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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/9/2005

**File Folder** USSR: GENERAL 5/5 [1981-1983]

**FOIA**

F06-114/7

**Box Number** 26

YARHI-MILO

2606

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9897	MEMO	KIMMITT TO WHITTLESEY RE PROPOSAL TO INVITE SOVIET YOUTH TO U.S. [ 1 - 1 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	8/9/1983	B1
9898	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO KIMMITT RE PROPOSAL TO INVITE SOVIET YOUTH TO U.S. [ 7 - 7 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	8/9/1983	B1
9899	MEMO	KIMMITT TO WHITTLESEY RE PROPOSAL TO INVITE SOVIET YOUTH TO U.S. [ 8 - 8 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	ND	B1
9900	MEMO	MATLOCK TO CLARK RE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE 1984 OLYMPICS [ 23 - 23 ] <b>R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</b>	1	10/6/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9904	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE 1984 OLYMPICS [ 24 - 25 ] <b>R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</b>	2	10/3/1983	B1
9905	MEMO	DERWINSKI RE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE 1984 OLYMPICS [ 27 - 27 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b> <b>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O.</b>	1	9/30/1983	B1
9901	MEMO	MATLOCK TO CLARK RE U.S. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN THE SOVIET UNION [ 28 - 28 ] <b>R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</b>	1	10/6/1983	B1
9906	LETTER	WICK TO CLARK RE USSR [ 29 - 31 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	3	9/29/1983	B1

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2606

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9902	MEMO	KIMMITT TO MCFARLANE [ 33 - 33 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	10/23/1983	B1
9907	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE ACCREDITATION OF SOVIET JOURNALISTS [ 35 - 36 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b> <b>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O.</b>	2	10/12/1983	B1
9908	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9907 [ 42 - 43 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b> <b>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O.</b>	2	9/17/1983	B1
9903	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE AMERICAN CADEMICS ON SOVIET POLICY [ 49 - 49 ] <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	12/13/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9909	CABLE	101007Z DEC 83 [ 50 - 57 ]	8	12/10/1983	B1
		<b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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USSR/ym

4884

File  
LENCZOWSKI

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 9, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH WHITTLESEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *RMK*

SUBJECT: Proposal to Invite Soviet Youth to U.S.

We have reviewed the proposal to have the President invite eleven-year old Avi Goldstein to the U.S. We and the State Department have reservations and recommend against it. Mike Gale may want to discuss our reasoning with John Lenczowski of the NSC Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-1147 #9897  
BY GI NADA DATE 7/7/08

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

To: Bud McFarlane

Faith and I would like you to  
review these prior to submission.

Thanks -

Franklin D. Roosevelt

July 14, 1933

RECEIVED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

83 JUL 15 11:57

July 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEEVER *FRW*

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

SUBJECT: Samantha Smith and Avi Goldstein

I think this is an excellent idea. If you agree, I will authorize Michael Gale to proceed.



RECEIVED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1983

83 JUL 15 AM 11:57

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY *FRW*  
 THRU: JONATHAN VIPOND III *JV III*  
 FROM: MICHAEL R. GALE *MRG*  
 SUBJECT: Samantha Smith and Avi Goldstein

Samantha Smith is the young girl who was invited to the Soviet Union by Mr. Andropov. I would like to propose a great opportunity to combat some of the news coverage on Samantha Smith.

A young man, age nine, by the name of Avi Goldstein, has written to Samantha Smith. Avi has been refused an exit visa from the Soviet Union from birth. He resides in Tbilisi, USSR with his parents, who first applied to leave in July, 1971. Avi's father is a physicist, as is his uncle, who spent a year in prison for parasitism.

What I would like to do is to arrange for a letter to come from Avi to President Reagan, which can be obtained around the first of August through some tourists bound for Tbilisi. This letter could be followed by a letter of invitation from the President to visit the United States, which would most likely be denied. This denial can then be used to dramatize the President's concern for human rights. If the Soviet Union permits Avi to come, or even if he is denied, we will a great opportunity available to us.

may 10 1983  
An open letter to the lucky American girl who  
received a letter from Mr. Andropov himself.

Dear friend,

My name is <sup>d</sup> Avi Goldstein. I am about  
your age, was born in December 1973. I live in  
Tbilisi, U.S.S.R. My parents applied for  
exit visas to Israel two years before I was  
born and got refused their right to emigrate. So I  
have experienced a lot: imprisonment of my uncle in  
1978, searches of our apartment, etc. The goal  
of my letter is not to make you pity me, not at all.  
I just want you to forward my letters ~~to~~  
~~directly to him.~~ He is Mr. Andropov because he  
never answered my letters sent directly to him. He is nice enough to invite  
you to the pioneer camps at the Black sea shore in the U.S.S.R.,  
but he denies my right to travel to Israel. Double  
stand and approach to the children may suggest  
double stand and approach to the children various problems.  
I wouldn't like to think so. Let us imagine  
that Mr. Andropov has not received any  
of my letters and if he did he <sup>would</sup> order to let  
our family go, at least me and my mother,  
or me and my grandmother.

2  
all of those combinations have been  
tried with no success. Once again I  
ask you, my American friend, to make  
this letter known to Mr. Andropov.

Having a precedent already, you are to expect  
an answer this time also. The answer could be  
extremely as to my family. If so, you won a  
victory in the human rights fight. If not,  
you know more about human hypocrisy.

Hoping to hear from you soon,  
Sincerely,  
Mr. Goldstein.

P.S. My parents helped me to compose this &  
letter in English.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4884

7

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Proposal to Invite Soviet Youth to U.S.

Faith Whittlesey's office has asked us for our evaluation of a proposal to counter the Soviet effort to exploit Samantha Smith with an initiative of our own. Specifically, the idea is to arrange for a letter to be sent to the President from Avi Goldstein, an eleven-year old in the USSR, to be answered in turn by an invitation from the President (Tab II).

Having consulted with State and secured their concurrence, we feel that the proposal entails too many drawbacks. Not only are there problems with White House complicity in arranging for the boy's letter and using amateurs to obtain it, but we have problems with mimicking the crude Soviet attempt to exploit a child for blatant propaganda purposes.

At Tab I is a memo from you to Faith Whittlesey recommending that we do not pursue this proposal.

Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Memo to Whittlesey  
Tab II Whittlesey proposal

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR fol 714 / 7 #9898

BY ad NARA DATE 7/7/08

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4884

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH WHITTLESEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Proposal to Invite Soviet Youth to U.S.

We have reviewed the proposal to have the President invite eleven-year old Avi Goldstein to the U.S. [Although the idea has some appeal on the surface] We and the State Department have [some] reservations [about it] and recommend against it. [Specifically, we have problems with White House complicity in arranging for the boy's letter and we are reluctant to conduct an operation that could be seen as mimicry of the Soviet attempt to exploit a child for blatant propaganda purposes. We believe in using a wide variety of public diplomacy vehicles and appreciate the effort to create new ones -- but this one has too many risks to be worth the potential rewards.]

