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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 6/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2208

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9202	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE HARTMAN-GROMYKO MEETING <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	10/28/1983	B1
9209	CABLE	191245Z OCT 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	6	10/19/1983	B1
9203	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SHULTZ'S LUNCH WITH DOBRYNIN, OCTOBER 28 <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	2	10/31/1983	B1
9204	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, OCTOBER 28 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	ND	B1
9205	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE LUNCH TODAY WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	10/28/1983	B1
9206	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE EAGLEBURGER-DOBRYNIN CONVERSATION <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	1	10/31/1983	B1
9210	CABLE	131518Z OCT 83 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	5	10/13/1983	B1
9207	MEMO	GATES TO MATLOCK RE DOBRYNIN <i>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	2/2/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 6/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2208

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9208	MEMO	DOBRYNIN AND THE POLITBURO PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	5	2/2/1984	B1
9211	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, APRIL 16, 1984 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	4	4/17/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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USSR/1916

SYSTEM II
91311

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

October 28, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Hartman-Gromyko Meeting

You may want to take a look at the report (Tab I) of Hartman's meeting with Gromyko on October 19. The major thrust of Gromyko's comment was that the Soviet leaders are convinced that the Reagan Administration does not accept their legitimacy, and that therefore it is not prepared to negotiate seriously with the USSR, but is actually dedicated to bringing down the system.

There is a large self-serving element in such argumentation, but I believe that it is an argument used in policy debates among the Soviet leadership. Given the present signs of uncertainty in the Soviet leadership, and the indirect evidence of debate, it probably serves our interest to do what we can (without changing our policies) to undercut the force of this argument.

Attachment:

Tab I Report of Hartman/Gromyko Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6# 9202
BY H0J, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



PAGE 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 13169 01 OF 02 191856Z CB1/B1
ACTION NODS-00

NOD489

INFO OCT-19 ADS-00 /000 W

-----360054 191906Z /53

D 191245Z OCT 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 13169

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

PLEASE PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT
SECRETARY BURT

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON GROMYKO OCTOBER 19

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: I CALLED ON GROMYKO TODAY TO GET A READING OF HIS VIEWS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE TOMORROW. THE DISCUSSION VERY QUICKLY BECAME A PHILOSOPHICAL ONE; IN FACT, HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO SAY ON THE ONE SPECIFIC ISSUE -- INF -- THAT WE TOUCHED ON. BUT HE DID GO TO GREAT LENGTHS IN ARGUING THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEM THE SOVIETS HAVE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS THAT THEY BELIEVE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEIR LEGITIMACY AND THEREFORE THAT WE CONSTANTLY INTRUDE IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE. EVEN ALLOWING FOR HIS WELL-KNOWN THESPIAN QUALITIES, GROMYKO WAS PASSIONATE ON THE SUBJECT, FREQUENTLY CORRECTING HIS INTERPRETER TO MAKE SURE THAT EXACT NUANCES WERE BEING CONVEYED AND EVEN KEEPING ME

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOI-114/6 # 9209

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

ALERT COPY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~



PAGE 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 13169 01 OF 02 191856Z CB1/01

NOD489

FIFTEEN MINUTES BEYOND OUR ALLOTTED HOUR TO EMPHASIZE HIS POINTS. WHILE A LOT OF THIS IS OBVIOUSLY SELF-SERVING, AT LEAST IT'S A PROBLEM WE SHOULD TALK ABOUT IN-HOUSE; I HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THE ISSUE WHEN I SEE YOU NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY.

3. GROMYKO RECEIVED ME IN HIS MFA OFFICE. HE LOOKED NONE THE WORST FOR WEAR FOLLOWING HIS RIGOROUS TRAVELS AND CONVERSATIONS. GROMYKO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USA DEPARTMENT CHIEF BESSMERTNYKH; I BROUGHT WITH ME MY DCM, ZIMMERMANN. WHILE GROMYKO HAD SOME HARD THINGS TO SAY, HIS TONE WAS MORE REFLECTIVE THAN POLEMICAL--A STRIKING CONTRAST FROM THE PYROTECHNICS AT MADRID.

4. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I HAD COME PRIMARILY TO LISTEN, AND WANTED TO GET HIS SENSE OF THE STATE OF RELATIONS BEFORE MY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. BEGINNING WITH INF, I WONDERED WHAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN. IF IT HAS BEEN TO STOP DEPLOYMENT, IT WON'T SUCCEED. IF IT HAS BEEN TO LIMIT OUR DEPLOYMENTS, OUR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE MORE SERIOUS. I TOLD GROMYKO I WAS PUZZLED.

5. GROMYKO RESPONDED BY NOTING THE LOW DEPTH TO WHICH OUR RELATIONS HAVE SUNK AND SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE PRODUCT OF THE POLICY OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. HE CLAIMED THAT IN INF THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEGOTIATING POSITION WAS NOT SERIOUS AND THAT WE WERE JUST KILLING TIME IN ORDER TO MISLEAD PEOPLE AND USE THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A SORT OF SMOKE SCREEN FOR DEPLOYMENT. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SEEK DOMINANCE, BUT WILL TAKE MEASURES TO ASSURE THAT ITS POSITION IS NOT WEAKENED. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS IN FAVOR OF PARITY AND EQUALITY. IT HAS MADE PROPOSALS BASED ON PARITY. BUT PARITY CAN BE ON VARIOUS LEVELS; IT IS ONE THING TO HAVE PARITY AT A LOWER LEVEL BUT ANOTHER THING TO HAVE PARITY AT

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PAGE 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 13169 01 OF 02 191856Z CB1/01
A HIGHER LEVEL LEADING TO MAJOR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

NOD439

6. AN UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION ENSUED REGARDING THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. GROMYKO CALLED OUR ASSERTIONS THAT THEY ARE NOT PART OF NATO SYSTEMS A "FAIRYTALE". IF WE WANTED SOMEONE TO BELIEVE SUCH A FAIRYTALE, THEN WE'LL HAVE TO LOOK FOR SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION. I TRIED TO PULL GROMYKO BACK TO THE SITUATION HE ENVISAGES FOLLOWING OUR DEPLOYMENTS. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ASSERTING SIMPLY THAT OUR ACTION WOULD LEAD TO NEW TWISTS IN THE ARMS SPIRAL. I STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ADDED THAT IN DOING SO WE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF SUCH NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AS THE FRG. GROMYKO SAID THAT OUR LATEST PROPOSAL WAS A MOCKERY OF COMMON SENSE AND THAT NEITHER IN INF NOR IN START HAD OUR RECENT PROPOSALS MOVED EVEN ONE SMALL STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF AGREEMENTS.

7. GROMYKO THEN MOVED ON TO HIS PRIMARY MESSAGE. HE SAID THAT U.S. POLICIES AND STATEMENTS ARE BASED ON DECEPTION AND ARE UNWORTHY OF TRUST. OUR WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED NO VESTIGE OF ELEMENTARY PROPRIETY. IDEOLOGY WAS BEING MIXED INTO POLICIES INVOLVING WORLD SECURITY AND ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE.

8. I ARGUED THAT SOVIETS, OF ALL PEOPLE, SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED AT IDEOLOGICAL COMBAT. I MYSELF HAD HEARD BREZHNEV, AT THE HEIGHT OF DETENTE, SAY THAT THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION WOULD CONTINUE. AND I HEARD ANDROPOV LESS THAN A YEAR AGO -- IN A SPEECH IN THE KREMLIN -- DEVOTE THE FIRST HALF TO IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE SECOND HALF TO A DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL. THE SOVIET UNION HAS A PARTY APARATUS AND NEWSPAPERS THAT CAN MAKE THE IDEOLOGICAL CASE WHILE THE GOVERNMENT

LEADERS CAN CONCENTRATE ON STATE POLICY; THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE SUCH POSSIBILITIES.



