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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/9/2005

File Folder GENERAL 2/5 [1984-1986]

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 26

YARHI-MILO

2608

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9934	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET TV COMMENTATOR POZNER [2 -2] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	4/6/1984	B1
9935	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE VISIT OF SOVIET TV COMMENTATOR [3 -3] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	3/19/1984	B1
9936	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET TV COMMENTATOR [4 -5] R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7	2	3/12/1984	B1
9943	MEMO	HILL TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT OF SOVIET TV COMMENTATOR [6 -6] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	3/3/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9937	MEMO	KIMMITT TO HILL RE VISIT OF SOVIET TV COMMENTATOR [7 - 7] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	ND	B1
9938	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE GROMYKO ON BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY [28 - 28] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	ND	B1
9939	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING OF PRESIDENT WITH RUSSIAN EMIGRES [42 - 43] R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7	2	6/7/1984	B1
9940	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING OF PRESIDENT WITH RUSSIAN ÉMIGRÉ WRITERS [45 - 45] R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7	1	4/2/1984	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9941	PAPER	USSR/PAKISTAN: STIFFENING SOVIET STANCE [49 - 49]	1	7/25/1984	B1
9942	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD COMPROMISE [50 - 51]	2	8/3/1984	B1
		R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7	
9944	CABLE	041307Z MAR 85 [59 - 65]	7	3/4/1985	B1
		R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7	

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US-USSR General
~~matlock~~
File

1101 1

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	X	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	X	_____	I
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	3	_____	N
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner

You will recall that State sent us a memo March 3 regarding issuance of a visa to Vladimir Pozner, who had offered an exchange of TV appearances with Jim Dabakis of Salt Lake City.

State was instructed, by Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum of March 19, not to issue the visa since the exchange did not provide an adequate measure of reciprocity. However, State had already authorized the visa before receiving the memorandum.

In subsequent discussion with State on the matter I learned that, before action could be taken to withdraw the visa authorization, the Soviets stepped in and instructed Pozner not to come. It appears that they decided that they did not want to offer Dabakis access to Soviet TV, as Pozner had promised.

The bottom line of this mix-up on our side is that the visit will not in fact take place and the Soviets will be blamed by Dabakis and Senator Hatch, who was interested.

I wish all of our crossed wires could end so happily.

Attachment:

Tab I - Copies of previous memos on the subject.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9934

BY CU NARADATE 7/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Matlock

1831
3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

March 19, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator ~~(S)~~

Inasmuch as the proposed exchange of TV appearances by Vladimir Pozner in the U.S. and Mr. Dubakis and a university professor in the USSR does not meet the test of real reciprocity, we cannot concur that a visa should be issued. ~~(S)~~

If either of the following conditions can be met in arranging for the exchange, we could reconsider our position: ~~(S)~~

(1) An exchange which meets the criteria established in any future exchange agreement concluded with the Soviet Union, or

(2) An exchange whereby Mr. Dabakis would appear on Soviet television with a well-informed USG official (selected by the Department of State), after which Mr. Pozner would be granted comparable treatment in the U.S. ~~(S)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9935

BY GJ NARADATE 7/2/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

March 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT:

Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner

The memorandum from State at TAB III describes plans developed by Jim Dabakis, a TV talk show announcer from Salt Lake City, to invite Moscow TV commentator Vladimir Pozner to the U.S. for at least seven national TV programs, in return for which Pozner would arrange for Dabakis and a Brigham Young University professor to appear on four national TV programs in the Soviet Union, and to tour the fifteen Soviet republics. Dabakis and the professor would go to the Soviet Union in August and September, and Dabakis has agreed to spend a week in Washington before his departure to be briefed on U.S. positions on the issues. Senator Orrin Hatch has expressed support for the project, and State recommends that a visa for Pozner be approved.

Although it can be argued that a Soviet commitment to arrange for TV appearances in the Soviet Union by Americans is a step forward in achieving more reciprocity in the area of information exchange, in fact this proposal falls far short of real reciprocity. First, the Soviets would be sending an experienced propagandist, while the Americans (even with extensive briefing) are likely to be much less well prepared to defend U.S. positions than he is to present Soviet views. Second, by arranging Pozner's appearances here first, we have no assurance that the promised programs in the USSR will in fact materialize, and if they do, that they will not be "doctored" after taping.

For these reasons, my preference would be to deny the visa unless and until one of two conditions are met: (1) the exchange is pursuant to an exchange agreement in force which guarantees effective reciprocity; or (2) the exchange is arranged so that the Americans go first, that a USG official familiar with the issues accompany Dabakis, and that Pozner be granted reciprocity for the treatment actually offered the Americans.

If we follow this course, we can expect a certain degree of public criticism, including -- perhaps -- by Senator Hatch. We also cannot prevent Pozner from appearing on U.S. television in feeds from Moscow, and the visa denial could be legally

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CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/7 #9936BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/09

challenged by the American sponsors -- as some past refusals have been. If the visa denial should become a public issue, we would doubtless be charged with acting contrary to our current policy of dialogue, and rejecting an arrangement which provides more potential reciprocity than we have obtained in the past.

Our decision, therefore, is essentially whether 1) to accept an arrangement which offers some, but inadequate, reciprocity in order to avoid a public controversy at this time and to provide some possibility of U.S. citizens appearing on Soviet TV, or 2) to hold firm on the principle of full reciprocity, while recognizing that we cannot prevent U.S. networks from using Soviet spokesmen by feeds outside the U.S.

I have prepared alternate Kimmitt to Hill memos for you to choose.

John Lenczowski ^{JK} concurs. *I concur only with the first recommendation. "Dialogue" requires reciprocity. Otherwise it is "monologue." - John L.*

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you authorize the memorandum at TAB I which directs State to refuse a visa to Pozner unless and until one of the conditions set forth above is filled (in which case State or I would call Senator Hatch to explain in advance).

Approve JK Disapprove

OR, ALTERNATELY,

2. That you authorize the memorandum at TAB II, which concurs in issuance of the visa, if you feel that it is unwise at this time to stimulate public controversy on the issue.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Kimmitt to Hill
- Tab II Kimmitt to Hill
- Tab III Incoming Memo from State

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 3, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator

Jim Dabakis, an ABC talk-show announcer from Salt Lake City, has invited Vladimir Pozner, a Moscow TV commentator who is frequently seen on American network TV news programs, to visit the US starting March 29. He has arranged for Pozner to appear on at least seven national TV programs, as well as local media, and to speak to various groups. Dabakis has been promised that in return he and a Brigham Young University professor will be able to appear on four major Soviet national TV programs and tour all 15 Soviet republics in August and September of this year.

While this visit raises questions of allowing a recognized Soviet propagandist to appear live on American TV with reciprocity only in the form of appearances on Soviet media by a relatively unknown pair of Americans, we have concluded that it is less costly to allow the visit to proceed. We cannot prevent appearance by Soviets, including Pozner, on American TV by direct satellite feed from Moscow. Refusing him entry would arouse criticism from US media (and in Pozner's case from Senator Orrin Hatch, who strongly supports Dabakis' project) on press freedoms grounds and Helsinki Final Act considerations and would give Pozner an issue he could use effectively in his propaganda. Refusal would have to be based on a finding on foreign policy grounds that his presence here would endanger national security. This would come at a particularly sensitive time in view of the recent filing of four lawsuits against the Department challenging the legality and constitutionality of several visa refusals on the same grounds in 1983.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL-114/7-49943

BY CI NARA DATE 7/7/08~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet TV Commentator (U)

Although we are disturbed by the lack of real reciprocity in the arrangements Mr. Dabakis has negotiated in his exchange of television appearances with Mr. Pozner, we concur that denial of the visa would be subject to misinterpretation by elements of the American public, and therefore concur with the State Department recommendation that, in this instance, a visa be authorized for Mr. Pozner. (C)

The State Department should ensure, however, that Mr. Dabakis and his companion are fully briefed on USG policies before they travel to the USSR -- and, if possible, before Pozner's visit to the U.S. The Department also should monitor closely the treatment accorded Mr. Dabakis and his companion and furnish a report assessing the balance of benefits resulting from this exchange of television appearances. (C)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/7 #9937BY CIV NARA DATE 7/7/08~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 6, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Internal Problems: Health

Many of us feel that the Soviet regime is facing mounting problems at home, and this provides some incentive for them to moderate an aggressive foreign policy. Usually we concentrate our attention on sagging economic growth, consumer dissatisfaction, mismanagement, oppressive controls and low morale.

All these are indeed real -- and up to now intractable -- problems. Western researchers are just beginning to discover yet another very serious problem: a clear trend in recent years toward more disease and poorer health standards. This is all the more striking, since it follows a few decades of fairly steady improvement in this area. It also runs counter to the experience of virtually every other industrialized country in the world.

A recent report by Murray Feshbach of Georgetown, who is famous among Soviet specialists for winnowing statistical evidence from a wide variety of Soviet publications to demonstrate trends the Soviet authorities would prefer to conceal, provides a host of shocking statistics. Such as the following:

-- Mortality per 100,000 population has doubled in the last two decades;

-- The incidence levels and death rates due to pulmonary disease quintupled in the same two decades;

-- Whooping cough, scarlet fever, diphtheria, measles and mumps are all on the increase--and the incidence of the latter is nearly one hundred times that in the U.S.

-- The rate of hospitalizations has grown twice as fast as the population since 1960, and is nearly double the rate in the U.S.

-- There is evidence that Soviet military units are experiencing epidemics of diseases such as infectious hepatitis, dysentery and typhoid, and in January "Extraordinary Antiepidemic Commissions" were established in every military and naval unit.

A copy of Feshbach's report is at TAB I in case you are interested in additional such examples. In any event, all this does put our problems with Medicare and rising health care costs in a bit of perspective. And it helps explain why most Soviet citizens seem to believe that their life is getting worse, not better, even though the statisticians tell us that the availability of consumer goods continues to improve modestly.

Attachment:

Tab I - "Recent Research on Soviet Health," by Murray Feshbach

RECENT RESEARCH ON SOVIET HEALTH

By Murray Feshbach
Georgetown University

The Soviet health scene is much improved over the period when they first took power in 1917. At that time there were only about 25,000 doctors for the entire population of about 160 million (using present boundaries), whereas now there are not quite 1 million doctors for a population of not quite 275 million persons. From this viewpoint they have made enormous progress in providing access to medical services, as they have in the number of hospital beds, and in a number of other measures, especially that of mortality and of morbidity. For example, no longer does one out of every four children die in their first year of life; instead about 3 out of every 100 live-born die before reaching their first birthday at the present time. The overall crude death rate has declined from about 30 deaths per 1000 population to about 10 at the present time. While the track of these declines has not always been in a straight-line declension, the basic trend over the entire period is as described. Confusion in the vectors of medical progress occurs essentially in the recent period, which particularly applies to the data on morbidity, sickness rates if you wish. Thus, the focus of this discussion on my recent research will concentrate primarily but not exclusively on the morbidity side and not on mortality issues as in past presentations here at the Wilson Center for the Kennan Institute or in publications.

