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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 5/9/2005

**File Folder** USSR-EUROPE

**FOIA**

F06-114/7

**Box Number** 25

YARHI-MILO

2514

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9807	CABLE	241711Z FEB 81 <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	5	2/24/1981	B1
9808	CABLE	050315Z MAR 81 <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	3/5/1981	B1
9815	MEMO	PRAVDA SEES FRICTIONS BETWEEN U.S., NATO ALLIES <b>R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/7</b>	1	5/6/1981	B1
9809	PAPER	USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: NEW SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES AGAINST TNF <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	5/27/1981	B1
9810	PAPER	BREZHNEV ON THE NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	1	6/30/1981	B1
9811	PAPER	MALTA: SOVIETS TO OPEN EMBASSY	1	9/23/1981	B1
9805	PAPER	SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" IN THE NETHERLANDS <b>D 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	1	10/17/1981	B1 B3
9812	CABLE	061748Z NOV 81 <b>PAR 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	2	11/6/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9814	[PAPER	SOVIET "PEACENICKS:" SEDATED BUT STILL EMBARRASING <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	1/22/1983	B1
9806	MEMO	USSR: MOSCOW "PEACE MARCHES"	1	10/2/1983	B1
9813	PAPER	SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NORDIC STATES <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	6	11/15/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ALLIES

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NLRR Feb-14/7 #9807

BY C/N NARADATE 7/7/08

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5246

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID 3683  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8875  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3005

FYI (West European  
Perception of  
Brezhnev's Speech)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 11 2

MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
E.O.12 65: RDS-1 2 24 1 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W.) OR-P  
TAGS: NATO, UR  
SUBJECT: (C) POLADS DISCUSSION OF BREZHNEV SPEECH  
REF: STATE 45953

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF BREZHNEV SPEECH AT POLADS FEBRUARY 24, ALLIES SAW A MIXTURE OF PREDICTABLE THEMES AND OLD PROPOSALS MIXED WITH ONE OR TWO INTERESTING NEW ELEMENTS. FRENCH AND GERMAN REPS SAW SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER GEOGRAPHIC EXTENSION OF CBM'S AS THE MOST INTERESTING NEW ELEMENT AND ONE WHICH REPRESENTS A DEPARTURE FROM PAST SOVIET RIGIDITY ON THE ZONE OF APPLICATION. GERMAN REP NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BREZHNEV SPEECH, WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON PEACE AND DETENTE, WAS ONLY HALF OF THE FAMILIAR "CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH AND SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE HARD-LINE USTINOV SPEECH BEFORE THE PARTY CONGRESS. ITALIAN REP CAUTIONED THAT BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, WHILE SELF-SERVING AND NOTHING NEW, COULD NONETHELESS COMPLICATE THE DELICATE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION ON TNF IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES. POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGREED TO MEET MONDAY, MARCH 2 FOR FURTHER EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL ANALYSES OF BREZHNEV SPEECH. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARA

9. END SUMMARY.

\*\*\*\*\*WHRS COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

NAN COL VP  
EOB:EURE, EURW, DEPOL

PSN:015179

PAGE 01

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3. FRENCH REP FOUND IN BREZHNEV SPEECH A NUMBER OF PREDICTABLE THEMES, NOTABLY THE REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AND THE PORTRAYAL OF THE USSR AS PEACE-LOVING AND MODERATE. TO HAVE DONE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE FAILURE OF BREZHNEV'S EMPHASIS ON DETENTE. THE SEVERAL PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE BREZHNEV SPEECH SEEMED INTENDED TO PROMOTE A RETURN TO DETENTE; HOWEVER, THEY WERE FOR THE MOST PART REPETITIONS OF OLD SOVIET PROPOSALS AND DO NOT SEEM TO REFLECT ANY NEW FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS CASE, ALSO, THE APPROACH WAS TO HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, IN THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO CONCEDE ANY OF THE ADVANTAGES THEY HAD WON IN RECENT YEARS.

4. THE INDICATION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND THE GEOGRAPHIC ZONE OF APPLICATION OF CBM'S IS THE MOST IMPORTANT NEW PROPOSAL. HE NOTED THIS SOVIET WILLINGNESS WAS CONDITIONAL ON WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND THE CBM ZONE ACCORDINGLY AND IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT THIS MEANT. NONETHELESS, THIS REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM PAST SOVIET POLICY, DESTROYING THE EARLIER RIGID LINE THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC ZONE OF APPLICATION HAD BEEN SET "ONCE AND FOR ALL" BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (I.E., 25 KM). FRENCH REP COMMENTED THAT THIS SHIFT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON CBM'S DEMONSTRATED THE WISDOM OF THE WESTERN POLICY OF FIRMNESS ON THIS SCORE.

5. FRENCH REP ALSO COMMENTED ON BREZHNEV'S LINKING OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE SOVIET PERSIAN GULF SECURITY PROPOSAL, SUGGESTING THIS DEMONSTRATED CONTINUED SOVIET STRATEGIC PUSH TOWARDS THE STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF/SOUTHWEST ASIA. IN THIS REGARD, HE RECALLED HIS EARLIER COMMENTS ON THE IOZP (USNATO 639), NOTING THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO BE CAUTIOUS IN OPPOSING AN IOZP CONFERENCE THIS YEAR SO AS NOT TO APPEAR SO NEGATIVE AND INFLEXIBLE THAT AREA STATES INTERESTED IN THE IOZP CONCEPT MIGHT BE ATTRACTED TO THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL.

6. CANADIAN REP AGREED THAT MUCH OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH WAS PREDICTABLE AND A REPETITION OF OLD PROPOSALS. AT THE SAME TIME HE CAUTIONED THAT SOVIET EMPHASIS ON PEACE, DETENTE AND NEGOTIATIONS WAS INTENDED TO PLAY ESPECIALLY TO EUROPEAN AUDIENCES WHO ARE NERVOUS ABOUT A DETERIORATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND WESTERN CALLS FOR AN ARMS BUILDUP. THE BREZHNEV FLEXIBILITY ON CBM'S, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO PUT THE BALL IN THE WEST'S COURT, BY A DEMONSTRATION OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, PROVIDING THE WEST RECIPROCATED. WHILE IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE

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BREZHNEV CONDITION OF RECIPROCITY MEANT, IT COULD MEAN THE EXTENSION OF CBM'S TO CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, CANADIAN REP SAID HE SAW NOTHING NEW HERE AND POSSIBLY EVEN A RETROGRESSION FROM THE OCTOBER 1979 OFFER.

7. GERMAN REP AGREED THAT THE BREZHNEV SPEECH WAS LARGELY A COLLECTION OF OLD IDEAS AND PROPOSALS, WITH ONLY A FEW NEW ELEMENTS. HE CAUTIONED THAT BREZHNEV'S EMPHASIS ON  
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3006

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION. 2 OF 02 USNATO 01102

MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE

DETENTE AND THE CLEAR ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY THE USSR AS MODERATE, FLEXIBLE AND PEACE-LOVING MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT OVERALL SOVIET ATTITUDE ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. HE VIEWED THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AS THE "CARROT" HALF OF THE "CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH WHEREAS THE HARD-LINE USTINOV SPEECH JUST PRIOR TO THE PARTY CONGRESS WAS THE OTHER HALF OF THE STORY. CONCERNING THE CBM AREA OF APPLICATION QUESTION, FRG REP ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WAS "AN INTERESTING NEW ELEMENT" IN THE SOVIET POSITION BUT ADDED IT WAS CONDITIONAL ON TWO THINGS: (1) RECIPROCITY; AND (2) ANY SUCH EXTENSION WOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FINAL ACT. THE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION HAD NOT YET BEEN SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL NOR PRESENTED AT MADRID SO IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT TO ASSESS ITS SIGNIFICANCE. IN ANY EVENT, ITS INTENT WAS CLEAR; TO LAY THE BLAME ON THE WEST IN MADRID FOR INFLEXIBILITY WHILE THE SOVIETS PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS MODERATE AND WILLING TO COMPROMISE.

