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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 5/9/2005

File Folder USSR: GENERAL 4/5 [1981-1983]

FOIA

F06-114/7

Box Number 26

YARHI-MILO

2605

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9880	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN UPDATE [2 - 2] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	4/9/1982	B1
9881	PAPER	SOVIET TRENDS: MARCH 1982 [3 - 12] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	12	4/29/1982	B1
9882	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR [20 - 20] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	9/14/1982	B1
9886	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE VIEWS OF ROBERT FORD, FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION [21 - 21] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	9/10/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9887	PAPER	ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION BY R.A.D. FORD, SPECIAL ADVISER ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA [22 - 34] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	13	ND	B1
9883	PAPER	USSR: KGB CHAIRMAN'S POLICY TOWARD DISSENT [35 - 35] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	10/14/1982	B1
9888	PAPER	USSR: NOVEMBER 7 ANNIVERSARY SLOGANS FEATURE BREZHNEV POLICY THEMES [36 - 38] R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7	3	11/1/1982	B1
9889	PAPER	USSR: INVIGORATING THE PEACE MOVEMENT [39 - 39] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	11/15/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9884	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE SOVIET "MESSAGE OF PEACE" [40 - 40] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	1/3/1983	B1
9890	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE SOVIET "MESSAGE OF PEACE" [41 - 41] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	12/28/1982	B1
9891	MEMO	SOVIET WEEKLY [49 - 50] P 11/24/2009 F06-114/7	2	2/9/1983	B1
9892	CABLE	121810Z MAY 83 [51 - 52] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	5/12/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9893	CABLE	271444Z APR 83 [53 - 54] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	2	4/27/1983	B1
9894	CABLE	081443Z APR 83 [55 - 57] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	3	4/8/1983	B1
9895	PAPER	SOVIET UPGRADING MOSCOW'S ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES [58 - 58]	1	3/23/1983	B1
9885	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO DOBRIANSKY; KRAEMER; LINHARD RE SHULTZ EVENING REPORT [72 - 72] R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7	1	3/4/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9896	MEMO	DAILEY RE RELEASE OF UPDATED VERSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER [74 - 75]	2	3/3/1983	B1
	R	7/7/2008			NLRRF06-114/7

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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USSA

General

Pipes 1
120
file

National Security Council
The White House

Package # _____

4/9/81

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	K	
Bud McFarlane	2	M	
Jacque Hill	3	2	
Judge Clark	4	✓	I
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 9, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Soviet and East European Update

Polish Economy: Bad and getting worse. Insufficient availability of raw materials and supplies has caused some 40 percent of Polish industrial capacity to be shut down. Light industry has been especially hard hit. For the first time in years there is a surplus of electric power. There is talk of layoffs and an estimated 300,000 Polish workers are said by official Polish newspapers to be threatened with unemployment. High Polish bureaucrats admit both privately and publicly that without the lifting of Western sanctions and fresh credits the Polish economy cannot be improved and faces "catastrophe". There is fear in Warsaw of mass violence caused not by political motives but by anger over the dramatic drop in living standards. *(S)*

Soviet Union:

Because of personnel shortages, the Soviet Union has altered its student draft deferments, sharply cutting down the number of students eligible for them. *(S)*

A senior Soviet official told an American executive that because of hard currency shortages, in the immediate future the USSR will have to confine its imports largely to food: even important energy-related projects will have to be delayed. *(S)*

There are rumors that Soviet authorities have ceased to accept applications from Jews wishing to emigrate. There is a likelihood that Jewish emigration will be completely suspended. *(S)*

On the succession crisis there is nothing new to report: Brezhnev is suffering from a heart-related complication which has incapacitated him but does not seem to pose an immediate danger to his life. *(S)*

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/7 #9880

BY *AL* NARADATE 7/7/08~~SECRET~~

Derivative multiple sources; review April 2008.

~~SECRET~~

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

~~(U)~~ SOVIET TRENDS: MARCH 1982

Summary

~~(LOU)~~ Brezhnev displayed unusual vigor at the national trade union congress and in Tashkent where he toured local factories and gave major addresses. The demonstration of physical ability to perform his leadership functions backfired, however, when he fell ill upon return to Moscow. His condition apparently was not as serious as was rumored; but he was forced to undergo hospitalization and recuperate at his suburban dacha.

~~(C)~~ Several Soviet sources have pegged the 1981 harvest figure at 158 million metric tons (gross) of grain, although no official total has been published. This figure is lower than even the lowest US Government estimates and explains the intense Soviet sensitivity about last year's harvest and this year's prospects.

~~(C)~~ Soviet university students are now being reminded of restrictions on draft deferments which were mandated by a 1980 law but go into effect only this year. The number of institutions permitted to offer deferments to their students has been cut sharply; length of deferments for family reasons has been reduced by half; and university graduates will now have to serve longer tours of duty.

~~(U)~~ Longstanding Soviet military concern over pacifism among Soviet youth was refocused this past year. Marshal Ogarkov's recent pamphlet called attention to the need to intensify military-patriotic propoganda to offset pacifist ideas held by Soviet citizens. Pravda and Kommunist have indicated official uneasiness over the fairly widespread grumbling about sacrifices demanded of Soviet youths.

DECLASSIFIED

BY C1 NARADATE 7/7/88
NIRR F06-114/7-9881

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1,2,4 4/29/02 (multiple sources)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Report 376-CA
April 29, 1982

~~SECRET~~

- ii -

(C) Under the pressure of three consecutive harvest failures and extensive food rationing, proposals for reshuffling the farm bureaucracy have been made by the top leadership and are being widely discussed. Brezhnev is promoting an integration of the rayon-level bureaucracy in charge of food production and distribution, but the local and central bureaucracies apparently have registered strong objections. Arguments about investment policy are now appearing in the press. These, of course, have the potential to affect other major segments of the economy and national priorities.

(S/NF/NC/OC) In response to heavy Slavic immigration into Estonia, local intellectuals reportedly are sacrificing their standard of living and their penchant for drinking in favor of increasing family size. Estonian linguistic, ethnic, and cultural identity is, in their view, threatened with extinction within the next two decades unless demographic trends can be reversed.

* * * * *

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(~~LOU~~) Brezhnev Falls Ill After Tashkent Visit

Soviet media officials videotaped Brezhnev's speech at the 17th All-Union Trade Union Congress rather than broadcast it live, evidently because of uncertainty about how Brezhnev would perform. In fact, he managed quite well and spoke for more than an hour on March 16, the opening day of the five-day congress.

The Brezhnev media cult was in high gear at the congress: He received a gold medal from the World Federation of Trade Unions on March 17, and Lao Prime Minister Phomvihane presented him with the Gold Medal of the Laotian People's Revolutionary Party the following day. The seating arrangement March 16 put Brezhnev in the center as usual, but Chernenko sat on his right, continuing the high profile displayed this winter. Andrey Kirilenko did not appear, adding fuel to earlier speculation that he might be in political trouble.

On March 22, Brezhnev flew to Tashkent, accompanied by his speechwriter, A. Aleksandrov, and Leonid Zamyatin, head of the Department for International Information of the CPSU Central Committee. There he undertook what for him was a taxing schedule of activities: On March 23 he toured two major factories and a farm; the next day he made a major speech aimed primarily at China and Japan; and on March 25 he spoke to the Uzbek leadership about local problems and presented a medal to Uzbek leader Rashidov.

Brezhnev seems to have fallen ill on the return flight to Moscow March 25. The media in any event failed to publish the customary photograph of his arrival, and various Western press sources reported seeing a ZIL ambulance in the cortege. Subsequently, it became known that Brezhnev had suffered a temporary circulatory disturbance but that his prognosis was favorable. He was seen leaving the Kremlin clinic under his own power on April 12 and apparently went to his suburban dacha for recuperation.

The flood of rumors and speculation about Brezhnev's health led to an official announcement by the Foreign Ministry on April 4 that the Secretary General was taking a "routine winter rest" and that he had not suffered a stroke. The statement, however, proved insufficient to scotch sensational rumors about the imminence of a political succession.

The decision to visit Tashkent apparently was taken to present Brezhnev as a leader still capable of meeting the demands of office, but the aftermath actually intensified rather than dampened rumors of an impending transition.

(c) Lowered Harvest Total

No official Soviet figure for the 1981 grain harvest has yet been published, although the bunker weight (gross) figure of 158 million metric tons (mmt) has now surfaced twice in public lectures outside Moscow. A lecturer in Murmansk gave an indirect calculation well below the USDA estimate of 175 mmt, and the figure of 158 mmt was cited by both a Leningrad lecturer and a Moscow administrator.

Moscow is extremely sensitive about the poor 1981 crop. It will, of course, be one of the factors underlying the US-Soviet grain talks to be held in Paris in May. (Another important factor is the uncertain prospects for the 1982 crop.) Nevertheless, the Soviets are adamantly refusing to allow American diplomats to tour grain-growing areas by car, thus denying them on-the-spot assessments.

(c) USSR Tightens Draft Deferments

Soviet media have begun to remind university students of changes in the conscription law that went into effect January 1, 1982. The changes restrict student deferments to students enrolled in specially designated colleges and lengthen the period of military service for draftees with a higher education.

The revised text of the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service appeared in December 1980, but general awareness of the impending changes is only now developing. Recent articles on the subject in Lithuania are clearly part of an official educational campaign that other republics will probably also conduct.

The chief effect of the changes is to tighten conscription policy, thus increasing the number of educated urban conscripts in the armed forces. Article 35 of the law now grants student deferments only to enrollees in specific institutions designated by the USSR Council of Ministers on the basis of recommendations by Gosplan and the Ministry of Defense. Only about 40 schools nationwide (or 5 percent of the total number) will reportedly provide deferments, including such "prestige schools" as Moscow State University and certain medical and engineering-technical institutes. In Lithuania, for example, only students at the Lithuanian Agricultural Academy and the Kaunas State Medical

Institute can be deferred. Vilnius State University, with a quarter of Lithuania's student body, does not qualify.

The revised law also:

- reduces maximum deferment for family reasons from 10 years to 5;
- extends military service for draftees with a higher education from 1 year to 18 months in the army and air force, and from 1 year to 2 in the navy;
- adds "language" and "specialization or level of studies" and "attitude toward religion" (instead of the former "religious belief") to the list of factors that do not relieve Soviet citizens of their military obligation. (Lack of Russian language competence and student or conscientious objector status are thus eliminated as grounds for deferment.)
- increases somewhat the rights of servicemen to educational and other benefits and facilitates the performance of periodic refresher training by reservists.

A separate decree permits students enrolled in universities prior to January 1, 1982, to qualify for deferments under the old rules. But authorities are also implementing a stricter policy on medical deferments for both students and nonstudents. All previously issued deferments for medical disabilities reportedly have been canceled, and new deferments are being issued only to the severely handicapped and those diagnosed as schizophrenics.

The well-educated urban elites regard military service as a distasteful and degrading obligation, so schools that can still provide military deferments doubtless will now be besieged by parents seeking to protect their sons.

~~(LOU)~~ Creeping Pacifism Within the USSR

Pacifism inside the Soviet Union has become a matter of serious regime concern. The authorities now seem to suspect all age groups in the population of being vulnerable to its lure. That in turn suggests a growing popular fear of nuclear war in the USSR and skepticism about the chance of victory in such a conflict, as well as greater reluctance of youth to serve in the armed forces.