11

Paralleling the trend in mortality rates, morbidity incidence and rates are much different than those of the early phase of the Soviet regime. But again, the recent period brings into question the trend line of success, if you wish, and opens up issues of its impact on the population, the economy, the military, and on resource allocation policies.

Returning to the early Soviet period, between 1917 and 1923, some 3 million persons lost their lives to cholera, typhus, typhoid and dysentery during this period of upheaval. Perhaps some 20-25 million persons were sick with typhus by 1920. This situation had ~~become~~ become so pervasive and so dangerous to the new Soviet regime, that¹ early in December of 1919, Lenin felt it incumbent to refer to the health situation in the strongest of terms: "Either the lice will defeat socialism, or socialism will defeat the lice." unquote. Since that point in time, and with a great deal of assistance by the American Relief aid program for medications and medical services, in addition to food supplies, the epidemics of the time were abated. Nonetheless, as recently as 1934, there were some 9 and one-half million cases of malaria throughout the Soviet Union. This no longer occurs.

Thus, the structure of disease patterns changes with further medical intervention, and of course with changes in the age structure of a population, usually shifting to chronic diseases

of the older ages and away from those of the typical childhood prevalence. In the Soviet Union, the ~~share of~~ ~~expectation among~~

older persons has obviously taken place ~~given the drop in~~ ~~fertility~~ among the Slavs and Balts ~~but because of continued~~

factors as to

increases in stress, pollution, ^{and} smoking and alcohol consumption, ^{have led} ~~to~~ ~~continued~~ ^{dramatic} increases ^{in heart disease} ~~leading to~~

a doubling in mortality (per 100,000 population) in the two decades of 1960's and 1970's. Cancer deaths also increased until recently. Unfortunately we do not have any age and sex data for the period since 1971/72 and our evaluation has to be limited to crude overall population measures. Undoubtedly these deaths played a large part in driving the overall crude death rate up by about 50 percent between 1964 and 1980. In addition, accidents, poisonings and injuries had been increasing because of more private vehicles on the streets of the Soviet Union, leading to accidents and deaths, half of which may have been due to inebriated drivers.

There is evidence, however, that the latter grouping has been displaced as the third ranked cause of death in the Soviet Union. During a visit last year to the Soviet national institute of pulmonary diseases in Leningrad, Rosemarie Crisostomo and her group were informed that deaths due to pulmonary diseases were now the third cause of death throughout the country. Incidence ^{levels} and death ^{rates} due to pulmonary disease had quintupled per 100,000 population between 1960 and 1979.

This evidence may underlie the reports in medical journals about incredible rates of influenza, upper respiratory diseases and especially pneumonia occurring among the very young, and even the not so young in the USSR. One recent survey by the national institute on influenza studied 5 presumably random ^{ly chosen} child-care institutions throughout the Soviet Union. This survey found that among children of 0 to 3 years of age in these institutions, their average annual rate of illness from pneumonia was 72 per 100 and from influenza 636 per 100 children during the period 1968 to 1975. Alternative statements relating to the frequency of respiratory illness among children in Belorussia (up to 10 and more times per year) blocked the proper administration of vaccines to prevent childhood illnesses and caused an increase in the number of unvaccinated children. The national pediatrics journal of September of 1980 notes that "influenza and acute respiratory infections" are "virtually uncontrollable." Earlier in the year, ⁽¹⁹⁸⁰⁾ the authors of an article on the health of Soviet children noted that flu and acute respiratory illnesses remained at 900 out of every 1000 children "practically without change" in its level. When the trade union newspaper, Trud, reported that there were 30 million cases sick with influenza each year (29 October 1981, p. 4), this was twice as much as that found for 1975 (of 15.8 million) in a besplatno health statistics publication, and must underlie the Academy of Medical Sciences' report in their journal for November of 1981 that "the significance of a number of infectious diseases is growing, primarily viral diseases, including influenza and influenzal pneumonia, infectious hepatitis, and adenoviral infections." (VAMN SSSR, no. 11, Nov. 1981, pp. 33-40.) Acute pneumonia

remains the first cause of infant deaths given in an April 1982 (ZRF, no. 4, p. 6.) detailed listing of the basic reasons for mortality of children in their first year of life.

Following our attention to patterns of illness among the younger population, the remarkable record of the period since 1980 must be addressed at this point. Thus, after continuous decline, albeit at levels much above that of the United States--only in terms of roughly comparable sizes of total population, being only 15 percent higher in the Soviet Union--275 to 235--something has gone awry almost across the board. As we can see from the table on index numbers related to incidence and to incidence per 100,000 population of the Soviet Union, the recent period has witnessed an increase of over 250 percent in diphtheria in the last three years for which we have officially reported data (actually if we go back one more year, to 1979, the increase is ^{more than 45} ~~at least 5~~ times, from 200 cases in 1979 to 920 in 1982).

Similar dramatic increases take place in the numbers and rates of pertussis, that is, whooping cough, almost doubling in the recent period. Scarlet fever (scarlatina) which had declined between 1980 and 1981, again increased by 40 percent relative to 1980, and lastly, measles increased by 30 percent. Absolute numbers also give us some perspective on the dimensions of this turnaround--assuming that it will take a period--hopefully short--to rectify and improve the health of the individual Soviet citizen. Thus, diphtheria in the USSR ^{as noted earlier} increased to 920 cases in 1982, the United States had 5 cases reported in 1983, and did not exceed 900 in any year since 1960. As to pertussis, the median

figure for 1978 to 1982 in the United States amounted to 3,819, and showed a further decline to 2,258 in 1983. The Soviet ~~average~~ ^{average} of 21,880 not only is 6 to 7 times higher than in the United States (or very slightly less if adjusted for the population size differential) but includes a doubling in the last 3 years, going from 13,900 to 27,500 in 1980 and 1982, respectively.

The average incidence of typhoid fever in the USSR over the period 1978-1982 is 34. times the level in the United States.

Measles displays an increase also of remarkable dimension. Again, in the U.S. case, we probably would have succeeded in reducing measles to zero by October of 1982 as expected by the Centers for Disease Control several years ago, but the people without prior medical care arriving from Haiti and Cambodia, among others, has kept the number at about 1,400 cases (1436) in 1983, down from the ~~average~~ ^{average} figure of 13,385 in the five years prior. Simultaneously, in the Soviet Union, after almost doubling between 1977 and 1978 (from 315,000 to 545,000 cases, respectively), the numbers declined until 1981, when it reached just below 343,000 (342,800), not quite as low as in 1977, however. Nonetheless, in the next year, the incidence of measles increased to over 466,000 reported cases, or an increase of over 35 percent. Measles is not a simple illness, as also applies to whooping cough, let alone to diphtheria, referred to earlier, and both measles and pertussis may have serious complications. Thus measles is linked to pneumonia and encephalitis, and pertussis is especially hazardous among children under 2 years of age, frequently leading to bronchopneumonia among the young as well as the elderly. Moreover, measles mortality if over 4 percent is a standard measure of the presence of malnutrition.

At this point it is necessary to speculate about the production quality of Soviet vaccines, and the maintenance and administration of the same domestic as well as foreign medicines imported into the country. Regretfully, it appears to me that they are either less effective or improperly stored or administered with unsterile needles or while counterindicated by the illness of the recipient. For example, in Belorussia, DPT is not administered to the "many children under 1 year of age who have acute respiratory illnesses up to 10 or more times each year." (Zdr. Belo., 9/80, p. 38.) , The lead article of Pediatriya, in September of 1980, reports that "At the present time we have established the inadequate effectiveness of the pertussis component of the DPT vaccine, in excess reactions, incomplete immunization especially among children under 5 months of age who are not vaccinated and who have serious (tyazhelo) cases of illness." (p.3) Later, the article notes that measles vaccines had been utilized for 10 years, but "measles remains a widespread infectious disease" against which a successful "anti-toxin has not been developed. The effect of vaccinations was greater in the first years of application than at the present time. The reduction in the effectiveness of the vaccine is explained by the non-standard quality of the vaccine and defects in the vaccination [process]." More can be recounted of the "inactivization of the serum during transportation, maintenance and administration" from Soviet medical sources (e.g., Sov. meditsina, no.9, Sept. 81, p. 44; Pediatriya, no. 11, Nov. 81, p. 12; and Zdrav. Belor., no. 9, Sept. 1980, 38.) Refrigeration, which is necessary for many medications also is noted as being inadequate or lacking and leads to partial loss of effectiveness.

immunogenic activeness. (Tr.Inst.Past., 1982--thanks to CDC,Gary Noble,MD,Asst Dir for Science)

It has been indicated to me that it is possible that perhaps in their desire to fulfill the plan, to cover serum shortages, etc., the domestic producers may dilute the vaccine in order to achieve the required production quantum of so many liters, kilograms, etc. Hard to believe, but also hard to exclude from consideration.

Lastly, coverage of the child population in 1975 which should have been administered DPT shots, varied from 88.2 percent in Estonia, to 90.5 percent in the Ukraine, to a high (among the 5 republics listed in the source) of 97.1 percent in Uzbekistan. (Detsk. infekts., vyp 8, 1978, p. 38.) On one hand, it is surprisingly low in the western republics and on the other, surprisingly high in the eastern republic of Uzbekistan. A worst case scenario might indicate that the shortfall in the first instance exposed more to risk of the diseases and that in the second instance, probably the unsanitary conditions or use of non-disposable needles may have led to nonimmunological responses and therefore also left these children open to risk of diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. But this may be too perjorative, nonetheless I suspect not too much so.

I have not yet indicated anything about remarkable increases in various illnesses which are contrary to expectations of a successful public health and medical system. One of the growing concerns seems to be related to growth of sepsis among the

newborn, growing from 0.9 percent of the newborns in the 1960's to 4.7 percent in the early part of the 1970's. (Citing a 1975 source, Terap. arkhiv, 10/1981). Bacterial infections of the newborns may have ensued from poor hygienic care by the mother during the prenatal period. Another illness related to sanitation, salmonellosis, has increased dramatically in the last two decades in the Soviet Union, increasing by 3.4 times between 1961 and 1972, and a further 4 times of the higher base derived for 1972, for a total increase of 12 times between 1961 and 1977. (Ped., 6/78) (In the United States, there was an increase of 50 percent between 1971 and 1980, from 21,928 cases to 33,715 cases.)

