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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/28/2005

**File Folder** DISSIDENTS (12/23)

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 23

YARHI-MILO

2312

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9418	MEMO	RAYMOND TO DOBRIANSKY RE INTERNATIONAL SAKHAROV DAY	1	3/2/1983	B6
9422	CABLE	040950Z MAY 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	5/4/1983	B1
9423	CABLE	051355Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/5/1983	B1
9424	CABLE	051027Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/5/1983	B1
9419	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO MCFARLANE RE MRS. SHCHARANSKIY REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	3/8/1983	B1
9425	CABLE	051355Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/5/1983	B1
9426	CABLE	091643Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/9/1983	B1
9427	CABLE	102059Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	3/10/1983	B1
9428	CABLE	111633Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/11/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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2312

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9429	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE USG AND ÉMIGRÉ INVOLVEMENT IN SAKHAROV CELEBRATIONS <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/12/1983	B1
9430	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9429 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/12/1983	B1
9431	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9429 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/12/1983	B1
9432	CABLE	151329Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	3/15/1983	B1
9433	CABLE	250519Z MAR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	3/25/1983	B1
9434	CABLE	061453Z APR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	4/6/1983	B1
9435	CABLE	061453Z APR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	4/6/1983	B1
9436	CABLE	071546Z APR 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	4/7/1983	B1
9420	MEMO	USSR: ANDROPOV MAY RELEASE PROMINENT DISSIDENTS <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	4/19/1983	B1

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JET 4/28/2005

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9421	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING CEREMONY FOR SAKHAROV RESOLUTION <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	4/14/1983	B1
9437	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING CEREMONY FOR SAKHAROV RESOLUTION <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	4/2/1983	B1
9438	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9437 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	4/2/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

CONFIDENTIAL

SHCHARANSKIY  
Disseminated  
2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2617 DTG: 040950Z MAR 83 PSN: 072981  
EOB497 AM007798 TOR: 063/1207Z CSN: HCE672

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AMEMBASSY MADRID 2233

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 02617

EXDIS  
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR, US (SHCHARANSKIY, ANATOLIY)  
SUBJECT: SHCHARANSKIY: POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR PARDON  
REFS: (A) STATE 044074, (B) MADRID 1598, (C) MOSCOW 1857

1. ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE DO NOT KNOW FOR CERTAIN WHAT THE PROCEDURES FOR APPLYING FOR PARDON OR CLEMENCY ARE. WE HAVE NOTHING IN OUR FILES ON, NOR DO WE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT, ANY PREVIOUS ANALOGOUS CASES INVOLVING PARDON OR CLEMENCY.

HOWEVER, SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER AND SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND BROTHER LEONID TOLD US DURING A MEETING WITH THEM ON MARCH 3 (SEPTEL) THAT, AS FAR AS THEY KNOW, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MADE PUBLIC THE FORMAL PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED IN REQUESTING PARDON OR CLEMENCY. BONNER EVEN SAID THAT ANY SOVIET CITIZEN COULD REQUEST CLEMENCY ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER SOVIET CITIZEN. ALL THREE AGREED, WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO CITE ANY SOURCE, THAT SUCH AN APPEAL SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET. BONNER ALSO SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT THAT A GROUP OF FIVE PRISONERS IN LENINGRAD (PERHAPS MEMBERS OF THE GROUP ACCUSED OF PLANNING TO HIJACK A PLANE IN THE EARLY 1970S) HAD BEEN RELEASED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THEIR TERM OF IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT HAVING DONE ANYTHING TO REQUEST EARLY RELEASE.

3. ARTICLE 52 OF THE 1960 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RSFSR, AS AMENDED TO JULY 3, 1965, "RELIEF FROM CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH RELEASE OF THE GUILTY PERSON ON SURETY," STATES THAT "IF, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE PERSON AND THE PERSON HIMSELF DO NOT REPRESENT A GREAT SOCIAL DANGER AND IF THE ACT OF THE GUILTY PERSON HAS NOT RESULTED IN SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND HE HAS SINCERELY REPENTED, THEN UPON PETITION OF A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OR COLLECTIVE OF WORKING PEOPLE SUCH PERSON MAY BE RELIEVED FROM CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PUNISHMENT AND RELEASED ON SURETY FOR REEDUCATION AND CORRECTION TO THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OR

COLLECTIVE OR WORKING PEOPLE WHICH HAS SUBMITTED THE PETITION." THIS ARTICLE ALSO PROVIDES THAT "A PERSON WHO DOES NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF GUILTY OR WHO FOR ANY REASONS INSISTS ON CONSIDERATION OF THE CASE IN COURT MAY NOT BE RELEASED ON SURETY."

4. ARTICLE 53 OF THE 1960 CRIMINAL CODE, AS AMENDED TO JULY 3, 1965, "CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE FROM PUNISHMENT AND REPLACEMENT OF PUNISHMENT BY Milder PUNISHMENT," STATES THAT "IF, BY HIS EXEMPLARY CONDUCT AND HONORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD LABOR, A PERSON SENTENCED TO DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM...PROVES HIS CORRECTION, THE COURT MAY APPLY TO HIM, AFTER HE HAS SERVED NOT LESS THAN HALF OF THE ASSIGNED TERM, A CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE FROM PUNISHMENT..." BUT CONTINUES THAT "CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE...SHALL NOT BE APPLIED:... (3) TO PERSONS CONVICTED OF ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE (ARTICLES 64-73)..." SINCE SHCHARANSKIY WAS FOUND GUILTY OF HAVING VIOLATED ARTICLE 64, "TREASON," HE PRESUMABLY WOULD BE INELIGIBLE FOR EARLY RELEASE UNLESS ARTICLE 53 HAS BEEN AMENDED.

THE RSFSR CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF OCTOBER 27, 1960, AS AMENDED TO JULY 3, 1965, CONTAINS NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE ON THIS MATTER OTHER THAN THE STATEMENT IN ARTICLE 363, "EARLY RELEASE AND CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE FROM PUNISHMENT AND REPLACEMENT OF PUNISHMENT BY A Milder ONE," THAT "CONDITIONAL EARLY RELEASE OF A CONVICTED PERSON...SHALL BE CARRIED OUT BY THE COURT UPON A JOINT PROPOSAL BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CORRECTIONAL LABOR INSTITUTION AND THE SUPERVISORY COMMISSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE DISTRICT OR CITY SOVIET OF WORKING PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES AT THE PLACE OF SERVING THE PUNISHMENT OR THE AGENCY CHARGED WITH EXECUTION OF A JUDGMENT OF EXILE OR BANISHMENT."

5. IN ANY EVENT, A DECISION TO GRANT SHCHARANSKIY PARDON OR CLEMENCY WILL BE ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL, RATHER THAN ADMINISTRATIVE OR JURIDICAL, IN NATURE, AND SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL FIND THE "PROPER" WAY TO DO WHAT THEY WANT TO IN SHCHARANSKIY'S REGARD. IN THIS RESPECT, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF, ASSUMING THE SOVIETS DECIDE TO PARDON HIM, THEY INSIST ON A BT

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NLS F06-114/0 #9422

BY NOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07



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PAGE 01  
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AMEMBASSY MADRID 2234

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 02617

EXDIS  
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
PROCEDURE WHICH THEY COULD CONSTRUE AS ENTAILING AT  
LEAST A SUPERFICIAL ADMISSION OF GUILT ON HIS PART.

6. INR AND, PERHAPS, OTHERS MAY BE ABLE TO SUPPLEMENT  
OUR THOUGHTS ON THIS MATTER, WHICH ARE BASED ON  
ADMITTEDLY MEAGER RESOURCE MATERIALS.  
ZIMMERMANN  
BT

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SCHARANSKIY  
Dissemination

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01 OF 02      MOSCOW 2729      DTG: 051355Z MAR 83      PSN: 075477  
EOB868      AN008201      TOR: 064/2006Z      CSN: HCE176

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 02729

EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR  
SUBJECT: SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER AND BROTHER REQUEST  
- STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
REFS: (A) STATE 002671, (B) MADRID 01598 (NOTAL),  
- (C) MOSCOW 02148 (NOTAL)

1. - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. DURING MARCH 3 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER (SEPTEL), SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND BROTHER LEONID ARRIVED JUST AFTER MRS. MILGROM HAD A MEETING AT KGB HEADQUARTERS WITH AN OFFICIAL WHO HAD REFUSED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF. MILGROM INFORMED US THAT HER INTERLOCUTOR HAD TOLD HER THAT A FUTURE MEETING BETWEEN ANATOLIY AND HER "DEPENDS ON HIS BEHAVIOR" AND THAT HE IS FEELING BETTER AND IS TAKING MEDICINE. IN ANATOLIY'S RECENT LETTER TO HER, SHE CONTINUED, HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD WRITE HER AGAIN ON FEBRUARY 21. WHEN SHE ASKED THE KGB OFFICIAL ABOUT THIS LETTER, HE REPLIED THAT ANATOLIY ACTUALLY HAD WRITTEN HER ONLY ON FEBRUARY 28 AND, AS OF MARCH 3, THE LETTER STILL WAS UNDERGOING CENSORSHIP. HE ASSURED HER, HOWEVER, THAT IT SOON WOULD BE PUT INTO THE MAIL TO HER AND THAT SHE THEREFORE SHOULD RECEIVE IT WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.
3. MILGROM ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE KGB OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HER THAT HER LETTER OF FEBRUARY 14 TO ANDROPOV HAD NOT REACHED THE GENERAL SECRETARY. RATHER, THIS OFFICIAL SAID, IT HAD BEEN INTERCEPTED AS "INAPPROPRIATE" FOR ANDROPOV'S ATTENTION.

4. MILGROM, BONNER AND LEONID SHCHARANSKIY, RECALLING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS IN 1978, EXPRESSED THEIR FIRM CONVICTION THAT A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AT THIS TIME WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO HIM AND REQUESTED THAT HE MAKE ONE.