Original Complaints. The Soviet Union during Khrushchev's reign had just begun to emerge from self-isolation, and even then there were high officials who evidently feared a spread of

Western-style pacifism to the East. Marshal Filipp Golikov, chief of the armed forces' Main Political Directorate, complained at the 1961 Party Congress that "elements of pacifism" had crept into the works of Soviet writers. Golikov did not elaborate but warned that such heresy would make it more difficult to instill "love for the army and military service" into the young. His argument presumably also reflected the military's misgivings about Khrushchev's peace rhetoric and diplomacy, as well as about his abortive attempt to scale down the size of the officer corps.

In any event, Marshal Ivan Konev asserted in the March 1967 issue of the Komsomol journal that there were "false pacifist moods among a part of the youth" since "our propaganda has not always stressed that the path to a stable peace is connected with a strengthening of the country's defense capabilities and with a strengthening of our military organization" (Molodoy Kommunist, No. 3, 1967).

Renewed Concern. Criticisms of homegrown pacifism have now cropped up again in Soviet political and military literature. An unsigned article in the November 30, 1981, edition of Pravda insisted that internal propaganda must be "decisively rid of sudden outbursts of pacifism, which sometimes occur in certain materials designed for informational and propaganda purposes." The same message appeared almost verbatim in an editorial article in the January 1982 issue of the party magazine Kommunist (No. 1). Journalists and lecturers evidently were being admonished to be tougher on the West in their coverage of foreign affairs, but the articles could also have been intended as an antidote to "nuclear fear" remarks dropped by several top leaders in recent years.

Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff, deplored "elements of pacifism" on the domestic scene in his Russian-language pamphlet Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland (January 1982). Ogarkov said that the present generation of Soviet youth "and not only youth" were underrating the threat of war emanating from the West and urged more intensive military-patriotic education of the USSR population at large.

Ogarkov's brochure was the offshoot of a speech he made at an April 1981 ideological conference in Moscow and an article he wrote for the July 1981 issue of the party journal Kommunist. The pamphlet, however, omitted a reference to pacifist sentiment inside the Soviet Union which appeared in these earlier versions: "Problems of the struggle for peace are at times not understood from the standpoint of class interests, but in a rather simplified manner: any peace is good and any war is bad." (The Marshal's implication that even a bloody and devastating "just" war might be viewed as "good" apparently was judged inappropriate.)

Pravda on March 20 provided fresh evidence of official uneasiness about creeping pacifism on the home front. In an article on films, USSR People's Artist Aleksandr Zarkhi decried the stark explicitness in Western cinematography and then reproached Soviet producers of realistic war films for being heedless of their potentially demoralizing impact on Soviet audiences:

"Unquestionably, the cruel scenes at times found in certain Soviet films are generated by a director's intention to indict the aggressor's devilish inhumanity. But it is a short distance from the excessive viewing of bodily writhing to tearful, pessimistic weakness.... There is a limit beyond which courage and hope can be lost, beyond which ends the wise power of art which can strengthen a man's dignity, will and confidence in victory.... Streams of blood, disembowelings and bitter suffering in a hospital can sometimes beget cowardice...." (Emphases supplied.)

One can assume that Marshal Golikov in 1961 had exactly this sort of thing in mind when he hit at Soviet literary works that could move youth toward pacifism.

Sources of Concern. A number of factors may help to account for the Soviet media's recent attack on domestic pacifism. Much of the pacifist sentiment among Soviet youth can be traced to deepening alienation from the regime and greater distaste for military service as conscripts--at best a hard, dull, and brutal tour, not made more attractive now by the prospect of hazardous duty in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the general population is clearly becoming less resigned to the seeming permanence of material sacrifices on behalf of a still further buildup of the country's defense capability. With the rise of educational standards and access to foreign sources of information, many Soviet citizens have also become aware that hostilities involving a Kremlin-client somewhere in the Third World might escalate into a superpower crisis. Popular enthusiasm for Third World allies thus is on the wane and reservations about "fraternal assistance" verging in the direction of "pacifism" could be growing.

(c) The Food Program

Public Discussion. Successive harvest failures and de facto rationing of foodstuffs in many towns have given urgency to development of the special food program that Brezhnev called for in 1981. Politburo member Romanov told the Leningrad regional

10

party committee on March 26 that a CPSU plenum would "soon" be held on the food program, but indications are that major decisions will not be taken for some months.

The main features of the present agrarian system which currently are under attack in the press are:

- detailed quantitative planning from above which does not directly take into account production costs or revenues;
- dependence of kolkhozes on state enterprises which service their technical needs without due regard for their interests;
- the backwardness of agriculture's infrastructure (roads, transport, warehouses, etc.).

Such factors are treated in the media as the basic cause of poor resource use, demoralization of farm personnel, and the continuing migration of too many rural youths to the cities.

The discussion of remedies for management ills has been narrower in scope than it was in the mid-1960s when such reform economists as Venzher (once denounced by Stalin) urged a kolkhoz "free market" system allowing farm chairmen to decide what to produce and where to sell it for a profit. Some recent proposals for reshuffling functions and funds nonetheless seem to be causing varying degrees of dismay at all levels of the Soviet bureaucracy.

New Acronyms. Brezhnev's office of the Presidency is promoting an integration of the entire food sector at the rayon level. The Supreme Soviet Presidium met on March 10 and endorsed pilot schemes for rayon agro-industrial associations (RAPO's). The RAPO's are subordinated administratively to rayon soviets, incorporate the soviets' agricultural departments, and get funds from the soviets and member farms and enterprises. In principle, the RAPO's, headed by a director and council of delegates:

- act as a check on autocratic planners;
- coordinate the planning of local agrobusiness;
- control some production financing and local pricing;
- free the rayon party committees of non-"political" concerns.

The pilot scheme in Georgia, for example, allows a RAPO to confirm planning orders and to decide on priorities for local

resource use. RAPO's will get the investment funds earmarked for kolkhozes and sovkhoses, but the farm-related enterprises in a rayon will still be funded by their central ministries or agencies and pay dues to the association.

RAPO control of industrial firms is bound to be impaired by the firms' status of dual subordination--to the association and to their ministries. In some cases, the firms are still under ministry direction alone. This means that central industrial organs will continue to have an important, if not decisive, voice in the financial matters of their rural outlets.

Officials' Responses. Press comment on RAPO experiments reveals considerable skepticism about them. The chairmen of wealthier kolkhozes are said to be reluctant to help poorer farms through contributions to the RAPO treasury. Directors of industrial firms resent the idea of control by an agricultural organ. And the central ministries do not like having their routine unsettled.

Above the RAPO's, there assuredly will be several layers of bureaucracy. Gosplan envisages oblast-level associations, as well as agro-industrial state committees both in capitals of the union republics and in Moscow. The USSR state committee would also have numerous glavki, or trusts, for the guidance of social-economic and production affairs in the countryside (Planovoye khozyaystvo, No. 3). In addition, party bosses in the republics might be opposed to the thought of new state committees. Vitaliy Chemm, a secretary of the Latvian CP, for example, proposed republic-level associations (ReAPO), but ignored the state committees in his treatment of reorganization in the March issue of Kommunist Sovetskoy Latvii.

Investment Lobbying. Prof. Aleksandr Birman, a leading reform economist, pleaded in the January issue of Zhurnalist for more good-quality roads and special trucks and warehouses to support agriculture. He pointed out that in the many roadless districts the cost of delivery of milk or vegetables exceeded what a farm received from their sale. Large amounts of foodstuffs were lost because of deficiency in the number and quality of storehouses, refrigerators, packaging, and means of mechanization, Birman asserted, yet many economic officials were indifferent to such requirements of a modern society.

A polemic against those wishing to economize on road building and specialized truck production for agriculture was waged by Izvestiya chief editor Petr Alekseyev in the February issue of Kommunist. He put at 5-7 billion rubles the annual losses that

agriculture incurred because of lack of roads. An annual increase in the volume of road building by 15-20 percent was set as a difficult but realistic task. Alekseyev also plumped for a new branch of the truck industry devoted to producing refrigeration vehicles as a means of saving thousands of tons of produce now doomed to spoilage.

No effective food program can be implemented on the basis of existing investment ratios, according to Pavel Ignatovskiy in the March issue of the Gosplan journal which he edits. Ignatovskiy made almost the same points as Birman and Alekseyev about the creaky infrastructure of food production. "Cardinal measures" were advised in "the matter of a re-distribution of resources" so as to improve the situation. And like the others, Ignatovskiy assailed economic executives who take a different position.

Other Voices. Only a minority of contributors to the farm policy debate in the party press stressed the importance of economic stimuli. The most vocal in this group were Prof. K. Pankova, writing for the September 1981 issue of Kommunist, and the retired kolkhoz chairman A. Dunart, whose letter in praise of Pankova's article was run in the journal's March 1982 issue. Both addressed the chronic problem of unprofitability on many farms and asked for price fluctuation in response to the significant crop variation caused by weather.

Pankova observed that "Such practice is widespread in economically developed countries. In years of poor harvests the sliding prices rescue the farms from a financial famine." Actually, the sliding scale was introduced in the USSR in 1958 but was allowed to work only downward. Good weather and crops at that time led to a reduction of procurement prices, but they were not increased during the subsequent years of unfavorable weather.

A. L. Meyendorf, a researcher at Moscow's Institute of Economics, said in private that it could take several five-year periods to implement his scheme for procurement prices that reflect scarcity and are the tool for deciding among alternative resource uses and production locations. Meyendorf's concepts were set forth in the March issue of the USSR Academy journal Voprosy ekonomiki and allegedly enjoy the support of such Academy economics leaders as N. P. Federenko and Y. I. Kapustin. The opposition, said Meyendorf, is centered in the Institute of Agricultural Economics and Ministry of Agriculture. There, quantitative centralized planning and daily work plan fulfillment reports are still regarded as far superior to "unproven" price-system theories.

Power Over Pragmatism. Despite the debate, it is apparent that the time-honored guiding idea of Soviet agricultural management is alive and well. One set of bureaucratic controls is regularly substituted for another in the hope of increasing productivity while insuring the supremacy of the party-led town over the countryside, where the party is weak. The real solution of the food problem, i.e., equal partnership between industry and agriculture, is not even discussed. RAPO's seem merely the latest variation on the theme of politics over economics in agriculture's development.

Nevertheless, the pressure to spend more on agriculture's infrastructure carries implications for Kremlin power politics. The leadership may now be facing some hard decisions about resource allocation which can effect national priorities. In time, this can impact on a range of things from economic performance to diplomatic behavior. Debate over investment may also help to fuel the upcoming succession struggle, making it more intense than the rather orderly transfer of power in 1964.

Estonians Opt for Sobriety and Reproduction

~~(S/NF/NC/OC)~~ Estonian intellectuals have decided to make "heroic" sacrifices in order to save their nation from disappearing in a Slavic sea, according to a well-informed visitor who contrasted his recent findings with those of five years ago. Educated Estonians are now increasing their family size; many now have 4-5 children despite cramped housing. Their rationale for accepting the resultant lowered standard of living is a conscious effort to preserve the Estonian language and culture. For the same reason, they are abstaining from alcohol despite the traditional Estonian penchant for heavy drinking. Again, the reason for abstinence is to avoid squandering their human resources, thus making it easier for the Slavic immigration to overwhelm the Estonians.

~~(C)~~ Estonian fears of national extinction are vivid and frequently mentioned to visitors. In 1981 an Estonian official even predicted to visiting Americans that Estonians probably would disappear as a nation within two generations unless they managed to achieve real autonomy or independence. Estonians even fear that they might lose their union-republic status if the number of indigenous Estonians should fall below 50 percent of the population; they cite the example of the Karelo-Finnish Republic which was demoted to autonomous republic status in 1956. (The Estonians may be too pessimistic on this score in view of the political history of the Karelian Republic in the 1940-56 period.)

