utilize the discretionary authority of section 212 (a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and handle visa applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of the applicant's involvement in Soviet front organizations, the purpose of the trip and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. This strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with executive authority and adequately protects our national security interests. (S)

Under this policy, it is anticipated that visits by senior World Peace Council officials to the U.S. would in almost all cases not be in the U.S. interest and that visas would be denied. (S)

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July 7, 1985

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ACTION

NLRR F06-114/7 #9950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY CLY NARADATE 6/25/09FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations

Issue

Whether to continue our present policy on requests to visit the United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other Soviet front organizations.

Background

Section 212(a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the Congress.

Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to visit the United States for two weeks ostensibly to attend a series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organizations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way. (Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)

Discussion

Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary authority of Section 212(a) (27) selectively and handle these applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy, and adequately protects our national security interests.

Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been utilizing Section 212(a) (27) excessively and has refused visas when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also

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cc Vice President



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been a number of court challenges to our use of 212(a)(27) authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applicability of 212(a)(27). However, because the purposes of the WPC are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.

We believe that these criticisms are also supported by those who seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part would change their opinions. In light of these considerations, it is important that we continue to implement our present policy which features the application of 212(a)(27) on a case-by-case basis.

The Administration's critics also contend that refusal to issue visas to communist or pro-Soviet spokesmen and active measures operators violates the constitutional guarantee of free speech. However, this is an absolutist interpretation. It ignores the fact that there are instances in which the exercise of free speech has been legitimately restricted to protect private and public interests (e.g., to prevent libel, to prevent the release of classified information, etc.). The exclusion of foreign nationals whose presence in the U.S. is likely to affect adversely U.S. interests clearly belongs to the category in which certain free speech restrictions are justified.

Moreover, WPC activists and leaders of other fronts are clearly agents of influence of the Soviet Union. Some are formally recruited and paid by Moscow, the KGB, or the International Department of the CPSU; others are what the Soviets call "trusted contacts" who follow Soviet direction without being paid. They are in no sense independent free-thinking individuals who are participating in rational open-minded debate. There may be times when it serves our interests to allow such individuals to enter the U.S. For the most part, however, their purpose is ultimately to destroy democratic institutions. They seek to mobilize U.S. support, usually unwitting, for this effort.

Additionally, such individuals impose a further obligation on our already strained counterintelligence capabilities. The FBI is tasked with ascertaining the scope of Soviet active measures in the U.S. as well as other Soviet intelligence activities. Permitting additional Soviet active measures personnel to enter the U.S. would further diminish the FBI's coverage of other Soviet activities. Unless the FBI specifically requests that we allow such personnel to enter so that they can take advantage of their presence, we should as a rule refuse to allow such persons to enter the U.S.

In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel

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for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.

Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a visa.

RECOMMENDATION

That we continue to implement our present policy on a case-by-case basis.

Approve RR

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by:  
Paula Dobriansky/  
Ken deGraffenreid

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>PD</sup>

SUBJECT: Presidential Message re: Ukrainian Congress  
Committee of America

I have reviewed and, with the exception of one minor deletion, concur with the proposed Presidential letter to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Anne Higgins for your signature forwarding the revised letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Anne Higgins
- Tab A Edited Letter
- Tab II Backup documents

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Presidential Message re Ukrainian Congress  
Committee of America

We have reviewed your proposed letter from the President to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and, with the exception of one minor deletion, concur with its content.

Attachment:

Tab A Edited Letter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 24, 1985

It is an honor to join with members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II.

In his farewell address to the cadets of West Point, General Douglas MacArthur reminded us that "The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training -- sacrifice... he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war." More than forty years ago, your brothers-in-arms gave flesh-and-blood meaning to General MacArthur's words as they offered their last full measure of devotion in resisting the twin tyrannies of Nazism and Communism that ravaged their homeland. In the darkness of untold hardships, their spirit of courage and self-sacrifice shone brightly.

Although the shadow of tyranny continues to darken your ancestral lands, a spirit of hope and the yearning for liberty live on to inspire a new generation. I wish to express my solidarity with the brave people of ~~the~~ Ukraine in your resolve to advance the cause of freedom and self-determination for your beloved homeland. God bless you.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1985

TO: WILLIAM MARTIN, NSC

FROM: ANNE HIGGINS *Anne Higgins*

RE: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Attached for your review/approval is a proposed Presidential Message for the above-named group. They are having an event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of WWII. Linas Kojelis in the Office of Public Liaison will be hand-carrying the message on October 1.

Please respond by Monday, September 30.