5. COMMENT: DESPITE THE VIEWS OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS,

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NLS F06-114/6#9423

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY hjt NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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PAGE 02 OF 02      MOSCOW 2729

DTG: 051355Z MAR 83      PSN: 075477

WE STRONGLY QUESTION THE UTILITY AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME OF ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY ONE REPEATING THE 1978 DECLARATION OF ANATOLIY'S INNOCENCE. THERE RECENTLY HAVE BEEN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOVIET INTIMATIONS THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOMETHING IN THE WORKS--ANDROPOV'S LETTER TO MARCHAIS (REF. A), WHICH EVIDENTLY STATED THAT, WHILE SOVIET LAW PROVIDES FOR THE REDUCTION OF PRISON SENTENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS NOT AIDED BY NOISY CAMPAIGNS AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES; AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S FEBRUARY 10 MEETING WITH SERGEI KONDRASHEV (REF. B), WHO SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR SHCHARANSKIY TO APPLY FOR A PARDON; AND THE FEBRUARY 21 TASS DISPATCH (REF. C), THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATION THAT SHCHARANSKIY MIGHT BE PARDONED. THESE INTIMATIONS MAY WELL SIMPLY BE ATTEMPTS TO QUIET WESTERN VOICES; HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT ON SHCHARANSKIY, A HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENT COULD COMPLICATE MATTERS. IN OUR VIEW, ANY SOVIET DECISION TO FREE SHCHARANSKIY MUST BE BASED ON THEIR ABILITY TO SAVE FACE AND TO PRESERVE THE "CORRECTNESS" OF THEIR ORIGINAL FINDING ON SHCHARANSKIY-- THAT HE WAS GUILTY. A HIGH-LEVEL PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SHCHARANSKIY'S INNOCENCE COULD CAUSE THEM TO BACK AWAY AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME.      END COMMENT.  
ZIMMERMANN  
BT

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SAKHAROV  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 01 OF 02      MOSCOW 2709      DTG: 051027Z MAR 83      PSN: 075005  
EOB425      AN007960      TOR: 064/1305Z      CSN: HCE103

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AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 1533

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AMEMBASSY MADRID 2240  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1986

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 02709

EXDIS  
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE - AMB. KAMPELMAN  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR, NO  
SUBJECT: SAKHAROV ACCEPTS NORWEGIAN OFFER TO EMIGRATE  
REF: OSLO 0991 (NOTAL)

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. DURING A MARCH 3 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER, WE GAVE HER A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT SAKHAROV IN THE NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENT BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVE OSMUND FAREMO AND FOREIGN MINISTER STRAY AND ASKED HER ABOUT SAKHAROV'S PLANS TO EMIGRATE. BONNER REPLIED THAT SHE HAD HEARD ON THE BBC THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD INVITED SAKHAROV TO LIVE IN NORWAY AND WANTED TO MEET WITH NORWEGIAN DIPLOMAT TO DISCUSS THIS OFFER. BONNER ADDED THAT SAKHAROV WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AN OFFER FROM THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO HIM TO LIVE IN NORWAY.
3. SUBSEQUENTLY ON MARCH 3 WE INFORMED THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY OF BONNER'S DESIRE FOR A MEETING, AND MET ON MARCH 4 WITH A NORWEGIAN EMBOFF TO BRIEF NORWEGIANS FULLY ON WHAT WE KNOW OF SAKHAROV'S RESPONSE AND TO MAKE PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS. NORWEGIAN EMBOFF INFORMED US THAT THEY ARE CABLING OSLO, AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SEE BONNER EARLY NEXT WEEK.

EMBOFFS MET AGAIN WITH BONNER AT MIDDAY MARCH 4. AT THIS MEETING SHE SHOWED THEM A COPY OF A LETTER FROM SAKHAROV TO THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH SHE PLANS TO GIVE TO NORWEGIAN EMBOFF. THE ORIGINAL, BONNER CLAIMS IN A COVERING NOTE, SHOULD ALREADY OR SHORTLY BE IN THE POSSESSION OF HER SON-IN-LAW, YEFREM YANKELEVICH. FROM MEMORY, FOLLOWING IS ROUGH TRANSLATION OF TEXT: BEGIN QUOTE: WITH GRATITUDE I ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO COME TO NORWAY WITH MY FAMILY FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE. IT IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, TO RECEIVE THE PERMISSION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. AS

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NLS Feb-11/4/06 # 9424  
BY WOT NNSA, DATE 12/13/07

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 2709

DTG: 051027Z MAR 83 PSN: 075005

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EXDIS  
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YOU MAY KNOW, I HAVE TWICE BEEN REFUSED SUCH PERMISSION TO TRAVEL ABROAD (IN 1975 AND 1977) ON THE BASIS OF SENSITIVE SECRET WORK IN WHICH I WAS ENGAGED UP TO 1968. I ASK THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT REQUEST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO GRANT ME PERMISSION TO LEAVE AND GO TO NORWAY. IF THIS REQUEST IS REFUSED, I HAVE ANOTHER SMALL REQUEST. MY WIFE, ELENA BONNER SUFFERS FROM GLAUCOMA. THIS IS THE RESULT OF AN INJURY RECEIVED DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THREE TIMES SHE HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO GO ABROAD TO ITALY FOR TREATMENT OF THIS CONDITION. NOW, THE CONDITION OF HER EYES HAS SERIOUSLY WORSENERED, AND IN SEPTEMBER 1982 SHE SUBMITTED A FORMAL REQUEST TO AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW TO GO AGAIN TO ITALY FOR TREATMENT. THIS REQUEST HAS NOW LANGUISHED FOR SIX MONTHS WITHOUT ACTION OR REPLY. I ASK THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES BE URGED TO PERMIT HER TO GO FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT WHICH SHE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BEFORE. END QUOTE.

5. BONNER ASKED THAT THIS RESPONSE BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE TIME BEING, AND ESPECIALLY REQUESTED THAT IT NOT BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS.  
ZIMMERMANN  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Residents*  
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**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 8, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Mrs. Shcharansky's Request for Appointment

This morning, Mr. David Stahl (National Conference on Soviet Jewry) called and informed me that Avital Shcharansky would like to meet with you on Thursday, March 10, at any time. He gave me no reason for the meeting. My guess is that she wants to discuss Mrs. Milgrom's (Anatoly Shcharansky's mother) recent request that the President issue a statement on behalf of her son (see attached cable, Moscow 2729 -- Tab I). I do not recommend that you see her. As we discussed previously, I suggest that I meet with her.

RECOMMENDATION

That you do not see Mrs. Shcharansky, but that I meet with her.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Moscow cable, 2729

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 106-11416 #9419  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

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PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 2729  
EOB368 RECALLED

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TOR: 064/2006Z CSN: HCE176

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AMEMBASSY MADRID 2242  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3896

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 02729

EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR  
SUBJECT: SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER AND BROTHER REQUEST  
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT  
REFS: (A) STATE 002671, (B) MADRID 01598 (NOTAL),  
(C) MOSCOW 02148 (NOTAL)

EXDIS

1. ( - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING MARCH 3 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER (SEPTEL), SHCHARANSKIY'S MOTHER IDA MILGROM AND BROTHER LEONID ARRIVED JUST AFTER MRS. MILGROM HAD MEETING AT KGB HEADQUARTERS. OTHER OFFICIAL WHO HAD REFUSED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF. MILGROM INFORMED US THAT HER INTERLOCUTOR HAD TOLD HER THAT A FUTURE MEETING BETWEEN ANATOLIY AND HER "DEPENDS ON HIS BEHAVIOR" AND THAT HE IS FEELING BETTER AND IS TAKING MEDICINE. IN ANATOLIY'S RECENT LETTER TO HER, SHE CONTINUED, HE HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD WRITE HER AGAIN ON FEBRUARY 21. WHEN SHE ASKED THE KGB OFFICIAL ABOUT THIS LETTER, HE REPLIED THAT ANATOLIY ACTUALLY HAD WRITTEN HER ONLY ON FEBRUARY 28 AND, AS OF MARCH 3, THE LETTER STILL WAS UNDERGOING CENSORSHIP. HE ASSURED HER, HOWEVER, THAT IT SOON WOULD BE PUT INTO THE MAIL TO HER AND THAT SHE THEREFORE SHOULD RECEIVE IT WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.

EXDIS

3. MILGROM ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE KGB OFFICIAL HAD TOLD HER THAT HER LETTER OF FEBRUARY 14 TO ANDROPOV HAD NOT REACHED THE GENERAL SECRETARY. RATHER, THIS OFFICIAL SAID, IT HAD BEEN INTERCEPTED AS "INAPPROPRIATE" FOR ANDROPOV'S ATTENTION.

EXDIS

4. MILGROM, BONNER AND LEONID SHCHARANSKIY, RECALLING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS IN 1978, EXPRESSED THEIR FIRM CONVICTION THAT A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AT THIS TIME WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO HIM AND REQUESTED THAT HE MAKE ONE.