8. ITALIAN REP COMMENTED THAT THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS FOR A FREEZE ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, WHILE OLD AND SELF-SERVING, COULD NONETHELESS PRESENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHERE TNF WAS A DELICATE ISSUE. ON CBM'S, ITALIAN REP AGREED THE SOVIET MOVE DEMONSTRATED THE VALIDITY OF WESTERN FIRMNESS. HE NOTED THAT THE BREZHNEV REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING CBM'S TO THE FAR EAST, COUPLED WITH THE HINT OF RECIPROCAL EXTENSION TO NORTH AMERICA, WENT FAR BEYOND

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THE SCOPE OF CSCE; IT APPEARED THE SOVIETS WERE ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE SERIOUS COMMITMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT BY RUSHING FORWARD TO A BROADER FRAMEWORK.

9. DUTCH REP SAID HE WAS STRUCK NOT ONLY BY THE STRONG EMPHASIS ON DETENTE IN THE BREZHNEV SPEECH BUT ALSO BY THE ATTITUDE IMPLICIT IN THE SPEECH THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW SPEAKING FROM A PERCEIVED POSITION OF STRENGTH, ONE MARKEDLY ENHANCED FROM THE PAST. THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS THE GUARANTOR OF WORLD PEACE WAS LINKED TO A SOVIET PERCEPTION OF EQUILIBRIUM IN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO AND STRATEGICALLY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US. AMONG OTHER THINGS, SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN ITS POWER PERMITTED IT TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING ON ARMS CONTROL AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE EMPHASIS IN THE SPEECH ON REASONABLENESS AND DETENTE WAS CLEARLY ADDRESSED TO A EUROPEAN AUDIENCE AND WAS AN ATTEMPT AT WEDGE-DRIVING BETWEEN EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THE US.

10. US REP NOTED PRESS GUIDANCE (REFTEL) PROVIDED BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON BREZHNEV COMMENTS AND CDE.

11. ACTION REQUESTED: FOLLOWING THE INITIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ABOVE, POLADS AGREED TO HOLD A SEPARATE MEETING MONDAY, MARCH 2 TO SHARE FURTHER VIEWS FROM CAPITALS, WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE, SUBSEQUENT PREPARATION OF INFORMAL PAPER ANALYZING MAJOR ELEMENTS OF SPEECH FOR PRESENTATION TO PERMREPS. IT IS ASSUMED IN ADDITION THAT SPEECH WILL BE DISCUSSED BY SOVIET/EASTERN EUROPEAN EXPERTS MARCH 3-5, AND ANY WRITTEN REPORT WOULD DRAW ON PRESENCE OF EXPERTS. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV SPEECH WHICH WE CAN DRAW ON FOR MARCH 2 MEETING. BENNETT  
BT

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Department of State

USSR - Europe 6  
OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM  
(MALTA)

PAGE 01 STATE 055444  
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STATE 055444

INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	AID-07	INR-10	SS-15	CIAE-00	EB-08
	ICA-11	DODE-00	H-01	IO-14	NEA-06	<u>HSC-05</u>	NSAE-00
	COME-00	L-03	DLOS-09	DOE-10	TRSE-00	PM-09	PA-01
	DOE-00	SMS-01	CG-00	FMC-01	SIG-03	OES-09	ACDA-12
	SP-02	SPRS-02	/151 R				

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APPROVED BY EUR:LSEAGLEBURGER  
EUR/WE: JMARESCA  
EUR/SOV: WWARREN  
P: MPATERSON (INFO)  
S/S: RGHSEITZ  
EUR: RLBARRY

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AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/4/01 (EAGLEBURGER, L.S.), EUR

TAGS: PEPR, MT, UR, US

SUBJECT: (S) SOVIET-MALTESE MARITIME AND BUNKERING AGREEMENTS

REF: VALLETTA 292

1. ~~45~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOR PARIS: DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT YOU APPROACH THE QUAI AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON, AND OUR CONCERNS ABOUT, GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN MALTA:

-- IN LATE JANUARY, MALTA AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED MARITIME AND FUEL OIL BUNKERING AGREEMENTS. THE FORMER PERMIT SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS TO CALL AT MALTA WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION. THE LATTER ACCORD PROVIDES FOR STORAGE OF UP TO 200,000 TONS OF FUEL AT THE FORMER NATO BUNKERING FACILITIES IN MALTA.

-- ALTHOUGH THE ACCORD IS OSTENSIBLY COMMERCIAL IN NATURE, IT IN FACT ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO PRE-POSITION SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF THEIR OWN FUEL IN MALTA WITHOUT HAVING TOPAY HARD CURRENCY FOR THE OIL, AS THEY DO IN BUNKERING

ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

-- THE MALTESE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER DISPOSITION OF THIS OIL ONCE IT LEAVES MALTESE TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND MALTA'S PRIME MINISTER MINTOFF HAS IN FACT SUGGESTED THAT WHAT THE SOVIETS DO WITH THE OIL OUTSIDE MALTESE WATERS IS OF NO CONCERN TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

-- THE NET EFFECT OF THE SOVIET-MALTESE AGREEMENTS COULD BE TO ENHANCE THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE

SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON.

-- MALTA IS ALSO ENGAGED IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON OTHER MATTERS, SUCH AS CIVIL AVIATION AND FREIGHT TRANSSHIPMENT AGREEMENTS, WHICH COULD RESULT IN AN EVEN GREATER SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE ISLAND. MOSCOW HAS LONG SOUGHT AND MAY FINALLY GAIN PERMISSION TO OPEN A RESIDENT EMBASSY IN MALTA AFTER THE 1982 MALTESE GENERAL ELECTIONS. IN ADDITION, WE UNDERSTAND MINTOFF? HAS BEEN PRESSING THE SOVIETS TO GIVE A "SECURITY GUARANTEE" TO MALTA.

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEWS THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH CONCERN. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THEY REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT BY MINTOFF AWAY FROM THE POLICY OF TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT THAT MALTA HAS PURSUED UP TO NOW AND WHICH WE HAVE SUPPORTED.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POINTS, YOU SHOULD TELL YOUR FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS THAT:

-- WE PASS THIS INFORMATION ALONG AS A MATTER OF INTEREST TO FRANCE AS IT CONSIDERS ITS RELATIONS WITH MALTA.

-- WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING FRENCH VIEWS ON THIS MATTER.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT A FRENCH DEMARCHE TO MALTA, IF ONE HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN MADE (REFTEL), WOULD HELP REGISTER WESTERN DISPLEASURE AND MIGHT HELP AVERT FURTHER DEALS WITH MOSCOW THAT MINTOFF IS CONTEMPLATING. (IF ASKED YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE DO NOT PLAN A DIRECT DEMARCHE TO MALTA OURSELVES BECAUSE OF COMPLICATIONS RELATING TO THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET REFUGEE IN OUR EMBASSY IN VALLETTA AND BECAUSE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO INVOLVE THE "SUPERPOWERS" FURTHER. WE HAVE MADE A DEMARCHE ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AND HAVE ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT REFLECTING OUR CONCERN.)

