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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** USSR-DOMESTIC EE 2/2

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9570	CABLE	092230Z JUN 83 <b>PAR 3/16/2011 F2006-114/7</b>	1	6/9/1983	B2 B3
9573	CABLE	161516Z JUN 83 <b>R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</b>	4	6/16/1983	B1
9574	CABLE	271828Z JUN 83 <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	3	6/27/1983	B1
9575	CABLE	271352Z JUL 83 <b>R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</b>	4	7/27/1983	B1
9576	PAPER	MOSCOW AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT: PROSPECTS FOR UNITY AND COOPERATION IN 1984	18	5/14/1984	B1
9577	PAPER	RELIGION/SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE <b>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</b>	13	7/30/1984	B1
9571	PAPER	USSR ROLE OF PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE EXPANDED UNER CHERNENKO <b>R 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</b>	4	12/5/1984	B1
9578	CABLE	121412Z JUN 85 <b>R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</b>	4	1/12/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9572	PAPER	GORBACHEV'S SHAKEUP OF THE FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS <i>R 8/26/2011 RELEASED</i>	16	6/20/1986	B1
9579	CABLE	071421Z JUL 86 <i>R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7</i>	11	7/7/1986	B1

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FOIA(b)(2)

PAGE 01 DIA WASHINGTON DC// [REDACTED] DTG: 092230Z JUN 83 PSN: 065043  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L N O F O R N

SERIAL: DIADIN 160-5A  
SUBJ: USSR: PROSPECTS FOR PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION. (U)  
DOI: 9 JUN 83 (AS OF 1615 EDT)

TEXT: 1. (C/NF) THE UNANNOUNCED MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC) PLENUM, EXPECTED TO CONVENE ON 13 OR 14 JUNE, WILL MOST LIKELY ADDRESS IDEOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP AND THE SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ON THE 16TH WILL PROBABLY GIVE PRO-FORMA RECOGNITION TO ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION MEASURES.

2. (C/NF) COMMENT: THE PLENUM, POSSIBLY POSTPONED AT LEAST ONCE BECAUSE OF INTERNAL DEBATE ON THE EXTENT OF ECONOMIC CHANGE AND ENSUING LEADERSHIP STRUGGLES, WILL PROBABLY TACKLE BOTH AREAS. IT IS UNLIKELY EITHER SESSION WOULD OCCUR UNLESS SOME OF THESE MAJOR ISSUES WERE ALREADY RESOLVED BY THE POLITBURO.

3. (C/NF) THE PLENUM MAY REVEAL POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP CHANGES, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL FIELDS. MANY OF PARTY LEADER ANDROPOV'S APPOINTEES IN THESE FIELDS ARE NOT CONSIDERED PARTY "APPARATCHIKS." IF THESE APPOINTEES WERE ELEVATED TO POLITBURO STATUS, IT WOULD EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY ENHANCE THEIR POLITICAL PROMINENCE. THEIR PROMOTION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE ANDROPOV WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO FURTHER CONSOLIDATE HIS OWN POSITION. SOME OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR APPOINTMENT TO CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP ARE: RYZHKOV, A NEW CC SECRETARY; NEW BELORUSSIAN 1ST SECRETARY SLYUNKOV; AND RECENTLY APPOINTED KGB CHAIRMAN CHEBRIKOV. ADDITIONALLY, CC SECRETARY DOLGIKH, PRESENTLY A CANDIDATE MEMBER, COULD BE PROMOTED TO FULL POLITBURO STATUS.

4. (C/NF) ALTHOUGH NOT OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED, THE PLENUM WILL REPORTEDLY FOCUS ON IDEOLOGY. IF SO, IT MAY ENDORSE AN IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITED CHANGE IN THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE LABOR DISCIPLINE CAMPAIGN. ANDROPOV HAS INDICATED HE IS AMENABLE TO SOME CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM, BUT HE APPEARS TO HAVE RULED OUT THOSE THAT WOULD UNDERMINE CENTRAL PLANNING.

5. (C/NF) FURTHERMORE, A NEW LAW ON LABOR COLLECTIVES WILL REPORTEDLY BE APPROVED AT THE SUBSEQUENT SUPREME SOVIET SESSION. IT WAS INITIALLY INTRODUCED IN DRAFT FORM IN APRIL AND HAS BEEN TOUTED IN THE SOVIET PRESS AS A STEP TOWARD BROADER WORKER PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT. THE LAW ALSO APPEARS TO INVOLVE WORK COLLECTIVES MORE CLOSELY IN AN EFFORT TO ENFORCE DISCIPLINE. ALTHOUGH ANDROPOV MAY USE BOTH OF THESE FORUMS TO IMPLEMENT REVISED ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, THEY WILL PROBABLY PORTEND INCREMENTAL CHANGES, WHILE AVOIDING MEASURES THAT MIGHT APPEAR TO ENCRONCH ON TRADITIONAL LENINIST IDEALS.

PREP: [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(2), (3)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 07650

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PGOV, ECON, UR  
SUBJECT: ANDROPOV STRIKES PRAGMATIC NOTE AT CPSU PLENUM

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY. IN HIS SPEECH TO THE CPSU PLENUM ON JUNE 15, GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV STRUCK A MORE PRAGMATIC AND MODERATE TONE THAN THAT TAKEN BY CHERNENKO THE PREVIOUS DAY. BY ADDRESSING THE CONTENT OF THE NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY PROGRAM, ANDROPOV UNDERSCORED HIS ROLE AS PRE-EMINENT PARTY SPOKESMAN ON ALL MAJOR QUESTIONS, INCLUDING IDEOLOGY. (CHERNENKO'S SPEECH, IN CONTRAST, WAS FOCUSED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON IDEOLOGY.) IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, ANDROPOV REITERATED THE NEED TO REINVIGORATE THE ECONOMY BY RAISING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY. THOUGH IT FAILED TO OUTLINE A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO ACHIEVE THIS END, HIS SPEECH APPEARED DESIGNED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR EVENTUAL CHANGES IN ECONOMIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT. ON THE FOREIGN POLICY FRONT, ANDROPOV EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO TOLERATE SOME DIVERSITY AMONG EAST BLOC COUNTRIES, DEEMPHASIZED THIRD-WORLD PROBLEMS, AND WAS MORE RESTRAINED ON SECURITY PROBLEMS THAN RECENT SOVIET PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. ANDROPOV DISPLAYED THE SAME URGENT RESOLVE AS IN NOVEMBER TO RAISE PRODUCTIVITY, ENFORCE THE SOCIALIST PRINCIPLE "TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS WORK," ESTABLISH ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE EXISTING ECONOMIC SYSTEM, AND FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE IT. THE SPECIFICS REMAIN UNCLEAR, AND ANDROPOV GENERALIZES HIS NOVEMBER ADMISION OF HAVING NO READY RECIPES. STRATEGY MUST BE BASED ON A SOUND MARXIST-LENINIST FOUNDATION, BUT "FRANKLY SPEAKING, WE HAVE NOT YET STUDIED PROPERLY THE SOCIETY IN WHICH WE LIVE AND WORK, AND HAVE NOT YET FULLY REVEALED THE LAWS GOVERNING ITS DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC ONES." IN A PASSAGE WHICH IS BOUND TO FURTHER ENLIVEN THE ONGOING ECONOMIC DEBATES HERE, ANDROPOV NOTED SPECIFICALLY THAT SOVIET SCIENCE HAS YET TO PROVIDE PRACTICAL, SOCIALIST SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF RAISING EFFICIENCY, IMPROVING QUALITY, AND SETTING PRICES, AND CALLED AGAIN FOR CAREFUL STUDY OF THE EXPERIENCES OF OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THIS SCORE.

A HIGH TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION?

4. PRIDE OF PLACE IN ANDROPOV'S PRESENT GUIDANCE ON SPEEDING ECONOMIC GROWTH GOES TO MASTERING HIGH TECHNOLOGY. THE WIDEST USE OF COMPUTERS AND ROBOTS, MATERIAL AND ENERGY-SAVING TECHNOLOGY, THE LATEST ATOMIC REACTORS, AND IN THE FUTURE, FUSION ENERGY--"ALL THIS WILL BRING ABOUT A VERITABLE REVOLUTION IN OUR ECONOMY." BUT EVEN WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF INVESTMENTS, ANDROPOV QUALIFIED HIS EXPECTATIONS HERE BY REITERATING A POINT HE MADE IN NOVEMBER: ECONOMIC MANAGERS WHO RISK INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY OFTEN LOSE OUT, WHILE THOSE WHO RESIST IT DO NOT SUFFER. PLANNERS MUST HURRY THEIR WORK IN MAKING INNOVATION PROFITABLE, "SINCE LOSS OF TIME COSTS US DEARLY."

NEED FOR CHANGES IN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

5. ANDROPOV CALLED FOR A "RADICAL IMPROVEMENT OF PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT" AND CITED THE FOOD PROGRAM AND THE MORE RECENT AND HARDLY PUBLICIZED ENERGY PROGRAM (WHICH HE COMPARED TO LENIN'S ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAM) AS GOOD EXAMPLES OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING BY REGIONS AND KEY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. BUT HE PROVIDED NO SPECIFICS AS TO EXACTLY WHAT FURTHER CHANGES IN THE PLANNING AND MANAGE-  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PGOV, ECON, UR  
SUBJECT: ANDROPOV STRIKES PRAGMATIC NOTE AT CPSU PLENUM  
MENT MECHANISM ARE IN ORDER, EXCEPT FOR GREATER WORKER  
INVOLVEMENT IN MANAGEMENT AND A REDUCTION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS.

SEPARATION OF PARTY AND STATE

6. AT THE END OF HIS SPEECH ANDROPOV CALLED FOR A STRICTER SEPARATION OF PARTY FUNCTIONS FROM STATE FUNCTIONS, SAYING THAT CONFUSION ON THIS SCORE HAS LED TO DUPLICATION IN WORK, DIMINUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PART OF STATE OFFICIALS WHO BLAME PARTY OVERSEERS FOR SHORTCOMINGS, AND "DEPARTMENTALISM" ON THE PART OF PARTY OFFICIALS. THIS REMARK WOULD APPEAR TO ASSOCIATE ANDROPOV WITH TECHNOCRATS AND MANAGERS RESENTFUL OF EXCESSIVE PARTY TUTELAGE AND, PERHAPS, WITH A RUMORED PROPOSAL TO RESTRUCTURE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENTS WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING THEIR DAY-TO-DAY INVOLVEMENT IN RUNNING THE ECONOMY.

CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE WILL HAVE TO BE EARNED

7. ANDROPOV DEVOTED MORE ATTENTION THAN IN PREVIOUS SPEECHES TO A WIDE RANGE OF CONSUMER ISSUES, INCLUDING THE HOUSING SHORTAGE, FOR WHICH HE PROMISED RESOLUTION IN THE "NOT Distant FUTURE," AND SUGGESTED BROADER USE OF COOPERATIVE CONSTRUCTION. BUT HE CERTAINLY DID NOT AIM TO RAISE EXPECTATIONS. STRESSING THAT COMMUNISM AND EQUAL ACCESS TO MATERIAL GOODS IS A LONG ROAD AHEAD, ANDROPOV DEFENDED WAGE DIFFERENTIATION AND CALLED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PATTERNS OF "REASONABLE CONSUMPTION." IN SHORT, ANDROPOV ADMITTED TO PROBLEMS IN THE SUPPLY AND QUALITY OF CONSUMER GOODS, BUT WARNED AGAINST "UNREALISTIC" COMMITMENTS ON THIS SCORE.

THE NEED TO EXPAND SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY: BOLD RHETORIC

8. WHILE STRESSING THE NEED FOR GREATER STATE AND LABOR DISCIPLINE, ANDROPOV ALSO DWELT AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH ON THE NEED TO EXPAND "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY," INCLUDING A GREATER ROLE FOR LOCAL SOVIETS, POPULAR DISCUSSION OF NEW LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES, GREATER TRADE UNION DEFENSE OF WORKER RIGHTS, AND GREATER CITICISM AND FREER DISCUSSION IN PARTY MEETINGS. THESE THEMES HAVE BEEN SOUNDED WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY SINCE POLISH EVENTS OF 1980, BUT AT SEVERAL POINTS THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS SHARP IN HIS CRITICISM. HE CALLED, FOR INSTANCE, FOR AN END TO CASES OF "USE OF STATE PROPERTY AND OFFICIAL POSITION FOR PURPOSES OF PERSONAL ENRICHMENT." IN SHORT, HE ADMONISHED THE PARTY TO TAKE ITS OWN RHETORIC SERIOUSLY.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

9. ANDROPOV DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES, ADMITTING CANDIDLY THE EXISTENCE OF PROBLEMS, AND DISTANCING HIMSELF FROM BREZHNEV'S POLICIES OF THE PAST TWO DECADES, INCLUDING

THE "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE," WHICH HE CAREFULLY REDEFINED IN A LESS CATEGORICAL FORM. ANDROPOV SEEMED TO DE-EMPHASIZE THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS, AND, ON SECURITY ISSUES, WAS MORE RESTRAINED THAN RECENT SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HIS ONLY REFERENCE TO THE U.S. CAME IN A BRIEF COMMENT ON THE ROOTS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TENSION. THERE WAS NO DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION OR SPECIFIC U.S. POLICIES.

SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS  
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E. O. 12356:    DECL:    OADR  
TAGS:    PINR, PINS, PGOV, ECON, UR  
SUBJECT:    ANDROPOV STRIKES PRAGMATIC NOTE AT CPSU PLENUM

13.    COMMENT:    SINCE THEY WERE DIRECTED TOWARD THE  
CONTENT OF THE NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY PROGRAM, ANDROPOV'S  
REMARKS ON BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY WERE  
NECESSARILY GENERAL.    HIS SPEECH REINFORCES OUR  
IMPRESSION THAT DOMESTIC ISSUES, DESPITE THE "COMPLICATED"  
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, HEAD THE LEADERSHIP AGENDA.  
THE GENERAL SECRETARY REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE URGENCY  
OF REVIVING AN AILING ECONOMY AND ADMONISHED RESPONSIBLE  
AUTHORITIES TO HASTEN ELABORATION OF CORRECTIVE MEASURES.  
THE LACK OF EVEN A GENERAL OUTLINE OF JUST WHAT CHANGES  
ARE NEEDED OR CONTEMPLATED INDICATES, HOWEVER, THAT THE  
DEBATE ON THE ECONOMY HAS JUST BEGUN.    EITHER ANDROPOV  
HAS NOT FULLY FORMULATED HIS STRATEGY, OR IF HE HAS,  
HE DOES NOT FEEL CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY TO GET THE  
DESIRED MEASURES ADOPTED.    END COMMENT.  
HARTMAN  
BT

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PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 8799 DTG: 271828Z JUN 83 PSN: 020164  
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4. (C) THE SELECTION OF ANDROPOV AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM ADDS TO HIS PRESTIGE. (ANDROPOV WAS ALREADY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE COUNCIL).

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--MOREOVER, KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO'S REPORT ON IDEOLOGY WAS LACED WITH ODEISANT REFERENCES TO ANDROPOV, INCLUDING A BOW TO HIM AS "HEAD" OF POLITBURO. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME CHERNENKO ACCORDED ANDROPOV THIS HONORIFIC WHICH WAS ALSO USED IN THE PLENUM'S CONCLUDING RESOLUTION. ANDROPOV ALSO MADE A FEW IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENTS--THOUGH NOT AS MANY AS SOME SOVIETS HAD EXPECTED--THAT WEAKEN THE POSITION OF HIS PUTATIVE RIVAL CHERNENKO AND OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO WERE CLOSE TO BREZHNEV.

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5. (C) THOSE PERSONNAL CHANGES WHICH WERE MADE APPEAR TO REDOUND TO ANDROPOV'S ADVANTAGE:

TO USMISSION USNATO - IMMEDIATE 0000

--APPOINTMENT OF Leningrad Party Boss Romanov to the Secretariat increases Andropov's strength in shaping issues for decision. (It may also increase Romanov's chances in the succession sweepstakes after Andropov leaves the scene.)

INFO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

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--EXPULSION FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF ERSTWHILE BREZHNEV CRONIES, FORMER POLICE CHIEF-NIKOLAY SHCHELOKOV AND FORMER KRASNODAR PARTY BOSS SERGEY MEDUNOV--BOTH REPORTEDLY UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR CORRUPTION--BOOSTS ANDROPOV'S ANTI-CORRUPTION LINE.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINS PINT UR NATO  
SUBJECT: GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF CPSU PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET MEETING

--ANDROPOV PROBABLY GAINED WITH USTINOV FROM THE PROMOTION OF MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV AND DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER SHABANOV TO FULL MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SHOWED THE INCREASING CLOUT OF THE MILITARY IN HIGHER DECISION-MAKING COUNCILS.

REF: A) USNATO 04046, B) USNATO 04081

--OTHER PROMOTIONS INVOLVED CONSERVATIVE-MINDED INDIVIDUALS FROM THE RUSSIAN REPUBLIC. RSFSR PREMIER SOLOMENTSEV WAS NAMED CHIEF OF THE PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE REPLACING PELSHE; VITALIY VOROTNIKOV BECAME A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND BECAME THE NEW RSFSR PREMIER. THE PATTERN OF VOROTNIKOV'S PROMOTIONS (FROM AMBASSADOR TO CUBA TO MEDUNOV'S REPLACEMENT AND NOW TO MOSCOW, SUGGEST THAT HE IS A NEW CLIENT OF ANDROPOV. KOCHEMASOV WHO WAS JUST NAMED AMBASSADOR TO THE GDR, BECAME A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

1. (C) FOLLOWING, AS REQUESTED IN REF A, IS OUR GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MID-JUNE CPSU PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET SESSION FOR POLADS ON JUNE 28.

