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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES				Withdrawer			
					JET	5/2/2005	
File Folder	DISSIDENTS (18/23)				FOIA		
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			···	Pages		11031110110113	
9477 MEMO MATLOCK/RAYMONI					5/11/1984	B1	
	MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV SITUATION [1 -2]						
		•	NLRRF06-114/7				
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9491 MEMO	ח	DECC CTATEMENT	ON CAIZHADOV	1	ND	B1	
9491 MEMO		PRESS STATEMENT ON SAKHAROV SITUATION			ND	ВІ	
		[9 -9]					
	R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7				
9478 MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE NEXT		1	5/19/1984	B1		
	STEPS ON SAKHAROV						
	Ann Sales	[23 -23]					
	R	6/25/2009	F2006-114/7				
9479 MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV			1	ND	B1	
	[24 - 24]						
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DISSIDENTS (18/23)

FOIA

F06-114/7

YARHI-MILO

2402 No of Doc Date Restrictions

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9492 MEMO

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24

SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE

3 5/18/1984 B1

Pages

NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV

[25 - 27]

Document Description

7/7/2008 R

NLRRF06-114/7

9480 MEMO SAME TEXT AS DOC #9479 1 5/21/1984 B1

[28 - 28]

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9493 MEMO

SAME TEXT AS DOC #9492

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9481 MEMO

SAME TEXT AS DOC #9478

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[32 - 32]

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> **JET** 5/2/2005

File Folder **FOIA** DISSIDENTS (18/23)

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Box Number	Document Description			YARHI-MILO 2402			
ID Doc Type				No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
9482 MEMO		OINDEXTER TO MO	CFARLANE RE	1	6/1/1984	B1	
		[33 - 33]					
	R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7				
9483 MEMO	M]	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH ALEXEI SEMYONOV JUNE 1, 1984		1	6/1/1984	B1	
		[34 - 34]					
	R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7				
9484 MEMO		ELEPHONE CALL	ГО DOBRYNIN RE	1	ND	B1	
		[36 - 36]					
	R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7		100		
9485 MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9482			1	6/1/1984	B1	
		[38 - 38]					
	R	7/7/2008	NLRRF06-114/7				

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Box Number	Document Description			YARHI-MILO 2402				
ID Doc Type				No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions		
9486 MEMO	-	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV/BONNER LETTERS [39 - 39]		1	6/12/1984	B1		
	R	6/25/2009	F2006-114/7					
9487 E-MAIL	E-MAIL PROFS MCFARLANE TO MATLOCK RE SAKHAROV [40 -40]			1	6/12/1984	B1		
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9488 MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE JESSE JACKSON AND SAKHAROV			2	ND	B1		
		[43 -44]						
	R	6/25/2009	F2006-114/7					
9489 MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9488			1	ND	B1		
		[49 - 50]						
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7/7/2008

FOIA

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YARHI-MILO

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Box Number

24

PAR

No of Doc Date Restrictions **ID Doc Type Document Description Pages** 1 8/25/1984 B6 9490 MEMO **BILL ECKERT TO** MCFARLANE/MURPHY/GREGG RE TELEPHONE CALL, AUGUST 25, 1984, GEORGE BUSH TO TANYA YANKELEYEVICH [58 - 58]

NLRRF06-114/7

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 11, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK, JR. WALTER RAYMOND, JR. W

STEVEN E. STEINER

SUBJECT:

Sakharov Situation

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 406-114/7 #9477

April to the first

IV CH NARO MOTE 7/7/08

We face a volatile and potentially dangerous situation with the Sakharov case, which may require Presidential action on short notice. Sakharov has been on a hunger strike since May 2 protesting the continuing refusal by the Soviet authorities to permit his wife to travel to the West for needed medical treatment. To make matters worse, the Soviets have indicated an intention to bring criminal charges against her and have confined her to to Gorky with him -- possibly under house arrest.

This seems to be the most serious situation faced yet by Sakharov and Bonner, due to their weakened health and the increasing inflexibility of Soviet authorities. Further, because of the authorities' efforts to cut off information about them, things could break quickly and we could be behind events.

We have already taken numerous actions. State issued a strong statement on Tuesday (Tab I) expressing our concern and refuting the spurious Soviet charge that our Embassy has been involved in a conspiracy with Mrs. Bonner. We have instructed all of our embassies in Western Europe to request intervention by their host governments. We have asked Western leaders going to Moscow in the near future to raise the issue, and we made an approach to the Vatican as well. We are in touch with Sakharov's family here (daughter and son-in-law), who have released a statement of their own but -- like us -- lack up-to-date information.

Shultz and Eagleburger raised this matter with Dobrynin on behalf of the President and received a particularly unpleasant Soviet reply. A Presidential Statement (Tab II) was produced by Dodie Livingston's office in connection with Sakharov's coming birthday, but it failed to mention the current situation. We see no need for further action now at the Presidential level, as this could needlessly subject the prestige of the President to the kinds of answers the Soviets are giving these days. But we need to watch this very closely

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and to stay on the high ground. If Sakharov's condition is deteriorating rapidly or if the Soviets start forcefeeding him (which under Soviet law could begin on Tuesday), we may need to issue a Presidential Statement quickly. If things get even worse, we should consider a live Presidential appearance.

A proposed Presidential Statement, reflecting our information to this moment, is at Tab III for your consideration. We are still working it with State and the Speechwriters. We will keep you informed and will be prepared to move quickly.

Attachments

Tab I State Department Statement of May 8, 1984
Tab II Presidential Statement issued May 7, 1984
Tab III Proposed Presidential Statement on Current Situation

cc: Karna Small Bob Sims

NOTE: We are reviewing on a close-hold basis with State the advisability and possible elements for suggesting a trade to secure Sakharov's release from the Soviet Union. Jack would like to discuss this with you tomorrow morning.