(U) The recent demographic trend has not favored Estonians, who had the lowest rate of growth among the major Soviet nationalities in the 1970-79 period, 0.14 percent according to the 1979 census, compared with the national average of 0.9 percent per annum. The Slavic minority in Estonia has a much higher birth rate than the Estonians which, combined with the Slavic influx, is sharply diluting the Estonian majority. The Estonian share of the republic's population fell below 65 percent in 1979, and Tallinn, the capital, is now one-half Slavic.

Prepared by D. Graves, x29204
I. Belousovitch
S. Ploss
M. Cook

Approved by M. Mautner, x29536

As the Soviets See Themselves

THE LAST FOOT!



"Well, let's go, Pal Ivanych, can you move your feet?" "I'm trying!" "Oh! I'm afraid you won't make it, Pal Ivanych!" "You lie! I'll get there!"



"Oh! You won't make it!" "All my strength, but I'll do it!" "Buck up, Pal Ivanych, One last try..."



Рисунок Е. ВЕДЕРНИКОВА.

- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

March 1-31, 1982

March

- 1 Brezhnev spoke at banquet for Jaruzelski.
- 1 Venus-13 softlanded on planet Venus.
- 2-4 All-Union Congress of Journalists held in Moscow.
- 3 Ten Politburo members, including Brezhnev, attended Moscow Art Theater's presentation of "Thus Shall We Conquer," a play devoted to Lenin's last days.
- 3 Civil Air Minister Bugayev in Literaturnaya Gazeta article complained about ban on Aeroflot flights to US.
- 3-4 Ponomarev attended Annual General Assembly of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
- 4 Western press reported major explosion at factory near Aviamotornaya metro station in Moscow.
- 4 Ukrainian party leader Shcherbitskiy awarded Order of October Revolution for Ukrainian harvest of 1981.
- 5 AUCCTU plenum relieved Aleksey Shibayev as trade-union chief and named Stepan Shalayev as his replacement; Chernenko and Kapitonov presided at the plenum.
- 5 Kirilenko was only Moscow-based Politburo member who did not attend Women's Day meeting addressed by Raisa Dement'yeva, a secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.
- 5 Sharaf Rashidov, Uzbek party leader, awarded Order of October Revolution for 1981 Uzbek cotton crop.
- 8 International Women's Day, a Soviet national holiday.
- 8 Leonid Zamyatin, head of International Information Department of CPSU Central Committee, awarded Order of Lenin for 60th birthday.
- 9 Brezhnev met with Finnish President Koivistu; addressed banquet in his honor.

March

- 10 Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet approved experiments with rayon agro-industrial associations in Georgia and Latvia.
- 10 Azerbaydzhan leader Aliyev awarded Order of October Revolution for 1981 Azerbaydzhan harvest procurement.
- 10 Sovetskaya Rossiya article by First Deputy Minister of MVD Yuriy Churbanov (Brezhnev's son-in-law) criticized Soviet film industry for its incorrect depiction of crime and offered MVD help in filming this genre.
- 10 Literaturnaya Gazeta article by V. Perevedents and I. Gerardi discussed pros and cons of diversion of Siberian water to Central Asia.
- 10 Dissident Viktor Tomachinskiy sentenced to one year in jail and five years of exile from Moscow for parasitism.
- 11 Kirilenko's signature is unexpectedly absent from Pravda obituary of popular musician L. O. Utesov.
- 11 Western press reported Deputy Minister of Culture USSR N. I. Mokhov was forced to retire for "lack of vigilance in circus scandal." Mokhov's secretary denied the allegation.
- 11 Stepan A. Shalayev was released as Minister of Timber, Cellulose and Paper, and Woodworking Industry USSR in connection with his new assignment as trade-union chief.
- 12 Chernenko and Ponomarev received a Danish Communist Party delegation.
- 16-20 Brezhnev addressed 17th All-Union Trade Union Congress: reiterated food program, advocated an increased role for trade unions, announced moratorium on SS-20 emplacements pending introduction of Pershing IIs, and promised retaliatory steps if Pershing IIs were introduced. Shalayev gave official report on trade unions.
- 17 World Federation of Trade Unions leader S. Gaspar awarded WFTU gold medal to Brezhnev; all Moscow-based leaders but Kirilenko and Pelshe attended the ceremony.

March

- 17 Aleksandr Sergeyevich Glessner, currently resident in Italy, was deprived of Soviet citizenship by March 17 ukase.
- 18 Lao Prime Minister Phomvihane presented the Gold Medal of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party to Brezhnev; Kirilenko and Pelshe were absent from the ceremony.
- 18 Marshal V. I. Chuykov, victor of battle of Stalingrad, died at age 82.
- 19 TASS reported a meeting of British business representatives with Yuriy Brezhnev, first deputy minister of trade, in an apparent attempt to scotch rumors about his status.
- 20 Sovetskaya Litva article by Maj. Gen. Mitskevichyus outlined new limitations on military deferments for university students in Lithuania.
- 22 Brezhnev and aides Aleksandrov and Zamyatin flew to Tashkent for award ceremonies; all Moscow-based leaders except Kirilenko and Pelshe attended departure ceremony. Central Asian leaders assembled in Tashkent to meet Brezhnev.
- 22 Ustinov, Chernenko, and four other Politburo members stood in guard of honor for late Marshal Chuykov.
- 22-23 First Deputy Minister of Justice USSR A. Ya. Sukharev addressed conference of jurists on crime and embezzlement in agriculture and food-processing plants.
- 23 Brezhnev toured Tashkent tractor plant, aviation plant, and local kolkhoz, accompanied by Uzbek leaders.
- 23 Marshal Chuykov buried at Mamayev Kurgan at Volgograd.
- 24 Brezhnev spoke at Tashkent: noted Uzbek labor surplus; urged Central Asian youths and women be enlisted in labor force; made overtures to China and Japan; presented medal to Uzbek SSR.
- 24 USSR Academy of Sciences Vice-President A. V. Sidorenko died in auto accident in Algeria.
- 24 Gorbachev and Rusakov departed for Vietnam to attend Fifth Congress of Vietnam Communist Party.

March

- 25 Brezhnev addressed Uzbek leaders on local economy; presented medal to Uzbek party leader Rashidov; flew from Tashkent to Moscow. Unofficial sources claim Brezhnev was taken from Moscow airport to medical facility after being stricken with a circulatory disorder.
- 26 Ponomarev addressed plenum of Soviet Peace Committee.
- 26 Belorussian leader T. Ya. Kiselev awarded Order of October Revolution for 1981 Belorussian harvest.
- 26 Pravda article on 11th Party Congress in 1922 spelled out party's strictures on trade unions' role, including ban on trade union "independence."
- 27 June 20 elections for deputies to local soviets and judges and assessors to courts in union republics announced.
- 27 Moscow visit of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen leader al-Hasani postponed from March 29 to unspecified future date.
- 27 Newly named ambassador to Budapest V. N. Bazovskiy co-authored with N. D. Shumilov a biography of the wartime Leningrad leader, A. A. Kuznetsov, who was purged in 1949.
- 28 Mikhail Tsivin, 18-year-old Soviet Jew, arrested in Red Square for hoisting placard asking for right to emigrate to Israel.
- 30 Kunayev presided over Kazakh party plenum; K. Kamalidenov released as agitprop secretary in connection with his appointment as Kazakh KGB chief; former republic KGB chief Shevchenko transferred out of the republic.
- 30 Pravda article by K. Rutenberg, first secretary of Talsinkiy Rayon Party Committee in Latvia, recounted bureaucratic opposition to rayon agro-industrial association (RAPO).
- 31 April 3 visit to Cambridge by Yuriy Chazov, Brezhnev's cardiologist, canceled on medical grounds. Western press speculated that the medical problem was Brezhnev's, not Chazov's.

Dobriansky
Dylo
USSR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

September 14, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES *R*

SUBJECT:

Former Canadian Ambassador's Assessment of
Developments in the USSR

Former Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Robert Ford, has prepared a brief paper (Tab I) summarizing his views on the current situation in the USSR and recommending a broad set of policies for the West. The gist of his analysis and recommendations is as follows:

- The Soviet Union is in deep trouble but it is unlikely that Brezhnev's successors will undertake major innovations: most likely they will continue present policies with minor variations.
- The Soviet military buildup is likely to be increased under the succession leadership, the role of the military will grow, and Russian nationalism will be on the rise.
- A Western policy of outright hostility to the USSR may, in the long run, weaken the system but in the short run it will strengthen anti-Western tendencies and hence is undesirable.
- The best policy would be to persuade the Soviet leadership that the United States does not desire the breakdown of the regime and the dissolution of its empire: this policy alone stands a chance of convincing Moscow to cut down its military expenditures and turn to its domestic problems.
- The greatest danger lies in the next five-six years: if the West "does not do something suicidal" at the end of this period, the correlation of forces will shift in our favor.

Attachment:

Tab I Paper by former Canadian Ambassador to the USSR

cc: Norman Bailey
 Paula Dobriansky
 Henry Nau
 Roger Robinson

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 BY GI NARADATE 7/7/08



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 10, 1982

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
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM CLARK

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Views of Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Attached is a paper prepared by Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that the Secretary thought you would find interesting.


L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated above

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BY CS NARA DATE 7/7/08

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

A paper by R.A.D. Ford, Special Adviser on East-West Relations to the Department of External Affairs

The way in which the USSR develops in the next few years will be deeply affected by foreign affairs and above all relations with the United States. They must therefore be examined together.

It is obvious that the USSR is in deep trouble in the economy, agriculture, Eastern Europe, relations with the West, Afghanistan. All of these problems will be accentuated after the departure of Brezhnev since it is almost certain that power will once again have to devolve on a troika and be even more dispersed among the leading members of the hierarchy, making it harder for difficult decisions to be taken.

It would be a mistake to talk in terms of divisions between a hard-line and a soft-line but there are certainly differences of opinion about policy, which can be summed up in the following three trends:

- (I) Because of the immobilism of the last years of Brezhnevism and the innate caution of the leading Soviets there will be a strong tendency to follow present policies with perhaps minor variations.

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This means no major innovation in foreign or international affairs, with a continuing effort both to strengthen the armed forces; and to maintain a measure of good relations with the West without making any substantial concessions.

(II) The leadership is fully aware of the deepening economic crisis and the desirability of trying to increase economic growth and improve the production and quality of consumer goods and the standard of living, but there is certainly no consensus about how to go about it. The three main options opened to them are: economic reform; an effort to return to détente as a means of providing capital and technology which would make it unnecessary to indulge in their risky business of economic reform; a serious effort to reach an agreement with the U.S. on arms control and reductions as the only means of reducing the proportion of GNP devoted to the military. The leadership faces the difficulty, as outlined later, of finding a way to implement any of these policies without running into massive resistance from the military, from the orthodox party bosses and from the hardliner nationalists. Finding a solution will depend very much on circumstances and the emergence of a strong leader.

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(III) Others will argue that détente was a mirage, that there can be no accommodation with the West, that deterrence (in the Soviet sense) must depend on adequate Soviet military strength, and that therefore the share of the GNP absorbed by the military and the military industries must be increased.

I think that the inclination of the Soviets would be for (I). It coincides with their conservative style and requires the least amount of initiative, but circumstances may not permit the continuation of the present policies of improvisation. Strained relations with the West, which may easily get worse, over Poland for example, and a perceived threat to their economic and their political system may force them to take decisions they would otherwise prefer to avoid.