PERSONNEL SHIFTS WHICH DID NOT HAPPEN:

2. (C) SUMMARY. IN OUR VIEW ANDROPOV GAINED IN PERSONAL POWER BY THE PLENUM AND THE SUPREME SOVIET. HE IS, HOWEVER, STILL APPARENTLY SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS TO DOMESTIC AND PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. IN CONTRAST TO THE DOMESTIC AREA, THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED AND THE THEMES ON FOREIGN POLICY RUNNING THROUGH ALL THE MAJOR SPEECHES SUGGESTED A UNITED LEADERSHIP FRONT. MOREOVER, SUPPORT FOR ANDROPOV FROM USTINOV AND GROMYKO SHOULD ALLOW THE GENERAL SECRETARY FLEXIBILITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY AREA. WHILE THERE WERE FEWER PERSONNEL SHIFTS THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED, AND NO NEW POLICY DIRECTIONS GIVEN, WE ARE RELUCTANT TO USE THE WORD IMMOBILISM TO DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF THE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS. ANDROPOV'S HEALTH PROBLEMS (SEE BELOW) ARE CERTAINLY A FACTOR, BUT WE ARE REMINDED THAT ANDROPOV HAS BEEN IN OFFICE ONLY SEVEN MONTHS. HE PROBABLY WANTED TO ACCOMPLISH MORE AT THE RECENT MEETINGS BUT HE DOES SHOW SOME POLITICAL MUSCLE. HE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE COME TO THE LEADERSHIP POST WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM AND APPARENTLY STILL HAS NOT FORMULATED ONE. ANDROPOV'S PLENUM SPEECH, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS THAT HE WILL USE A NEW PARTY PROGRAM AS THE VEHICLE TO PLACE HIS STAMP ON THE FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

6. (C) ANDROPOV WAS APPARENTLY NOT ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH SEVERAL THINGS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN TO HIS ADVANTAGE.

3. (C) ANDROPOV GAINED GROUND ON SEVERAL ACCOUNTS AT THE PLENUM AND SUPREME SOVIET IN MID-JUNE BUT HE REMAINS DEPENDENT ON THE POLITBURO MEMBERS WHO PUT HIM INTO OFFICE--A FACTOR WHICH ARGUES FOR CONTINUITY IN THE MAJOR LINES OF SOVIET POLICY, ESPECIALLY ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY ISSUES.

--THE NEW HEAD OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, YEGOR LIGACHEV, WAS NOT PROMOTED TO PARTY SECRETARY. THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A STRONG SIGNAL THAT ANDROPOV WAS TAKING COMMAND OF APPOINTMENTS TO LOCAL AND REGIONAL PARTY POSTS. IN ITS ABSENCE, IT APPEARS THAT ANDROPOV NEEDS MORE TIME TO ESTABLISH HIS DOMINANCE OVER PATRONAGE IN THE PARTY.

--ANDROPOV DID NOT ADD ANY FULL MEMBERS TO THE POLITBURO WHO WOULD OWE THEIR POSITIONS TO HIM.

--ANDROPOV DID NOT--AS HE MIGHT HAVE HOPED TO DO--EASE BREZHNEV CRONY TIKHONOV OUT OF THE PREMIERSHIP.

THE SPEECHES:

BY CU NARRA DATE 7/7/68  
NLR R Feb-11/17 #9574  
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7. (C) THE SPEECH ANDROPOV DELIVERED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CALLING FOR A NEW PARTY PROGRAM, INDICATED HE STILL IS SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS TO DOMESTIC, AND PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. IN CONTRAST, THE THEMES ON FOREIGN POLICY RUNNING THROUGH ALL THE MAJOR SPEECHES SHOWED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO SEE EYE TO EYE IN THIS AREA, AND THAT SUPPORT FOR ANDROPOV FROM USTINOV AND GROMYKO SHOULD ALLOW HIM SOME FLEXIBILITY.

--ANDROPOV'S EMPHASIS ON DOMESTIC ISSUES IN HIS PLENUM SPEECH SUGGESTS THAT DOMESTIC POLICY IS THE MOST TROUBLESOME FOR HIS SEVEN-MONTH-OLD LEADERSHIP.

--THE SPEECH WAS COUCHED IN BROAD PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS AND DID NOT UNVEIL A NEW COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM-OR-POINT TO ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW DIRECTION IN DOMESTIC POLICY. IT DID SUGGEST HOWEVER, THAT THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTS THE BUREAUCRACY TO DISCIPLINE ITSELF IN THE INTEREST OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY WHILE NEW POLICIES RE BEING FORMULATED.

--ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME SOVIET ADOPTED A MUCH BALLYHOODED LAW ON LABOR COLLECTIVES THAT SUPPOSEDLY WILL BRING - WORKERS MORE DIRECTLY INTO MANAGEMENT, THERE WAS LITTLE IN ANDROPOV'S WORDS LAST WEEK TO RAISE EXPECTATIONS OF A BETTER LIFE. HIS MESSAGE WAS A CONSERVATIVE ONE-WORK HARDER, PRODUCE MORE, AND IMPROVE THE QUALITY-OF PRODUCTION.

FOREIGN POLICY:

8. (C) THE REMARKS OF ANDROPOV AND GROMYKO LAST WEEK ACKNOWLEDGED PROBLEMS--INCLUDING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND FRATERNAL PARTIES--AND MADE NO NEW COMMITMENTS IN THE -THIRD WORLD. ANDROPOV, IN FACT, REFERRED TO THE-LIMITS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND EMPHASIZED--THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIRD WORLD LEADERS FOR THE-SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THEIR ECONOMIES. HE DID PLEDGE, HOWEVER, CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT TO THIRD WORLD-CLIENTS.

GROMYKO'S SUPREME SOVIET SPEECH:

9. (C) THE LARGEST PORTION OF GROMYKO'S SPEECH WAS, INDEED, A COMPREHENSIVE AND POLEMICAL CRITIQUE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS. GROMYKO REAFFIRMED-MOSCOW'S DESIRE FOR "SMOOTHER" RELATIONS WITH-WASHINGTON; BUT HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN FACT, GROMYKO'S SPEECH STRUCK US AS SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE IN TONE. HE CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS SEE THEMSELVES AS-UNDER ASSAULT BY THE UNITED STATES ON SEVERAL FRONTS: -

--REARMAMENT IN PURSUIT OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY;  
-- EFFORTS TO WAGE ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES;  
-- DESTABILIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE AND AN IDEOLOGICAL CRUSADE AIMED AT THE ROLLBACK OF SOCIALISM; AND -  
-- AN AGGRESSIVE PUBLIC-RELATIONS CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO PUT THE ONUS ON MOSCOW FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON ARMS

CONTROL.

--ON SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS GROMYKO BROKE LITTLE NEW GROUND. THE MOST NOTEWORTHY ASPECT WAS HIS

ADOPTION OF THE HARSHLY CRITICAL SOVIET PRESS LINE ON THE NEW U.S. START PROPOSALS -- HE DESCRIBED THEM AS THE "FACELIFTED U.S. POSITION" THAT WAS "FULLY TAILORED TO SUIT THE CURRENT FURTHER EXPANSION" OF U.S. PROGRAMS. HE ENDORSED THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR FREEZE, BUT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY FORESHADOW THE SUPREME SOVIET'S SUBSEQUENT CALL FOR A MULTILATERAL FREEZE AMONG THE USSR, US, UK, FRANCE, AND CHINA. HE ALSO CALLED FOR RESUMPTION OF THE CTB TRILATERALS AND RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET.

--DESPITE HIS BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, GROMYKO CONCLUDED ON A CONFIDENT NOTE. HE ASSERTED THAT THE USSR'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION REMAINS SOLID, THAT THE TIDE OF HISTORY IS ROLLING IN SOCIALISM'S FAVOR, AND THAT IT IS A WELL RECOGNIZED FACT THAT "NOT A SINGLE SERIOUS QUESTION OF WORLD POLITICS CAN BE SOLVED, AND IN PRACTICE IS NOT SOLVED," WITHOUT THE USSR'S PARTICIPATION. "THAT IS HOW IT SHOULD BE," GROMYKO BOASTED, IMPLYING THAT US-SOVIET RELATIONS CAN IMPROVE ONLY IF THE U.S. ACCEPTS THE USSR AS AN EQUAL SUPERPOWER.

10. (C) CHERNENKO'S PLENUM SPEECH:

--THE MAIN EVENT OF LAST WEEK WAS, OF COURSE, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. THE FOCUS OF PUBLISHED LEADERSHIP SPEECHES (CHERNENKO AND ANDROPOV) WAS ON INTERNAL RATHER THAN FOREIGN PROBLEMS. CHERNENKO DID TOUCH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS, HOWEVER, IN CALLING FOR EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE U.S. IDEOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE. HIS REMARKS WERE HARSHLY CRITICAL OF WASHINGTON AND HE SEEMED TO BE ADOPTING THE SAME DEFENSIVE TONE AS GROMYKO IN EXPLAINING SOVIET POLICIES.

--CHERNENKO STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES ARE FOLLOWING AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS COURSE (A POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO INF DEPLOYMENT) AND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS ANNOUNCED A NEW CRUSADE AGAINST COMMUNISM. IN CALLING FOR A-NEW PROPAGANDA COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WEST, CHERNENKO SEEMED TO CONVEY THE SENSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AT DISADVANTAGE.

--CHERNENKO'S JUNE 14 DELIVERY OF THE MAIN PLENUM SPEECH IS OF GREATER INTEREST IN SOVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS. THAT CHERNENKO GAVE THE SPEECH INDICATES THAT THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT MEMBER IS

HOLDING HIS OWN IN THE LEADERSHIP -- AT LEAST FOR NOW. HE RETAINS AT LEAST SOME OF THE IDEOLOGICAL PORTFOLIO FORMERLY HELD BY SUSLOV.

--FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, HOWEVER, THE MORE INTERESTING STATEMENTS ON INTERNAL MATTERS LAST WEEK WERE MADE BY ANDROPOV IN HIS CONCLUDING SPEECH. ANDROPOV REFERRED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN HIS SPEECH TO A NEW PARTY PROGRAM, SUGGESTING THAT THIS MIGHT BE HIS VEHICLE TO SET A NEW POLICY DIRECTION -- NOT YET PROCLAIMED. ON ECONOMIC TOPICS, NONETHELESS, CHERNENKO WAS OF INTEREST PRECISELY BECAUSE HE ECHOED THEMES PREVIOUSLY SOUNDED BY ANDROPOV: FRANK, IF VAGUE, ADMISSION OF PAST SHORTCOMINGS, TOGETHER WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINE AND ORDER. HE ALSO DOWNPLAYED INCENTIVES TO SPUR PRODUCTIVITY.

--CHERNENKO DID KEEP THE DOOR OPEN FOR SOME KIND OF ECONOMIC REFORM BY URGING MORE FRESH THINKING FROM SOVIET ACADEMICS AND THINK TANKS. ANDROPOV IS BELIEVED TO BE INTERESTED IN ECONOMIC REFORM AND CHERNENKO'S REMARKS COULD SIGNAL A DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP CONSENSUS TO MOVE AHEAD. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THE

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LEADERSHIP HAS AGREED ON THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF  
ECONOMIC CHANGE.

--CHERNENKO'S SPEECH HAD A STRONG ORTHODOX CAST THAT  
MOVES HIM CLOSER TO ANDROPOV ON IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES AS  
WELL. HE CALLED ON VARIOUS SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL  
ORGANIZATIONS TO BE MORE AGGRESSIVE AND REPEATED THE  
STANDARD CALL FOR A VIGOROUS STRUGGLE AGAINST SUCH  
CHRONIC PROBLEMS AS DRUNKENNESS, THEFT AND  
BRIBE-TAKING. CHERNENKO CALLED FOR BETTER ATTENTION TO  
SOVIET PUBLIC AND SOCIAL CONCERNS -- A THEME THAT HAS  
GAINED CURRENCY AMONG THE LEADERSHIP SINCE THE 1980  
DISRUPTIONS IN POLAND AND ONE THAT HE HAS SPOKEN OUT ON  
IN THE PAST.

11. (U) ANDROPOV'S HEALTH:

--SOVIET SOURCES HAVE REPORTED IN RECENT MONTHS THAT  
THE 69 YEAR OLD SOVIET PARTY LEADER HAS ONE OR MORE  
MEDICAL PROBLEMS--INCLUDING DIABETES MELLITUS,  
PARKINSON'S SYNDROME, AND NEPHRITIS. HIS OCCASIONAL  
APPEARANCE OF PHYSICAL FRAILTY HAS PROMPTED MUCH  
SPECULATION ABOUT HIS PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL STAYING

POWER.

--SINCE REPLACING BREZHNEV, ANDROPOV HAS CARRIED A  
HEAVIER BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND BEEN IN GREATER  
PUBLIC VIEW AND THUS LESS ABLE TO CONCEAL SOME OF HIS  
MEDICAL PROBLEMS. HIS PERFORMANCE, SINCE NOVEMBER,  
NONETHELESS, BELIES THE EXISTENCE OF MOST OF THE  
SPECIFIC AILMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

--(S) ANDROPOV DOES PROBABLY HAVE A KIDNEY IMPAIRMENT  
THAT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE EFFECTS OF YEARS OF  
HYPERTENSION, BUT THE DISEASE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE  
ADVANCED TO THE POINT WHERE DIALYSIS IS INDICATED.  
MORE SERIOUS IS HIS CORONARY HEART DISEASE. HE  
SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK IN 1966, AND HIGH BLOOD  
PRESSURE AGGRAVATES HIS HEART PROBLEM. HOWEVER, HIS  
CARDIAC FUNCTION HAS BEEN IMPROVED BY A  
PACEMAKER THAT CONTROLS ABNORMAL HEART RHYTHMS. IN  
ADDITION, CLOSE MEDICAL SUPERVISION AND PRESCRIBED REST  
AND MEDICATIONS MITIGATE CARDIAC DETERIORATION AND THE  
RELATED ANGINA PECTORIS THAT HE APPARENTLY SUFFERS.

--(S) THE CARE HE RECEIVES INCREASES THE CHANCE OF  
SURVIVAL FROM ANOTHER ACUTE HEART ATTACK. WITH  
CONSTANT MEDICAL ATTENTION AND PERIODIC REST, ANDROPOV  
SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME AND ENERGY TO CARRY OUT HIS  
PLANS FOR THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS--WHICH MUST BE HELD BY  
1986.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/27/89  
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, UR, KALR  
SUBJECT: MAJOR EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION  
REF: MOSCOW 9025

1 (C) SUMMARY. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS PROVIDED THE FIRST DETAILS OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS ATTEMPTED UNDER ANDROPOV'S LEADERSHIP. BEGINNING ON JANUARY 1, 1984, AN "ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT" WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES WHICH FALL UNDER FIVE IMPORTANT UNION AND REPUBLIC MINISTRIES. BY DECENTRALIZING SOME DECISIONS ON INVESTMENT AND WAGES, THE EXPERIMENT IS DESIGNED TO BOOST PRODUCTIVITY AND STIMULATE TECHNICAL INNOVATION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL CENTRAL CONTROL. ALTHOUGH THE EXPERIMENT IS A CAUTIOUS STEP AND APPLIES TO ONLY A FEW MINISTRIES, THE VARIETY CHOSEN SUGGESTS THAT THIS IS AN EXPERIMENT TO TEST POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. AS AN EXPERIMENT, HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT COMMIT THE REGIME TO FURTHER CHANGE, AND IT LEAVES THE COURSE OF FUTURE ECONOMIC REFORM STILL OPEN. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) IN ITS JULY 26 EDITIONS THE SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS CARRIES A SUMMARY OF THE RECENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET RESOLUTION DECREE ON "AN EXPERIMENT" IN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT. THE RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS ANNOUNCED ON JULY 16 (REFTEL). BEARS THE LENGTHY TITLE: "ON ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO EXPAND THE RIGHTS OF INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS (ENTERPRISES) IN PLANNING AND IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RESULTS OF THEIR WORK." THE RESOLUTION OUTLINES A SERIES OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE ROLE OF ENTERPRISES IN THE PLANNING PROCESS, BOOST PRODUCTIVITY, STIMULATE TECHNICAL INNOVATION AND LINK ENTERPRISE PROFITS AND WORKER BENEFITS MORE CLOSELY WITH PERFORMANCE. THE EXPERIMENT IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN ON

JANUARY 1, 1984 IN THE FOLLOWING MINISTRIES:

- HEAVY AND TRANSPORT MACHINE-BUILDING,
- ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY,
- FOOD INDUSTRY OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC
- LIGHT INDUSTRY OF THE BYELORUSSIAN REPUBLIC, AND
- LOCAL INDUSTRY OF THE LITHUANIAN REPUBLIC.

WHILE THE PRESS HAS CARRIED ONLY A SUMMARY OF THE RESOLUTION, AND MANY DETAILS ARE UNCLEAR, THE FOLLOWING POINTS RECEIVED PARTICULAR ATTENTION.

3 (U) PLANNING. THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND ENTERPRISES PARTICIPATING IN THE EXPERIMENT TO BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED AT ALL STAGES IN DEVELOPING THE PLAN. THE NUMBER OF PLAN INDICATORS IS TO BE REDUCED, AND AN INCREASED ROLE IS TO BE GIVEN TO UNSPECIFIED ECONOMIC NORMS. THESE NORMS ARE TO SERVE AS "THE LEVER TO INFLUENCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY." THE RESOLUTION SPECIFIES THAT THE NORMS ARE TO BE WORKED OUT AND PRESENTED TO THE INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND ENTERPRISES IN A TIMELY FASHION BEFORE THEY ARE INCORPORATED IN THE PLAN. ONCE ESTABLISHED IN THE PLAN THEY WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE OR REVISION. THE RESOLUTION CHARGES GOSPLAN AND GOSSNAB, TOGETHER WITH THE MINISTRIES, WITH THE TASK OF MAKING THE NECESSARY CHANGES IN THE PLANNING PROCESS.

