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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/26/2005

**File Folder** USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 5/8

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 22

YARHI-MILO

2207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9192	MEMO	INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKOVA <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	8/15/1983	B1
9188	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE POSSIBLE SOVIET DEFECTOR <b>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</b>	1	8/16/1983	B1
9193	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANDREI BEREZHKOVA CASE <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	8/13/1983	B1
9194	MEMO	DAM TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH SOVIETS ON ANDREI BEREZHKOVA <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	8/15/1983	B1
9189	LETTER	TRIPLETT TO SMITH RE USSR <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	8/17/1983	B1
9195	MEMO	BURT TO INTERAGENCY COODINATING COMMITTEE FOR U.S.-SOVIET AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVES RE NEW CLOSED AREA MAP FOR SOVIET TRAVEL IN THE U.S. <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	8/1/1983	B1
9196	MEMO	DRAFT STATE DEPARTMENT MEMO ON SOVIET DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	17	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9197	MEMO	INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKOVA FINAL SITUATION REPORT <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	8/18/1983	B1
9198	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY BY SENIOR LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	9/8/1983	B1
9199	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9198 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	9/8/1983	B1
9190	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK RE SOVIET SPIES, RECIPROCITY AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY <i>R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6</i>	2	9/22/1983	B1
9191	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SOVIET SPIES <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	ND	B1
9200	MEMO	HILL TO CLARK RE RECENT EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FROM THE U.S. <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	9/12/1983	B1
9201	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO MATLOCK/LENCZOWSKI RE SHULTZ'S EVENING REPORT OF OCT 12, 1983 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	10/13/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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USSK-deplo

1

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

83 AUG 15 P 7: 31

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

**B**

S/S #

DEPT OF STATE  
033 AUG 15 PM 7 30


MESSAGE NO. 1037 CLASSIFICATION CONF No. Pages 2  
FROM RSMITH EUR/sov  2  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSA	ops center		
CIA	ops center		
WH	SIT ROOM		

FOR CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: 



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OPERATIONS CENTER

INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKO

SITUATION REPORT NO. 8

SITUATION AS OF 1700 EDT, AUGUST 15, 1983

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Soviet Telephones Working Again. Our efforts with the phone company, with FBI help, were successful. The telephones at the Soviet Chancery are once again working properly.

Soviet Embassy Interview with ABC. ABC informed us at about 2:45 p.m. that just previously they had an on-camera interview with Embassy First Secretary Mikoyan, acting as press spokesman. According to ABC, Mikoyan said the Soviets would not permit an interview with Andrei and he would leave for home with his parents when the time came. He also asked rhetorically what kind of law it is that requires a boy like Andrei to be interviewed. So far we have no other indication that the Soviets are soliciting interviews, but Mikoyan is likely to be carried widely this evening. ABC is planning a "Night Line" piece on the issue and we have heard reports that it is looking into the legal questions involved.

Demonstration at Soviet Embassy Compound. Soviet Embassy officials this afternoon reported two separate "demonstrations" in front of the Soviet residential complex on Tunlaw Road. The first group of demonstrators protested Soviet actions in Poland; the second, Afghanistan. Soviets complained that the demonstrators were directly across the street from the compound and, therefore, not adhering to the "500 feet" rule. Embassy officials also wished to know whether these demonstrations had been authorized. Police reported that one demonstrator had in fact been arrested for violating the distance requirement and for burning a Soviet flag, but that the others were adhering to the rules. No additional information was available concerning the first demonstration, which ended at 3:00 p.m. The second consisted of 25 members of the Young Americans for Freedom, and was still going on 4:00 p.m. The Police had not received prior notification of either demonstration, and we so informed the Soviet Embassy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F06-114/6#9192  
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

ABC Carries Another Departure Notice. ABC News has been checking out with our public affairs people a report, sourced as a "tip from the FBI," that Andrei is heading for Baltimore. The FBI believes that this report may be based on monitoring of their radio frequencies. Two Soviet vans are en route to New York on a routine courier run to Canada, and the FBI has instituted surveillance. The FBI would prefer we not comment on these reports.