5. COMMENT: DESPITE THE VIEWS OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS, WE STRONGLY QUESTION THE UTILITY AT THIS PARTICULAR

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DTG: 051355Z MAR 83 PSN: 075477

TIME OF ANY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY ONE REPEATING THE 1978 DECLARATION OF ANATOLIY'S INNOCENCE. THERE RECENTLY HAVE BEEN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOVIET INTIMATIONS THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOMETHING IN THE WORKS--ANDROPOV'S LETTER TO MARCHAIS (REF. A), WHICH EVIDENTLY STATED THAT, WHILE SOVIET LAW PROVIDES FOR THE REDUCTION OF PRISON SENTENCES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS NOT AIDED BY NOISY CAMPAIGNS AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES; AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S FEBRUARY 10 MEETING WITH SERGEI KONDRASHEV (REF. B), WHO SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR SHCHARANSKIY TO APPLY FOR A PARDON; AND THE FEBRUARY 21 TASS DISPATCH (REF. C), THE FIRST PUBLIC INDICATION THAT SHCHARANSKIY MIGHT BE PARDONED. THESE INTIMATIONS MAY WELL SIMPLY BE ATTEMPTS TO QUIET WESTERN VOICES; HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT ON SHCHARANSKIY, A HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENT COULD COMPLICATE MATTERS. IN OUR VIEW, ANY SOVIET DECISION TO FREE SHCHARANSKIY MUST BE BASED ON THEIR ABILITY TO SAVE FACE AND TO PRESERVE THE "CORRECTNESS" OF THEIR ORIGINAL FINDING ON SHCHARANSKIY-- THAT HE WAS GUILTY. A HIGH-LEVEL PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SHCHARANSKIY'S INNOCENCE COULD CAUSE THEM TO BACK AWAY AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME. END COMMENT.

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EXDIS  
DEPT FOR EUR/SOV  
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: CVIS, SHUM, CSCE, UR, US (PETROV, SERGEI)  
SUBJECT: SERGEI PETROV PLANS FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE  
REF: MOSCOW 2656

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SERGEI PETROV, RECENTLY AGAIN REFUSED EXIT PERMISSION FROM THE SOVIET UNION (REFTEL), AND LIVING UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ARREST ON GROUNDS OF PARASITISM AND/OR AVOIDING MILITARY SERVICE, HAS SHARED WITH CONSOFF HIS PLANS TO STAVE OFF OFFICIAL ACTIONS AGAINST HIM. PETROV HAS SUPPLIED THIS INFORMATION IN CONFIDENCE, AND FOR THE RECORD SHOULD THE AUTHORITIES ARREST HIM. FOR THE PRESENT, HE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WISH THAT HIS INTENTIONS BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

3. WITH REGARD TO HIS THREATENED INDUCTION FOR RESERVIST DUTY, PETROV PLANS THE FOLLOWING STRATEGY: DURING HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE HIGH-RANKING OVIR OFFICIAL ON MARCH 4, AND IN THE PRESENCE OF A MILITIA CAPTAIN FROM HIS NEIGHBORHOOD PRECINCT, PETROV ELICITED FROM THE FORMER A STATEMENT THAT THE APPLICATION FOR RENUNCIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENSHIP PETROV HAD SUBMITTED BY LETTER TO THE SUPREME SOVIET IS CURRENTLY "UNDER REVIEW" BY THAT BODY. THEREUPON, PETROV TURNED TO THE MILITIA OFFICIAL AND POINTED OUT THAT THAT BEING THE CASE, IT WOULD NOT BE PROPER FOR HIM, PETROV, TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE MATTER OF HIS INDUCTION FOR RESERVIST DUTY, INASMUCH AS HE AT ANY TIME MIGHT BE DECLARED TO BE STATELESS BY THE SUPREME SOVIET. HIS SERVICE WOULD THEN BE ILLEGAL. THE MILITIA OFFICIAL, CAUGHT OFFGUARD BY THIS TWIST ADDED TO WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED AS A PLACATING THROWAWAY LINE BY HIS OVIR COLLEAGUE, HAD NO READY ANSWER. PETROV INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO HECTOR THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNING HIS RENUNCIATION APPLICATION, AND TO MAINTAIN THAT THE ATTEMPT TO INDUCT HIM HAS NO LEGAL FOUNDATION. PETROV, A REALIST, READILY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IN THE END THE AUTHORITIES CAN DO WHAT THEY WISH WITH HIM. HE IS DETERMINED, HOWEVER, TO STRIP AWAY THE FIG LEAVES OF PLAUSIBLE LEGALITY THEY MAY WISH TO DON.

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EXDIS

4. FURTHER IN THIS REGARD, PETROV PLANS TO ATTEMPT QUIETLY TO OBTAIN A CONTRACT AS A PHOTOGRAPHER WITH SOME SEMI-OFFICIAL BODY--HE MENTIONED THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AS A POSSIBILITY--TO BE PRODUCED IN THE EVENT THAT THE CHARGE OF "PARASITISM" IS PURSUED FURTHER BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES. (PETROV'S ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS ALSO ALLOW HIM TO TEACH; GAINING SEVERAL PUPILS WHOM HE MIGHT TUTOR IN MATHEMATICS WOULD SERVE A SIMILAR PURPOSE.) PETROV WILL NOT PRODUCE THIS EVIDENCE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT (SHOULD HE ACQUIRE IT) ON HIS OWN, FEARING THAT IT WOULD MERELY GIVE THE KGB A HEADSTART IN GETTING HIM FIRED. HE WILL HOLD BACK UNTIL ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND USE SUCH CONTRACTS AS A LAST LINE OF DEFENSE, GAINING, IF NOTHING ELSE, TIME FOR ANOTHER APPLICATION TO EMIGRATE.

EXDIS

5. FOR LENINGRAD AND MADRID: WE ARE REPEATING REFTEL FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

EXDIS

6. COMMENT: PETROV HAS CONSULTED WITH OTHER REFUSENIKS, PRIMARILY JEWISH, WHO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITH SIMILAR THREATS IN RECENT MONTHS. HE TAKES SERIOUSLY THE MOVES MADE AGAINST HIM, AND DOES NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE CAPACITY OF THE AUTHORITIES TO UNDERTAKE SWIFT AND ARBITRARY MEASURES. HIS FORMULATION AND DISCUSSION OF HIS PLANS HAS MUCH THE AIR OF A TERMINALLY-ILL PATIENT PUTTING HIS AFFAIRS IN ORDER AGAINST THE DAY OF HIS DECEASE; INDEED, PETROV HAS TOLD CONSOFF THAT HE VIEWS SUCH STATEMENTS AS HE WOULD LEAVE WITH HIS MOTHER FOR RELEASE TO THE WESTERN PRESS UPON HIS ARREST TO BE HIS LEGACY.  
ZIMMERMANN  
BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 066233

MADRID FOR CSCE, GENEVA FOR USDEL UNHRC  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, CSCE, UNHRC, UR  
SUBJECT: RAISING CASE OF SOVIET DISSIDENT IOSIF BEGUN  
REF: (A) STATE 40099; (B) TEL AVIV 2270

FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS TO AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN  
AND HEAD OF USDEL TO UNHRC SCHIFTER

1. (~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).
  
2. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF RAISING THE CASE OF IOSIF BEGUN, AS MENTIONED IN REF A. THE BEGUN CASE IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY NOW, WHILE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PREPARE ITS CASE AGAINST HIM, PROBABLY FOR ANTI-SOVIET AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA (ART. 70). AS DELEGATIONS ARE AWARE, THAT "PROPAGANDA" CONSISTS OF ARTICLES BEGUN HAS WRITTEN ON JEWISH CULTURE AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE THE TEACHING OF THE HEBREW LANGUAGE.
  
3. HAYIM LUBARSKY OF THE ISRAELI GROUP, THE ASSOCIATION OF PRISONERS OF ZION, MET WITH ME ON MARCH 8. HE HAS KNOWN BEGUN FOR 16 YEARS, AND DISCUSSED BEGUN'S 12 YEARS AS A REFUSENIK, INCLUDING THE THREE YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR PARASITISM. LUBARSKY SAID HIS THREE-WEEK TOUR IN CANADA AND THE U. S. WAS MOST SUCCESSFUL IN OTTAWA, WHERE AN APPEAL ON BEGUN'S BEHALF WAS PRESENTED IN PARLIAMENT. HE SAID HE HAS A FRIEND WHO HAS BEEN LOBBYING ON BEGUN'S BEHALF IN THE UK AND THE NETHERLANDS AS WELL.
  
4. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT BEGUN IS CHARGED WITH A SERIOUS OFFENSE WHICH MAY BRING 12 YEARS OF DETENTION AND EXILE. THIS IS AN OMINOUS DEVELOPMENT AND COULD BE AN EARLY SIGN OF HOW THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL TREAT DISSIDENTS.

SHULTZ  
BT

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March 11, 1983

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

TO: ✓ PAULA DOBRIANSKY  
JOHN LENKOWSKY

SUBJECT: International Sakarov Day

Can you clarify the current situation concerning Solzhenitsyn's participation or non-participation in Sakarov Day. It is my belief that he should not participate unless Sakarov (or his American representative Yankolevich) concurs.

Can you confirm whether we have a commitment from the President to participate.

attachment

F/11C

FILE - 15  
SAKHAROV  
Discussions

CAS 7/12/02

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March 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: See Attachment

DATE AND PLACE: February 28, 1983, USIA Conference Room  
and Director's Office

SUBJECT: Agency Facilitative Support for International  
Sakharov Day, May 21, 1983

DISTRIBUTION: All Attendees

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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION: A morning conference and afternoon follow-up session reviewed what Sakharov Day organizers aim to achieve in their world-wide series of events. Discussants then proceeded to consider how USIA could act as a catalyst for organizing international TV broadcasts that would focus world attention on Sakharov's plight and Soviet repression.

The Agency, it was decided, will take an active facilitative role to draw together celebrity performers, producers and commercial networks to realize a broadcast event. After initial phone calls by Director Wick and others, some tentative commitments were elicited.

On the American side, ABC-TV expressed interest in airing a one-hour entertainment tribute to Sakharov (to be broadcast at 7 p.m. on May 22), and promoter Morgan Mason, reached by telephone in Los Angeles, expressed confidence that clients of his such as Barry Manilow, Paul McCartney, Olivia Newton-John and others would be interested in performing for Sakharov Day events.