4. (U) CONTRACTS. THE SAME ORGANIZATIONS ARE CALLED UPON TO EXAMINE MEASURES FOR STRENGTHENING "CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS" AMONG ENTERPRISES AND FOR INCREASING JOINT RESPONSIBILITY AMONG SUPPLIERS, CONSUMERS, AND THE STATE SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS FOR UNCONDITIONAL FULFILLMENT OF AGREEMENTS. FIRMS WHICH PARTICIPATE IN THE EXPERIMENT ARE TO BE JUDGED "ABOVE ALL" ON FULFILLING PLAN ASSIGN-  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/27/89  
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, UR, KALR  
SUBJECT: MAJOR EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION  
MENTS RELATING TO THE VOLUME OF "SALES" WHICH MEET  
CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS FOR ASSORTMENT, QUALITY, AND DELIVERY  
DATE. DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC BRANCH OF INDUSTRY,  
ENTERPRISES WILL ALSO BE JUDGED ON CARRYING OUT SCIENTIFIC  
AND TECHNICAL INNOVATION, INCREASING PRODUCTIVITY, AND  
REDUCING THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION.

5. (U) PRODUCTIVITY AND INVESTMENT. TURNING TO THE GOAL  
OF INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY, THE RESOLUTION OUTLINES GREATER  
AUTONOMY FOR ASSOCIATIONS AND ENTERPRISES TO USE VARIOUS  
CAPITAL AND WAGE FUNDS TO STIMULATE INNOVATION. UNDER  
THE EXPERIMENT, ENTERPRISES WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE  
THE "FUND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION" AS  
"UNCENTRALIZED" INVESTMENT CAPITAL WHICH CAN BE USED  
TOGETHER WITH "CENTRALIZED" INVESTMENT FUNDS. (EMBASSY  
COMMENT: WE INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT THESE FUNDS WILL  
BE USED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ENTERPRISE. END COMMENT.)  
FINANCIAL RESOURCES WHICH ARE ACCUMULATED IN THIS FUND  
WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL OR FREEZING.  
"CENTRALIZED" AND "UNCENTRALIZED" CAPITAL INVESTMENT  
FUNDS WILL BE LISTED SEPARATELY IN THE STATE BUDGET.  
ASSOCIATIONS AND ENTERPRISES ARE ALSO PERMITTED TO USE  
FUNDS EARMARKED FOR CAPITAL REPAIRS TO PURCHASE NEW  
EQUIPMENT WHEN RE-EQUIPPING IS MORE EFFICIENT. ENTERPRISES  
AND ASSOCIATIONS ARE ALSO TO BE PERMITTED TO DRAW CREDITS  
FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASING NEW EQUIPMENT.

6. (U) INNOVATION. TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATION AND SPEED UP  
THE ADAPTATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY, ENTERPRISES PARTICIPATING  
IN THE EXPERIMENT WILL BE PERMITTED TO MAKE THEIR OWN  
DECISIONS ON THE USE OF PART OF THE FUND FOR THE DEVELOP-  
MENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO IMPLEMENT DESIGN AND

PROJECT WORK WHICH IS BASED UPON NEW TECHNOLOGIES.  
THIS INCLUDES THE PAYMENT OF BONUSES TO SCIENTIFIC,  
TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING WORKERS TO ENSURE THE OUTPUT  
OF HIGH QUALITY, EXPORTABLE GOODS.

7. (U) PRODUCTIVITY AND INCENTIVES. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
RESOLUTION ALSO CONTAINS A SERIES OF MEASURES INTENDED  
TO LINK MORE CLOSELY WORKERS AND MANAGEMENT BENEFITS AND  
ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE. FIRMS, PARTICIPATING IN THE  
EXPERIMENT WILL HAVE THE SIZE OF THEIR WAGE AND INCENTIVE  
FUNDS CLOSELY LINKED WITH THEIR PERFORMANCE. TO THIS  
END, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR THE  
PERFECTING AND SIMPLIFYING THE FORMATION OF THE FUND FOR  
MATERIAL INCENTIVES. IT ALSO SPECIFIES THAT USE OF THIS  
FUND IS TO BE LINKED MORE CLOSELY WITH THE VOLUME OF SALES  
BASED UPON DELIVERY CONTRACTS. DEPENDING ON THE BRANCH OF  
INDUSTRY, OTHER FACTORS IN DETERMINING THE USE OF THIS  
FUND WILL BE: RAISING THE TECHNICAL STANDARD OF PRODUCTION,  
INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, AND LOWERING THE COSTS  
OF PRODUCTION.

8. (U) WAGES AND BENEFITS. ENTERPRISES AND ASSOCIATIONS  
WHICH PARTICIPATE IN THE EXPERIMENT WILL ALSO HAVE GREATER  
DISCRETION OVER THE USE OF THEIR WAGE FUNDS. SAVINGS MADE  
IN THE USE OF THE WAGE FUND CAN BE USED TO PAY INCREMENTAL  
SALARY INCREASES TO WORKERS WHO HAVE PERFORMED HIGH  
QUALITY WORK OR WHO CARRY OUT MULTIPLE JOB RESPONSIBILITIES.  
IN DISCUSSING BONUSES, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION  
PLACES PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF FULFILLING  
PLAN TASKS WHICH ARE BASED UPON THE VOLUME OF SALES  
COVERED BY CONTRACTS. THE RESOLUTION ALSO ENVISAGES A  
GREATER ROLE FOR THE FUND FOR SOCIAL-CULTURAL ACTIVITIES  
AND HOUSING CONSTRUCTION. GROWTH IN THE SIZE OF THIS FUND  
IS TO BE LINKED TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ENTERPRISE,  
AND THE ENTERPRISE WILL BE GIVEN GREATER CONTROL OVER  
HOW THE FUND IS USED.

9. (U) FINALLY, THE RESOLUTION STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: 7/27/89  
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, UR, KALR  
SUBJECT: MAJOR EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION WHICH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ATTACH TO THIS RESOLUTION IN IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS OF THE 26TH PARTY CONGRESS. THE RESOLUTION IS CHARACTERIZED AS EMBODYING ONE OF THE MAIN DIRECTIONS IN IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY AND PERFECTING THE "STYLE" AND METHOD OF THE ECONOMY.

10. (C) COMMENT. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS EXPERIMENT WAS PRECEDED BY AN UNUSUAL PROPAGANDA BUILD-UP. THE NEED FOR MEASURES TO COMBINE MORE EFFICACIOUSLY CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND LOCAL INITIATIVE WAS MENTIONED BY ANDROPOV IN HIS NOVEMBER 22, 1982 CPSU PLENUM SPEECH, BY GORBACHEV IN HIS APRIL 21 LENIN-DAY SPEECH, AND BY ALIEV IN HIS RECENT (JUNE 16) ADDRESS TO THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET ON THE NEW LABOR LAW. IN ADDITION, THE EXPERIMENT WAS DISCUSSED AT A RECENT MEETING OF THE POLITBURO.

11. (C) THIS PILOT PROJECT IS THE LONGEST STEP TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT SINCE BREZHNEV'S DEATH, AND AT FIRST SIGHT, PROBABLY THE LONGEST STEP IN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT REFORM SINCE 1979. IT INCORPORATES SOME OF THE GOALS OF THE 1979 MANAGEMENT REFORM APPROACH INCLUDING MORE RATIONAL TARGETS FOR ENTERPRISE AND REWARDS FOR ACHIEVING THEM THROUGH THE WAGES FUND. THIS EXPERIMENT ALSO RESPONDS TO SEVERAL OF THE OBJECTIVES MANAGEMENT REFORMERS HAVE ADVOCATED IN THE SOVIET PRESS OVER THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS.

12. (C) IT SEEMS TO SUBSTANTIALLY ENHANCE THE ENTERPRISES' CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN FINANCES, BOTH FOR INVESTMENT AND FOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, GIVING THEM SOME PROTECTION

FROM THE PREDATIONS OF HIGHER ORGANIZATIONS. ALTHOUGH IT IS A CAUTIOUS STEP, APPLYING ONLY TO A FEW MINISTRIES, THE VARIETY OF THE MINISTRIES CHOSEN SUGGESTS THAT THIS IS A BLUEPRINT FOR THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY AS A WHOLE. WE WOULD EXPECT THE CONSIDERABLE SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THE MOSCOW LEADERSHIP AND THE PARTY TO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO INSURE THAT THE EXPERIMENT SUCCEEDS, EVEN IF FURTHER REVISIONS ARE NECESSARY.

13. (C) MISSING ELEMENTS.

(A) BY APPLYING THE EXPERIMENT ONLY TO CERTAIN MINISTRIES, THE "CONTROL GROUP" -- THE REST OF SOVIET INDUSTRY -- WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF THE OLDER "REFORMS" AS THEY MOVE INTO THE PLANNING CYCLE FOR THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR PLAN. THE RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT, AND THEIR APPLICATION THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY, ARE THUS SOME YEARS OFF.

(B) THE SUMMARY OF THIS DECREE SAYS NOTHING ABOUT TWO KEY FACTORS: PRICE-SETTING BY ENTERPRISES, AND MANAGERS' AUTHORITY TO HIRE AND FIRE. THE FOCUS IS INSTEAD ON THE ENTERPRISES' ROLE IN PLANNING, FINANCING, AND IN UNDERTAKING AND FULFILLING DELIVERY CONTRACTS.

(C) DESPITE THE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FALLING ON ENTERPRISE MANAGERS, THE SUMMARY DOES NOT MENTION THEM. INSTEAD, THE LABOR COLLECTIVES ARE CITED, A DELIBERATE LINK TO THE RECENT LAW TO INCREASE THEIR ROLE.

(D) "NORMATIVE NET OUTPUT" -- A BIG ELEMENT IN THE 1979 REFORMS -- IS NOT MENTIONED. BUT REFERENCES TO THE STANDARDS AND INDICATORS TO BE USED BY FIRMS UNDER THE EXPERIMENT ARE VAGUE, SUGGESTING THAT MANY EXISTING INDICATORS WILL CONTINUE TO BE USED, AND THAT THE FLEXIBILITY TO CHANGE THEM IS BUILT IN. WE HAVE LONG THOUGHT THAT IF THE MULTIPLICITY OF INDICATORS NOW IN USE IS TO BE SIMPLIFIED, THE SOVIETS WILL FAVOR DIFFERENT

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SUBJECT: MAJOR EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION  
INDICATORS IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF INDUSTRIES.  
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14. ONCE AGAIN, THE ANDROPOV APPROACH TO THE ECONOMY MEETS  
AN OLD RUSSIAN DIALECTIC HEAD ON: THERE IS TO BE BOTH  
CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION. THE DECREE SEEMS TO  
BE AN ATTEMPT TO STABILIZE AND SIMPLIFY THE PLANNING  
AND MANAGEMENT GOALS OF ENTERPRISE SO THAT BOTH GOSPLAN  
AND THE ENTERPRISE CAN PLAN, AND RESPOND TO INCENTIVES,  
MORE EFFECTIVELY OVER A LONGER PERIOD. CENTRAL DIRECTION  
OF THIS EXPERIMENT REMAINS IN PLACE: THE PROCESS TOWARD  
FURTHER REFORM IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND REVERSIBLE. END  
COMMENT. ZIMMERMANN  
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~~(U)~~ RELIGION/SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY:  
THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE

Summary

~~(U)~~ The Prague-based Christian Peace Conference (CPC) is a Soviet-backed international front organization.<sup>1/</sup> Since its founding in 1958, it has sought to influence opinion within church-related groups on a host of controversial international foreign and defense issues. The CPC from the start has been headed by a prominent Soviet or East European theologian or religious leader, and its major gatherings always have been staged in a communist country. Following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the CPC was purged of dissidents to ensure Soviet control.

~~(U)~~ The CPC shares the USSR's approach to human rights and national liberation movements; since at least 1978 it has worked to promote a "liberation theology" justifying Christian support for armed struggle against unjust social orders. Like the USSR, the CPC rejects pacifism (on the grounds that pacifists do not distinguish between "just" and "unjust" wars), but it does not rule out cooperation with pacifists for tactical reasons.

~~(U)~~ During the 1970s, the CPC focused on promoting Soviet interests in the Third World. With the 1980s debate over the deployment in Europe of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), it has turned its attention to disarmament and security issues, invariably supporting Soviet initiatives in this sphere. It has never publicly criticized Soviet or East European suppression of religion.

1/ See attached appendices for CPC leadership members, policymaking and support bodies, working bodies, and CPC statute extracts.

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(S/NF) Soviet lines of control within the CPC are well established, both organizationally and financially. In cooperation with other Soviet-backed groups, the CPC is working intensively to influence mainline church positions on disarmament and security issues. Current CPC activity is structured to encourage anti-INF sentiment in advance of the sixth World Christian Peace Assembly, scheduled for July 2-9, 1985, in Prague.

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"The Christian Peace Conference is no mere pacifist organization; it is contributing by its specific activity toward maintaining peace and toward efforts for disarmament. That is why it fully supports L. Brezhnev's latest proposals, which are a significant step toward halting feverish armament and preventing the emergence of a world nuclear conflict."

CPC President Karoly Toth in Rude Pravo, March 26, 1982

"In the overall stream of bourgeois-clerical propaganda's falsifications, religion is presented as the keeper of some kind of eternal spiritual values. Here its hostility toward social and intellectual progress at many stages of history is carefully concealed."

Pravda, July 6, 1984

~~(U)~~ CPC Origins

At its founding congress (June 1-3, 1958; Prague), the CPC defined its objective as a "peace fight." The CPC role in Moscow's post-World War II peace offensive was defined during the congress by the organization's first secretary general, Czechoslovak theologian Bohuslav Pospisil, who declared: "At a time when public opinion everywhere is alarmed by the growth of nuclear arms we are beginning to realize that at this critical moment...the churches must not stand aside." The first clear-cut indication that the CPC defined "peace" in Soviet terms was the congress' failure to criticize the Soviet military intervention in Hungary two years earlier. Instead, the Hungarian "counterrevolution" was attacked and reproached for its "encumbrance of Christian activities."<sup>2/</sup>

The CPC at its second meeting (April 16-19, 1959; Prague) attributed the concept of cold war exclusively to the noncommunist West. Most significantly, Secretary General Pospisil made clear that the "peace fight" had political ramifications: "It is not

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<sup>2/</sup> (U) "The History of the Christian Peace Conference," Part I, Reformatusok Lapja, February 14, 1971, Budapest.

irony, but the logic of history that in the peace movement Christians openly and sincerely march side by side with the progressive elements of society, the Communists."<sup>3/</sup>

The CPC's third meeting (September 6-11, 1960; Prague) condemned anticommunism as the ideology of a crusade incompatible with the Cross.<sup>4/</sup> Since the founding congress in 1958, participation in the organization had grown: the 1958 conference hosted 40 representatives; in 1959 there were 96 delegates in attendance; and in 1960 198 delegates participated. Also in 1960, for the first time, East bloc representatives were a minority (96 of the 198 delegates).

~~(U)~~ A More Defined Course

The CPC held its first All-Christian Peace Assembly in Prague, April 13-16, 1961. In the opening address to the 700 participants, CPC President and Czechoslovak theologian and World Peace Council member Joseph Hromadka noted:

"We have to recognize that the old international order, which up to the second World War supported the so-called Christian peoples of the West, has fallen apart. We are at the beginning of a new order, the construction of which may well take up to several decades more."

One of the main CPC concerns at the 1961 conference was to organize the "peace fight" along stricter lines. A Continuation Committee of 110 members and a Working Committee of 16 were formed to conduct the work of the CPC between gatherings.

The second All-Christian Peace Assembly (June 28-July 3, 1964; Prague) drew 1,200 delegates from 50 countries. On this occasion the representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, Leningrad professor of theology Vitichy Borowoj, proposed that the CPC adopt an ostensibly politically neutral outlook: "Our movement is essentially and potentially neither Eastern nor Socialist, but generally Christian."<sup>5/</sup>

What Borowoj meant by a politically neutral Christian commitment was spelled out in the course of the third All-Christian

3/ ~~(U)~~ Ibid., Part III, February 28, 1971.

4/ ~~(U)~~ Ibid., Part IV, August 8, 1971.

5/ ~~(U)~~ Ibid., Part VI, August 29, 1971.



Peace Assembly (March 31-April 3, 1968; Prague). More than a thousand people participated. Resolutions issued in the name of the assembly called on the world's churches to: put an end to "anti-Communist hysteria," described as the cause of the global arms race; take part in the "construction of that new society in which social justice, peace and the possibility of a complete evolution of the personality are guaranteed"; and demand that the West European nations and the US "pay for the stimulation of the economy and the industrialization of the Third World, without any strings being attached to this aid."<sup>6/</sup> This last message heralded greater CPC attention to the Third World in the next decade.

~~(U)~~ The Invasion of Czechoslovakia

The CPC had difficulty retaining its following after the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Several CPC officials, along with officials in a number of other Soviet-backed front organizations, were replaced by Moscow in an effort to restore discipline. CPC President Hromadka and Secretary General Jaroslav Ondra (successor to Pospisil), both Czechoslovaks, were forced out of office after they protested the invasion. Several West European CPC members resigned. By February 1970, Soviet control had been restored, albeit at the expense of once-heavy European participation.