NOD489

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PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS STRONG IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS; THE
FACT THAT HE HOLDS THEM DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE DOES NOT
DESIRE TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL OR TO DISCUSS REGIONAL
PROBLEMS SERIOUSLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

9. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT IN NEGOTIATING WITH THREE U.S.
PRESIDENTS, BREZHNEV HAD NEVER PUT IDEOLOGY ON THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE SAID IT WOULD BE ONE THING IF
PRESIDENT REAGAN WENT TO A CLUB AND GAVE A LECTURE ON
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST
IDEOLOGY. HE COULD OUTLINE THE ADVANTAGES OF CAPITALIST
IDEOLOGY; HE COULD ARGUE THE VIRTUES OF IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY
OVER MATERIAL PHILOSOPHY. AND, IN THE FIELD OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, HE COULD NOTE HIS PREFERENCE FOR ADAM SMITH
OVER KARL MARX. BUT IT'S SOMETHING ELSE WHEN HE ATTACKS
THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR SOCIAL SYSTEM, OUR CONSTITUTION
OUR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, AND OUR LEADERSHIP. WITH SUCH
RHETORIC BEING USED, GROMYKO CONTINUED, IT IS DIFFICULT
TO DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES, INDEED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING
AT ALL

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Department of State

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INCOMING

PAGE 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 13169 02 OF 02 191904Z C01/B1
ACTION NODS-00

NOD498

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----360140 191907Z 41

Q 191245Z OCT 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 13169

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

PLEASE PASS TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND ASSISTANT
SECRETARY BURT

10. I COUNTERED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO DEFINE OUR
COMPETITION PURELY IN TERMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES.
THE COMPETITION GOES ON IN MANY AREAS, IN PART BECAUSE
BOTH OF US ARE FREE TO PROMOTE OUR COMPETING IDEOLOGIES
AND THIS IS BOUND TO BRING US INTO CONFLICT. WE HAVE TO
MAINTAIN A STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONSHIP, EXERCISE RESTRAINT,
AND TALK MORE. I DENIED THAT OUR MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE
SOVIETS WAS THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR SYSTEM; OUR MAJOR
PROBLEM WAS THAT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR
FRIENDS WERE AFFECTED BY SOVIET ACTIVITIES. I RECALLED
FOR GROMYKO THAT OUR CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION TOOK ROOT AT THE TIME OF A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT
AND A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS.

11. GROMYKO THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG PLEA FOR THE
SEPARATION OF IDEOLOGICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS, ARGUING
THAT IDEOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE A FACTOR WHEN ISSUES OF
WAR AND PEACE ARE BEING DISCUSSED. SAYING IN SPEECHES
ON NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND SECURITY THAT SOCIALIST
REPRESENTATIVES DON'T BELIEVE IN GOD OR IN LIFE

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USSR/Diplo
8

System II
91319

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

October 31, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Shultz's Lunch with Dobrynin, October 28

Secretary Shultz has sent the memorandum to the President at Tab A regarding his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin last Friday. It tracks with the debriefing Shultz gave his senior staff (which I attended) following the lunch. It does, however, omit the following details and observations which Shultz made at that time:

-- Dobrynin commented on Shultz's reference to Shcharansky by saying that there was a misunderstanding involved: Kondrashev (Kamplaman's interlocutor in Madrid) had never been authorized to give assurances of his release.

-- Dobrynin asked specifically what the President had in mind in his reference to "confidential contacts" in his handwritten letter. Shultz said that he meant restricted contacts through normal diplomatic channels to which only a very few officials would be privy, in order to maintain confidentiality.

-- When Shultz suggested that communications had to be a two-way street, and that more regular contact must be provided to Hartman in Moscow, Dobrynin merely shrugged.

-- Shultz complained that he had great difficulty understanding Dobrynin at times, because of the latter's tendency to speak rapidly with a slur, and wondered aloud if it would not be a good idea to have someone else present at future meetings.

I understand from State that the proposed letter for Hartman to deliver has been sent to Secretary Shultz for approval, and if he approves, should come over later today. As I mentioned Saturday, I believe it would be useful to send a letter at this time, as part of a move to activate the dialogue on the Moscow end.

I have prepared a memorandum for the President (Tab I) transmitting the Shultz memorandum and calling the President's attention to the first three points mentioned above, and also

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI-114/6 #9203
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

calling his attention to the Hartman-Gromyko meeting of October 19. Because of the sensitivity of some of these matters, I have not coordinated this memo with other members of the staff.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin,
October 28

George Shultz has sent you the memorandum at Tab A regarding his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin last Friday, at which only the two of them were present.

When he briefed Jack Matlock and some members of his senior staff after the lunch, he made the following additional points, which were not included in the memorandum because of their sensitivity:

-- In response to George's mention of their assurances on Shcharansky, Dobrynin said that there had been a misunderstanding, since Kondrashev (Max Kampleman's KGB interlocutor in Madrid) had never been authorized to give assurances on Shcharansky's release.

-- Dobrynin asked specifically what you had in mind in your reference to "confidential contacts" in your handwritten letter to Andropov. Shultz said that you meant restricted contacts through normal diplomatic channels to which only a very few officials would be privy, in order to maintain strict confidentiality.

-- When George suggested that communication had to be a two-way street, and that more regular contact must be provided to Art Hartman in Moscow, Dobrynin merely shrugged.

Even though Dobrynin was unresponsive on the matter of Hartman's access, you should note that Gromyko did in fact receive Hartman on October 19, just before Hartman's departure for the U.S., and spent an hour and fifteen minutes with him. In that conversation, Gromyko argued that the Soviet leadership is convinced that you are not serious in your efforts to negotiate since you do not recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet Government and seek only to bring it down. Hartman responded vigorously to these allegations. While self-serving (in the sense that they are advanced to "explain" Soviet truculence), such ideas may in fact be held by some members of the Soviet leadership.

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NLS F06-114/6 # 9204
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Whether or not that is the case, however, I believe it is important to continue efforts to activate the dialogue, since our public diplomacy will be undermined if the Soviets can argue plausibly that we are unwilling to communicate with them.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz

Prepared by: Jack F. Matlock

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: My Lunch Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I had a wide-ranging discussion at a private lunch with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the state of the U.S.- Soviet relationship. Rather than dwell on details, I focussed the conversation on the nature of our dialogue and whether, in fact, discussions at a high level serve a useful function for the two countries.

Dobrynin said that it appeared to Moscow that the U.S. wants confrontation rather than to solve problems. He claimed we had handled the KAL incident in a provocative way and complained about your blaming the Soviets for everything, including Bishop's death in Grenada and the Beirut tragedy. I told him that, from our perspective, our response on KAL had been restrained. Furthermore, I emphasized our shock over the apparent Soviet decision to renege on its commitment to Max Kampelman on Shcharanskiy. I added that the two sides clearly differed substantially on ideological issues and that we were prepared to compete in that area. I also said that we are ready for real discussions, but these had to focus not only on arms control but also on issues of importance to us such as Soviet regional misbehavior and human rights. Dobrynin did not really argue with my points, but he did grouse that on some issues such as the Middle East we had been reluctant to talk.

Dobrynin seemed to have explicit instructions only on INF. He went through Andropov's latest proposal in familiar terms, adding a complaint about the "double standard" in which the U.S. asserted its right to deploy missiles in the FRG "only eight minutes from the USSR" while insisting that the Soviets have no missiles in Cuba. This was said matter-of-factly rather than as a threat.

I summed up with Dobrynin by suggesting that we think about our conversation and meet again after the Asian trip. I said we both needed to consider whether it was useful to continue a high-level dialogue and how we should go about it, adding that the past experience of several American administrations has been that efforts at a U.S.- Soviet dialogue always seem to be derailed by Soviet actions.

I hope the session will give the Kremlin food for thought. Incidentally, Dobrynin told me he had been reporting to Moscow that you will stand for reelection and win and that the Soviet government must be prepared to deal with the Administration for the next five years.

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

USSR/Deplo

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13

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

October 31, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Eagleburger-Dobrynin Conversation

Following my request last week, State finally sent over today the copy of a cable reporting on the Eagleburger-Dobrynin conversation which had been mentioned earlier in a night reading item.