-- FRANCE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER WEIGHING IN WITH THE ITALIANS TO FORESTALL RATIFICATION OF THEIR "NEUTRALITY GUARANTEE" AND AID AGREEMENT WITH MALTA AS A SIGN OF CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET AGREEMENTS.

4. FOR BRUSSELS: YOU SHOULD PASS THE INFORMATION IN PARA 2 ONLY TO PIERRE DUCHATEAU, EC DIRECTOR FOR RELATIONS WITH NORTHERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AS A MATTER OF INTEREST AS THE EC CONSIDERS ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH MALTA ON RENEWAL OF THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT AND THE NEW FINANCIAL PROTOCOL. HAIG

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BY CU NARADATE 7/7/08

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FBIS 24

PRAVDA SEES 'FRICTIONS' BETWEEN U.S., NATO ALLIES

LD060628 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0545 GMT  
6 MAY 81

(TEXT) MOSCOW, 6 MAY (TASS)--"THE SHOWS OF 'UNITY'  
MANIFESTED IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS  
AND HEADS OF STATES WHO HAVE RECENTLY VISITED WASHINGTON  
CANNOT HIDE THE FRICTIONS IN NATO," PRAVDA WRITES TODAY.

NOTING THAT "WASHINGTON IS MANEUVERING WHILE BEING FORCED  
TO RECKON WITH THE OPIONS OF ITS ALLIES," THE NEWSPAPER CONTINUES:  
"THIS CAN ALSO BE SEEN IN THE U.S. POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE  
PEACE INITIATIVES PRESENTED AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS. AS THE  
AMERICAN PRESS IS NOTING, 'THE FEAR OF IRRITATING THE WESTERN  
ALLIES' IS FORCING WASHINGTON' TO PROMISE TO SIT DOWN AT THE  
NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THE RUSSIANS." ACCORDING TO THE NEW YORK  
TIMES, AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERIAL NATO COUNCIL SESSION IN ROME,  
U.S. SECRETARY OF TATE HAIG "HAS COME UNDER STRONG PRESSURE  
FROM THE WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE DEMANDING THAT HE  
AGREE TO A MOST SPEEDY RESUMPTION OF TALKS WITH THE USSR."

"AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, BANKING ON THE USE OF MILITARY MIGHT  
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE ITS FALTERING  
POSITIONS IN THE WORLD AND AGAIN IMPOSE ITS INDISPUTABLE LEADERSHIP  
ON THE ALLIES. HOWEVER, THE DISCORD IN THE WESTERN CAMP IS NOT  
DYING DOWN," PRAVDA CONCLUDES.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/11

USSR / EUROPE

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8102462

RECEIVED 06 MAY 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 06 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST

USSR

NATO

TNF

SUBJECT: WHITHER WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION ON KEY SECURITY ISSUES

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 08 MAY 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

RENTSCHLER

SCHWEITZER

STEARMAN

PIPES

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COMMENTS

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DCB*SUBJECT: Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on  
Key Security Issues

I forwarded to you recently an excellent USICA piece on Western European public attitudes, along with my own summary of the article. In a marginal annotation (Tab II) you requested copies for the President, Vice President, and other White House staff. You said you would personally highlight the copy sent to the President.

At Tab I is a memorandum for the President for your signature forwarding to him the article and the summary. It was unclear in your note whether you wished to forward the article itself, the summary, or both. The Vice President and Messrs. Meese, Baker and Deaver are "copy to" addressees on the memo to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I and forward to the appropriate White House officials.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I      Memo to the President  
          A      ICA article  
          B      NSC staff summary  
Tab II     Original memo with marginal comments

(H)

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on  
Key Security Issues

For many years the United States International Communication Agency (USICA) has been conducting polls in foreign countries on issues of importance to this country. Recently one of the USICA analysts wrote an excellent article summarizing trends of the past 5 years in opinion surveys conducted in Western Europe. I am forwarding to you at Tab A a highlighted copy of the article and a summary at Tab B which one of my staff members prepared.

The important point of the article is that most Europeans recognize the menace posed by the Soviet Union, but have not decided what to do about it. They favor neither accommodation with the USSR on the one hand, nor increasing their defense budgets, on the other. Sooner or later, they will have to choose.

Guiding that choice is the challenge not only of European leaders, but of this Administration. We must be both strong and sophisticated in our approach in order to bring European public opinion to the same stage we have brought American public opinion.

cc: Vice President  
Meese  
Baker  
Deaver

//

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SUMMARY

Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on Key Security Issues

Attached is an excellent analysis of 5-8 years of public opinion polls commissioned by the ICA in Western Europe. It traces the trends in informed public thought on key security issues. The conclusion is that European opinion is schizophrenic: it understands the Soviet threat, but it has not yet drawn the logical corollary of the need for greater mutual efforts to deal with it.

Part of the blame for this attitude lies with the United States: for pushing detente, and failing to provide the consistent leadership by example and management which an alliance of free nations requires. This administration has an opportunity to cure this European schizophrenia through a strong yet sophisticated set of policies.

The entire 9-page analysis is worth reading if time permits but below is a 1-1/2 page summary:

Attitudes toward the Soviet Union

-- In a 1980 survey substantial pluralities of the French, German and British publics consider Soviet and East European socialism a failure in terms of respect for individual liberties, improving living standards, economic development, reducing social inequalities, and worker participation in management of industry. In 1972 pluralities felt that Soviet-style socialism had been successful by these same criteria.

-- Large majorities in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden regard the Soviet Union as a danger to world peace, or still pursuing the goal of worldwide communist domination. The size of these majorities has increased in recent years.

The Strategic Balance

-- In 1980 surveys, the British and West German publics believe the Soviet Union stronger "in overall power" than the United States. The French consider the US stronger. However, in military power alone, since about 1977 publics in all three countries consider the Soviet Union stronger than the United States and the Soviet bloc stronger than the Western Alliance by increasingly wider margins.

-- The perception of relative strength between the US and the Soviet Union has important policy implications. Recent surveys show that those who consider the US more powerful than the USSR are more confident that the US will come to Europe's aid than those that believe the USSR is the stronger nation. The same phenomenon is true on the question of strong sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan: Those who believe the US is stronger favor the sanctions to a much greater extent than those who consider the Soviet Union stronger.

"Finlandization" versus "Detente"

-- According to a 1980 survey, only 5 percent of the public in six NATO countries agree that "reducing defense efforts and relying on greater accommodation with the Soviet Union is an appropriate way to assure their defense."

-- Europeans, however, draw a distinction between accommodation and detente. Majorities in Germany and France favor detente and consider that the West benefits from it as much as the Soviet Union.

NATO

-- Surveys in the fall of 1980 show that large majorities of West Germans and Dutch, pluralities of Italians and Belgians and 31 percent of Frenchmen consider NATO "essential."

-- Despite the lukewarm support for specific Afghanistan measures, on the general question of out-of-area responsibilities, a majority in Britain and large pluralities in France and West Germany believe that "NATO should also protect (its) vital interests in other parts of the world."

Defense Spending

-- Among six European NATO countries, majorities in Great Britain and West Germany support maintaining or increasing defense expenditures. In France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, one-third to one-half of those surveyed support existing levels, about a third favor cuts, and 10 percent favor increases.