Raymond F. Smith  
Berezhkov Working Group

William Garland  
Senior Watch Officer

Cleared: RBU *RB/12*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED 12 AUG 83 16

TO PRESIDENT FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 12 AUG 83 4

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By SMX NARA, Date 6/12/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

CM

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET EMBASSY DEFECTOR

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SIMS

LENCZOWSKI

KIMMITT

COBB

THOMPSON

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# 8324720

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NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



file USSR/Pol. Lenczowski  
 National Security Council  
 The White House

II

RECEIVED

System # \_\_\_\_\_  
 Package# 90988  
 add-on

83 AUG 16 P 7: 08

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)

JP: Our records show the 8/13 memo  
 went to El Paso. Bob

Both memos at Tabs I & II  
 have gone out to the Judge.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

August 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Defector

Attached at Tab I and Tab II are the last two memos from State to the President on the Berezhkov case. You have received an advanced copy already of at least the first of these. They both outline our basic position and the most recent memo speculates on the nature of Soviet tactics.

One related item which I learned independently is that, according to Soviet law, 16 is the age at which a Soviet citizen can be held legally responsible for high treason. Article 64 of the RSFSR criminal code states that among other things any attempt to escape the country or refuse to return constitutes high treason. I have passed this information on to State.

Recommendation

That you pass these memoranda on to the President if he has not seen them as yet.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Shultz memo of August 13, 1983  
Tab II Dam memo of August 15, 1983

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR POB-114/6 #9188  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/83

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED

83 AUG 13 P 2: 23

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: Developments in the Andrei Berezhkov Case.

I would like to report on the latest developments and on some of the prospects for the next few days.

First, there is a wire service report this morning that Andrei and his mother transitted Paris today on their way to Moscow. We have checked it out as thoroughly as we can, and there appears to be nothing to it. The FBI continues to surveil the Soviet residence complex at Mt. Alto closely, and believes he is still there. The report is almost certainly a mixture of two facts. First, the Soviets had made bookings for Mrs. Berezhkov and Andrei on last night's flight from Dulles to Paris. We told the Soviet Charge they could not be used unless there was an interview that satisfied us Andrei wished to depart, and their Charge assured us they would not be on the flight. (Shortly thereafter they issued a press statement that he was still with his family.) Second, coincidentally, a TASS family with two sons left on a normal trip home from Dulles. One of the boys was 15, about Andrei's age. The FBI checked them out in a mobile lounge that gave some privacy from inquiring reporters. The Soviet Embassy has complained, but according to the FBI report the family themselves expressed gratitude. What has happened, I think, is that reporters have discovered the reservations and observed the family going through Paris airport, and put the two together, wrongly.

Second, we will be starting talks to probe Soviet flexibility for resolving the case on the basis of our interview requirement. I am having Rick Burt handle these contacts with the Soviet Charge. There are two good reasons for starting now:

-- We want to keep the initiative. They have the young man, and they appear to be digging in on the theory that we must permit unhindered departure because he has diplomatic immunity. We do not agree with the theory, but we also want to get things moving before they lock onto something that makes it harder for them to move back. If this happens, it increases the risk that they will do something to our people in the USSR.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F06-114/6 # 9193  
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



8

~~SECRET~~

-- After yesterday's go-round on the Paris reservations, I think the Soviets are less likely to try to spirit Andrei out without our knowing, but having talks going would be an additional incentive for them not to risk confrontation at an airport.