The short report in the night reading covered the highlights. Perhaps the most interesting items are Dobrynin's harping on the need to re-establish communications (including his broad hint that he would like to see the President again), and his comments regarding the need to notify the Soviets of proposals privately in advance of going public, if we want the proposals to be taken seriously (paragraph 6). This is, in fact, the Soviet attitude, since they do not expect us to take seriously Soviet proposals which have not been discussed with us in advance.

A copy of the cable/memcon is attached at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I State cable/memcon

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI-114/6 #9206
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/83



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 06 STATE 291811
ORIGIN NODS-00

C06/15 004160 NOD283

TO → *Mablock*
10/31/83

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY P: WMONTGOMERY
APPROVED BY P: LSEAGLEBURGER
EUR: MPALMER
S/S: BMCKINLEY
S/S-O: RADAVIS

-----074335 131541Z /46

O 131518Z OCT 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 291811

NODIS
-STADIS////////////////////////////////////

E: O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: US, UR
SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN MEETING WITH EAGLEBURGER
1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO HAND HIM COPIES OF SOVIET UN INITIATIVES ON "CONDEMNATION OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND A "NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE." THE UNDER SECRETARY PROMISED A US RESPONSE, BUT NOTED HIS OWN OFF-THE-CUFF VIEW THAT THEY RAISE MAJOR VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THAT PROPOSALS WERE TOO GENERAL; WE PREFER SPECIFIC APPROACHES. THE UNDER SECRETARY RAISED THE BOMBING IN BURMA AND REITERATED THE NEED FOR ALL PARTIES TO ACT WITH CAUTION. THE TWO THEN EXCHANGED VIEWS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION, ANDROPOV'S SPEECH, AND ARMS CONTROL.
END SUMMARY.

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NLS F06-114/6*9210
BY HDS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



SECRET

Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 06 STATE 291811

C06/15 004160

NOD283

3. UN INITIATIVES. DOBRYNIN HANDED OVER COPIES OF LETTERS FROM ANDROPOV TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON "CONDEMNATION OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND A "NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE." HE SAID THAT WE WERE BEING GIVEN COPIES SINCE OUR TWO COUNTRIES WERE THE MOST CLOSELY INVOLVED

IN THESE MATTERS. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT WE HAD NOT RASHLY REJECTED THE PROPOSALS, THAT WE WOULD STUDY THEM AND GIVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND AFTER ONLY A QUICK READING, HE SAW TWO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS: FIRST, VERIFICATION WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM; AND SECOND, ~~THE~~ PROPOSALS WERE BOTH EXTREMELY GENERAL -- WE PREFERRED SPECIFIC APPROACHES.

4. THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE BOMBING IN BURMA WITH THE AMBASSADOR. EMPHASIZING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS FRAGMENTARY AND NOT CONCLUSIVE, HE SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE SEEMS TO BE POINTING IN THE DIRECTION OF NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT. THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE BECOMING MORE CONVINCED OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT AS TIME GOES ON. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE USG WANTED THE SOVIETS TO KNOW THAT SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM, NOW TRAVELING TO SOUTH KOREA FOR THE FUNERAL, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REPEAT OUR EARLIER CAUTIONS TO THE SOUTH KOREANS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND TO KEEP ACTION IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CHANNELS. HE ADDED THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE UNDERSTANDABLY HYPER-SENSITIVE NOW, BUT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO STOP THEM FROM UNDERTAKING ANY RASH ACTS AND HOPEFULLY, THE SOVIETS WOULD CONVEY THE SAME MESSAGE TO PYONG YANG. WE HAD URGED THE CHINESE TO DO SO AS WELL. DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD REPORT

OUR VIEWS TO MOSCOW AND NOTED THAT THE CHINESE WERE CLOSER THAN SOVIETS TO BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.



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Department of State

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OUTGOING

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5. ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT. THE TWO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE MEANING OF ANDROPOV'S SPEECH. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAW IT AS TOTALLY CONFRONTATIONAL AND HARDLINE, LIKE "SLAMMING A DOOR" ON DIALOGUE. MOREOVER, IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO MOVE IN POSITIVE DIRECTIONS WHEN THE LEADER OF THE SOVIET UNION REPEATS STATEMENTS ALREADY MADE BY LOWER LEVELS THAT THE SOVIETS SHOT DOWN KAL-007, THEY WOULD DO IT AGAIN, AND IT IS NOT THEIR FAULT. FURTHER, AT A TIME WHEN COMMUNICATION LINES ARE TENUOUS, IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE SOVIETS REACTED SO QUICKLY AND SO NEGATIVELY TO OUR INF PROPOSAL. THE UNDER SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE SOVIET REACTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD CAREFULLY STATED THAT ARMS CONTROL AND CERTAIN OTHER AREAS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE KAL-007 SHOOTDOWN. DOBRYNIN RESPONDED THAT ANDROPOV WAS NOT TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO PUT IN A NEW POLICY, BUT SIMPLY DRAWING CONCLUSIONS AS TO OUR POLICY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. HE ADDED THAT ANDROPOV'S REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT OUR DISCUSSION COULD NOT BE CONTINUED.

6. ARMS CONTROL. WHILE BLAMING THE US SIDE FOR INITIATING AND CONTINUING THE PRACTICE OF "LEAKS" AND ANNOUNCING INITIATIVES IN THE PRESS, DOBRYNIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE NOW GUILTY OF THIS PRACTICE. HE SAID THAT IF WE BOTH WERE SERIOUS, THAT BEFORE A NEW INITIATIVE WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, A "WARNING" OR "HEADS-UP" WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE OTHER SIDE TO HELP THEM PREPARE. HE USED THE CURRENT US START INITIATIVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO PROCEED. NOT ONLY WAS THE SOVIET SIDE NOT GIVEN ANY WARNING OF THE INITIATIVE, BUT WHEN THEY SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, GENERAL ROWNY - AT LEAST FOR

THE FIRST TWO OR THREE MEETINGS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT - COULD NOT GIVE IT TO THEM.



~~SECRET~~

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TURNING TO THE US INF PROPOSAL, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT OUR METHOD OF HANDLING THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS WELL AS OTHER UNSPECIFIED "HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS" HAD TAKEN AWAY THE FLEXIBILITY THAT KVITSINSKIY HAD.

HE WENT ON TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS SIMPLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO TURN IT DOWN BECAUSE IT DID NOT DEAL WITH THE TWO ISSUES CENTRAL TO THE SOVIETS:

(A) IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.

(B) IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE US BUILD-UP OF MISSILES IN EUROPE.

DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THESE ISSUES WERE THE BASIS OF THEIR TURN DOWN AND THAT REGARDLESS OF CHANGES ON OTHER ISSUES, THESE HAD TO BE ADDRESSED.

THE TWO THEN DISCUSSED THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN SOME DETAIL.

7. GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. IN RESPONSE TO DOBRYNIN'S REQUEST, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER GAVE HIS VIEW OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT THIS IS A TOUGH TIME THAT BOTH SIDES NEED TO MANAGE VERY CAREFULLY. WHILE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT, IT NOW HAS BECOME EVEN MORE SO - EVEN DANGEROUS.

DOBRYNIN AGREED AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN TERMS OF ACTUAL COMMUNICATION, THIS WAS THE WORST TIME THAT HE CAN RECALL. HE DID NOT MEAN FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS, BUT RATHER FRANK, OPEN CONVERSATIONS

BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS. HE DID RECALL THAT HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN VERY GOOD. HE SAID THAT WE CURRENTLY DO NOT ATTEMPT TO HAVE A DIALOGUE, TO EXPLAIN POSITIONS AND VIEWS TO EACH OTHER. THERE IS JUST TOO MUCH MISUNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES.