~~(U)~~ The 1970s Focus on the Third World

Attendance at the fourth All-Christian Peace Assembly (September 30-October 3, 1971; Prague) dropped to a relative low of 240 delegates and 100 observers from 49 countries. But it included representatives and observers of the World Peace Council, World Council of Churches, World Lutheran Federation, All-African Conference of Churches, and UNESCO. WPC Presidential Committee member Richard Andrimanjato (Madagascar) was elected to the CPC Working Group.

The assembly organizers made special efforts to associate the fight for peace more strongly with the "fight for social progress." The new focus on the Third World and national liberation was underscored when newly elected Secretary General Janusz Makowski (Poland) asserted:

"More militants from [the developing world] should be recruited for the CPC...our militants went to Africa, America, Latin America and India in 1971.... Representatives of

~~(U)~~ <sup>6/</sup> Ibid., Part VIII, October 8, 1971.

the Third World have never been so numerous as today, when they constitute nearly forty percent of this Assembly."

The assembly passed resolutions on Vietnam, the Middle East, East Pakistan, and South Africa, all supportive of Soviet foreign policy positions. Statements and resolutions defined the struggle against anticommunism as a task to be undertaken by Christianity and the churches in the interests of peace. The blatant pro-Soviet direction of the gathering prompted the Paris daily Le Figaro to comment on October 1: "Following the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia deep repercussions have occurred within the CPC so it has become an instrument of Soviet policy."

Other CPC gatherings during the 1970s underscored the organization's close alignment with Soviet foreign policy interests, particularly with respect to the advancement of "social progress" in the developing world:

1974. The CPC Study Commission for Economy and Politics, meeting in Prague in early March, discussed "threats to world peace" and agreed in the course of its deliberations that an essential part of Christian activity consisted of "exposing the warlike political-economic mechanism of imperialism." On March 12-15, 50 representatives of churches and other Christian organizations gathered in Prague as another working commission, to review cooperation of all peace forces. The CPC subcommission on the Middle East met in Cairo on April 23-27; participants' resolutions endorsed the Arab "struggle against Zionism" and the liberation struggle of the Palestinians. In the end the session adopted a statement of principles placing the CPC firmly behind the anti-Zionist struggle.

1975. An Asian Christian Peace Conference in January adopted resolutions demanding the "full reunification of Korea in accordance with the principles of the five-point proposals of the North Korean Government." It also established a commission to investigate the question of political prisoners in Asian countries. Later that month, 80 churchmen from Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia attended a CPC seminar in West Berlin on the "Meaning of the World Christian in the Work for Peace."

In February, the CPC's International Secretariat met in Moscow, and on April 10 its Working Committee convened in Sofia with 50 leading church representatives attending. The theme of the April session was "The Co-Existence of Christians, Jews, and Muslims and the Problems of Peace in the Middle East." Discussions touched on contributions Christians could make in resolving



the Middle East conflict, general problems facing the international political system, and possibilities for further cooperation of anti-imperialist forces. CPC President Metropolitan Nikodim stressed during the deliberations the necessity of putting an end to Zionism's "misuse" of religious ideas for justifying Israel's "aggressive" policies.

1976. The CPC in January issued a call for support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The CPC's Anti-Racism Study Commission met in the Federal Republic of Germany in February to draft a statement on the situation in Namibia and a circular letter to churches on Angola. Seventy participants from 24 countries, including Secretary General Mirejovsky, attended a CPC seminar in Sofia in mid-June to discuss the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its significance for the Third World. It issued a communique stressing the significance of the CSCE Final Act but warning that the conference had not done away with the forces opposed to detente. It therefore was important for peace forces to remain vigilant. The Helsinki Accords, the communique added, did not signify any diminution of the efforts of socialism to combat capitalism in order to secure a better future for mankind.

1977. Mirejovsky, three CPC vice presidents, and the international secretaries from 15 countries attended the CPC's International Secretariat meeting in Prague on January 11. The final communique expressed support for Warsaw Pact disarmament proposals and welcomed the convening of a special UN session on disarmament the following year. It also pledged support for UN proposals for an anti-apartheid conference in Africa and for economic sanctions against Chile. According to local media reports, delegates expressed their determination to oppose attempts by reactionary forces to use the human rights issue as a "pretext for reviving the cold war spirit and impeding detente." In May the CPC joined the Berlin Conference of European Catholics (a complementary Soviet-line front) in Prague for a discussion on the need to counter attempts to revive the Cold War. Other CPC gatherings throughout the spring focused on the Christian's contribution to peace, justice, and freedom in Africa and the "oppression of progressive forces" in Latin America.

1978. The fifth All-Christian Peace Assembly (June 21-29; Prague) was attended by more than 680 delegates, guests, and observers from nearly 100 countries who participated in workshops on disarmament, racism, economic problems, theological questions, cooperation with the UN, and the contribution of Christians to "world peace." The participants approved a message to Christians,

including the churches; an appeal to governments concerning dangers to peace in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East and the proposed production of the neutron bomb; and resolutions on disarmament and detente, colonialism and neocolonialism, China's "militaristic moves," and the need to solve the Vietnam-Cambodian dispute peacefully. The assembly also endorsed the Soviet call for a world disarmament conference. The imprisonment of priests in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the USSR was not mentioned in the course of the gathering, nor were church protests then taking place in the GDR against expansion of pre-military education in the schools.

1979. A 13-member CPC delegation attended a World Peace Council conference on Vietnam in Helsinki on March 16. A week later the CPC leadership conferred with WPC President Romesh Chandra in Budapest. In April, the CPC Working Committee met in Helsinki and issued statements on detente, disarmament, southern Africa, Vietnam, and Palestine, all consistent with the Soviet line. In mid-May the CPC staged a disarmament conference at Selm in the FRG.

(U) The CPC and the National Liberation Movement

Parallelism with Moscow's line is especially obvious in the CPC's promotion of "social progress" and defense of Third World interests, particularly in the context of the national liberation struggle. According to official CPC documents, social injustice is to be remedied by armed struggle; such "war for a just cause" is in turn a prerequisite for a "just peace." Armed struggle also is legitimate against a "pacification" policy that prejudices socialism:

"The striving for liberation without the search for a just peace can easily degenerate into aggression and expansionism... For this reason the concept of the just peace is fundamental to all proceedings.... Confronted by injustice all over the world we cannot be neutral, and we cannot submit to the role of mere observer. By the message of the Bible we are bound to take concrete decisions and to participate actively in any fight against injustice.... That form of exploitation which characterizes the capitalist system was recognized by the ecumenical movement as one of the causes of social injustice in the modern world....

"Any consideration of the necessity to abolish unjust structures of power will necessarily lead to the question of how and when to apply power and violence. The CPC gave a lot of thought to this problem in connection with the question of revolution. We realized that there can be social situations in which only revolutionary change will be able to create a legitimate new

society. In such a situation we Christians have no choice but to suggest this form of establishing people's rights."<sup>7/</sup>

At the same time, opposition to revolution is unjustified:

"There is another type of change which does not deserve the name of 'revolution.' That is the so-called counter-revolution. Whereas revolution wants to bring about the humanization of society, counter-revolution strives to restore the old, unjust order of society...."<sup>8/</sup>

The justification of revolutionary violence had been formulated during the 1971 assembly:

"In a situation in which institutionalized power excludes every other possibility violence is a justified means to reach this objective (namely, radical social change)... The fact that theologically war cannot be justified...can never mean that the possibility of a fight against unjust social structures and of revolution as ultima ratio is to be excluded."<sup>9/</sup>

(U) Liberation Theology and Human Rights

According to documents from the 1971 assembly, Christians should lend their support to peace forces that promote the armed national liberation movements of the Third World against imperialism. The same conference characterized Western imperialism as the "greatest threat to the peaceful existence of mankind." It rejected pacifism per se, for not distinguishing between just and unjust peace, but did not exclude cooperation with the pacifists.<sup>10/</sup>

The CPC's own "theology of liberation" seeks to provide a philosophical underpinning for the "peace fight" and national

<sup>7/</sup> (U) "Peace and Justice: The Ecumenical Duty of Christians and Churches. Contribution of the CPC to the Fifth World Congress of the World Council of Churches," Theologiai Szemle (TSz), No. 5-6, 1975, pp. 175-180, Budapest.

<sup>8/</sup> (U) Karoly Toth, "The Problems of the Third World in the CPC in Cuba and Madagascar," TSz, No. 11-12, 1974, pp. 342-346.

<sup>9/</sup> (U) Ibid., p. 343.

<sup>10/</sup> (U) "Peace and Christian Responsibility: A New Impulse From Prague," For the West of Europe, Prague, December 1971.

liberation warfare.<sup>11/</sup> This "theology" recommends supporting national liberation movements and demands that Western churches rid themselves of the bourgeoisie: "The churches of these countries must free themselves of the bourgeoisie social ties. The churches existing in Western society need liberation at least as urgently as the proletarian masses."<sup>12/</sup>

The CPC as a result declares itself against the "individualistic concept" of human rights and demands that "distinctions be made according to the respective situation" (thereby apparently excluding from its purview human rights violations in the USSR and other communist regimes). It also maintains that Christians have the duty to concede that "any realization of human rights must lead towards socialism."

The CPC has stated specifically:

"Human rights have to be seen not only as individual rights to liberty, but also and rather as the rights and duties of groups and communities.... The liberal interpretation of human rights is not in accordance with the message of the Bible. We regard an absolute concept of human rights, which does not take the historical development into account, as unacceptable."<sup>13/</sup>

~~(U)~~ The 1980s: Peace and Disarmament

With NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy INF missiles in Western Europe, Soviet-backed fronts, including the CPC, mobilized as part of an overall Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign to overturn the decision. The CPC continues to promote Third World causes, but the focus of its activity since 1980 has been the anti-INF campaign.

1980-81. The CPC in mid-May 1980 sponsored an International Seminar on Detente; in October the CPC Continuation Committee met in the GDR and called for a halt to the production and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. In November 1981, a CPC conference in East Berlin rejected the US "zero option," endorsing instead the USSR's proposal for a moratorium on INF deployment in Europe.

11/ ~~(U)~~ Karoly Toth, "On the Theology of Liberation and the Fight Against Racial Discrimination," TSz, No. 1-2, 1975, pp. 42-52.

12/ ~~(U)~~ TSz, No. 7-8, 1975, pp. 234-240.

13/ ~~(U)~~ "The Attitude of the CPC to the Question of Human Rights," TSz, No. 11-12, 1974.



1982-83. In March 1982 a CPC Working Committee session, attended by 60 church representatives from 26 countries, was held in Prague; a letter to Brezhnev stemming from the session endorsed his proposal for a moratorium on nuclear missile deployments, called for support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and an international conference on the Middle East, and attacked US policy in Central America. In May 1982 a massive "World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life From Nuclear Catastrophe" was held in Moscow, cosponsored by the CPC and attended by more than 2,000 delegates. Its final report criticized Western foreign and defense policies and expressed support for the USSR on a broad range of issues.

In February 1983 a CPC International Secretariat meeting endorsed the results of a January 5 Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session in Prague; delegates also commemorated the 35th anniversary of communist rule in Czechoslovakia. In May, a CPC-sponsored gathering, "What Can the Churches Do in the Interests of Disarmament?", was staged in Budapest; more than 150 US, Asian, and African church representatives attended. On October 14, Czechoslovak leader Husak received Toth on the occasion of the 25th CPC anniversary. Meetings commemorating the anniversary, attended by CPC activists from all over the world, were staged in Moscow through late October. In an October 20 meeting with USSR Supreme Soviet officials, Toth applauded Andropov's "peace initiatives."

1984. A six-day CPC meeting in Odessa in January discussed US "nuclear strategy" in the Pacific and its influence on Japan. A four-day International Secretariat session, staged later that month in Prague, stressed the role of the churches in the anti-INF movement and the global struggle of "progressive forces" for security, peace, and disarmament. An April gathering of the Working Committee was staged in Dresden to examine the "exacerbated threat of war" in advance of the sixth All-Christian Peace Assembly in July 1985. At Dresden, Toth told participants from 27 countries that the peace movement's influence had grown as a result of INF deployment in Europe. The session's final document called on all nuclear powers to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons; urged the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances to sign a non-use of force treaty; called on all Christians and churches to "act against the militarization of space" by the United States; and pledged the CPC to do "all it could" to prevent further INF deployments.

(S/NF/NC/OC) Soviet Lines of Control

Financially, the CPC's most generous component is the Russian Orthodox Church; that the CPC could not exist without that support

is well understood at all levels of the organization. The Soviet Peace Fund also is believed to finance part of the CPC's operations. The current CPC leadership--President Toth (Hungary), Secretary General Lubomir Mirejovsky (Czechoslovakia), and Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev (USSR)--keeps the organization steered in a pro-Soviet direction.

Two well-placed Soviet officials--Bishop Sergey Fomin and Dr. Aleksey Buyevskiy--also have responsibility for insuring that the CPC conforms to Soviet initiatives. Fomin, a CPC deputy secretary general, is vice chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's External Church Relations Department, the "foreign ministry" of the Russian Orthodox Church. The department's responsibilities include direction of all church participation in international bodies including the CPC and the World Council of Churches (WCC). Fomin is considered the decisive CPC voice on policy and administrative matters; he attends all meetings of CPC organs and maintains direct ties to Prague headquarters via a personal Soviet representative based there. Buyevskiy, a layman, is secretary of the Patriarchate's External Church Relations Department and a CPC Working Committee member.

Some friction exists between Toth and Fomin/Buyevskiy. For example, the two Soviets advocate stronger CPC support of the PLO and opposition to "Zionism" while Toth prefers a more moderate position--fearing CPC isolation from noncommunist Western church and peace movement organizations. Moreover, Toth (a Hungarian Protestant) is obsessively anti-Catholic, a fact that embarrasses Russian Orthodox Church officials seeking good relations with the Holy See. Toth nevertheless has been loyal to Moscow, from Czechoslovakia through Afghanistan; the Soviets reportedly consider him competent, intelligent, and a good CPC leader, with stature in the international ecumenical movement.

~~(S/NF/NC/OC)~~ CPC Relations With Other International Organizations

The CPC promotes the Soviet line in UN deliberations whenever it can and makes full use of its consultative status to address numerous General Assembly special committees. The CPC also cooperates with the World Council of Churches. According to Hungary's Nepszabadsag (August 13, 1983), Toth is a member of the WCC's Executive Committee. Mirejovsky, Filaret, and other CPC leaders also are believed to hold positions in the WCC.

These same CPC officials simultaneously are members of the World Peace Council, but the CPC-WPC relationship is complicated by personality problems. Toth, Mirejovsky, and the Russian Orthodox hierarchs reportedly detest Chandra, a result of personality clash and the fact that the two organizations are to some extent

competitors. These differences do not, however, preclude close WPC-CPC cooperation on issues deemed important by Moscow.

Covert CPC Influence

~~(S/NF)~~ Soviet and pro-Soviet CPC elements have long sought to influence public opinion and advance Moscow's interests by a host of less-than-public means. For example, in early 1970 the CPC leadership under Soviet Metropolitan Nikodim discharged two Western CPC vice presidents who refused to endorse numerous pro-Soviet resolutions issued at a previous CPC gathering. Nikodim subsequently purged the CPC International Secretariat, Working Committee, and Vice Presidency of all dissent; the result was the dissolution of numerous Western CPC affiliates. In late 1981, the CPC sought to cultivate various members of the European antinuclear movement, known for their criticism of Eastern suppression of religious peace activists, and tried to persuade them to focus their efforts against INF deployment.

~~(S/NF/NC/OC)~~ Reports in the wake of INF deployment indicate more aggressive CPC proselytizing of mainline Western churches on disarmament and security issues. In this context, the Soviets in the past 18 months have created two new front organizations, each formally independent of the CPC, to manipulate churches and church leaders in the West:

- the "Working Presidium of the World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life From Nuclear Catastrophe" (to continue the work of the May 1982 Moscow religious conference), set up in November 1982; and
- the "Public Commission for Relations With Religious Peace Circles," established by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in late 1983.

Both groups are headed by Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Belorussia (not to be confused with the CPC leader Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev), who also is the chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church's Moscow Patriarchate. Both organizations can be expected to solicit Western participation for next year's sixth World Christian Peace Assembly (July 2-9, 1985; Prague).

Prepared by David Hertzberg  
632-9120

Approved by Martha Mautner  
632-9536

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Appendix A

Christian Peace Conference Leadership

President: Karoly Toth (Hungary)

Secretary General: Lubomir Mirejovsky (Czechoslovakia)

Chairman of the CPC  
Working Committee: Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev (USSR)

(Toth, Mirejovsky, and Filaret all are World Peace Council members; Toth is on the WPC's Presidential Committee and the World Council of Churches' Executive Committee.)

Vice Presidents: Rev. Richard Andriamanjato (Madagascar; a WCC co-president, WPC vice president)

Prof. Sergio Arce-Martinez (Cuba)

Prof. Gerhard Bassarak (German Democratic Republic)

Dr. Nicolae Corneanu (Romania)

Metropolitan Paulos Mar Gregorios (India; a WPC member, WCC co-president)

Dr. Jan Michalko (Czechoslovakia)

Bernadeen Silva (Sri Lanka)

Honorary Presidium  
Members: Bishop Tibor Bartha (Hungary)

Dr. Heinrich Hellstern (Switzerland)

Dr. Herbert Mochalski (Federal Republic of Germany)

Abraham Thampy (India)

Deputy Secretary  
Generals: Bishop Sergey Fomin (USSR)

Rev. Christie Rosa (Sri Lanka; WPC member)

Director of CPC's  
Prague Headquarters: Rev. Tibor Gorog (Hungary)



Appendix B

CPC Policymaking Bodies

CPC Leadership: Toth, Mirejovsky, Filaret; sign all CPC final documents, approve policy lines.

CPC Presidium: Composed of CPC President, Secretary General, Vice Presidents, and honorary members (12-16 officials).