-- "Denmarkization:" The survey data shows that there is an increasing tendency among smaller NATO countries to favor reduced military budgets on the grounds that their military contributions do not make a critical difference.

Summary

Several quotations of perceptive European observers capture the essence of this survey data:

-- "(the USSR) represents less a terrifying menace or a radiant future than a massive, cumbersome presence, as embarrassing as it is disconcerting." (Pierre Hassner)

-- "The Europeans recognize the danger of the Soviet buildup, but they are pretending to disregard it because they are doubtful of the present strength of the United States." (Raymond Aaronn)

-- The author concludes himself: "West Europeans are simultaneously strong and aggressive, weak and fearful. U.S. policy toward the Continent will have to take full account of these ambiguities."

(A)

# Research Memorandum

International Communications Agency United States of America  
Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of Research



April 9, 1981

16

## WHITHER WESTERN EUROPE: PUBLIC OPINION ON KEY SECURITY ISSUES

Overview: This profile of West European public opinion at the beginning of the 1980's reflects changes which have occurred in the world and in West Europe's relationship with the U.S. during the past decade. On balance, the prevailing opinion climate -- to the extent it influences official positions -- presents the Reagan administration with more problems than promise.

What West Europeans are telling themselves, according to a recent study by Michel Crozier, is: "There is no more Big Brother...America will never be what it was...We [West Europe] have ceased to be provincials exercising only limited regional responsibilities...."

There is a variety of reasons for this more self-reliant outlook on the part of West Europeans. Over the past 15 years they have become increasingly sceptical about relying on a protector who in their eyes either turns out faulty leaders (Johnson, Carter) or destroys the good ones (Kennedy, Nixon), who is unable to implement an energy program, whose foreign policy is crippled by a recalcitrant Congress, who allows his military advantage to be dissipated and who abandons crucial allies such as Iran with seeming equanimity.

More positively, the steady strengthening of West European economic power during the 1970's has considerably enhanced the Continent's political influence in the world. This has been accompanied by greater intra-West European political and economic cooperation, particularly between West Germany and France, leading to a more assertive West Europe seemingly bent on distancing itself from Washington where it is profitable and prudent to do so.

The apparent desire of many West Europeans that the Continent play a more independent role in the world is heightened by the increasing realization that while the U.S. and West Europe still share common broad interests -- containment of Soviet expansionism and secure energy supplies, for example -- there are increasingly differing perceptions on how to accomplish these ends. West Europe's concern with preserving detente, its hesitations about deployment of theater nuclear weapons and its policy toward the Mid-East -- dictated by energy needs -- are just a few examples of where the West European approach differs from that of the U.S. Widespread perceptions of the growing military might of the Soviet Union have intensified West European concerns about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

On the positive side, there is less today of the visceral anti-Americanism of earlier years. Even a significant proportion of the French look to the U.S. as a good friend. Moreover, West Europeans, keenly aware of the USSR's global and regional military might, do recognize that the U.S. is vital to the security of the Continent. Whatever ideological appeal the USSR once held for West Europeans seems irredeemably lost and the threat of "Eurocommunism," so strongly felt only a few years ago, also appears on the wane.

In brief, the prevailing climate of opinion in West Europe contains a unique mixture of pluses and minuses for U.S. policy-makers. West Europeans are simultaneously strong and aggressive, weak and fearful. U.S. policy toward the Continent will have to take full account of these ambiguities.

The data which follow are a synthesis of various public opinion surveys sponsored by the International Communication Agency (USICA) during the past 18 months on central issues of U.S.-West European relations. Also included are data provided by the European Communities (EC) research services and surveys made public by others. This synthesis tries to provide a benchmark on West European public attitudes early in the crucial decade ahead. The data are organized into the following areas: (1) public perceptions of the USSR and its military challenge to the West and (2) how West Europeans respond to this challenge.

This report, while based on public opinion findings, reflects the interpretive views of the author. The reader should also be reminded that in some instances, findings from one or several countries have been used (albeit cautiously) to make generalizations about "West European" opinion.

### THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

#### Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union

In the wake of World War II and for many years thereafter, many West Europeans -- particularly those on the left and center-left of the political spectrum -- viewed the USSR as a model to emulate, or, perhaps less happily for some, the inevitable wave of the future.

What are their attitudes today? Pierre Hassner, the noted French political analyst, recently observed: "Except for a few extremists on one side or the other, it [the USSR] represents less a terrifying menace or a radiant future than a massive, cumbersome presence, as embarrassing as it is disconcerting." He added that, while West Europeans perceive the Soviet Union as a success on the military level, "there is a consensus that it represents a failure on various levels ranging from economic well-being to the ideological model."

A measure of the decline in favorable public attitudes toward the USSR emerges from a comparison of surveys conducted in France in 1972 and in October 1980. In the most recent survey, four times as many (59% to 14%) expressed a negative view of "socialism" in the USSR and East Europe than held a positive opinion. Negative perceptions also predominated in 1972, but by a much narrower margin (43% to 28%).

In the 1980 study, majorities or substantial pluralities of the French public held that Soviet and East European "socialism" was a failure in terms of: respect for individual liberties (70%), improving living standards (53%), economic development (46%), reducing social inequalities (43%) and worker participation in management of industry (42%). By contrast, in 1972 positive opinions prevailed over negative views on four of these five indices, and on the fifth (individual liberties), the public was less negative.

Additionally, almost three times as many (57% to 21%) thought that the "popular democracies" of East Europe survived only by the presence of Soviet troops on their soil than believed these regimes represented the will of their citizens.

There are no comparable data for Britain and West Germany. However, given the absence of a large communist party in these two countries and their long-standing antipathy toward the USSR, it is quite likely that negative views of the Soviet Union are even more widespread in Britain and West Germany than in France.

In addition to rejecting the Soviet experience as a failure, more West Europeans, in the wake of the Afghanistan and Polish crises, have come to see the Soviet Union as a threat to world peace than previously. For example, in neutral Sweden many more (59%) in September 1980 perceived the USSR as pursuing a policy which "continually" or "often" endangers peace in the world as thought that about Soviet policy only a year earlier (43%).

Seventy-one percent of the West Germans described the USSR as a danger to world peace. The proportion believing West Germany is threatened by the Soviet Union nearly doubled (from 35 to 63%) between 1979 and 1980. In Britain, the already very high percentage considering the USSR a military threat to their country increased further (from 77 to 85 %) from 1979 to January 1980.

A spring 1980 survey in France showed that large majorities of the French perceived the USSR as an expansionist power and considered that the prime Soviet objective remains worldwide communist domination. In February 1981, 61 percent said they mistrust Soviet foreign policy. Only 12 percent -- far fewer than one might have expected in a country where 20 percent vote Communist -- said they trust Soviet policy. Interviews with more than 700 candidates to

the European Parliament in Spring 1979 showed that only two percent advocated closer ties between the European Community and the Soviet Union. Among the French and Italian candidates who ran under the Communist banner, not one favored closer EC-USSR ties.

### The Strategic Balance

March 1980 surveys conducted in Britain, France and West Germany revealed that the publics in these three major countries differed in their perceptions of the overall power balance between the U.S. and the USSR.<sup>1</sup> The British and, by a more narrow margin, the West Germans, perceived the Soviet Union as generally stronger than the U.S. The French took the opposite view.