Calls to Polish-born French promoter Albert Koski in Paris produced similar support, with Koski saying he could interest artists such as Simon and Garfunkle, David Bowie, Eric Clapton and Carlos Santana in a European TV broadcast dedicated to Sakharov. Radio-Television Luxembourg (RTL) emerged as the most promising European broadcast partner.

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Washington's Kennedy Center was viewed as a locus for a major Sakharov Day event, but efforts to reach Center Director George Stevens, Jr., and National Symphony Orchestra Director Mstislav Rostropovich to enlist their cooperation were unsuccessful. (Mr. Lozansky said the Center Opera and Concert Halls were fully booked for the evenings immediately preceding May 21, and so the Sakharov Committee had reserved the Center Terrace. After discussion it was concluded that the Terrace was completely unsatisfactory, and that an effort should be made to obtain use of the Opera Hall, if need be for an afternoon event.) Mr. Lozansky also said Mr. Rostropovich had a conducting engagement on May 20, but that he might still be able to participate in some way.

Mr. Bukovsky indicated that Sakharov Day organizers had so far secured the participation of singer Joan Baez, who had assured him in a conversation of her interest.

Consensus was repeatedly voiced that this ambitious undertaking must be pursued vigorously in view of its broad scope and the small amount of time remaining to organize it. Producer Marty Pasetta said if ABC confirms its commitment to the program, the network could be expected to advance funds to hire private producers. Pasetta would then help to assemble an American production team.

As organization of the events proceeds, USIA will undertake to bring artists, producers and networks into close contact with local Sakharov Day committees in Europe and the U.S. While the broadcast(s) will be an entertainment event, it should be perceived as drawing upon and reinforcing numerous rallies and programs scheduled throughout Europe and the U.S. at that time.

Bukovsky/Lozansky Comments: Mr. Bukovsky and Mr. Lozansky mentioned a number of plans to have statements supporting Sakharov issued by scientists, intellectuals and public officials. All of these plans are in an early stage of development but could include:

-- A Congressional Bill (to be co-sponsored by Rep. Solarz [D-NY]) declaring May 21 National Sakharov Day, and appealing for international observance of the same.

--Decrees by various U.S. city governments/mayors of Sakharov weeks in their respective cities.

--Press Conferences by prominent musicians, performers etc, declaring their concerts in the week prior to Sakharov's birthday to be in his honor.

--Participation by Solzhenitsyn in the Washington Sakharov event and a meeting between Solzhenitsyn and the President at the White House. (Lozansky said he had discussed this with White House Staff Member Ken Creep and NSC Soviet affairs specialist John Lenczowski.)

European rallies, said Lozansky, are scheduled for Paris, Brussels, London, Amsterdam and Stockholm. So far, the 2,000-seat Mutualite' hall in Paris has been secured by local Sakharov organizers for a program on May 18. After the positive contact with Koski, however, Pasetta suggested that this hall would be too small for any of the entertainment presentations, and recommended the Palais de Congres.

Production Expenses and Fund-Raising: Throughout the day's discussion, Pasetta repeatedly emphasized that the success or failure of the project would depend on securing the right kind of celebrity talent in order to interest network broadcasters to invest money in the production. In response to Mr. Lozansky's questioning, Pasetta said fund raising for the Sakharov Freedom Award Scholarship through ticket sales at entertainment events might be considered, but that there were many factors to weigh first. Also a good description of the fund was needed, which Lozansky said he could provide.

-----  
ACTION ASSIGNMENTS: All discussants agreed that a great deal of organizational work was immediately called for. Among the near-term points to be covered are the following:

-- After ABC notifies Director Wick that it is able and willing to broadcast a May 22 Sakharov tribute, Pasetta will be informed and his recommendations for further action solicited. Lozansky and Bukovsky will be advised.

-- Director's office will establish contact with Messrs. Stevens and Rostropovich to take steps toward assuring availability of Kennedy Center and participation of Maestro Rostropovich.

-- B/TV/Snyder will contact Albert Koski to arrange Koski's participation in further planning, passing on the latest information on American network commitments, American performances, and European Sakharov Day Committee organizers.

-- The Director may wish to contact other American promoters mentioned during the course of the day's conversation, such as Lou Wasserman, Sue Mengers and Bill Hays.

-- When appropriate, NASA contacts need to be advised of the need for cooperation in arranging satellite transmission of the television feed for Europe.

Clearances: EU/Remick, EU/Baldyga, C - Mr. Shirley  
EU:MDillen:3/1/83:724-9295

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Attachment - February 28, 1983 Meeting Attendees

Vladimir Bukovsky  
Edward Lozansky

Director Wick  
Counselor Shirley

Marty Pasetta TV Producer

Elliot Abrams STATE/Assistant Secretary/HA  
Tom Simons STATE/EUR/SOV  
Jim Jatras STATE/P

Walt Raymond, Jr. NSC

Brian Carlson C  
Barbara Haig C  
Mark Everson D  
Al Snyder B/TV  
Scott Thompson P  
Gifford Malone P  
Richard Bissell P/D  
Bill Bach P/PACG  
James Thurber P/G  
Gerry Hursh-Cesar P/R  
Michael Schneider P/G  
Len Baldyga EU  
Marlin Remick EU  
Mark Dillen EU

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7 SAKHAROV  
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EXDIS  
MADRID FOR U. S. DEL CSCE - AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR, NO  
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN DEMARCHE TO SOVIETS ON SAKHAROV  
REFS: A) MOSCOW 02778, B) MOSCOW 02709

1. ~~A~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. NORWEGIAN EMBOFF INFORMED US ON MARCH 11 THAT BONNER HAD BEEN TOLD DURING HER VISIT TO THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY THE PREVIOUS DAY (REF A) THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON SAKHAROV IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THE DEMARCHE WOULD INCLUDE:  
1) A FORMAL INVITATION TO SAKHAROV AND BONNER TO EMIGRATE TO, AND TO LIVE IN, NORWAY; AND 2) A REQUEST TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ACT POSITIVELY ON THEIR EVENTUAL, FORMAL APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE TO NORWAY. IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REJECTS THIS REQUEST, THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF ADDED, THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL ASK THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW BONNER TO TRAVEL TO ITALY FOR TREATMENT OF HER GLAUCOMA. (NOTE: THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF SAID THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT MAY ALREADY HAVE MADE SUCH A DEMARCHE, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF "POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS" WITH THE SOVIETS IN OSLO THIS WEEK. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF NOTED THAT BONNER HAD NOT BEEN TOLD THAT THE DEMARCHE MAY ALREADY HAVE TAKEN PLACE.)

3. OUR INTERLOCUTOR SAID THAT BONNER HAD GIVEN THEM A COPY OF SAKHAROV'S LETTER (REF B). BONNER EXPLAINED THAT, FEARING A POSSIBLE SEARCH EN ROUTE BACK TO MOSCOW, SHE HAD DECIDED TO CARRY ONLY A COPY OF SAKHAROV'S LETTER AND HAD SENT THE ORIGINAL TO THE U. S.

4. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF SAID THAT BONNER HAD STATED THAT SAKHAROV AND SHE WILL AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE NORWEGIAN DEMARCHE BEFORE FORMALLY APPLYING TO EMIGRATE. THE NORWEGIANS PLAN TO CONTACT BONNER AFTER HER RETURN FROM GOR'KIY ON APRIL 5. (BONNER PLANS TO TRAVEL BACK TO GOR'KIY THE EVENING OF MARCH 12.)

5. BONNER ALSO REPORTEDLY STATED TO THE NORWEGIANS THAT SAKHAROV AND SHE FEEL "MORE INSECURE" SINCE

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 2927

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BREZHNEV'S DEATH AND FEAR THAT THE AUTHORITIES MAY AT ANY MOMENT TAKE STEPS TO PREVENT HER FROM VISITING MOSCOW. BONNER ALSO TOLD THE NORWEGIANS THAT, ALTHOUGH SAKHAROV AND SHE ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THEIR CHANCES OF RECEIVING PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE TO NORWAY, THEY BELIEVE THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S DEMARCHE MAY RESULT IN AN IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR SITUATION IN THE USSR.

6. WE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN A READ OUT OF THE MEETING FROM BONNER ON MARCH 12. ZIMMERMANN  
BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8307047

SAKHAROV 677

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 DOBSONSKY

March 12, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 MAR 1983 A 5:49

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: USG and Emigré Involvement in Sakharov Celebrations

Our Embassy in Moscow has conferred with Yelena Bonner, the wife of Dr. Andrey Sakharov, to gain her and her husband's views on the preparations now under way in the United States to celebrate Sakharov's sixty-second birthday (May 21, 1983).

Mrs. Bonner strongly welcomes the idea of such celebrations ("the more the better"), but has two reservations.

First, she does not believe that the USG should be involved in the celebrations in any major way. This is because prominent USG involvement would enable the Soviets to claim that the Sakharov celebrations were a sham, and were being used by the USG to score political points against the USSR.

Second, Mrs. Bonner holds similar reservations about the involvement of prominent Soviet emigrés in such celebrations. She feels that emigré involvement would make it even easier for the Soviets to persuade neutral opinion that Dr. Sakharov was simply being used by "anti-Soviet" elements to whip up a political campaign against the USSR, and that Dr. Sakharov's rights as an individual were not the fundamental concern. Mrs. Bonner particularly mentioned her antipathy toward the idea being pushed by Soviet emigrés Bukovskiy and Lozanskiy to use Solzhenitsyn at one Sakharov event (a possible meeting with President Reagan at the Kennedy Center).

Mrs. Bonner believes that the way to avoid these pitfalls is for the International Sakharov Day celebrations to be organized and led by a group of religious figures, writers, and scientists, including supporters of the peace movement, who are not known for their hostility toward the Soviet Union.

