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Withdrawer

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File Folder DISSIDENTS (19/23)

FOIA

F06-114/7

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YARHI-MILO

2403

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9494	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV, FREDKIN, AND PC'S TO USSR <i>R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</i>	2	9/6/1984	B1
9495	LETTER	MATLOCK TO FREDKIN DRAFT MESSAGE <i>R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</i>	1	ND	B1
9496	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV AND FREDKIN <i>PAR 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</i>	2	9/24/1984	B1
9497	REPORT	THE SAKHAROV CASE: A SOVIET SAGA <i>PAR 5/7/2013 F2006-114/7</i>	14	9/25/1984	B1 B3
9498	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV AND FREDKIN: UPDATE <i>R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7</i>	1	10/26/1984	B1
9499	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV AND FREDKIN <i>PAR 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7</i>	2	9/14/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Sakharov, Fredkin and PC's to USSR

You will recall that, a couple of weekends back, you asked me to telephone Edward Fredkin in Boston in response to a call from Tanya Yankelevich to the Vice President. As I reported at the time, I did so, and encouraged him to make representations on behalf of Sakharov if he was inclined to do so. He briefed me at that time on discussions he had had with Velikhov and others about the possibility of constructing a large manufacturing facility for microcomputers, and I made it clear that no advance assurances could be given on how such a proposal would be regarded from the export license point of view.

I have now received a message from Fredkin, relayed through our Charge in Moscow, concerning his discussions with Velikhov (TAB II). Specifically, Fredkin asks if he can be given assurance of rapid approval of an export license for 100 IBM PC-XT's, which the Academy of Sciences says it wants to study the feasibility of large-scale introduction of PC's into the Soviet economy. Fredkin feels that a favorable action on this would strengthen his hand in making an appeal for Sakharov, and also that it would not provide the Soviets with any technology that they do not already have, since they have already acquired a number of IBM PC's -- a item which is so widely available that effective export control is quite impossible.

I do not believe that Fredkin's request can be accommodated. Not that the export of 100 IBM PC-XT's would do any damage (I think his arguments are sound on this), but because of the impropriety of showing favoritism in applying export control regulations. I have therefore drafted a reply to him (to be sent through Embassy Moscow), in which I explain why this is impossible, but point out that the IBM PC-XT is expected to be licensable under normal procedures by the end of the year, and express appreciation for any representations he may choose to make in regard to Sakharov.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 108-114/7 #9494
BY CN NARA DATE 6/25/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Fredkin returns to Moscow September 7 and it would be helpful if the message could be sent by COB that day.

Recommendation:

That you approve my sending the message at Tab I.

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Draft message to Fredkin
- Tab II - Incoming message from Fredkin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft Message, Matlock to Fredkin

Dear Edward:

Thank you for the message regarding your talks in Moscow.

Your report on your conversations with the Academy of Sciences was most interesting, and I think your comments on the future implications of the introduction of large numbers of microcomputers into Soviet society are quite persuasive. The question of export licensing of manufacturing facilities, should it arise in the future, would of course require detailed examination in the U.S. Government. However, ultimate approval is certainly not beyond the realm of the possible. Obviously, any decision on a major question of this sort would be influenced by the overall political relationship at the time. While I do not wish to imply any sort of direct linkage, it is clear that the Sakharov situation does have a bearing on the political climate, and a humanitarian resolution of that tragic situation would contribute to its improvement. I would hope that this point is understood by your Soviet interlocutors.

As for your specific request, we would like to be helpful if we could, given our shared interest in resolving the Sakharov tragedy. However, it seems clear that any explicit or implicit commitment to give special treatment to an export license application would raise serious legal questions. Whether or not a profit is involved in the transaction, it could be deemed improper for any USG official to give assurances of preferential treatment, and for this reason neither I nor anyone else can do so.

My understanding of the status of revision of export license regulations is as follows. The July decision of COCOM still must be formulated in regulations, and there will be a meeting of COCOM country representatives shortly to coordinate drafting language. Subsequently, it will be the responsibility of each country to revise its own regulations. This entire process is expected to be complete before the end of the year. The specialists working on the matter anticipate that, when the regulations are revised, licenses for export of the IBM PC-XT to the Soviet Union would be available to vendors by prompt and routine approval.

We appreciate your efforts to make representations on behalf of Sakharov and trust that you will understand the constraints which make it impossible to give the sort of specific assurance you have requested. Nevertheless, the prognosis is that the transaction you contemplate should be possible without undue delay if normal procedures are followed.

Sincerely,

Jack

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLRR F06-114/779495
BY CW NARA DATE 6/25/09

Dear Jack:

I have had many fruitful meetings with Velikhov and I am making very good progress in general. Velikhov heard my message with regard to the Sakharov situation and he seemed sympathetic to the ideas that I brought from Washington. He agreed immediately to bring these ideas to the attention of those persons in the government who could act on such problems. He has been hampered by two problems. First, as a simple practical matter, at the end of August, most of the people he would have liked to have contacted were away on vacation, but they will be back early in September. Second, with those he did get to, he encountered "pessimism". It seems that there is an "after you Alfonse" problem. Who is it that takes the first step? In my opinion, your call to me might be called a first step, but I am afraid that it may not be concrete enough for them. I am leaving today for Bratislava and Budapest and then back to Moscow on the 7th of September. I hope that when I get back to Moscow, people will be back from vacation, and that a meeting will be arranged for me to speak to some very senior person about the Sakharov situation.

I have made progress on the PC (Personal Computer) question. They seem to be actively proceeding on a path that would lead them to want to acquire several billions of dollars of non-strategic equipment in the PC area. Most of this business could go to the USA. As I explained to you on the phone, the introduction of millions of PC systems into the USSR, each with the ability to easily copy documents from one floppy disk to another and each with a printer, will result in changes in the USSR with regard to official attitudes about allowing citizens to print and make copies. Today, everything that prints or that makes copies (like a xerox machine) must be registered and controlled. As you know, the result is a dearth of copying machines in the USSR. The program being envisioned by the Academy of Sciences would absolutely bring the freedom of printing and copying to millions of Russians, to an extent that would be impossible to control. It is my considered opinion that a Soviet program to distribute millions of PCs should be in line with the long range strategic goals of the U.S. vis-a-vis the USSR.

In order to better evaluate the PC concept, they have asked me to request permission from the U.S. government for the immediate acquisition of 100 IBM-PC-XT systems. My company, Fredkin Enterprises, would buy these systems, along with accessories and software, and resell them to an agency of the USSR Ministry of Trade. These systems would be used in a project aimed at helping them to gain a better understanding of

the value of spending a few billion dollars for PCs. The IBM-PC-XT is the model currently in use in the USSR, in such places as the Academy of Sciences Moscow computation center. That institute has about 10 PCs now, most of which are IBM-PC-XT models, and they are planning to acquire another 20 XTs in the near future. Velikhov has an XT at home, and others have them. I have shown Kamman, at the U.S. Embassy, photos I have taken of IBM-PC-XT systems in use. These systems are easily obtained. Someone goes into a European computer store, buys them, and brings them back to the USSR. The point is, if there are any secrets in the XT, they already know them. In addition, IBM has already announced the IBM-AT which is a new and advanced personal computer that replaces the XT. Customer delivery of the IBM-PC-AT systems starts this month. At this time, the IBM-XT does not represent the forefront of PC technology.