CPC International Secretariat: Composed of some 20 nonworking committee members and presumably headed by Secretary General; meets three times a year; appointed by the CPC Working Committee.

CPC Working Committee: Composed of the Presidium and some other officials; meets twice a year; elected by the All-Christian Peace Assembly. Working Committee in turn appoints the International Secretariat.

CPC Continuation Committee: Composed of 100 officials, meets approximately every 18 months. Elected by the All-Christian Peace Assembly; carries on CPC work between assemblies.

All-Christian Peace Assembly: Composed of several hundred CPC officials; meets every 5 to 7 years (1961, 1964, 1968, 1971, 1978, and 1985).

CPC Policy Support Bodies

Study Commissions on: --theology  
--economy and politics  
--antiracism  
--youth  
--women's problems  
--international problems

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- III -

Submissions on:

--Indochina  
--Middle East  
--European security  
--disarmament  
--United Nations

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Appendix C

CPC Working Bodies

CPC Headquarters in Prague: Headed by Tibor Gorog (Hungary),  
also an International Secretariat  
member

Regional CPC Affiliates: African Christian Peace Conference  
  
Asian Christian Peace Conference  
  
Regional Committee for Latin  
America and the Caribbean

Organizations Tied to the CPC: Berlin Conference of European  
Catholics (also represented on the  
World Peace Council)  
  
Asian Buddhists' Conference for  
Peace (also represented on the  
World Peace Council)

National CPC Affiliates: "Churches, Ecumenical Bodies, and  
Individuals" from 79 countries

Appendix D

Extracts From the Statute of the CPC

Article I

The Christian Peace Conference is an international movement of Christians, Theologians, Clergymen and Laymen, which...was founded:

- to awaken Christendom and make it recognize its own complicity in the two World Wars and the necessity to work for peace, reconciliation, and peaceful cooperation among nations;
- to concentrate on joint peace actions the forces of those who, all over the world, embrace Christianity;
- and finally, to coordinate the peace groups in individual churches and their joint efforts towards a peaceful reconstruction of present society.

Article III

1. Such churches, groups and individuals as agree to the principles, the import and the mission of the movement, expressed in Article I, may participate in the work of this movement.

2. Participants have the right to take part fully in the work of the movement, to elect the organs of the CPC and to be elected to them.

3. Participants have the duty to spread the ideas and objectives of the CPC and as far as possible, to support the movement financially.

4. Participants are entitled to form regional work units.

Article VIII

The expenditures of the CPC amount to:

- (a) Cost of interdenominational Christian peace meetings.
- (b) Costs of the review and other information material.
- (c) Salaries for the staff of the secretariat of the CPC.
- (d) Office material and similar expenses.
- (e) Travel expenses for the members of committees, commissions and the secretariat of the CPC.

# Memorandum

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

TO : Paula Dobrianski  
White House NSC

DATE: July 25, 1984

FROM : Miklos K. Radvanyi **MKR**  
Senior Specialist

SUBJECT: Igor Yuryevich Andropov's Appointment as Soviet Ambassador to Athens

Andropov's new appointment deserves our attention for various reasons:

- 1) He has been known as an expert on African and Middle Eastern affairs;
- 2) His latest assignments involved the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
- 3) His appointment was announced days after Papandreu visited Prague and East Berlin;
- 4) Presently, there are serious tensions between the U.S. and Greece and also the European Community and Greece;
- 5) The Greek government supports the PLO and most probably other terrorist organizations cooperating with the PLO.
- 6) Beirut became an unlikely place to conduct subversive operations from.

The most likely explanation for this appointment is that the Kremlin became convinced that differences between Athens and its Nato partners on a wide range of issues are ripe for Communist exploitation. In this respect, so it appears, Andropov's appointment signals a decisive Soviet attempt to widen the gap between Greece and the other member states of NATO, and thus further weakening the Southern flank of NATO. Furthermore, such a step will put additional pressure on Turkey, whose political and economic situation remains extremely volatile.

By making its decision, the Kremlin was undoubtedly influenced by Papandreu's

statements and his administration's actions. Thus, during his visit to Prague, Papandreu adopted the Soviet position on the deployment of Euromissiles. Speaking to a gathering of women, Averof, Papandreu's main opponent, said that the Prime Minister was the only one of the ten European Community leaders to adopt such a position. Indeed, whereas Mitterand and Craxi "consider Euromissiles indispensable to Europe's security", Papandreu supports a completely different view. In East Berlin Papandreu declared that Greece will not join to an exclusively European defense system under consideration by the member states of the European Community. The release of well-known terrorists from Greek jail and the subsequent exchange of denunciations between Washington and Athens further highlighted the deep divisions between the political philosophies of the two countries. On his recent visit to Greece, Libyan Foreign Liaison Secretary 'Ali Abd as-Salam at-Turayki, declared that foreign military bases pose a threat to security and peace in the Mediterranean. His opinion was echoed by Greek foreign Minister Ioannis Kharlam-bopoulos. At the end of this visit, it was announced that Papandreu will officially visit Lybia in the near future.

In conclusion, there is a real possibility that Soviet diplomacy which went through a period of relative passivity since the invasion of Afghanistan, is becoming once again more active and aggressive in its pursuit of attempting to exploit differences between the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, it is within the realm of possibilities that Andropov was charged with the responsibility to set up a new center of subversion in Athens, whose task will be to coordinate this type of actions in the Middle East and Africa.

## USSR

### Role of Party Control Committee Expanded Under Chernenko

*The CPSU Party Control Committee appears to have been given an expanded role since Chernenko came to power. The committee now has a higher public profile, and there are indications that the anticorruption campaign begun under Andropov is being stepped up.*

The party leadership's interest in improving the work of the Party Control Committee was underlined at a special Central Committee conference on 19-20 November which was attended by senior central officials and the heads of regional control commissions. No such major Central Committee conference on party control has been reported in the central press since 1966, when Arvid Pelshe took over as chairman of the Control Committee. According to the 22 November *Pravda*, Mikhail Solomentsev, the current head of the Control Committee, told the conference that the commissions' activists—their most active members—are being expanded. The conference recommended that regional control commissions be strengthened by the addition of more party committee members, specialists, and leading workers.

Solomentsev had proposed a more active role for the Party Control Committee in an article published on the eve of the conference. Writing in an October issue of *Kommunist* (No. 15), he advocated that party control representatives "frequently" participate in sessions of the party committee bureaus and ministry or department collegiums, taking a "close interest" in seeing that they carry out planned measures. Moreover, he indicated that the activities of party control should not stop with uncovering violations, but should include "positive and concrete" measures to improve the work of organizations where problems have been found. He added that Control Committee decisions can be "considered fulfilled" only when they have been implemented and verified. By contrast, Pelshe defined the role of control organs more narrowly. For example, in a July 1981 *Kommunist* article Pelshe emphasized the importance of exposing violations but made no reference to an ongoing role for party controllers in the work of party bureaus or in overseeing the implementation of control decisions.

The work of the Party Control Committee has also been given increased attention since General Secretary Chernenko took power, apparently in an effort to make an example of party members who have been disciplined. Since April *Pravda* has published eight unsigned accounts of actions by the committee. By contrast, no similar reports appeared during the 15 months of the Andropov regime, although on two occasions *Pravda* did publish articles on investigations of the committee that were signed both by a correspondent and a "responsible controller" (28 May and 3 August 1983). Some of the actions reported by the committee under Chernenko include:

- First Deputy Minister of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification Falaleyev, a deputy minister, and local officials in Bratsk were expelled from the party and dismissed from their posts for abusing their positions and embezzling state resources (*Pravda*, 8 October). This action followed a 27 July *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* article, which complained that Falaleyev had repeatedly accepted gifts from officials in Bratsk. Previously Falaleyev, the highest level official yet reported to have been disciplined by the Control Committee this year, was reprimanded by the committee for failing to observe state discipline (*Pravda*, 11 July).
- The party secretary of a medical school was expelled from the CPSU for admitting and giving staff appointments to many unqualified individuals in return for bribes from their parents. Others involved, including an obkom department head, were also punished (*Pravda*, 18 April).
- A high publishing official was expelled from the party for drunkenness, extortion, and loss of valuable materials (*Pravda*, 20 May).

The increased publicity for actions of the Control Committee has been accompanied by suggestions in the press that exposures of wrongdoing in the party should be more broadly publicized. For example, an unusually frank letter from a party veteran in the 15 October *Pravda* rejected the views of some party members who, "honestly in error," fear that if offenses of party officials are publicized the party's prestige would be undermined. He argued that keeping the discussion of problems behind "closed doors" could create a "profound political danger" by weakening the credibility of the party. A similar theme was struck in an article in the 11 November *Sovetskaya Rossiya* that argued that protecting leaders from punishment or concealing their misdeeds can cause rumors, damaging the party's authority.





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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 07871

E.O. 12356: DNG: 6/12/91  
TAGS: ECON, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV ADDRESSES SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE AND  
THE ECONOMY

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN A LENGTHY SPEECH TO A SPECIAL HIGH LEVEL MEETING ON SCIENCE AND THE ECONOMY ON JUNE 11, GORBACHEV DISCUSSED A MUCH BROADER RANGE OF ECONOMIC ISSUES THAN SUGGESTED BY THE CONFERENCE'S STATED TOPIC. SPEAKING IN THE BLUNT AND FORCEFUL STYLE WHICH HAS BECOME HIS TRADEMARK, THE GENERAL SECRETARY CRITICIZED PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, MINISTRIES, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY, AND LOCAL LEADERS FOR PURSUING PAROCHIAL INTERESTS, FAILING TO IMPLEMENT CHANGES, AND WASTING RESOURCES. THE PARTICULAR HARSHNESS OF GORBACHEV'S ATTACKS ON THE MINISTRIES RAISES THE POLITICAL STAKES. BY THROWING DOWN THE GAUNTLET TO SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL MINISTERS (AND PERHAPS INDIRECTLY TO TIKHONOV AS WELL), GORBACHEV MAY LOSE CREDIBILITY IF THE INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT REMOVED.

3. THE GENERAL SECRETARY ALSO GAVE THE CLEAREST OUTLINE YET OF HIS THINKING ON KEY ECONOMIC POLICY QUESTIONS IN THE 12TH FIVE-YEAR-PLAN INCLUDING ACCELERATING GROWTH RATES, INCREASING INVESTMENT IN MACHINEBUILDING, AND RAISING THE SHARE OF INVESTMENT IN RECONSTRUCTION OF EXISTING ENTERPRISES. ON THE QUESTION OF CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, GORBACHEV WAS SHORT ON SPECIFICS, BUT HE LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE WILL SEEK A REDUCTION IN THE ROLE AND NUMBER OF MINISTRIES, AN INCREASE IN MANAGERIAL POWERS OF ENTERPRISES, AND THE CREATION OF MORE INTER-BRANCH, INTEGRATED PRODUCTION ASSOCIATIONS. GORBACHEV'S IDEAS ON SPEEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF SCIENCE INTO THE ECONOMY WERE LIMITED TO SUCH FAMILIAR PROPOSALS AS LINKING INSTITUTES AND ENTERPRISES MORE CLOSELY AND ESTABLISHING INDICATORS TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF ENTERPRISES IN INTRODUCING NEW TECHNOLOGIES. HE ALSO APPEARED TO STRENGTHEN THE MANDATE OF THE STATE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO COORDINATE SCIENCE

4. ON JUNE 11, GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ADDRESSED THE FIRST SESSION OF A TWO-DAY CONFERENCE OF SENIOR PARTY LEADERS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND SCIENTISTS ON SCIENCE AND THE ECONOMY. GORBACHEV'S HOUR AND TEN MINUTE SPEECH (AS CARRIED ON THE JUNE 11 VREMYA NEWSCAST) COVERED A FAR WIDER RANGE OF ECONOMIC TOPICS THAN IMPLIED BY THE CONFERENCE'S STATED THEME OF SPEEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO THE ECONOMY. THE SPEECH WAS DELIVERED IN THE BLUNT, FORCEFUL STYLE WHICH HAS BECOME GORBACHEV'S TRADEMARK, AND AS WITH HIS RECENT SPEECH IN LENINGRAD, MUCH OF THE IMPACT IS LOST WHEN IT IS READ, RATHER THAN VIEWED ON TELEVISION. IN ADDITION, THE PUBLISHED VERSIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN RELEASED SO FAR IN ENGLISH TASS AND IN THE CENTRAL PRESS, ARE CONDENSATIONS OF THE SPEECH AND LEAVE OUT A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIVE POINTS. HANDING OUT CRITICISM

5. GORBACHEV IS PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL IN HIS CRITICISM OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE PURSUING THEIR OWN REGIONAL OR AGENCY INTERESTS, WHICH ARE UNRESPONSIVE TO CHANGE, AND WHICH FAIL TO MAKE PROPER USE OF RESOURCES. ONCE AGAIN, HIS FAVORITE TARGETS ARE THE INDUSTRIAL MINISTRIES. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, GORBACHEV ESCALATES HIS ATTACK BY CITING FOUR MINISTERS BY NAME:

- -- MINISTER OF MACHINEBUILDING FOR ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND FODDER PRODUCTION BELYAK AND MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS YASHIN ARE CITED FOR ASKING FOR INCREASED RESOURCES WHILE TRYING TO REDUCE PLAN TARGETS;
- -- MINISTER OF FERROUS METALLURGY KAZANETS IS CRITICIZED FOR PURSUING A "WRONG POLICY" OF INVESTING IN NEW PLANTS RATHER THAN REBUILDING OLD ONES; AND
- -- MINISTER OF THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY FEDOROV IS LABELLED AS A MAN "WHO DOES NOT KEEP HIS PROMISES" TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN HIS MINISTRY IN THE USE OF IMPORTED EQUIPMENT.

THE NEAR TOTAL LACK OF RESPECT FOR THESE MINISTERS CONVEYED BY GORBACHEV MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THEY

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E. O. 12356: DNG: 6/12/91  
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SUBJECT: GORBACHEV ADDRESSES SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE AND

CAN LONG REMAIN IN THEIR POSTS WITHOUT A SERIOUS LOSS  
OF CREDIBILITY ON GORBACHEV'S PART.

6. IN ADDITION TO THE MINISTRIES, THE STATE COMMITTEE ON PLANNING IS HIT WITH SEVERAL SHARP CRITICISMS. IT IS "AN ILLUSION", GORBACHEV SAYS, TO THINK THAT GOSPLAN COULD DEVELOP "AN OPTIMAL VARIANT" OF INTER-BRANCH RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY, ALTHOUGH IN FACT THIS IS PRECISELY ITS JOB. HE ALSO CRITICIZES GOSPLAN, ALONG WITH THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, FOR HINDERING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT. GORBACHEV DIRECTS OTHER CRITICAL REMARKS AT THE LEADERS OF KRASNOYARSK KRAI (PERHAPS AN INDIRECT SLAP AT ITS FORMER BOSS, POLITBURO CANDIDATE MEMBER DOLGIKH) AND AT PARTY ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE INDUSTRIAL MINISTRIES.

OUTLINING A POLICY OF HIGH GROWTH

7. GORBACHEV, HOWEVER, DOES NOT LIMIT HIMSELF TO CRITICISM, AND HE GOES ON TO PROVIDE THE clearest PICTURE YET OF HIS THINKING ON KEY QUESTIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND STRUCTURE IN THE UPCOMING 12TH FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD. THE PLAN, HE NOTES, RECENTLY WAS EXAMINED BY THE POLITBURO AND WHILE ITS GENERAL LINES WERE APPROVED, THERE WERE ALSO CRITICISMS. IN PARTICULAR, GORBACHEV WARNS THAT THE TARGET FIGURES IN THE DRAFT SHOULD BE VIEWED AS MINIMUMS.

8. GORBACHEV PORTRAYS THE HIGH GROWTH STRATEGY IN THE NEW PLAN AS A "NECESSITY" TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION. HE NOTES THAT THERE CAN BE NO "CUTTING BACK" IN RESOURCES FOR SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION "IS FORCED TO INVEST THE NECESSARY FUNDS IN THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE." AT THE SAME TIME, HE ADMITS THAT THE CAPITAL STOCK IN INDUSTRY IS SERIOUSLY OUTDATED. WHERE, HE ASKS IN A KEY PASSAGE IN THE SPEECH, WILL THE "ENORMOUS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS"

REQUIRED TO REBUILD THE ECONOMY COME FROM? HIS ANSWER IS THAT MEASURES TO RAISE PRODUCTIVITY AND SPEED TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS WILL INCREASE GROWTH AND THEREBY "PAY FOR THEMSELVES."

9. THE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS HIGH GROWTH STRATEGY, GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGES IS "INCREASING GROWTH WILL TAKE TIME WHILE CAPITAL RESOURCES ("FONDI") ARE NEEDED IMMEDIATELY." THEREFORE, IN THE SHORT TERM, RESOURCES MUST BE "CONCENTRATED" IN KEY AREAS. FOR GORBACHEV, THIS MEANS IN PARTICULAR THE CIVILIAN MACHINERYBUILDING SECTOR WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY THROUGHOUT INDUSTRY. GORBACHEV SAYS THIS SECTOR HAS BEEN STARVED OF INVESTMENT FUNDS AND IN THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN SHOULD RECEIVE AN 80-100 PERCENT INCREASE IN INVESTMENT. OTHER AREAS CITED AS "CATALYSTS" OF PROGRESS INCLUDE MICROELECTRONICS, COMPUTERS, AND INSTRUMENT-MAKING.