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UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS ONE EXAMPLE HE KNEW OF A SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING. THAT WAS AT MADRID OVER THE QUESTION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES. IN OUR VIEW, WE WERE MISLED. DOBRYNIN STRONGLY AFFIRMED THAT THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. UPON HEARING OUR VERSION, THE SOVIETS HAD INTENSELY "GRILLED" THE SOVIET INVOLVED. HE STRONGLY DENIED MAKING OR PROPOSING ANY SUCH DEAL. DOBRYNIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT NATURALLY THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THEIR MAN AND THE US SIDE WILL BELIEVE THEIRS. WHAT HE CAN CONFIDENTLY SAY, HOWEVER, IS EVEN IN THE EVENT THAT KONDRASHEV DID DISCUSS A DEAL WITH KAMPELMAN, IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS SIMPLY DO NOT OPERATE THIS WAY. ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN PROPOSED OR AT LEAST CONFIRMED AT A HIGHER LEVEL. THE U. S. SIDE SHOULD HAVE CHECKED.

8. TEXT OF THE TWO SOVIET UN PROPOSALS WILL BE SENT SEPARATELY.

SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~



Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

WEC/PS
NDS/IE
→ *File!*
Dobrynin

2 February 1984

NOTE TO: Jack F. Matlock
National Security Council
European and Soviet Affairs

Jack

The original of this was provided to John Poindexter. I met with Jeremy this morning to talk about the paper you and he are thinking about and he mentioned your discussions about Dobrynin's status and the request to I hope the attached is useful.

Bob

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:
As Stated

~~SECRET~~

CI By Signer
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR FD6-114/6 #9207
BY *LW* NARA DATE 11/16/15

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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(b)(3)

2 February 1984

Dobrynin and the Politburo

SUMMARY

Anatoliy Dobrynin probably does not get the hearing in Moscow's highest circles that he did in the halcyon days of US-Soviet relations in the early 1970s. Because of his now circumscribed access in Washington, he has less of interest to report. His boss, Foreign Minister Gromyko, has become more powerful--and reportedly more difficult to get along with--and Dobrynin may have run afoul of him in some way. Nevertheless, his skill in handling Americans is appreciated in Moscow, and he still makes an input into policy discussions on the US-Soviet relationship. As an experienced political animal, he probably avoids getting trapped in internal policy debates where there are winners and losers. If Dobrynin were to succeed in reestablishing the exclusive intermediary role he once had, both he and the Politburo would probably be pleased. Thus there are factors operating on several levels that will keep him in Washington for the foreseeable future, regardless of any bureaucratic ambitions he might have.

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In the 1970s Dobrynin was a highly influential member of the Brezhnev national security team. His unique access in Washington's highest circles and his critical role in the back channel arms control negotiations made him uniquely valuable to Soviet policymakers. In particular, Dobrynin apparently enjoyed good access to Brezhnev. He was someone worth listening to, in Moscow as well as Washington [redacted]

Today his circumstances are different. As US-Soviet relations have deteriorated and Dobrynin's access to US officials has become circumscribed, he has had less opportunity to exercise his skills on matters that thrust him into the immediate concerns of the Politburo. In effect, he no longer has anything special to communicate. His boss, Gromyko, who has had a major role in the conduct of foreign affairs since the days of Stalin, has acquired increasing political power and personal responsibility. He was a member of the powerful inner Politburo circle that aided Andropov's accession to the leadership in 1982, and became a First Deputy Premier in 1983. This has widened the political distance between Gromyko and Dobrynin, along with everybody else in the bureaucracy that Gromyko directs. And it is unlikely that Dobrynin's relationship with Andropov could be as close as it was with Brezhnev, simply because Dobrynin has not yet shared with Andropov a challenge comparable to that of the early SALT period, nor as close as the one Gromyko has with Andropov.

A case could be made that Dobrynin is in political difficulties. He did not accompany Gromyko to the foreign minister summits at Madrid and Stockholm, whereas our Ambassador to Moscow attended both. Dobrynin also did not attend the plenum of the Central Committee in December. Early in Andropov's tenure, we heard that rumors were circulating that Dobrynin was slated to return to Moscow as the Foreign Minister, although the scenario under which such a promotion could take place was never made clear. The rumors alone, however, would be enough to anger Gromyko if he got wind of them, especially if he thought that the rumormongers were acting on Dobrynin's behalf.

There have been some reports in the past, moreover, that relations between Gromyko and Dobrynin have not always been good. The reports are believable for a number of reasons. Gromyko's explosive outbursts of abuse at his subordinates are well known. Dobrynin's unique high-level access in the past, and the urbane and positive image he is able to project, in contrast to his dour and irascible boss, are enough to cause friction on the face of it. Gromyko has never been easy to work for. When it comes to the fine points of conducting foreign policy, not even those superior to him in rank are immune from his criticism. In the

late 1940s, as a deputy foreign minister, Gromyko once mercilessly chewed out his own minister [REDACTED] when the minister inadvertently gave away an advantage to Allied negotiators in Paris. Likewise, in the 1970s he scolded the late Premier Kosygin in front of a foreign visitor for broaching a discussion of Soviet relations with a third country, a discussion Gromyko considered improper.


We are more ready to believe that Dobrynin may have fallen victim to Gromyko's ire--perhaps more than once--than we are to believe that Dobrynin's political fortunes have fundamentally deteriorated with the political apparatus in Moscow. Gromyko may have taken more personal responsibility for the conduct of the US-Soviet relationship than was the case before, and may have wanted to make that clear both to Dobrynin and others by not taking Dobrynin along to Madrid and Stockholm. As for the December plenum, it did not deal with foreign affairs, and Dobrynin has skipped plenums before. He may have been told to return to Washington to perform specific missions. Most importantly, as discussed later in this paper, Dobrynin has always been careful not to become a position-taker in a way that could make him a political loser. Simply being the Ambassador to the United States, and attempting to do his job in difficult times, is not enough to put him in jeopardy unless he has gone out on a limb beyond his instructions, and we have no evidence that he has ever done that.

Dobrynin's recent activities, in fact, can be interpreted to mean that he is still considered a useful functionary by Soviet policymakers. In late November he was recalled to Moscow for what was apparently a major review of East-West relations in the wake of the initial NATO INF deployments. Exposure of this kind in Moscow helps Dobrynin make up for not having a dynamic part to play in Washington. Others apparently involved in this review were Foreign Ministry USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh, USA Institute Director Arbatov, and Minister Counselor Sokolov from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Other high-level officials were almost certainly involved, and the results of the review were certainly taken into account in the Politburo policy deliberations.

Moreover, upon his return to Washington, Dobrynin was quick off the mark in providing a US journalist with the new policy line--i.e., that the Soviets are prepared to resume substantive exchanges in the field of arms control despite their public inflexibility on returning to the INF talks. His remarks have been consistent with those of high-level party officials such as Vadim Zagladin back in Moscow, indicating that he is still very much in the main channel in carrying out policy directives.

While presenting the official party line in Washington, Dobrynin probably would attempt to secure an exclusive intermediary role for himself similar to the one he enjoyed in earlier days. From his point of view, the ideal situation would be an unpublicized channel to the top levels of the US Administration. Failing that, Dobrynin would seek, simply as a matter of tactical advantage for the Soviet side, to meet one-on-one with his talking partner, speaking English with no interpreter present. We know that Gromyko himself during the 1970s encouraged Dobrynin to employ the latter tactic, and the former was considered so desirable by the Soviets in the past that Gromyko would probably concede its usefulness today regardless of his attitude toward Dobrynin. Obviously such a role would be highly desirable from Dobrynin's personal point of view as well.

[redacted] Dobrynin in the past exploited such access in Washington with considerable political skill.



Dobrynin's caution would be likely to keep him from becoming involved in internal debates--at the Central Committee staff level--where there might be winner and losers. He is probably content to let others issue nuanced statements skirting around the question of whether detente is irreversible or whether the US ruling class is too fundamentally untrustworthy for the Soviet Union to deal with. As an ambassador, he would not engage in such discussions overtly anyway, but we suspect he does not do it in his cables to Moscow either.

The people who know Dobrynin's skills and services best are probably Gromyko most of all, but also Andropov and Ustinov, as both men held positions during Brezhnev's regime that gave them access to his reporting. Dobrynin is undoubtedly very careful in his dealings with Gromyko.