I have a request. Instead of having the USSR purchase the models of the IBM-XT by clandestine methods, why not throw them a bone, and let them obtain them on a legitimate basis? If the U.S. could react very quickly, with a positive response to this small Soviet desire, I think that that gesture would break the ice and allow me to have a constructive meeting on the Sakharov situation. The Ministry of Trade has before it a business proposal from me covering the steps involved in moving towards the acquisition from the West of a great many computers and a factory to make personal computers, and the total value of this deal would be several billions of dollars.

While it has been proposed that my firm make a substantial profit on the sale of these 100 sample PC systems, it may make sense for me to forego that profit. I do not want to be viewed as using the Sakharov situation as way to make a profit. If the U.S. can react quickly, and allow me to use that quick reaction as a gesture that allows for progress on the Sakharov situation, then I will propose to the USSR that the deal be done with no profit or fee, or that the profit be used for some constructive purposes with regard to East-West problems.

My specific proposal is as follows. When I return to Moscow on the 7th, I would like to be able to obtain a piece of paper from the U.S. Embassy that enables me to report that there is an excellent chance that the U.S. may grant very rapid (within days or weeks) approval for the sale of the 100 sample systems. This information could come from you or some other appropriate person in Washington. This possibility should not be contingent on the immediate political situation. I will then emphasize that this rapid and positive step by the highest levels of the U.S. administration warrants giving me a serious

hearing with regard to the Sakharov situation. I believe that the result would be a meeting with the possibility that they may listen and react positively to the information that you gave to me.

My family and I will be in Bratislava starting this evening, until the 4th, then we will go to Budapest, returning to Moscow on the 7th. In Bratislava, I can be reached through the the Academy of Sciences, care of Prof. Ivan Plander. In Budapest, we will be staying at the Hyatt Atrium Hotel, and I will contact the U.S. Embassy there. In Budapest I will be visiting with Prof. Tibor Vamos, of the Academy of Sciences.

I realize that I am making an unusual request, and asking that something be done rapidly that would normally take time. Because of the July COCOM decision, it seems clear that the USSR will be able to buy such PC systems from various vendors in many different countries. They currently are taking deliveries of an even more sophisticated PC system that is made in Australia. Therefore the cost to the U.S. of a quick, positive reaction would be very small; the benefit could be large. I don't think it would be wise to haggle over the details of these 100 systems, we should either decide to do it now, or to not react and to let the order wend its way through the normal Department of Commerce procedures. I believe that the only favour they are asking is to accomplish the acquisition of these systems quickly and in a legitimate way, instead of slowly or in an illegitimate way. Why shouldn't we grant them this simple request, and see if that step leads to another?

Best Regards,

Edward Fredkin

457 West Roslyn Place
Chicago, Illinois 60614
September 17, 1984

Ms. Paula Dobriansky
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington D.C.

Dear Ms. Dobriansky:

As I hope you recall, I recently met with you to discuss my Soviet husband's difficulties obtaining emigration permission to join me in the United States. His most recent application was denied on May 30, 1984.

I am writing to you in the hope that you can assist in insuring that our problems and marriage cases generally will be taken up at the forthcoming high level meetings between President Reagan and Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Schultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko. I think those meetings offer unique opportunities to raise this continuing problem.

I appreciate your concern in this matter. I have enclosed an updated fact sheet. I can be reached at (312) 353-1640 (work) or (312) 549-0091 (home) if you need any further information.

Thanks.

Sincerely,

Fran Pergericht

Fran Pergericht

Roman Kuperman
Leninsky Prospekt 73/8, Apt. 246
Moscow, U.S.S.R. 117296

Frances Pergericht
457 West Roslyn Place, Apt. 2
Chicago, Illinois 60614

married February 24, 1982 by Soviet authorities in Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Roman Kuperman's requests to emigrate from the Soviet Union were refused on:

March 15, 1983
August 4, 1983
October 21, 1983
May 30, 1984

Fran Pergericht's requests for temporary residence in Moscow were refused on:

August 4, 1983
March 15, 1984

tourist visas were granted to Fran Pergericht for trips during:

October, 1981
November, 1981
February, 1982
May, 1982
November, 1982
May, 1983
October, 1983
August, 1984

The Soviet government refused to authorize tourist visas for trips in:

April, 1984
May, 1984
June, 1984
July, 1984

File Dissident⁹

The Center for Russian and East European Jewry

240 Cabrini Blvd., New York, N.Y. 10033

Tels. (212) 928-7451, 795-8867, 799-8902

September 17, 1984

74-2

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We pray that your forthcoming meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko may eventually lead to a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The political importance of your meeting for the internal victims of Soviet oppression can hardly be over-rated. Among them are the greatest heroes and martyrs of our time; their struggle for freedom constitutes a noble contemporary saga.

In the past you have signalled the Soviets that positive action in this area will help create a better climate for discussion in other areas of bilateral concern. We earnestly hope that the administration will maintain and expand this thrust in the forthcoming meetings.

Such action is now even more necessary than before, as recent days have seen a relentless new advance in the long Soviet struggle toward the total destruction of Jewish life and identity in the USSR. I refer to the arrest of as many as four Jewish religious/cultural personalities -- Yuli Edelshtein, Yaakov Gorodetzky, Alexander Kholmiansky and Yaakov Levin, and the planting of a gun and drugs on two of them -- an ominous development. This follows the tragic 12-year sentence imposed last October on the distinguished Jewish culturalist, Dr. Iosef Begun.

Having terminated emigration, the Soviets are now further accelerating their attacks on the last lifeline of Jewish survival -- the small Jewish self-study groups and their teachers. We are witnessing a contemporary Soviet form of a new "final solution" of the Jewish problem, a non-physical genocide!

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Prof. Michael Wyschogrod

We have reached a point at which the question of Soviet Jewry on the U.S.-Soviet Agenda must encompass not only emigration, and release of the Prisoners of Conscience and Refuseniks, but also our clear articulation of the principle of non-harassment of the unofficial Jewish study groups. Nowhere else in the world is it a crime to study, publicly or privately, Jewish customs, history and literature, which are the elementary educational staples of even the smallest Jewish communities in the West.

We are coming to the conclusion that, in order to halt this Soviet form of a "final solution," the administration must take steps toward directly negotiating with Moscow for the purpose of moving toward a comprehensive resolution as a whole. A piecemeal approach will no longer suffice. The apparent limitations imposed by "practical politics" can and must be superceded.

The components of such a "resolution" would include the principles of National Repatriation (well-established in Soviet precedent) and, of course, of Family Reunification. In regard to Soviet Jews, we are talking about repatriation to Israel and reunification of families in the U.S. and elsewhere outside of Israel.

In recent months, there have been several anguished petitions from Soviet Jews calling for repatriation. Two of the most remarkable were "A Statement on Repatriation" (apparently began to circulate February 7, 1984) signed by over 100 Refuseniks each representing a family unit, and still rapidly accumulating signatures - some 400 as the latest report) followed by a letter to Mitterand (June 18/19) on the occasion of his visit to Moscow. The letter refers to the precedents of the repatriation of Poles, Greeks and Germans; it states that the process of Jewish departure would be "a gradual one in the foreseeable future, thus not causing the Soviet Union any harm" (in terms of a brain drain) and that "the Government of Israel and the Jewish organizations in the West have to respect the political and economic interests of the USSR insofar as these affect significant strategic interests of Israel and the West as defined by open agreements and obligations."

President Ronald Reagan


-3-

September 17, 1984

There is a further letter, also signed by Mr. Kolker, stating that the enunciation of the repatriation principle should not be seen as undermining the principle of Family reunification. We will forward the full texts shortly.