10. AT THE SAME TIME, GORBACHEV SUGGESTS THAT SOME CURRENT HIGH PRIORITY CLAIMANTS ON INVESTMENT RESOURCES SUCH AS ENERGY AND THE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX WILL RANK LOWER. HE EXPECTS THAT 75-80 PERCENT OF THE INCREASE IN ENERGY NEEDS CAN BE ACCOUNTED FOR THROUGH CONSERVATION. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE SHARE OF TOTAL INVESTMENT IN ENERGY TO BE "STABILIZED", ALTHOUGH IT WOULD SHIFT THE BURDEN FROM THE ENERGY PRODUCING ENTERPRISES TO THE CONSUMER ENTERPRISES. IN THE CASE OF THE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, GORBACHEV SAYS THAT THE LEVEL OF INVESTMENT HAS REACHED THE "OPTIMUM LEVEL", BUT THE RETURN IS UNSATISFACTORY.

11. A FINAL IMPORTANT POINT IN THE HIGH GROWTH STRATEGY STRESSED BY GORBACHEV IS THE NEED TO RAISE THE SHARE OF INVESTMENT IN RECONSTRUCTION OF EXISTING ENTERPRISES. THE GENERAL SECRETARY CALLS FOR THE PRESENT ONE-THIRD SHARE TO BE RAISED TO ONE-HALF. RECONSTRUCTION PROVIDES, HE ESTIMATES, A RETURN "APPROXIMATELY TWICE AS GREAT" AS NEW CONSTRUCTION.

-  
RESTRUCTURING MANAGEMENT  
-

12. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH CONTAINS STRONG LANGUAGE ON THE IMPORTANCE AND THE URGENCY OF CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, BUT HE STOPS SHORT OF PROPOSING A SPECIFIC PROGRAM. NEVERTHELESS, BT

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POLICY OF SEEKING SOME TECHNOLOGY ABROAD, PARTICULARLY FROM COMRADE COUNTRIES. ONE POSSIBLE NEW ELEMENT IS GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO THE MANDATE OF STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (GKNT). GKNT, HE SAYS, SHOULD COORDINATE SCIENCE AND TECHNICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE COUNTRY, ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL SECRETARY DOES NOT SPECIFY HOW IT IS TO EXERCISE THIS POWER.

-  
MOVING TOWARDS A PROGRAM  
-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 07871

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SUBJECT: GORBACHEV ADDRESSES SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE AND

HIS REMARKS MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NUMBER AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL MINISTRIES WILL BE REDUCED, THE RIGHTS OF ENTERPRISES WILL BE EXPANDED AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT APPLIED THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY IN THE 12TH FIVE-YEAR-PLAN. EXCEPT FOR CONTINUING REFERENCES TO REDUCING PLAN INDICATORS, HE DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR PRECISELY WHERE OR HOW THE NEW LINES BETWEEN MINISTRIES AND THEIR ENTERPRISES WILL BE DRAWN. NOR ARE HIS IDEAS ON STRENGTHENING COST-ACCOUNTING AND USE OF INCENTIVES AND "ECONOMIC LEVERS" (I.E. PRICES, WAGES, AND CREDITS) PRESENTED IN DETAIL.

13. GORBACHEV ALSO RAISES THE EXPECTATION THAT SOME ACTION WILL BE FORTHCOMING ON THE QUESTION OF COORDINATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVING DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY. HE POINTEDLY NOTES THE FAILURE OF GOSPLAN AND THE MINISTRIES TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, AND SUGGESTS THAT LARGE INTEGRATED INTER-BRANCH INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS SHOULD BE FORMED ALONG THE LINES OF THOSE EXISTING IN THE GDR.

-  
FAMILIAR IDEAS ON SCIENCE  
-

14. WHILE GORBACHEV DOES DEVOTE SOME TIME TO THE PROBLEM OF SPEEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF SCIENCE INTO THE ECONOMY -- THE OSTENSIBLE SUBJECT OF THE SYMPOSIUM, HE HAS LITTLE NEW TO SAY. HE REPEATS STANDARD EXHORTATIONS FOR MORE ATTENTION TO BE PAID TO INCREASING THE QUALITY OF PRODUCTION AND ADVANCES A NUMBER OF FAMILIAR PROPOSALS INCLUDING: DEVELOPING CLOSER LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISES; CREATING OF INTER-BRANCH SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CENTERS UNDER THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; ESTABLISHING NEW PLAN INDICATORS TO MEASURE AN ENTERPRISE'S SUCCESS IN INTRODUCING NEW TECHNOLOGY; AND INCREASING PRICE INCENTIVES FOR NEW HIGH-TECH GOODS. GORBACHEV ALSO APPEARS TO REAFFIRM CURRENT

15. WHILE GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND THE ECONOMY DID NOT CONTAIN A SPECIFIC PROGRAM FOR ACTION, IT DID MOVE FURTHER TOWARDS DEFINING THE DIRECTION AND LIMITS OF THAT PROGRAM. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT GORBACHEV HAS REJECTED MORE RADICAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN FAVOR OF INCREASING MANAGERIAL AND WORKER DISCIPLINE, REVAMPING THE MINISTERIAL STRUCTURE, AND IMPROVING INTER-BRANCH COORDINATION. PERHAPS AS IMPORTANTLY, WHAT IS ALSO EMERGING IS A RESOURCE ALLOCATION STRATEGY WHICH GAMBLES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH TO EASE THE TRADEOFFS AMONG THE CONSUMER, INDUSTRY, AND DEFENSE.

-  
LEADERSHIP TURNOUT  
-

16. LIGACHEV'S PROMINENT SEATING (JUST TO GORBACHEV'S RIGHT) PROVIDED FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS BECOME THE PARTY'S NUMBER TWO. FLANKING GORBACHEV ON THE LEFT WAS A DECIDEDLY GLUM-LOOKING TIKHONOV, WHOSE HEAD RESTED ON HIS HAND VIRTUALLY THROUGHOUT THE GORBACHEV SPEECH. TIKHONOV'S POSE AND EXPRESSION REFLECTED DISTINCT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR WHAT HE WAS HEARING -- UNSURPRISING IN VIEW OF THE SAVAGING OF SEVERAL OF HIS MINISTERS AS WELL AS THE STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AS A WHOLE.

17. THE LEADERSHIP LINEUP WAS AS FOLLOWS. READING FROM GORBACHEV'S RIGHT WERE LIGACHEV, RYZHKOV, KUNAYEV, SHCHERBITSKIY, VOROTNIKOV, CHEBRIKOV, DEMICHEV, DOLGIKH, KUZNETSOV, AND SOKOLOV. READING FROM GORBACHEV'S LEFT WERE TIKHONOV, GROMYKO, GRISHIN, SOLOMENTSEV, ALIYEV, PONOMAREV, SHEVERDNADZE, KAPITONOV, ZIMYANIN, RUSAKOV, AND NIKONOV. ROMANOV WAS THE SOLE MEMBER OF THE LEADERSHIP NOT ON HAND FOR BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 07871

E. O. 12356: DNG: 6/12/91  
TAGS: ECON, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV ADDRESSES SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE AND

THE MEETING. WHILE WE HAVE HEARD THAT ROMANOV IS ON  
VACATION (HE HAS NOT APPEARED SINCE MAY 10), A GKNT  
SOURCE (REF MOSCOW 6797) MADE A POINT OF TELLING  
US LAST MONTH THAT ROMANOV WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE  
PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE -- ANOTHER INDICATION  
THAT HIS STAR IS DEFINITELY LOW ON THE HORIZON THESE  
DAYS. HARTMAN  
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20 June 1986  
FB 86-10018

CIS 8/26/11

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
# Analysis Report

Gorbachev's Shakeup of the Foreign Policy Apparatus



Foreign Broadcast Information Service

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## Personnel Changes

Since Gorbachev came to power last year, virtually the entire top leadership involved with Soviet foreign policy, in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Central Committee apparatus, has been changed. Although most of the changes have come in recent months, the process began last July with the announcement that Andrey Gromyko was being replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister and being made chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (president). Gorbachev followed up this change with the appointment of Aleksandr Yakovlev, then-head of a foreign affairs research institute and a former ambassador, as head of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department. During the following half year, relatively few changes in the foreign affairs establishment were made.

### Secretariat

The 27th CPSU Congress marked the beginning of a dramatic acceleration in changing the MFA and the Central Committee's top echelons. Gorbachev began the process even before the congress when on 18 February, at a Central Committee plenum, Secretary Konstantin Rusakov, who headed the Socialist Countries Department, was removed from the Secretariat. At the congress itself, long-time International Department chief Boris Ponomarev was retired, and three new secretaries with foreign affairs responsibilities were named:

- The appointment of longtime Soviet Ambassador to Washington **Anatoliy Dobrynin** (66) as party secretary and head of the Central Committee's International Department presumably gave him influence over foreign policy appointments and may have been a catalyst for subsequent broad changes in the USSR's diplomatic structure. His appointment has also placed an experienced diplomat intimately familiar with the United States in a post formerly held by ex-Comintern official and hardline ideologist Ponomarev, raising the prospect of greater involvement of the party apparatus in U.S.-Soviet affairs and, perhaps, a less doctrinaire approach to East-West relations. Western media have reported that Dobrynin has moved First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko—who has had oversight responsibilities for East-West relations in the MFA since 1977 and who served as chief of its U.S. affairs section for more than a decade—into the International Department as

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*Gorbachev, Dobrynin, and foreign policy adviser Chernyayev at 15 May meeting with Dr. Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale. (Pravda, 16 May 1986)*

first deputy chief, a move that would further bolster the department's expertise on the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Dobrynin's high public profile and varied activities since assuming his Secretariat post suggest that his responsibilities may exceed those carried out by Ponomarev and could include an important role in formulating Soviet policies across the board. As secretary, Dobrynin has delivered—and the Soviet press has published—a number of foreign policy speeches addressing East-West and other foreign policy issues in some detail. Soviet media have also reported meetings between Dobrynin and foreign ambassadors earlier this month and have noted his participation in talks with numerous foreign delegations, including Gorbachev's 15 May meeting with American industrialist Armand Hammer, Premier Ryzhkov's 27 May meeting with Libya's second-ranking leader, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, and President Gromyko's meeting the next day with Syrian Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam. By contrast, although Ponomarev frequently participated in talks with foreign party officials, he virtually never received foreign ambassadors,

<sup>1</sup> Dobrynin was specifically identified for the first time by Soviet media as chief of the party's International Department in a 9 June TASS report on a meeting he held in Moscow with a visiting Italian communist. Dobrynin's predecessor Ponomarev was not usually identified by Soviet media as holding this post after becoming a secretary in 1961, but, judging from his regular meetings with representatives from nonbloc parties, he clearly was in charge of the department. Dobrynin's appointment as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities—a position also formerly held by Ponomarev—was announced at the regular Supreme Soviet session held on 18-19 June.

and he usually did not take part in high-level government-to-government discussions.

- The appointment of **Aleksandr Yakovlev** (62) as party secretary elevated a foreign affairs specialist with close ties to Gorbachev.<sup>2</sup> Yakovlev, who was ambassador to Canada from 1973 to 1983 and chief of the Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations from 1983 until his appointment to head the Propaganda Department last year, probably has taken over full responsibility for oversight of foreign propaganda and international information. TASS announced on 25 April that Central Committee International Information Department head Leonid Zamyatin had been named Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom, and in early May Moscow party chief Boris Yeltsin, in an interview with the West German newspaper *Die Zeit*, revealed that Zamyatin's former department had been abolished. This action followed expressions of dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of Soviet international and domestic propaganda by several Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, who, in his report to the 27th CPSU Congress, chided the media for their "blindness to the new" and their "insufficient efforts" at covering events.

- The elevation of **Vadim Medvedev** (57) to the Secretariat at the congress apparently was made in order to make him head of the Socialist Countries Department, replacing Rusakov. Medvedev's portfolio is suggested by his numerous meetings with bloc party delegations visiting Moscow over the last two months and his position as ranking Soviet official behind Gorbachev during the latter's visit to East Germany in April and his June visit to Hungary for the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting. His appointment underscores Moscow's current emphasis on promoting intrabloc scientific and technical cooperation, since he had previously served as head of the Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department.

Medvedev's ties to the top leadership are unclear, but he may have benefited from an earlier association with Yakovlev. In the early 1970's, Medvedev became a deputy chief of the Propaganda Department under Yakovlev, who as first deputy chief served as acting head of the department from 1970 until his assignment to Canada in 1973.

<sup>2</sup> Yakovlev's career and his ties to Gorbachev are discussed in the FBIS *Trends* of 5 September 1985, pages 7-9.

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**Heads of CPSU Central Committee Departments  
Dealing With Foreign Affairs Under Gorbachev**

Department	Head
International	Boris Ponomarev (1955-86) Anatoliy Dobrynin (1986-)
International Information	Leonid Zamyatin (1978-86) (department abolished)
Propaganda	Boris Stukalin (1982-85) Aleksandr Yakovlev (1985-)
Liaison With Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries	Konstantin Rusakov (1977-86) Vadim Medvedev (1986-)
Cadres Abroad	Stepan Chervonenko (1983-)

**Adviser to General Secretary**

Further underscoring his interest in replacing longtime foreign affairs functionaries, Gorbachev just prior to the 27th congress retired Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, foreign policy assistant to every general secretary since 1966. Gorbachev's new foreign affairs assistant for noncommunist countries<sup>3</sup> is **Anatoliy Chernyayev** (65), who had served as a deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department since 1970. Although Soviet media have never announced the shift, their coverage of Gorbachev's meetings with noncommunist foreign visitors since early February has shown Chernyayev, who was promoted to full Central Committee membership at the 27th congress, at Gorbachev's side in place of Aleksandrov-Agentov, who was removed from the Central Committee at the congress.

Chernyayev's background as a high-level party functionary differs considerably from that of his predecessor. Prior to joining former General Secretary Brezhnev's personal staff, Aleksandrov-Agentov worked in a number of diplomatic posts, including those of second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm after World War II and head of the Foreign Ministry's Third European Department (Germany and Austria) in the 1950's. By

<sup>3</sup> Viktor Sharapov, whom General Secretary Andropov made an aide for intercommunist relations, remains on Gorbachev's staff.

contrast, Chernyayev spent almost his entire career in the party apparatus, with a three-year stint in the late 1950's and early 1960's on the editorial staff of the Prague-based journal of the international communist movement *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. As a deputy chief of the International Department, Chernyayev dealt primarily with the United Kingdom and Canada—presumably playing some role in Gorbachev's visits to those countries in 1984 and 1983 respectively—and parts of West Europe. His last publicly reported trip abroad before joining Gorbachev's staff was a mid-December 1985 visit to Malta as head of a CPSU delegation.

### Foreign Ministry Shakeup

Moscow has revealed even more extensive changes within the Foreign Ministry than within the top Central Committee foreign affairs bureaucracy. The responsibilities of several new officials—and the fate of a number of old ones—are not yet clear, but the changes known thus far seem designed to inject new blood into the upper levels of the ministry, perhaps with an eye toward improving the management of Soviet relations with the West. Unlike the changes in the Central Committee Secretariat, however, new appointments in the MFA have thus far come from within rather than outside.

**First Deputy Foreign Ministers** Soviet media on 21 May confirmed the appointment of **Yuliy Vorontsov** (56) and **Anatoliy Kovalev** (63) as first deputy foreign ministers, the highest rank in the MFA after the foreign minister. They replace the two men who had held this rank since 1977, Georgiy Korniyenko and Viktor Maltsev, who apparently have moved to positions in the Central Committee apparatus and diplomatic corps respectively.<sup>4</sup> Both Vorontsov and Kovalev have had extensive experience in East-West relations. Vorontsov had been ambassador to France since 1983 and prior to that had been ambassador to India. Earlier he had worked as Dobrynin's deputy in the Soviet Embassy in Washington in the 1970's. His responsibilities within the MFA are not yet clear. Since his appointment he has led a Soviet delegation to a United Nations conference on African economic problems, and Soviet media have reported him as meeting with visiting South Yemeni and Hungarian officials.

<sup>4</sup> Moscow radio in a Serbo-Croatian broadcast on 6 June confirmed Maltsev's appointment as ambassador to Yugoslavia.



*Kovalev at 6 May press conference on Chernobyl. (Soviet TV, 6 May 1986)*

Kovalev, a deputy foreign minister since 1971, has a strong background in European affairs. He headed the Soviet delegation to CSCE from 1973 to 1975 and, from 1965 to 1971, was chief of the MFA First European Department (Benelux, France, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland). Reflective of his West European responsibilities as deputy foreign minister, he accompanied Gorbachev on a trip to Great Britain in December 1984. He continues to be involved in West European affairs: *Pravda* on 21 May identified him as one of a group of officials participating in talks between Premier Ryzhkov and visiting Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, and TASS on 2 June reported that he took part in Gromyko's talks with a visiting British parliamentary delegation.

#### **Deputy Foreign Ministers**

Soviet media have revealed the appointment of four new deputy foreign ministers since the congress—two with considerable background in U.S.-Soviet relations, one with extensive knowledge of West European affairs, and one with Southeast Asian experience:

- Judging from his appearance at press conferences on 16 May and 4 June dealing with U.S.-Soviet arms control issues, **Aleksandr Bessmertnykh** (52), formerly chief of the MFA's USA Department, appears to have assumed overall responsibility for U.S. affairs, displacing Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov.<sup>5</sup> Bessmertnykh served in posts ranging from first secretary to counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1970 to 1982.

- **Vladimir Petrovskiy** (53) had been chief of the International Organizations Department since 1979, writing prolifically over the years on the United Nations, East-West relations, and arms control. Along with Defense Ministry

<sup>5</sup> The duties of Komplektov (54), who formerly had responsibility for U.S. affairs at the deputy foreign minister level, are unclear, but they apparently no longer include bilateral relations with the United States. According to TASS, Komplektov represented the Soviet side in 21 May U.S.-Soviet discussions of Central America, suggesting that he may have assumed a Latin America portfolio from 79-year-old former Deputy Foreign Minister Nikita Ryzhov, whose retirement was announced in March. However, he was also reported by Soviet media to have participated in Gromyko's talks with visiting Syrian Vice President Khaddam during the latter's visit to the USSR in late May, and TASS on 31 May reported that Komplektov had met in Moscow with the visiting general director of the European office of the United Nations.