Department of State

May 8, 1984

STATEMENT ON THE SAKHAROVS

The Department of State is strongly concerned about press reports that Andrei Sakharov has been on a hunger strike since May 2 and that his wife, Elena Bonner, has been charged with slandering the Soviet state, which could lead to as much as three years' confinement. The refusal of the Soviet authorities to reveal any information about the present welfare and whereabouts of the Sakharovs lends credence to these reports. Dr. Sakharov has been trying for many months to obtain permission from the Soviet authorities for his wife to travel abroad for medical treatment, something she has been allowed to do twice before. He has apparently been driven to this extreme action by the continued refusal of the authorities to even respond to his requests.

The Soviet handling of this matter has been inhuman and incomprehensible. Rather than simply allowing Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, they have placed criminal charges against her, threatened her with even more serious treason charges and made totally false allegations about involvement in the current situation by the U.S. Embassy. The circumstances of Dr. Sakharov, a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and numerous other accolades, is a legitimate matter of concern for all persons interested in promoting human rights and international peace. Soviet silence about Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner is totally unacceptable.

We urge the Soviet authorities to provide truthful information about the present situation of Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. We also urge them as a matter of simple humanity to end Dr. Sakharov's exile, and allow Mrs. Bonner to travel abroad for medical treatment. Finally, we ask that all like-minded persons in the West press the Soviets for information on the fate of the Sakharovs, and for an end to Soviet persecution of these two brave individuals.

draft:EUR/SOV:JFSchumaker clear:EUR/SOV:RFSmith EUR/SOV:TWSimons EUR:MPalmer HA:GMatthews Wang#0044A X21712 Statement Issued 5/7/84

STRAIGHT WIRE - OR TELEX - MAY 7, 1984

TELEX: 429 439 FREEDOM

Mr. Ed Lozensky Freedom House 20 West 40th Street New York, New York 10018

Nancy and I are delighted to join all those gathered to pay homage to Dr. Andrei Sakharov on this special occasion.

When judged against the backdrop of world events, Andrei Sakharov, it is clear, is one of those rare individuals who has transcended difficult challenges to become part of history. A renowned physicist, Dr. Sakharov has repeatedly demonstrated his overriding commitment to international peace and the human rights of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In recognition of these singular qualities, Dr. Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.

Exiled to the closed city of Gorky in 1980, he and his wife have been subjected to continuous harassment and attempted intimidation. Even in the face of his declining health, the Soviet government has refused to permit him to enter the Academy of Sciences Hospital in Moscow. Nor have the Soviets allowed him to emigrate to another country.

In his strivings for peace and freedom, his life and work serve as testimony to the power of moral courage to inspire people around the globe. By forcefully speaking out and aiding the victims of severe repression, he has with his valor brought light and meaning to the very heart of liberty.

I

PS Chard

2

At this critical time in history, it is incumbent upon us to bring deserved attention to the plight of the Sakharovs. It is easy to identify with their fate, for they seek the fundamental freedoms that all Americans cherish.

As Andrei Sakharov approaches his sixty-third birthday, we fervently hope that the coming years will see the realization of the progress and liberty he has so devotedly sought.

RONALD REAGAN

RR: Wells: vs

cc: K.Osborne/D.Livingston/B.Kimmitt, NSC/L.Speakes(FYI)/CF

EVENT: MAY 8

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*Edwin M. McMillan
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*Robert S. Mulliken Richard Pipes

*James Rainwater
*Paul A. Samuelson
*Glenn T. Seaborg

*Herbert A. Simon *George D. Snell

Michael I. Sovern Valentin Turchin *Torsten N. Wiesel

*J.D. Watson
*George Wald
Allan Wynn

*Nobel Laureate

THE ANDREI SAKHAROV INSTITUTE

3001 Veazey Terrace, N.W. Suite 332 Washington, D.C. 20008 Tel. (202) 364-0200

March 19, 1984

Ms. Carolyn Sundseth The White House Washington, D.C.



* Andrei Sakharov World Renowned Physicist Peace Nobel Laureate Exiled to Gorki, U.S.S.R. Since 1980

Dear Carolyn:

It was a pleasure to talk to you on the phone. I am sending you the information about our project and the request for a Presidential Proclamation on the occasion of the International Andrei Sakharov Day.

If this proclamation will be issued I think that it should be addressed to four major groups which are doing this project:

Dr. Edward D. Lozansky, Executive Director, Andrei Sakharov Institute

Rev. Hans Stuckelberger, President Christian Solidarity International

Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky, President Resistance International

Mr. David H. Barron, Chairman of the Board The Jefferson Educational Foundation

I think that the proclamation should mention not only Sakharov but all persecuted christians and jews fighting for their basic religious and other human rights.

Thank you very much for your support. Please do what you can to make sure that we will have the Andrei Sakharov Day in the White House on May 16 or 17. Linas is working on that. Hoping to see you at this day in the White House I remain,

Edward Dzemice

Edward D. Lozansky



PRESS STATEMENT ON SAKHAROV SITUATION

I want to express my profound concern over a potentially tragic human situation. Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and one of the most courageous defenders of international human rights, entered on a hunger strike several days ago to protest the continuing refusal by the Soviet authorities to permit his wife -- Elena Bonner -- to receive urgently needed specialized medical treatment in the West. To make matters even more ominous, the Soviet authorities -rather than granting Mrs. Bonner's request on a humanitarian basis -- have indicated an intention to bring criminal charges against her. And they have restricted her to the provincial city of Gorky, where Dr. Sakharov himself has been confined since 1980.

Both Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner are in a state of seriously weakened health. Dr. Sakharov, who will be 63 this month, has been repeatedly refused specialized medical treatment at the Academy of Sciences Hospital in Moscow. Mrs. Bonner suffers from serious eye problems and a heart condition. Wounded three times defending her country in World War II, she was permitted in earlier years to go abroad three times for medical treatment and each time returned to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet authorities are clearly trying to shut off Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner from the rest of the world, as if their fate would then be forgotten. But Americans will not forget these two brave individuals and the tragic plight they now face. If this threatening situation is carried further or if the health of either of them seriously deteriorates, the Soviet authorities will bear a deep and onerous responsibility before the community of nations and East-West relations will obviously suffer another serious setback. Frankly, it just makes no sense to treat two such noble persons in this manner, particularly in light of their failing health. Surely, the interests of a powerful country like the Soviet Union can in no way justify this.