We deeply appreciate your past interest and concern and look forward to your early response to our plea.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jacob Birnbaum". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Jacob Birnbaum
National Director

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1984

12
File USSR
Dissidents
or
Human Rights

MEMORANDUM FOR FAITH WHITTLESEY

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS *LK*

SUBJECT: Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, September 28

The President's scheduled meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko is being followed very closely in the East European-American communities, especially by Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian-Americans. While most of these groups have not expressed opposition to the meeting and trust the President to remain true to his principles, they nonetheless, urge him to remain realistic and firm.

Specifically, the Baltic and Ukrainian-American have requested that the following issues be added to the meeting's agenda:

1. Political Prisoners: The President is urged to request the release of political prisoners, and the granting of permission to them and their families to emigrate to the West if they so desire. They urge the President to make release of political prisoners a measure of Soviet "good faith" intentions for future U.S./Soviet relations.

Though the Baltic and Ukrainian-Americans would like to see all political prisoners released, the major organizations have identified some priority requests (many of these being in especially poor health):

Estonians: Mart Niklus, Enn Tarto, Tiit Madisson

Latvians: Lidija Lasmane-Doronina, Ints Calitis,
Gederts Melngailis

Lithuanians: Viktoras Petkus, Balys Gajauskas, Vytautas
Skuodis

(Note: Vytautas Skuodis is an American citizen, born in Chicago, Illinois.)

Ukrainian: Yuriy Shukhevych

The groups stress that it is important for the President to mention these people by name or to hand Mr. Gromyko a list. Even if they are not released, the fact that the President specified these individuals will guarantee them more humane treatment.

2. U.S. Non-Recognition of Soviet Annexation of Baltic States: The Baltic-American communities ask that, in his "tour d'horizon" of international issues, the President inform Mr. Gromyko that the U.S. considers the Soviet presence in the Baltic States an unresolved matter.

3. Family reunification: The President should express U.S. displeasure at the Soviet Union's refusal to allow family members of American citizens living in the Soviet Union who wish to emigrate to the U.S. to do so. The Lithuanian community is especially interested in the case of Mrs. Marija Jurgutis, whose husband currently lives in Los Angeles.

4. Soviet Tariffs: Many Americans of Baltic and Ukrainian birth or heritage continue to send packages of clothing, medicine and other supplies to their relatives in the U.S.S.R. Recently, the Soviet government has increased the duty which the recipients must pay on packages from the West to a prohibitive rate. The President is asked to request a reduction of tariff rates.

Recommendation: It would be very helpful if we could arrange a meeting for Baltic and Ukrainian-American representatives with Mr. McFarlane as soon as possible after September 28 to brief them on the results of the Gromyko visit. If you agree, I will prepare a memorandum requesting such a meeting.

cc: John Lenczowski, NSC ✓

Dissident
10

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
91007

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 24, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Sakharov and Fredkin

Following his message to me about his desire to arrange for the sale of 100 IBM-XT personal computers to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Edward Fredkin sent me a message through Embassy Moscow with a proposal for an attempt to resolve the Sakharov problem. He left Moscow before it could be answered, and then came to see me on September 17 to explain what he had in mind.

Fredkin explained that, while he was in Moscow, he noted that the Soviets were making a lot in the press over the Peltier case here. Although he recognizes that this is not a matter of genuine interest to them but only one of propaganda, he felt it provided a possible cover for an optically reciprocal resolution of the Sakharov problem. Accordingly, he left with his Soviet contacts (Arbatov and Velikhov) a "personal proposal" for steps to resolve the issue. The text is at TAB I, and Fredkin apologized for the rhetoric in the first two pages, which he said was designed to stimulate Soviet interest in the idea.

Essentially, Fredkin's proposal is that a person or persons trusted by both sides visit both Sakharov and Peltier, take pictures of them and interview them, and then certify to their condition. Following this both governments would issue statements that they were satisfied that the conditions of the two individuals were as found by the observers. The next step would be confidential talks by US and Soviet officials in an effort to find a way to resolve the situation, consistent with the sovereignty of both countries.



B1

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR #06-114/7 #9496
BY *CJ* NARA DATE 6/25/09

Perhaps recognizing that some of this would be on the record, Fredkin went out of his way during our meeting -- and during earlier telephone calls -- to describe what he had observed of computer developments in the Soviet Union, and offered to talk with government specialists if there is an interest. (I am doing a separate memorandum of these comments, and believe it would in fact be useful to have someone talk to him.)

b1

However, inasmuch as we contacted him (as a result of Tanya Semyonov's call to the Vice President) to encourage him (without commitment) to take up the Sakharov problem, we may be to some degree on the hook, since it would be damaging to our relations with the Sakharov family if we tried to turn him off at this point.

Actually, Fredkin does not seem to be seeking hard-and-fast commitments at this point. Essentially, what he is asking is whether we would be prepared to respond favorably if the Soviets pick him up on his proposals. I doubt that they will, although conceivably his scenario could provide a face-saving way to solve the problem if the Soviets decide at some point they want it solved.

Therefore, I recommend that we tell Fredkin that his plan is an ingenious one, and that if the Soviets show an interest, we will do what we can to make it work on our side. I would caution him, however, that we cannot make advance commitments regarding concrete actions until there is a clear sign of Soviet interest, and a more precise indication of what precisely they want us to do and what they themselves are prepared to do.

Recommendation:

That you approve my replying to Fredkin along the lines described above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Fredkin "Appeal" of September 13, 1984, as submitted to his Soviet contacts.

16

A Concerned Citizen
Planet Earth

13 September, 1984

To whom it may concern
USSR, Moscow

To whom it may concern
Washington, USA

The world is rapidly plunging towards a terrible fate, which may involve the destruction of a majority of mankind, and the fruits of thousands of years of civilization. Why? That is a question that deserves an answer.

Every creature that lives on this planet has a will to survive. Yet, no creature survives beyond its normal life span because all creatures are mortal. While we may want to live forever, it is certain that we will all die someday. Under the best and most peaceful of circumstances, we can expect that every one now alive on this planet will be dead by the year 2150.

Every species of creature on this planet has survived for thousands of years and also has the ability to survive for thousands of years into the future. Yet no species has the will to survive, because a species cannot have a will of its own. If mankind manages to continue surviving on this planet, it will not be a matter of the will of our species, but because of the will of the individuals who wish to have mankind survive. I and others like me, who want to survive, to have others survive, to have our species survive must express our will against all forces that threaten that survival. We need not care if one man so wants to win that he puts winning ahead of his own survival. We all must care when some want to win, to have their nation win, and they put that goal ahead of the survival of all mankind.

The fear of annihilation knows no national boundaries. The will to survive knows no national boundaries. Those who wish to go on living, whoever and wherever they may be, must express their will in terms of actions that are effective. Throughout history, governments have proven themselves unable to avoid war. Such wars are usually preceded by an increase in tensions and an increase in hostility. In fact, situations similar to those developing today, between the USSR and the USA are very much like those that have led to war in the past. The difference is that today, everyone in the world is threatened by this USA-USSR confrontation. It is those who are threatened who must work to save themselves and their descendants by finding ways to reduce the chance of war. Since everyone is threatened, we all must work on this problem. There is no aspect that is too small to be worthy of careful and considerate effort. It is not a time for us to be patient, rather it is a time for us to be purposeful and persistent.