### Ministry of Foreign Affairs Leadership - 1985-86

March 1985 (pre-Gorbachev)	February 1986	June 1986
<b>Foreign Minister</b>		
Andrey Gromyko	Eduard Shevardnadze	Eduard Shevardnadze
<b>First Deputy Foreign Ministers</b>		
Georgiy Korniyenko	Georgiy Korniyenko	
Viktor Maltsev	Viktor Maltsev	
		Anatoliy Kovalev
		Yuliy Vorontsov
<b>Deputy Foreign Ministers</b>		
Boris Aristov (appointed minister of foreign trade Oct 85)		
Leonid Ilichev	Leonid Ilichev	Leonid Ilichev
Mikhail Kapitsa	Mikhail Kapitsa	Mikhail Kapitsa
Viktor Komplektov	Viktor Komplektov	Viktor Komplektov
Anatoliy Kovalev (appointed first deputy foreign minister May 86)		
Nikita Ryzhov	Nikita Ryzhov (retirement officially announced Mar 86)	
Viktor Stukalin (removal announced Jan 86, appointed ambassador to Greece Feb 86)		
	Vadim Loginov (appointed Dec 85)	Vadim Loginov
	Vladimir Nikiforov (appointed Dec 85)	Vladimir Nikiforov Aleksandr Bessmertnykh Vladimir Petrovskiy Anatoliy Adamishin Boris Chaplin

arms control spokesman Colonel-General Nikolay Chervov, he held a press conference in Budapest on 11 June to discuss the Warsaw Pact summit, suggesting he may have assumed a portfolio dealing with international security issues.

- *Izvestiya* on 22 May confirmed **Anatoliy Adamishin's** appointment as deputy foreign minister. Adamishin (51), a European specialist who had worked under Kovalev in the First European Department and then followed his career path, becoming chief of the department in 1978, attended Gromyko's talks with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez, a sign that he may have assumed Kovalev's old deputy foreign minister responsibilities.

- The fourth newly designated deputy foreign minister, **Boris Chaplin** (born 1931), a former Moscow raykom first secretary, served for the past 12 years as ambassador to Vietnam. He may be in line for an Asian affairs portfolio, although both 80-year-old Leonid Ilichev, the deputy foreign minister who handles the normalization talks with China, and 64-year-old Mikhail Kapitsa, a deputy foreign minister who oversees Soviet relations with the Far East, have both been identified in their old jobs in recent weeks.

**Ambassadors** Moscow has changed its ambassadors to virtually every major nonbloc country since the congress, including the United States, West Germany, Great Britain, France, China, Japan, and the United Nations:

- The 20 May appointment of former Ambassador to Spain **Yuriy Dubinin** (55) as Moscow's envoy to the United States only two months after he was named ambassador to the United Nations suggests the possibility of last-minute political infighting over the key posting. It may also reflect the new influence of First Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev: Dubinin served as deputy head of the First European Department under Kovalev in the late 1960's and succeeded him in the job when Kovalev became deputy foreign minister in 1971.

- The naming of veteran arms control negotiator **Yuliy Kvitsinskiy** (49) as ambassador to West Germany probably reflects the priority Moscow attaches to security issues in its relations with Bonn. Kvitsinskiy also has extensive credentials as a Germanist, having served in the Bonn embassy before becoming chief INF negotiator in 1981.

- The significance of the appointment of former International Information Department head **Leonid Zamyatin** (64) as ambassador to Great Britain is unclear. Zamyatin's political status as a Central Committee full member is higher than that of his predecessor Viktor Popov—who was only a member of the Central Auditing Commission—suggesting that Moscow is planning to accord more importance to its relations with London. However, Zamyatin's loss of his post as a Central Committee department chief also implies a decline

in his standing. Prior to his appointment as head of the department in 1978 Zamyatin was director general of TASS from 1970 to 1978. Before that he held various posts in the MFA, including those of Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in 1959-1960 and chief of the Foreign Ministry's press department from 1962 to 1970.

- The designation of former deputy premier **Yakov Ryabov** (58) as ambassador to France, announced by TASS on 19 June, clearly represents a demotion for Ryabov, but his appointment does not appear to have any clear implications for Soviet-French relations. Ryabov, reelected to the Central Committee at the 27th CPSU Congress, has had a highly mercurial political career: he was appointed party secretary with responsibility for the defense industry in 1976, but he lost this position in 1979 when the fortunes of his mentor, former Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko, started to wane. Ryabov was appointed chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations in May 1983, and he moved up to his deputy premier's post in October 1984.
- Moscow's interest in energizing policy toward East Asia may have inspired the appointment of former UN Ambassador **Oleg Troyanovskiy** (66)—who was made a candidate member of the Central Committee at the 27th congress—as ambassador to China and the posting to Japan of **Nikolay Solovyev** (54) who, unlike his predecessors, is a career diplomat with long experience in Japanese affairs.
- The reported transfer of Soviet Ambassador to Egypt **Aleksandr Belogonov** (55) as Moscow's permanent representative at the United Nations, mentioned in Egyptian but so far not Soviet media, would place another apparent protege of First Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev in an important diplomatic post. Prior to his appointment to Egypt, Belogonov, who has published studies on U.S. politics and arms control agreements, was deputy to Kovalev in the Foreign Ministry's policy planning administration.

**Arms Control  
Personnel**

Although Western media have reported that the MFA has established a new arms control agency under chief Geneva negotiator Viktor Karpov, Moscow has not reported the existence of such an office and has continued to identify Karpov in his Geneva position. The evident involvement of both Bessmertnykh and Petrovskiy in arms control issues may indicate an effort to place greater responsibility for the coordination of arms control policy at the deputy foreign minister level.

One indication that influential officials in Moscow are dissatisfied with the performance of at least some Soviet arms control negotiators came in comments by *Novosti* press agency chief Valentin Falin—a former ambassador to West Germany—at a 30 May Bonn press conference. As quoted by Reuter, Falin accused Soviet diplomats at the Vienna MBFR talks of looking at “new” proposals from Moscow with “old eyes,” and he claimed that they have “created more problems than they have solved.” Their efficiency, Falin said, “can only be registered in minus figures.”

### **Gorbachev's Criticism of Past Performance**

Alongside his ongoing shakeup of foreign policy personnel, Gorbachev seems to be trying to discourage a business-as-usual attitude among Soviet foreign affairs specialists and to place them on notice that he expects better performance. The stress Gorbachev has placed on the need for “new thinking” in foreign policy—particularly in his comprehensive 15 January arms control proposals—parallels the stress he has placed on the need for reform at home and includes the foreign policy establishment as a target of his effort to inject new dynamism and responsiveness into the bureaucracy.

### **Foreign Ministry Conference**

The 23 May Foreign Ministry conference reflected the Gorbachev regime's commitment to follow through on the congress agenda's call for a break with the foreign policy continuity characteristic of the Brezhnev era. The conference, according to a brief TASS report published in *Pravda* on the 24th, was devoted to the subject of “implementing the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress in the field of foreign policy” and was without precedent in recent decades: Brezhnev is not known to have addressed any such conference following the four party congresses during his tenure as general secretary; nor did Andropov or Chernenko hold foreign policy review meetings after assuming the top party post. The significance that the Gorbachev leadership attributed to the meeting was suggested by the list of officials that TASS reported in attendance, which included Shevardnadze, Dobrynin, Medvedev, Yakovlev, Central Committee department head Chervonenko, a deputy premier, two USSR ministers, and an unspecified number of Central Committee functionaries, deputy foreign ministers, ambassadors, general counsels, and secretaries of party organizations.

The conference seemed aimed at jarring the Soviet foreign policy establishment out of any lethargy left over from Gromyko's 28-year tenure as foreign minister. (Gromyko was not reported to have been present.) Judging from the sketchy summary provided by TASS, the focus of Gorbachev's "major speech" was the need to critically assess past Soviet diplomatic performance, to discard old methods of diplomacy, and to embrace the "new thinking" on international relations espoused by Gorbachev. He reportedly "examined critically and with party-style exactingness" the experience of Soviet diplomacy in "recent years"—an implicit swipe at Gromyko's stewardship over Soviet foreign policy in Brezhnev's last years and during the Andropov and Chernenko regimes—and outlined a series of "measures" designed to "perfect the entire practice of implementing the strategic line" of the congress. The critical nature of Gorbachev's comments—Soviet media almost never publish even indirect criticisms of Soviet foreign policy—may account for the unusual absence of a published text or an extended report on his speech or the proceedings of the conference.

The conference was also apparently aimed at impressing on those assembled the importance that Gorbachev attaches to mobilizing Soviet personnel abroad to help achieve the domestic economic, scientific, and technological goals set at the 27th congress. Paralleling references in his congress report to the world's growing economic and technological interdependence, Gorbachev emphasized the "organic connection" between the party's domestic tasks and its foreign policy objectives and explained that the "major changes" taking place in "socialist society" are linked to changes in "the world at large." The economic dimension of foreign affairs was reflected in the presence at the conference of the ministers of finance and foreign trade, the chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (foreign aid), and the chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology.


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
Gorbachev's interest in reshaping the substance and style of Soviet foreign policy has been evident in the emphasis he has placed on the need for change in several major policy statements in recent months. In his 15 January disarmament proposals, for example, he implicitly repudiated the approach of his predecessors, who accented the need for continuity in foreign policy, by calling for "new political thinking" and a "break with the past" in order to overcome the "negative, confrontational tendencies" that had developed in East-West relations. He codified his views on the changed world situation and Moscow's response to it in his Central Committee report to the 27th congress, arguing that changes in


the international environment "created by nuclear confrontation" are "so deep and significant" as to necessitate the formulation of a strategy based on "new approaches, methods, and forms."

Gorbachev may face internal resistance in implementing his foreign policy program. In a 28 January speech for the visiting head of the Italian Communist Party he intimated that "negative" attitudes about the need for change might be present among Soviet officials: A "certain inertia of thinking," he said, can block realization that the world is "rapidly changing before our very eyes," and many traditional views that were "possibly correct" in the past are now "hopelessly outdated." International Department head Dobrynin hinted in even stronger language at the possibility of internal resistance in a 27 May speech to an international conference in Moscow on "problems of peace and the prevention of war," reported in *Pravda* on the 28th. The process of "shaping and affirming the new thinking," Dobrynin said, is a "difficult matter," and "fierce clashes, sharp discussions, and painful differences are inevitable" in this process.









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<SUBJ> SUBJECT: THE SOVIET WRITERS CONGRESS TESTS GORBACHEV'S  
CAMPAIGN OF "OPENNESS"

<TEXT> REF: (A) MOSCOW 10798; (B) MOSCOW 10400

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. SUMMARY: UNDER UNUSUALLY RELAXED RULES OF ORDER, THE CONGRESS OF THE UNION OF WRITERS LAST WEEK, JUNE 24 JUNE 28, WAS THE SCENE OF FREE WHEELING ARGUMENT WHICH TESTED THE MEANING OF GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN TO ENCOURAGE OPENNESS OF DISCUSSION. IN CONSEQUENCE, A NEW UNION OF WRITERS LEADERSHIP WAS ELECTED, THE NEED TO PUBLISH WORKS HERETOFORE BANNED OR PRINTED IN SMALL EDITIONS WAS DISCUSSED HEATEDLY, AS WERE PREVIOUS PARTY ANATHEMAS ON SUCH WRITERS AS ZOSHCHENKO AND AKHMATOVA. GLAVLIT'S FUNCTION WAS DESCRIBED AS IRRELEVANT IN THE MODERN ERA, BUT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON HOW TO REASSIGN ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FINAL CLEARING OF MATERIALS FOR PUBLICATION. THE MORE OPEN DISCUSSION RESULTED IN HEATED CONFRONTATIONS ON VARIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN THE "LIBERALS" AND THE "NATIONALISTS." THE LATTER WERE DESCRIBED BY AN EMBASSY CONTACT AS ENSCONCED IN THE MOSCOW WRITERS UNION, WHOSE CHAIRMAN, FELIKS KUZNETSOV, WAS OPENLY ATTACKED ON THE FLOOR FOR HAVING ORDERED A FALSE COUNT OF THE BALLOTS FOR CONGRESS DELEGATES. DISCUSSION OF AN ARTICLE SAID TO HAVE MALIGNED THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE REACHED SUCH A POINT THAT THE DELEGATES FROM GEORGIA LEFT THE HALL, RETURNING ONLY AFTER AN APOLOGY FROM THE PODIUM. AS A RESULT OF THIS AND OTHER REFERENCES DURING THE CONGRESS, THE NEW WRITERS UNION BOARD AND SECRETARIAT WILL INITIATE A MAJOR REVIEW OF THE UNION'S NATIONALITY SECTIONS, THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD. THE NEW UNION FIRST SECRETARY, VLADIMIR KARPOV (CHIEF EDITOR OF NOVY MIR), IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN UNHAPPY AT THE DIRECTION TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS' HOT HEADED DISCUSSION. HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT CHANGES WILL BE SLOW IN COMING AND NOT OF THE SWEEPING KIND WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE RECENT CONGRESS OF THE UNION OF CINEMATOGRAPHERS AND ITS AFTERMATH. EMBASSY SOURCES HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE CONGRESS AS HAVING MOVED THE UNION "TOWARD THE CENTER, PERHAPS A BIT TO THE LEFT OF IT." ANOTHER WARNED THAT MUCH DEPENDED ON WHETHER MOSCOW PARTY CHIEF, BORIS YEL'TSIN, WOULD CLEAN OUT THE SUSLOV/GRISHIN ERA NATIONALISTS, LED BY KUZNETSOV. PYOTR PALIYEVSKY AND ANATOLIY IVANOV. THE SPONTANEOUS CONVERGENCE

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NLRR Feb-11/47 #9579  
BY EW NARA DATE 11/24/89

OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE NON RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES AND THE RUSSIAN "LIBERALS" WAS NOTED BY SEVERAL EMBASSY SOURCES. END SUMMARY.

3. IN THE ATMOSPHERE AFTER THE CONGRESS OF THE UNION OF CINEMATOGRAPHERS CLEARED OUT ITS OLD LEADERSHIP, MOSCOW INTELLECTUALS WERE BUZZING WITH SCENARIOS PREDICTING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AT THE CONGRESS OF THE WRITERS UNION. RUMORS WERE FANNED BY THE MEETING HELD ON THE EVE OF THE CONGRESS ( JUNE 19) ON GORBACHEV'S INVITATION (REFTEL A) AT WHICH MORE THAN 20 WRITERS MET WITH HIM, ALSO WITH 2CD SECRETARY YEGOR LIGACHEV, ALEKSANDER YAKOVLEV, PARTY SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF INFORMATION AND CULTURE, AND MURIN YORONIN, CHIEF OF THE CC CULTURAL DEPARTMENT. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCES, SAYING THAT "WE" APPROVE OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CINEMATOGRAPHERS CONGRESS, GORBACHEV ENJOINED THE WRITERS NOT BE "PASSIVE" BUT TO HELP IN THE COUNTRY'S "SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION." THE PROCESS HAS ONLY BEGUN, HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING, OF BRINGING ALL, RPT ALL, OF THE PARTY IN LINE WITH THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE AND THE NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY. THE WRITERS MUST ACT TO LESSEN THE WEIGHT OF THE WALL OF ENTRENCHED OFFICIALDOM WHICH RESTS ON ITS PRIVILEGES AND BLOCKS THE LEADERSHIP'S WISHES FROM BEING TRANSLATED INTO ACTIONS DEMANDED BY THE PEOPLE AND THE "OBJECTIVE" CONDITIONS OF THE DAY. ACCORDING TO

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7048  
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 5294  
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 8162  
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 11473

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: THE SOVIET WRITERS CONGRESS TESTS GORBACHEV'S

<TEXT> STATE FOR EUR/SOV  
USIA FOR EU(RUTH), P/RSE  
LENINGRAD FOR P&C ALLIN  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, SCUL, SOCI  
AN EMBASSY SOURCE, ANATOLIY IVANOV QUESTIONED WHETHER THE WRITERS COULD UNDERSTAND WHAT THE PARTY EXPECTED OF IT WITHOUT A CLEARER LINE AND HE PRAISED EARLIER PARTY DECREES ON LITERARY MATTERS, WHICH HE SUGGESTED SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED. REPORTEDLY, HE SINGLED OUT THE ZHDANOV ERA DECREE CRITICIZING ZOSHCHENKO AND AKHMATOVA. IVANOV WAS CHALLENGED BY PLAYWRIGHT MIKHAIL SHATROV IN A HOT ARGUMENT IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, THE HOST LEADERS DID NOT INTERVENE. AS WILL BE SEEN, THIS ISSUE WAS THEN FOUGHT OUT ON THE FLOOR OF THE CONGRESS, WITH THE "LIBERALS" STRENGTHENED BY THE WORD SPREADING THROUGH THE MOSCOW INTELLIGENTSIA THAT IVANOV'S POINT OF VIEW HAD NOT MET WITH THE LEADERSHIP'S APPROVAL.

4. THE CONGRESS BEGAN, ACCORDING TO ALL EMBASSY SOURCES, WITHOUT ANY AGENDA AT ALL, WITHOUT ANY "CLEARED SPEECHES," NOT EVEN AGREED SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. THE VARIOUS CONGRESS COMMITTEES, ON PROSE, POETRY, ETC., WERE EXPECTED TO GIVE REPORTS, AND THAT WAS ABOUT IT. THE OPENING DAY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE COLLAPSE AT THE PODIUM OF THE FIRST SPEAKER, UNION FIRST SECRETARY GEORGY MARKOV. HIS SPEECH WAS FINISHED BY ANOTHER, IT WAS SOON REPORTED THAT HE WAS RESTING EASILY, AND THE CONGRESS PROCEEDED WITHOUT PAUSE. IF THERE WAS NO SET PATTERN, SEVERAL NOTABLE THEMES OF DISCUSSION EMERGED, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCES.