A determined effort to return to détente would require a strong man with a solid political base and army support, neither of which conditions seem very likely, and in any event would quickly run into the obstacle of Afghanistan and/or Poland since it seems improbable that very much progress could be made in restoring East-West relations without as a minimum some concessions on the Soviet side on these issues, and in both areas the security problem looms large in Soviet eyes, and therefore involves the military.

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As regards economic reforms, it would take a very strong leader to introduce measures which most of the Soviet hierarchy, and all the little communist bosses around the country would consider dangerous innovations affecting their power and also liable to lead to demands for political reforms as well, and which would also infect the East-European empire.

What I think most likely is a combination of (I) and (III). The Soviets' preference is for continuity, but the situation will probably facilitate an increase in the role of influence of the military accompanied by a growth of great Russian nationalism. The role of the military could also be enhanced because of the power struggle and the reluctance of any of the contenders to advocate policies opposed by the military.

No matter what path the succession leaders choose, there are a few hard facts with which they will have to live. The first is the continuing, if not increasing share, of the GNP which will have to go to the military. The second is the inability of the country to feed itself adequately under the present system. The third is the awe-inspiring inefficiency in most branches of the economy, particularly consumer-goods and their poor quality, the devastatingly low standard of living.

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The military-industrial complex is the one exception to the rule because it is the only branch of the economy where the users can and do insist on quality. The fourth fact is the low morale reflected in the high death rate and very low birth rate among the Russian population who are gradually seeing their numerical superiority whittled away.

There is no answer to these and the innumerable other economic and human problems. But in spite of a crying need for economic and administration reform, I think it highly unlikely that anything more than mere tinkering with the system can take place. Therefore, the attraction the Soviet system seems to exert on so many people, particularly in the Third World, and in spite of its manifold and repugnant drawbacks, ought to decline. Since at the same time the regime will clearly have to maintain and tighten its control, and human rights will be even less observed in future than in this poor present.

How can we influence Soviet developments?

While there is a limit on the extent to which the West can affect the policies of a succession government in the USSR, we should not underestimate what can be done - for better or for worse. Let us assume, first, a Western policy of declared hostility with the aim (specific or not) of achieving clear

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military superiority, of weakening the economy and of hastening the eventual collapse of the Soviet system.

The result of such a policy, and it need only be perceived on the Soviet side, would be:

- (I) A strengthening of the position of those Soviets who argue that the West is unalterably opposed and that détente is a fraud and a delusion; an increase in great Russian nationalism and anti-americanism.
- (II) A determination, agreed by both the military and civilians, that the USSR must never be in a position of military inferiority no matter what the economic cost; and, inevitably, a considerable increase in the influence of the military.
- (III) The rejection of any idea of economic reform; a tightening of belts; an even greater reliance on internal discipline; repression against Jews, troublesome minorities, religious, nationalist and political dissidents; and a tighter grip on the East-European empire.

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(IV) No direct challenge to the USA; but a greater tendency to take risks in order to exploit weak points in the Third World and to utilize politically the Soviet military force.

A western policy of outright hostility might work in the long run, by weakening the Soviet system at its most vulnerable point, therefore accentuating the problem of survival for the political system and the leadership. But it will not work in the short run as the Soviets are capable of sacrifices they think necessary to survive, and danger lies precisely in the short run because it is in this period that the West will be in a real or conceived position of military inferiority.

This kind of policy could therefore have a negative effect on Soviet developments. It is less likely that we can do very much to encourage developments which we would consider advantageous to the West. The most obvious alternative policy would be a determined effort on the part of all NATO countries to improve economic and political relations with the USSR. There are major obstacles of which the first is the impasse over Afghanistan and Poland. The second is the need to reestablish military parity before negotiating in depth with the Soviets. The third is the danger, in a period of economic recession, of giving away too much for illusory gains. The exception is arms reduction and control, an area in which Soviet civilian

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leaders might feel there was a possibility of cutting back military expenses and military influence.

To be even moderately successful, such a policy would have to be coordinated with our European allies. The main element in détente is, of course, US-USSR relations but if an improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington took place strictly in a bilateral context, there would be an alarmed European reaction, and even more troublesome would be an attempt by the Europeans to go it alone.

I am skeptical that at this time we could gain very much from an obvious effort to reverse the process of the last few years, even if it were politically possible. Nor do I think it would have a great enough effect internally; that is by promoting a moderate line in Moscow, to justify the risks we would run.

A third option, which I personally prefer, is a kind of western attentism accompanied by an effort not to make things worse and by a self-restraining ordinance which will admittedly be difficult because of the very different nature of our systems. It would be unwise to seek a better relationship before we are strong enough (and I do think it was necessary for the U.S.A. to demonstrate its strength and its will) and before the Soviets are ready for it. Any precipitate offer or move on the part of the West would be suspect in Soviet eyes.

The one conjuncture which I think might make the Soviets ready to be less truculent would be a double realization by them that the civilian economy was continuing badly to decline; and that the U.S.

was not seeking the downfall of the Soviet regime and the breakup of its empire. This seems to me the only combination which would convince the Soviets that they could and should endeavour to reduce the military slice of the GNP, and if this is not done, there seems no way in which the standard of living, already disastrously low, will not further deteriorate.

The question can legitimately be raised whether on the other hand the Soviets themselves are seeking military superiority. I think the difficulty in considering the question of the military balance stems from a widely differing approach to the subject. The West tends to look at the military balance in strictly military terms and often restricted to one area, i.e. intermediate range nuclear weapons, or conventional forces in Central Europe. But the Soviets, fully cognizant of their economic weaknesses, of the threat from China, of the unreliability of their East European allies, look at the strategic balance taking all factors into consideration, and their conclusions are invariably that, at the very best, there is no more than an approximate balance in correlation of forces.

The exasperating factor in dealing with the Soviets is that they seem to see no contradiction in proclaiming a political philosophy which assumes the inevitable downfall of the capitalist states, while objecting if we foretell collapse of communism. The difference is that Marxism-Leninism, while useful and necessary

to keep the party in power, and occasionally as an adjunct to foreign policy, is not the basis on which realistic policies are formulated. They do not follow a strategy aimed at the destruction of capitalism in the U.S.A., for example, and are therefore alarmed when they sense that their destruction might be the aim of the U.S. (they are realistic about distinguishing between what they consider politically necessary anti-Soviet declarations and practical measures).

In a secondary way, I think it important that an effort be made to avoid unnecessarily humiliating them. They are extremely sensitive and insecure about their place in the world. A lot can be gained by giving them at least the appearance of political parity with the U.S. Real parity is a long, long way off.

I have no illusions about the Soviets and my expectations from détente in the past and whatever might develop in the future are low-key and realistic. The Soviets are not going to alter their fundamental view of the world, and they will be unable to resist small victories at our expense if the opportunity presents itself, and no matter what the state of our relations.

But I think the Soviets may be reaching one of the periodic water-sheds in their history, when they feel the time has come to pause and consolidate their gains. After the immobilism of the present, there may come a recognition that they have pushed their people too far, too hard; that their hold on Eastern Europe is

becoming more difficult and more expensive; and that the confrontation with the U.S. has become counter-productive and even dangerous, and could create more military, technological and economic problems than they would like to envisage. Their experience and ideology justify the occasional pause. Brezhnev would find it difficult. His successors might find it easier. The problem for them will be to find a way to make concessions necessary to ease tensions.

No matter which policy direction is taken, the new leaders are likely to be just as tough and difficult as Brezhnev and company, perhaps even more so until they consolidate their position or until some exceptional man comes to the fore. I do not see one on the horizon but then Kruschchev looked an unlikely candidate to be a reformist leader, and Sadat beside Nasser appeared a cypher. The Russians always prepare surprises for us.

The next few years are going to be particularly difficult in East-West relations because of the concatenation of a number of circumstances.

- (i) The assumptions on which the peace of Europe rested since World War II are beginning to wear thin. These are the division of the Continent into two areas in which each sides' mandate held sway,

which will be increasingly questioned; and the doctrine of approximate nuclear balance which is losing some of its validity in light of the new technology.

- (ii) An American Administration which has decided to try to restore military power and the political will of the West and to challenge the USSR more directly than has been done in the past.
- (iii) Problems in the economies of Western industrialized nations creating strains in the Western alliance.
- (iv) New players on the scene, particularly China and Japan, and new problems in inflammable areas such as the Gulf and the Middle-East, complicating the East-West struggle and globalising it.
- (v) Finally, all of this will coincide with a transfer of power in Moscow and the accentuation of economic problems inside the USSR.

Within five years to a decade, the famous correlation of forces of which the Soviets are so fond of talking will begin strongly to shift in our favour, provided the West does not do something suicidal. But we have to get through the coming 5-6 years which will be dangerous because of the above combination of circumstances and because of the real or perceived Soviet military superiority.

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34

It seems logical in that period to avoid letting the Soviets exploit their only really valid card. Perhaps we should reexamine the only indisputably advantageous element in agreements worked out in the seventies-crisis limitation between the super-powers and try to revive it in a realistic and unemotional way accepting that relations are confrontational but controllable.

The Soviets are obsessed with the U.S. It is the only power that really counts for them. While they would like ideally a relationship of parity which is probably unrealistic and unattainable given their ideological motivation, I do not believe they would be adverse to something more limited and more closely related to the actual situation.

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BY CA NARADATE 7/7/88

- 3 -

10/14/82

3. USSR: KGB CHAIRMAN'S POLICY TOWARD DISSENT

Under new KGB Chairman Fedorchuk, the heavy and systematic repression of dissent is continuing, with changes in style rather than policy. Recent moves to cut off dissidents' contacts with the West were undoubtedly planned under Andropov, but their implementation shows the brutality Fedorchuk customarily employed against activists in the Ukraine.

* * *

During June and July, Soviet authorities ended the "separated spouses" hunger strike through the usual combination of pressure and flexibility, showing their customary regard for balancing foreign and domestic considerations. Similarly, the practice of imprisoning some activists and forcing others to emigrate continues. Jewish emigration has remained stable since January at a very low 200-300 per month.

The Moscow Helsinki Group's self-dissolution in early September merely confirmed that repression had paralyzed its activities months earlier. Swift police action was taken against peace activists in June and July in line with ongoing policies.

Since late May, soon after Fedorchuk's installation, Moscow has been pursuing a program to limit contacts between activists and foreigners (e.g., ending direct dial telephoning abroad, harassing Westerners seeking dissident contacts, warning prominent refuseniks to break off contact with foreigners). This policy, however, was undoubtedly planned under Andropov and approved by the Politburo. Fedorchuk's innovations have been more in style than policy. Recent cases of excessive violence in Moscow are typical of the tactics Fedorchuk used against activists in the Ukraine, where he was not inhibited by the presence of foreign journalists and diplomats.

There is little doubt that Fedorchuk will act vigorously to suppress the human rights movement and control other nationalist and religious activists. Too vigorous action against non-conformity by individual intellectuals, however, would raise charges of neo-Stalinism--something current leaders have been careful to avoid.

Fedorchuk also faces significant changes in the nature of Soviet dissent. The regime's opponents now tend to operate clandestinely. The new generation of activists appears to be increasingly politicized and programmatic. Instead of concentrating on individual rights and violations of law by public officials, they seem more inclined to criticize the regime's policies, search for possible alternatives, and consider ways of mobilizing mass support against the regime.