The most important step is to move away from positions of conflict and hostility, and towards positions of cooperation and rapprochement. As hostility increases, tensions increase, communication decreases, suspicions increase and in general, the world moves towards war. War has happened in the past, and many have suffered. We must understand that there have been no new discoveries that now make war less likely; the new discoveries only make war more terrible.

A case in point are situations like those that surround Leonard Peltier and Andrei Sakharov. In the USSR and USA, the situation of these individuals, and the reaction on the other side, has as a consequence the fact that there is an increase in hostility and suspicion. There are steps, however, that can be taken in concert between the USA and the USSR that will serve to reduce the confrontational nature of these situations, while respecting each country's right to solely determine its own internal affairs.

We must all realize, that if the US and the USSR go to war, they will have determined the internal affairs of all sovereign countries. Surely killing most if not all of the population of a country, without consulting with its government for permission to do so could be considered an infringement on its internal affairs! A war between the USA and the USSR could have such a result for most countries. In today's world, the USSR and the USA both have military establishments that have plans in place that will result in infringing upon the sovereign rights of every country on the planet. It should be possible to consider small requests that one country might make about the affairs inside another, if that request is honestly made as part of a series of concrete actions that can lead to a reduction in tensions.

Consider the Peltier and the Sakharov situations. Everyone in the world might benefit if ways could be found to stop the destructive effects of these situations. What are the destructive effects? Within each country, public opinion is being influenced in the direction of hostility and confrontation. The USA claims that the USSR is bad, because of its treatment of Sakharov, and the USSR claims that the USA is bad because of its treatment of Peltier.

Those who believe that having a way to turn public opinion against the "enemy" is a step towards winning, revel in and enjoy such confrontational situations. What they do not realize is that they do not win when the other side loses. This is a situation where most events lead to consequences where mankind wins, or mankind loses. It doesn't matter if all Russians die three minutes before all Americans die, and thus enjoy three minutes as the "winner".

To truly understand what makes sense, every issue must be first examined in terms of its consequences for all mankind, secondly in terms of its consequences for one's own country. Otherwise we are led to results that seem better for one country

then for another, but where everyone is dead or dying. Why not try to answer questions first in mankind's interests, and secondly in national interests? True, it goes against simple human nature, but the same logic that causes patriots to place the concerns of their country ahead of their own personal concerns, can lead countries to put the concerns of the world ahead of their own national concerns.

In this light, there must be solutions to the Peltier and Sakharov situations that, by putting the needs of the world first, benefit all mankind. Of course, in finding such solutions, there is no reason not to proceed fairly, evenly, respectfully, with compassion not just for the two men, but compassion for everyone.

I, as an inhabitant of the world, do hereby make the following private proposal to the Governments of the USA and the USSR. I suggest that a representative of the USSR and of the USA get together to hold private discussions to arrive at a series of steps along the following lines.

1. The US and the USSR establish private communications, one person from each side.
2. Washington, (certainly government press releases and VOA) becomes noticeably quiet on the Sakharov situation.
3. Moscow, (certainly government press releases and Radio Moscow) becomes noticeably quiet on the Peltier situation.
4. X, a person described below, will meet with a Soviet official who answers questions X will ask about Sakharov's situation. They promise that all such discussions will be completely private.
5. Y, a person described below, will meet with an American official who answers questions Y will ask about Peltier's situation. They promise that all such discussions will be completely private.
6. X and Y will work out with a Soviet and an American official the contents of two projected press conferences, including press releases and general responses to questions.
7. X and Y will then communicate with, respectively, the American and Soviet official and then if, in their judgement conditions are suitable, they will proceed with the following steps. If conditions are not suitable, all matters discussed will be kept confidential, and we will not proceed with the following steps.
8. X will meet with Sakharov. X will speak to him to verify to his complete satisfaction that the information X received in step 4 above is accurate. X will take photos of Sakharov with a Polaroid camera.

9. Y will meet with Peltier. Y will speak to him to verify to his complete satisfaction that the information Y received in step 5 above is accurate. Y will take photos of Peltier with a Polaroid camera.

10. In Moscow, X will hold a press conference, giving a simple and neutral statement of the pertinent facts that X personally observed. X will give the photos to the press. X will not, however, grant any subsequent press interviews as X will be unwilling to become a public personality.

10. In Washington, Y will hold a press conference, giving a simple and neutral statement of the pertinent facts that Y personally observed. Y will give the photos to the press. Y will not, however, grant any subsequent press interviews as Y will be unwilling to become a public personality.

11. The US State Department's first response will be to issue a press release that they are now satisfied with Moscow's official position on the state of Sakharov's condition.

12. The USSR Foreign Ministry's first response will be to issue a press release that they are now satisfied with Washington's official position on the state of Peltier's condition.

13. Washington and Moscow will then remain "noticeably" quieter about the Sakharov and Peltier situations, awaiting further private discussions. A request will be made to the Sakharov family and private groups in the USA and USSR to do the same, so long as progress is made in private talks. This facts about this US-USSR understanding, however, will remain private.

14. Private discussions will then take place that respect the mutual sovereignty of the USSR and the US, but which are aimed at finding innovative ways to solve this dilemma. Each side will take into consideration the fact that by making fair and contemporaneous concessions to the perceived needs of the other side, that they will not lose, rather it is all mankind that will win.

15. So long as such discussions make progress, the US and USSR will continue to show restraint in their public statements about these issues.

16. X and Y must be persons capable of complete neutrality with regard to these issues. Each must be a person that understands both sides of each issue. They must each be a person trusted by both sides.

This proposal attempts to take into account certain Soviet and American realities about this situation, but gaining approval will require a spirit of goodwill, where the interests of all of mankind can be put above national interests.

One can ask "Why tackle such small issues with such an elaborate procedure? Why not solve questions about arms in space or strategic weapons in Europe?" The answer is that these small issues loom large in the minds of many and they contribute in a disproportionate way to world tensions, hostility and distrust. We can and must make progress on such issues.

I am willing to be X or Y or both. There are others who can fill such roles. Our problem is to solve this problem, for the sake of mankind, and not to quibble over details. Nevertheless this little problem is worthy of great attention. Its solution needs the thought of our best thinkers, later they can pay attention to harder problems.

I would be pleased if, having modified this proposal to take into account the reactions of the appropriate persons in the US and USSR, if it could be considered at an early date. Perhaps it could be a matter of discussion in New York, when Gromyko may meet with Reagan.

Respectfully submitted,


Edward Fredkin
Moscow, USSR

*File Dissident
L. KOROWSKI*

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NLRR F06-114/7 #9497

BY KOL NARA DATE 5/7/13



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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FOIA(b)(1)

25 September 1984

FOIA(b)(3)

The Sakharov Case: A Soviet Saga

Summary

The Soviet Union's most prominent dissident, Andrey Sakharov, has for two decades presented the regime with a dilemma: how to silence him without incurring too much damage to the Soviet regime's image at home and abroad. In the past, sensitivity to Western and domestic criticism restrained the leadership from using the full panoply of repressive measures against Sakharov and even enabled him at times to win concessions from Moscow. When the 63-year-old physicist went on a hunger strike on 2 May to gain a temporary exit visa for his wife Yelena Bonner, however, the regime adopted a tough approach. By forcing Sakharov to end his hunger strike and severing Bonner's ties with the outside world, the Kremlin appears to have calculated that the mix of advantages and drawbacks of a hardline policy had changed: [REDACTED]

- They may have believed that Sakharov enjoyed less foreign support than previously because he had concentrated recently on personal causes (e.g. efforts to win emigration for his family) rather than broader political questions.
- They may have concluded that Bonner, especially after she asked for asylum in the US Embassy in Moscow, would not return to the USSR if permitted to leave and would stir up more foreign criticism of Soviet policies than would ensue from harsh regime actions to suppress her dissent.