Meningococcal infections commonly found in meningitis and septicemia apparently were at a low point in the USSR between 1962 and 1968, increasing markedly after 1968 to the present time. For example, even in Moscow between 1964 and 1970, there was recorded a remarkable increase of "50 - 60 times." And according to a 1982 source, the decade of the 1970's reportedly witnessed even further increases. For Tashkent alone, with 1971 equal to 100, then in 1972 to 1978, it was 300, 600, 900, 700, 900, 400 and 400, respectively. Some 75 to 80 percent of the national increase reportedly also affected children under 15 years of age. (By date of publication--Zdr.Tad, no.5/Sep-Oct,1979, p. 52; Ped., no.9,Sept.1980,p.3 and 5; Zdr. Belor., no.2, Feb.1982, p. 56; and Zdr. Tadzh., no. 5, Sep-Oct. 1982, p. 74.)

This lengthy ^{of time} period of ~~expansion~~ ^{increase in} of meningococcal infections is contrary to the classic volume on Control of Communicable Diseases in Man which states that

irregular intervals, lasting 3 to 5 years, ^{and} not the decade and a half noted here for the Soviet Union.

And lastly, mumps, in addition to its well-known potential impact on adult males, also can lead occasionally to encephalitis and similar complications. Thus, when in the United States, in 1980 there were 8,576 cases, or a rate of 3.7 per 100,000 population, the Soviet rate per 100,000 population of their country was almost 100 times as high--that is, 343; which in turn yields a figure of 911,000 cases of mumps in that year. (By 1983, the US figure had declined to 3,285 cases.) The vaccine used in the United States was licensed over 15 years ago (in 1967), one should reasonably hope that they could have learned to master its production, or import sufficient quantities (plus proper maintenance) to reduce this enormous number to some reasonably low level.

In the limited time I have for this presentation, I had also hoped to cover issues of patient visit data versus data derived from large-scale medical surveys. The latter reveals the level of sickness incidence and rates to be about twice as high as patient visit based materials, and in some cases even higher rates are revealed. For 1970, the last survey for which we do have such data, the ratio yielded a figure twice as high. As a consequence, the materials discussed earlier here may be seriously incomplete, in some instances dramatically so.

But now I prefer to turn to issues of nutrition, not in terms of fast food or in terms of personal diet--in my case, all too obvious--but in terms of shortages of basic vitamins and other nutrients such as folic acid, which in turn facilitate or predispose an individual to becoming ill. This issue is arguably also linked to issues of the ability of Soviet women to lactate postpartum and the quality of Soviet artificial milk used as a substitute for natural milk and immunities imparted to the infant therefrom.

In the no. 1 issue for January-February 1984 of Voprosy pitaniya, it was revealed that the Institute of Nutrition of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences had been conducting a 10-year longitudinal study of some 64,000 persons located throughout the country. (pp.3-7) ^{Although all nutritional surveys are difficult to interpret,} The results of the survey reveal a shortage of vitamins A, B1, B2, B6, C and niacin among the foods consumed by part of the population under examination. This is the same survey cited by the department head of the RSFSR Gosplan institute which also cited these nutrient shortages, underlining the shortages during the winter-spring period (EKO, no. 6, June 1982, p. 68.) and by the Scientific Secretary (N.V. Blazheyevich, of the Problem Commission "Problems in Vitaminology" of the AMN, in the no. 4 (July-August) issue of Voprosy pitaniya. (pp. 76-77) Both Institute of Nutrition articles stress the adverse impact of a deficient vitamin supply because of a lack of animal products, vegetables and fruits and local, nationality-related and climato-geographic reasons for deviations from recommended patterns of nutrition on an adult's work capacity, resistance to infections. rapidity of recovery

from illness, and for pregnant and breast-feeding women, can be the "reason for hypotrophy, premature births, and infringes upon the physical and mental development of the child." (Vopr. pit., no. 1, Jan-Feb. 1984, pp. 3-4.)

Compounding this problem, and specifically related to the inability of women to lactate or to do so for only a short period of time, the substitution of artificial milk for breast milk has led to other problems. In those instances where Malysk, the most widely available infant formula artificial milk, is utilized, the child is more frequently ill with hypotrophy (low body mass), rickets, alimentary anemia, and pneumonia in comparison with those who are breast-fed and those fed with the newer products--Baldyrgan and Balbolek, as well as the traditional kefir. (Zdr. Kaz, 2/83, pp. 57-60) One of the tasks assigned to the Problem Commission on "Problems in Vitaminology" is determination of the appropriate levels of folic acid and vitamins D and E, in addition to the usual assortment of vitamins A, B1, B2, and niacin. (Vopr. pit., no.4, Jul-Aug 82, pp76-77.). One survey, in Novokuznetsk, found that one-quarter of the children in ages 1 to 14 years of age suffered from latent iron deficiencies, with the peak rate manifested among 2 to 3 year olds. (242.0 +/- 9.6 per 1000 children and 380/1000 among 2-3 year olds.....source.....). I do not know the representativeness of this survey for all Soviet children but the dimension of the rate is so high that it must be worrisome to Soviet medical analysts.

At this late point in today's presentation, I would like to address issues of medical practice --as recently unearthed in Soviet medical sources. Skipping issues of supply or usage of very modern, very expensive medical technology, of which a profound shortage exists in the Soviet Union, including kidney dialysis machines of recent moment, selected types of practice available for the general public are confusing to say the least.

Thus, in a case where numbers have deeper meaning than just ratios or cases, the report on the share of tubercular patients who undergo surgery stands in particular note. In the early 1970's, apparently some 17.4 to 20.6 percent of all those with active tuberculosis of the lungs and 10.0 to 19.1 percent of those with "destructive" tuberculosis of the lungs underwent surgery. (Zdr. (Kishinev),no.5,Sept-Oct.78, p. 21.) In the United States, surgery is avoided if at all possible and does not exceed 1 percent, in part because medications are very successful in treatment of this illness and when performing invasive surgery of the lungs, it is my understanding that the possibility of the spread of the infection is very high probability. In addition, they administer drugs for only 2 to 3 months before making a decision as to surgical intervention, and in the United States (without asserting that our procedures are perfect), this is just the initial point for further application of additional drugs which are used in relatively successful combination.

In December of 1982, an article written as advice to new, young surgeons in Uzbekistan gives clear admonition to the individual

surgeon should not go out as a guest or receive guests, drink alcoholic beverages, or perform physical work. It is desirable (zhelatel'no) that on the day before (sic) surgery the surgeon take a good shower and change his [or her] gown." (Med. zh. Uzb., 12/Dec.82, p. 9.)

In May of 1983, the national popular health journal, Zdorov'ye, published a two-column article "That Everyone Must Know How to Do." (p. 31) In addition to the use of mustard plasters (which I remember from my childhood), it also shows an illustration and gives instructions on how to use banki (cupping). Used to reduce inflammations and pain, it has not been part of American medical practice since the 1930's.

In July of 1983, the national Health Ministry, Ministry of Medical Industry and Medical Trade Union newspaper, Meditsinskaya gazeta, found it appropriate to publish an article written by its "own correspondent" about needles. Presumably this article is broadly representative of a situation which is beyond reasonable shortfalls in supply, to put it mildly. Thus, the supply of needles for injections for a 950-bed, 13 department neuropsychological hospital and two dispensaries with a "large out-patient admission and treatment" facilities, was 200 needles for the entire year. Reportedly this is one-tenth their requirements. And one-tenth seems to be their equitable share as the correspondent notes that the total demand for needles in Krasnodarsk Kray (with about 5 million population) was determined at 2,277,650 for 1982 and 2,346,100 in 1983. In 1982, they received 230,940, or slightly more than one-tenth the level of demand. In 1983. they received 79,680 in the first five months

of the year--again about one-tenth. (Med.gaz., 22 July 1983, p. 2)
 However, someone or some organization was stirred by this item,
 and by 14 December 1983, two years into the "catastrophic"
 situation, the "artificial" deficit and the "acute shortage of
 needles for injections" was met by one-half, when they supplied
 the kray's medical agency with a special supplement of 1.1
 million needles. For over a year and a half, however, before the
 emergency supplement arrived, hospitals and clinics were forced
 to take the old needles and "sharpen, straighten and remove the
 rust" from them (tochim, vypryamlyayem, chistim zarzhavevshiye)
 in order to offset the shortfall. What about sterilizing them?

Many reports are available about the lack of sanitation and
 hygiene in medical institutions of the Soviet Union. But that
 the same national medical newspaper would publish in December of
 1983, the letter written by a newspaper staff member (of
Tashkentskaya Pravda) about his recent experience may indicate
 that this particular situation also was more generalized than its
 location. Thus, the staff member wrote that when he complained
 about the dirty sheet used for his bed, he was told it was the
 same one used by 10's of patients before him, and that he should
 not complain. While this may be truly exceptional, it may yet be
 useful to illustrate basic attitudes among many hospital staff
 personnel, and the Med. gaz. publication of the article served
 also to reaffirm the need for attention to sanitary and hygienic
 rules. Whether it will be successful is moot, however.

Lastly, why was the very unusual step taken by the Soviet armed forces this January to form "Extraordinary Antiepidemic Commissions" in every military unit on land and on sea. The Radio Liberty research report of 25 January of 1984 by Peter Kruzhin makes the logical point that these commissions undoubtedly were formed after "epidemics" (not further defined) had occurred. (RL 41/84) Previous information about outbreaks of infectious hepatitis among whole military formations may have been the harbinger of additional outbreaks of dysentary, typhoid and other intestinal diseases.