We have conveyed our great concern over this situation directly to the Soviet leadership and asked for a humanitarian resolution. But thus far our pleas have been ignored, as have those of other governments and private individuals. I know that I speak for all Americans in calling on the leaders of the Soviet Union, in the name of humanity, to avoid a potential tragedy by permitting Mrs. Bonner to receive the needed medical treatment in the West and by dropping the unfounded criminal charges against her. We ask them as well to bring an end to Dr. Sakharov's forced exile and to permit him to live the rest of his life in dignity in a place of his own choosing.

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CONFIDENTIAL DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

original to NSC/S 10 10/1/84 file Desidents

MAY 16, 1984

NOTE TO TOM SHULL

FROM:

TOM GIBSON /5.

RE:

CREED - Christian Rescure Effort for the Emancipation

of Dissidents

I was active in the establishment of this group three years ago. Recently my good friend and former mentor Dr. Ernest Gordon sent me the attached materials. I think you will find them interesting.

Of particular interest is the letter form the Ukraine. Dr. Gordon writes sermons that are regularly broadcast into the Soviet Union via V.O.A. and Radio Liberty. I saw the original letter, and though I am no authority on such matters, it looked to be a genuine item.

Two summers ago I directed a lobbying effort against MFN for Romania, given its human rights record. Ernest's report on his trip there is most illuminating.

Dr. Gordon was the Dean of the Chapel at Princeton University for 25 years before retiring and establishing CREED.

THE WHITE HOUSE 5/2/

Paula

Have you been packing their issue?

pracking their issue?

Manual are do dry
many.

Manual Their issue?

For the record:

OBE. (Per

conversation with Tom Shull.)
(most cases resolved; Gordon has spoken already to NSC or Steele re: his ideas.)

P) 10/184

CREED

P.O. Box 8007 Washington, DC 20024 703-549-0047

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Dr. Ernest Gordon

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> Virginia Scott Watson Episcopal Church Women of Virginia

> > Mr. John Whitehead The Rutherford Institute



April 16, 1984

President Ronald Reagan The White House Washington, D. C. 20500

My dear Mr. President,

Your recognition of the Soviet Union and its empire as a ruthless atheistic tyranny, and the summing up of your diplomatic policy as that of strength, realism, and dialogue is a great help to me in my mission of freedom. Your revokation of the MFN status for Romania last year strengthened my position enormously in my negotiations with Romanian authorities for the liberation of persecuted believers.

I enclose a brief report of my recent mission to Romania, and a copy of a letter from the Ukraine thanking CREED for its Sunday broadcasts entitled, "Life in Christ." We communicate as well by correspondence, and also by personal missions. We are cooperating with Christian intellectuals in Eastern Europe who are granted freedom of movement within the Soviet Union because of their expertise in "high technology." Conferences have been arranged so that I may meet with some of them in order to teach them over a period of two weeks at a time. Thus, I am able to help them in the vital missions they undertake.

In gratitude for your courage and witness,

I have the honor to remain.

Ever sincerely yours,

Dr. Ernest Gordon

President

Enclosures



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CREED House 310 S. Lee Street Alexandria, VA 22314

2 Corinthians 9:8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15.

I heartily thank the Lord for turning your hearts to this charity which you are doing, namely in helping where there is such a need. This is all done by the Lord for our good, for it is the Lord Who touches the hearts of His children to do good things. Eph. 2:10. Such is written about the one to whom you are addressing and I have already experienced. Psalm 89:10. I listen to your programs before dawn. If all that I receive comes from you then I am getting it. If it is from some other radio transmission, then you would probably be able to find out which one and pass on my gratitude. In any case, I would like to know where this gift comes from, from which church. My gratitude is great and grateful is the one who has received with joy. Heb. 10:34. May the Lord bless you. 1 Cor. 15:58.

3 March 1984

Translator's note:

- 41. In Russia, the Psalms are calculated differently, and this reference is probably Psalm 90:10.
- There is no signature, only the name and address on the envelope. Though it is sent from the Ukraine, it is written in Russian.

Human Rights and M.F.N. for Romania

Because of President Reagan's temporary suspension of Romania's M.F.N. status last year the cause of human rights for believers was greatly advanced. Since May 1983 His Excellency Mircea Malitza, the Romanian Ambassador in Washington, has cooperated most graciously with my organization, the Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents, in behalf of Romanian believers harassed by government authorities. He facilitated two trips to his country for me, and a colleague, in order to negotiate with Mr. Ian Rosianu in behalf of certain believers.

- I. Last August our negotiations resulted in permission to emigrate for three priests of the Romanian Orthodox Church and a lady teacher of English, who is a baptist. All four had been subject to cruel mental torture and physical harassment over many years.
- II. From March 9-15, 1984, I responded to the plea of Ian Stef and Beni Cocar in Medias and Buni Cocar (his brother) in Bucharest, to identify with them as a representative of the Christian community in the U.S.A., to preach to their congregations, and to plead for their freedom. Because of their successful ministries, particularly with young people, their state licenses had been revoked and their congregations ordered to evict the buildings. The services I attended, and preached in, were well conducted, the people kindly, responsive, and non-rebellious. The building was crammed with people most of whom were in the 20-35 year old age bracket.

On March 13 and 14 I met with the President of the Ministry of Culture and Religion to negotiate with him for the freedom of the three pastors threatened with arrest. I was told I should not have visited such people.

Mr. Rosianu made it clear that freedom of religion is permitted only in conformity to the laws of the State. He laid great stress on the fact that Jonestown could not have happened in Romania.

I also interceded for the well known Gheorghe Calciu who has now served five of a ten year sentence. The alleged crime was that of being a Fascist. In fact it was that of influencing young people by his faith and teaching. An attempt is being made to identify him with the infamous Valerian Trifa who was deported from this country for atrocities committed in World War II.

Ambassador Malitza continues to be extremely helpful, and very conscious of the importance for Romania of receiving the M.F.N. status. An annual appraisal of Romania's performance in human rights is obviously desirable. Its beneficial influence would be even greater if the Jackson-Vanick amendment were enlarged to include freedom of conscience as well as freedom of movement.