[REDACTED]

Soviet leaders probably see Dobrynin as uniquely useful where he is, regardless of the US-Soviet climate, and they seem to have no intention of returning him to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow in the foreseeable future. He has been in Washington for almost 22 years, is dean of the diplomatic corps, and knows how to cultivate Americans. Whatever his desire to return to a higher position in Moscow, he seems destined to remain in Washington as long as Gromyko remains Foreign Minister. Gromyko is 74, however, and Dobrynin is a decade younger. He is probably content to stay where he is, move with great care, and wait to see what the future holds for him.

File: USSR
USS-USA
Trade & Econ
Council

TO: B. ANDERSON

17 pages
file Dobrynin 26

Dobrynin Speech

Secretary Brown, Members of the Council,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Comrades,

Accepting your invitation to attend the Eight annual meeting of the Soviet-American Trade and Economic Council I hoped to see among you many of my old friends, and those hopes have been rewarded. I am pleased to greet this afternoon the two co-chairmen Vladimir Sushkov and Bill Verity, as well as Nickolai Inozemtsev and Dwayne Andreas, Jack Murphy and Eugene Putovranov, Valery Pekshev and Don Kendall, and many others with whom we worked hard and persistently to break the new ground for Soviet-American trade and economic relations. I have already had the pleasure of addressing a number of previous meetings of the Council which is a representative body of the business communities of our two countries engaged in activities aimed at promoting trade and economic cooperation between our two nations.

A long time ago Dale Carnegie, a well-known American, wrote an interesting book "How to Win Friends and Influence People". According to one of the "musts" of that book, - normal and mutually beneficial relations in business - and I would add, in world politics, too - are possible only if the sides take into account the legitimate interests of each other, show the proper understanding and readiness to make concessions for the sake of achieving the main objective.

We do not build our foreign relations according to Mr. Carnegie, we do that on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence

worked out by founder of our State V.I.Lenin, but on this specific issue we do not differ with Mr.Carnegie or with my old friend David Rockefeller (long ago we have discussed that none of us has tails or horns though we come from different - using common American expression - empires.)

Let us now in this light have a look at what is happening in the Soviet-American relations. They are now characterized by a dangerous level of tensions impeding to the utmost the possibility of a constructive dialogue which is so badly needed to ensure lasting peace on the Earth.

Of course, the channels of official communication between our two countries are open. Bjut unfortunately the problem with these communications is that so far they have not produced much in substance. Our presidents from time to time are writing each other personal letters. Diplomatic exchanges through State Department in Washington and Foreign Ministry in Moscow are taken place more or less regulary. In principle this is natural development which could be welcomed.

We have, we believe, a constructive program, advanced by President K.U.Chernenko, of what, in our view, should be done to ensure a turn for the better in the Soviet-American relations, but I couldn't unfortunately report to you any progress in this field.

These applies, first and foremost, to the central area of our relationship - matters of security and arms limitation, including strategic and "European" arms, as well as the prevention of militarization of outer space.

A paradoxial public discussion is going on now between out two capitals and two Governments: whether we live now in more secure or less secure world than several years ago. Judge for yourselves.

The deployment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe led to the disruption of the talks on the nuclear arms in Europe and on the strategic arms.

As a result the military and political situation has deteriorated. The number of warheads targeted on each other has grown; the time has been reduced for making a vital decision to respond to a nuclear strike or to a nuclear situation that could spontaneously develop; and the confidence among countries has been undermined. In other words the arms race is going on practically unrestrained. As a result both our nations find themselves with more and more arms and at the same time with less and less security. This is at least our opinion and our conviction.

Some people are wondering whether we, in the Soviet Union, are looking at the problem of arms control only from the point of view of the forthcoming presidential elections in the United States. In this connection I would like to emphasize that we consider our relations to be above your domestic politics. Specifically, in a sense that if a good agreement is reached today, tomorrow, next year or the year after - the sooner the better - we are prepared to sign it no matter what effect it could have on the outcome of your elections or on the political fortune of your politicians.

I can state here officially that we are prepared already now in the middle of your election campaign to conclude a number of important agreements or negotiate on them. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Konstantin Chernenko said several days ago in his conversation in Moscow with Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG Hans-Dietrich Gensher and I quote:

"The Soviet Union has put forward a package of far-reaching proposals to improve the international situation and eliminate the nuclear threat.

Some people pretend that such proposals are non-existent and are trying to convince the public that the USA is for a dialogue, yet everything allegedly turns on the reluctance of the Russians. But, as a matter of fact, things are different.

The Soviet Union's favours a meaningful dialogue, puts forward concrete proposals aimed at reaching practical agreements, The Soviet proposals are known to the U.S. administration. The USSR proposes the United States, among other things, to start talks on preventing the militarization of outer space, resume with Britain's participation talks on complete and general prohibition on nuclear weapons tests. We have also called upon the United States to put into effect, at last, the Soviet-American agreements 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union also persistently raises the question of the a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals. But a negative answer invariably comes from the American side to these proposals". End of the quote.

Some problems of arms control of course are very difficult and need long time to reach agreement. But I ask you what is wrong with the proposal to resume the talks on complete test ban agreement. Simultaneous announcement by Kremlin, White House and White Hall will be definitely welcomed by the whole world and with some sign of relief.

It is clear, however, that no agreement will be at hand unless we together whole-heartedly engage in active and productive diplomacy. We suggest to speak with each other in a language of culture, science, tourism and trade rather than in a language of nuclear warheads.

The genius of diplomacy is to keep things moving, to generate compromises, to look for openings, opportunities, possibilities. Should we pronounce them an anathema in Soviet-American relations and think that the complex international problems are best solved by military force, or by trying to turn a threat of a nuclear war into an instrument of diplomacy? Absolutely not.

Looking back into the history of our relations one can see that it was a long road and not always as smooth as Nevski Prospect in Leningrad or your New Jersey Turnpike. Nevertheless, during all those years we had a number of fruitful, positive experiences. It is very well reflected in the fact that since 1933 we signed approximately 110 agreements with about half of them signed in the 70's.

During the least years, however, we witness virtual dismantling of the very basis and structure of the Soviet-American bilateral relations - cultural, scientific, economic - which had been so pain-

stakingly created in the 70's. Almost none of the agreements in the above mentioned areas exist anymore, with the exception of a few which I could simply count on my fingers. Does the Soviet Union want and is prepared to restore all these agreements? Answer is only one without any reservation: yes, we want and are prepared to restore these agreements.

I would like to report to you that here are recent attempts by two sides to resume some of these agreements. But this process is very slow and concrete results have not been reached yet.

Under the new pressure in our relations it is so important to make a joint effort to stabilize them more, to stop fruitless and repeated mutual accusations (each side had, no doubt, a lot to say about the others actions) and find some new practical ways to improve them so that outstanding issues in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Middle East could be little by little solved. We do not expect miracles overnight but to begin steadily in this direction is essential.

Our two countries exist on the same planet and if they will not be able to live together they ^{will} die together. But it is no longer sufficient now to fully realize this indisputable truth. What is needed now is a joint effort by both the Soviet Union and the United States, by politicians and businessmen of both countries, so that tomorrow will not be "the Day After" for all of us, for our children and grandchildren. We do not believe in doomsday. We do believe that reason will triumph.

It seems that we should again look for an answer in the history of our relations, which gives fair examples of cooperation between our two countries on the basis of a correctly and timely realized commonality of interest.

The first thing that comes to mind in this connection is the Soviet-American fraternity in arms in the struggle for freeing the world of Nazism.

The year of that war showed very graphically that the bonds of friendship can exist between the USSR and the U.S., as well as cooperation in various fields.

Unfortunately at present little is known about it in the United States, especially among new generation of Americans. It is interesting to note, for example, that a recent poll in New York of a hundred young Americans showed that none of them (I repeat - none) knew the truth as to with whom and against whom the U.S. was fighting during the Second World War. The most typical answer - the U.S. was fighting against the Soviet Union. Here are a few examples:

"America and England fought against Russia and Germany" (a sophomore of the historical faculty of the University of New York);

"The U.S. and Germany against the Russians" (a school teacher);

"I don't know" (a college student);

"The free world against the world communism" (a clerk of a bank);

"The U.S., Germany, Great Britain - against Japan" (a manager of a department store).