Mike Gale may want to discuss our reasoning with John Lenczowski of the NSC Staff.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR E06-114/7 #9899  
BY CU NARA DATE 7/7/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*and see if they have USSR Genl 9*

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 830488

RECEIVED 15 JUL 83

TO MCFARLANE

FROM VIPOND, J

DOCDATE 00 00

WHITTLESEY, F

14 JUL 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

GOLDSTEIN, AVI

SMITH, SAMANTHA

SUBJECT: PROPOSAL TO INVITE RUSSIAN YOUTH TO VISIT US

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 18 JUL 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

RAYMOND

ROBINSON

FORTIER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( C /

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*NSC/S*

*JLenczowski memo to WPC sent forward (without folder) 9 Aug -*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

~~Matlock~~

Lenczowski

I think this is an excellent idea. My only concern is any White House involvement in getting the letter here. If the direct letter does not arrive, couldn't we proceed on the basis of the open letter we have already? I assume we are convinced that the open letter itself is bonafide. What do we  
(over)

- know about Avi and his family? Shouldn't we check out the facts as completely as we can before making a commitment?
- Also, we should let State know what is afoot
1. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
  2. NSC SECRETARIAT
- and see if they have any advice -

JEM

3. BRIAN MERCHANT  
SITUATION ROOM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

W: Bud McFarlane

Faith and I would like you to  
review these prior to submission.

Thanks -

Jonathan Lipson. (11)

July 14, 1993



RECEIVED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

03 JUL 15 11:57

July 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEEVER *FRW*

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

SUBJECT: Samantha Smith and Avi Goldstein

I think this is an excellent idea. If you agree, I will authorize Michael Gale to proceed.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK, JR. *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Anecdotes

Attached at Tab A is a collection of Soviet anecdotes and jokes compiled by NSC staff members at Judge Clark's request. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Judge Clark forwarding the materials.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Judge Clark

Tab A Soviet Anecdotes

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 27, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Soviet Anecdotes

Attached at Tab A is a collection of anecdotes and jokes relating to the Soviet Union. They are quite humorous and useful in small, private gatherings. However, we do not feel that they would be appropriate generally for use in high-level statements.

Attachment:

Tab A Soviet Anecdotes

15

The word from the Soviet Union is that they are having problems with the new stamp that was issued with Andropov's picture on it. Apparently, the citizens were encountering difficulties in getting the stamp to stick to the envelope. A lengthy investigation revealed the source of the problems -- the people were spitting on the wrong side of the stamp!

---

Johnny Carson "Carnac" type joke:

The Great Carnac delves deep into his mind and comes up with this as the answer:

"Michelin, Tuck, and Gromyko"

After opening the envelope he finds that the question is:

"Name a tire, a friar and a liar."

---

It was a big day in the Soviet Army last Saturday -- it was the "All-Union Bath Day" and that called for the troops to change their underwear. The order, we hear, that was issued at a post near Minsk was as follows:

"All right, Barracks Six change with Barracks Two."

---

Two KGB Officers were talking at the office and one notes that he just received a frantic phone call from a Soviet citizen. The caller indicated that he "had just lost his parrot, but wanted them to know that he didn't necessarily share its views".

---

The story goes that Brezhnev and Napoleon met one day recently in the hereafter and the conversation reportedly went as follows:

BREZHNEV: "If we would have had brave and competent commanders like you no German would have crossed our borders."

NAPOLEON: "If we had newspapers like your's no one would have heard about Waterloo."

---

We hear that three fellows were talking one day, trying to discern what nationality Adam and Eve were. In the group there was an Englishman, a Frenchman, and a Russian.

The Englishman ventured an opinion first and claimed that Adam must have been a Brit. "After all," he noted, "only an English gentleman would share his last apple with a lady."

"On the contrary," noted the Frenchman, "Adam had to have been a Frenchman. Who else could have seduced that young lady so quickly?"

"I beg your pardon," chimed in the Russian, "but, you see, he must have been a Soviet citizen." Asked for an explanation he pointed out, "He must have been a Russian. Who else would walk around without any clothes, feed two people on one apple, and still think they were in Paradise?"

---

Have you heard about the six Soviet wonders? Well, reportedly they are:

- Nobody is unemployed, but nobody works.
- Nobody works, but everybody is paid.
- Everyone is paid, but there is nothing to buy.
- There's nothing to buy, but nobody lacks for what he needs.
- Nobody lacks for what he needs, but everybody complains.
- Everybody complains, but when it comes time to vote -- everyone votes yes.

A Soviet architect went abroad on an exchange and was hosted by an American counterpart for a weekend. The American architect showed his Soviet colleague around his house, noting:

"Over here is the large eat-in kitchen and over there is our dining room with the fireplace. On the right is the living room leading to the family room. Upstairs I have three bedrooms for the children and a large master suite, along with three baths. How do you like the layout?"

"The Soviet responded that he thought it was well planned and spacious."

The American then asked, "How does this compare with your dwelling?"

To which the Russian replied, "Oh, about the same -- except without partitions."

---

What are some titles of books entered in the "Smallest Soviet Book" category?

- History of Soviet-South Korean Friendship
- Soviet Civil Rights and Elections Handbook
- The Limits of Soviet Military Power

\*\*\*An American professor visiting the Soviet Union on an exchange program was intently listening to the standard Soviet rationale for the necessity of expending such an enormous amount of their wealth on the armed forces. After hearing the recitation of the difficult threat situation facing the USSR for the umpteenth time, the American nodded in agreement,

"Yes, I can understand the precarious security situation facing the Soviet Union -- after all, you are completely surrounded by Communist countries!"

---

Have you seen the poster in the Yugoslav travel agency? It advertises vacations in the USSR and in striking letters notes:

"Visit the Soviet Union -- Before It Visits You."

---

It is rumored in Moscow that a caustic observer of current trends in Soviet society was moved to note that the ideology appears to have been modified to allow for a transitional stage between "Socialism" and "Communism" -- "Alcoholism!!"

---

A professor asked one of his students for a succinct manner in which one could describe the current Soviet leadership. After a pause the student replied:

"Alcohol, Protocol and Geritol."

---

Two Soviet soldiers on duty in Afghanistan were on patrol in a hazardous insurgent-held area. One grumbled to the other:

"This place really is terrible -- our friends rob us, we could get shot out here, there is no food, and my commander hates me."

"Sssh," said the other. "Be quiet ... or they might not let you go to Yugoslavia!"

---

One observer was overheard to have noted to his friend,

"Why do you suppose the Soviets have stayed in Afghanistan so long?"

To which the other replied,

"Oh, I don't know. They're probably still looking for the guy that invited them in!"

Word has it that there is a new phone number in Moscow now that one can call for "Fraternal Assistance." The number is "56-68-79". (Dates of Hungarian, Czech and Afghan invasions.)

---

\*\*\*While engaging his Soviet colleagues in a deep conversation on the security difficulties facing the Soviets in East Europe, the American professor drew their attention to the deteriorating economic conditions in Poland. This brought to the surface a flood of traditional expressions of spite toward their Polish brethren, particularly addressed to an alleged Polish aversion to labor. Commented one Soviet observer dryly,

"The problem with the Poles is that they want to live like Capitalists, but work like Communists."

---

A Polish recruit was being taught the rudiments of small unit tactics by his more experienced commander. Perplexed over a potentially difficult battlefield choice, the young soldier asked:

"Comrade Commander. What if we Poles are suddenly invaded by the Soviets and the Germans at the same time? Which one do we shoot first?"