We agree with Mrs. Bonner's view that publicity for Dr. Sakharov is useful, and believe her reservations concerning the format for a Sakharov Day should be taken into account in organizing it. Sakharov's decision to emigrate to Norway, if the Soviet authorities permit him to leave, is a new element in the situation that we will need to assess as preparations for Sakharov Day proceed. We will also wish to keep in direct touch with Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner, the intended beneficiaries of our efforts.

We would also note that beyond the Sakharov case there are other specific cases where, in accordance with the President's

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BY LBJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



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wishes, we are trying the confidential route in an effort to resolve the situation, the most prominent example being our current efforts along a broad front to help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The fact that these confidential efforts are underway does not mean that the USG should eschew public efforts. Nor does it mean that we should cease our pressure and criticism overall of the Soviet Union's abysmal human rights performance, or that we should refrain from behind the scenes support of the efforts of others to publicize these cases. What it does mean, however, is that the USG role in any public efforts, such as the Sakharov Day celebrations, will have to be extremely carefully evaluated to ensure that they do not undermine or discredit parallel efforts which are not in the public eye.

  
L. Paul Bremer, II  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

RECEIVED 14 MAR 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 12 MAR 83

*Desidents*

*CS*

*7/12/02*

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SAKHAROV, ANDREY

SUBJECT: US & EMIGRE INVOLVEMENT IN SAKHAROV BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 16 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

LORD

MYER

STEARMAN

FRAN -

This memorandum is OBE. (another <sup>Bremer</sup> memo re: Sakharov  
(for the record) # 2224 is under review). Please Xerox <sup>at</sup> then close out.

COMMENTS

PAULA

4/5/83

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8307047

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24

United States Department of State

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 12/17/07  
Washington, D.C. 20520

March 12, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: USG and Emigré Involvement in Sakharov Celebrations

Our Embassy in Moscow has conferred with Yelena Bonner, the wife of Dr. Andrey Sakharov, to gain her and her husband's views on the preparations now under way in the United States to celebrate Sakharov's sixty-second birthday (May 21, 1983).

Mrs. Bonner strongly welcomes the idea of such celebrations ("the more the better"), but has two reservations.

First, she does not believe that the USG should be involved in the celebrations in any major way. This is because prominent USG involvement would enable the Soviets to claim that the Sakharov celebrations were a sham, and were being used by the USG to score political points against the USSR.

Second, Mrs. Bonner holds similar reservations about the involvement of prominent Soviet emigrés in such celebrations. She feels that emigré involvement would make it even easier for the Soviets to persuade neutral opinion that Dr. Sakharov was simply being used by "anti-Soviet" elements to whip up a political campaign against the USSR, and that Dr. Sakharov's rights as an individual were not the fundamental concern. Mrs. Bonner particularly mentioned her antipathy toward the idea being pushed by Soviet emigrés Bukovskiy and Lozanskiy to use Solzhenitsyn at one Sakharov event (a possible meeting with President Reagan at the Kennedy Center).

Mrs. Bonner believes that the way to avoid these pitfalls is for the International Sakharov Day celebrations to be organized and led by a group of religious figures, writers, and scientists, including supporters of the peace movement, who are not known for their hostility toward the Soviet Union.

We agree with Mrs. Bonner's view that publicity for Dr. Sakharov is useful, and believe her reservations concerning the format for a Sakharov Day should be taken into account in organizing it. Sakharov's decision to emigrate to Norway, if the Soviet authorities permit him to leave, is a new element in the situation that we will need to assess as preparations for Sakharov Day proceed. We will also wish to keep in direct touch with Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner, the intended beneficiaries of our efforts.

We would also note that beyond the Sakharov case there are other specific cases where, in accordance with the President's

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

wishes, we are trying the confidential route in an effort to resolve the situation, the most prominent example being our current efforts along a broad front to help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The fact that these confidential efforts are underway does not mean that the USG should eschew public efforts. Nor does it mean that we should cease our pressure and criticism overall of the Soviet Union's abysmal human rights performance, or that we should refrain from behind the scenes support of the efforts of others to publicize these cases. What it does mean, however, is that the USG role in any public efforts, such as the Sakharov Day celebrations, will have to be extremely carefully evaluated to ensure that they do not undermine or discredit parallel efforts which are not in the public eye.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE - SAKHAROV  
Dissidents  
ID 8301677 2/

RECEIVED 14 MAR 83 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 12 MAR 83

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28 1987  
Hirtel

SUSPENSE

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SAKHAROV, ANDREY

SUBJECT: US & EMIGRE INVOLVEMENT IN SAKHAROV BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 16 MAR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

LORD

MYER

STEARMAN

Required

Agree with team - we can also  
try to do more to promote  
this in Europe, possibly with  
private funding W

COMMENTS

REF# 8307047

LOG

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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8307047

United States Department of State

NLS FOI 114/6#9431BY WAT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 12, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM TO MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: USG and Emigré Involvement in Sakharov Celebrations

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

wishes, we are trying the confidential route in an effort to resolve the situation, the most prominent example being our current efforts along a broad front to help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The fact that these confidential efforts are underway does not mean that the USG should eschew public efforts. Nor does it mean that we should cease our pressure and criticism overall of the Soviet Union's abysmal human rights performance, or that we should refrain from behind the scenes support of the efforts of others to publicize these cases. What it does mean, however, is that the USG role in any public efforts, such as the Sakharov Day celebrations, will have to be extremely carefully evaluated to ensure that they do not undermine or discredit parallel efforts which are not in the public eye.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAKHAROV  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02      MOSCOW 3042      DTG: 151329Z MAR 83      PSN: 012748  
EOB709      AN002498      TOR: 074/2139Z      CSN: HCE453

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4273

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AMEMBASSY MADRID 2271  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 9643  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2004

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 03042

EXDIS  
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR, AU  
SUBJECT: AUSTRIAN UNIVERSITY OFFER OF ONE-YEAR  
- GUEST PROFESSORSHIP TO SAKHAROV

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR HELMUT LIEDERMANN (PROTECT) CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM ON MARCH 14 TO ASK THAT THE EMBASSY CONVEY TO SAKHAROV THROUGH ELENA BONNER AN OFFER FROM AN AUSTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF A ONE-YEAR GUEST PROFESSORSHIP. ALTHOUGH NOTING THAT, AS AUTONOMOUS INSTITUTIONS, AUSTRIAN UNIVERSITIES THEMSELVES MUST MAKE SUCH AN OFFER AND THAT NONE FORMALLY HAS AS YET, LIEDERMANN SAID THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT SUCH AN OFFER WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IF SAKHAROV WOULD INDICATE THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT IT. LIEDERMANN ADDED THAT THIS IDEA HAD SPONTANEOUSLY SURFACED IN AUSTRIA WITHOUT ANY FOREIGN ENCOURAGEMENT BEFORE THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD STATED IN PARLIAMENT THAT SAKHAROV WOULD BE WELCOME TO LIVE IN NORWAY AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT AN OFFER FROM A UNIVERSITY IN A NEUTRAL COUNTRY MIGHT BE "MORE EFFECTIVE." LIEDERMANN ALSO ASKED THAT WE KEEP THIS OFFER STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
3. DCM ZIMMERMANN, NOTING THAT IT RECENTLY HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT SAKHAROV IS READY TO EMIGRATE, SAID THAT BONNER AND HE WOULD MOST LIKELY GREET THE AUSTRIAN OFFER POSITIVELY AS YET ANOTHER INSTANCE OF PRESSURE ON THE AUTHORITIES TO ACT ON SAKHAROV'S CASE. IN THIS SENSE, CONTINUED ZIMMERMANN, ALL INVITATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM WESTERN EUROPE, ARE HELPFUL. IN HIS OPINION, ZIMMERMANN ADDED, IT WAS JUST SUCH EUROPEAN PRESSURE WHICH HAD TIPPED THE SCALES DURING THE SAKHAROV/BONNER HUNGER STRIKE FOR THE EMIGRATION OF LIZA ALEKSEYEVA. IN CONCLUSION, ZIMMERMANN SAID THAT WE WOULD CONTACT MRS. BONNER UPON HER RETURN TO MOSCOW ON APRIL 5 TO CONVEY THE AUSTRIAN OFFER TO HER AND BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR LIEDERMANN.  
HARTMAN  
BT

EXDIS

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DECLASSIFIED

NLS F00-114/6#9432

BY LOJ NARA DATE 12/3/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Assault*

**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

March 25, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Request for a Meeting Between the President and Solzhenitsyn

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a self-explanatory memorandum to Edwin Meese forwarding a proposed response (Tab A) to a letter from Ernest W. Lefever (Tab B).

Norman Bailey concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Edwin Meese.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Edwin Meese
- Tab A Proposed response
- Tab B Incoming letter from Ernest W. Lefever, March 10.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Ernest W. Lefever  
Requesting Presidential Meeting with Solzhenitsyn

Ernest Lefever sent you a letter (Tab B) which proposes a meeting between the President and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. At Tab A is a suggested reply which does not encourage such a meeting for the following reasons. First, the President is keenly aware of the nature of Russian imperialism and really does not need any further explanations on how bad the Soviet system is. Second, Solzhenitsyn has a rather controversial reputation within various ethnic communities for some of his ideas on the future of Russia are perceived to be undemocratic. Finally, in May 1982, he was invited (along with other Soviet dissidents) to a luncheon with the President, but declined the invitation. For these reasons, I do not think the proposed meeting would serve any useful purpose at this time.

## Attachments:

Tab A Proposed response to Mr. Lefever  
Tab B Incoming letter from Mr. Lefever of March 10

Dear Ernest:

Thank you for your recent letter which proposes a meeting between President Reagan and Alexander Solzhenitsyn.

As you know, the President has consistently demonstrated his realistic grasp of the Soviet Union and is keenly interested in curtailing Soviet human rights violations. During the past two years, he has met with various Soviet dissidents, including the wife of Anatoly Shcharansky. In fact, in May 1982, the President hosted a lunch for a number of renowned Soviet dissidents. Mr. Solzhenitsyn was invited to this luncheon and was offered a private meeting with the President. He, however, declined the invitation.