It would seem that, taking into account the current political environment in the U.S., such answers are not accidental. They are a result of cold war and even of deliberate attempts to erase from the memory of the peoples the relations of friendship and cooperation.

How else should one regard the fact that the reference made by general Eisenhower to "the great Russian allies" in his well-known speech just published by the Pentagon in its official pamphlet dedicated to the landing in Normandy.

But I can assure you that in my country everyone, old and young, all generations know and remember that we were allies in the war against Fascism. We do remember Roosevelt and general Eisenhower. We do remember everything that was good in our relations and we do believe that we could cooperate again.

I would like in this connection to recall the words of my good ^{8.}
old friend, a veteran of the Washington political scene senator ³³
Fullbright, and I quote:

"I hate this business that we preach so much, that the Russians are monsters so that soon everybody seems to think they really are. Compare present time by contrast there was detente - Nixon started it in 1972 - and that was the right approach, to start on joint ventures we could both agree on... What was significant in President Nixon's approach to Russia was the joint ventures, however small, ...and this is what builds confidence between nations".

Speaking of joint ventures leading to greater mutual confidence, I would like to touch upon the question of trade. This is after all the main subject of your meetings here.

What is the state of the Soviet-American trade? I'll give only one figure. Disregarding the grain sales, the volume of trade between our two countries in less than 1 billion dollars a year. That is less than 50 per cent of the U.S. trade with Trinidad and Tobago. You will recall that some time ago, discussing the prospects of the Soviet-American trade the U.S. and the USSR representatives would speak of tens of billions of dollars. Now we have to recognize that our common hopes were not fulfilled and the hopes - otherwise realistic hopes - were not transformed into deeds.

In the recent words of George Kennan, the former well-known American Ambassador to the USSR (I quote) "Soviet-American trade has been subjected to an unprecedented series of wholly abnormal harassments and restrictions, primarily from the American side - most of them the deliberate results of governmental policies..." (end of quote).

It is regrettable that the opponents of improved Soviet-American relations managed - over the head of the U.S. business circles - to embody in the legislation many discriminatory restrictions on the trade

with the Soviet Union. That includes, in the first place, the failure to grant to the USSR a normal trade regime and access to the federal credits through the Export-Import bank and the Credit corporation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Our trade cannot fail to be affected also by the repeatedly introduced anti-Soviet sanctions imposed in the futile attempt to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union. It is well-known who is the first to suffer from such sanctions.

I believe that the American members of this Council, among whom there are many companies specializing on the production of machines and tools, cannot be indifferent to the fact that within the past 6 years the volume of the Soviet import of the goods of that group has declined by almost five times, and currently their share in our purchases on the American market is less than 10 per cent.

The situation is far from good as regards the grain trade, too.

The 14-day notification requirement for Soviet ships entering U.S. ports makes it very difficult and costly for us to transport grain purchased in this country. We are told that the US commitments under the 5-year grain trade agreement are limited only to making certain amounts of wheat and corn available to us. As for moving this grain out of the U.S. under such adverse circumstances, we are told, it's our business. Strange logic, to say the least. A number of U.S. grain trade ports including Houston are closed to travel by Soviet foreign trade, diplomat: and consular officials. How are we supposed to keep in touch with the crews of the Soviet grain-hauling ships entering Houston?

Recently the U.S. mass media began hue and cry around the alleged "leaks" of the American technology to the Soviet Union. We believe that such accustains - groundless as they are - make the situation arou

the Soviet-American trade even more tense, and certainly do not bring about its growth.

As to those accusations, I would like to tell you so the speak confidentially that we are thinking about building in the U.S. in next year or two an exhibition of the newest achievements of the Soviet technology (if the political climate allows that). I hope that exhibition will help convince many sceptics here (those who still can be convinced) that the U.S.S.R. is not a backward country at all.

Incidentally, your own experts warn against mistakes in assessing the role played by the Soviet import from the U.S. and, generally speaking, from the West in assaining our economic objectives.

According to a recent Western study, the contribution of imported technology to the Soviet economic growth is "either small or uncertain". It is estimated that it added only 0,5 per cent annually to Soviet industrial output during the 1970's and probably still less now.

It should be noted that the deterioration of the Soviet-American trade and economic relations is taking place against the background of a successful development of the Soviet foreign trade with West European countries. In 1983 the volume of trade of the Soviet Union with those countries was 44 billion dollars and grew by 6,4 per cent over the level of 1982, whereas the trade with the U.S. declined by more than 15 per cent. Most of the West European countries have a realistic attitude to the questions of the trade and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries, proceeding from the premise that trade between East and West is, first of all, in their own economic interests. West European firms cooperate, for example, with Soviet foreign trade organizations in the

industrial construction in the U.S.S.R. They supply our country with machines and tools for the enterprises of the chemical, metallurgical, paper and pulp, light and food industries, the industry of construction materials, gas and transportation systems and the agroindustrial complex. Consumer goods and foodstuffs are also imported from the countries of Western Europe. Among the Soviet exports to those countries should be mentioned: oil and oil products, natural gas, chemicals, timber, ores, lathes, electric engines, automobiles and other industrial goods.

They know very well in the countries with the Soviet Union that their firms cooperating with the Soviet foreign trade organizations have no problems as regards trade operations and business transactions. I believe that many American companies could see themselves what reliable partners our foreign trade organizations are, though I could admit that we have our share of buracrats and red tase too. (Though-I am not sure whether Suchkov will agree with me).

I would like to say following to the American businessmen here.

Your presence obviously demonstrates that, despite serious problems, the trade between our two countries to fight for the future, that your Council remains solid and capable of doing things that the roots of the trade and economic cooperation are rather strong.

The mere fact that we g-t send here almost 40 best men in our trade business headed by well known Deputy Foreign Trade Minister g-d Suchkov shows that we do believe in the future if this Council.

Otherwise we will not pay Mr. Suchkov's travel expenses.

Recent statements by the representatives of the Administration show that the futility of the economic pressure on the USSR and other

countries of the socialist community is receiving a growing recognition in Washington. The appeal to develop trade in non-strategic goods is now contained in the message which the annual meeting of ASTEC received from President Reagan.

We welcome it. I can assure you that we are also for that. We see no alternative whatsoever to the policy of peaceful co-existence in the relations between the USSR and the US, and it cannot be built without a stable and broad economic cooperation. We genuinely believe that trade can and must be a bridge to peace.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Gromyko said recently that, I quote:

"It is of course needed to build a bridge between East and West, and the more reliable it will be, the better. But nuclear missiles are unreliable supports for this bridge, it could not be used then to go to achieve trust and cooperation, mutual understanding and peace. We suggest building this bridge on a different basis, the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence and firmly established norms of mutual relations, first of all between the nuclear powers, about which Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko spoke with very compelling logic on behalf of our party and the state.

We consider that the development of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the US based on equality, mutual benefit and unconditional implementation of the obligations assumed will facilitate the improvement of the relations between the two countries, the relaxation of the international tensions and the preservation of peace.

At your meeting you have adopted a broad program of action to further intensify the work of the Council. You can rely on my general support.

Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nickoai Inozemtse told you of the large-scale programs being worked out in the Soviet Union, including long-term Food Program and Pover Program. In 1983 the Soviet Union's import of oil and gas equipment alone amounted to 1,7 billion dollars. Room can definitely be found within these Programs for the cooperation of the two powerful, mutually complimentary economies similar by their geographic and economic features. "Food Machinery Coproration", "Xerox", "Pepsico", "Glisson Works", "Ralston Purina", "Monsanto", "Dupon" successfully work in this direction. Many of them took part in the exhibition "Agrobusiness-US" in Moscow, which was a success. Contracts with some of your companies were signed just recently or prepared to be signed. But this is only modest begining, together we could and must do much more.