This paper was prepared by [REDACTED] the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments may be directed to Chief, Policy Analysis Division, [REDACTED]

SOVA M 84-10164

[REDACTED]

- They may have felt that an unyielding position would signal that US policies toward the Soviet Union have produced tougher, not more accommodating, behavior.
- They may have judged that a tough stance would reinforce other recent regime actions designed to increase greater ideological controls and eliminate Western influences at home.
- It is conceivable that some Soviet leaders have used the Sakharov situation to give an anti-Western thrust to policy or to complicate General Secretary Chernenko's tenure.

The regime isolated Bonner in Gor'kiy in early May, then probably threatened both Sakharovs with the prospect that she would receive a harsh sentence for anti-Soviet propaganda or possibly even for treason. The authorities also hospitalized Sakharov soon after he began his hunger strike and may have subjected him to psychiatric treatment in order to break his resolve and to end his fast. [REDACTED]

By the end of August, the regime brought the situation to its present status. Bonner was convicted of anti-Soviet slander but given a relatively lenient sentence. For the first time, both Sakharovs are confined to Gor'kiy, out of the Moscow spotlight and in a controlled environment. Sakharov's hunger strike has been ended. The Soviets have combined their actions against Sakharov and Bonner with a disinformation and propaganda campaign to deflect foreign criticism. [REDACTED]

The regime is likely to view the status quo as a victory of sorts. While Sakharov's death could enliven the issue of Soviet mistreatment of its dissidents, Moscow appears to have weathered the storm for now. The leadership is probably counting on time and the lack of information from unofficial sources about Sakharov's situation to cause the West to lose interest in his plight. [REDACTED]

Background

Andrey Sakharov, considered the father of the Soviet Union's first hydrogen bomb, has presented the regime with a dilemma since becoming a leading critic of Soviet foreign and domestic policies nearly two decades ago. His prominence at home and abroad as a physicist, Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and symbolic head of the Soviet dissident movement has made it difficult for the regime to silence him without incurring both the wrath of its own scientific community and condemnation from the world at large. Indeed, Sakharov's international visibility and the high regard for him at home has forced the leadership to treat him as a special case. In recent months, however, the leadership appears to have reassessed its approach on the Sakharov issue, seeing fewer disincentives than previously and new incentives to move against Sakharov. [REDACTED]

Sakharov's weapons research initially led him to dissident activities. He came into disfavor after writing a series of letters to then Premier Khrushchev (1958, 1961 and 1962) opposing nuclear weapons tests. He cofounded the Moscow Human Rights Committee in 1970, but it was not until February 1973 that Soviet officialdom first publicly criticized him--then for a letter written in 1968 and published abroad as "Thoughts on Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom." Subsequent calls by Sakharov for an investigation of mental hospitals run by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and--with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn--for the leadership to renounce Marxism as an ideology, provoked strong attacks in the Soviet media on Sakharov in the mid-1970s, but the regime still refrained from subjecting him to disciplinary actions. [REDACTED]

Sakharov's special status was reflected in the fact that TASS announced Sakharov's Nobel Peace prize in October 1975, although it asserted that the award is given to Soviet "enemies." The regime attempted during 1977 to rein Sakharov in when it publicly warned him to curb his dissident activities or face criminal charges. In January 1980, following Sakharov's criticism of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the regime took its first direct disciplinary action against him, stripping him of his state honors and exiling him to Gor'kiy. The Academy of Sciences censured Sakharov in 1978 and 1980, but it has not expelled him. A vote for his expulsion--which, according to academy statutes, would have to be by secret ballot--would probably be difficult to obtain. Moreover, because any failed attempt would embarrass the regime, the leadership has been reluctant to force the issue. [REDACTED]

Despite the regime's disciplinary action in 1980, it did allow his wife's daughter and her husband to emigrate that same year.

Sakharov was also successful in pressuring the regime to gain emigration for another family member in 1981, after his stepson (who lived in the United States) married a Soviet woman by proxy (at the time the woman was denied permission to emigrate). In November 1981 Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner, went on a hunger strike as a way to force the authorities into granting the emigration of the wife of Sakharov's step-son. The authorities hospitalized both Sakharovs and threatened to force-feed them, but yielded to their demands in little more than a week. The woman entered the United States in January 1982. [REDACTED]

The Regime Says No

The current situation was precipitated in September 1982 when, according to Bonner's family, she again applied for a temporary exit visa to visit Italy for eye treatment (she was permitted to visit there in 1975, 1977 and 1979). This time the regime said no. Moreover, Soviet media launched a new campaign to discredit Sakharov after his article on "The Danger of Thermonuclear War" was published abroad (Foreign Affairs, July 1983). On 2 May 1984, Sakharov went on a new hunger strike to gain an exit visa for Bonner. [REDACTED]

Since April it has been difficult to reconstruct with precision the events in the case. Bonner's access to US diplomats ended then, and in May her ability to communicate with others was largely cut off. It appears that the authorities isolated Bonner in Gor'kiy in early May, then threatened both Sakharovs with the prospect that she would receive a harsh sentence for anti-Soviet propaganda or even possibly be tried for treason. They also hospitalized Sakharov and may have subjected him to psychiatric treatment as a way to break his resolve and to end his hunger strike. The regime appears to have brought the Sakharov situation to its current status by the end of August. [REDACTED]

It is possible that a temporary settlement was reached with the couple under which Bonner would receive a light sentence and be permitted to reside with her husband in Gor'kiy. A "most reliable" source of the US Embassy in Moscow reported that Bonner was tried and sentenced on 17 August for anti-Soviet slander. An investigation had been under way since May, and she was given a relatively light sentence--five years internal exile in Gor'kiy. According to the West German press, Viktor Louis--an agent of the KGB who has functioned as a "tipster" and unofficial channel abroad for the regime's views and actions--indicated in early September that Sakharov had been released from a hospital and was living with Bonner in Gor'kiy. [REDACTED]

Only days after Bonner's sentence, Viktor Louis, according to media reports, provided photographs of the Sakharovs dating from mid-June. He also provided a videotape of the couple in Gor'kiy. That tape appears to be the work of the KGB. Although extensively edited and heavy-handed, the videotape does seem to show that both Sakharovs are alive and confined to Gor'kiy and that Sakharov is not on a hunger strike. According to dated material introduced into the tape, Sakharov was in the hospital as of mid-July. For example, the physicist is shown in hospital dress with two other people (one of whom is a nurse, the other possibly a psychiatrist). Magazines held up to the camera by one of the people in the scene bear the dates 28 June 1984 (Bunte) and 13 July 1984 (Paris Match). Sakharov is again depicted in the videotape in what may be a hospital dining room, and someone hands him an international edition of Newsweek, dated 16 July 1984. (Some of his comments in this instance were edited out by the authorities.) Bonner is shown in Gor'kiy on the videotape with her lawyer, and a Soviet journal that appears in the scene places the date around 15 July. Although both Sakharov and Bonner appear together in the videotape, there is no indication of the date they are together. (While it seems Bonner was isolated from Sakharov and others in early May, the couple may have been reunited in Gor'kiy after Bonner's conviction in mid-August.) There is nothing apparently more recent in the videotape than 16 July. The West German newspaper Bild Zeitung received the tape on 22 August. [REDACTED]