Although Solzhenitsyn is a great writer and has contributed immensely to our understanding of the Soviet Union, given the present heavy demands on the President's schedule, a meeting cannot be arranged at this time.

Again, thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely,

Mr. Ernest W. Lefever  
President  
Ethics and Public Policy Center  
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20009

WHITE HOUSE  
COUNSELLOR'S OFFICE TRACKING WORKSHEET

*NDO/K*

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 83103111

Name of Correspondent: Ernest W. LeFever

CN Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Writer strongly supports a possible meeting between the President and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CNHAMM</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>83103114</u>
<u>NS CLARK</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>83103119</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>for signature of Ed Moore</u>
	Referral Note:	
	Referral Note:	
	Referral Note:	
	Referral Note:	

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
  - C - Comment/Recommendation
  - D - Draft Response
  - F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
  - I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
  - R - Direct Reply w/Copy
  - S - For Signature
  - X - Interim Reply
- DISPOSITION CODES:**
- A - Answered
  - B - Non-Special Referral
  - C - Completed
  - S - Suspended
- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
  - Code = "A"
  - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original Incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

1887

35

# Ethics and Public Policy Center

1666 Connecticut Avenue N.W. ☐ Washington, D.C. 20009 ☐ 202 328-7400

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Ernest W. Lefever  
*President*

March 10, 1983

Honorable Edwin Meese, III  
Counsellor to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Ed:

I have chatted with Marilee Melvin about the possible visit between Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and President Reagan.


At first I thought this might be arranged in connection with an award we had hoped to give him on October 20, 1983. That award dinner will not take place until 1984 at the earliest, but I still think it is a sound idea for the President to see this great man. I know the checkered history of his relationship to Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, but the ineptitude of the past should not prevent a future meeting between two great men.

Solzhenitsyn is controversial and irascible, but he will loom great in history.

His greatness was acknowledged at a dinner we held to honor him on September 16, 1980, at which George Will and Michael Novak paid tribute. A copy of their addresses on that occasion is enclosed.

If there is anything I can do in this matter, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Ernest W. Lefever

Enclosure:

Solzhenitsyn and American Democracy

2/5

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Ethics and Public Policy Reprint • 29

Solzhenitsyn  
and  
American  
Democracy

Georgie Will  
Michael Novak

~~SECRET~~

SHCHARANSKIY

36

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1604 DTG: 250519Z MAR 83 PSN: 028216  
EOB136 AN008956 TOR: 084/1414Z CSN: HCE344

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3705

INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 5702  
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2395

~~SECRET~~ STATE 081604

EXDIS, MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE  
E. O. 12356; DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, SHUM, UR, US  
SUBJECT: AVITAL SHCHARANSKIY'S MEETINGS AT DEPARTMENT

1. (LOU) MRS. SHCHARANSKIY AND ADVISER ELI SADAN MET WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN AND EUR DAS PALMER MARCH 9-10 AT DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS CURRENT STATUS OF EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY.

2. (S) SADAN BEGAN SESSION WITH PALMER BY PROPOSING POSSIBLE PRISONER EXCHANGES INVOLVING PRO-SOVIET COMMUNISTS IMPRISONED IN URUGUAY AND PARAGUAY, SUGGESTING THAT "RECIPROCAL GESTURES" MIGHT BE ARRANGED. WHILE NOTING THAT "SOMETHING" WAS GOING ON, PALMER SAID THAT SENSITIVITY OF THE SUBJECT PREVENTED HIM FROM ELABORATING, AND CAUTIONED THAT IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE USG TO PURSUE A "SERIOUS CHANNEL" WITH THE SOVIETS.

3. (C) SIMULTANEOUSLY, PALMER URGED, AVITAL SHOULD KEEP UP PUBLIC PRESSURE BY CONTINUING TO SOLICIT SUPPORT OF OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. SADAN AGREED THAT IT WAS POLITICALLY A GOOD TIME TO DO SO, BUT HE AND AVITAL EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE FRG AND EC-10 AS INSUFFICIENTLY STRONG.

THEY NOTED THAT THEIR REQUESTED MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD HELP THEM IN THESE EFFORTS, BUT PALMER POINTED OUT THAT PRESSING BUSINESS OF EL SALVADOR WOULD PROBABLY PRECLUDE SUCH MEETINGS. MOREOVER, PALMER HIMSELF HAD RECOMMENDED AGAINST SUCH MEETINGS AS SERVING NO USEFUL PURPOSE AT THIS TIME. WHILE HOPE FOR BEHIND-THE-SCENES PROGRESS EXISTED, THE USG SHOULD MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE AND AVOID GESTURES WHICH MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS "HUMILIATING" TO SOVIETS. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, SUPPORT AVITAL'S REQUEST TO MEET PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, AND AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK WOULD CITE ANATOLIY'S CASE AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY IN JERUSALEM.

4. (S) IN RESPONSE TO AVITAL'S SKEPTICISM OVER THE

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NLS F06-114/6-4433

~~SECRET~~

BY ART, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1604 DTG: 250519Z MAR 83 PSN: 028216

EXDIS

LIKELY SUCCESS OF PRESENT EFFORTS ON ANATOLIY'S BEHALF, PALMER NOTED THAT, SHOULD THOSE EFFORTS FAIL, THE USG WOULD RETURN TO A HIGH-VISIBILITY CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER, THE CURRENT PROCESS SHOULD BE GIVEN AT LEAST TWO MONTHS, AND AVITAL SHOULD NOT EXPECT A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY BEFORE THAT TIME WAS UP. SADAN CONSIDERED THAT TIME TOO LONG TO WAIT, AND AVITAL NOTED THAT MRS. MILGROM WAS ALSO IMPATIENT. PALMER MENTIONED THAT THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MILGROM, WHICH CAME AS NEWS TO AVITAL AND SADAN.

EXDIS

5. (C) IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING, AMBASSADOR HARTMAN EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT MEET REGULARLY WITH MRS. MILGROM, BELIEVING THAT LOWER-LEVEL CONTACTS ARE LESS LIKELY TO PROVOKE SOVIET INTERFERENCE. HE HAD NOT HEARD THE RUMOR, WHICH SADAN HAD RECEIVED THROUGH A CANADIAN SOURCE, THAT ANATOLIY WAS NO LONGER AT CHISTOPOL'.

EXDIS

6. (S) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN "SIGNS" OF MOVEMENT ON ANATOLIY'S CASE TO PEOPLE (PCF LEADER MARCHAIS, AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN) WHOM IT WAS NOT IN THEIR INTEREST TO MAKE LOOK BAD, AND THAT IT DID NOT SEEM REASONABLE FOR SOVIETS TO GO THIS FAR IF THEY DID NOT INTEND TO GO FURTHER. NEVERTHELESS, NOTHING DEFINITE HAD YET OCCURRED. THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED THE USG BELIEF THAT AT PRESENT TIME THE MOST EFFECTIVE COURSE TO PURSUE WAS ONE INVOLVING PUBLIC PRESSURE WITH LOW-VISIBILITY USG PRIVATE PRESSURE, AND HE HOPED THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS MIGHT BRING MOVEMENT IN ANATOLIY'S CASE BY "THIS SPRING". WE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, WAIT INDEFINITELY FOR SOMETHING TO HAPPEN.

EXDIS

7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED TO AVITAL'S CONCERN ABOUT HER HUSBAND'S HEART CONDITION BY NOTING THAT ANATOLIY'S HEALTH WAS SOMETHING OF WHICH BOTH THE USG AND THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE, AND WHICH COULD AFFECT THE LATTER'S TIMING IN DEALING WITH THE CASE.

8. (LOU) MRS. SHCHARANSKY THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS EFFORTS. THE AMBASSADOR RE-EMPHASIZED THE STRENGTH OF THE USG COMMITMENT TO HER HUSBAND.

9. (U) THIS CABLE WAS PREPARED AFTER AMBASSADOR HARTMAN'S DEPARTURE. SHULTZ  
BT

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

FILE -  
1887 *dissidents* 38

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

— *Dobziansky*

April 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Ernest W. Lefever  
Requesting Presidential Meeting with Solzhenitsyn

Ernest Lefever sent you a letter (Tab B) which proposes a meeting between the President and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. At Tab A is a suggested reply which does not encourage such a meeting for the following reasons. First, the President is keenly aware of the nature of Russian imperialism and really does not need any further explanations on how bad the Soviet system is. Second, Solzhenitsyn has a rather controversial reputation within various ethnic communities for some of his ideas on the future of Russia are perceived to be undemocratic. Finally, in May 1982, he was invited (along with other Soviet dissidents) to a luncheon with the President, but declined the invitation. For these reasons, I do not think the proposed meeting would serve any useful purpose at this time.

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- Tab B Incoming letter from Mr. Lefever of March 10

APR 0 4 1983

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Again, thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.

Sincerely,

Mr. Ernest W. Lefever  
President  
Ethics and Public Policy Center  
1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20009

*NDCK*

WHITE HOUSE  
COUNSELLOR'S OFFICE TRACKING WORKSHEET

- O - OUTGOING
  - H - INTERNAL
  - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/15/12

Name of Correspondent: Barack Obama

CN Mail Report      User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: White House Correspondence  
Re: [illegible]  
[illegible]

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	Tracking Date %:	Type of Response	Disposition Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
Office/Agency (Staff Name): <u>[illegible]</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>1/15/12</u>			<u>1/1</u>
<u>[illegible]</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>1/15/12</u>			<u>1/1</u>
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<u>[illegible]</u>		<u>1/1</u>			<u>1/1</u>

- ACTION CODES:**
- A - Appropriate Action
  - C - Comment/Recommendation
  - D - Draft Response
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- FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**
- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
  - Code = "A"
  - Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

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Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2500.