5. TO BEGIN WITH THERE WAS AN INTERCESSION BY ANDREY VOZNESENSKY, WHO OPENLY ATTACHED FELIKS KUZNETSOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE MOSCOW WRITERS UNION, FOR HAVING FALSIFIED THE BALLOTING THERE FOR DELEGATES TO THE CONGRESS. OTHERS REPEATED THE CHARGE. ACCORDING TO VOZNESENSKY, AKHMADULLINA, GEL'MAN, OKUDZHAVA AND ROSHCHIN, AMONG OTHERS, HAD BEEN ILLEGALLY DENIED DELEGATE STATUS. AMID PASSIONATE DEBATE, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE NAMED PERSONS SHOULD BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE CONGRESS AS HONORED GUESTS WITH FULL RIGHTS OF DISCUSSION AND ELECTION TO OFFICE. ACCORDING TO SOME EMBASSY SOURCES, THIS IS UNUSUAL IF NOT OUTRIGHT ILLEGAL BY SOVIET "RULES OF ORDER," BUT IT HAPPENED AND, IN FACT, SEVERAL OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED WERE IN THIS WAY LEGITIMIZED FOR POSITIONS ON THE UNION'S PRESIDUM, INCLUDING

AKHMADULLINA AND OKUDZHAVA. ISKANDER, GEL'MAN AND ROSHCIN WERE ELECTED TO THE CONTROL COMMISSION.

6. THIS EARLY ATTACK GALVANIZED THE ENTIRE CONGRESS INTO WHAT IS DESCRIBED TO THE EMBASSY AS A FURY OF TRUE POLITICKING. THROUGHOUT THE DAYS AND FAR INTO THE NIGHTS, GROUPS GATHERED TO PREPARE STATEMENTS, ARGUE POSITIONS, PASS AROUND PETITIONS AND, IN GENERAL, TO ARGUE THE LAST SPEECH OR STATEMENT MADE. WE ARE ASSURED THAT THERE WAS NO PARTY UKASE AT ANY TIME WHICH TRIED TO GET A HANDLE ON THE DISCUSSION, WHICH BOILED FOR ALL OF THE DAYS OF THE CONGRESS. SO MUCH SO THAT THE CHAIRMAN OF THE RSFSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, VITALIY VOROTNIKOV, COMMENTED TO VISITING NORTH RHINE WESTFALIAN LAND PRESIDENT, JOHANNES RAU, THAT WHAT WAS GOING ON AT THE CONGRESS WAS "OPEN CONFRONTATION"; THEN, IN SOMEWHAT DEPRECATING TONES: "I WISH I HAD ONLY THEIR PROBLEMS."

7. CONSIDERING THE SUBJECTS WHICH SHOULD HAVE COME UP, IF WE ARE TO CREDIT OUR SOURCES, MOST OF THE IMPORTANT ONES DID; AND IF THE PROBLEMS HAVE NOT DEFINITELY BEEN RESOLVED, STILL THEIR VENTILATION CREATED SCENES, ACCORDING TO ONE SOURCE, "UNLIKE ANY AT A WRITERS CONGRESS SINCE THE FIRST ONE AND THEN WE WERE BEING TAKEN UNDER THE PARTY WRAP, WHEREAS NOW WE

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<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 MOS 46

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AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 8163

EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 MOSCOW 11473

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: THE SOVIET WRITERS CONGRESS TESTS GORBACHEV'S

<TEXT> STATE FOR EUR/SOV

USIA FOR EU(RUTH), P/RSE

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TAGS: PGOV, PINR, SCUL, SOCI

ARE STRUGGLING TO EMERGE FROM IT." FOR EXAMPLE,

THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF WORKS WHICH HAVE BEEN

BANNED. ACCORDING TO AN EMBASSY SOURCE, ALL

OF THE IMPORTANT AUTHORS UNDER FIRE IN THE

PAST WERE CITED ON THE FLOOR, BY ONE SPEAKER

OR THE OTHER. AGAIN, IVANOV WAS THE CENTER

OF HEATED ARGUMENT ON WHETHER THE PARTY

ANATHEMA AGAINST CERTAIN WRITERS

(ZHDANOV'S AGAINST ZOSHCHENKO AND AKHMATOVA

WAS SPECIFIED), SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN.

8. ATTACKED ON THE FLOOR BY THE POET

KUNYAYEV AS "TWO SOULED", AS A FORMER "METROPOLITE"

(REFERRING TO HIS HAVING BEEN PUBLISHED IN

"METROPOL" IN 1979), AND ONE WHO HAS DEDICATED

POETRY TO SUCH "TRAITORS" AS TARKOVSKY, LYUBIMOV

AND NEISVESTNY, VOZNESENSKY ROSE TO THE OCCASION

WITH A SHARP COUNTER ATTACK. "THE FATHERLAND

IS IN DANGER WITHOUT FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION,"

HE SAID, AND HE ARGUED FOR THE PUBLICATION

OF WORKS WHICH HAD LONG BEEN BANNED. YEVGENIY

YEVTUSHENKO, TYPICALLY, GAVE THE ARGUMENT A

MORE ORTHODOX TWIST: "DEMOCRACY DOES NOT

INEVITABLY LEAD TO ANARCHY," HE IS QUOTED

AS SAYING. "EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON WHO IS

HOLDING THE STEERING WHEEL. IT IS IN RELIABLE

HANDS TODAY, AND OUR HANDS, THE HANDS OF THE

WRITERS, SHOULD ALSO BE ON THE STEERING

WHEEL. UNDER SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY, EVERYONE

SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE STEERING OF THE

STATE."

9. HOLDING A PETITION SIGNED BY 40 WRITERS,

YEVTUSHENKO DEMANDED OF THE STARTLED DELEGATES

AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON WHETHER THE PASTERNAK

DACHA IN PEREDELKINO SHOULD BE TURNED INTO

A MUSEUM IN HIS HONOR. MANY VOTED FOR THE

PROPOSITION AND, THE EMBASSY WAS TOLD, NONE

AGAINST. "THE VOTE IS CARRIED," YEVTUSHENKO

ANNOUNCED, THOUGH HE HAS SINCE SAID (PROTECT)

THAT SUCH A VOTE HAS NO PRECEDENT AND IS PRO

BABLY EITHER ILLEGAL OR AGAINST THE ESTABLISHED

RULES OF ORDER. (COMMENT: AT A JUNE 30

PRESS CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE CONGRESS,

YEVTUSHENKO REITERATED THE "DECISION OF THE

CONGRESS" AND WAS SUPPORTED AT THE CONFERENCE

TABLE BY ONE OF THE NEW UNION BOARD MEMBERS,

CHINGIZ AITMATOV, WHO SAID THE MATTER WAS NOW SETTLED.) THOUGH DOCTOR ZHIVAGO WAS CITED AT THE CONGRESS AS A BOOK WHICH SHOULD BE PUBLISHED, EMBASSY SOURCES DOUBT WHETHER THIS WILL IN FACT SOON TAKE PLACE.

10. THE PUBLICATION OF HUGE QUANTITIES OF WORKS BY WHAT ARE EUPHEMISTICALLY REFERRED TO AS "UNTALENTED" AUTHORS WAS CITED AS USING UP SO MUCH PAPER THAT THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN DENIED THE COLLECTED WORKS OF GOGOL OR THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LERMONTOV OR THE PUBLICATION OF SUCH CLASSICS AS KARAMZIN'S HISTORY. THE CLOGGING OF THE PRINTING HOUSES BY SUCH WORKS HAS BLOCKED FROM PUBLICATION THE WORKS OF YOUNG AUTHORS, MANY SAID, WITH THE RESULT THAT TALENTED YOUNG WRITERS FIND IT HARD TO MAKE A LIVING, AND MANY SEEK OTHER EMPLOYMENT. IN GENERAL, VOZNESENSKY SAID, AN AUTHOR MUST SPEND 90 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TRYING TO GET HIS WORKS PUBLISHED; ONLY 10 PERCENT IS LEFT FOR CREATIVE EFFORT.

11. BUT VOZNESENSKY AND OTHERS WERE REFERRING ALSO TO THE SYSTEM OF CLEARING WORKS FOR PUBLICATION, NOT ONLY THE SHORTAGE OF PAPER. THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION, OF WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD ONLY REFERENCES, OF GLAVLIT'S NO LONGER BEING NECESSARY. IT IS SAID THAT THE RESIDUAL CENSORSHIP FUNCTION WAS "OFFERED" TO THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE, WHICH DECLINED,

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EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS  
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<SUBJ> SUBJECT: THE SOVIET WRITERS CONGRESS TESTS GORBACHEV'S

<TEXT> STATE FOR EUR/SOV  
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LENINGRAD FOR P&C ALLIN  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, SCUL, SOCI  
WHILE GOSKOMIZDAT SAID THAT IT DID NOT REQUIRE  
SUCH A FUNCTION, SINCE ITS APPARATUS AND  
THE PUBLISHERS AND THEIR ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
WERE NOT MAKING IDEOLOGICAL MISTAKES. ACCORDINGLY,  
THE ONLY FUNCTION FOR GLAVLIT WAS TO JUDGE WHETHER  
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION WAS BEING REVEALED.  
IT IS RECALLED BY EMBASSY SOURCES THAT THE NEW  
UNION FIRST SECRETARY, VLADIMIR KARPOV, FOUGHT  
ALONG WITH HIS PUBLISHERS AGAINST GLAVLIT TO  
GET PERMISSION TO HAVE HIS NOVEL,  
PULKOVODETS, PUBLISHED. AND IT WAS KARPOV  
AS THE EDITOR OF NOVY MIR WHO SUCCESSFULLY  
FOUGHT WITH GLAVLIT TO GET THE RIGHT TO PUBLISH  
YEVTUSHENKO'S FUKU IN THE MAGAZINE, ACCORDING TO THE  
AUTHOR (PROTECT). EMBASSY SOURCES SAY THAT  
GLAVIT HAS IN RECENT YEARS PLAYED NO USEFUL  
FUNCTION EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET  
LITERARY SCENE, MERELY DELAYING THE PROCESS  
OF PUBLICATION UNNECESSARILY, IRRITATING GOSKOMIZDAT  
AND MOST PUBLISHERS AND THE CC OFFICES INVOLVED  
IN ADJUDICATING THESE MATTERS.  
12. AS THE DISCUSSION RAGED, CAMPS WERE  
FORMED ALONG LINES FAMILIAR TO INTELLECTUAL  
DEBATES IN RUSSIA: THE "LIBERALS" ON ONE  
SIDE AND THE "RUSSIAN NATIONALIST" ON THE  
OTHER. WITH THE LATTER GATHERED AROUND  
KUZNETSOV. PALIYEVSKY AND IVANOV, ACCORDING  
TO ONE EMBASSY COURSE, THEIR GROUP WAS  
QUICKLY GIVEN THE DESIGNATION "BLACK HUNDREDS",  
A "REFERENCE TO THE RIGHT WING NATIONALISTS  
OF THE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES. AND  
THE LINES WERE DRAWN ON CHARACTERISTIC ISSUES,  
THE EMBASSY WAS INFORMED. AS AN ARTICLE BY  
ASTAFYEV WHICH HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN NASH  
SOVREMENNIK CAME UP FOR DISCUSSION AS ONE  
WHICH HAD MALIGNED THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE THERE  
WAS INCREASINGLY ANIMATED DISCUSSION, WHICH  
CULMINATED WHEN AUTHOR VALENTIN RASPUTIN  
ADVISED THE GEORGIANS NOT TO COMPLAIN UNTIL  
THEY HAD "CLEANED UP THEIR HOUSE." THERE  
WAS PANDEMONIUM AS THE GEORGIANS LEFT THE  
HALL ACCOMPANIED BY JEERS OF "GOOD REDDANCE:  
BACK TO THE BAZAAR WITH YOU BUT ALSO CRIES  
OF "FOR SHAME." ONLY AFTER AN ELOQUENT APOLOGY  
BY 85 YEAR OLD GAVRILO TRAEPOL'SKIY. A MEMBER

OF SOVREMENNİK'S EDITORIAL BOARD, DID THE GEORGIANS RETURN TO THE CONGRESS TO GREAT APPLAUSE. BUT THERE WERE OTHER EPISODES, THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD, OF GROSS DISRESPECT AND INSULT TO OTHERS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN PEOPLES, AND TO THE JEWS. THERE WAS SUBSEQUENT TALK IN THE CONFERENCE ROOMS AROUND THE CONGRESS HALL OF THE NEED TO REVAMP COMPLETELY THE STAFFS OF THE UNION'S LANGUAGE SECTIONS. THERE WERE EVEN SUGGESTIONS, THE EMBASSY WAS TOLD, THAT THE DEPTH OF HOSTILITY EXPRESSED WHEN OPEN DISCUSSION WAS ALLOWED TO TAKE PLACE WOULD FORCE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT FORMALLY. THE SPONTANEOUS CONGRUENCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE NATIONALITIES OTHER THAN RUSSIAN. ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE RUSSIAN "LIBERALS", ON THE OTHER, WAS NOTED BY SEVERAL EMBASSY CONTACTS.

13. THE ELECTION TO UNION OFFICES WAS COMPLETELY UNPLANNED, EMBASSY CONTACTS HAVE ASSURED US, WHICH IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE PARTY CAUCUS DID NOT HAVE A VIEW; BUT THERE WERE THREE CANDIDATES FOR THE POST OF FIRST SECRETARY TILL THE VERY END: VLADIMIR KARPOV, WHO WAS ELECTED TO THE POSITION, AS WELL AS AUTHORS YURIY BONDAREV AND SERGEY ZALYGIN. AS FOR MARKOV, NOW IN GOOD HEALTH AGAIN, HE IS EXPECTED TO HAVE A LARGELY CEREMONIAL ROLE AS CHAIRMAN, A POSITION WHICH HAD LONG BEEN VACANT. THE EMBASSY'S FIRST SUMMARY OF VIEWS EXPRESSED TO IT IS THAT

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PRACTICE DESPITE THE UNUSUAL SCENES OF OPEN DEBATE DURING THE CONGRESS ON PREVIOUSLY TABOO SUBJECTS AND PERSONS CRITICIZED BY EARLIER PARTY DECREES. VENTILATING VIEWS DOES NOT SOLVE PROBLEMS; MERELY OUTLINES THEIR SERIOUSNESS. CHANGES IN THE POLICIES OF SELECTION OF WORKS, PUBLICATION OF WORKS PREVIOUSLY BANNED AND IN OPPORTUNITIES GIVEN TO THE YOUNGER WRITERS WILL BE CRITERIA BY WHICH TO JUDGE THE CONGRESS' EFFECTS, IN THE REPUBLICS AS WELL. THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE IMPORTANT PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE WRITERS UNION. THE EMBASSY HAS ALREADY HEARD THAT NIKOLAY TEDORENKQ, SECRETARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION, WILL BE REMOVED OR HAS INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO RETIRE. FURTHER, THE UNION'S NATIONALITY LANGUAGE STAFFS, THE SOURCE OF MUCH PATRONAGE, ARE EXPECTED TO UNDERGO DRASTIC OVERHAUL. NEVERTHELESS, IT CAN BE EXPECTED THAT THE PACE OF CHANGE WILL BE SET BY KARPOV'S DESIRE TO COOL THE PASSIONS BROUGHT OUT DURING THE CONGRESS' DEBATES. REFLECTING THIS VIEW THE LITERATURNAYA GAZETA OF JULY 2 AND A SPECIAL TV PROGRAM OF THAT DATE ON THE CONGRESS WERE "FAIR AND BALANCED", AS ONE EMBASSY SOURCE WRYLY PUT IT, GIVING LITTLE FAVOR TO THE LIBERALS,

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<SUBJ> SUBJECT: THE SOVIET WRITERS CONGRESS TESTS GORBACHEV'S

<TEXT> STATE FOR EUR/SOV  
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TAGS: PGOV, PINR, SCUL, SOCI  
YET NO OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE TO THE NATIONALISTS,  
WHO ARE IN THE MAJORITY.  
CHANGED ATTITUDES AMONG NON RUSSIAN INTELLECTUALS  
WILL BE IMPORTANT SYMPTOMS OF THE NEW ERA  
OF "OPENNESS" UNDER GORBACHEV. IMPORTANT  
NON RUSSIAN LITERARY FIGURES SEEM LIKELY TO  
FIND IT CONGENIAL, PERHAPS EVEN USEFUL, TO  
DEVELOP THE CONGRUENCE OF INTERESTS WHICH  
WAS REVEALED ON THE FLOOR OF THE CONGRESS  
IN THE "ALLIANCE" WITH THE SO CALLED RUSSIAN  
LIBERALS. THE REACH INTO THE "PROVINCES",  
INTO THE REPUBLICS WOULD ORDINARILY BE SLOW, HARD  
TO MEASURE AND DISSIPATED BY THE DISTANCE FROM  
THE CENTER. AFTER THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE CON  
GRESS, HOWEVER, IT IS FELT THAT SOME OF THE  
MOST CONFRONTATIONAL ACTION MIGHT VERY WELL  
TAKE PLACE AWAY FROM MOSCOW, AS THE OLD LINE  
RUSSIAN APPARTCHIKI AT THE CENTER AND IN  
THE REPUBLICS CONFRONT AN INCREASINGLY SELF  
CONFIDENT LOCAL INTELLIGENTSIA ON THE LATTER'S  
TURF. END COMMENT.

HARTMAN

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