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

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USSR
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(U) USSR: NOVEMBER 7 ANNIVERSARY SLOGANS FEATURE
BREZHNEV POLICY THEMES

Setting the scene for this year's November 7 revolutionary celebrations, the slogans issued by the CPSU Central Committee on October 16 accented the positive on domestic issues while replaying traditional foreign policy formulas. For Soviet audiences, the most significant changes, compared with previous lists, related to domestic areas long associated with Brezhnev and his protege Chernenko, such as the food program and agriculture. The foreign policy section's only real novelty was the omission of the usual mention of Chinese hegemonism. Slogans highlighting the gas pipeline, the Middle East, and the international peace movement merely reflected the present prominence of those issues on Moscow's international agenda.

The USSR's holiday slogans rarely promulgate new policies. Rather, their function is to alert regime functionaries to the current official interpretations of established policy lines and thus serve as operative guidelines for the immediate future. This year's were no exception.

Domestic Themes

As did slogan language for May Day 1982, changes in domestic policy slogans this October tended to stress themes frequently associated with Brezhnev and Chernenko, who have been out in front of the other Kremlin leaders in promoting agricultural development and party supremacy.

Indeed, agricultural production took precedence over industry this time: the major farming project, the Non-Black Soil Zone, for example, rated higher priority than the Baykal-Amur Railroad. Although de-emphasizing a major industrial undertaking could be related to the declining

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November 1, 1982

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/21/09

political fortunes of Party Secretary for industrial management Kirilenko, the stress on agriculture is consistent with current Soviet efforts to implement the new food program. In fact, a new slogan urged working people to implement the May plenum decisions, specifically the food program.

The only other noteworthy innovation on the domestic side was a call for "builders of the gas pipelines and workers of gas industry" to struggle for "an early startup and the most rapid full use" of the new gas pipelines. That innovation was an obvious response to the US sanctions.

A number of minor revisions in the language of other domestic slogans did, however, have the effect of accentuating ideology and "partymindedness" at the expense of nationalist sentiment:

- there were new references to "communist labor" and "young builders of communism";
- "Socialist competition" was upgraded to 9th from 26th place in the listings, even though industrial management finds it disruptive of operational routine;
- the usual slogan on youth no longer enjoined it to "ardently love the Soviet homeland" but rather to "be conscious fighters for Lenin's cause, for communism."

Similarly, Brezhnev's greetings to the Tallin ideological conference in October featured such old-style party language as "proletarian internationalism" and "socialist Fatherland." The objective in both cases seemed to be to rouse CPSU officials to exercise their party authority more vigorously.

Foreign Policy Themes

The most notable change in the international slogans was the dropping of any reference to "hegemonism"--Moscow's usual pejorative summation of Chinese foreign policy--from the slogan on Asia. Beginning in May 1981, this slogan had urged Asians to struggle against "collusion between imperialism and hegemonism." In May 1982, the reference to "collusion" was dropped; now, the Asian enemy is merely "imperialism." The elimination of "hegemonism" will be particularly striking to the Soviet public, which has been told little about the contacts between the two countries in recent months. (It also highlights a difference between the USSR and Vietnam, which continues to emphasize "hegemonism" as the principal threat to stability in Southeast Asia.)

The "peace" slogans this year reflected Moscow's hope to rejuvenate the West European peace movement to impede the NATO

nuclear deployments scheduled for 1983. In language much stronger than last year's, one slogan called on the peoples of the world to "be vigilant," "defend detente," and "eliminate the threat of war." Another exhorted peace champions to "demand the prohibition of nuclear, neutron and chemical weapons" (last year's called only for people to "advocate" such prohibition). The change in language augers revitalized Soviet promotion of the peace and security campaign in Europe.

Lebanon clearly prompted the new slogan demanding "an end to Israel's aggressive actions" and support for the "Palestinian people" (although not for the Palestine Liberation Organization). Moreover, the usual slogan on Soviet-Arab friendship was altered to exhort the peoples of Arab countries to "rally your ranks," an obvious reflection of Soviet disappointment with the disarray in the Arab world during the Lebanon crisis.

The Soviets have periodically used their holiday slogans to challenge particular aspects of US foreign policy, but this year's slate omitted any such references (except for the generalized "imperialism" rubric). Given recent calls in Soviet media for vigilance in the face of an alleged ideological "crusade" launched by President Reagan, this omission is striking. Indeed, the foreign policy slogans as a whole were largely devoid of the ideological rhetoric so much more evident in this year's internal ones.

In other areas, the slogans remained generally unchanged from previous years. There were no new slogans dealing with African or other Third World concerns; nor was the order and wording of the usual greetings to specific countries altered, except for that on Nicaragua. The latter was moved ahead of El Salvador, perhaps reflecting a subtle change in the order of Soviet priorities in Central America this year.

Prepared by Karen Puschel; Sidney Ploss
x21302

Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - NOVEMBER 15, 1982

39

1. USSR: INVIGORATING THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The USSR is stepping up its covert and overt efforts to stimulate popular opposition to NATO's INF deployments as the scheduled deployment date nears.

* * *

Moscow is encouraging West European communist parties, some of which played an important role in the USSR's 1977 drive to block US deployment of neutron weapons in Europe, to mount campaigns against INF deployment in 1983. To this end, the Soviets have offered both financial assistance and propaganda guidance to the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese parties. Last year, they gave the Greek party (KKE/EXT) some \$1.5 million to finance peace marches, the distribution of anti-American propaganda, and related activities, some of which are scheduled for 1983.

The Soviets also have moved to coordinate support from the major communist international front organizations in particular the World Peace Council (WPC) and its affiliated International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (ICESC). The WPC's 1983 "program of action," which incorporates numerous Soviet suggestions, calls for WPC support of new "mass actions" against INF deployment similar to those staged last June in New York and West Berlin. In addition, the WPC intends to sponsor a massive "World Assembly for Peace and Life Against Nuclear War" in Prague next June 15-19 drawing in all major front groups in Europe.

Soviet officials also have asked Raymond Goor, ICESC President, to take the lead in organizing a disarmament conference to which only "Europeans" will be invited; a preliminary session is scheduled to be held this month in Vienna. The Soviets may in fact count more heavily on the Brussels-based ICESC than on the WPC to attract noncommunist participation in disarmament and security-related forums, since the WPC's Soviet connection is too blatant for many Europeans. Both the WPC and ICESC, however, will work actively with their European-based national affiliates and coordinate their activities with local communist parties.

These preparations come amidst an ever-growing volume of Soviet propaganda giving prominent coverage to anti-nuclear activities, defending the "peace" movement, and attacking alleged US attempts to "slander" it. One theme which will undoubtedly become a major feature figured in a recent TASS release--identification of specific proposed cruise and Pershing II missile sites in Great Britain, Italy, and the FRG.

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NLRR F06-114/7 #9889

BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08

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8913 Dobriansky

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 3, 1983

Soviet
memoranda.

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Soviet "Message of Peace"

NOTED

On December 24, the Soviet Embassy forwarded to State the attached "Message of Peace" (Tab I) issued by the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee, and asked that it be transmitted to the President. The document, addressed to "all parliaments, governments, political parties and peoples of the world," is merely a summary of standard Soviet propaganda themes. Specifically, it cites the prevention of nuclear war as the most important goal, reaffirms the Soviet no-first-use pledge and preparedness to freeze its nuclear arsenals, reiterates Soviet support for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on chemical weapons and urges rapid conclusion of the START and INF talks.

This message does not merit or require the President's attention. No formal diplomatic response will be made by State.

AK SK
Lord and Kraemer concur.

Attachment:

Tab I State memorandum of December 28, forwarding Soviet "Message of Peace"

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NLRR FOI-114/7 #9884

BY CN NARA DATE 7/7/08



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 28, 1982 26 P10: 26

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Soviet "Message of Peace"

The attached "Message of Peace," issued jointly by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, was delivered by the Soviet Embassy to the Department on December 24. The Embassy requested that it be formally transmitted to the President.

The document, a compendium of standard Soviet propaganda themes, is addressed to all parliaments, governments, political parties, and peoples of the world. It identifies the prevention of nuclear war as the most important goal, reaffirms the Soviet non-first-use pledge, and calls for rapid conclusion of the START and INF talks. The "peace message" also reiterates Soviet support for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on chemical weapons. In an indirect criticism of the United States, the document calls for the "earliest resumption of suspended negotiations" on other arms control matters.

In view of the content and purpose of the Soviet "peace message," no formal diplomatic response is required. In the event of questions from the press about the U.S. reaction to the document, we recommend that it be dismissed as a propaganda exercise embodying nothing new of substance.



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Russian text of Soviet "Message of Peace"
and Soviet Embassy's translation

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NLRR 106-114/7 #9890

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: 12/27/88

BY GV NARA DATE 7/7/06

TO THE PARLIAMENTS, GOVERNMENTS,
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD

We, representatives of all the peoples of the USSR, who have assembled in Moscow to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on behalf of 270 million Soviet people, send this Message of Peace to the parliaments, governments, political parties, and peoples of the world.

What the finest minds of humankind have dreamed of for ages - the ending of national strife and discord and the attainment of genuine equality and friendship among different nationalities - has become a reality in our country due to the Leninist policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet State, due to the implementation of the socialist principles of national and social freedom, and the abolition of all forms of oppression and exploitation.

Soviet foreign policy, too, is determined by the new relations between people, between nationalities in our socialist state. Our ideal, our invariable aim and constant concern is that there should be universal peace, friendship, and cooperation among peoples.

The Great October Socialist Revolution rang in a new epoch of history. Having shaken off social and national oppression, the working people created the land of Soviets, a state that has asserted relations of fraternal friendship and equality among peoples, ensuring true freedom, progress, and prosperity to all nationalities.

Durable, dependable, and lasting peace is the first and most compelling need of all people, of all nations, of all humankind.

The need for peace is of special significance today when countries have weapons that can destroy human civilizations and all life on our planet, and when the threat of war, which was appreciably moved back in the 1970s, has again begun to mount and international tension is increasing visibly.

All the efforts of countries, the activities of governments, of organized political parties and movements, and of all citizens of every country should now be addressed to preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Nothing is or can be more important than that.

We, authorized representatives of the Soviet people, solemnly declare that in keeping with the Leninist policy of peace and international cooperation, the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to avert war.

We reaffirm that, in accordance with the commitment it has undertaken, the Soviet Union will not resort to the first use of nuclear weapons and once again call upon the other nuclear powers to undertake a similar commitment.

We declare that the Soviet Union is prepared, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States of America, to freeze its nuclear arsenals.

We urge quick and productive completion of the Soviet-U.S. talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms and on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe, and the earliest reaching of agreement on armed forces and armaments reduction in Central Europe.

We offer coming to agreement without delay on a complete and general nuclear test ban so that no more new kinds and types of nuclear weapons could be developed.

We urge the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

We call for the earliest resumption of suspended negotiations on all other matters concerning the limitation and reduction of armaments.

We call on the legislative bodies and governments of all the countries of the world to contribute actively to the settlement of conflict situations and to the extinguishing of flash points of tension exclusively by political means.

We favour strengthening the United Nations and enhancing its role in consolidating international peace and security.

In furtherance of these objectives, the Soviet Union is prepared to cooperate with all the countries of the world regardless of their political and social systems.

There is a great historic responsibility that devolves these days on all the countries of the world for the present and the future.

Soviet people are convinced that if countries and peoples combine their efforts, they will eliminate the threat of war, preserve and consolidate peace on Earth, and ensure the human right to life. It is precisely to this end that we call upon parliaments, governments, political parties, and peoples of the world to pool their efforts.

SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE USSR

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU

К ПАРЛАМЕНТАМ, ПРАВИТЕЛЬСТВАМ,
ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИМ ПАРТИЯМ И НАРОДАМ МИРА

Мы, представители всех народов СССР, собравшиеся в Москве, чтобы торжественно отметить шестидесятую годовщину образования Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, от имени двухсот семидесяти миллионов советских людей обращаемся к парламентам, правительствам, политическим партиям и народам Земли с этим посланием мира.

То, о чем веками мечтали лучшие умы человечества - преодоление национальной вражды и розни, подлинное равноправие и дружба различных наций, - стало явью в нашей стране благодаря ленинской политике Коммунистической партии и Советского государства, благодаря осуществлению социалистических принципов национальной и социальной свободы, ликвидации всех форм угнетения и эксплуатации.

Новые отношения между людьми, между нациями в социалистическом государстве определяют и внешнюю политику СССР. Наш идеал, наша неизменная цель и постоянная забота - всеобщий мир, дружба и сотрудничество между народами.

Великая Октябрьская социалистическая революция ознаменовала начало новой исторической эпохи. Сбросив социальный и национальный гнет, люди труда создали Страну Советов - государство, утвердившее братскую дружбу и равноправные отношения народов, обеспечившее для всех наций подлинную свободу, прогресс и процветание.

Прочный, надежный, устойчивый мир — это первая и самая настоятельная потребность всех людей, всех народов, всего человечества.

Требование мира приобретает особенно важное значение в нынешних условиях, когда государства располагают оружием, способным уничтожить человеческую цивилизацию, саму жизнь на Земле, и когда угроза войны, которую удалось заметно отодвинуть в 70-х годах, снова стала усиливаться, а международная напряженность ощутимо нарастает.

Все усилия государств, активность правительств, организованных политических сил, всех граждан каждой страны должны быть обращены сейчас на то, чтобы не допустить ядерной катастрофы. Нет и не может быть более важного вопроса.

Мы, полномочные представители советского народа, торжественно заявляем, что Советский Союз, следуя ленинской политике мира и международного сотрудничества, сделает все от него зависящее для предотвращения войны.

Мы подтверждаем, что в соответствии с принятым на себя обязательством Советский Союз не прибегнет первым к применению ядерного оружия, и еще раз обращаемся к другим ядерным державам с призывом взять на себя такое же обязательство.

Мы заявляем о готовности Советского Союза заморозить на взаимной основе с Соединенными Штатами Америки арсеналы своего ядерного оружия.

Мы выступаем за быстрое и результативное завершение советско-американских переговоров об ограничении и сокращении

стратегических вооружений и об ограничении ядерных вооружений в Европе, за быстрое достижение договоренности о сокращении вооруженных сил и вооружений в Центральной Европе.

Мы предлагаем безотлагательно договориться о полном и всеобщем запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия с тем, чтобы больше не могли создаваться его новые виды и типы.

Мы выступаем за запрещение и уничтожение химического оружия.

Мы призываем к скорейшему возобновлению прерванных переговоров по всем другим вопросам ограничения и сокращения вооружений.

Мы обращаемся к законодательным органам и правительствам всех государств мира с призывом активно содействовать урегулированию конфликтных ситуаций и очагов напряженности исключительно политическими средствами.

Мы выступаем за укрепление Организации Объединенных Наций, повышение ее роли в упрочении международного мира и безопасности.

Во имя этих целей Советский Союз готов сотрудничать со всеми государствами мира независимо от их политических и социальных систем.

Велика историческая ответственность, лежащая ныне на всех государствах мира, ответственность за настоящее и будущее.

Советские люди убеждены, что государства и народы, объединив свои усилия, смогут победить военную угрозу, сохранить и упрочить мир на Земле, обеспечить право человека на жизнь. К такому объединению усилий мы призываем парламенты, правительства, политические партии и народы Земли.

ВЕРХОВНЫЙ СОВЕТ
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
КОММУНИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ПАРТИИ
СОВЕТСКОГО СОЮЗА

National Security Council
The White House

8913
add-on

Package # _____

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>		<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information

cc: VP

Van, NSC/S 12/29
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J

TO

1

National Security Council
The White House

8913

Package # 8913

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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BY CV NARADATE 7/7/08

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 132168

NODIS
GENEVA FOR USSCC - ELLIS ONLY; PARIS FOR A/SEC BURT ONLY
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, MNUC, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO U. S. SECOND DEMARCHE ON
- - PL-5 ICBM. - -

REF: A) STATE 114209 B) STATE 68969 C) STATE 57582

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, DURING MAY 11 CALL ON ACTING SECRETARY DAM, DELIVERED "ORAL STATEMENT" RESPONDING TO U. S. APRIL 25 DEMARCHE ON SOVIET TEST OF PL-5 ICBM (REF A). TEXT OF SOVIET DEMARCHE, TRANSLATED FROM RUSSIAN NON-PAPER, IS IN PARA 3. ACTING SECRETARY SAID U. S. WOULD HAVE TO STUDY SOVIET STATEMENT CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF SOVIET DEMARCHE:

-- THE SOVIET SIDE, AS A GESTURE OF GOOD WILL, HAS ALREADY PROVIDED CLARIFICATIONS REGARDING THE MISSILE

ICALLY POINTED OUT THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT ONE OF A NEW MISSILE, BUT OF THE MODERNIZATION OF THE EXISTING ICBM KNOWN IN THE U. S. AS THE SS-13, AND THAT THE MODERNIZATION OF THE MISSILE IS BEING CARRIED OUT IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT-II TREATY. IT WAS SAID ALSO THAT THE SOVIET UNION, IN TESTING MISSILES, DOES NOT ENGAGE IN DELIBERATE DENIAL OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION WHEN SUCH DENIAL WOULD IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.

-- MOREOVER, ATTENTION SHOULD BE DRAWN TO THE FACT THAT AMONG THE QUESTIONS NEWLY RAISED BY THE U. S. SIDE, THERE ARE THOSE THE ANSWER TO WHICH, IT SEEMS, IS WELL KNOWN. THIS APPLIES, FOR INSTANCE, TO THE QUESTION OF SUCH CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET MISSILE AS THE NUMBER OF STAGES, THE LENGTH, THE LARGEST DIAMETER AND THE TYPE OF PROPELLANT. THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT-II TREATY COULD CONFIRM THAT THE SAID CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET MISSILE LAUNCHED ON

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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TELEGRAM

52

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2168 DTG: 121810Z MAY 83 PSN: 024184

FEBRUARY 8 WERE ENTIRELY WITHIN THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY THE TREATY FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF ICBMS. BUT SINCE THE U. S. SIDE HAS SOME SORT OF AMBIGUITIES IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY THAT THE MODERNIZED MISSILE HAS THE SAME NUMBER OF STAGES AS THE SS-13 MISSILE, AND DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THE LATTER EITHER IN DIAMETER OR IN THE TYPE OF PROPELLANT (SOLID). WITHIN THE LIMITS ALLOWED BY THE SALT-II TREATY, THE LENGTH OF THE MISSILE IS SOMEWHAT REDUCED, AND ITS LAUNCH-WEIGHT AND THROW-WEIGHT ARE DECREASED AS WELL, AS IS PERMITTED BY THE THIRD COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO ARTICLE IV, PARAPGRAPH 9 OF THE SALT-II TREATY.

-- IT SHOULD ALSO BE STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT DEPART FROM THE PROVISION OF THE TREATY CONCERNING THE TESTING OF A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE; ITS WEIGHT IS NO LESS THAN FIFTY PERCENT OF THE THROW-WEIGHT OF THE MISSILE.

-- FROM ALL THIS IT CLEARLY FOLLOWS THAT THE MISSILE LAUNCH OF FEBRUARY 8 WAS CARRIED OUT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM OF MODERNIZATION OF THE SS-13 MISSILE, WHICH HAS BEEN OPERATIONAL FOR A LONG TIME.

-- AS TO THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THIS MODERNIZED MISSILE TO THE "RS-14" MISSILE, KNOWN IN THE U. S. AS THE SS-16, THE VERY FACT OF RAISING THIS QUESTION

PLYING WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS NOT TO TEST, PRODUCE OR DEPLOY THE SS-16 MISSILE. THE MISSILE LAUNCH OF FEBRUARY 8 HAS NO CONNECTION TO THE SS-16 MISSILE. ONE CANNOT CALL OTHER THAN ABSURD THE ASSUMPTION THAT, FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE SS-13 MISSILE, DESIGNS WOULD HAVE BEEN USED WHICH HAVE LONG BECOME OBSOLETE, HAVING BEEN DEVELOPED PRACTICALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CREATION OF THE SS-13 ICBM NOW BEING MODERNIZED.

-- SUCH QUESTIONS CANNOT BUT RAISE DOUBTS AS TO THE ACTUAL AIMS BEING PURSUED HERE. THE IMPRESSION IS THAT SOMEONE WOULD LIKE TO PORTRAY THE SOVIET UNION, WITHOUT ANY GROUNDS, AS A VIOLATOR OF PREVIOUSLY ACHIEVED AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND THUS TO COMPLICATE THE WORKING OUT OF MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

-- IN LIGHT OF THE EXHAUSTIVE CLARIFICIONS ABOVE, THE U. S. SIDE SHOULD BE LEFT WITH NO DOUBTS WHATSOEVER THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS OBSERVING IN FULL THE PROVISIONS OF THE SALT-II TREATY ESTABLISHING THE LIMITS FOR CARRYING OUT MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING ICBMS.

END TEXT

4. ALSO PRESENT ON U. S. SIDE WERE UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER, PM DIRECTOR HOWE, AND EUR DAS PALMER.
SHULTZ
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SOV: MILITARY
53

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02
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NLRR F06-114/7 #9893

BY CJ NARA DATE 7/7/08

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5957

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 05230

NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, UR
SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ ANDROPOV PROPOSAL FOR BMD TALKS

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IT IS CLEAR FROM DOBRYNIN'S REMARKS THAT THE THRUST OF ANDROPOV'S PROPOSAL FOR BMD TALKS, WHICH SURFACED FIRST IN HIS DER SPIEGEL INTERVIEW, IS TO "PREVENT" AN ACCELERATED U. S. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IN THAT AREA. BY PROPOSING THAT ONLY SCIENTISTS MEET, THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY HOPE TO EXPLOIT THE TALKS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES AND, UNDOUBTEDLY, TO LEARN FROM U. S. SCIENTISTS MORE ABOUT OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES AND PROMISING LEADS FOR R-AND-D. FURTHER CONFIRMING OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA INTENT, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY IN MOSCOW SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES VICE PRESIDENT VELIKHOV SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT YET RESPONDED TO ANDROPOV'S OFFER (SEPTEL). THUS, FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS SHOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. NEVERTHELESS, I SEE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN NOT FLATLY REFUSING THE ANDROPOV IDEA; BUT WE SHOULD AGREE TO IT ONLY IF TALKS ARE BROAD ENOUGH TO DEAL WITH THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES RELATED TO STRATEGIC STABILITY: NOT JUST BMD BUT ALSO, FOR EXAMPLE, ICBM VULNERABILITY. TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS WE COULD RESPOND TO THE SOVIETS THAT TALKS AMONG EXPERTS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, INCLUDING THOSE PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIC FORCES STRUCTURES WHICH ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER MIGHT VIEWS AS DESTABILIZING, COULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE.