The Regime's Motivations

By refusing to give in to Sakharov and his wife this time, the Soviets chose a course of action that practically ensured international condemnation at a time when several foreign leaders were planning first-time meetings with General Secretary Chernenko. It also risked even greater condemnation since Sakharov could have died during his hunger strike. Indeed, West European governments grew concerned in May about the medical condition of the then fasting Sakharov. For example, Portuguese Prime Minister Soares sent a letter to Moscow on Sakharov's behalf, and King Juan Carlos of Spain broached the subject of human rights during his visit to the USSR in May. The furor over Sakharov's status almost torpedoed French President Mitterand's visit to Moscow in June. [REDACTED]

In taking a hard line stance toward Sakharov, the Soviets probably were motivated by the following calculations:

- They may have believed that Sakharov's tendency in recent years to concentrate on personal causes--such as helping family members to emigrate rather than on

broader questions of human rights--had weakened his moral appeal at home and abroad. In sum, the regime may see Sakharov as having somewhat less sympathy than he had earlier. Moreover, Bonner's action in seeking asylum afforded the regime a greater opportunity to smear her as a would-be defector than had earlier been the case.

- They may have concluded, at least by the time Bonner appealed for asylum in the US Embassy in Moscow, that if Bonner left the USSR again, she would not return. The leadership probably believes that the Soviet image internationally would suffer more if Bonner were abroad and able to criticize the regime with impunity than if they resorted to repressive techniques in keeping her at home. The Soviets probably assume that even if Sakharov died and the tone of Soviet-West European relations worsened temporarily, little real change would occur in the substance of these relations.
- They may have believed they had no incentive to accommodate Sakharov at a time when dialogue with the West was negligible and could use the Sakharov issue in a broader campaign to make it appear that US policies had backfired by producing tougher Soviet behavior.
- They may have judged that a tough policy toward the Sakharovs would reinforce the regime's other actions designed to limit Western influences on Soviet society and to inculcate greater ideological commitment among youth and intellectuals. The leadership has increased internal repression generally in recent months. The hardline stance is reflected in the regime's increased efforts to block refusenik contacts with Westerners (especially with US Embassy officers and American newsmen) and in new dissident prosecutions, including that of Yuriy Shikanovich--a mathematician and friend of Sakharov--who has been sentenced to five years in prison and five more in internal exile for his involvement with the prominent underground publication Chronicle of Current Events.

While the decision to refuse to give in to Sakharov was probably made by the leadership as a whole, it is conceivable that even Soviet policy toward Sakharov has become bound up in differences in the leadership and pre-succession politics. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Tactics

The regime has made a major effort to keep the West from finding out the true state of affairs in the Sakharov case. To this end the Soviets have employed a variety of propaganda techniques. Soviet media and Soviet officials in contact with US officials have been used in an attempt to convince the West that the Sakharovs are alive and well and to counter recurring rumors that Sakharov has died. [REDACTED]

- TASS alleged on 30 May that Sakharov was feeling well, eating regular meals and living normally in Gor'kiy and that Bonner was getting good medical treatment. A week later, TASS specifically denied Western press accounts that Sakharov had died, asserting that such accounts were part of a broader smear campaign undertaken by "US special services."
- A senior Soviet diplomat in Moscow told the US Embassy's deputy chief of mission on 31 May that Bonner's health was good, that she was living in Gor'kiy and even driving her car all over the city. He described Sakharov's hunger strike as a "pseudo-hunger strike," asserting that he had not lost a pound.
- During French President Mitterand's June visit to Moscow, Soviet spokesman Leonid Zamyatin asserted to the foreign press that Sakharov was feeling well, getting a high salary as an Academy of Sciences member and was being exploited in a US-sponsored anti-Soviet campaign. Soviet media repeated these themes throughout the summer.
- A prominent member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences told the foreign press in early June that Sakharov was in Gor'kiy, well, and that his situation as publicized in the West--"this disinformation"--does not correspond to reality. [REDACTED]

One plausible explanation for some of the erroneous reports that Sakharov had died is that Sakharov's friends and sympathizers were spreading rumors to focus Western attention on the case. It is also conceivable that Soviet authorities themselves were responsible for putting out the false stories. They could have done this in order to prepare the foreign audience for the

possibility that he might die either from his hunger strike or from force-feeding. They could also have seen an advantage in floating contradictory rumors to confuse Western observers and cloud the issue of Sakharov's fate. Moreover, they could have fed alarmist rumors to friends and relatives of Sakharov in order then to refute them, thereby discrediting the veracity of Sakharov's friends, and the Western press that publicized rumors of mistreatment of Sakharov. [REDACTED]

For example, the circumstances of a reported telephone call from Bonner to an Italian acquaintance in June suggested the possibility that the Soviets were "setting up" Bonner by deliberately providing her with false information. An Italian newspaper reported that Bonner said in the call that her husband was "no longer with us." Bonner's family abroad concluded that since contact with Bonner had been tightly controlled by the authorities, the call probably was designed to confuse them about the situation. Bonner almost certainly could not have made an international phone call without official approval, she may have been led to believe that Sakharov had died, as part of the pressure the authorities were then applying. After the Western press reported the phone call the Soviet attacked it as representative of the Western "smear campaign." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Finally, it is possible that the false stories of Sakharov's death were floated by Soviets who may have used the Sakharov situation to give an anti-Western thrust to policy or to complicate General Secretary Chernenko's tenure, attempting to embarrass his regime over its handling of the affair. We have little evidence, however, to support this hypothesis. [REDACTED]

The Soviet Endgame

With both Sakharovs confined to Gor'kiy, the end of Sakharov's hunger strike, and the prosecution of friends of the Sakharovs, the regime may be satisfied that it has concluded the Sakharov affair on its own terms and forced the submission of the country's most prominent dissident. At a minimum, the regime has bought some time for itself on the issue. [REDACTED]

The Soviet leadership could conceivably now move to arrange an exchange of Bonner for someone in the West. They have exchanged people for political prisoners in the past. In fact, Sakharov's family abroad broached the subject of possible exchanges for the couple with West European leaders during the summer. This prospect, however, seems unlikely. The regime probably will continue to believe that Bonner alone, or together with Sakharov, would stir up criticism abroad of Soviet policies. [REDACTED]

The most likely course is for the regime to continue the status quo and wait out the situation, believing that the interest of foreign governments and even its own intellectuals will wane with the passage of time. To maintain the status quo the regime can still rely on intimidation and the threat of even more repression against the Sakharovs. [REDACTED]

The status quo seems also to remove some of the embarrassment over the case felt by Soviet intellectuals and officials at home. For example, in July the director of the Soviet Space Research Institute commented that the Sakharov situation was standing in the way of US-Soviet scientific exchanges. Earlier, [REDACTED] reported after visiting the USSR that there was widespread concern among Soviet intellectuals about Sakharov. While Soviet diplomats and scientists may have no illusions about what has happened in this case, in dealing with foreigners they can at least point to the pictorial evidence in the Soviet film (no matter how contrived) that the Sakharovs are not being mistreated. [REDACTED]

In sum, the regime appears to have succeeded in placing Sakharov and his wife in a completely controlled environment, isolated from foreign diplomats and Western reporters. The leadership is consequently likely to view the status quo as a victory of sorts. While Sakharov's death could trigger a major propaganda problem for the regime, the leadership for now appears to have weathered the storm and reined in a critic who has rankled it for two decades and who until now had seemed to enjoy some immunity from the full panoply of Soviet repressive measures. [REDACTED]

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1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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Deindert

October 26, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Sakharov and Fredkin: Update

You will recall my memorandum of September 17 (TAB I) reporting on a private effort by Edward Fredkin to arrange for the release of Sakharov and Bonner.