REPORT OF VISIT TO ROMANIA, MARCH 9-15, 1984

Purpose:

- a. To verify freedom of religion with approval of Ministry of Culture.
- b. To identify with pastors Ion Stef and Beniam Cocar in Medias, and with Buni Cocar in Bucharest. The approval of government authorities not requested. These three pastors had their licenses revoked, ordered not to continue the leadership of their congregations. In the case of the congregation in Medias, it was technically evicted, but having refused to obey the eviction order continues to hold services although subject at times to severe harassment.

The pastor in Bucharest had been informed that he would have his license renewed if he agreed to inform the secret police of the activities of the individuals in his congreation. This he refused to do. Since then he has been subject to acute harassment.

c. To plead with the President of the Ministry of Culture and Religion for the release of Father George Calciu now serving a 10 year sentence. He has completed five of those years.

Report on trip:

- a. Freedom of worship is practiced in Romania. But it is only permitted in conformity to the laws of the State. "Scientific materialism" is the official ideology, one which claims sovereignty over the lives and consciences of the citizens. The goal of the State is to ensure that this ideology controls every aspect of the national life. At present there are no indications that religion will wither away as state socialism flourishes. In general, religion is thriving. Not only is it thriving, it is seen as the only possible alternative. One member of the communist party indicated that no one believed in its avowed principles, but only went along with it to ensure having favored treatment.
- b. During September, 1982, I learned that the licenses, or "authorizations", of Pastors Ion Stef and his son-in-law Beni Cocar, both pastors of the Baptist congregation in Medias, had been revoked. The reason seems to have been due to the success of their youth work. In their behalf I interceded with the Ministry of Culture and Religions through the offices of Ambassador Malitza in Washington. Apart from continuous harassment, the two

pastors continued their ministry with the enthusiastic support of their rapidly growing congregation. During the month of February I received a request to visit Medias, preach to the congregation, and plead its case before Mr. Ion Rosiana, the President of the Ministry of Culture.

John Crossley, of East Watch International, and I arrived at Medias late in the evening of March 10 and informed Pastor Cocar of our arrival. On our arrival at the church we noted that the windows of the pastor's study had been broken by a stone and three metal slugs which were still lying on the floor among the shattered glass. This stoning occurs regularly. The Sunday morning service was jammed with people of all ages. They were bright, clean, and attentive. There were over 600 worshippers in a building which normally seats about 400. The choir numbered about 75. The presence of young people in the 20-35 year age bracket was noticeable. Beni Cocar conducted the service reverently. He, by the way, translated my sermon with obvious fluency. The service lasted for approximately 4 hours. The same num-- ber of people attended the evening service, which lasted from 5:00-9:00 p.m. At this service seven young people indicated their desire to become members of the Church.

As John Crossley and I were leaving the church, we were warned that a member of the secret police was observing us. We were followed by two secret police in a car to the City of Sibiu. We had hoped to visit a poet and hymn writer who had suffered imprisonment for his writings, published unoficially. Our plans had to be aborted as we were followed by a number of secret police on foot and by car.

We tested the only two exits from the city and found police cars waiting for us at each exit. We were followed by one of them to the hotel in Pitest where we arrived after 2:00 a.m. There we waved goodbye to our guardian angels.

On Monday, March 13, I was given an appointment with the President of the Ministry of Religion and spent over six hours with him and the Patriarch. At the ministry I brought up the case of the three pastors, Ion Stef, Beni Cocar, and his brother Buni of Bucharest. First of all, I was told that I should not have visited the church in Medias as both the congregation and the ministers had continued to hold worship services which were illegal. Mr. Rosiana was adamant about the freedom of religion in his country providing the church observed the laws of the government and accepted its supremacy. Only by obedience to the State could religious "freedom" be maintained.

Pastors Ion Stef and Beni Cocar had, in fact, been guilty of putting the law of God above the law of man. My experience of the Medias church had been one of highly dedicated and intelligent Christians who had been soundly and wisely instructed in the Christian faith by the pastors. Regrettably the head of the Baptist Union had been used as an instrument of the State in the attempt to discipline the pastors and the congregation. The thriving nature of their church was the reason for the State's punitive action.

Buni Cocar came to Bucharest from a church in the country. His ministry in the city was an immediate Like his brother in Medias, he was guilty of influencing young people to the extent that several hundred became Christians. His license was withdrawn, but like his brother, he continued his ministry at the request of his growing congregation. An official of the secret police offered Pastor Cocar the return of his license if This offer he refused. he agreed to serve as an informer. He was obviously suffering from the strain of constant surveillance. Along with his brother, he joined John Crossley and myself in visiting the American Embassy. When we left the building, the military guard went through the motions of trying to arrest both brothers. Mr. Crossley and I escorted them through their ranks. Several days afterwards a minister of the Baptist Union, who is also a secret agent, visited Buni Cocar to tell him that he was a criminal, and that he must never visit the Embassy again.

Those three pastors represent the vitality of the Christian church in Romania. Their harassment represents the response of the State officials to it.

I indicated to Mr. Rosiana that the State had nothing to fear from such people as they did not engage in revolutionary activities of a political nature, that they were patriotic, and that they contributed enormously to the moral fibre of the nation. In reply, Mr. Rosiana accused them of illegal activities which, if allowed, would result in a situation similar to that of Jonestown. He pointed out the equivalent of Jonestown could never happen in Romania because of the beneficial control of religion by the State. A remark that Hitler might well have made! It appears that the President of the Baptist Union, Mr. Comel Mara and the Secretary, Pavel Barbatei, both of whom are the appointees of the State and not of the Baptist fellowship, are regarded by the authorities as the type of religious leaders desired by the State. They conform to the law of the State.

The example of Jonestown was mentioned several times as an indication of anarchy in the U.S. No mention

was made, however, of the Rev. Jim Jones' advocacy of the communist ideology.

When I asked why so many congregations were denied permission to build places of worship, I was informed that such permission was a matter of priorities according to the following formula; first, State administrative buildings such as the new one under construction in the center of Bucharest, then schools, hospitals, housing for the people and churches at the bottom of the list.