What is most striking is the change in perceptions which occurred in all three countries -- and in Japan as well -- since 1972 when a broadly similar question was last asked. Since then, the proportion seeing the U.S. as the "most powerful [country] in the world" declined by about 20 percent in all three countries and those giving the edge to the USSR increased by about the same proportion. In brief, during the past eight years the Soviet Union has advanced from a position of clear "strength" inferiority to one of equivalence with the U.S. in the view of these European publics.

When the strength balance is tested in strictly military terms, the findings for the U.S. are even more bleak. A majority (54%) in Britain (July 1979) thought the USSR ahead in nuclear military power, only 18 percent named the U.S. In France and West Germany, more gave the nuclear edge to Russia than to the U.S. However, substantial pluralities in these two countries perceived the two superpowers as about equal in nuclear strength, thus endorsing the claim that essential equivalency was being maintained. On this dimension as well, perceptions of U.S. nuclear strength have declined considerably since 1972 when the publics in all three countries gave the edge to the U.S.

On total military strength, the same pattern of increasing Soviet power also emerged as early as 1977. Even at that early date, twice as many Frenchmen and West Germans and five times as many Britons considered the USSR the strongest as thought the U.S. ahead.

Very recent findings published in the French weekly Le Point (March 9, 1981) reveal that French and West German perceptions of Soviet

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<sup>1</sup>The wording of this question allowed the respondents to judge the overall power balance, including, but not necessarily limited to, military power.

military superiority have further increased since 1977 and are far more widespread in these two countries than in the United States. While Americans were not too far from evenly divided (44% to 33%) on whether the East or the West was militarily strongest, the West Germans (68% to 27%) and the French (51% to 14%) overwhelmingly viewed the Soviet bloc as militarily superior.

There are no more recent measurements for Britain since 1977, but even at that time more in the U.K. thought the balance would continue to shift in favor of the USSR than toward the U.S. The continuing Soviet military buildup since then is likely to have confirmed them in this outlook.

Many West Europeans, as measured in the three leading countries, clearly have perceived the Soviet Union over the past decade as the emerging dominant military power and the U.S. as a once dominant power in decline. Other survey data indicate that these publics are seriously concerned by this trend and tend to attribute offensive as well as defensive motives to the Soviet buildup. They fear, in particular, that the USSR will use its military superiority to blackmail their leaders into political and economic concessions.

How do West Europeans react to the Soviet military buildup? "They do recognize the danger," observed Raymond Aron, "but they are pretending to disregard it because they are doubtful of the present strength of the United States." As seen in other surveys, perceptions of the superpower strength balance also influence West European views on U.S. reliability and their willingness to follow U.S. policy leads.

Among the British, French and West Germans who saw the U.S. as the most powerful country today and into the future, about twice as many expressed "great confidence" that the U.S. would come to their defense than did those who believed the USSR to be the most powerful nation. Similarly, a slightly higher proportion of those perceiving the U.S. to be the most powerful nation favored strong actions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan than did those who thought the USSR strongest.

THE WEST EUROPEAN RESPONSE

"Finlandization" vs. "Detente"

West European public perceptions of a Soviet military advantage have so far not induced substantial proportions to consider "self-Finlandization" as an appropriate policy for their country. Only five percent of those interviewed in six NATO countries last fall thought that "reducing our defense efforts and relying on greater

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accommodation with the Soviet Union" was an appropriate way to assure their defense. The proportion would be even smaller if one excluded from the analysis the French (21%) and Italian (14%) Communist Party voters, who more than others adhered to that position.

In answer to a roughly similar question, as many as 23 percent of the European Parliamentary candidates interviewed in spring 1979 preferred the "accommodation" option. Again, however, it was only among the Communist (62%) and to a much lesser degree the Socialist (36%) candidates that "accommodation" was seen as an attractive solution. Among the other four major Community political groups (Christian Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and Gaullists) less than a tenth favored "accommodation."

While only a tiny minority of the West European public appears susceptible to Soviet political pressure, there is overwhelming public support for detente with the USSR. As noted above, West Europeans are mistrustful of the Russians. However, the perceived need for detente with the USSR appears to override their suspicions.

An example of this comes from a recent French survey in which 73 percent of the public condemned the USSR for not living up to its Helsinki commitments but about as many (68%) agreed that France should participate in the Madrid CSCE conference because it is necessary "at all costs to compromise with the USSR in order to maintain detente." Four West Germans in five thought the continuation of detente an "appropriate" way to safeguard peace, freedom and independence despite their misgivings about Soviet objectives.

A second example is the widespread support expressed by the British, French and West Germans in mid-1979 for SALT-II ratification despite their reservations about what the treaty would accomplish and doubts that the Soviets would honestly implement it. This suggests that whatever their doubts about the intrinsic merit of the treaty, many in West Europe obviously viewed it as the centerpiece in the already badly torn fabric of detente.

The French and West Germans are also far apart from Americans in their views of what policy their country should follow toward the USSR. A majority (57%) of Americans commended a policy of "firmness" vis-a-vis the Soviets and only a third advocated "conciliation." By contrast, majorities in West Germany (67%) and France (52%) favored a conciliatory approach. Moreover, far more West Germans (65%) and French (54%) than Americans (34%) thought that the West has benefited as much as the Russians from detente. There are no data from other countries on these issues, but it is likely that support for a conciliatory approach toward the USSR and sanguine views about detente are at least as prevalent elsewhere on the Continent as in France and West Germany.

In fact, the crucial issue dividing the U.S. from its European allies in the Afghanistan crisis was the relative priority each side gave to detente. Even before that crisis, Peter Corterier, West Germany's Social Democratic Party spokesman on defense observed: "Europeans tend to underestimate the danger, even for them, of Soviet global policies. Americans underestimate the very real results that Europeans -- particularly Germans -- get out of detente."

### NATO

"What Kind of Alliance is This Anyway?" "Is the Western Alliance Really in Selfish Disarray?" "Disjointed Alliance." These and equally provocative headlines were the daily fare of major U.S. and West European newspapers during the first six months of 1980. With few exceptions, the accompanying articles argued that while the NATO alliance had undergone crises in the past, the one ushered in by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was unprecedented in severity and consequence.

This Atlantic discord, severe as it was, does not appear to have seriously diminished West European public perceptions of NATO as vital to the Continent's security. Surveys conducted in half a dozen European NATO countries in the fall of 1980 revealed that majorities or pluralities in most countries considered NATO still essential to their security, a slight decline from two years earlier but on a par with a 1976 measurement. Perceptions of NATO's essentiality were, however, far from uniform. The West Germans (80%), the British (70%) and the Dutch (61%) were far more sensitive to NATO's importance than were the Italians (49%), the Belgians (45%) and the French (31%).

About 60 percent of the West Europeans surveyed also preferred continued military ties with the U.S. over other possible security arrangements. However, at least a third of these supporters of military ties to the U.S. wanted a modified NATO structure giving the Europeans more say. And, it was in Belgium, France and Italy -- the three countries where NATO's essentiality was least often perceived -- that desires for a greater European voice were most frequently expressed.

The evidence concerning West European public support for a NATO role outside the Atlantic area is mixed. West Europeans were generally opposed to having their country back specific U.S. measures against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a majority in Britain (63%) and large pluralities in France (47%) and West Germany (48%) believed that "NATO should also help protect vital interests in other parts of the world." Only one Briton and Frenchman in five and one West German in three held that NATO's only role was to provide security for West Europe.