To which the Commander quickly responded:

"Why the Germans, of course. Business before pleasure, you know."

---

A Soviet archaeological team was invited to Egypt to participate in the identification of a mummy recently discovered buried in some ancient ruins. It seems that teams of Western scientists simply were unable to accurately identify just whose remains they were examining.

The Soviet group asked for a few days to complete their own investigation. Strange noises and several grunts and groans were heard, but after the first day the Soviet team reported no progress. Surfacing again the second day with sweat pouring off their brows, the Moscow group again reported no luck, but thought they could make an identification the next day.

About midway through the day the Soviet team came up from the ruins and proudly announced that the mummy was that of no other than Ramses III.

The Egyptians were impressed and asked the director of the Soviet team how he had secured the identity of Ramses III.

"No real problem," asserted the burly director, "he confessed on his own accord!!"

Napoleon's failure to conquer the Russians after his massive invasion of 1812 has fascinated historians seeking to explain the reasons behind Napoleon's lack of success. The explanation given at the University of Notre Dame was simple:

"No bench."

---

\*\*\*A college professor was conducting an issue analysis in his class on International Politics, looking at both sides of the question of whether or not the U.S. ought to attempt to use grain sales as political leverage on the USSR. The debate ranged far and wide in class and encompassed most of the usual pros and cons.

The essential argument, however, came down to a heated discussion between two students who were arguing opposite sides of the issue. One young lady argued stridently that employing grain as a lever had negative humanitarian overtones and could lead to widespread suffering in the Soviet Union if we employed an embargo on grain. The other responded that it was up to the Soviets to bear responsibility for their decision to place so many of their resources into defense and so little into agriculture. Therefore, the Kremlin was at blame on this issue.

As the argument heated up, the young lady exclaimed:

"It is simply not right to use a measure that could cause famine or severely deprive Soviet citizens of this badly-needed wheat. If we did this, what would they eat?"

To which the other student caustically replied, with an expert eye to historical analogies:

"Let'em eat tanks!"

---

An American, Englishman, Frenchman and Russian were sitting around a bar, and the American -- a bit of a braggart -- observed that, while his Volvo was fine for running around town, he always took his Cadillac on long trips. The Brit chimed in with, "Quite right. I use the Ford Escort in London, but always take the Rolls when I come to the Continent." Not to be outdone, the Frenchman said his Renault was best in the Paris traffic, but he always drove his Citroen limousine when he went to the Riviera.

When the Russian's turn came, he said: "I'm with you guys. My Zhiguli is fine for Moscow, but when I leave the country I always take the tank."



Brezhnev was returning from a State visit to Germany by car, and for security reasons, the windows were shrouded in curtains. Mrs. Brezhnev, impatient with the long trip, asks after a few hours, "Where are we?" Brezhnev stuck his arm out the window for a couple of minutes, drew it back in and said, "We've got a while to go still; we're in Czechoslovakia." A few hours later, Mrs. B. asks the same question, and Brezhnev stuck his arm out again, drew it in quickly and said, "We're getting closer. We're in Poland now." Hours later, Mrs. B. observes, "Aren't we ever going to get home?" So the arm went out the window again, with the observation, "We're in the Soviet Union and should be home soon." And sure enough, within minutes they arrived.

Mrs. B. then asked, "How in the world could you tell where we were just by sticking your arm out of the car?"

Her husband replied, "Well, you see, the first time someone kissed my hand, so I knew we were in Czechoslovakia. The second time, somebody spit on it, so I knew we were in Poland. And the third time, some S.O.B. stole my watch, so I knew we were home."

---

There are more, somewhat colorful anecdotes, too. Incidentally, the ones marked with asterisks are true.

Andropov's mother comes to Moscow from her country village to visit her son. She is met at the train by a bright shiny limousine and brought to Yuri's spacious well-kept apartment within the Kremlin and is served tea in the finest English bone china. After Andropov finishes his day's activities, he takes her in his Mercedes sports car to his Dacha just outside Moscow. 21

The Dacha has spectacular furnishings from the West: video recorders, a Sony stereo and the best of Drexel furniture.

Yuri turns to his mother and says "Well Mom, what do you think?" She replied, "it all looks fine Yuri, but what are you going to do when the Communists come back to power?"

---

Early one morning the word gets out that a meat shop in the center of Moscow just received a shipment of fresh beef.

By 8:00 a.m. the line outside the store is 2½ blocks long. The store manager comes outside, looks at the length of the line and using a megaphone informs the people that there is not enough meat for everyone. He then tells the crowd that all the Jews (or Ukrainians) are to get out of the line and go home.

At 6:00 p.m. that evening the manager comes back outside and informs the 50 people who have been waiting all day who are at the end of the line that there was no more meat left.

After the line broke up one Russian turned to another Russian and said, "You see, the Jews (or Ukrainians) get all the breaks".

---

In a first grade classroom in Leningrad, the teacher asks the students many questions about the life and times of Lenin. Her final question was, "How tall was Lenin?" The first graders were puzzled, except for one little boy sitting in the back row who enthusiastically raised his hand. The teacher called on the boy and he answered by stating that Lenin was five feet, four inches tall. The teacher asked how he knew Lenin's height. He responded by saying: "My Dad is six feet and he always says (put hand just under your nose) that he has had Lenin up to here."

---

The Swiss announced a contest for the best work on elephants. The British submitted a volume entitled "The Elephant and the British Empire". The French submitted a book called "The Elephant and Love". The Russians submitted a volume on "The Superiority of the Soviet Elephant". The Polish entry was "The Soviet Elephant: Our Teacher and Idol."

---

At the beginning of the 21st Century the Russians had at last achieved communism. A child reads an historical novel and asks his mother, "What does queue for meat mean?"

"Well dear, a queue is an expression from the bad old times. It means a long line of people standing to buy goods." "Yes Mommie, I know that," said the young girl "but what does meat mean?"

-----  
Which is the most peace loving nation on earth? Answer: Afghanistan. Question: Why? Answer: Because it does not even interfere in its own internal affairs.

-----  
There is a new pastry in Moscow called a Brezhnev. It is just like a Napoleon except it does not contain any cream, eggs, butter or sugar.

-----  
A drunk is arrested in Red Square for yelling that Andropov is a fool. He is sentenced to 20 years and 20 days. 20 days for slander and 20 years for telling a state secret.

-----  
A lecturer is discussing communism and one of the people in his audience asks whether it is possible to develop communism in Poland. The lecturer responds by stating that it is theoretically possible to develop communism in Poland but the results will be uncertain except that we could no longer buy Polish ham.  
-----

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 6, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Participation in the 1984 Olympics

State has recommended strongly against any attempt to bar Soviet participation in the 1984 summer Olympics (TAB I). In State's opinion, barring the Soviets would violate legal obligations assumed by the U.S. organizations and would also harm U.S. political interests. Ed Derwinski has also submitted a separate memorandum in support of this position (TAB II).

I believe that State's case is persuasive. To attempt to block Soviet participation in the Los Angeles Olympics would embroil us in a highly publicized legal and public relations squabble, which would shift attention from the real issues in the KAL massacre to the U.S. reaction. Since such action would be seen by many as a potentially fatal blow to the Olympic movement as such, the public outcry could bring such intense pressure that it might be very difficult to sustain a decision to exclude the Soviets, and if it were sustained the action could lead to a cancellation of the games in Los Angeles and provide a pretext for attacks on U.S. policy long in the future.