The meeting of ASTEC concided with an anniversary of the Amtorg Trading Co. - a member of the Council, which for over 60 years already has been working in the US in the field of the Soviet-American trade. It can be considered that the time when that company was created was the beginning of the long and difficult journey to develop the trade and economic relations between the two countries. Over the past 6 decades there were different periods in these relations, both th periods of a successful mutually beneficial cooperation and the periods of an almost complete halt in trade, We would like to hope that a sober approach to the questions of bilateral trade will prevail in not so distant future, and the sides will be able to trade confident that no new obstacles will appear and the trade will not be automaticzly sacrificed because of some difficulties in our political relations. On the contrary may beprevisly businessmen could show right road out of the present dangerous deadloch.

Pr.Reagan send his own message to this Council in which he appeals to develop trade between our countries in nonstrategic goods. We welcome this message.

But yesterday you heard two interpretation on this message from US Government officials:

- one from Mr.Palmer,
- the other from Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Mr.Lyng and Deputy Secretary of Council D-t Clarence Brown,
- frankly I prefer second interpretation at least spirit and emphasize of that interpretation.

Taking this opportunity I would like to express best wishes of success to this Council in its needed and important work for the general improvement of our relations.

Two our distinguished co-chairmen, as you know, have issued a joint appeal: "We want the business, we need the trade".

For my part, as ambassador, I would like to assure the members of the Council that the Soviet Government supports this appeal, will continue to follow closely the activities of the Council and render the Council and each of its members every possible assistance in the development of trade between the USSR and the US. The message to you sent by Mr.Chernenko, our president, vividly testifies to that.

Before I conclude the remarks I would like to congratulate our American hosts on behalf of my companions and colleagues for a well organized meeting of the Council. I think that it is very appropriate to share a round of applause to Bill Verity for his efforts to ensure the success of this meeting and his admirable dedication to the cause of bringing our business communities closer together.

Bill do not worry I don't have a georgian horn with me, so we will be in a sober mood to listen to the next speaker.

Thank you.

Dipl 40

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8390197

RECEIVED 22 FEB 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 15 FEB 83

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/19/02

le US-Secret

KEYWORDS: USSR

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SHULTZ - AMB DOBRYNIN MEMCON RE US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

LENCZOWSKI

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

ISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday Greetings

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent the President greetings on the occasion of his birthday (Tab B). Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign the letter (Tab A) to Dobrynin.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to Dobrynin
- Tab B Letter from Dobrynin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday Greetings

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent you greetings on the occasion of your birthday (Tab B). Attached at Tab A is a letter for your signature to Dobrynin thanking him and the Corps for the birthday greetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Dobrynin at Tab A.

OK No

Attachments:

- Tab A Letter to Dobrynin
- Tab B Letter from Dobrynin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and your wish that the coming years will bring peace and happiness to all Americans.

Allow me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, and the hope that the peace and happiness you wish for the American people will be reflected in your own lands.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Anatoly Dobrynin
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED/Released
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dmf NARA, Date 6/19/02

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 17, 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Dobrynin's Birthday Greetings

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, acting in his capacity as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, has sent the President greetings on the occasion of his birthday (Tab B). Attached (Tab A) is a draft reply for the President's signature.

for Charles Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- A. Draft Presidential Reply
- B. Ambassador Dobrynin's Birthday Greeting

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED RESPONSE

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I would like to thank you, and through you the Diplomatic Corps in Washington, for your birthday greetings and your wish that the next few years will bring peace and happiness to all Americans.

Allow me to extend my own greetings to you and the members of the Corps, and the hope that the peace and happiness you wish for the American people will be reflected in your own lands.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Washington, D.C.

DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8404039

46

KS

February 6, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington and my own behalf I would like to extend to you our sincere birthday greetings.

Allow us to wish you many more years of good health, happiness and peaceful life to you and to all American people.

With best personal regards,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN
Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps
in Washington, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Diplomats Matlock

2515

47


1984 MAR 27 11 5:23

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
March 27, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: March 28, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:00 - 2:30 P.M.
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *RMK*
for 

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and to provide guidance to Amb. Hartman for his future contacts with Soviet officials. Hartman plans to return to Moscow this coming weekend.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary Shultz
- Robert C. McFarlane
- Ambassador Hartman
- Jack F. Matlock

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Release White House staff photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *SMJ* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS


-- I'm glad we have a chance to meet while you are in town. Why do you think the Russians still seem to be giving us a cold shoulder?

-- What sort of tactics should we be following over the coming months? Have they really decided finally that they will not deal this year, as some are saying?

-- Do you think the Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?


-- Is there anything we can do to give you more ammunition in your dealings with Gromyko and the other Soviet leaders?

-- I know you have a tough job in Moscow, and I get nothing but good reports on the Embassy's fine performance. Please let your staff know that we really appreciate what you are doing for us there.




MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

- GLAD WE HAVE CHANCE TO MEET WHILE YOU ARE IN TOWN. WHY DO YOU THINK RUSSIANS STILL SEEM TO BE GIVING US COLD SHOULDER?
- WHAT SORT OF TACTICS SHOULD WE BE FOLLOWING OVER COMING MONTHS? HAVE THEY REALLY DECIDED FINALLY THEY WILL NOT DEAL THIS YEAR, AS SOME ARE SAYING?
- DO YOU THINK SOVIET LEADERS REALLY FEAR US, OR IS ALL THE HUFFING AND PUFFING JUST PART OF THEIR PROPAGANDA?



2.

- IS THERE ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO GIVE YOU MORE AMMUNITION IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH GROMYKO AND THE OTHER SOVIET LEADERS?
- I KNOW YOU HAVE TOUGH JOB IN MOSCOW, AND I GET NOTHING BUT GOOD REPORTS ON EMBASSY'S FINE PERFORMANCE. PLEASE LET YOUR STAFF KNOW WE REALLY APPRECIATE WHAT YOU ARE DOING FOR US THERE.



REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on March 28, 19 84

for The President of White House:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President
Secretary of State George Shultz
Robert McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, American Ambassador to Soviet Union
Jack F. Matlock, NSC

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing

Requested by Rachel C. Ashley

Room No. Oval Office

Room No. 368 Telephone 5112

Time of Meeting 2:00 p.m.

Date of request March 27, 1984

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

RECEIVED 17 APR 84 08

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 17 APR 84

*File
US-USSR
Shultz-Dob.*

KEYWORDS USSR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *smf* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: SOVIET AMB DOBRYNIN MTG W/ SHULTZ 16 APRIL

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

MATLOCK

COMMENTS ORIGINAL WITH MCFARLANE

REF# 8411341

LOG

NSCIFID

(K /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

84 APR 17 7:58
April 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin,
April 16, 1984

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon. I gave him your letter to Chernenko, made a few points about your thinking in sending it, and touched on some of the doubts we have concerning Soviet willingness to move forward with us. I also suggested a number of concrete forward steps we could take in the near future. I noted that discussions could continue with Ken Dam and Rick Burt in my absence between Wednesday and May 3.

In presenting the letter, I told Dobrynin that you value your private exchanges with Chernenko. You were disappointed with the tone of some recent Soviet statements, including Chernenko's April 9 interview with Pravda, but you want to use this correspondence to move things forward.

I said that you had been giving thought to the Soviet charge that our programs threaten them, and therefore went into some detail in your letter about the legitimate grounds we have for seeing a threat in Soviet actions and programs. Nevertheless, I said, the most important thing is that both sides take into account the concerns of the other.

I drew special attention to your hand-written postscript as evidence of your thinking and testimony to how deeply you feel.

Going over the highlights of the letter, I pointed to your treatment of the Stockholm negotiations as a direct response to points Chernenko had made: we are prepared to discuss reciprocal assurances on non-use of force if they are prepared to negotiate seriously the confidence-and-security-building measures we have proposed. Chernenko had referred to this in his Pravda interview and called for a concrete signal in arms control; you had now provided this signal. In this connection, I said that we accepted their invitation to Ambassador Goodby to come to Moscow for further discussions.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6 #9211

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

53

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

On START and INF, I said you had reiterated that we are ready to move forward in private discussions and have some ideas, and that we fail to understand why they will not engage us confidentially on these central issues. They must realize, I said, that making removal of our missiles a precondition for further talks is a non-starter.