### Defense Spending

Past studies suggest that West Europeans generally prefer a super-power military balance to superiority by one side or the other. Accordingly, they would doubtlessly welcome a restoration of Western military strength now perceived as inferior to that of the Soviet bloc. Indications are, however, that the governments of our NATO allies will have difficulty in rallying public support for the increased defense spending required to achieve that goal.

Surveys conducted in six European NATO countries last October showed that only the British and, to a lesser extent, the West Germans are steadfast in support of defense expenditures. About a quarter in both countries favored increased defense spending and another half were prepared to support present defense spending levels.

In the other four countries surveyed -- France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands -- from a third to a half supported existing levels of defense spending. However, a third or more in these countries wanted defense cuts while only 10 percent or less favored increases such as those called for under the NATO goal of a three percent real annual increase in allied defense spending.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, a survey taken in view of the Venice Economic Summit (June 1980) suggests that increasing inflationary pressures could adversely affect public support for defense expenditures. Reduced defense spending to fight "worsening inflation" had wide appeal in France and Italy. A majority (67%) in Britain and a plurality (47%) in West Germany opposed such reductions even at the cost of rising inflation. But, if push came to shove, far more even in these two countries would oppose cuts in medical and social services than would object to cuts in the defense budget.

In addition to the potential adverse effect on military expenditures arising from inflation and other economic pressures, defense advocates must contend with "Denmarkization" -- the increasing tendency of the smaller NATO countries to reduce their military budgets, which they justify on the grounds that their military contributions will not make the critical difference. The contrast, noted above, between the more pro-defense attitudes of the British and West Germans and the reluctance of the Italians, Belgians and Dutch indicates the extent of "Denmarkization" among the smaller allies.

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<sup>2</sup>The question wording "...spending in support of NATO..." could conceivably have caused more of the respondents -- particularly in France -- to vote in favor of cuts than would have been the case if the question had been put in terms of national defense.

Personal interviews with 742 candidates to the European Parliament (spring 1979), who perhaps reflect the views of other political elites in their country, point in the same direction. Candidates from the smaller NATO countries (Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and even Italy) were far less committed to defense spending than candidates from Britain and West Germany. There was also a high proportion of defense-minded candidates among the French, including the communists, when defense was placed in the national rather than the NATO context.

#### Arms Negotiations (TNF)

The NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Brussels in December 1979, agreed, after much controversy over how to face up to the Soviet theater nuclear buildup, on a compromise calling for simultaneously modernizing NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces and initiating TNF arms control negotiations with the USSR.

Despite the concessions made in order to bring the arms control advocates aboard, the NATO decision has encountered serious public opposition. In West Germany, a survey conducted three months after the NATO agreement, revealed that fully 60 percent of the public opposed "the stationing of more and new nuclear weapons in the FRG." In Britain, where there has been a resurgence of anti-nuclear sentiment, one third of the public opposed cruise missile stationing in Britain "under any conditions" and another third said they would accept them only after negotiations with the Soviets had either been undertaken (19%) or had proven a failure (20%). Only 15 percent would accept the missiles without prior negotiations with the Soviets.

Equally strong public opposition is found in the smaller NATO countries. In the Netherlands a majority (53 to 39%) opposed TNF deployment. And in Belgium, a plurality (42% to 26%) opposed their government's decision to proceed with TNF deployment on Belgian soil even if efforts to reach prior agreement with the USSR do not succeed.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

April 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on Key Security Issues

*This is something for P to read. Give me clear copies, pls. I'll mark for him. Give others to VP, etc. I read 5/4/81*

Attached is an excellent analysis of 5-8 years of public opinion polls commissioned by the ICA in Western Europe. It traces the trends in informed public thought on key security issues. The conclusion is that European opinion is schizophrenic: it understands the Soviet threat, but it has not yet drawn the logical corollary of the need for greater mutual efforts to deal with it.

In my opinion, part of the blame for this attitude lies with the United States: we have pushed detente, and failed to provide the consistent leadership by example and management which an alliance of free nations requires. This administration has an opportunity to cure this European schizophrenia through a strong yet sophisticated set of policies.

I recommend you read the entire 9-page analysis if time permits but provide the 1-1/2 page Reader's Digest version below:

Attitudes toward the Soviet Union

-- In a 1980 survey substantial pluralities of the French, German and British publics consider Soviet and East European socialism a failure in terms of respect for individual liberties, improving living standards, economic development, reducing social inequalities, and worker participation in management of industry. In 1972 pluralities felt that Soviet-style socialism had been successful by these same criteria.

-- Large majorities in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden regard the Soviet Union as a danger to world peace, or still pursuing the goal of worldwide communist domination. The size of these majorities has increased in recent years.

The Strategic Balance

-- In 1980 surveys, the British and West German publics believe the Soviet Union stronger "in overall power" than the United States. The French consider the US stronger. However, in military power alone, since about 1977 publics in all three countries consider the Soviet Union stronger than the United States and the Soviet bloc stronger than the Western Alliance by increasingly wider margins.

-- The perception of relative strength between the US and the Soviet Union has important policy implications. Recent surveys show that those who consider the US more powerful than the USSR are more confident that the US will come to Europe's aid than those that believe the USSR is the stronger nation. The same phenomenon is true on the question of strong sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan: Those who believe the US is stronger favor the sanctions to a much greater extent than those who consider the Soviet Union stronger.

#### "Finlandization" versus "Detente"

-- According to a 1980 survey, only 5 percent of the public in six NATO countries agree that "reducing defense efforts and relying on greater accommodation with the Soviet Union is an appropriate way to assure their defense."

-- Europeans, however, draw a distinction between accommodation and detente. Majorities in Germany and France favor detente and consider that the West benefits from it as much as the Soviet Union.

#### NATO

-- Surveys in the fall of 1980 show that large majorities of West Germans and Dutch, pluralities of Italians and Belgians and 31 percent of Frenchmen consider NATO "essential."

-- Despite the lukewarm support for specific Afghanistan measures, on the general question of out-of-area responsibilities, a majority in Britain and large pluralities in France and West Germany believe that "NATO should also protect (its) vital interests in other parts of the world."

#### Defense Spending

-- Among six European NATO countries, majorities in Great Britain and West Germany support maintaining or increasing defense expenditures. In France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, one-third to one-half of those surveyed support existing levels, about a third favor cuts, and 10 percent favor increases.

-- "Denmarkization:" The survey data shows that there is an increasing tendency among smaller NATO countries to favor reduced military budgets on the grounds that their military contributions do not make a critical difference.

Summary

Several quotations of perceptive European observers capture the essence of this survey data:

-- "(the USSR) represents less a terrifying menace or a radiant future than a massive, cumbersome presence, as embarrassing as it is disconcerting." (Pierre Hassner)

-- "The Europeans recognize the danger of the Soviet buildup, but they are pretending to disregard it because they are doubtful of the present strength of the United States."  
(Raymond Aaronn)

-- The author concludes himself: "West Europeans are simultaneously strong and aggressive, weak and fearful. U.S. policy toward the Continent will have to take full account of these ambiguities."

cc: Rentschler  
Schweitzer  
Stearman  
Pipes  
Dobriansky

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 27, 1981

1. USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: NEW SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES AGAINST TNF

Recent letters to West European socialist parties from the Soviet Communist Party underscore Moscow's determination to undermine European support for NATO's LRTNF plans. Rising opposition within West European socialist circles was probably responsible for Moscow's special pitch. The letter will fuel West German SPD opposition to TNF which was temporarily papered over when Schmidt won a 211-9 party vote endorsing his stance.