In sum, the entire Soviet population seems to be undergoing a difficult health period if this interpretation can be generalized from the materials given here and additional information which it was not possible to include in the limited time I have. Let me add just one more piece of evidence. And that relates to the number of persons hospitalized throughout the Soviet Union. In absolute terms it has increased from 41.5 million to 64.9 million persons admitted to hospitals in 1960 and 1982, respectively. In relative terms, this is an increase of over 56 percent or more than twice as much as the increase in the Soviet population (25.4 percent, 216.3 and 271.2 millions, respectively, at the end of 1960 and 1982). Alternatively measured, in 1960, 17.6 percent of the Soviet population in 1960 and 24.1 percent in 1982 were reportedly admitted to all medical institutions as patients. (N.B. Numbers do not jibe; should be 19.1 and 23.9 percents of the total population, in 1960 and 1982, if total population and total admissions are correct) Or about one out of every 4 Soviet

one of every 7 or 8 persons; about half the Soviet rate. Possibly better roads to the farms enable the rural population to enroll in urban facilities rather than their own usually inadequately staffed, supplied and equipped rural medical points. The Soviet urban hospital administrators may have become more relaxed about place of residence for admission. The rules have changed for hospitalization of specific illness, disease, age group, etc. Thus, ^{why} the new ruling in Belorussia for obligatory admission of all young children under 3 years of age who complain of any, I repeat, any type of stomach ache? Why is the reaction so drastic? But in-hospital acquired infections could be serious, and this policy certainly would lead to overcrowding and the possible spread of such infections. The policy of full dispensarization, i.e., attachment to dispensaries for the entire Soviet population to commence with July of this year may be insufficient to fully correct many of the emerging disease patterns noted here, but if properly exercised might reduce the difference between reported and real illness rates revealed by Romenskiy's group, the real rates being about twice as high as the reported rates on the average and therefore the health status of the Soviet population may be more negative than that depicted today.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Lenczowski
3492 27
File USSR Foreign Policy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN *WLS*

SUBJECT: Gromyko on the Basis of Soviet Foreign Policy

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President describing a recent article by Foreign Minister Gromyko in which he expresses a remarkably bleak view of East-West relations. Because this is such an unusually candid and authoritative description of Soviet foreign policy, it should be of interest to the President.

The Gromyko article was carried by the TASS English service on April 19; therefore, it was clearly intended for more than a domestic audience.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

JL
John Lenczowski concurs.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *CVS* NARA, Date *7/18/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Gromyko on the Basis of Soviet Foreign Policy

Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko recently defined Soviet foreign policy in terms which rule out common East-West interests in any significant area -- save the prevention of a major war. Gromyko also confirmed continued Soviet support for so-called "liberation movements" in the third world.

Writing in an April issue of Moscow News, Gromyko stated that the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy are "proletarian internationalism" and "peaceful coexistence." He said "proletarian internationalism" is expressed in Soviet support for the "revolutionary and liberated movements of working people's masses and oppressed peoples." The Soviets would, for example, include the Marxist-Leninist movements in Angola, Nicaragua and El Salvador in this category.

Gromyko defines "peaceful coexistence" as: "a specific form of socialism's class struggle against capitalism. This struggle is going on and will continue in the field of economics, politics and, of course, ideology, because the world outlook and the class goals of the two social systems are opposite and irreconcilable (emphasis added). However, this historically inevitable confrontation must be conducted in forms which would not generate military conflicts and, the more so, would not jeopardize the very existence of humanity."

While the above definitions of "peaceful coexistence" and "proletarian internationalism" have been in Soviet writings for many years, it is highly unusual to see them expressed in such a candid manner by one of the most senior members of the Politburo and by the one who is primarily responsible for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR File 7-14/7 #9938

BY Ar NARADATE 7/7/08

US - USSR
General

~~Matlock:~~

File 29

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1984

Dear Bob:

Thanks for sending over the report on your trip to Moscow, Leningrad and Helsinki, and for briefing Jack Matlock.

Academician Velikhov's proposal for a joint meeting on the technical aspects of crisis management is most interesting, and I hope you'll keep me informed if plans along these lines develop.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Dr. Robert Kupperman
CSIS, Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 19, 1984

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Kupperman Visit to Soviet Union

Bob Kupperman has sent you a report of his visit to Moscow, Leningrad and Helsinki, March 30-April 9, and I met with him today for an oral debrief.

Kupperman said that his host in the USSR was Yevgeni Velikhov, a Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Velikhov arranged for him to give a lecture on the technical aspects of crisis management at the Soviet Academy, and his talk was very well received.

Subsequently, Velikhov proposed that the Soviet Academy and CSIS co-sponsor a cooperative venture to explore crisis management issues analytically, with about ten specialists coming from the Soviet Union. Topics would include such items as the mathematical theory of compromise, joint games, and compromise simulation. Kupperman was cautious about making a commitment, but agreed to talk to Velikhov further about the idea when the latter is in Washington in May.

Some of these topics seem very close to some of the crisis management areas which the Soviets have so far refused to discuss with us officially, so it is interesting that they are soliciting a meeting on them with non-governmental specialists. Their doing so, of course, is consistent with their current posture of downplaying official negotiations in some areas while dealing with private groups on the same subjects.

Kupperman's report is at TAB II, and a letter of acknowledgment at Tab I.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Bob Kupperman at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Mr. Kupperman
 Tab II Kupperman's Trip Report

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

Staff of the Agency
Robert H. Kupperman
ack
April 17, 1984

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Bud:

The trip to the Soviet Union was quite useful. I think true progress was made. Though I know that you are up to your neck at the moment, I believe it would be a good idea for us to get together as soon as possible.

For your review, I am attaching a copy of my trip report that I prepared for CSIS.

Sincerely,

Robert H. Kupperman
Robert H. Kupperman
Senior Associate

MEMORANDUM OF RECORD

RHK

FROM: Robert H. Kupperman

DATE: April 13, 1984

SUBJECT: Trip report of Robert H. Kupperman to the Soviet Union and to Helsinki, Finland (March 30 - April 9, 1984)

At the invitation of the USSR Academy of Sciences I was asked to address members of the Academy and other scientific groups on the mathematics of arms control and the technical aspects of crisis management. My wife and I traveled to the Soviet Union on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In addition to our trip to the Soviet Union, Finland extended an invitation to us to discuss the possibility of my conducting an international congress on the subject of arms control and crisis management under the aegis of Georgetown University, the Institut de la Vie, and the Government of Finland.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that despite obvious strain between the United States and Soviet governments, my wife and I were treated cordially and the discussions held with the scientists in the USSR and Finland were largely substantive. There is no question that the Soviets are very worried over the lack of progress in arms control. They are especially concerned about our Star Wars initiatives. It is also clear that they agree that the future of meaningful arms control measures lies beyond the traditional impasses so painfully evident in the INF and START talks.

My first meeting was with Academician Moiseev, a member of the Academy and Director of the Computer Center of the Academy. Academician Moiseev led a large seminar (perhaps 50 or 60 people) on the mathematical models of conflict and compromise. In my view, he had given a lot of thought to their design. Following Professor Moiseev's presentation I was invited to lecture on the policy and mathematical implications of strategic force structure, deterrence and stabilization at times of stress. I lectured on the relevant technical and policy issues for some two hours. Afterwards, I answered questions as forthrightly as I could. From comments made afterwards, I believe my talk was well received.

Following the seminar, Academician Moiseev said that he and other Soviet technical and international relations experts would like to enter into a cooperative venture with the Center for Strategic and International Studies to explore the crisis management issues analytically. He agreed that the subject was of incalculable importance and that there was a chance to make great headway. (For one, unlike INF and START, no hardened political positions have been taken by either side about the crisis issues.)

That afternoon we were received by Academician E.P. Velikhov (my host and Vice President of the Academy). Velikhov and I conversed for nearly an hour. He said that the key to working together was to gather top-notch Soviet scientists who really wished to commit their efforts. Velikhov then stated his wish to enter into an agreement with the Center and establish a working relationship between the Academy and CSIS. I told him that we

look forward to a close relationship, but would have to explore carefully the terms of any formal arrangement. Finally, Velikhov said that he planned to be in the United States in May and would enter into a bilateral relationship with our National Academy of Sciences and would pursue some relationship with the Federation of American Scientists. (It was clear that the relationship with the Federation had all sorts of propaganda implications, such as "nuclear winter".)

At Velikhov's request, I visited Dr. A. Jakovlev, who was Director of the Institute of World Economy. That meeting, while largely cordial, reflected Soviet intransigence. No matter what I said about the crisis management issue, Jakoolev replied with a statement about the evil intent of the Reagan administration. Finally, I asked him if he preferred the risk of nuclear carnage to that of cooperative ventures which might prevent it. He was left somewhat speechless.

Jakovlev's deputy, whose name I do not recall, said that the U.S. does not understand the "psychology" of the Soviet people but that the Soviet Union understands the American psychology all too well. (He accused us of being a violent people, noting that 20,000 murders per year are committed on U.S. television.) He made a most incredible statement -- if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to play a war game, the Soviet Union could do a better job in playing the U.S. role than could the United States. I responded that I was not certain that the Soviet Union fully understood us as well as they thought.

My next meeting was with Vitaly Zhurkin, Deputy Director, Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Zhurkin expressed the party line about the strained relationship between the U.S. and USSR but said he was prepared to work with the Center. (At lunch with Moiseev the prior day, he said that Zhurkin would be working with him. Moiseev also joined the Jakoolev meeting unexpectedly. A few minutes after he sat down at the Jakoolev meeting, the tone of the meeting became more productive.) Zhurkin asked if the Center's study would also include issues about the first-use of nuclear weapons, and I stated that we would consider all of the relevant issues including his concerns.

A curious thing about the meeting was that Georgi Arbatov refused to step in and say hello. (I had the feeling that Arbatov resented Velikhov having taken the lead in the crisis management matter.)

The next meeting was at their space and research institute. Their computer simulations of the Heley's Comet mission were demonstrated. The real reason for that institute having wished to see me was their admission they have been given the job of analyzing U.S. efforts in Star Wars. Obviously, I could discuss nothing with them.

When I first came to the Soviet Union, and shortly before I left, I visited with Mr. Warren Zimmermann, the Deputy Chief of Mission to our embassy. I told Zimmermann about everything that had transpired. It turns out that he leads our delegation on

the crisis management negotiations with the Soviets. He said that the Soviet Union has been quite uncooperative with him and have only sent low level technicians to discuss hot line matters. He also complained that few of Ambassador Hartman's or his calls are returned by the Soviets.

At each meeting with the Soviets, I made it clear that neither the Center nor I represented the U.S. government. Moreover, I told my hosts that it was imperative that they maintain the arms control dialogue with the United States government.

On Friday evening we took the night train to Leningrad and Saturday morning we were met at the train and were taken to meet with Dr. V. V. Ivanishev who is Chief of the System Analysis Lab in Leningrad. (He works for Moiseev.) The only thing I was able to learn from Dr. Ivanishev was that the USSR planned to go beyond the nuclear winter propaganda efforts by building models of the ecological effects of nuclear warfare.

On Sunday, April 8, we left Leningrad via Aeroflot to Helsinki. (The Aeroflot trip, though one-half hour long, was in itself a memorable experience.) The following morning we attended a luncheon in our honor given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The senior official was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was clear that they were in touch with the Soviets. In addition to the Soviet Union's interest in a bilateral relationship with CSIS, Finland wanted to pursue the multi-lateral aspects of crisis management. In particular, they proposed I lead an international congress on crisis management. In addition to the

Ministry officials, there were quite a number of others present including the head of Finland's National Academy of Science and several other leading academicians.