1367  
36

# Ethics and Public Policy Center

1666 Connecticut Avenue N.W. ☐ Washington, D.C. 20009 ☐ 202 328-7400

---

Ernest W. Lefever  
President

March 10, 1983

Honorable Edwin Meese, III  
Counsellor to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Ed:

I have chatted with Marilee Melvin about the possible visit between Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and President Reagan.

At first I thought this might be arranged in connection with an award we had hoped to give him on October 20, 1983. That award dinner will not take place until 1984 at the earliest, but I still think it is a sound idea for the President to see this great man. I know the checkered history of his relationship to Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, but the ineptitude of the past should not prevent a future meeting between two great men.

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His greatness was acknowledged at a dinner we held to honor him on September 16, 1980, at which George Will and Michael Novak paid tribute. A copy of their addresses on that occasion is enclosed.

If there is anything I can do in this matter, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Ernest W. Lefever

Enclosure:

Solzhenitsyn and American Democracy

Public Policy Review

# Socialism and American Democracy

1938

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 25, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM:

PAULA DOBRIANSKY (17)

SUBJECT:

Request for a Meeting Between the President and  
Solzhenitsyn

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a self-explanatory memorandum to Edwin Meese forwarding a proposed response (Tab A) to a letter from Ernest W. Lefever (Tab B).

Norman Bailey <sup>7/13</sup> concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Edwin Meese.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Edwin Meese  
 Tab A Proposed response  
 Tab B Incoming letter from Ernest W. Lefever, March 10.



SAKHAROV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 02      MOSCOW 4148      DTG: 061453Z APR 83      PSN: 044887  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04148

EXDIS  
EUR/RPM PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR  
SUBJECT: APRIL 5 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE  
- ELENA BONNER  
REFS: (A) MOSCOW 02927 (NOTAL), (B) MOSCOW 03042

1. (A) - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. EMBOFFS MET WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER IN HER APARTMENT ON APRIL 5. EMBOFFS TOLD HER THEY WOULD CONTACT THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY THE FOLLOWING MORNING CONCERNING THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S DEMARCHE ON SAKHAROV'S EMIGRATION AND CONVEY ANY MESSAGE FROM THE NORWEGIANS TO HER THE FOLLOWING AFTERNOON. BONNER SAID THAT SAKHAROV WOULD ACCEPT AN OFFER OF A ONE-YEAR PROFESSORSHIP FROM AN AUSTRIAN UNIVERSITY BUT THAT THE PROBLEM IS OBTAINING PERMISSION FOR HIM TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION. BONNER SAID THAT SHE HAD HEARD THAT THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE MADRID CONFERENCE HAD SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT SAKHARANSKIY WOULD HAVE TO CONFESS AND ADMIT HIS GUILT BEFORE HE COULD BE RELEASED, MENTIONED THAT TATYANA OSIPOVA HAS ENDED HER HUNGER STRIKE IN CAMP AFTER AUTHORITIES HAD PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER A MEETING WITH HER HUSBAND IVAN KOVALEV IF SHE WOULD DO SO, AND CHARACTERIZED ANDROPOV AS POPULAR WITH SOVIETS BECAUSE HE IS LIQUIDATING THE BREZHNEV MAFIA. END SUMMARY.
3. NORWEGIAN DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS. EMBOFFS MET WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE ELENA BONNER IN HER APARTMENT ON APRIL 5 FOLLOWING HER RETURN FROM GOR'KIY EARLIER THAT DAY. EMBOFFS INFORMED BONNER THAT THEY WOULD CONTACT THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY THE NEXT MORNING CONCERNING THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON SAKHAROV'S EMIGRATION TO NORWAY (REF A) AND WOULD CONVEY TO HER THE FOLLOWING AFTERNOON ANY MESSAGE THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY MIGHT HAVE. (NOTE: THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF WHO HAS BEEN HANDLING THIS MATTER WILL RETURN TO MOSCOW ONLY ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 6, AND SO WE WILL CONTACT HER THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 4148

DTG: 061453Z APR 83 PSN: 044887

MORNING OF APRIL 7. WE WILL SO INFORM BONNER.)

4. AUSTRIAN OFFER OF A ONE-YEAR PROFESSORSHIP. EMBOFFS CONVEYED TO BONNER THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR'S RECENT OFFER OF A ONE-YEAR PROFESSORSHIP AT AN AUSTRIAN UNIVERSITY (REF B). BONNER SAID THAT SAKHAROV WOULD BE HAPPY TO ACCEPT SUCH AN OFFER BUT THAT THE PROBLEM IS SECURING PERMISSION FOR HIM TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION. (NOTE: WE WILL INFORM THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR OF BONNER'S REPLY IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.) IN THIS REGARD, BONNER CONTINUED THAT A SOVIET FRIEND HAD SUGGESTED TO HER EARLIER THAT DAY THAT SAKHAROV WRITE TO ANDROPOV CONCERNING EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, BONNER NOTED, SHE WAS CERTAIN THAT SAKHAROV WOULD NOT DO SO.

5. SAKHAROV'S HEALTH. BONNER SAID THAT SAKHAROV'S HEALTH HAS IMPROVED. HE HAS RECOVERED FROM THE INJURY TO HIS BACK WHICH HE SUSTAINED FROM A FALL ON AN ICY SIDEWALK AND NO LONGER IS EXPERIENCING THE HEART PAINS WHICH RECENTLY HAD PLAGUED HIM. THEY BOTH HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE SPRING-LIKE WEATHER IN GOR'KIY TO GO FOR WALKS. BONNER ADDED THAT SHE DOUBTED THAT SAKHAROV WOULD WALK MUCH BY HIMSELF DURING HER ABSENCE.

6. ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY. BONNER SAID THAT SHE HAD HEARD THAT THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE MADRID CONFERENCE RECENTLY HAD STATED IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT SHCHARANSKIY WOULD HAVE TO CONFESS AND ADMIT HIS GUILT BEFORE BEING RELEASED.

7. TAT'YANA OSIPOVA. BONNER SAID THAT SHE HAD LEARNED THAT IVAN KOVALEV'S WIFE TAT'YANA OSIPOVA RECENTLY HAD ENDED HER HUNGER STRIKE IN CAMP AFTER AUTHORITIES HAD TOLD HER THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING WITH HER HUSBAND IF SHE WOULD END THE STRIKE. BONNER RECOMMENDED THAT OSIPOVA'S CASE NOT, RPT., NOT BE PUBLICIZED AT THIS TIME LEST EXCESSIVE ATTENTION TO HER CAUSE THE AUTHORITIES TO FORBID SUCH A MEETING.  
BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 04148

EXDIS  
EUR/RPM PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SHUM, UR  
SUBJECT: APRIL 5 MEETING WITH SAKHAROV'S WIFE

8. ANDROPOV'S POPULARITY. BONNER NOTED THAT ANDROPOV IS QUITE POPULAR AMONG THE SOVIET PEOPLE BECAUSE HE "IS LIQUIDATING THE BREZHNEV MAFIA." BONNER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE A "STRANGE" PEOPLE, AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR FAILURE TO REACT TO THE PRICE INCREASES OF LAST FEBRUARY. ANYWHERE ELSE IN EASTERN EUROPE, SHE CONTINUED, SUCH INCREASES WOULD HAVE CAUSED AN IMMEDIATE POPULAR REACTION, BUT IN THE SOVIET UNION NO ONE DID ANYTHING IN PROTEST.

9. TRAVEL PLANS. BONNER PLANS TO REMAIN IN MOSCOW FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS, POSSIBLY UNTIL FRIDAY, APRIL 15, AND TO RETURN TO MOSCOW ON MAY 10 OR 11.  
HARTMAN  
BT

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BY NOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02      MOSCOW 4208      DTG: 071546Z APR 83      PSN: 046699  
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1512  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2032

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 04208

EXDIS  
EUR/RPM PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR KAMPLEMAN  
EO12356DECLOADR  
TAGS: SHUM, R, NO  
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN DEMARCHE ON SAKHAROV  
REFS: (A) MOSCOW 04148, (B) MOSCOW 02927

EXDIS

1. ~~(A)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. NORWEGIAN EMBOFF INFORMED US ON APRIL 7 THAT THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY ON MARCH 15 DELIVERED TO THE MFA A LETTER FROM NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER STRAY TO GROMYKO UNDER COVER OF A LETTER FROM THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR. STRAY STATED IN HIS LETTER THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD LEARNED THAT SAKHAROV HAD DECIDED TO EMIGRATE TO NORWAY AND THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE HIM, AND ASKED FOR THE COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN FACILITATING SAKHAROV'S EMIGRATION. OUR INTERLOCUTOR ADDED THAT STRAY ALSO HAD RAISED SAKHAROV'S EMIGRATION TO NORWAY WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION VISITING OSLO IN EARLY MARCH FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTRIES. THE NORWEGIANS HAVE NOT RECEIVED A REPLY TO STRAY'S LETTER AND, PENDING RECEIPT OF ONE, DO NOT, RPT., NOT PLAN TO DO ANYTHING MORE. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF SAID THAT SHE AND, IN HER OPINION, THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THE NEXT STEP IS FOR SAKHAROV HIMSELF TO APPLY TO EMIGRATE TO NORWAY.

EXDIS

3. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF CONTINUED THAT STRAY HAD SAID NOTHING IN HIS LETTER ABOUT BONNER'S TRAVEL TO ITALY OR ELSEWHERE FOR TREATMENT OF HER GLAUCOMA SINCE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN "AWKWARD" TO HAVE INCLUDED THIS MATTER IN THE SAME LETTER. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO RAISE BONNER'S REQUEST WITH THE SOVIETS IF SAKHAROV IS DENIED PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE.

4. THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF ALSO SAID THAT HER GOVERNMENT PREFERS NOT TO MAKE ITS DEMARCHE PUBLIC. WE ASSURED HER THAT WE ALSO BELIEVE IT BEST TO KEEP THIS MATTER STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

OUR INTERLOCUTOR ASKED THAT WE CONVEY THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR DISCUSSION TO BONNER AND INFORM HER THAT THE NOR-

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 4208

DTG: 071546Z APR 83 PSN: 046699

WEGIAN EMBASSY WOULD BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE HER IF SHE WISHED PERSONALLY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES. WE TOLD THE NORWEGIAN EMBOFF THAT WE WOULD SO INFORM BONNER DURING OUR MEETING WITH HER LATER THAT DAY AND WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH IN THE NEAR FUTURE. (NOTE: BONNER WAS NOT AT HOME WHEN WE WENT TO HER APARTMENT. SHE CALLED LATER, AND WE ARRANGED TO MEET WITH HER ON THE MORNING OF APRIL 8.)  
HARTMAN  
BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/19/83

2. USSR: ANDROPOV MAY RELEASE PROMINENT DISSIDENTS

It now seems likely that the Soviets will grant visas to the Pentacostals who have left the US Embassy. More important, Moscow may be preparing to release other prominent dissidents, undercutting our indictment of the Soviet human rights record. Should any of these releases take place, it would improve Moscow's image in Western Europe and thus help its anti-INF campaign. The Soviets would also hope that this would lend support to those European allies who want to accept the compromise draft on human rights issues now before the CSCE, and perhaps help get an agreement at Madrid on a conference on disarmament in Europe.

\* \* \*

Soviet authorities invited Lidiya Vashchenko to apply for emigration and promptly issued her exit visa for Israel. She arrived in Israel April 10 and is now in a position to send formal "invitations" to family members. That prospect has finally persuaded the Embassy Pentecostals to return home. Having moved to end the impasse, it seems likely that Andropov will now permit the family to emigrate. If so, that may be a sign that Moscow is preparing to move on other prominent cases as well.

The Shcharanskiy Case. In response to French Communist leader Marchais' inquiry in January regarding Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Andropov pointedly noted that Soviet law did not exclude the possibility of an early release. Recent soundings of Soviet intentions on this score have not encountered the total unresponsiveness of earlier days.

Georgiy Vladimov. After repeated threats to arrest and prosecute prominent dissident writer and Soviet representative of Amnesty International Georgiy Vladimov, authorities accepted his application to emigrate. In mid-February, Vladimov told reporters that he was planning to leave for West Germany in June.

The Sakharov Case. Even the exile of Andrey Sakharov in Gorkiy may not be permanent. In early February, Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, informed our Embassy that he now had no objection to emigration--as though his willingness to leave was the key requirement for his departure. In early March, Bonner indicated that Sakharov was prepared to accept a Norwegian offer to come to Oslo; after discussions with Bonner, the Norwegian Embassy has recently made a demarche to the Soviet Government. Andropov may well be the one Soviet leader able to convince the Politburo of the political advantages of a positive decision in spite of earlier regime objections based on security considerations.

A possible common denominator in the cases is Moscow's seeming preference that the activists not go to the US. Their emigration to Europe or Israel would deny the US credit for the outcome. Andropov's policy of disciplining Soviet society by rooting out corruption and dissent would, of course, not be affected.

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BY RW  
DATE: 3/19/13  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON*DABZKUSKA  
file Dissidents*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

April 19, 1983

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JM*

REQUEST: Signing ceremony.

PURPOSE: To honor Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet human rights activist, renowned scientist and Nobel Prize Laureate.

BACKGROUND: In January 1980, Andrei Sakharov was exiled by Soviet authorities to Gorky, where he has been subjected for two years to villainous harassment, punishment, loss of his livelihood and acts of physical violence, in retaliation for his outspoken advocacy of human rights.

It is expected that in mid-April a joint House-Senate resolution honoring Dr. Sakharov (H.R. 178) will be passed in time for one of the main events honoring Sakharov -- a National Academy of Sciences news conference on April 27 involving several Nobel Prize winners.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 27, 1983; DURATION: 10-15 minutes  
Time: open

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room

PARTICIPANTS: List to be provided.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: 1. Brief remarks; 2. Signing document.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity.

RECOMMENDED BY: Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 14, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON **SIGNED**

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Presidential Signing Ceremony for Sakharov Resolution

As noted in State's memorandum (Tab II) of April 2, the organizers of Sakharov Day have requested a Presidential signing ceremony for the joint House-Senate resolution (H.R. 178) honoring Dr. Sakharov. This would be a worthwhile endeavor for the following reasons:

- It would manifest the President's continuing support for Dr. Sakharov in his ongoing struggle with Soviet authorities.
- This event would uphold the President's preference for "firm principles and quiet diplomacy on human rights issues" and would be consonant with Sakharov's clearly stated preference that government efforts not overshadow private efforts.
- Both Sakharov and his wife, Elena Bonner, have indicated they approve and appreciate this kind of support.

A Schedule Proposal for your signature is provided at Tab I.

*JL* Lenczowski, *u* Lord, *W* Raymond and *PES* Sommer concur. *Jm* OSTP concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ *✓* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Proposed Schedule Proposal
- Tab II State's memorandum, April 2, 1983

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BY *RW* DATE *3/19/13*



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2224

April 2, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83 APR 2 P 3: 02

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Presidential Signing Ceremony for Sakharov Resolution

We understand that the organizers of Sakharov Day have been in touch with White House Science Adviser Keyworth to request a Presidential signing ceremony for the joint House-Senate resolution honoring Dr. Sakharov (H.J. 178). Congressional staffers we have contacted anticipate that the resolution will probably be passed by mid-April, in time for one of the main events honoring Sakharov, a National Academy of Sciences news conference on April 27 involving several Nobel Prize winners. The Sakharov Day organizers feel that a signing ceremony would give a big boost to their efforts, and increase the amount of attention that would be paid to the Academy's press conference.

We believe that Dr. Sakharov deserves and can use considerable support in his ongoing struggle with the Soviet authorities, and he and his wife Elena Bonner have let us know they would appreciate support on this occasion. At the same time, they would prefer to see private spokesmen take the lead over government figures. This fits well, we believe, with the President's preference for both firm principles and quiet diplomacy on human rights matters. Thus, we think that a Presidential signing ceremony would be appropriate in this case, provided it is conducted in a manner consonant with the Sakharovs' evident preference that government efforts not overshadow private efforts on their behalf.

We would appreciate any early word that may be forthcoming on the President's decision in this matter.

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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NLS F06-114/6#9437

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADRBY LOT NARA DATE 12/13/07

*Handwritten notes*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 22, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Presidential Signing Ceremony for Sakharov Resolution

I was informed by Charles Tyson that the first Schedule Proposal for a Presidential Signing Ceremony of the joint House-Senate Resolution (H.R. 178) honoring Dr. Sakharov on April 27 was disapproved. On that day, the President will be in New York until the late afternoon and has a speaking engagement in the evening.

I am resubmitting this Schedule Proposal as both State, NSC and OSTP perceive this to be a very worthwhile endeavor. Most significantly, it would manifest the President's continuing support for Dr. Sakharov, a renowned Soviet human rights activist and Nobel Prize Laureate. A proposed Schedule Proposal is provided at Tab I.

*JL* *U* (not available until Mon.)  
Lenczowski, Lord, Sommer, and OSTP concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Schedule Proposal at Tab I be forwarded to Fred Ryan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

- Tab I Schedule Proposal
- Tab II State's memorandum, April 2, 1983

*Handwritten initials and date: CLS 7/14/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2224

April 2, 1983

83 APR 2 P 3: 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Presidential Signing Ceremony for Sakharov Resolution

We understand that the organizers of Sakharov Day have been in touch with White House Science Adviser Keyworth to request a Presidential signing ceremony for the joint House-Senate resolution honoring Dr. Sakharov (H.J. 178). Congressional staffers we have contacted anticipate that the resolution will probably be passed by mid-April, in time for one of the main events honoring Sakharov, a National Academy of Sciences news conference on April 27 involving several Nobel Prize winners. The Sakharov Day organizers feel that a signing ceremony would give a big boost to their efforts, and increase the amount of attention that would be paid to the Academy's press conference.

We believe that Dr. Sakharov deserves and can use considerable support in his ongoing struggle with the Soviet authorities, and he and his wife Elena Bonner have let us know they would appreciate support on this occasion. At the same time, they would prefer to see private spokesmen take the lead over government figures. This fits well, we believe, with the President's preference for both firm principles and quiet diplomacy on human rights matters. Thus, we think that a Presidential signing ceremony would be appropriate in this case, provided it is conducted in a manner consonant with the Sakharovs' evident preference that government efforts not overshadow private efforts on their behalf.

We would appreciate any early word that may be forthcoming on the President's decision in this matter.

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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NLS Folio 714/6 #9438~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADRBY WOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

REQUEST: Signing ceremony.

PURPOSE: To honor Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet human rights activist, renowned scientist and Nobel Prize Laureate.

BACKGROUND: In January 1980, Andrei Sakharov was exiled by Soviet authorities to Gorky, where he has been subjected for two years to villainous harassment, punishment, loss of his livelihood and acts of physical violence, in retaliation for his outspoken advocacy of human rights.

It is expected that in April the joint House-Senate resolution honoring Dr. Sakharov (H.R. 178) will be passed. A signing ceremony would manifest the President's continuing concern for Dr. Sakharov, an internationally renowned human rights activist.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: May 10, 11, 12, 18 or 19, 1983  
Time: open DURATION: 10-15 minutes

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room

PARTICIPANTS: List to be provided.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: 1. Brief remarks; 2. Signing document.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity.

RECOMMENDED BY: Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Charles P. Tyson

CS 7/12/12

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