\* \* \*

The letters argued the Soviet position on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe in surprising detail:

- The USSR wants to open talks on the limitation of nuclear forces in Europe without delay.
- There is now an approximate equilibrium in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The US, UK, and France together have about 1,000 launchers, and the Soviet Union approximately the same.
- The US hopes to delay TNF negotiations and use them as a smokescreen to hide plans to deploy Pershing II and GLCMs.

While the letters made no new proposals, they contained nuances which were intended to give further play to Brezhnev's moratorium proposal. The letters state that a moratorium would go into effect with the opening of TNF negotiations. This would have to be agreed upon before talks started and would remain in effect for the duration of the negotiations.

The SPD and the French Socialist Party have agreed to discuss the letters at an informal meeting during the Finnish Social Democratic Party Congress in early June. Letters were also sent to the British Labor Party and the Finnish, Belgian, and Italian Socialist Parties.

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BY CU NARADATE 7/7/08

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### 3. BREZHNEV ON THE NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

The Scandinavians have been trying to manage domestic pressures for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NNWFZ) by focusing on Soviet short- and medium-range systems in the Baltic and the Kola Peninsula. In an apparent bid to deflect the Scandinavians, Brezhnev has hinted that Moscow might consider some concessions regarding nuclear weapons on its territory. Brezhnev's intent apparently is to quicken Scandinavian interest in the NNWFZ by dangling the bait of Soviet territory being included. Having played this game for 20 years, the Nordics are not apt to be deceived.

\* \* \*

Moscow has long supported Finnish President Kekkonen's 1963 proposal for an NNWFZ and has stated for the record that it is prepared to take part in "constructive discussion" of the proposal and "to act with the other nuclear powers as a guarantor" of such a zone. When any discussions on the subject got underway, however, the Soviets always carefully maintained a distinction between the area affected and the USSR itself, and declined to allow consideration of Soviet nuclear weapons on the Kola Peninsula in an NNWFZ context.

The interest in Brezhnev's new "answer" stems from its deliberately ambiguous language on this score. He noted only that the USSR "does not exclude" the possibility of "considering some other actions" which would affect Soviet territory bordering on the NNWFZ.

Coming in the wake of the recent Nordic Council reaffirmation of their interest in an NNWFZ, provided it treated Soviet nuclear weapons in the North European area, the Soviet bait seemed intended to keep the issue alive. By stating that the Soviet Union is willing to participate, and perhaps not merely as "guarantor," Brezhnev not only strikes a statesmanly pose, but attempts to force the Nordics to make the next move.

In the long run the Soviets presumably will prove as intractable as ever on any concession that would affect their Kola and Baltic positions. This was hinted at by a Soviet news agency commentator who recently told a Finnish paper that the USSR "cannot for strategic reasons give up a certain military use of a part of its territory while the US is seeking...to deploy nuclear weapons on foreign soil."

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BY AS NARADATE 7/7/08~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





1/22/83

3. SOVIET "PEACENIKS:" SEDATED BUT STILL EMBARRASSING

At a time when unofficial peace movements appear to be spreading in Eastern Europe, most of the small group of peace activists in the Soviet Union are now either in prison or psychiatric wards. Quick intervention by the KGB prevented the group from exploiting the anti-nuclear movement in the same way the Moscow Helsinki Group used the CSCE Final Act to create an independent organization with political potential. But the very existence of independent peaceniks continues to embarrass the regime, and any further action against them could undercut Moscow's anti-nuclear campaign in Western Europe.

\* \* \*

The Soviet peace group was formed in June of last year in the wake of regime-staged peace demonstrations in the USSR. Its proposals for a joint US-Soviet dialogue echoed official Soviet proposals on many points, but the group's independent nature made it unacceptable to the Kremlin. Just before Christmas, the wives of several members of the Moscow group reported that their husbands were undergoing psychiatric tests in Moscow's ill-famed Serbsky Institute, and that the KGB was collecting evidence for possible criminal charges. Earlier, the group's founder, Sergey Batovrin, reportedly was receiving debilitating drugs in a psychiatric hospital.

The Kremlin could, of course, indict peace activists on criminal charges. But KGB threats to charge two members of the group with "arrogation," illustrate how far the prosecutor would have to stretch the law to make a case. Article 200 of the Criminal Code defines "Arrogation" as "the unwarranted exercise...of one's actual or supposed rights, causing substantial harm to citizens or to state or social organizations." Presumably, the state could claim that the unofficial peace group had harmed the reputation and interests of the official Soviet Peace Council, which enjoys the legal status of a public organization.

Bringing the peaceniks to trial at this time, however, would undermine the USSR's attempt to gain the support of the peace forces in Western Europe. Consequently, the authorities are likely to do little more than keep the activists heavily tranquilized until they decide what to do with them. In the meantime, similar peace groups apparently have been organized in three other Soviet cities in spite of Moscow's repression. Isolated groups of pacifists also are believed to exist in the Baltic republics.

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BY CU NARADATE 7/7/08

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~~(U)~~ SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NORDIC STATES<sup>1/</sup>~~(C/NF)~~ Summary

Moscow's current efforts to play on Nordic security concerns and to dilute NATO's role in the region center on promoting the idea of a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) and opposition to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment. Since Finnish President Kekkonen proposed the NNWFZ in 1963, the Soviets periodically have refurbished the concept to generate Nordic interest. They no doubt realize, however, that progress on that score peaked in 1980-82 when the ruling Norwegian Labor Party endorsed an NNWFZ provided that it was part of Europe-wide arms control negotiations and that Soviet weapons and bordering territory were included.

In 1982, the Social Democratic Party regained power in Sweden and Prime Minister Palme suggested an NNWFZ if the USSR withdrew its nuclear missiles from the Baltic. Moscow recognized at least an opportunity to complicate Norwegian relations with NATO and began casting out hints of possible Soviet concessions.

Elections in Norway and Denmark of Conservative governments that opposed the NNWFZ concept effectively sidetracked the issue. The grounding of a Soviet submarine carrying nuclear missiles in Swedish territorial waters in fall 1981, a spate of submarine incursions in Swedish and Norwegian waters in 1982 and 1983 and the ensuing April 1983 Swedish Government report, and the September 1983 Korean

<sup>1/</sup> (U) For a detailed study of Soviet-Nordic relations, see "Soviet-Nordic Relations: An Overview," INR Report No. 408-AR, June 11, 1982 (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON).

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airliner incident further clouded Soviet-Nordic relations. Moscow nevertheless is pursuing the NNWFZ idea, usually as a subsidiary to its more immediate effort to stimulate greater anti-INF activity by local peace groups as NATO INF deployments begin.

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Cooling of Soviet-Nordic Relations

(C) In 1980-82, signs of Scandinavian interest in some form of NNWFZ seemed to promise an expanded Nordic-Soviet dialogue and opportunities for Moscow to erode NATO's influence in the area. However, the submarine violations of Scandinavian territory and leadership changes in Norway, Denmark, and Finland put a quick end to any optimism in Moscow.

(C) In Norway, Labor Party Prime Minister Brundtland, who had toyed with the idea of an NNWFZ, was replaced by the Conservative Willoch. Danish Social Democratic Prime Minister Jorgensen was succeeded by a Conservative, Schleuter. Both Willoch and Schleuter oppose negotiations with the Soviet Union on an NNWFZ. Willoch's argument that only nuclear powers can set up nuclear free zones prompted TASS to express "regret."