A joint organizing meeting was broached, with the hope of holding an international congress about a year later.

cc: Robert C. McFarlane
Amos Jordan
William Taylor

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED

June 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Letter Recommending Mlýnař as Soviet Expert

Dr. Jiří J. Víték of the University of Alabama in Birmingham has written you recommending Zdenek Mlýnař as a person with a "deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the Soviet system" and suggesting that we seek his advice.

Mlýnař was a leading Communist Party functionary during the "Prague Spring," and was taken by the Soviets to Moscow with the Czechoslovak Politburo when the Soviets invaded. He managed to leave Czechoslovakia shortly after the Soviet invasion and wrote a moving account of the events following the Soviet invasion and of his own disillusionment with the Soviet system. He now lives in Vienna and occasionally contributes to broadcasts by RFE. He is a controversial figure with the Czechoslovak emigration, however, because of his Communist past.

An appropriate letter of acknowledgement is attached at TAB I.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter at TAB I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

JL
John Lenczowski concurs.

Attachments:

- Tab I -- Letter for signature
- Tab II -- Dr. Vitek's letter of May 22, 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Vitek:

Thank you for your letter of May 22, 1984,
concerning Mr. Zdeněk Mlýnař.

We are very familiar with Mr. Mlýnař's writings
and agree with you that they provide very
important insights regarding the Soviet system.
We shall continue to follow his comments with
great interest.

Sincerely,

Dr. Jiri J. Vitek
Director, Division of
Neuroradiology
University of Alabama
Birmingham, Alabama 35294



The University of Alabama in Birmingham
Department of Diagnostic Radiology
Division of Neuroradiology
Jiri J. Vitek, M.D., Ph.D., Director
Ernest R. Duvall, M.D.
B. Chandra-Sekar, M.D.
Kundan L. Gupta, M.D.
205/934-5131

*Stats Joe
RCM reply*
40
MAY 29 1984

May 22, 1984

Mr. R. McFarland
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Sir:

As an immigrant to the United States and as a person who deeply cares for the success of the United States in international politics, I perceive some misconceptions in the political approach toward the Soviet Union. The basic problem I feel is the lack of knowledge of the Marxism-Leninism as interpreted in the Soviet Union, the lack of detailed understanding of the Soviet system, and the lack of comprehension of the Soviet way of thinking.

I would like to recommend to you a man, who in my opinion, is the foremost expert of the Soviet system and its politics, presently living in the West.

Mr. Z. Mlynar, originally from Czechoslovakia and presently living in Vienna, Austria, was the professor of the international law at Charles University in Prague. In the mid seventies, he was forcefully expelled from Czechoslovakia. Mr. Mlynar studied the Soviet system from inside, being not only the theoretician but also involved in practical politics as a member of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and later as a member of its politburo. Professor Mlynar headed a special group of advisors to the politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on the future development of the s.c. Socialist systems. He is extremely familiar with all the nuances of Soviet life. He studied law in the Soviet Union. He knows personally almost all Soviet high political leaders and other communists leaders in all Soviet dominated countries. Some of the s.c. younger members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and its politburo were his personal friends from the times of his studies in Moscow. He was one of the Czech political leaders taken hostage in the summer of 1968.

In the last several years, he has written a large amount of articles about the present conditions in the Soviet Union and other East European countries. He has also written several essays on the future development of these systems not only from the political but also economical point of view. It is my understanding that his conclusions are slightly different to the ones published in the American news media and in American journals devoted to foreign affairs. All of his predictions,

Mr. R. McFarland
May 22, 1984
Page Two

as far as changes with the Soviet system, were always correct. In the United States, there is not one single man of science (even in between Soviet defectors) with such a deep theoretical and practical knowledge of the Soviet system as Mr. Z. Mlynar.

I think you should take advantage of his theoretical and practical knowledge of the Soviet system and ask him to evaluate certain problems related to the United States policies toward the Soviet Union and its allies.

Sincerely yours,



Jiri J. Vitek, M.D.
Director, Division of Neuroradiology

JJV/pjh

P.S. One of his last articles written for the public was published in Wiener Tagebuch, no. 4, in 1984 in Vienna, Austria.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JWM*

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Russian Emigres

You will recall that Mike Deaver suggested that it might be useful for the President to meet with some Russian emigre writers, and you authorized me to discuss the matter with persons knowledgeable of the Russian emigre scene and recommend about five who would be appropriate (TAB II).

Based on the advice of Walt Raymond, Steve Sestanovich and some specialists in State and the CIA, I would recommend the following five emigre intellectuals:

Vasily Aksyonov, a prominent writer living in Washington who left the USSR in the late 1970's and has continued to publish copiously in Russian and in English translation.

Georgy Vladimov, a writer and human rights activist who left the Soviet Union only last year and is now the editor of the emigre journal Grani. He lives in Frankfurt, West Germany.

Ernst Neizvestny, a well-known sculptor who was criticized by Khrushchev but later became a friend of the Khrushchev family and did Khrushchev's tombstone. He now lives in New York.

Yuri Lyubimov, the famous theater director who left the USSR last year and is now living in London.

Vladimir Lefebvre, a scholar who has been in the United States about ten years (he lives in California), and has done interesting work on the differences in American and Russian ethical systems.

As you can see, we have included some intellectuals who are not creative writers, since we feel it would be useful to have some of the other arts represented, and because the individuals involved have some unique insights which we believe would interest the President.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/7 #9939BY CH NARA DATE 6/25/09

I believe that at least an hour should be devoted to the meeting if it is to serve its purpose. An informal lunch would also be a possibility.

We should have at least two weeks notice to organize the meeting, since some of the invitees would have to travel from Western Europe.

Recommendation:

That you authorize sending the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

by SES
Walt Raymond and Steve *OOT* Sestanovich concur.

Attachment:

- Tab I - Schedule Proposal
- Tab II - Matlock/McFarlane memo of April 2, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

2653 Add-on

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1987
By AS NARA, Date 7/18/02

44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

REQUEST: Private Meeting or Informal Luncheon

PURPOSE: To meet with five Russian emigre intellectuals and hear their views on conditions in Soviet Union.

BACKGROUND: Mike Deaver requested our views on the desirability of the President meeting with some Russian emigre writers. We think it a good idea, which could serve two purposes: to provide the President with some unique insights into Soviet society, and to indicate his regard for Russian culture, which is being maintained by persons who have left the Soviet Union.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None (with these individuals)

DATE & TIME: Late June or early July

LOCATION: Oval Office or Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Vasily Aksyonov, novelist
Georgy Vladimov, editor of Grani, Frankfurt
Ernst Neizvestny, sculptor
Yuri Lyubimov, theater director
Vasily Lefebvre, scholar
Mr. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Meese, Baker and Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President invites the guests to comment on the present situation in the Soviet Union, and discusses their views.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: Staff Photographer only

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 2, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*BY CU NARA DATE 6/25/05

SUBJECT: Meeting of President with Russian Emigre Writers

Mike Deaver has requested your opinion regarding the possibility of the President meeting with three Russian emigre writers living in the United States, Vasili Aksyonov, Sergei Dovlatov and Yuz Aleshkovsky.

I believe that the President would find it very interesting to hear the views of these writers on some of the questions he has been discussing with other recent visitors, particularly those relating to Russian and Soviet psychology and the role of Communist ideology in regime thinking.

If he has a meeting with emigre writers, however, I believe it should include some from genres other than the novel (Josef Brodsky, for example, is one of the finest Russian poets writing today). We should also give some thought to the orientation of members of the group as regards other Russian emigres. It would be unfortunate to be seen favoring one faction over another. Of the three writers mentioned in the Times article, I know only Aksyonov personally. He is a brilliant writer who is an excellent conversationalist.

In sum, if you think the President would be interested, I would recommend that we draw up a list of not more than five Russian emigre writers and invite them to a meeting or a private lunch. Some of them do not speak English well, so an interpreter will probably be necessary.

Recommendation:

That I discreetly consult some persons knowledgeable about the Russian emigre cultural scene (including Suzanne Massie), and develop a list of about five emigre writers to be invited to a meeting or lunch with the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memo from Deaver's office and New York Times article~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

46

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence received (YY/MM/DD) 84103128

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: Sittman / Deane

DC Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

SUBJECT: request for President Reagan to meet w/ three Soviet writers who have immigrated to the US

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>DCS, H</u>	<u>C</u> <u>84 103 128 PM</u>	<u>S</u> <u>84103128</u>
<u>NS KIMM</u>	<u>C</u> <u>84103128 PM</u>	<u>S</u> <u>84103130</u>
	Referral Note: _____	
	Referral Note: _____	
	Referral Note: _____	

ACTION CODES: A - Appropriate Action C - Comment/Recommendation D - Draft Response F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be	I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary R - Direct Reply w/ Copy S - For Signature X - Interim Reply	DISPOSITION CODES: A - Answered B - Non-Special Referral C - Completed S - Suspended	FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE: Type of Response = Initials of Signer Code = "A" Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
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COMMENTS: _____

47

21957

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 29, 1984

Bob Kimmitt

TO:

FROM: **BILL SITTMANN**
Special Assistant to the President
and Special Assistant to the
Deputy Chief of Staff

Subject: Attached

Mike Deaver would like your
thoughts about a possible
meeting with these people and B

Information

Action

Emigré Novelists Look at U.S.

Concern Over Softness On Russians

By WALTER GOODMAN

THE scores of Soviet writers who have found their way to the West in the last decade were evidently encouraged by their Slavic muse, most of them continue to write in Russian about Russia, to associate with other emigré writers in Russia, to be emigré—what they believe is a lack of understanding among Americans about the nature of the Soviet regime.

That concern came through sharply in recent interviews with three novelists now living on the East Coast, whose work has made an impact here and abroad in the last few months. They are Vasily Aksyonov, author of "The Island of Crimea," published by Random House, a political fantasy about an independent Crimea trying to secede in the shadow of Soviet power; Sergei Dovlatov, author of "The Chertomukhino," a tabloid on Soviet journalism published by Alfred A. Knopf; and Yury Alaburovsky, whose novel "Kangaroo," a satirical satire about the Soviet secret police, appeared in France last year to favorable reviews and is due to be published in this country in July by Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

The three are stars compared to Russian emigré like those who have joined together for mutual support in a Russian Writers' Club that meets once a month at the Russian Institute at Columbia University. Last month,

the group of about 30, almost entirely Jewish, celebrated its fifth anniversary with a party at the Ruzhnik restaurant, not chosen for literary irony. "We have a big problem making a living," says Yevgeny Lybin, the club president. "Some of us write for Russian newspapers. Some of us have wives or husbands who have jobs. Nobody's work has been translated. When somebody makes a success, they don't come to our meetings any more."