Guided by your note on the memorandum, I informed Fredkin that while we welcome his -- and other -- private efforts to resolve this important issue, we could not in advance endorse any particular course or commit ourselves to specific actions without considering all the relevant circumstances at the time. I asked him, however, to keep us informed if the Soviets showed any interest in his scenario, and he agreed to do so.

He has not contacted me again, so I presume that up to now the Soviets have not nibbled.

Attachment:

Tab I - Copy of Memorandum of September 14, 1984, "Sakharov and Fredkin"

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI-114/7#9498
BY CW NARADATE 7/7/08

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT: Sakharov and Fredkin

I wouldn't welcome US sponsorship for us to help am "inspect" an "agreed" advance

Following his message to me about his desire to arrange for the sale of 100 IBM-XT personal computers to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Edward Fredkin sent me a message through Embassy Moscow with a proposal for an attempt to resolve the Sakharov problem. He left Moscow before it could be answered, and then came to see me on September 17 to explain what he had in mind.

Fredkin explained that, while he was in Moscow, he noted that the Soviets were making a lot in the press over the Peltier case here. Although he recognizes that this is not a matter of genuine interest to them but only one of propaganda, he felt it provided a possible cover for an optically reciprocal resolution of the Sakharov problem. Accordingly, he left with his Soviet contacts (Arbatov and Velikhov) a "personal proposal" for steps to resolve the issue. The text is at TAB I, and Fredkin apologized for the rhetoric in the first two pages, which he said was designed to stimulate Soviet interest in the idea.

Essentially, Fredkin's proposal is that a person or persons trusted by both sides visit both Sakharov and Peltier, take pictures of them and interview them, and then certify to their condition. Following this both governments would issue statements that they were satisfied that the conditions of the two individuals were as found by the observers. The next step would be confidential talks by US and Soviet officials in an effort to find a way to resolve the situation, consistent with the sovereignty of both countries.



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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/7 # 9497
BY GJ NARA DATE 6/25/07

but most might be lost

Perhaps recognizing that some of this would be on the record, Fredkin went out of his way during our meeting -- and during earlier telephone calls -- to describe what he had observed of computer developments in the Soviet Union, and offered to talk with government specialists if there is an interest. (I am doing a separate memorandum of these comments, and believe it would in fact be useful to have someone talk to him.)

B1
[REDACTED]

However, inasmuch as we contacted him (as a result of Tanya Semyonov's call to the Vice President) to encourage him (without commitment) to take up the Sakharov problem, we may be to some degree on the hook, since it would be damaging to our relations with the Sakharov family if we tried to turn him off at this point.

Actually, Fredkin does not seem to be seeking hard-and-fast commitments at this point. Essentially, what he is asking is whether we would be prepared to respond favorably if the Soviets pick him up on his proposals. I doubt that they will, although conceivably his scenario could provide a face-saving way to solve the problem if the Soviets decide at some point they want it solved.

Therefore, I recommend that we tell Fredkin that his plan is an ingenious one, and that if the Soviets show an interest, we will do what we can to make it work on our side. I would caution him, however, that we cannot make advance commitments regarding concrete actions until there is a clear sign of Soviet interest, and a more precise indication of what precisely they want us to do and what they themselves are prepared to do.

Recommendation:

That you approve my replying to Fredkin along the lines described above.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment:

Tab I - Fredkin "Appeal" of September 13, 1984, as submitted to his Soviet contacts.

A Concerned Citizen
Planet Earth

13 September, 1984

To whom it may concern
USSR, Moscow

To whom it may concern
Washington, USA

The world is rapidly plunging towards a terrible fate, which may involve the destruction of a majority of mankind, and the fruits of thousands of years of civilization. Why? That is a question that deserves an answer.

Every creature that lives on this planet has a will to survive. Yet, no creature survives beyond its normal life span because all creatures are mortal. While we may want to live forever, it is certain that we will all die someday. Under the best and most peaceful of circumstances, we can expect that every one now alive on this planet will be dead by the year 2150.

Every species of creature on this planet has survived for thousands of years and also has the ability to survive for thousands of years into the future. Yet no species has the will to survive, because a species cannot have a will of its own. If mankind manages to continue surviving on this planet, it will not be a matter of the will of our species, but because of the will of the individuals who wish to have mankind survive. I and others like me, who want to survive, to have others survive, to have our species survive must express our will against all forces that threaten that survival. We need not care if one man so wants to win that he puts winning ahead of his own survival. We all must care when some want to win, to have their nation win, and they put that goal ahead of the survival of all mankind.

The fear of annihilation knows no national boundaries. The will to survive knows no national boundaries. Those who wish to go on living, whoever and wherever they may be, must express their will in terms of actions that are effective. Throughout history, governments have proven themselves unable to avoid war. Such wars are usually preceded by an increase in tensions and an increase in hostility. In fact, situations similar to those developing today, between the USSR and the USA are very much like those that have led to war in the past. The difference is that today, everyone in the world is threatened by this USA-USSR confrontation. It is those who are threatened who must work to save themselves and their descendants by finding ways to reduce the chance of war. Since everyone is threatened, we all must work on this problem. There is no aspect that is too small to be worthy of careful and considerate effort. It is not a time for us to be patient, rather it is a time for us to be purposeful and persistent.

The most important step is to move away from positions of conflict and hostility, and towards positions of cooperation and rapprochement. As hostility increases, tensions increase, communication decreases, suspicions increase and in general, the world moves towards war. War has happened in the past, and many have suffered. We must understand that there have been no new discoveries that now make war less likely; the new discoveries only make war more terrible.

A case in point are situations like those that surround Leonard Peltier and Andrei Sakharov. In the USSR and USA, the situation of these individuals, and the reaction on the other side, has as a consequence the fact that there is an increase in hostility and suspicion. There are steps, however, that can be taken in concert between the USA and the USSR that will serve to reduce the confrontational nature of these situations, while respecting each country's right to solely determine its own internal affairs.

We must all realize, that if the US and the USSR go to war, they will have determined the internal affairs of all sovereign countries. Surely killing most if not all of the population of a country, without consulting with its government for permission to do so could be considered an infringement on its internal affairs! A war between the USA and the USSR could have such a result for most countries. In today's world, the USSR and the USA both have military establishments that have plans in place that will result in infringing upon the sovereign rights of every country on the planet. It should be possible to consider small requests that one country might make about the affairs inside another, if that request is honestly made as part of a series of concrete actions that can lead to a reduction in tensions.

Consider the Peltier and the Sakharov situations. Everyone in the world might benefit if ways could be found to stop the destructive effects of these situations. What are the destructive effects? Within each country, public opinion is being influenced in the direction of hostility and confrontation. The USA claims that the USSR is bad, because of its treatment of Sakharov, and the USSR claims that the USA is bad because of its treatment of Peltier.

Those who believe that having a way to turn public opinion against the "enemy" is a step towards winning, revel in and enjoy such confrontational situations. What they do not realize is that they do not win when the other side loses. This is a situation where most events lead to consequences where mankind wins, or mankind loses. It doesn't matter if all Russians die three minutes before all Americans die, and thus enjoy three minutes as the "winner".