(C) After 25 years' reliance on Kekkonen's careful course of friendly neutrality toward the USSR, Moscow in October 1981 faced a successor. Although Mauno Koivisto has shown no signs of altering Kekkonen's basic policy course and has restated Helsinki's support of the "Kekkonen Plan," Moscow still views him as an unknown quantity. Helsinki has carefully avoided identification with the Swedish or Norwegian Labor Party proposals.

(C) After repeated violation of both Norwegian and Swedish territorial waters by suspected Soviet submarines, particularly invasion of Sweden's military base at Stockholm in October 1982, the Swedish Government Commission on April 26, 1983, formally charged the Soviet Union with such violations. Palme then gave Moscow a stiff protest note asking that violations cease; the note was rejected.

(C) The Swedish Commission's report proved the most damaging development in the past year to Soviet credibility in the Nordic area. The report alleged numerous violations of Swedish territorial waters by Soviet submarines over the preceding two years and prompted Palme not only to lodge the formal protest with the Soviet Government but also to cancel all planned visits by Swedish political and military officials to the USSR. The Soviets shortly before had hailed Palme for his proposal of a nuclear free strip in Central Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact lines and had been heartened by his support of an NNWFZ.

(C) The Swedish population reacted with outrage to the Commission's findings and was further incensed by Moscow's denial and

charge that Stockholm was serving NATO interests by trying to aggravate tension in the Nordic region. Soviet media for their part dismissed the charges as paranoia and accused Sweden of using the allegation as an excuse to build up Swedish defenses, increase NATO's influence in the region, and neutralize the local peace movements.

(C) Danish skepticism about Soviet peace propaganda also increased markedly after the Swedish Commission's report, and the Danish Social Democratic Party canceled a scheduled visit to Moscow of a parliamentary delegation. Although Danish waters are too shallow for normal submarine operation, stories about the penetration abilities of Soviet "minisubs" have generated uneasiness in the Danish public.

(C/NF) At their meeting on April 26, 1983, the Nordic defense ministers declared that Soviet actions represented a threat to all Nordic countries. The unique political position of Finland and its mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union inhibited the Finns from taking any stance against Moscow, and President Koivisto's visit to the Soviet Union took place on schedule in early June.

(C) Sweden has not been alone in sighting suspected Soviet submarines in its territorial waters. Intrusions into Norwegian waters also have taken place periodically. Indeed, at the time the Swedish Commission issued its report, the Norwegian Navy had just dropped depth charges on a suspected foreign submarine in Hardangerfjord. Norway's NATO membership and its proximity to the Soviet Union traditionally have meant particular Soviet sensitivity to any augmentation of NATO northern flank activity and the stockpiling of NATO military equipment on Norwegian soil. Soviet media often remind the Norwegian public of the risk entailed in allowing any NATO buildup in Northern Europe. Soviet violation of Norwegian waters thus was interpreted variously as a Soviet reposte to Norway's more active role in NATO or as retaliation for an earlier NATO warship visit to Norway's Haakonsværn Navy Base.

(C) Moscow Persists in Promoting NNWFZ

Despite, or perhaps because of, the cooler atmosphere, Moscow has persisted with NNWFZ promotion and made several attempts to increase its attractiveness. Although Brezhnev in 1981 offered merely to consider "some measures" applying to Soviet territory in the region adjoining an NNWFZ, Soviet Defense Ministry arms control spokesman General Chervov went somewhat further last March when he hinted at Soviet willingness to keep USSR nuclear-armed submarines out of the Baltic area. Andropov on May 10 then told a visiting Finnish group that the USSR was prepared to consider "quite substantial" measures, implying inclusion of Soviet

territory adjacent to an NNWFZ. At a June 6 dinner for Koivisto he went even further, asserting that the Soviets also would be prepared to discuss inclusion of the Baltic Sea in an NNWFZ.

The embellishments found little resonance in Scandinavia. The Soviets can be expected to keep pressing the NNWFZ issue, however, and courting the Scandinavian public as opportunities arise. Even the mere start of discussions on the subject would serve their interest because they would view it as a step in the direction of their ultimate objective of clouding the Danish and Norwegian role in NATO in time of crisis.

~~(C/NF)~~ Exploiting Anti-INF Sentiment

Although the Nordic NATO members (Norway, Denmark, and Iceland) are not basing countries in NATO's INF modernization plan, Moscow has actively cultivated left-wing organizations and peace activists in these countries in order to bring anti-INF pressure to bear on the ruling governments. Prime targets have been the INF opponents within Norway's Labor Party and Denmark's Social Democratic Party (SDP).

Norway's opposition Labor Party almost succeeded in overturning a parliamentary vote in November 1982 on Norway's contribution to INF infrastructure funding. But the Swedish Commission's report, periodic searches for suspected Soviet submarines, and the KAL downing have appreciably eroded popular backing for the anti-nuclear movement. Moreover, Moscow's image suffered further damage from a Norwegian commission's report issued in August on the Hardangerfjord submarine intrusion. This report recommended measures to enhance Norwegian ability to respond to similar future occurrences.

Regardless of decreased popularity, Moscow will continue to encourage the anti-nuclear movement in Norway but probably has little expectation of altering the government's stand, at least as long as Willoch remains in power. Willoch is a strong supporter of the US position at the Geneva INF talks and has drawn heavy criticism from Soviet media for that reason. Moscow was particularly annoyed by his March interview with a Finnish newspaper in which he claimed that the USSR had violated nonaggression pacts with Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during World War II. Soviet media accused him of resorting to anti-Soviet statements aimed at marring Soviet-Finnish relations.

Moscow probably sees somewhat brighter prospects in Denmark. The SDP has succeeded in blocking a Danish contribution to INF deployment. Last May it pushed through a parliamentary resolution calling on the government to seek postponement of INF deployment while the Geneva talks continued and brought the Schleuter

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government near to collapse. Although Schleuter supports the NATO double-track decision, he is compelled by this resolution to advance the views of the opposition, weakening his own stand.

Moscow has hailed the SDP's success and depicts the public opposition to deployment in Denmark (60 percent opposed) as signs of Alliance disunity; but its effectiveness in promoting anti-INF sentiment has been undercut in Denmark, as it has in the other Nordic countries, by the KAL incident and submarine incursions.

~~(C/NF)~~ Outlook

Recent Soviet actions seem to indicate that Moscow is taking steps to repair some of the damage to its relations with the Nordic states. Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen's October 31-November 1 visit to Moscow--at Soviet invitation--suggests some forward movement, although Moscow seems to have profited more by the Schleuter government's fear of being upstaged by an SDP delegation's visit to the USSR before its own than by any Danish desire to improve relations. (Hints at the time of Moscow's invitation suggested a possible rescheduling of the SDP trip, which had been canceled in May following issuance of the Swedish Commission's findings on submarine intrusions.) Although Elleman-Jensen's meeting with Soviet officials--including Gromyko--produced nothing new, it did provide Moscow with a chance to reiterate its views on international issues to both internal and foreign audiences.

The Soviets also are dropping hints about their "good intentions" toward Sweden. In an apparent attempt to allay Swedish fears about the submarine intrusions, Andropov included assurances of Soviet respect for Swedish borders in a September letter to Palme. The Swedes also have reported receiving assurances that the USSR would punish any commander who violated Swedish territory.

In any event, Moscow welcomes such positive signs as Palme's apparent interest in trying to improve Swedish-Soviet ties and the Danish Foreign Minister's visit--the first of a NATO foreign minister to Moscow since the KAL downing--as INF deployments begin. Any significant improvement of ties, however, seems remote.

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