*S* Fortier, Sims, *Stur* and Lenczowski concur. *I do not concur - JL*

RECOMMENDATION

That no attempt be made to bar Soviet participation in the 1984 Olympics.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum from Charles Hill
- Tab II Memorandum from Ed Derwinski

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NLRR fo6-114/7 #9900  
BY CS NARA DATE 6/25/09



Washington, D.C. 20520

October 3, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Participation in the 1984 Olympics

You have raised the question of the position the Administration should take on the proposal that, in light of the KAL incident, the Soviets should be barred from participation in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. The California Legislature has passed a resolution to that effect.

Preventing the Soviets from participating in the Olympics by unilateral US action is strongly contraindicated on legal, political and practical grounds. To gain the right to stage the Olympics the US host organizations, the US Olympic Committee and the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, had to agree to abide by International Olympic Committee rules and bylaws, including the right of unhindered participation in the Games of all accredited Olympic teams. As in the case of previous Olympics held in this country, they had the support of the US Government in doing so. To ban the Soviets from coming to the US for the Games would dishonor that commitment.

On the political level, unilateral US action would contravene the policy established by NSDD-102 to make action by the world community the primary focus of our response to the KAL incident, and would serve Soviet interests by identifying the incident as a US-Soviet bilateral issue. It would also detract from our strategy of focusing on civil aviation safety and humanitarian issues, which has attracted widespread international support. We are aware of no movement among other governments to use denial of participation in the Olympics as a sanction against the Soviets and believe that we would find little or no support for such an action. On the contrary, we believe that a number of countries would boycott the Los Angeles Olympics in protest of a ban on the Soviets. Quite possibly, the result would be fatal damage to the future of the Olympics, and a lasting source of anti-American criticism

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NLRR F06-114/7#9904

BY RW NARA DATE 11/24/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and propaganda. The athletes and sports officials that would be affected by such an action have shown themselves adept at gaining media exposure for anything they can label as tampering with the Olympic ideal, as proved true in 1980 with our boycott of the Moscow games.

The legal and political situation is completely different from that in 1980. Then, the Soviets were hosts and the US participants needed only to decline to take part. In the case of Los Angeles, however, the US as host government would have to take direct, overt action to break a commitment to the US organizers and deny an accredited Olympic participant admission to the US. This would greatly assist Soviet propaganda in its effort to paint us as untrustworthy partners, as in the case of the grain sales embargo. It would lose for us our current advantage in having the Soviets clearly identified in world opinion as flagrant violators of international commitments as a result of the KAL incident.

As a practical matter, the US-Soviet sports rivalry is a major drawing card for the Olympics. Without it, those people in Los Angeles and elsewhere who have invested heavily in organizing the 1984 Games are likely to suffer major losses; they may seek reimbursement from the USG through litigation or legislation. Furthermore, we can expect many of the politicians, journalists and others now clamoring to use the Olympics to punish the Soviets for KAL to change their tune as time passes, as they identify their own interests in Soviet participation.

Finally, the measured Administration response to the KAL incident gained a highly positive international reaction, especially enhancing our position in Europe as we approach decisive points for the success of our policies. Our banning the Soviets from coming to the US for the Olympics would provide an emotional issue that could resuscitate the opposition that had its arguments gutted by the Soviet downing of KAL-007.

*Baroness McKelvey*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MEMORANDUM

Washington, D.C. 20520  
XR S/S 8330076  
XR S/S 8330260

October 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet Participation in the 1984 Olympics

In addition to the memorandum we are sending you separately on this subject, Deputy Secretary Dam thought you ought to see the attached memorandum from Ed Derwinski that adds a political dimension to the question.

*Barbara McKinley*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
As stated.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CJS NARA, Date 7/18/02

THE COUNSELOR  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1983 *Ch 9/30*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE ACTING SECRETARY

FROM : Ed Derwinski *ED*

SUBJECT: Soviet Participation in the 1984 Olympics

I have no quarrel with the substance of the EUR paper but I think the reasons for not barring the Soviets can be quite simply stated.

In agreeing to host the Olympics, Los Angeles agreed to abide by International Olympic Committee rules that all accredited Olympic teams be admitted. If a team is barred from participating, we cannot be the host.

The President has acknowledged this. When he met with U.S. Olympic and Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee officials in 1981, he said that "the U.S. will welcome athletes from all nations to participate in the 1984 Olympic games." Furthermore, in a 1982 letter to the International Olympic Committee, he said that "the Olympic Charter will be enforced."

Therefore, barring Soviet athletes from participating is a non-issue. There is no diplomatic, political or public relations value in doing so. In fact we would be shooting ourselves in the foot. So far, the President's handling of the KAL incident has dealt a sharp blow to Soviet prestige. Moving to bar the Soviets from Los Angeles would hand them exactly the kind of propaganda card they're now looking for. Let's keep pressing the Soviets on the KAL outrage by every means in our interest, but not do something that will hurt us more than them. However, by the time the Olympics take place next summer, the KAL incident will no longer be an issue.

I believe the United States has much to gain by being the perfect host of the Olympics. We should encourage as many people to come as possible and see the wonders of the U.S. If anything, we should upgrade our role as Olympic hosts in the eyes of the world.

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DECL: ~~OADR~~

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NLRR fol-114/7 49905

BY CW NARA DATE 7/7/08



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28

~~SECRET~~

October 6, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: U.S. Exchange Programs in the Soviet Union

Charlie Wick has sent you a memorandum (Tab I) reporting on the current status of some educational and exchange programs with the USSR. Specifically, he points out that the Soviets have withdrawn 20 of their scholars who were in the U.S. under the IREX program (doctoral and post-doctoral research) on grounds that they were unsure of their safety. The Soviets have, however, permitted the U.S. scholars under the exchange to remain in the Soviet Union. Wick feels that, inasmuch as the "reciprocity" aspect of this is running in our favor, we should not withdraw ours, and asks if this policy is in line with your thinking.

I agree with Wick that this situation is working to our advantage at this time and that it would be a mistake on our part to emulate the Soviet action. Therefore, I would recommend that we let the situation continue as it is evolving. My guess is that the Soviets will send their researchers back in the near future.

No reply is necessary unless you disagree with the above.

*si* Fortier, Lenczowski, Lord and Raymond *out* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That there be no change in our current policy of continuing our side of the IREX exchange.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum from Mr. Wick

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR 106-114/7#9901  
BY GL NARA DATE 6/25/09

**United States  
Information  
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

29



~~SECRET~~

September 29, 1983

Dear Bill:

As you know, NSDD 102, "U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner," suspended all discussion on the issue of a new exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union. As the Administration considers options for the future, I do wish to draw to your attention the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and Fulbright academic/educational exchange programs which we, in agreement with the Department of State, have been continuing, despite the absence of an extant official exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union. (See Attachment A for details of these programs.) We also have continued with the America Illustrated and Soviet Life magazine exchange.

On September 15 the Soviets informed IREX that the twenty Soviet participants in this program currently in the U.S. for the academic year would be withdrawn out of concern for their security and would return to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Embassy told IREX that this action would in no way jeopardize the American exchangees in the Soviet Union and that they are welcome to remain in the USSR to complete their scheduled research. The Soviet Embassy said IREX will be informed at a later date whether the Soviet exchangees might return this year.