To truly understand what makes sense, every issue must be first examined in terms of its consequences for all mankind, secondly in terms of its consequences for one's own country. Otherwise we are led to results that seem better for one country

than for another, but where everyone is dead or dying. Why not try to answer questions first in mankind's interests, and secondly in national interests? True, it goes against simple human nature, but the same logic that causes patriots to place the concerns of their country ahead of their own personal concerns, can lead countries to put the concerns of the world ahead of their own national concerns.

In this light, there must be solutions to the Peltier and Sakharov situations that, by putting the needs of the world first, benefit all mankind. Of course, in finding such solutions, there is no reason not to proceed fairly, evenly, respectfully, with compassion not just for the two men, but compassion for everyone.

I, as an inhabitant of the world, do hereby make the following private proposal to the Governments of the USA and the USSR. I suggest that a representative of the USSR and of the USA get together to hold private discussions to arrive at a series of steps along the following lines.

1. The US and the USSR establish private communications, one person from each side.
2. Washington, (certainly government press releases and VOA) becomes noticeably quiet on the Sakharov situation.
3. Moscow, (certainly government press releases and Radio Moscow) becomes noticeably quiet on the Peltier situation.
4. X, a person described below, will meet with a Soviet official who answers questions X will ask about Sakharov's situation. They promise that all such discussions will be completely private.
5. Y, a person described below, will meet with an American official who answers questions Y will ask about Peltier's situation. They promise that all such discussions will be completely private.
6. X and Y will work out with a Soviet and an American official the contents of two projected press conferences, including press releases and general responses to questions.
7. X and Y will then communicate with, respectively, the American and Soviet official and then if, in their judgement conditions are suitable, they will proceed with the following steps. If conditions are not suitable, all matters discussed will be kept confidential, and we will not proceed with the following steps.
8. X will meet with Sakharov. X will speak to him to verify to his complete satisfaction that the information X received in step 4 above is accurate. X will take photos of Sakharov with a Polaroid camera.

9. Y will meet with Peltier. Y will speak to him to verify to his complete satisfaction that the information Y received in step 5 above is accurate. Y will take photos of Peltier with a Polaroid camera.

10. In Moscow, X will hold a press conference, giving a simple and neutral statement of the pertinent facts that X personally observed. X will give the photos to the press. X will not, however, grant any subsequent press interviews as X will be unwilling to become a public personality.

10. In Washington, Y will hold a press conference, giving a simple and neutral statement of the pertinent facts that Y personally observed. Y will give the photos to the press. Y will not, however, grant any subsequent press interviews as Y will be unwilling to become a public personality.

11. The US State Department's first response will be to issue a press release that they are now satisfied with Moscow's official position on the state of Sakharov's condition.

12. The USSR Foreign Ministry's first response will be to issue a press release that they are now satisfied with Washington's official position on the state of Peltier's condition.

13. Washington and Moscow will then remain "noticeably" quieter about the Sakharov and Peltier situations, awaiting further private discussions. A request will be made to the Sakharov family and private groups in the USA and USSR to do the same, so long as progress is made in private talks. This facts about this US-USSR understanding, however, will remain private.

14. Private discussions will then take place that respect the mutual sovereignty of the USSR and the US, but which are aimed at finding innovative ways to solve this dilemma. Each side will take into consideration the fact that by making fair and contemporaneous concessions to the perceived needs of the other side, that they will not lose, rather it is all mankind that will win.

15. So long as such discussions make progress, the US and USSR will continue to show restraint in their public statements about these issues.

16. X and Y must be persons capable of complete neutrality with regard to these issues. Each must be a person that understands both sides of each issue. They must each be a person trusted by both sides.

This proposal attempts to take into account certain Soviet and American realities about this situation, but gaining approval will require a spirit of goodwill, where the interests of all of mankind can be put above national interests.

42

One can ask "Why tackle such small issues with such an elaborate procedure? Why not solve questions about arms in space or strategic weapons in Europe?" The answer is that these small issues loom large in the minds of many and they contribute in a disproportionate way to world tensions, hostility and distrust. We can and must make progress on such issues.

I am willing to be X or Y or both. There are others who can fill such roles. Our problem is to solve this problem, for the sake of mankind, and not to quibble over details. Nevertheless this little problem is worthy of great attention. Its solution needs the thought of our best thinkers, later they can pay attention to harder problems.

I would be pleased if, having modified this proposal to take into account the reactions of the appropriate persons in the US and USSR, if it could be considered at an early date. Perhaps it could be a matter of discussion in New York, when Gromyko may meet with Reagan.

Respectfully submitted,

Edward Fredkin
Moscow, USSR

draft

5

MEMORANDUM

8300

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for Awards
to Dr. Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner

I have reviewed the attached Presidential message for presentation of the Simon Wiesenthal Center's Humanitarian Award in honor of Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner and concur with the change as noted.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Presidential message as edited at Tab A

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Anne Higgins
- Tab A Presidential message
- Tab B Background papers

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for Awards to
Dr. Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner

We have reviewed and concur with the proposed Presidential message provided the change as indicated is made at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Presidential message

Tab B Background papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8300

RUSH

November 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT, NSC

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for Awards
to Dr. Andrei Sakharov & Yelena Bonner

I would appreciate your review ASAP of the attached Presidential message for presentation of the Simon Wiesenthal Center's Humanitarian Award in honor of Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner. The event is this SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11, in Los Angeles, but the message is needed earlier for printing.

Thank you.

REC for ANH
ANNE HIGGINS (ck)
18-OEOB/Ext. 2941

November 1, 1984

I am pleased to send warm greetings to all who are gathered to honor Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner with the Simon Wiesenthal Center's Humanitarian Award.

No greater living symbols of resistance to Soviet tyranny exist in the Soviet Union today than Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner. Their selfless and courageous espousal of human rights, often to the point of starvation and imprisonment, and their solidarity with the cause of Soviet Jewry have been an inspiration to all who love freedom throughout the world. In this they are one with Simon Wiesenthal, who has devoted himself tirelessly to the advancement of human rights. I salute these champions of liberty and human dignity.

Nancy joins me in sending best wishes. -God bless you.

Sent to:

Mr. Martin Mendelsch
1825 K Street, N.W. - Room 512
Washington, D.C.

Call when signed to be picked up: 833-1893.

RR:CV:RDC:AVH:el

cc: K.Osborne/B.Hill/ASO/M.Breger/C.Vedlik/C.Korte/CF

DUE: NOV. 8 - EVENT: NOV. 11

11/08 wiesenthal center

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

1) Dobrynsky;
8920
file documents 42

December 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Linnas Deportation Case

Given the many queries we have received regarding the Karl Linnas deportation case, we would appreciate an update. Please provide details on those countries that have been asked to accept Linnas. The update should be forwarded to NSC by COB, Friday, December 28, 1984.

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 1, 1984

I am pleased to send warm greetings to all who are gathered to honor Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner with the Simon Wiesenthal Center's Humanitarian Award.

No greater living symbols of ^{a commitment to democracy} ~~resistance to Soviet~~ ~~tyranny~~ exist in the Soviet Union today than Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Bonner. Their selfless and courageous espousal of human rights, often to the point of starvation and imprisonment, and their solidarity with the cause of Soviet Jewry have been an inspiration to all who love freedom throughout the world. In this they are one with Simon Wiesenthal, who has devoted himself tirelessly to the advancement of human rights. I salute these champions of liberty and human dignity.

Nancy joins me in sending best wishes. God bless you.