--Rick Burt saw Sokolov this morning. Sokolov confirmed that the young man is in the housing complex, said he wanted to go back to the Soviet Union, and was willing to make a public statement to this effect. Burt responded that a public statement could be subject to all sorts of misinterpretation and that we felt a private interview was the appropriate way to ascertain his views. Sokolov did not rule this out, but added that such an interview could not be held on U.S. or Soviet property. He said he would get back to us on modalities. Sokolov also complained strongly about the "harassment" of Soviet personnel and threatened retaliation against U.S. persons in Moscow if it continued. Burt warned Sokolov against any retaliation in Moscow, saying it could lead to countermeasures of our own.

We have also been making plans for the interview, and have developed some guidelines for handling it whether it takes place with Soviet agreement or whether we force it at an airport as they are trying to sneak Andrei out. Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, will be handling the interview. Rick Burt will be in charge of dealing with the Soviets, and we will also have an experienced and respected doctor on hand (if there is time) to help us make judgements about Andrei's behavior. We have worked out the following guidelines for the interview:

-- If Andrei states convincingly that he wants to go back, he would be allowed to leave.

-- If he states that he wants to stay, he would be taken into the protective custody of the INS, and the normal procedures for dealing with an asylum request would start.

-- I have complete confidence in Elliott's judgment in the likely event that Andrei is ambiguous or indecisive in stating his intentions. Elliott has long experience in these humanitarian matters and has been deeply involved in Andrei's case from the beginning. If the interview takes place at an airport, we will also be prepared to hold the plane until it is possible for him to make a decision.

I will keep you current on further developments as they occur.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

83 AUG 15 PII: 19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

August 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Soviets on Andrei Berezhkov

Rick Burt called in Soviet Charge Sokolov today to continue their discussions on Andrei's case. Sokolov began with the typical complaints about the security situation around the embassy, including demonstrations, telephone stoppage, and bomb threats. Burt reassured him that we are not engaged in a campaign to harass or intimidate the Embassy, and said our impression is that conditions are more normal, which Sokolov acknowledged.

On the issues concerning Andrei, Sokolov reiterated the official Soviet line that they would not agree to our interviewing the boy and that he and his family should be allowed to depart unhindered. Burt restated our position and then turned the conversation toward a "personal" discussion of possible modalities for resolving the problem. Sokolov listened intently and agreed to think about Burt's points on who might conduct the interview, who would be present, and where it would be held. He seemed particularly concerned that even if we were satisfied the boy wants to return to the USSR, the FBI might not let him leave or create an embarrassing incident. Burt assured Sokolov that if the arrangements were right and we had a real opportunity to ascertain the young man's views, and were convinced he wanted to return home as Sokolov said, we could guarantee he would be allowed to leave unhindered.

Sokolov then returned to his earlier suggestion that perhaps there could be a press interview with Andrei. As he developed this suggestion, Sokolov suggested that the "press interview" might even be a private one which would not be reported, at least at the time it occurred.

Both sides agreed to study further the other's "personal ideas" and to meet at the Department at the same time tomorrow to develop them in more concrete terms.

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NLS F06-114/6#9194

~~SECRET~~

BY HOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



10  
~~SECRET~~

Sokolov may be using his instructions for a press interview to the limit, probing to see if there might be some way to find a solution that would respect the positions of principle both sides have taken, i.e. a meeting that would be the interview we require to ascertain Andrei's intentions, but would be only a press interview for the Soviets. On the other hand, it may be that Sokolov is only trying to buy time in which to explore some alternative (such as retaliation in Moscow or trying to sneak Andrei out of the country). In conjunction with Justice and the FBI we are continuing to watch the Soviets carefully.

We will pursue the dialogue with Sokolov tomorrow. I should caution that Sokolov was quite concerned that he would be quoted or that the U.S. side might imply he was moving off the principles they had already stated. In departing, he told the press once again that the Soviets would not agree to the U.S. demand for an interview and suggested there had been no progress in the meeting.

~~SECRET~~



P. Dobriansky 11  
FILE - SOVIET  
DLP, TRAVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES  
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON  
D.C.