On MBFR, I noted you had said we hope to present some new ideas before the end of the current round in Vienna.

On chemical weapons, I pointed out that the Vice President would be tabling our draft treaty in Geneva Wednesday, and gave him a copy of the text. I said we considered our draft to be a constructive proposal, although we know it will be hard to negotiate, since verification is a very serious problem. On the other hand, the issue itself is serious. Since World War I, use of these weapons had stopped until very recently, and although the Soviets disagree with us about use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, we should both recognize the danger that use in the Iran-Iraq war presents. In addition to discussions in the Geneva conference, therefore, I said we had some thoughts to present on a bilateral basis if the Soviets were ready for such an exchange.

At that point, speaking personally, I said I had encouraged efforts to move US-Soviet relations forward, but had to say frankly that I was not sure the Soviets were ready. We had seen polemics out of Moscow, a "deep freeze" in their language, which made me wonder about Soviet readiness to move. I told Dobrynin there were plenty of people who were ready to offer their analysis of current Soviet behavior; but in government discussions I stressed that we should not speculate, and that we should make an effort to improve things. This was especially true in the area of nuclear weapons, where neither side should lay down preconditions.

Moving to outer space arms control, I recalled that during our last discussion I had given Dobrynin our report to the Congress on this subject, and had thought he had agreed to beginning private discussion with me on this topic. However, Art Hartman's conversation with Gromyko April 3 had suggested otherwise. Dobrynin objected that I had been very negative, and that he had come away with the impression that we would only listen in any confidential discussions. I replied that we were not predisposed to be negative, but that verification would remain a very difficult problem in this area; we were willing to talk without preconditions, but the verification problem would not go away. This exchange left me unsure whether the Soviets are prepared to accept discussions on this basis.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

I then raised a subject I told Dobrynin he wouldn't like: human rights. Your letter expressed disappointment that Chernenko did not respond to the appeal in your March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues, and this was a real concern. We were pleased with reports that scientist David Goldfarb may soon be allowed to leave, and that binational spouse Yuri Balovlenkov has been asked to submit his papers. We hope he and others like him will be permitted to join their American spouses. But the Shcharanskiy case remains unresolved, and we have concerns about both Sakharov and his wife.

Referring to the language in your letter on regional issues, I then turned to them, and said I had two proposals to make:

-- On southern Africa, Gromyko had suggested to Hartman that another round of discussions would be useful, and I said Assistant Secretary Crocker would be prepared to meet with a Soviet counterpart in a third country in late April or early May.

-- On the Middle East/Persian Gulf, I suggested that Dobrynin and I meet for a special session accompanied by experts, and that he might wish to have someone come from Moscow for this purpose. In response to his question, I said I would be ready after my return from Asia, and reiterated the importance of talking about the Iran-Iraq situation in light of chemical weapons use there.

I then raised a number of bilateral issues:

-- On new consulates, I said we would be ready to begin discussing details as soon as Rick Burt returned from Europe at the end of this week.

-- On minor consular issues, I said we expect to have ideas for another round next week.

-- On an exchanges agreement, I said I hoped Art Hartman would be able to table a draft text in Moscow next week.

At our last meeting, Dobrynin had asked about bilateral agreements expiring this year, and I gave him a status report:

-- On fisheries, I noted that we had agreed this week to extend our agreement for eighteen months, and that we are looking at what else might be done in this area.

-- On the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement, I said we expected to have a response for the Soviets soon, and I was optimistic about the possibility of an extension.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

-- On the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement, I said the Navy expected to propose renewal during the regular talks scheduled for May in Moscow.

-- On the World Oceans Agreement expiring in December, I said we would be reviewing it in our normal process.

We touched briefly on our hotline upgrade talks, and here I pressed for a Soviet response to our proposal for another round at the end of the month. Dobrynin said he expected no problems, but it is being reviewed "in our White House," so it is impossible to predict with certainty.

Dobrynin asked if I had checked with you about our position concerning negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. I said I had, and the position remains unchanged.

Finally, after reading your letter, Dobrynin asked what the language about Soviet unwillingness to take advantage of opportunities for discussion on START and INF referred to. I said it referred to discussion in our private channel.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

File

May 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman Appointment Request

Art Hartman will be in town on consultation May 7-11, and I believe it would be useful for him to have a brief meeting with the President and to meet with you.

Recommendations

1. That you authorize the Scheduling Request at TAB I.

Approve Disapprove

In interest of time, I signed out.

2. That you schedule an appointment with Hartman (preferably before or after his meeting with the President).

*RMR
5/7*

Approve Disapprove

Date and Time: 10:30 am, tue, May 11

Attachments:

- Tab I - Schedule Request
- Tab II - Memorandum from State

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3637

~~Kimmitt~~
Matlock 57

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

May 7, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt ^{Bob}

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

PURPOSE: To review recent developments in U.S.-Soviet
Relations

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington May
7-11, and this will provide an
opportunity for the President to hear his
views on current developments in Moscow and
provide any instructions he may have for
contacts with Soviet officials.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Ambassador Hartman met with the President
during his earlier visits to Washington.

DATE & TIME: May 10 or 11 for 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
Meese, Baker, Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Ambassador Hartman,
solicits his views on the current situation
in Moscow, and discusses the issues as
appropriate.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None; White House Staff Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 7, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman Appointment Request

Art Hartman will be in town on consultation May 7-11, and I believe it would be useful for him to have a brief meeting with the President and to meet with you.

Recommendations

1. That you authorize the Scheduling Request at TAB I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

2. That you schedule an appointment with Hartman (preferably before or after his meeting with the President).

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Date and Time: _____

Attachments:

- Tab I - Schedule Request
- Tab II - Memorandum from State

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

May 7, 1984

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

PURPOSE: To review recent developments in U.S.-Soviet Relations

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman will be in Washington May 7-11, and this will provide an opportunity for the President to hear his views on current developments in Moscow and provide any instructions he may have for contacts with Soviet officials.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Ambassador Hartman met with the President during his earlier visits to Washington.

DATE & TIME: May 10 or 11 for 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Mr. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
Meese, Baker, Deaver at their discretion

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: The President greets Ambassador Hartman, solicits his views on the current situation in Moscow, and discusses the issues as appropriate.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: None; White House Staff Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/Jack F. Matlock



60
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 8413146

May 4, 1984

3637

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Appointment Requests: Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

Arthur A. Hartman, US Ambassador to the USSR, will be in Washington for consultations May 7-11 at the Secretary's request and would like to meet with President Reagan and with you to review recent developments and prospects in the Soviet Union and in US-Soviet relations. The Department of State recommends that appointments with President Reagan and with you be scheduled.

for *Charles Hill*
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3637

File

Matlock

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 10, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

OR

DATE: May 11, 1984
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:45 A.M.

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RMK*
602

I. PURPOSE:

To review U.S.-Soviet relations with Ambassador Hartman.

II. BACKGROUND:

The meeting will give the President the opportunity to discuss the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and to provide guidance to Amb. Hartman for his future contacts with Soviet officials. Hartman plans to return to Moscow this coming weekend.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director Soviet Union Affairs, State

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Release White House staff photo.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President greets Amb. Hartman and initiates a discussion of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment:

Tab A Talking Points/card

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *Smf* NARA, Date *6/19/02*

cc: Vice President
Edwin Meese
James Baker
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

-- I'm glad we have a chance to meet while you are in town. Why do you think the Russians decided to pull out of the Olympics?

-- What do you make of this show they are putting on of not dealing with us? Have they really decided finally that they will not deal this year, as some are saying?

-- What sort of tactics should we be following over the coming months?

-- Thanks for all the fine work.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 10, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for President's Meeting with
Ambassador Hartman

Attached at Tab I is a Meeting Memorandum and talking points for the President's meeting in the Oval Office on Thursday, May 11, at 9:45 a.m. with Ambassador Hartman.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Meeting Memorandum

Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *Smf* NARA, Date 6/19/02