C. When I inquired about Father Gheorghe Calciu Dumitreasa, I was informed that he was a fascist who identified himself with the former fascist regime. After his ordination he taught French at the theological seminary. Instead of teaching the doctrines of the Romanian Orthodox Church he had been found guilty of teaching those of fascism and therefore corrupting the minds of future priests. No answer was provided to my inquiry about the nature of the fascism he was alleged to espouse. The Patriarch commented, "Why do you, and all the West ask about this one bad priest, and not about the other 9,000 good ones?".

Before leaving for the visit to the convent on March 13, I received a letter which had been delivered by hand to the hotel. There were four signatures. Those, it is claimed, were the signatures of representatives of the Romanian Sefardit Jews (Sephardic, i.e. descendants of the Jews from Portugual and Spain), The letter described Father Calciu as "a Romanian fascist" dressed in a clergyman's soutane." The support of him by organizations in the West was alleged to be an activity of rightists. His name was linked to that of "the hateful Valerian Trifa". It is interesting that this letter should have been sent to me on the day after my visit to the Ministry of Culture, and to the address known only to it.

Both Mr. Rosiana and the Patriarch made no other charges against Calciu other than that he was a fascist. He has been accused of having been a member of the Iron Guard, a fascist organization which was abolished in 1941 when he was barely 14. For this alleged offense he was imprisoned from 1947 (when he was 21) until 1964.

When he was arrested he was a third year medical student. Because of the deepening of his faith in prison, he turned to the study of French and Theology. After his ordination in 1973 he was professor of French and New Testament studies at the orthodox seminary at Bucharest. He became very popular with the young people he taught. The evidence of his fascism is that he counselled his students to worship God rather than Marxism; described communism as a "philosophy of despair"; and opposed the destruction of one of Bucharest's famous church buildings.

He was dismissed from the theological faculty on May 23, 1978. Shortly thereafter he and his wife received death threats. He contributed his services to the formation of the SLOMR, a free labor union within the law. In May, 1979, he was arrested, tried as a "neo-nazi", and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. His personal property was confiscated and he was fined 1,500 lei for court expenses.

Father Gheorghe seems to be another of those who puts the law of God above the law of man, and does it so strongly that he is perceived as a threat to the hegemony of the State.

Conclusion:

The role played by Romania's need for the Most Favored Nation status is a primary one in the support of human rights and the defense of the prisoners of conscience. President Reagan's threat to rescind this status in February of 1983 seems to have had a salutary effect. The Romanian Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Malitza, has been most cooperative in his efforts to maintain the continuation of this status. He indicated privately to me that he was concerned about the possibility of the Jackson-Vanick amendment being enlarged to include as a requirement the rights of free religious expression and acts of conscience.

CREED'S PRIORITY CASES

FATHER ALFONSAS SVARINKAS - LITHUANIA (USSR)

6/83

Soviet concern about the situation in Poland appears to be behind the recent arrests in another predominantly Catholic country, Lithuania. Although Lithuania was annexed by the USSR in 1940, strong national and religious sentiment persists. On May 6. 1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinkas, 58, was sentenced to seven years in prison and three years internal exile. His arrest sparked a dramatic protest in Lithuania where 38,000 people signed petitions of protest to Andropov and nine believers asked to take his place in prison. Father Svarinkas was ordained in a Soviet labor camp where he spent ten years for protesting the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. There he was loved by even the worst criminals for his unfailing kindness and humility. After his release he was re-arrested in 1958 for an anti-state sermon he allegedly delivered, although on the day in question there was no sermon given in his church at all. He was sentenced to six years. After his release he was assigned a series of parishes, in each of which he transformed a deserted church into an overflowing one. In 1978 he was one of five priests who founded the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights. Shortly before his arrest in May, Father Svarinkas told a friend, "The KGB in itching to get rid of me, but what can they do? Shut me up in prison? Priests are needed there, also, Hang me? I would be closer to heaven. Most of all, we need martyrs. Ideals people die for do not die."

12/83 From a letter en route to prison, dated June 7, 1983:

"I left Vilnius May 27 at 8:00 p.m. At 9:00 a.m. Saturday, I was in Pskov. In the afternoon, I was in the prison itself. Conditions here are terrible. There are very many people here, and I wound up in the cellar. My cell is dark, without flooring, and water seeps up from beneath, through the clay. The bedbugs, mosquitoes and fleas! Sixteen individuals in a small cell! I have been eaten up by bedbugs. Last Friday, I got to a cell on the third floor. It was dry there. . . On the train and in my cell, I am the only political prisoner, so the talk and profanity are horrible. Sometimes, you can't even pray. Those are terribly dehumanized individuals. Here I had some opportunity to speak about God. Yesterday, I met a Latvian student. He was sentenced for speculation to 2.5 years. I spoke about Christ. He is very interested. It would be good for our atheists to see this crowd. Perhaps they would understand where they are leading our people, to what terrible destruction. . . My spirits are evenly good. At this time, I am taken up with the priesthood of Christ. From my heart, I repeat daily to the Lord, 'Fiat - Thy Will be done! '"

Father Svarinkas' prison address:

USSR
618263 p. Kuchino
Chusovskogo r-n.
Permskoy obl.
Ucrezdenie VS-389/36
Father Alfonsas Svarinkas
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CREED'S PRIORITY CASES

Balys Gajauskas - Lithuania (USSR)

2/83

Balys Gajauskas is a fifty-seven year old Roman Catholic veteran of anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania after World War II. Because of his resistance activities, he spent 25 years in a Soviet labor camp, from which he was released in 1973. Upon his return to Lithuania, Balys was denied legal residence in his homeland, and his mother was fined for harboring an illegal resident each time he visited her. During the next four years he was repeatedly harassed by the KGB for his continuing efforts on behalf of religious and democratic rights in Lithuania. On April 20, 1977 he was again arrested and one year later was sentenced to ten years in a strict regime labor camp, to be followed by five years of internal exile.