August 17, 1983

Mr. Raymond F. Smith  
Office of Soviet Affairs  
U.S. Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Smith:

As per our telephone conversation of today, please note that the Draft Note to the Soviet Union on closed areas of travel for Soviet citizens does indicate that Houston, Texas (Harris County) is among the cities newly closed. However, this was not mentioned by Mr. Burt in his cover memo of May 1. Given the sensitivity of the oil and gas equipment issue, it might be useful to highlight Houston as well as Silicon Valley in future cover memos for U.S. Government decision-making.

Sincerely,

William C. Triplett, II

WCT:mm

Enclosure  
Classified CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
DECL: ~~OAD~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FO6-114/6#9189  
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOG-114/6# 9/95

United States Department of State

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/06Assistant Secretary of State  
for European Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUG 1 1985

TO: Interagency Coordinating Committee for  
US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) Representatives

FROM: Richard Burt *RB by JHK*  
Chairman, ICCUSA

SUBJECT: New Closed Area Map for Soviet Travel in the U.S.

As part of the Administration's effort to enforce reciprocity with the Soviet Union, the Department of State has for some time been engaged in revising the list of areas closed to travel by Soviet diplomats in the United States. This map of closed areas was last revised in 1967. Since then, the Soviets themselves have revised their map. Moreover, there have been substantial changes in the areas to which we deny access to Soviet travelers. A prime example of this is the Silicon Valley area of California, which we have closed de facto for some time and which will now be formally closed.

The new map will match the reductions in percentage of closed territory made by the Soviets in 1978. It will also add Alaska and Hawaii -- areas excluded from the 1967 map. By closing all points in Hawaii, and the five major cities in Alaska, we will be able to reduce the percentage of closed area with only a modest reduction in the actual square mileage of closed areas in the 48 contiguous states, and at the same time meet all the major security concerns of the Department of Defense.

You will find enclosed a draft diplomatic note to the Soviet Embassy announcing these changes and enclosing a list of areas proposed for closing, a list of open cities in closed areas, and a list of approved transit routes through closed areas. There are, of course, substantial changes in the lists of closed areas, open cities, and approved transit routes. The draft note, which sets forth the framework of our travel control program and delineates the note-free travel zones, does not incorporate any procedural changes in the system. The only major change in the draft note from the 1967 version is a complete revision of the accessible area for Soviets assigned to the Consulate General in San Francisco. The note also re-states existing regulations and reduces to writing some practices long-followed, but not previously included in any formal notification to the Soviet Embassy.

I am also including for your general information a list of significant cities and areas that will be newly opened or closed. We anticipate presenting this package to the Soviets in a positive spirit, noting its reciprocal nature but also indicating that a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DECL: OADR



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

number of previously closed cities and areas will now be open to them. As has been our practice since 1952, and in accordance with long-standing U.S. policy, we intend to re-state our offer to abolish travel controls on a mutual basis.

This proposal has been fully discussed with the Army, Air Force and Navy to ensure that all areas of military sensitivity have been included in closed areas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has also reviewed this project. All areas of concern have been fully worked out at the working level with each of the services and the Bureau. In addition, we have consulted the National Security Agency and, to the extent possible, have met their concerns as well.

I would appreciate it if your agency could review this matter in the next two weeks. The new maps will go into the final phase of production about August 15. Any proposals for changes received after that date would, naturally, present nearly insurmountable problems to incorporate.

Should you or your agency have any further questions, you may wish to contact the Office of Soviet Union Affairs at 632-8670, attention Raymond F. Smith, officer-in-charge, bilateral relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



The Department of State refers to its note of July 26, 1967, to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, concerning regulations applicable to certain Soviet citizens traveling in the United States.

The Soviet Government first instituted a system of stringent travel restrictions for foreigners in 1941. After attempts to secure the abolition of travel controls and closed areas in the Soviet Union, the United States reluctantly instituted its own system of closed areas for Soviet citizens on January 3, 1955. Since then, the United States has on many occasions proposed mutual abolition or reduction of all travel restrictions. The United States avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its offer to abolish or reduce travel restrictions or closed areas on the basis of reciprocity.