4. IN MY VIEW, THE START CONTEXT IS THE APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR SUCH TALKS, SINCE WE ARE ALREADY DEALING WITH IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF STRATEGIC STABILITY IN GENEVA. WE COULD PROPOSE TO THE SOVIETS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SUB-GROUP IN THE START CONTEXT THAT COULD INCLUDE SCIENTISTS, ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS, ETC.

5. IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT AGREE, WE CAN INFORM THE ALLIES AND THE CONGRESS THAT WE RESPONDED POSITIVELY AND RESPONSIBLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. IF THE SOVIETS DO AGREE, WE WILL HAVE A VENUE AND AN AGENDA CONSISTENT WITH OUR PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED INTEREST (IN START AND IN WASHINGTON) IN DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. THE BOTTOM-LINE CONDITION IS THAT THE TALKS INVOLVE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US AS WELL AS TO THE SOVIETS. HARTMAN

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54

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 5230

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 04293

USSCC/US CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: 4/8/89
AGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE: SOVIET
- PRESS CONFERENCE
REF: MOSCOW 4212

1. ~~ACT~~ SUMMARY: SECOND-STRING SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS TODAY UNVEILED THE NEW BOOKLET, "HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE," BUT AT A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR THE OCCASION WESTERN REPORTERS SHOWED INTEREST MAINLY IN THE SOVIET INF POSITION. IN LINE WITH GROMYKO'S EVASIVENESS LAST WEEK ON HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD RESPOND IF U.S. INF MISSILES WERE DEPLOYED, GENERAL MAJOR MIKHAYLOV DID NOT PROVIDE A CLEAR ANSWER. AT ANOTHER POINT, HE SHOWED CONSTERNATION WHEN THE USA INSTITUTE'S COL (RET.) SEMEYKO SAID THAT ANDROPOV'S DECEMBER 21 PROPOSAL WOULD LEAVE THE USSR WITH WARHEAD

SUPERIORITY ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. SURPRISINGLY, SEMEYKO ALSO IMPLIED THAT THIS ADVANTAGE WAS JUSTIFIED BY U.S. WARHEAD SUPERIORITY ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. END SUMMARY.

THE CAST OF CHARACTERS

2. ~~ACT~~ THE APRIL 8 PRESS CONFERENCE TO UNVEIL THE NEW BOOKLET, "HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE" (HEREINAFTER, "AVERT"), WAS CHAIRED AT THE BEGINNING BY ALEKSEY SHITIKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF UNION AND ALSO CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY, THE PRINCIPAL SPONSOR OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE. SOVIET PRESS OFFICIALS HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT VADIM ZAGLADIN, FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CPSU CC'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, WOULD CHAIR THE PRESS CONFERENCE. ZAGLADIN IS A MORE AUTHORITATIVE SPOKESMAN THAN SHITIKOV. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE AUTHORITY AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO WHOM OTHER SPEAKERS OFTEN DEFERRED WAS THE GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATIVE, GENERAL MAJOR KONSTANTIN MIKHAYLOV, A DEPUTY TO GENERAL COLONEL CHERVOV. OTHER STRATEGIC ANALYSTS AND SECOND-STRING PROPAGANDISTS ON THE PODIUM INCLUDED: CC INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT CONSULTANT VADIM SOBAKIN, THE USA INSTITUTE'S ZHURKIN, MILSHTEYN, AND SEMEYKO, AND IMEMO'S BYKOV AND PROEKTOR.

INF QS AND AS

3. ~~ACT~~ AFTER MAKING A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT WHICH REPLAYED THEMES IN "AVERT" (REFTEL), SHITIKOV ENTERTAINED QUESTIONS. MOST WESTERN REPORTERS ASKED ABOUT INF. HIGHLIGHTS FROM SOVIET RESPONSES FOLLOW.

4. ~~ACT~~ BYKOV SAID THE U.S. INTERIM PROPOSAL WAS NOT EQUITABLE, FOR IT WOULD "SOMEWHAT REDUCE" U.S. SYSTEMS BUT "SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE" SOVIET SYSTEMS. ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO AN ACCORD WHICH ALLOWED SOME U.S. MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, MIKHAYLOV DID NOT PROVIDE A CLEAR ANSWER. CONSENT TO SUCH DEPLOYMENTS, HE SAID, WOULD MEAN CONSENT TO IMBALANCE IN MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. A BALANCE EXISTS NOW. REGARDING A SOLUTION IN WHICH THE USSR WOULD UNDERTAKE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS BT

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NLRR F06-114/7 #9894
BY CW NARADATE 7/7/08

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56

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 04293

USSCC/US CD DEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: 4/8/89
AGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE: SOVIET
- PRESS CONFERENCE
AND THE U.S. WOULD DEPLOY "SOME" NEW MISSILES, "ONE CANNOT
REDUCE AND DEPLOY IN THAT WAY." IT IS "DIFFICULT TO
IMAGINE" THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED.
INTERESTINGLY, MIKHAYLOV ALSO SAID THAT "HOW THE BALANCE
IS TO BE REPRESENTED" IS A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

5. (U) ON THE ISSUE OF ASIAN INF,
"HUNDREDS OF AIRCRAFT" ON U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN TH
SIXTH AND SEVENTH FLEETS,
KOREA, AND "OTHER" MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

6. (C) ASKED ABOUT TARGETING OF SS-20S, MIKHAYLOV

REPLIED WITH A SMILE, "THEY WILL BE TARGETED WHERE IT WILL
BE NECESSARY." (COMMENT: THIS CANDID RESPONSE CONTRASTS
AGAINST OCCASIONAL SOVIET CLAIMS TO VARIOUS EUROPEANS AND
TO THE JAPANESE THAT SS-20S ARE NOT TARGETED ON "YOUR
COUNTRY.")

7. (U) ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REDEPLOYMENT
FORWARD TO EUROPE OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, MIKHAYLOV SAID
THAT MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES COULD NOT BE MOVED FORWARD
IN A MATTER OF "HOURS OR DAYS." AIRCRAFT CAN BE DEPLOYED
FORWARD FROM SIBERIA TO EUROPE NO FASTER THAN THE U.S.
CAN BRING AIRCRAFT FROM ITS TERRITORY TO EUROPE.

AN INF DEBATE

8. (U) THE MOST INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRESS
CONFERENCE WAS THE EMERGENCE OF A SUBTLE DIFFERENCE OF
VIEW BETWEEN SEMEYKO AND MIKHAYLOV ON WHETHER THE ANDROPOV
DECEMBER 21 PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE THE USSR WARHEAD
SUPERIORITY ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE.

9. (U) SEMEYKO SAID THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL INVOLVES
MISSILE EQUALITY WITH NATO. SINCE THE SS-20 HAS THREE
WARHEADS, "THIS WOULD GIVE THE SOVIET UNION WARHEAD
SUPERIORITY." BUT, REMEMBER, THE U.S. HAS A
"PREPONDERANCE IN STRATEGIC WARHEADS."

10. (U) MIKHAYLOV QUICKLY INTERJECTED THAT "AIRCRAFT
CAN CARRY SEVERAL BOMBS," AND THUS "THE THING IS TO GET
A BALANCE ON WARHEADS AND CHARGES." SOBAKIN ADDED THAT
THE BRITISH AND FRENCH ARE MOVING TO MIRV THEIR SUBMARINE-

LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES.

COMMENT

11. (U) SEMEYKO IS OF COURSE RIGHT ABOUT THE ANDROPOV
PROPOSAL. IF BOTH SIDES WERE TO HAVE 138 AIRCRAFT IN
EUROPE OF COMPARABLE CAPABILITY, AND IF THE SOVIET
UNION WERE TO HAVE 162 SS-20S TO "COUNTER" 162 BRITISH
AND FRENCH MISSILES, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE WARHEAD
SUPERIORITY. THE ADVANTAGE IN INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETABLE
MISSILE WARHEADS WOULD BE EVEN GREATER SINCE THE BRITISH
POLARIS MISSILE WARHEADS DO NOT HAVE THIS CAPABILITY.
BT

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57
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 04293

USSCC/US CD DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL: 4/8/89

AGS: MNUC, PARM

SUBJECT: HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE: SOVIET

- PRESS CONFERENCE

SEMEYKO'S SURPRISING ACKNOWLEDGMENT TAKES ON ADDED SIGNIFICANCE IN LIGHT OF GROMYKO'S COMMENT LAST WEEK THAT "WARHEADS ARE A MATHEMATICALLY MORE ACCURATE EXPRESSION OF THE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" (READ: THAN ARE LAUNCHERS).

12. (C) NEVERTHELESS, SEMEYKO'S COMMENT WAS A PROPAGANDA BLUNDER. SOVIET SPOKESMEN DO NOT NORMALLY REFER TO WARHEAD COMPARISONS IMPLICIT UNDER ANDROPOV'S PROPOSAL. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE NEVER HEARD A SOVIET ARGUE THAT THE SOVIETS DESERVED WARHEAD SUPERIORITY ON MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS TO OFFSET U.S. WARHEAD SUPERIORITY ON INTER-CONTINENTAL ATTACK SYSTEMS. OVER THE LONGER-TERM SOBAKIN'S

POINT IS CORRECT: EACH NEW BRITISH AND FRENCH SLBM WILL HAVE TWO OR MORE TIMES THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AS ARE ON THE SS-20.

13. (C) THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS FAR MORE ANIMATED THAN THOSE TYPICALLY ARRANGED BY THE SOVIETS. IN SOME WAYS IT APPROACHED BEING THE "ROUND-TABLE" THAT WAS ADVERTISED. AN OVERFLOW CROWD OF JOURNALISTS WHO HAD BEEN HEAVILY PRESSED BY THE MFA TO ATTEND THIS "MAJOR" EVENT, WERE SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED AT THE LOW LEVEL OF OFFICIALS PRESENT, BUT TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK TOUGHER AND MORE POINTED QUESTIONS THAN USUAL, AND EVEN TO PRESS FOR BETTER ANSWERS. WHILE ONLY MILDLY NEWSWORTHY IN CONTENT, THE TWO-HOUR PRESS CONFERENCE WAS UNUSUALLY FRANK AND OPEN. AS ONE REPORTER PUT IT AFTER THE SESSION WAS OVER, THE GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK AND THE ONE TODAY SHOWS THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY TURNING ON THE HARD SELL. HARTMAN
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED
SIGNED

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: DOD Publication Soviet Military Power, 1983

FILE
SOV,
military 1361
Dobriansky: 59
on "rom"

Issue

Providing former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter with the revised version of the DOD document Soviet Military Power, 1983.

Facts

- DOD has revised its unclassified description of Soviet military power to reflect improvements in Soviet military capabilities which have occurred since the first version was printed in 1981.
- Cap will formally present the publication, which is now being printed, to you on March 8 during your regular 9:30 a.m. national security briefing.
- As part of your overall public diplomacy initiative, Bill Greener, who is overseeing the public affairs program to support the defense budget, has planned a variety of events to highlight the publication of Soviet Military Power, 1983.
- One element of this plan is to have you send former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter copies of the new publication.

Recommendation

OK No

_____ That you sign the letters to former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter

Prepared by:
Robert W. Helm

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE

FROM: BOB HELM *AA*

SUBJECT: Draft Letters to Former Presidents Regarding Soviet Military Power, 1983

Secretary Weinberger has forwarded draft letters for the President's signature, transmitting the newest version of the DOD publication, Soviet Military Power, to former President's Nixon, Ford, and Carter.

This is in accordance with the public affairs plan developed by Bill Greener for the publication.