Our staff assessment is that the benefits to the U.S. national interest from both the IREX and the Fulbright programs far outweigh any advantages to be gained by a possible U.S. cancellation of the programs at this time. The burden for any possible cancellation of our bilateral educational exchange programs should fall on the Soviets, not on us. At present,

The Honorable  
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

~~SECRET~~

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NLRR Feb 7/14/7 #9906  
BY Gi NARADATE 7/7/08

Classified by: William G. Hamilton  
Office Symbol: EU  
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

-2-

we are doing much better than strict reciprocity -- we have almost thirty American scholars in the Soviet Union under these programs, while there will be no Soviets in the U.S.

I am not sure I agree with the above. My firm position regarding strict reciprocity inclines me against a piecemeal approach. However, the continuity of these exchanges must be viewed in our present overall posture towards the Soviets after the KAL jetliner massacre.

I pass this information to you for your review. Please let me know if you would advise a different course of action.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

  
Charles Z. Wick  
Director

Attachment: Background on IREX and Fulbright Programs (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT A

BACKGROUND ON IREX AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAMS

The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), a private non-profit organization representing American universities, administers an exchange of graduate students and young faculty between the U.S. and the USSR. This program receives substantial U.S. government funding (from USIA and the National Endowment for the Humanities), but is otherwise supported by its member institutions, the Ford Foundation, and other private sector contributors. Approximately thirty scholars from the U.S. are currently in the Soviet Union for the 1983-84 academic year.

The IREX program has been conducted without interruption since 1958. It has played an important role during the past twenty-five years in the training of American specialists on Soviet affairs. IREX graduates are prominent among Soviet specialists both in the academic community and in government service. The semester or academic year research program provides unparalleled access to Soviet society for the American participants. The Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) carefully reviews Soviet nominations for this program and rejects those whose research would involve sensitive high technology subjects.

IREX administration of this program has been marked by stubborn insistence on reciprocity, high esteem of the American academic community, and close coordination with USIA, the Department of State, and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

The Fulbright lecturer program, administered by USIA, provides for the exchange of university lecturers, generally for one semester. In recent years this has been a very one-sided program in the favor of the U.S. Last year seven Americans participated, but only two Soviets. Eight Americans are scheduled to lecture in Soviet universities in 1983-84, while no Soviets have been nominated for this year's Fulbright program.

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council  
The White House

~~Matlock~~

File 32

System #

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Package#

6367

add on

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

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33

NLRR Feb 11/7 #0902

BY WJ NARA DATE 7/7/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6367  
Add-on

October 20, 1983

Bud:

Re: White House Passes for Soviet Journalists

State has totally miscast this issue as one of potential discrimination against Soviet "journalists." The real issue is discrimination against US journalists (and the USG) through yet another instance of accepting the Soviet definition of reciprocity.

The simple fact is that we give Soviet journalists far greater access to our government than they give in Moscow to our journalists. We actually give White House, State, or other passes to their folks, while ours are accredited to the Soviet government generally and are cleared in on a case-by-case basis to offices in Moscow.

Especially since we know the true professional calling of their journalists, we should be careful to demand strict reciprocity in this instance. We should also be scrupulously evenhanded and demand similar reciprocity from all countries whose journalists receive better treatment here than ours do overseas.

We do not want, as State (almost snidely) suggests, to be hypocritical about our open society. Rather, we want to ensure our open society is not abused to the detriment of its citizens.

I recommend you go to Shultz on this issue. If you agree, we will develop the points above into a paper.

cc: Sims  
Matlock  
Lenczowski  
deGraffenreid

*Bob Kinnitt*

CONFIDENTIAL

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: <sup>RS</sup> ROBERT B. SIMS

SUBJECT: Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

State again (Tab I) presents extensive reasons for status quo.Kimmitt and Matlock <sup>KEM</sup> concur.*I NON-CONCUR. SEE ATTACHED.*RECOMMENDATION <sup>Bob</sup>

That you approve Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

TAB I State's memo  
 TAB II DOD's memo  
 TAB III Background



October 12, 1983

03 0 15 A 1: 06  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

In response to the NSC memorandum of September 28 on this subject, we have looked into the question of the practicality of accrediting Soviet journalists to the US Government generally, rather than to specific agencies. As we understand it, the purpose would be to permit their selective exclusion from facilities and briefings otherwise open to American and foreign journalists.

Applying a different accreditation system to Soviets than that for other foreign journalists would be clearly discriminatory and would result in retaliation against US correspondents in the USSR. As we noted in our memorandum of September 27, barring Soviets from otherwise open briefings would only slightly hinder their access to information. It would leave them free to use all the methods our open society provides to transmit their reportage back to Moscow. US correspondents in Moscow are, however, completely dependent on Soviet authorities not only for access to press conferences and interviews, but also for telecommunications facilities and unhampered export of TV cassettes. The Soviets, thus, have broad capabilities short of withdrawing accreditation for adding to the difficulties American correspondents experience in doing their jobs in the USSR. They are alert to any unilateral action against their correspondents and are prepared to retaliate against US correspondents. US media do not want any further limitations imposed on their people in Moscow and would pressure us to remove the cause of any Soviet retaliation measures applied to them.

The openness of our society and our efforts to honor Helsinki Final Act undertakings to facilitate the work of journalists do not leave us without means to control access of Soviet journalists to our officials. The Department's Spokesman is highly selective in recommending which foreign journalists should be granted interviews with US officials. He

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is equally selective in suggesting which officials should be asked to give interviews to Soviet journalists in the very few cases in which such interviews appear useful. We believe the same is true in the White House and the Pentagon. The Soviets do not perceive this as discrimination. It is also possible to arrange special briefings for restricted groups of foreign correspondents, such as those from NATO countries, without arousing Soviet charges of discrimination and retaliation. We believe the practice of selectivity provides satisfactory control over Soviet correspondents' access to our officials without opening us to retaliation or charges of hypocrisy for statements about our openness.

*Forman McRae*  
to Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13 OCT 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT  
Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT: White House Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

The recommendation to accredit Soviet journalists to the U.S. Government generally rather than to specific agencies is concurred in by the Department of Defense.

At present, journalists holding credentials issued by the White House, State Department or Capitol Hill Press Galleries are admitted to the Pentagon on the basis of those credentials. Therefore, the procedure to accredit Soviet journalists to the U.S. Government would pose no problem for the Department.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Benjamin Welles".

Benjamin Welles  
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

6361 add on

NSC/S 31

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

ROBERT B. SIMS <sup>RBS</sup>

SUBJECT:

White House Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

State strongly recommends renewal of the White House press passes for the nine Soviet journalists who hold them. I suggest you provide the State memo to Larry Speakes by signing Tab I.

John Lenczowski concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign Tab I, recommending renewal of the passes and providing the State Department's rationale.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

TAB I      Memo to Larry Speakes  
            TAB A      State's memorandum  
TAB II      Larry Speakes memo to you



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY SPEAKES

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: White House Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

State has strongly recommended renewal of the passes, and I am attaching their rationale at Tab A, for your information.