The United States Government, taking into account Note. No. 1/Pr of January 4, 1978, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has reduced the percentage of United States territory closed to Soviet travelers. The areas closed to Soviet travelers are listed in enclosure 1. Open cities in closed areas are listed in enclosure 2. Open transit routes through closed areas are listed in enclosure 3. Special permission is required for travel to United States possessions, territories and areas under United States administration.

These regulations apply to travel in the fifty United States by all Soviet citizens possessing valid passports issued by the Government of the USSR, except for Soviet citizen officers and employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations while their conduct is the responsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations and Soviet tourists on private visits to the United States. Soviet citizens who are visiting the United States within the framework of US-USSR exchanges agreements may visit closed areas in accordance with the particular exchange program and itinerary as approved by the Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FOG-114/6 # 9196

BY

hoj, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Except as otherwise provided herein, all Soviet citizens to whom these regulations apply who have not declared their itinerary for travel in the United States at the time of application for a United States visa must submit official notification at least forty-eight hours in advance of any travel to any point outside the free-movement zones of New York, Washington or San Francisco as defined herein. In the case of Soviet citizens assigned permanently or temporarily to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, or to Soviet commercial organizations in the United States, this notification must be addressed in writing to the Department of State, the Army, Navy or Air Force Foreign Liaison Offices, or the United States Mission to the United Nations, as appropriate. In the case of Soviet correspondents temporarily or permanently assigned in the United States, written notification is to be addressed to the Department of State. In the case of persons present in the United States in the framework of US-USSR exchange agreements notification is to be made to the Department of State. Notifications will include the names of all travelers, description of their itinerary, identification of means of transportation used, route numbers of all roads traveled by car listed in the order in which the roads are taken, and the location of each overnight stop. Listing of any city by name in the itinerary shall be deemed to include only such areas as are within the city limits unless specifically stated otherwise. (In the case of diplomats and journalists the listing of San Francisco, New York or Washington shall be deemed to include all areas within the respective free-movement zones.)

Travel by railroad or commercial airlines through closed areas is permitted when necessary to reach open areas or open cities in otherwise closed areas. During such transit travel Soviet citizens may not leave the immediate vicinity of rail or



air terminals within closed areas. Transit travel by automobile is permitted only on the designated transit routes listed in enclosure 2. While utilizing these transit routes, no stops or deviations are permitted except at public facilities (i.e., restaurants, gas stations and roadside rests) in the immediate vicinity of the transit route.

Soviet citizens subject to these regulations may not hire unchauffered motor vehicles nor may they charter helicopters, ships or aircraft. Boat travel through closed areas or within United States territorial waters bordering closed areas is also prohibited. Unless specifically authorized, entry into or stopping in the vicinity of identifiable military installations is prohibited.

The zone of free movement in the Washington, D.C. area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in Washington, D.C., is defined as follows. First, all open areas within 25 miles of the White House. Second, King's Dominion amusement park in Doswell, Virginia via route I-95. Third, Front Royal, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fourth, Luray, Virginia via routes I-66 and U.S. 340. Fifth, Annapolis, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Sixth, Colonial Williamsburg and William and Mary College at Williamsburg, Virginia via routes I-95, I-295 and I-64. Sixth, Ocean City, Maryland via route U.S. 50. Seventh, the Soviet recreational property at Pioneer Point, Maryland via routes U.S. 50, U.S. 301 and Maryland 18.

The zone of free movement in the New York City area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in New York City, is defined as all open areas in the States of New York and Connecticut within 25 miles of Columbus Circle, and in the State of New Jersey those portions of the counties of Bergen, Essex (except for the City of Nutley), Hudson (except for the City of Bayonne),



# DRAFT

Middlesex, Monmouth, Morris, Passaic, and Union within 25 miles of Columbus Circle.