His prison address:

His wife:

USSR

618263 Permskaya obl.

Litoskaya SSR

pos. Kuchino

Kaunas

uch. VA - 389/36 Balys Gajauskas

ul Palangos 18/12 Irena Gajauskas

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Union of Soviet Soci

Republics

2/84

Recent letters smuggled to his aunt in California reveal Balys' deteriorating health, including weakened eyesight, high blood pressure and stomach ulcers. Because he fears he will not survive his present sentence, Balys has indicated to his aunt his desire to emigrate to the U.S. with his wife, young daughter, and aging mother. The KGB has promised his wife permission to emigrate if she divorces her husband, but she refuses to leave without him.

Tom: The only way this good sould could be released would be if he were exchanged for a Soviet spy. Try to have their Brought to the President's attention. His intervention would more revocentains I demanstrate the sincerety of his cancern for believers and patroits.

Emest.

CREED HOUSE 117 PRINCE STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA. 22314

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT:

Andrei Sakharov's Birthday

The question of a possible message is being discussed with State. Since it has major political implications, we will do the drafting in coordination with State if it is decided that a message would be useful at this time. We will of course supply a draft to you in this event.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 17, 1984

TO:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT


SUBJECT: Andrei Sakharov's Birthday

Attached is a suggested memorandum from you to Dodie Livingston in response to her memorandum on above subject.

JACK MATLOCK

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



May 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT, NSC

FROM:

DODIE LIVINGSTON

SUBJECT:

Andrei Sakharov's Birthday

Tony Salvia, of the Department of State's Public Affairs office, has requested that we prepare and send a Presidential message to Andrei Sakharov on his birthday, May 21st.

Please advise us whether or not to proceed. If this message is to be done, we would draft and clear with NSC. We would appreciate a reply ASAP.

As always, many thanks for your courtesy and consideration.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

May 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Next Steps on Sakharov

Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.

It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you send it to the President for his information.

Walt Raymond concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 406-114/7 #9478
BY ON NARADATE 6/25/09

SECRET Declassify: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Next Steps on Sakharov

George Shultz has sent you the attached memorandum reviewing the steps we have taken to encourage the Soviet leadership to resolve the Sakharov situation favorably, and also some steps which are now underway.

George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders.

Attachment:

Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

SECRET DECL: OADR NLRR 606-714/2 #9479
BY ______ NARADATE _7/7/08

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR <u>F06-114/1</u> #9492 BY <u>CS NARADATE 7/1/08</u>

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II 90605

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz 67

Subject:

Next Steps on Sakharov

Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike. According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr. Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.

The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the Sakharovs:

- -- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with Dobrynin).
- -- The Department has released two public statements condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.
- -- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third World capitals to request the help of host governments and international political organizations in convincing the Soviets to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have already responded, and there is a possiblity that Mitterand may precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's case.
- -- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.
- -- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow will not take place as planned.
- -- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised





posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21) and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents on the situation.

- -- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family members in this country, and are advising posts where they can be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to other countries.
- -- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of an upcoming trip to the USSR.

Action Plan for Additional Efforts

In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.

- -- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response, both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation. The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on Sakharov.
- -- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international nature of concern about the Sakharovs.
- -- We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades, to determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation short of tragedy.



- -- We will also be going privately to other governments who have persons the Soviets want (such the West Germans and the Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their part to trade for Sakharov.
- -- We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.
- -- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.

Sakharor) HANGELE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1984

SECKET

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE Ton

SUBJECT:

Next Steps on Sakharov

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George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their interest to the Soviet leaders.

Attachment:

Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOL-114/7 #9480

BY Col MARADATE 7/7/08

SECRET DECL OADR NLRR FOLD 114/1#9498

BY CAL NARADATE 7/7/08

SYSTEM II 90605

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz

Subject:

Next Steps on Sakharov

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SECRET



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SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

May 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SGIGO

SUBJECT:

Next Steps on Sakharov

Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.

It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you send it to the President for his information.

Walt Raymond concurs.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve

Disapprove ____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984

NLRR <u>FOB-114/1 #9481</u>

BY <u>CH</u> NARA DATE <u>6/25/09</u>

SECRET Declassify: OADR

Sikharov

June 1, 1984



TO McFARLANE FROM POINDEXTER

I met with Semyonov, Sakharov son-in-law, this afternoon, and one suggestion he made was that we try to obtain a statement at the summit on the Sakharov situation. I doubt that a public statement is either a good idea or something the Allied leaders would agree to. However, it might be a good idea for the President to raise the Sakharov matter with his colleagues, in the spirit of consulting on how to proceed. He could point out that if there is a tragedy, public opinion will hamper our efforts to improve relations with the Soviets and ask whether anything else can be done to avert a tragedy. Perhaps a private message to the Soviet leadership from the summit participants? He would thus avoid twisting arms, but would sensitize the other participants to the importance of this issue to us (and indirectly to them).

You also should be aware that in Moscow today Bessmertnykh (the head of MFA's USA Division) told our DCM, Warren Zimmerman, that Sakharov is in the hospital and well and Bonner is in her apartment and is well. He added that "Your President has been informed." He also observed that they were working on a response to the President's last letter to Chernenko and that it would be "responsive" on the things the President had raised. At the end of the conversation, Bessmertnykh observed that it would be "incorrect" to say that everything in our relationship had been halted.

We are not sure what all this means. It will be well to wait for Chernenko's reply to judge the quality of the Soviet response to the President's letter. The fact that Bessmertnykh gave information (whether accurate or not) on the Sakharovs is interesting, since previously they have refused to discuss the matter with us at all, other than accusing us of instigating the whole affair. Perhaps it is only an effort to allay our concerns regarding Sakharov's fate, but it conceivably could indicate that serious consideration is being given to resolving the matter.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOLTIY 7#9482

BY CW NARADATE 7/7/08

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

June 1, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCKS

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with Alexei Semyonov

3:00 P.M., June 1, 1984

Semyonov is a son-in-law of Mrs. Bonner (therefore step son-in-law of Sakharov) and lives in Boston. He has been pressing hard for actions to save Sakharov and has spoken to me on the telephone several times. He has also met with Mark Palmer and perhaps others at State.