Mr. Alaburovsky is one of those who hasn't been to a meeting lately. Now 54 years old, he was a writer of children's books and stories as well as fiction and film scripts in the Soviet Union—"one of the most successful writers in Russia," he says. In 1974, he ran afoul of the authorities when he joined an attempt to persuade them to permit publication of "Metropol," a volume of collected works. He came to the United States in 1976 with his wife and 7-year-old son.

Now settled in a rambling old frame house in Middlestown, Conn., close to Wesleyan University, Mr. Alaburovsky has moved away from children's stories, which he wrote because "the world of childhood wasn't yet perverted by the cruelty of the political games," to fiction for adults. But his plots continue to reflect the imagination of a child's writer—with a difference. He is working on a novel about a group of Russians who save themselves during the Nazi invasion in 1941 by setting the Nazis free. The Germans make a film about them, as a scientific phenomenon, which leads after liberation to the group's arrest by the Soviet army for collaborating with the enemy.

Despite appearances—their working outfits include jogging shoes and a pair of corduroys—Mr. Alaburovsky is far from Americanized. He confesses that even after four years in

this country, his English is "prevalent." ("I haven't finished solving the problems of the Russian language," he notes wryly, adding that the "soul" of his work remains in Russian.) He relies for help in interviews on his wife, Irina, who learned her very serviceable English in Soviet schools and who now teaches Russian at Wesleyan, and a friend from Wesleyan's department of Russian literature.

Although America has had little impact on Mr. Alaburovsky's work so far, his politics are much on his mind. He says he is sure that he speaks for most Soviet emigrés in maintaining that "the fact of America's existence" is more important than any of its faults.

"In Russia," as he sees it, "the people have their leaders, who are trying to hurt them; in America, the people elect their leaders, who are trying to help them. It's self-annihilation or mutual-suicide." Although he favors a nuclear freeze—"and to hell with the army"—he believes that the political demonstrations against the war should be taking place in Red Square. "I agree with Reagan," he says. "If the Soviet Union wants peace, there will be peace."

Mr. Alaburovsky's bawdy proposal for improving international relations—offered with a straight face—is for Washington to interview "to defend the human rights of Soviet leaders." He explains: "Those people at the top are terrified that if they fall a little bit, there will be a complete collapse. That makes them dangerous to everybody. The number one problem in the Soviet Union is that its leaders are absolutely without culture, without spiritual values; they are not even truly pragmatic. There is no air up there. They have no sensitivity. For the sake of the world, they must be saved."

As Mr. Alaburovsky was leaving for Paris a few weeks ago, for the publication in French of a new novel, Vasily Aksyonov was returning after the opening in Paris of his play "The Heron," which he describes as a "sad comedy" modeled on "The Sea Gull" by Chekhov.

The 51-year-old writer, among the best-known in his homeland, arrived in this country in 1960, after resigning from the Soviet Writers' Union in protest against the expulsion of two younger writers for their part in the "Metropol" affair. His books, more than a dozen novels, were taken off the library shelves, his telephone was tapped, his mail blocked, the time of his car slashed. His citizenship was revoked soon after. He departs from the Soviet Union, he now lives in Washington, with his wife and a daughter and grandson by her first marriage, and teaches short-story writing at George College in Maryland.

His novel "The Buzz," written before "The Island of Crimea," will be published here in September. It takes place during what Mr. Aksyonov calls the Soviet Union's "great period"—the



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relatively permissive late 1960's and early 1970's, and centers on five intellectuals linked together by their experience of the Siberian gulag.

The gulag has figured intimately in Mr. Aksyonov's own life. His mother was Eugenia Chertok, whose books "Journey into the Whitebird" and "Within the Whitebird," reexamined memorably her 10 years in Stalin's camps.

Mr. Aksyonov, whose English is more than passable, says that he is beginning "to feel some influence of my new country in my writing." He plans to start work next year on a novel that will set partly in the United States.

It seems to Mr. Aksyonov that Americans have been growing more

Existence of U.S. is more important than its faults.

what more realistic about the Soviet Union. "Before, the media tried to make an image of Russia on the American model," he says. "They tried to interpret all events from an American perspective. But the Soviet Union is very different from America. It is an ideological empire."

He adds tentatively, "I'm afraid to sound a little bit conservative—but in spite of a conservative too-harsh rhetoric, Reagan understands. He likes Mr. Aksyonov, Sergei Dovlatov, my son, is working on a novel set in America; there he arrived early in 1979, at the age of 27, with his mother and a first wife, Irina Chertok. He

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 3, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Attitude toward Compromise

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR Feb-11/4/7 #9942
BY CV NARADATE 7/7/08

Vladimir Lefebvre, a Russian emigre now working in California, recently wrote an article comparing American and Soviet attitudes toward compromise which is highly relevant to our current dealings with the Soviets. It is short and I believe you should read it. Given the President's interest in Soviet psychology, you might want to send it to him as well.

Lefebvre argues, on the basis of polling he has done of Americans and ex-Soviets, that Americans and Russians place diametrically opposed moral values to compromise and confrontation. The first has a positive value for Americans, but is considered a moral flaw by Russians. This fact leads Lefebvre to say of the present Soviet leadership that "it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations."

Lefebvre's observations on the Soviet (I would say Russian) mind-set are entirely congruent with my own experience in dealing with Russians. I think the phenomenon discussed in the article explains in part the persistent Soviet effort to do two things, when they are serious about dealing with others:

(1) To get agreement on a broad principle in advance of talking about particulars. Often, of course, their proposals for non-aggression pacts, no-first-use and the like contain serious hooks. We tend to view them either as eyewash or of pernicious intent -- and sometimes they can be. But sometimes they are designed to provide a framework for public presentation of subsequent deals which avoids the appearance of compromise.

(2) The persistent effort to establish "private channels," when they are serious about striking deals. These permit them to structure their compromises so that they do not seem to be compromises. The other side of this coin is that when they do not deal in this fashion, and play out their positions in the public arena (as they did during INF following their rejection of Walk in the Woods, and are doing now regarding Vienna), there is no intent to compromise, since they put themselves in a position where compromise is simply impossible, even if empirically attractive.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Attachment:

Tab I - Article by Vladimir Lefebvre, "The Soviet Union and the Problem of Conflict Resolution"

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Vladimir A. Lefebvre*

"Is the Soviet Union brave enough to extend a hand of friendship to President Reagan?" a friend of mine recently asked me. This is a critical question and, as a psychologist, I cannot answer it very briefly. The peculiarities of cognition in the common Soviet man and his American counterpart differ so deeply that even such seemingly general categories as "human dignity" and "sacrifice" have completely different meanings in Soviet and American culture. Schematically, the differences are as follows.

An American respects himself and is respected by others when he is willing to compromise with another person. A Soviet man respects himself and is respected by others when he is uncompromising toward another person. For example, a simple Soviet woman working as a librarian writes to a Soviet newspaper about a conflict she has with her supervisor, in which neither person has attempted to reach a compromise. This woman closes her letter by praising her co-workers for their support of her uncompromising behavior: "They are wonderful people! They weren't afraid to begin a fight!" Note that this conflict has nothing to do with class struggle, revolution, ideology, etc. This was a routine ^{Job} conflict ~~at a job~~, and the people involved were average people behaving in

*Research psychologist at the School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717; author of ALGEGRA OF CONSCIENCE: A Comparative Analysis of Western and Soviet Ethical Systems, D. Reidel, Holland, 1982.

"normal" ways. However, the "norms" in the Soviet Union are different from those in America, i.e., in the Soviet Union a good person is not supposed to compromise with his opponent.

The question which naturally arises is, how does one resolve such conflicts? The answer appears discouraging--in Soviet culture there is no procedure for conflict resolution. A conflict usually ends with the victory of one side over the other or is simply stopped by a higher authority.

Two more examples: in the early 1920's, my grandfather was in charge of ~~the~~ Moscow-Leningrad railroad traffic. At that time, every train was escorted by a military team headed by a "commander." It was not unusual for the commanders to threaten my grandfather with their pistols in order to receive scheduling priority. Sometimes the train commanders also confronted each other, brandished their weapons, and even shot in the air to establish their rights. Any attempts to compromise were considered disgraceful and unworthy of a person of the "proletarian state." The trains spent hours stuck on the tracks because their commanders refused to cooperate with each other.

During the Second World War, my father was a Soviet war correspondent. He told me that once on a narrow, snowy road ^{his} ~~the~~ car ~~he~~ ~~was in~~ encountered a jeep carrying Stalin's close associate, Marshall George M. Zhukov. Although the road was narrow, it was still wide enough for two cars to pass each other. However, this did not happen. Zhukov did not allow his driver to move his jeep slightly aside, and my father's driver was forced to move in reverse for more than a mile. Nobody was

surprised at this. Zhukov just could not allow himself to compromise in any way in front of his subordinates.

Unfortunately, not all conflicts in Soviet history have such a "happy ending." During the 1920s and '30s, millions of people were killed because no decent procedure for conflict resolution existed in Soviet society. The absence of such a procedure is now the main obstacle to needed social and economic transformations; in order to begin these transformations, different groups of Soviet leaders must arrive at a certain compromise, but they cannot, since it would lead to the disgrace of one of the groups.

Analogous situations appear in international relationships. Let us imagine that the Geneva arms negotiations resulted in an agreement about significant Soviet-American arms reductions. The American representative would return home triumphantly; this is a victory: a compromise has been reached! Contrarily, the Soviet representative would be perceived by his compatriots as a person who made a disgraceful deal. Therefore, in order for this compromise to be accepted without scorn by the Soviet people, it would have to be presented to them as a strategical maneuver in the battle between East and West.

The contrasting reactions of the Soviet and American media to the actual events in Geneva in early 1983 provide fertile ground for further comparisons of East-West perceptions. Every hint of a possible compromise or any step toward one was praised and exaggerated by the American media and diminished and denied by the Soviets. Here are two examples:

"The USSR declares that no progress has been made in the Geneva talks. Concerning the information about the fact that Washington may suggest some 'intermediate propositions' in the Geneva talks, Moscow asserts that in the discussions on this topic one cannot see any steps toward reality."

(Krasnaya Zvezda (the Red Star), February 26, 1983)

"The Soviet Union is warning the world, despite the rumors overseas: there is no improvement in the Geneva talks!"

(Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 4, 1983)

The absence of a compromise is "good news" for the Soviets.