Attachment

TAB A State's recommendation

(A)



0085-12 02

September 17, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: White House Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

We understand that the accreditations to the White House of Soviet journalists resident in Washington are up for renewal. The question has been raised whether, in light of the KAL tragedy, those accreditations should be denied or renewal delayed.

We believe that the decision should be based on the practical effect of denial of White House accreditation, the effect of retaliation certain to be made against US journalists in the USSR and the extent to which denial would blur the distinction between an open and a closed society, which the difference between Western and Soviet response to the KAL incident has brought so starkly and usefully to world attention.

Under the US accreditation system denial would mean primarily removal of access to White House briefings. This might cause Soviet journalists some embarrassment in relation to their journalistic colleagues, but would only slightly hamper their access to information; it would have no effect at all on their ability to transmit their reportage back to Moscow. The accreditation system in Moscow is different. Foreign journalists are not accredited to the Kremlin, the Foreign Ministry, etc. separately, but have only a single national accreditation. Without that accreditation they cannot carry out journalistic activity or send out their reportage. The Soviets are, thus, in a position to retaliate against a denial of White House accreditation in ways that would hinder or terminate the ability of US correspondents to carry out their duties. We have no doubt that the Soviets would retaliate or that the response of the major US media represented in Moscow would be to put pressure on the Administration to renew the accreditations of Soviet journalists.

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NLRR F06-114/7 #9908

BY CI NARA DATE 7/7/08

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DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We would expect the Soviets to make propaganda use of a denial of accreditation, accusing us of hypocrisy in our claims of press freedom and of violation of the Helsinki Final Act. US media would probably also be critical of the denial on freedom of the press and openness grounds. In any case, publicity about the denial could be used to raise questions about the true openness of our society which the Soviets could exploit as they try to recover some of the losses they have suffered in world opinion as a result of their mishandling of the KAL incident.

We think that denial of White House accreditation for Soviet journalists would cost us more than we would gain, and strongly recommend that the accreditations be renewed.

*Barbara M. Keating*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



II

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM: Larry Speakes *LS*

For the past several years we have had a policy of renewing White House credentials for correspondents from the Soviet Union every sixty days. This group includes Tass, Pravda, and Soviet Radio and TV, for a total of 9 correspondents. Their passes are due to be renewed on Wednesday, September 14.

In view of the Korean Airline incident, I wanted to make you aware of our policy and have your views before we reissued these credentials.

cc: Bob Sims

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

46

ACTION

September 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: MARC BRAZIER *Marc*

SUBJECT: White House Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

Attached, for your signature, is a memo to Charles Hill in which you thank the Department for its advice regarding the accreditation of Soviet journalists and ask them to review and make recommendations on the practicality of your suggestion that Soviet journalists be accredited to the USG generally and not specifically to the White House or other Government agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Charles Hill at Tab I asking for State Department comments/recommendations on revising USG policy on the accreditation of Soviet journalists.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

TAB I Memorandum to Charles Hill

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

47

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: White House Accreditation of Soviet Journalists

Thank you very much for your memorandum of September 17, recommending the renewal of White House accreditation for Soviet journalists.

As recommended, the White House Press Office has renewed the press passes for these individuals. We would, however, appreciate the Department's comments and/or recommendations on the practicality of accrediting Soviet journalists to the US Government generally and not to specific agencies such as the White House. The intended result of this would be to clear these journalists for coverage of events on an as-required basis only, which is similar to the policy US journalists must operate under when covering the Kremlin.

Please assess the impact such changes would have and make recommendations to the NSC on the basis of assessment as soon as possible, but no later than November 1.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

NSC/S PROFILE

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USSR - General


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RECEIVED 13 DEC 83 19

TO MCFARLANE FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 13 DEC 83

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CJS NARA, Date 7/18/02



KEYWORDS . USSR MIDDLE EAST

SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET POLICY

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: American Academic on Soviet Policy

*This report doesn't seem plausible to me @ severe anxiety & fear of war*

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I. It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

*M*

Among the source's conclusions were:

--Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

--A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

--The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

--There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow telegram 15409 of December 10, 1983.

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NLRR FD6-114/7 #9903

BY CW NARA DATE 7/7/08

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50

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND  
DOMESTIC POLICY

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AN AMERICAN ACADEMIC WITH EXCELLENT ENTREE TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE BRIEFED EMBASSY ON HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 8. HE BELIEVES, BASED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, THAT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET THINKING AND ATTITUDES, ESPECIALLY TOWARDS THE U. S., OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS. WHERE EARLIER SOVIET DECISION-MAKING WAS FOUNDED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PRAGMATISM AND REASONED CALCULATION OF SOVIET INTERESTS, EMOTIONALISM AND EVEN IRRATIONALITY ARE NOW ENTERING INTO PLAY. THE ACADEMIC PERCEIVES A GROWING PARANOIA AMONG SOVIET OFFICIALS, AND SEES THEM LITERALLY OBSESSED BY FEAR OF WAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE U. S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE CENTRAL DETERMINING FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

3. THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTED, FURTHER, A CERTAIN SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS AND A LACK OF AN INTEGRATED FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO ANDROPOV'S LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE AND THE UNCERTAINTY THIS HAS GENERATED. HE FEELS THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP--PARTICULARLY ON DOMESTIC POLICY--AND PINPOINTS THE LOWER PARTY ORGANS (AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL) AND THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES AS THE MAJOR SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, AND ANTICIPATES THAT ANDROPOV WILL SHORTLY ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THIS OPPOSITION THROUGH WIDESPREAD PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER PARTY LEVELS. ALTHOUGH THE ACADEMIC SENSED THE SAME WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION AMONG HIS INTERLOCUTORS AS HE HAD DURING A PREVIOUS VISIT IN MAY OF THE NECESSITY FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE, HE DETECTED MUCH LESS OPTIMISM THAT THE KIND OF CHANGES REQUIRED TO BREAK OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE COULD BE REALIZED. HIS OWN BELIEF IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PURSUE OTHER THAN A GRADUAL, INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC CHANGE, AND THAT EACH SMALL STEP WILL BE ABSORBED BY THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN REFORM IT.

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4. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANDROPOV HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALBEIT ON A SOMEWHAT LIMITED SCHEDULE. THE ACADEMIC GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT USTINOV HAD STOOD IN FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY DURING THE LATTER'S ABSENCE; CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. END SUMMARY.

5. THE ACADEMIC IDENTIFIED THREE MAJOR CURRENTS IN SOVIET THINKING THAT HAD EMERGED SINCE HIS VISIT HERE IN MAY:

-- A GENUINE SENSE OF CONCERN OVER TRENDS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE AND A FEAR OF WAR THAT SEEMED TO BE SHARED BY SOVIET CITIZENS GENERALLY. THE OFFICIAL LINE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS GENERALLY BELIEVED BY THE POPULACE.

-- A GROWING CLIMATE OF NEO-STALINISM, PARTICULARLY EVIDENT AT THE RAION (DISTRICT) LEVEL AND AMONGST THE YOUNGER GENERATION, FED BY STRONG FEELINGS OF PATRIOTISM AND EVEN CHAUVINISM. THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING PUSHED AROUND BY THE U.S., AND THAT RESOURCES MUST BE MOBILIZED TO COUNTERACT THIS THREAT, UTILIZING THE ADVANTAGES WHICH A CENTRALIZED ECONOMY POSSESSES IN THIS REGARD. THE COROLLARY TO THIS IS THAT DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CHANGES CANNOT BE AFFORDED AT THIS TIME.