Your meeting will be essentially a hand-holding operation, to assure him that we are doing all we wisely can, and trying to avoid actions which could make the situation worse.

Semyonov will probably float several ideas of steps we could take. One he has mentioned would be to offer to delay INF deployments if Bonner is allowed to travel. He probably has others, most of which will be things that we have already done or else are impractical, but I believe you should hear him out, let him know if some are totally impossible (such as involving deployments), but tell him we will give the most careful consideration to the others.

A list of suggested general talking points is attached.

Attachment:

Tab I Suggested Talking Points

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BY GL NARADATE 7/7/08

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR SEMYONOV

- -- The President, and all of us, are deeply concerned about the situation Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner face.
- -- We have been trying to do all we can to encourage a humanitarian resolution.
- -- We feel that it could make the situation worse if we make the issue a test of strength between the U.S. and the Soviet leadership, since this could make it more difficult for them to make the right decision.
- -- However, we have left no stone unturned to make sure the Soviet government knows how strongly we feel about the situation and the negative effects a tragedy would have for the US-Soviet relationship.
- -- We believe other countries can be very helpful and have done all we can to encourage other governments to bring pressure to bear.
- -- We will not give up our efforts, and are always ready to consider new ideas.

TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYNIN


- -- Anatoly, I would have asked you to come and see me, but I know what I have to say touches on a delicate subject, and I thought it best to give you a call so we don't risk any press attention.
- -- Would you let Chairman Chernenko know that I'm very concerned over the situation that has developed with Mrs. Bonner and Sakharov.
- -- I've been careful not to make any public statements, because I don't want anyone to get the idea that I am bringing public pressure on your government.
- -- But, you know, if a tragedy occurs, it could have the most serious implications for our relationship. I wouldn't be doing my duty if I didn't point this out while the situation can be resolved.
- -- The fact is that the American people will never be able to understand why a sick woman shouldn't be allowed to travel abroad to get an operation. And if either of the Sakharovs dies under present circumstances, that will make a lot of things more difficult than they are already. I think you will agree that relations are bad enough as it is.
- -- So I hope you'll pass these thoughts on to Chairman Chernenko. Let him know also that I consider this a purely private conversation. If he makes a humanitarian decision, he can be sure that I won't mention this conversation in public and I certainly won't try to claim any credit or use it politically.
- -- You know, I had really hoped that our relations could be improved. We have some real problems, but I've made a number of decisions which I hoped could start us on a better road.
- -- Right now I'm puzzled by your government's actions. I just don't understand why we can't get down to business and settle some of the problems between us.
- -- Let your people know that I'm still willing to try to settle our problems if they are. I keep being asked to make some new gesture, but every time I make one, they slap me in the face. And, you know, I could ask the same. But we'll never get anywhere if we keep up this "Alphonse and Gaston" act.

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NLRR <u>FU6-114/7</u> #94 M

BY <u>Cu</u> NARADATE / 1/08

File 2 Sakharov-



TO McFARLANE FROM POINDEXTER

I met with Semyonov, Sakharov son-in-law, this afternoon, and one suggestion he made was that we try to obtain a statement at the summit on the Sakharov situation. I doubt that a public statement is either a good idea or something the Allied leaders would agree to. However, it might be a good idea for the President to raise the Sakharov matter with his colleagues, in the spirit of consulting on how to proceed. He could point out that if there is a tragedy, public opinion will hamper our efforts to improve relations with the Soviets and ask whether anything else can be done to avert a tragedy. Perhaps a private message to the Soviet leadership from the summit participants? He would thus avoid twisting arms, but would sensitize the other participants to the importance of this issue to us (and indirectly to them).

You also should be aware that in Moscow today Bessmertnykh (the head of MFA's USA Division) told our DCM, Warren Zimmerman, that Sakharov is in the hospital and well and Bonner is in her apartment and is well. He added that "Your President has been informed." He also observed that they were working on a response to the President's last letter to Chernenko and that it would be "responsive" on the things the President had raised. At the end of the conversation, Bessmertnykh observed that it would be "incorrect" to say that everything in our relationship had been halted.

We are not sure what all this means. It will be well to wait for Chernenko's reply to judge the quality of the Soviet response to the President's letter. The fact that Bessmertnykh gave information (whether accurate or not) on the Sakharovs is interesting, since previously they have refused to discuss the matter with us at all, other than accusing us of instigating the whole affair. Perhaps it is only an effort to allay our concerns regarding Sakharov's fate, but it conceivably could indicate that serious consideration is being given to resolving the matter.

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BY _____ CU_NARADATE 7/7/08

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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CEC	DAM
SEC	KLI
-	-

June 12, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Sakharov/Bonner Letters

Regarding the request of Mrs. Bonner's daughter for the letters Mrs. Bonner left with an Embassy officer, I would advise not to release them. If the family publicizes them in any way, this could be used as evidence in a trial of Bonner. While the KGB presumably has the text, direct evidence that they were passed to a foreign government could be used to Bonner's disadvantage, and furthermore could be played to support the claim that Bonner and Sakharov were acting in complicity with us.

Although the family might be presumed to appreciate these same considerations, in their desperate mood, they might well make a misstep which could be dangerous in the long run.

Recommendation:

That you advise Secretary Shultz that you consider it unwise to release the letters to Mrs. Bonner's relatives.

Approve	Disapprove	

Attachment:

Tab I Prompt note from RCM to Matlock

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR <u>FOB-114/7 *9</u>486 BY <u>GJ</u> NARA DATE <u>6/25/09</u> MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA

TO: NSGVE --CPUA

To: NSPBT --CPUA

-- SECRET --

NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock

On the way back from the Summit, Sec Shultz noted that he had received requests from friends of the Sakharovs for the letters they (Bonner and Sakharov) sent to the embassy surrounding their request for Bonner's travel and our help, to be released? He must decide soon and would like your advice. Please let me know as soon as possible.

cc: NSGVE --CPUA

NSJMP --CPUA

06/12/84 15:25:47

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.

I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.

Walt Raymond, Karra Small and Bob Sims concur.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve.

Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab. A - Suggested Talking Points

Bob,

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 5, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

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Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve

Disapprove ___

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Suggested Talking Points

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OBE, but use it if your feel it is
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

Issue

Should you clarify your comments in the interview released yesterday regarding Jesse Jackson's proposal to seek the release of Sakharov?

Facts

The press has interpreted your remarks as suggesting that Jackson may be violating the law if he seeks the release of Sakharov. Members of the Sakharov family have publicly encouraged his efforts and are likely to demand that you assume the responsibility for securing his release if you appear to discourage efforts by private individuals.

Discussion

Since we are unable to make public our private efforts on behalf of Sakharov, and have no assurance that they will be successful, it is important to keep the onus for Sakharov's condition on the Soviet authorities and not allow public attention to be distracted by a debate on who does what. The Soviets have given no indication that there is any "give" in their position, and they would likely deny Jackson a visa to go to Moscow to discuss Sakharov. Therefore, any efforts Jackson would make are most unlikely to be successful.


We cannot totally exclude the possibility (though it seems remote) that the Soviets would in fact release Sakharov in an effort to embarrass you. In the unlikely event this should occur, however, we believe the fall-out would be manageable. And it would remove a major irritant in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

In any case, the situation will be more difficult to manage if Jackson can claim that he is prevented from attempting to secure Sakharov's release by your disapproval of his efforts. This could be interpreted as your assumption of responsibility for securing Sakharov's release, and if you failed some could reproach you.

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For these reasons, it seems desirable to clarify your position by indicating that you have no objection to Jackson making efforts to free Sakharov, so long as he does not involve himself in negotiation of matters which are the responsibility of the government.

Recommendation

OK	No

That you respond along the lines of the attached talking points when asked again by the press regarding your attitude toward Jackson and Sakharov.

Attachment:

TAB A -- Suggested talking points

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

CONFIDENTIAL



SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

- Q. Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?
- A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.
- -- What is important is that such private efforts be conducted in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues such as this one with matters which are properly subject to negotiation between governments.
- -- That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act.
 Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this particular problem solved, and if it can be done without involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

July 5, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Jesse Jackson and Sakharov

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.

I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.

Walt Raymond, Karna Small and Bob Sims concur.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

Tab A - Suggested Talking Points

Declassify on: OADR

White House Guidalines, August 76, 1987, 2

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT:

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ONFIDENTIAL BY GJ NARADATE 6/25/19

For these reasons, it seems desirable to clarify your position by indicating that you have no objection to Jackson making efforts to free Sakharov, so long as he does not involve himself in negotiation of matters which are the responsibility of the government.

Recommendation

OK	No

That you respond along the lines of the attached talking points when asked again by the press regarding your attitude toward Jackson and Sakharov.

Attachment:

TAB A -- Suggested talking points

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

CONFIDENTIAL



SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITAT

FROM:

JACK F. MATLOCK

SUBJECT:

Presidential Statement Re Soviet Dissident

Attached is a suggested reply to Marshall Breger regarding a proposed Presidential statement on Alexander Yakir.

Walt Raymond concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment

Tab A - Draft Statement

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHALL BREGER

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT:

Presidential Statement Re Soviet

Dissident

While we do not believe that the Yakir case is appropriate for a statement by the President, we would have no objection to a statement by a White House staffer along the lines of the attached.

Attachment

Tab A - Draft Statement

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON YAKIR TRIAL

We are disturbed by the report that the Soviet authorities plan to put Aleksander Yakir, a Soviet Jewish refusenik, on trial in Moscow tomorrow. We have been following his case closely and are concerned that his trial may really be intended as a warning to refuseniks to stay away from dissidents and foreigners.

We all know that the Yakir family has encountered much hardship and harrassment since it first applied to emigrate 11 years ago. This new development could further endanger their chances of leaving.

We see this trial as part of a Soviet campaign of increased harrassment of both foreigners and citizens of the USSR. These additional violations of human rights will not pass unnoticed. You may be assured that the United States Government has intervened with the Soviet authorities to permit the prompt immigration of the Yakir family, and to acquit Aleksander of the draft evasion charges against him. In the Yakir case, the Soviet authorities have the opportunity to demonstrate in actuality the respect for human rights and due process which they frequently profess. We and many other throughout the world will be watching the Soviet decision on August 9 with concern.

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HESORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM:

SULJECT:

Telephone Call, 0920 HDT, Sat 25 Aug 84

Vice President George Bush to Mrs. Tanya Yankeleyevich (sp?)

daughter of Elaina Bonner. Her phone f in Kass. is

At the request of Gordon Zacks (by phone Aug 25), the Vice President celled Tanya to receive a request from her. After noting that there is a letter coming to the Vice President from the family, she asked for advice on the following situation.

A Dr. Fradkin will depart the US today or townrow for Hoscow at the invitation of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He is a Ph.D. in computer science, a professor at HIT, and owner of a flourishing computer business. He would like to know if the Administration would like for him to ask if the Soviets are interested in obtaining anything from the US in exchange for Sakharov.

The Vice President told Tanya that the Administration has, through other channels, tried to determine what it would take for the Soviets to free Sakharov. Noting that President Reagan and be are very concerned, the Vice President said he would get on the phone and see what kind of Administration reply might be appropriate for Tanya and Dr. Fradkin.

Tanya said, "I do not think it would be wise to give the Soviets a definite impression of what would be available to them, but just to tell Dr. Fradkin that it would be all right for him to ask the Soviets what they might want in return."

Tarva said Fradkin lives in Massachusetts near her. His bome phone is "If he has left for Hoscow already, surely the US Embassy there could contact him if necessary."

Tanya said she would appreciate knowing what is done. The Vice President thanked her for her suggestion and said an appropriate person would let ber know.

The Vice President-then asked her what she thought of the recent release of photos of the Sakharovs. She replied that this indicates the Soviets are susceptible to pressure, which is good.

The Vice President called Bud McFarlane at 0940 to pass along this information, asking that a knowledgeable person call Tanya back this morning. The Vice President wants me to tell him how it worked out, but does not wish to make follow-up calls himself.

Copy to:

End McFarlane Admiral Eurphy Don Gregg