We have been aware of similar incidents for quite a long time, but only now have we been able to speak of them as representing a special regular peculiarity of Soviet cognition. It became possible to explain this peculiarity after constructing a formal model of human ethical cognition which predicted the existence of the two different ethical systems. In the first ethical system, a person increases his ethical status when he compromises with another person, and in the second ethical system a person increases his ethical status when he confronts another person. We have numerous empirical data indicating that in American culture the first ethical system is dominant, while in Soviet culture the second system prevails. For example, in a comparative survey which Victorina Lefebvre and I conducted among people brought up in the Soviet Union vs. those in the United States one of the questions was:

Two terrorists are hijacking a small plane. There is a possibility of killing them without injury to the passengers. Another possibility is to start negotiations first and try to

persuade them to surrender. The head of the rescue group made the decision not to negotiate with the criminals.

Did he act correctly?

Fifty nine percent of those with a Soviet background approved the commander's decision, while only twenty four percent of Americans did so. As with the examples of real conflict, this survey indicates that a good person in Soviet culture must behave uncompromisingly toward his adversary.

The differences in ethical systems create mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings during Soviet-American negotiations. Very often Americans get the impression that their Soviet counterparts do not understand the advantages of a compromise. The Americans then direct their main efforts toward explaining to the Soviets all the advantages of compromise resolution. Moral problems are not taken into consideration. Americans believe that a compromise in relationships is universally evaluated as a meritorious act.

The Soviets know about the practical advantages of compromise very well, but the idea of a compromise in relationships has an immoral connotation. Therefore, a political leader making such a decision would be jeopardizing his moral reputation and his career. The following citation from Robert Kaiser about his meeting with Yuri Zhukov (no relation to Marshall George M. Zhukov), senior Pravda commentator, vividly illustrates this point:

"I paid a call on Zhukov soon after I arrived in Moscow The meeting was short, and I remember only one thing he said. When I commented that the recent settlement of the Berlin problem demonstrated that both his government and the Americans seemed ready to make compromises, he replied that the Soviet side had made no compromise."

(Robert Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power, Atheneum, New York, 1976, p. 186)

Yuri Zhukov could not admit that Brezhnev compromised; it would mean that Brezhnev committed an act embarrassing to himself and to his country. A Soviet leader ought to play according to the rules of his culture. Only the most confident of leaders, one securely ensconced in power, can dare to make conciliatory moves in Soviet-American negotiations.

Apparently one of the main reasons for the recent deterioration in Soviet-American relations is the relative lack of political power on the part of Soviet leaders after Brezhnev. Though the psychological features of their personalities differ, it is their lack of political strength which causes them to demonstrate uncompromising behavior toward adversaries and prevents them from concentrating on the purely pragmatic aspects of Soviet-American relations.

The difference in ethical systems alters the problem of conflict resolution. Western theories on this problem did not foresee the possibility of ethical asymmetry; it stood to reason that the Soviets would willingly compromise if it were advantageous for them to do so. But the core of the problem is that, for both ethical and psychological

reasons, the side of the second ethical system cannot accept compromises offered by the side of the first ethical system.

This dramatic situation is also partly understood in the Soviet Union, as is evidenced by numerous articles written by Fedor Burlatsky, a close associate of Andropov during the 1950's. The solution offered by Burlatsky in an oblique form, may be called "controlled confrontation": the main task for the two superpowers is not to search for a compromise (which inevitably touches upon Soviet ideology and morality), but to try to stabilize international tension at a level which allows us to avoid armed confrontation. These ideas seem useful. Compromise is inimical to the Soviet mentality; confrontation to the American mentality. The solution is to "cheat" cultural stereotypes and to create a stable situation which can be interpreted as confrontation by the Soviets and as compromise by the Americans. It could be a "silent" coordination of military development and activity toward stabilization, while political and ideological confrontation proceeds.

Sadly, our world has a very dramatic ethical asymmetry; and our future depends on how well we will be able to realize the differences and cope with them.



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*File -
Soviet Politics*

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BY CJ NARA DATE 7/7/08

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 02695

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, US, UR
SUBJECT: AN OUTSIDER'S READING OF CURRENT SOVIET POLITICS

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: A RECENT VISITOR WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL MOSCOW WORLD HAS DEVELOPED A COMPOSITE PROFILE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE USSR AS CHERNENKO BEGINS HIS SECOND YEAR IN OFFICE. AMONG THE ELITE, HE FINDS A PALPABLE RESENTMENT OF STAGNATION AND PARALYSIS IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, MATCHED BY CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS LOSING GROUND IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN EFFECT SUFFERING A REVERSAL OF THE CORRELATION OF FORCES. GORBACHEV IS RUNNING THE PARTY'S AFFAIRS AND EVEN CHAIRING THE DEFENSE COUNCIL IN CHERNENKO'S FREQUENT ABSENCE, BUT THE OLD GUARD FIERCELY RESISTS A FORMAL TRANSITION TO THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION THAT WOULD INEVITABLY TAKE THE REINS UNDER GORBACHEV. ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY IS OVERSHADOWED BY SUCCESSION POLITICS, WITH CONTROL OF THE NEXT CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO BE ELECTED AT THE 27TH CPSU CONGRESS HANGING IN THE BALANCE. THE TWO STALWARTS OF THE OLD GUARD ARE GRISHIN AND GROMYKO; THE LATTER MAY WISH TO USE HIS UNIQUE AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN POLICY TO ACHIEVE SOME TANGIBLE SUCCESS TO SHOWCASE AT THE PARTY CONGRESS. END SUMMARY.

3. A WELL-INFORMED SPECIALIST FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHO REQUESTED ANONYMITY HAS SHARED WITH US THE HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW AS CHERNENKO ENTERS HIS SECOND YEAR AS GENERAL SECRETARY. HE HAS ESPECIALLY ASKED THAT NONE OF THIS INFORMATION BE SHARED OUTSIDE THE US GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH CAREFUL WITH SOURCES AND DATA, HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SOME OF WHAT HE HAS LEARNED COULD BE DISTORTED OR AT BEST SELF-SERVING. NEVERTHELESS, HE FINDS WIDESPREAD ANGER AMONG MUSCOVITES AT THE WEAK IMAGE PROJECTED BY THE AILING CHERNENKO. DOMESTIC ISSUES ARE A HOSTAGE TO SUCCESSION POLITICS AND MARKED BY PARALYSIS. FOREIGN POLICY IS NOT SO MORIBUND, BUT IS CHARACTERIZED BY GROMYKO'S STRANGLEHOLD. THE CURRENT PERIOD IS INDEED A WINTER OF DISCONTENT.

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 2695

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COMPARABLE ONLY TO THE 1953-56 POST-STALIN POLITICAL
JOCKEYING.

EX
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4. LEADERSHIP SITUATION: IN THE OPINIONS VOLUNTEERED TO OUR SOURCE, POWER AT THE CENTER IS PRECARIOUSLY BALANCED. USTINOV'S DEATH REMOVED A KEY FIGURE FROM THE POLITBURO, AND IN SOME WAYS COULD PROVE TO BE AS CRUCIAL AS SUSLOV'S DEATH THREE YEARS EARLIER IN SHAPING THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEXT LEADERSHIP. GORBACHEV BENEFITS FROM HIS STATUS AS A FORMER PROTEGE OF ANDROPOV, HIS SUCCESSFUL CULTIVATION OF USTINOV, AND--IRONICALLY--HIS DEMONSTRATED TEAM LOYALTY TO CHERNENKO. IT WAS CHERNENKO WHO SETTLED THE QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD PRESIDE AT POLITBURO MEETINGS IN HIS ABSENCE, HAVING TWICE TURNED THE MEETING OVER TO GORBACHEV WHEN HIS LACK OF STAMINA FORCED HIM TO LEAVE AFTER THE FIRST HALF HOUR. OF THE LAST SIX MEETINGS OF THE POLITBURO, GORBACHEV CHAIRED FOUR IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND TWO FOR THE REMAINDER OF TIME WHEN CHERNENKO DEPARTED EARLY. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE CHAIRING POLITBURO MEETINGS AND VIRTUALLY RUNNING THE PARTY SECRETARIAT, GORBACHEV MEETS STRONG RESISTANCE FROM THE OLD GUARD--THE PEOPLE WHO PUSHED THROUGH THE CHOICE OF CHERNENKO WHEN ANDROPOV DIED.

EX
DIS

5. THE RECENT CHERNENKO APPEARANCES ON TELEVISION, DESCRIBED VARIOUSLY AS "PITIFUL" AND "HUMILIATING" FOR THE WHOLE IMAGE OF THE PARTY AND POLITBURO, ARE EXPLAINED BY OUR SOURCE'S INTERLOCUTORS AS A DESPERATE EFFORT TO KEEP CHERNENKO IN PLACE UNTIL THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS IN ORDER TO KEEP GORBACHEV FROM CONTROLLING THE SELECTION OF THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ACCORDING TO AT LEAST TWO SOURCES, GROMYKO IS A KEY PLAYER AND IN FACT A CONTENDER TO BE NAMED GENERAL SECRETARY. GROMYKO IS REPORTEDLY THE AUTHOR OF A PROPOSAL TO DEFER CHOOSING THE NEXT GENERAL SECRETARY UNTIL THE CONGRESS, EVEN IF CHERNENKO DIES OR BECOMES TOTALLY INCAPACITATED. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, AN INTERIM OR ACTING GENERAL SECRETARY WOULD BE APPOINTED, PRESUMABLY FROM AMONG THE OLD GUARD. THIS GROUP, WHICH INCLUDES GROMYKO, GRISHIN, TIKHONOV AND SOLOMENTSEV, WOULD TRY TO FIRM UP THE CHOICE OF A LEADER FROM AMONG THEIR OWN RANKS IN PRE-CONGRESS MANEUVERING; IN
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 02695

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, US, UR
SUBJECT: AN OUTSIDER'S READING OF CURRENT SOVIET POLITICS

THIS, THEY WOULD SEEK THE SUPPORT OF SEVERAL DOZEN
CURRENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS WHO HAVE BEEN
STRIPPED OF THEIR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT JOBS AND
WOULD STAND TO LOSE THEIR CC SEATS.

6. CHERNENKO'S HEALTH: OUR SOURCE LEARNED THAT
CHERNENKO HAD SUFFERED A BOUT OF PNEUMONIA SINCE
DECEMBER. AT BEST HE CAN WORK ONLY A FEW HOURS AT
A TIME, ONE OR TWO DAYS A WEEK.