-- A HIGH DEGREE OF PARANOIA AMONG HIGH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THE ACADEMIC SPOKE, NOT UNLIKE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIRTY YEARS AGO. SINCE HIS MAY VISIT, THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTICED THAT ATTITUDES HAVE BECOME MORE PERSONAL AND EMOTIONAL, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S., AND HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRRATIONAL ELEMENTS IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. HE CITED THE STRAIGHTFACED CLAIM MADE TO HIM BY ONE OFFICIAL THAT THE KAL FLIGHT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY STAGED BY THE U.S.--NOT AS AN INTELLIGENCE FLIGHT--BUT TO PROVOKE THE USSR AND ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS IN THE WORLD.

6. THE ACADEMIC DECLARED THAT THE STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY BRZEZINSKI THAT THE SOVIETS "WOULD CRAWL BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE" WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND  
-- DOMESTIC POLICY

WITH THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY HIS SOVIET CONTACTS HERE.  
ALL OF HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS HAD UNEQUIVOCALLY  
STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RETURN TO SEPARATE  
INF TALKS. MOREOVER, ALL HAD EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIET  
UNION WOULD NOT CONTINUE WITH START NEGOTIATIONS EITHER,  
BUT THIS HAD BEEN EXPRESSED AS PERSONAL OPINION RATHER  
THAN AS A CATEGORICAL STATEMENT.

7. THE ACADEMIC FELT THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL  
ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE KEY DETERMINANT OF SOVIET  
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT  
THE PRESIDENT'S RE-ELECTION, THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED  
NOT TO ALLOW HIM TO ASSUME THE MANTLE OF PEACEMAKER.  
SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD  
CONSISTENTLY SHOWED RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS THE U. S. BUT  
HAD MET WITH NO RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THEY  
CLAIMED TO SEE NO INCENTIVE WHATEVER FOR A POLICY OF  
RESTRAINT IN THE FUTURE. (IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION  
FROM THE AMBASSADOR, THE ACADEMIC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT  
NONE OF HIS SOVIET CONTACTS HAD CITED ANY SPECIFIC  
EXAMPLES OF PAST SOVIET RESTRAINT.)

8. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, HE FELT THAT THE PARAMETERS  
OF ASSESSING RISK HAD SHIFTED AWAY FROM THE BASICALLY  
PRAGMATIC APPROACH WHICH HAD IN THE PAST CHARACTERIZED  
SOVIET BEHAVIOR ABROAD. THE ACADEMIC SENSED, MOREOVER,  
THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT, AT THIS TIME, HAVE AN INTEGRATED  
FOREIGN POLICY. THIS WAS PARTIALLY A FUNCTION OF THE  
SERIOUSNESS AND COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THEM.  
A MORE IMPORTANT FACTOR, HE FELT, WAS THE UNSETTLED  
STATE OF THE LEADERSHIP.

THE MIDDLE EAST

9. THE ACADEMIC CITED THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE  
OF AN AREA WHERE THE LACK OF A COHERENT SOVIET POLICY  
IS EVIDENT. WHILE SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD WARNED  
THAT "YOU CAN BE SURE WE WILL REACT" TO ANY U. S. ACTION  
AGAINST SYRIA, THE SCHOLAR FELT THAT IN FACT HIS INTER-  
LOCUTORS HAD NO CLEAR IDEA WHAT FORM THIS REACTION WOULD

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TAKE. THERE SEEMED, MOREOVER, TO BE CERTAIN BASIC CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON. ON THE ONE HAND, THE ACADEMIC HEARD REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A U. S. -SOVIET CLASH OVER LEBANON; ON THE OTHER, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO DERIVE "SATISFACTION" FROM THE PRESENCE OF U. S. MARINE "HOSTAGES" IN LEBANON, WHICH WAS PERCEIVED AS GENERATING ARAB ENMITY WITH THE U. S. AND, ULTIMATELY, CREATING DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT.

10. THE SCHOLAR WAS TOLD THAT ANDROPOV HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN A MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT IN WHICH HE REPORTEDLY ASSERTED THAT SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TOO PASSIVE AND REACTIVE AND DIRECTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE THE INITIATIVE. WHETHER ANDROPOV HAD IN MIND DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY ACTIONS WAS UNCLEAR. THE SCHOLAR MAINTAINED THAT, ON A MORE GENERAL PLANE, THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS INCREASINGLY SEEKING TO TAKE CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY AND TO UNDERMINE GROMYKO.

11. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THREE FACTORS WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE CHANGE IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND ATTITUDES WHICH THE ACADEMIC HAD ENCOUNTERED HERE: THE TURN FOR THE WORSE IN ANDROPOV'S HEALTH, THE KAL INCIDENT, AND THE REALITY OF THE INF DEPLOYMENTS. THE ACADEMIC AGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, LAYING PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE FIRST FACTOR. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AMONGST HIS INTERLOCUTORS HALF A YEAR AGO, HE SAID, A SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF POSITIVE CHANGE BECAUSE OF THE UNITY FORGED BY A STRONG LEADER. ANDROPOV'S ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE FOR THE

LAST FEW MONTHS HAD PERMITTED DIFFERENCES TO EMERGE AND HAD GENERATED A SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS. WHETHER ANDROPOV COULD AGAIN ASSERT HIMSELF AS THE STRONG LEADER WHOM ALL BELIEVED WAS NECESSARY AND BEHIND WHOM ALL COULD UNITE WAS FOR THE MOMENT PROBLEMATICAL.

ANDROPOV'S HEALTH  
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12. THE SCHOLAR'S CONTACTS INDICATED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION (THE DATE AND NATURE OF WHICH WERE NOT SPECIFIED) AND HAD BEEN  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND  
-- DOMESTIC POLICY

ORDERED TO REST FOR AT LEAST FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. WHILE  
RECUPERATING AT HIS DACHA, HOWEVER, MAJOR DECISIONS  
HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO HIM AND RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN  
WRITTEN UNDER HIS DIRECTION. DURING THIS RECUPERATIVE  
PERIOD, USTINOV HAD SERVED AS ANDROPOV'S STAND-IN;  
CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. ANDROPOV  
HAD CONTINUED TO MEET WITH SENIOR FIGURES INDIVIDUALLY  
WHEN HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ATTEND POLITBURO MEETINGS.  
(THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ANDROPOV HAD NOT  
ATTENDED THESE MEETINGS WAS UNCLEAR.)

13. AT ANY RATE, ACCORDING TO THE ACADEMIC, ANDROPOV  
WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALTHOUGH UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO  
LIMIT HIS SCHEDULE. THE SCHOLAR HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY WORKS CURRENTLY EIGHT HOURS A DAY WITH  
A BREAK FOR A MID-DAY REST. (COMMENT: THIS SCHEDULE  
WOULD ACCORD WITH THE PATTERN OF ANDROPOV'S MOTORCADE  
MOVEMENTS.) WEEKENDS WERE TO BE RESERVED FOR REST.

OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV  
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14. THE SCHOLAR IS CONVINCED THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT  
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP (HE DID NOT PROVIDE  
ANY ELABORATION) AND THAT OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S  
EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC REVIVAL IS CENTERED IN THE ECONOMIC  
BUREAUCRACY AND IN MID-LEVEL PARTY ORGANS AT THE RAION  
(DISTRICT) LEVEL. THE SCHOLAR CHARACTERIZED THE RAIKOM  
SECRETARIES, TYPICALLY MEN IN THEIR 30'S AND 40'S, AS  
INTENSE PATRIOTS--EVEN CHAUVINISTS--WHO BELIEVED THAT  
THE COUNTRY SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO MEET THE CHALLENGE  
FROM THE U. S. THEY WERE NOT ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF  
ECONOMIC CHANGE. "IT WAS ANYBODY'S GUESS" WHETHER  
ANDROPOV'S RETURN TO A MORE ACTIVE ROLE WOULD RESULT  
IN THE ELIMINATION OR ISOLATION OF THIS OPPOSITION TO  
CHANGE, BUT THE SCHOLAR FELT SURE THAT ONE OF HIS  
GENERAL SECRETARY'S GOALS WILL BE TO UNDERTAKE A  
"CLEANING-OUT." HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD SOON BE  
MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER  
PARTY LEVELS, AND SAID THAT PROMOTIONS INTO THE POLITBURO  
MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED AT THE UPCOMING PLENUM. (COMMENT:  
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ONGOING PARTY-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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HAS INDEED BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE PERFORMANCE OF NUMEROUS DISTRICT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS. WHILE THE CAMPAIGN HAS NOW REACHED THE OBLAST LEVEL, DISTRICT LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE STILL BEING SINGLED OUT FOR SHORTCOMINGS.)

15. THE SCHOLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TWO SOURCES THAT ANDROPOV HAD SENT A HARD-HITTING LETTER TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN OCTOBER THAT DECLARED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THE FATHERLAND WAS IN DANGER AND UNDERScoreD THE NECESSITY OF REVIVING AND REINVIGORATING THE SOVIET ECONOMY. REPORTEDLY ANDROPOV STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT EXAGGERATING THE EXTERNAL DANGER TO THE NATION, AND HE WARNED THAT THE TIME HAD PASSED WHEN A "FORMALISTIC" APPROACH TOWARD CHANGES MANDATED BY THE CENTER WOULD BE TOLERATED AND THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT SUPPORT THESE CHANGES ASSIDUOUSLY WOULD BE DEALT WITH RUTHLESSLY. (COMMENT: WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A SIMILAR REPORT FROM A CHINESE DIPLOMAT, WHO SPECULATED THAT THE INTENT OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN TO PREPARE THE COUNTRY FOR AN INCREASED DEFENSE BURDEN.)

ECONOMIC REFORM  
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16. WHILE SOVIET CONTACTS EVINced A CONTINUED RECOGNITION THAT MAJOR ECONOMIC CHANGES WERE ESSENTIAL, THE SCHOLAR DETECTED A MARKEDLY DECREASED CONVICTION THAT SUCH CHANGES COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED. THE SCHOLAR HIMSELF WAS PESSIMISTIC THAT CURRENT EFFORTS WOULD MAKE AN APPRECIABLE DENT IN A SYSTEM STILL GOVERNED BY AN UNREAL PRICING MECHANISM AND A LACK OF MEANINGFUL MATERIAL INCENTIVES. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO WAY, HE ASSERTED, OF BREAKING THE VICIOUS PRODUCTIVITY/INCENTIVES CIRCLE. WHILE THE SOON-TO-BE INTRODUCED EXPERIMENT IN INCREASED ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY DID INDEED REPRESENT THE MOST MEANINGFUL STEP TAKEN IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC CHANGE SINCE THE LATE 60'S, IT WAS ULTIMATELY DOOMED TO FAILURE. IT WAS TYPICAL OF PREVIOUS EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THAT IT WAS LIMITED IN APPLICATION AND INCREMENTAL IN APPROACH. AS IT STOOD, IT WAS LIKELY TO BE ABSORBED AND THUS SMOTHERED WITHIN THE SYSTEM EVEN IF THE EXPERIMENT PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN THE FIVE MINISTRIES WHERE IT IS TO GET UNDERWAY NEXT JANUARY. THE SCHOLAR  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND  
-- DOMESTIC POLICY  
CITED ONE ECONOMIC OFFICIAL WHO CONCURRED WITH HIS OWN  
PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPERIMENT'S LIKELIHOOD  
OF HAVING A MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE.

17. THE ACADEMIC COMMENTED THAT THE MILITARY APPEARS TO HAVE SOMETHING OF AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS ECONOMIC CHANGE. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE WEAKNESS OF THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY AND ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS. THIS IMPELS THEM TO SUPPORT CHANGE ON A FAIRLY MAJOR SCALE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MILITARY RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROCESS OF CHANGE WILL YIELD LITTLE IMMEDIATE BENEFITS FOR THEM AND MAY EVEN CONSTRICT THEIR SHARE OF THE RESOURCES PIE. ONE THING IS CERTAIN-- THE MILITARY STRONGLY BACK THE ANDROPOV DRIVE FOR GREATER WORK DISCIPLINE.

18. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY ON RYZHKOV (WHOM THE SCHOLAR DID NOT SEE ON THIS TRIP), THE SCHOLAR SAID THAT HE REMAINED ACTIVE AS HEAD OF THE CC'S ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, WHICH WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE STRATEGIC ECONOMIC ISSUES AS DISTINCT FROM DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL ISSUES. THE ACADEMIC REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS NEW DEPARTMENT WOULD SUPERSEDE THE OTHER CC ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS (REF MOSCOW 5473) AS NO LONGER CURRENT. WHILE THERE WOULD BE NO ACROSS-THE-BOARD ABOLITION OF THE OTHER ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS OF THE CC AS HE REPORTED IN MAY, SEVERAL OF THEM MAY BE FUSED. IN ANY EVENT, THE ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT HEADED BY RYZHKOV IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC THINKING ON THE ECONOMY.

19. THE SCHOLAR HAD HEARD LAST MAY THAT A NEW STAFF WOULD BE CREATED FOR THE DEFENSE COUNCIL - IT WOULD BE PART OF AN NSC STAFF COMPOSED OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN MUFTI AND CIVILIANS. THE IDEA WOULD BE TO GIVE ANDROPOV A STRONGER STAFF. ON THIS TRIP THE ACADEMIC HAS HEARD THAT THIS STAFF EXISTS BUT IS NOT PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE - PERHAPS ANOTHER CASUALTY OF ANDROPOV'S ILLNESS. THE SCHOLAR EXPECTS ITS ROLE TO INCREASE, HOWEVER.

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20. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS HAVE INCLUDED POLITBURO  
CANDIDATE MEMBER PONOMAREV, CC INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT  
DEPUTY CHIEF ZAGLADIN, IMEMO DIRECTOR YAKOVLEV, IUSAC  
DIRECTOR ARBATOV, IEWSS DIRECTOR BOGOMOLOV AND OTHER  
OFFICIALS IN ECONOMIC ORGANS AND INSTITUTES.  
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