Recommendation

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Bob *NS* Sims concurs.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- Tab A - Letters to Former Presidents

61

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

Dear President Carter:

I thought you would be interested to see the updated version of Soviet Military Power.

I know that during your Presidency you, too were dismayed by the steady relentless nature of Soviet military expansion. It has seemed to me that in order to understand this threat fully the American people need access to some of the intelligence information that influenced our own thinking. In late 1981, therefore, the Department of Defense declassified much of the data on Soviet forces, and put it into the first edition of Soviet Military Power. This second edition will bring this up-to-date, and will also give the American people a better opportunity to compare Soviet forces directly with our own and our allies'.

The facts in this book are straightforward. The Soviet Union has not slowed the pace of its enormous military build-up. In little over a year, they have begun testing new models in almost every class of nuclear weapons. They are dramatically expanding their Navy and Air Force. They are training and equipping their ground forces for preemptive attack. They are using their military power to extend their influence and enforce their will in every corner of the globe.

I believe we can halt this Soviet build-up and get the Soviets to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction only if we show our strong, bipartisan resolve not to let the military balance tip against us. Your leadership is very important here; and this book should aid you.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
Box 350
Plains, Georgia 31780

62

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

Dear President Ford:

I thought you would be interested to see the updated version of Soviet Military Power.

During your Presidency, you alerted our nation to the steady, relentless nature of Soviet military expansion, and the need to devote more of our resources to defense. In continuing that effort, I have felt that the American people need access to some of the intelligence information that influenced our own thinking. In late 1981, therefore, the Department of Defense declassified much of the data on Soviet forces, and put it into the first edition of Soviet Military Power. This second edition will bring this up-to-date, and will also give the American people a better opportunity to compare Soviet forces directly with our own and our allies'.

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Like you, I believe we can halt this one nation arms race and get the Soviets to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction only if we show our resolve not to let the military balance tip against us. I have appreciated your help in this effort and urge your continued support.

I hope you know how much I value your support and counsel.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Gerald R. Ford
P.O. Box 927
Rancho Mirage, California 92270

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

Dear President Nixon:

I thought you would be interested to see the updated version of Soviet Military Power.

In The Real War, you made the compelling point that, "with the spectre of strategic inferiority staring us in the face, we must act now to restore the balance of power so that we can deter Soviet aggression and retain freedom for ourselves and all nations.

You have done a great service in alerting our nation to the steady, relentless nature of Soviet military expansion, and the need to devote more of our resources to defense. In pursuing that effort I have felt that the American people need access to some of the intelligence information that influenced our own thinking. In late 1981, therefore, the Department of Defense declassified much of the data on Soviet forces, and put it into the first edition of Soviet Military Power. This second edition will bring this up-to-date, and will also give the American people a better opportunity to compare Soviet forces directly with our own and our allies'.

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Like you, I believe we can halt this one nation arms race and get the Soviets to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction only if we show our strong, bipartisan resolve not to let the military balance tip against us. I have appreciated your help in this effort and urge your continued support.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
26 Federal Plaza, Suite 1309
New York, New York 10278

SOVIET MILITARY POWER

11/30/65

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

28 FEB 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE CLARK

SUBJECT: Draft Talking Paper for President
Reagan -- Soviet Military Power

Attached is a draft talking paper for President Reagan to use on 8 March when he formally accepts Soviet Military Power, and also draft letters from President Reagan to former Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. These follow-up on Bill Greener's public relations plan.

Draft Presidential Statement on Soviet Military Power

Our defense policy is based on a very simple premise: the United States will not start fights. We will not be the first to use aggression. We will not seek to occupy other lands or control other peoples. Our strategy is defensive; our aim is to deter war by ensuring that no adversaries ever conclude they could best us in a war of their own choosing.

What this means is that we design our defense program not to further ambitions, but to counter threats. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the greatest of these threats comes from the Soviet Union, the only nation with the military power to inflict mortal damage directly on the United States.

This also means that if the American people are asked to support our defense program, they must get the straight facts about this threat. The Defense Department's first edition of Soviet Military Power gave them those facts; this revised edition will keep them up to date and will give them a new opportunity to compare Soviet forces with our own.

The facts in this book are straightforward. The Soviet Union has not slowed the pace of its enormous military buildup. In little over a year they have begun testing new models in almost every class of nuclear weapons. They are dramatically expanding their Navy and Air Force. They are training and equipping their ground forces for preemptive attack. They are using their military power to extend their influence and enforce their will in every corner of the globe.

We must continue to demonstrate our resolve not to allow the military balance to tip against the United States. And in demonstrating

that resolve, we will not only deter aggression, but we will also offer the Soviets a real incentive to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction.

Let me quote a statement Winston Churchill made to the House of Commons in late 1934, as he urged the British to stop dismantling their defenses:

"To urge the preparation of defense is not to assert the imminence of war. I do not believe that war is imminent or that war is inevitable, but....that if we do not begin forthwith to put ourselves in a position of security, it will soon be beyond our power to do so."

Draft Letter from President Reagan to President Nixon

I though you would be interested to see the updated version of Soviet Military Power.

In The Real War, you made the compelling point that "with the spectre of strategic inferiority staring us in the face, we must act now to restore the balance of power so that we can deter Soviet aggression and retain freedom for ourselves and all nations."

You have done a great service in alerting our nation to the steady, relentless nature of Soviet military expansion, and the need to devote more of our resources to defense. In pursuing that effort I have felt that the American people need access to some of the intelligence information that influenced our own thinking. In late 1981, therefore, the Department of Defense declassified much of the data on Soviet forces, and put it into the first edition of Soviet Military Power. This second edition will bring this up-to-date, and will also give the American people a better opportunity to compare Soviet forces directly with our own and our allies'.

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Like you, I believe we can halt this one nation arms race and get the Soviets to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction

only if we show our resolve not to let the military balance tip against us.. I have appreciated your help for our efforts; this book should give you some new ammunition.

Draft Letter from President Reagan to President Ford

I thought you would be interested to see the updated version of Soviet Military Power.

During your Presidency you alerted our nation to the steady, relentless nature of Soviet military expansion, and the need to devote more of our resources to defense. In continuing that effort, I have felt that the American people need access to some of the intelligence information that influenced our own thinking. In late 1981, therefore, the Department of Defense declassified much of the data on Soviet forces, and put it into the first edition of Soviet Military Power. This second edition will bring this up-to-date, and will also give the American people a better opportunity to compare Soviet forces directly with our own and our allies'.

The facts in this book are straightforward. The Soviet Union has not slowed the pace of its enormous military buildup. In little over a year they have begun testing new models in almost every class of nuclear weapons. They are dramatically expanding their Navy and Air Force. They are training and equipping their ground forces for preemptive attack. They are using their military power to extend their influence and enforce their will in every corner of the globe.

Like you, I believe we can halt this one nation arms race and get the Soviets to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction only if we show our resolve not to let the military balance tip against us. I have appreciated your help for our efforts; this book should give you some new ammunition.

I hope you know how much I value your support and counsel.

Draft Letter from President Reagan to President Carter

I though you would be interested to see the updated version of Soviet Military Power.

I know that during your Presidency you, too, were dismayed by the steady relentless nature of Soviet military expansion. It has seemed to me that in order to understand this threat fully, the American people need access to some of the intelligence information that influenced our own thinking. In late 1981, therefore, the Department of Defense declassified much of the data on Soviet forces, and put it into the first edition of Soviet Military Power. This second edition will bring this up-to-date, and will also give the American people a better opportunity to compare Soviet forces directly with our own and our allies'.

The facts in this book are straightforward. The Soviet Union has not slowed the pace of its enormous military buildup. In little over a year they have begun testing new models in almost every class of nuclear weapons. They are dramatically expanding their Navy and Air Force. They are training and equipping their ground forces for preemptive attack. They are using their military power to extend their influence and enforce their will in every corner of the globe.

I believe we can halt this Soviet buildup and get the Soviets to accept genuine, mutual arms reduction only if we show our strong, bipartisan resolve not to let the military balance tip against us. Your leadership is very important here; and this book should give you some new ammunition.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

72

Secret

Mar. 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR

*Paula Dobrensky
Susan Kraemer
Bob Lindner*

FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of *Nov 5*

The following excerpt is for your information:

2. Demarche to Soviets on New ICBM Tests. Assistant Secretary Richard Burt called in Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov on Wednesday to raise the Soviets' ICBM test on February 8. We are concerned that this test may be inconsistent with the SALT II provision prohibiting flight-testing of more than one new type of ICBM. Rick noted that the missile tested on February 8 was distinctly different from the new "RS-22" ICBM tested last October. He asked for an explanation of the test in light of previous Soviet statements that they have a policy similar to our own of not undercutting existing agreements. Sokolov promised to seek a reply from Moscow.

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BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08Secret

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TO CLARK FROM DAILEY, P

DOCDATE 03 MAR 83

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CIS NARA, Date 7/12/02

KEYWORDS: MILITARY POSTURE NATO WEINBERGER, C
ARMS CONTROL USSR
MEDIA

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF UPDATED VERSION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 07 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

HELM

BOVERIE

KRAEMER

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United States Department of State



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NLRR F06-114/7 #19896

Washington, D.C. 20520

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BY CS NARADATE 7/7/08

March 3, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Release of Updated Version of Soviet Military Power

I appreciated our meeting Monday. It was most informative. My concerns about the telecast circuit satellite broadcast to Europe have lessen considerably. I was not aware that it was a closed circuit to Brussels for a specific audience. I was under the misconception that it was for broad scale viewing throughout Europe.

It is my understanding that your telecast will include Secretary Luns in Brussels. That will be most helpful in increasing the NATO content of our message. It is important that Europeans understand that our defense posture as it relates to Europe and particularly for intermediate range nuclear weapons is a NATO defense rather than American weapons being placed on European soil.

Following are some additional points which I believe will help enhance our position with the European public and follows up on themes the President and Vice President have used with great success.

1. NATO is a defensive alliance. Our assessment of Soviet military power indicates what we must do to assure our security. Our programs for weapons modernization and replacement, are designed only to reestablish the "margin of safety," that balance of nuclear power, technology, and conventional forces which provides for our security and deters Soviet aggression.
2. Our preferred objective is arms reductions, not arms buildup. We are pursuing defense modernization on a contingency basis. The Soviets should know that we will meet any challenge they present, but that we would prefer to join with them in an effort to reduce the number of weapons.
3. Our nuclear programs are designed to modernize and replace existing nuclear forces. We are not simply adding weapon upon

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

by CS NARA, Date 7/7/02CONFIDENTIAL

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weapon. We have fewer weapons and less explosive power today than we did 15 years ago. We are satisfied with this position since we are regaining the margin of safety.

4. The President's proposal to eliminate an entire category of intermediate range nuclear weapons from the face of the earth is a sincere one. It goes beyond anything proposed by various peace and nuclear freeze groups. We hope to have a serious response from the Soviet Union. As yet we have heard nothing but talk. There has been no serious proposal presented at the negotiating table in Geneva that meets the reasonable criteria outlined in the President's speech February 22.

In order to better communicate with the public here and in Europe, we believe that all of us should refrain from acronyms or jargon and spell out our terms. It is important that we explain the President's Zero Option Proposal as "The President's proposal to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons from the face of the entire earth."

Many thanks for all your help.



Peter H. Dailey, Chairman
Interagency Committee for
European Security and Arms Control

cc:
STATE - Secretary Shultz
NSC - William P. Clark
USIA- Charles Z. Wick

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