7. THE MILITARY: OUR SOURCE WAS TOLD CATEGORICALLY
THAT GORBACHEV CHAIRS THE DEFENSE COUNCIL IN CHERNENKO'S
ABSENCE. IT WAS CONSIDERED "INCONCEIVABLE" THAT A
CIVILIAN COULD EVER HAVE BEEN APPOINTED AS DEFENSE
MINISTER, AND ROMANOV IS SIMPLY A TECHNICIAN WHO
MANAGES THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY, NOT A DEFENSE POLICY-
MAKER. THE REAL POWER IN THE MILITARY IS AKHROMEYEV,
WITH SOKOLOV MERELY A CARETAKER. GORBACHEV'S CLOSE
RELATIONSHIP TO USTINOV, WHICH GREW OUT OF THE OLD
USTINOV-ANDROPOV ALLIANCE, HAD GIVEN HIM GOOD TIES
TO THE MILITARY, BUT USTINOV'S DEATH OBVIOUSLY
DEPRIVED HIM OF A SUPPORTER.

8. USTINOV DIED OF CANCER, OUR SOURCE LEARNED, A
CONDITION KNOWN TO THE LEADERSHIP FOR SEVERAL YEARS
FOLLOWING SURGERY THAT FAILED TO ARREST THE DISEASE.
USTINOV ENJOYED ENORMOUS AUTHORITY, BOTH IN MILITARY
AND POLITICAL CIRCLES. IN THE VIEW OF SOME SOVIETS,
USTINOV PERFORMED TWO FINAL SERVICES FOR THE MOTHERLAND.
HE SACKED OGARKOV, WHOM HE DISLIKED FOR HIS ARROGANCE
AND AMBITION, AND WITH WHOM HE HAD DEFENSE POLICY
DISAGREEMENTS. AND HE BROUGHT GORBACHEV CLOSE TO THE
MILITARY.

9. IT HAD BEEN ANDROPOV WHO PUSHED OGARKOV FORWARD
UNDER BREZHNEV, BUT ANDROPOV REPORTEDLY CONFIDED
LATER TO USTINOV THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. AND
IT WAS ANDROPOV WHO BROUGHT GORBACHEV INTO THE

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POLITBURO AND HELPED HIM CEMENT TIES WITH USTINOV. WHY, THEN, DID USTINOV ACQUIESCE IN THE CHOICE OF CHERNENKO TO SUCCEED ANDROPOV? THE ANSWER GIVEN TO OUR SOURCE IS THE USUAL ONE--AT 53, A RELATIVE NEWCOMER TO THE MOSCOW SCENE, GORBACHEV WAS NOT ANOTHER ANDROPOV. HE LACKED THE EXPERIENCE AND THE POWER BASE TO BECOME GENERAL SECRETARY. SO USTINOV DEVOTED HIS LAST EFFORTS TO STRENGTHENING GORBACHEV'S CREDENTIALS AND SHUNTING ASIDE THE THREATENING FIGURE OF OGARKOV ALTHOUGH IT PROVED TOO DIFFICULT TO ELIMINATE OGARKOV ENTIRELY.

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10. THE ECONOMY: OUR SOURCE INQUIRED WIDELY ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE SO-CALLED ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS. HE WAS TOLD THAT TIKHONOV IS THE FINAL ARBITER OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS, AND HIS BASIC INCLINATION (ALONG WITH CHERNENKO'S) IS NOT TO CHANGE PEOPLE OR POLICIES UNLESS ABSOLUTELY FORCED INTO IT. ENTRENCHED ECONOMIC BUREAUCRATS HAD COMBINED FORCES WITH THE MOST RUTHLESS POLITICAL BOSSES TO ENSURE THAT VESTED INTERESTS WERE NOT DISTURBED. ONE OF THE FAVORITE ARGUMENTS OF THE OPPONENTS OF REFORM IS THAT RUSSIA CAN'T RISK CHANGE WHILE THE ENEMY IS AT THE GATES. THUS THE POOR STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAS BECOME A CONVENIENT OBSTACLE TO DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THE ECONOMY.

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11. ACCORDING TO A SOVIET WHO CLAIMS TO KNOW GORBACHEV WELL, THE LATTER IS TRAINED NOT ONLY AS A LAWYER BUT ALSO AS AN AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIST. AS SUCH, GORBACHEV IS SAID TO BE FASCINATED BY THE FRESH ECONOMIC WINDS BLOWING IN CHINA. HE

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REPORTEDLY UNDERSTANDS THAT CAUTIOUS "EXPERIMENTS" WILL ALWAYS BE DEVoured BY THE SYSTEM, AND ADMIRES THE CHINESE EFFORT TO TACKLE ECONOMIC REFORM ON A MASSIVE SCALE. GORBACHEV HAS ECONOMIC ALLIES IN THE POLITBURO AND THE SECRETARIAT, SUCH AS VOROTNIKOV, LIGACHEV AND RYZHKOV, BUT THEY MUST BIDE THEIR TIME. VOROTNIKOV WAS REPORTEDLY BROUGHT INTO THE POLITBURO BY ANDROPOV TO SUCCEED TIKHONOV AND MAY EVENTUALLY DO SO. ALIYEV HAS NO STRONG PERSONAL LOYALTIES OR POLICY PREFERENCES, AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO PLAY HIS CARDS FOR MAXIMUM PERSONAL GAIN. DOLGIKH IS WIDELY CREDITED WITH ECONOMIC SKILL AND COULD BECOME A

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EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, US, UR
SUBJECT: AN OUTSIDER'S READING OF CURRENT SOVIET POLITICS

CENTRAL FIGURE IN AN EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE MAJOR
ECONOMIC SHORTCOMINGS OF LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND
LOW RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL.

12. FOREIGN POLICY: THE MOSCOW CONSENSUS IS THAT GROMYKO ENJOYS UNPRECEDENTED AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN POLICY, WITH SOME SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS CLAIMING THAT HE OFTEN ACTS WITHOUT CONSULTING THE POLITBURO. SOVIETS FAMILIAR WITH GROMYKO'S POSITION ADVOCATING THAT EVEN STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH BE BANNED COULD SEE NO REASON WHY HE HAD TAKEN SUCH AN ADAMANT POSITION, ACKNOWLEDGING PRIVATELY THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO ENGAGED IN RESEARCH. GROMYKO'S REPORTED POLITICAL AMBITIONS AND HIS ANTICIPATION OF THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS MAY HAVE CREATED AN INCENTIVE FOR HIM TO SEEK SOMETHING TANGIBLE IN THE ARMS CONTROL SPHERE THAT HE CAN REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AS AN ACHIEVEMENT, THUS OFFSETTING THE RECOGNIZED DEBACLE OF HIS INF STRATEGY. THIS INTEREST IN A VISIBLE SUCCESS MAY ACCOUNT FOR GROMYKO'S SUPPORT FOR RESUMED US-SOVIET DIALOGUE, INCLUDING HIS WHITE HOUSE VISIT BEFORE THE 1984 US ELECTION.

13. GROMYKO ASIDE, MANY MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET ELITE REGISTERED DEEP CONCERN TO OUR SOURCE OVER THE GENERALLY WEAK POSITION OF THE USSR IN THE WORLD. ONE ELEMENT OF THIS CONCERN IS THE REMARKABLE CONTRAST IN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE BETWEEN THE WEST--ESPECIALLY THE US AND JAPAN--AND THE SOVIET UNION. ANOTHER ELEMENT IS THE OBVIOUS CONFIDENCE OF THE US IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COMPARED WITH THE LACK OF VIGOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY STEMMING FROM THE PHYSICAL PROBLEMS OF ITS LEADERS. THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IS ILLUSTRATED BY AN ALLEGEDLY TRUE STORY MAKING THE ROUNDS: A HIGH SCHOOL GIRL APPEARING BEFORE A SCHOOL INSPECTION TEAM, WHEN ASKED TO NAME "HERO-CITIES" (A TITLE CONFERRED ON SOVIET CITIES THAT SUFFERED IN THE WAR), RESPONDED "AMERICA!" THE MOOD IS ALSO REFLECTED IN GLOOM ABOUT

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PROSPECTS FOR EAST EUROPE, WHERE JARUZELSKI IS SEEN AS BLACKMAILING THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES AS PRESENTING TEMPTING TARGETS FOR US DIPLOMACY OR EVEN ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN A POSSIBLE INTERNAL CRISIS.

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14. AFGHANISTAN IS A SPECIAL CASE. IN THE RECENT LOCAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN, A SET-PIECE ELECTION MEETING ADDRESSED BY A SENIOR MOSCOW CITY OFFICIAL, BORIS STEPANOV, ERUPTED IN TURMOIL WHEN A VOTER ASKED ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. STEPANOV GAVE A FRANK, DETAILED, PESSIMISTIC ACCOUNT OF SOVIET SETBACKS AND MASSIVE RESISTANCE BY THE LOCAL POPULACE. ONE SOURCE SAYS HE WAS DRUNK WHEN HE SPOKE; ANOTHER CLAIMS HE WAS COLD SOBER. IN ANY CASE, HIS NAME WAS QUICKLY REMOVED FROM THE BALLOT AND HE HAS DISAPPEARED FROM SIGHT. EMBASSY COMMENT: WHATEVER RETRIBUTION MAY HAVE BEEN METED OUT TO STEPANOV FOR HIS ALLEGED INDISCREET REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN, IT APPARENTLY DID NOT TAKE THE FORM OF EXCLUSION FROM THE BALLOT. ACCORDING TO THE LIST OF RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES PUBLISHED IN IZVESTIYA ON FEBRUARY 28, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH STEPANOV (FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE MOSCOW ISPOLKOM) WAS ELECTED BY A MOSCOW CITY CONSTITUENCY. END COMMENT.

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15. GORBACHEV IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN OFFERED THE TRIP TO THE US AT THE INVITATION OF THE US CONGRESS NOW BEING TAKEN BY SHCHERBITSKIY. HIS REASON FOR TURNING IT DOWN WAS TO AVOID THE RISK OF ESTABLISHING TOO HIGH A PROFILE BEFORE THE SUCCESSION. HIS PRIORITY AT THE MOMENT--LIKE THAT OF VIRTUALLY ALL THE OTHER POLITICAL LEADERSHIP-- IS DOMESTIC POLITICS.

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16. COMMENT: OUR SOURCE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY ENCOUNTERED SUCH UNDILUTED PESSIMISM AMONG HIS CONTACTS. HE IS NOT AMONG THOSE WHO REGULARLY SEE THE SOVIET UNION AS BEING ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE. HE REGARDS THE CURRENT MANEUVERING AS PART OF A PROTRACTED PROCESS OF GENERATION CHANGE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. WE HAVE FOUND HIS INSIGHT RELIABLE IN THE PAST AND CONSIDER HIS PERCEPTION OF A MALAISE BT

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EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINT, US, UR
SUBJECT: AN OUTSIDER'S READING OF CURRENT SOVIET POLITICS

AMONG THE ELITE WELL-FOUNDED, ALBEIT CONFINED TO
THE SMALL SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION WITH
HIGH POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.
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