The zone of free movement in the San Francisco area for diplomats and journalists, and for other Soviets subject to these regulations and resident in San Francisco, is defined as follows. First, the City and County of San Francisco. Second, San Francisco International Airport via route U.S. 101 from and to the City and County of San Francisco. Third, in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties (via the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge) an area bounded by California Route 17 from the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge to its intersection with route I-580, thence east on route I-580 to route I-680, thence north on route I-680 to California Route 24, thence west on California Route 24 to the point where California Route 24 intersects an arc of 18.5 statute miles radius centered at the intersection of the roads Skyview Way and City View Way (southwest of Twin Peaks Park) in San Francisco, thence northwest along the arc to the Contra Costa County/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay. Fourth, in Marin County (via the Golden Gate Bridge) an area bounded by a continuation of the 18.5 mile radius arc from its intersection with the Contra Costa/Marin County boundary in San Pablo Bay to its intersection with route U.S. 101 in Marin County, thence north on U.S. 101 to Lucas Valley Road, thence west on Lucas Valley Road to Nicasio Valley Road, west on Nicasio Valley Road to Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road, and west on Petaluma-Pt. Reyes Road to its intersection with California Route 1 (Shoreline Highway), and thence north on California Route 1 for two statute miles, thence by a line due west to the low water line in Tomales Bay, thence, following the low water line, along the west side of Tomales Bay to the Pacific Ocean and south to the Golden Gate Bridge. Drake's Estero, Estero de Limatour and Bolinas Lagoon are included within the free movement zone. In Marin County, only those portions of San

Francisco Bay within one kilometer of the low water line are included in the free movement zone. Angel Island is included in the free movement zone and may be reached by any commercial means of transport.

The Chief of Mission of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and the Principal Representative of the USSR to the United Nations in New York may travel without prior notification by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein to open areas and cities in the United States accompanied by members of his or her immediate family, an interpreter, and personal chauffeur. Family members unaccompanied by the Chief of Mission may also travel without prior notification and may be accompanied by a chauffeur if travel is by automobile.

Embassy and Consulate General personnel, and Soviet journalists, may travel by any means of transport not otherwise prohibited herein, on the basis of notification in writing at least 24 hours in advance (eight hours of which correspond to one working day), between Washington and San Francisco and between Washington and New York, and to cities and towns otherwise open to travel by Soviet official personnel which are located either on the interstate highway network in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, or in the State of California on interstate route 80 and on interstate route 5 north of Kern County.

This note does not modify or supersede the provisions of the Department's note of March 18, 1983, regarding the furnishing of travel services by the Office of Foreign Missions.

The United States Government wishes to emphasize again that its firm preference is to abolish all restrictions on free travel, and repeats its earlier offers to discuss with the Soviet Government any proposal to this end.

**DRAFT**

Enclosures:

1. Areas closed to Soviet citizens subject to US travel regulations.

2. Open cities in closed areas.

3. Open transit routes through closed areas.

Department of State,  
Washington, \_\_\_\_\_, 1983.



Enclosure 1

AREAS CLOSED TO SOVIET CITIZENS  
SUBJECT TO US TRAVEL REGULATIONSNames listed under each State are names of  
counties, unless otherwise indicated.

Mississippi River (entire length)

ALABAMABlount  
Calhoun  
Coffee  
De Kalb  
Dale  
Etowah  
Fayette  
Geneva  
Henry  
Jackson  
Jefferson  
Lamar  
Marion  
Marshall  
Madison  
Russell  
St. Clair  
Talladega  
Walker  
WinstonALASKACity of Anchorage  
City of Fairbanks  
City of Juneau  
City of Ketchikan  
City of NomeARIZONAApache  
Cochise  
Coconino  
Maricopa  
Mohave  
Navaho  
Pima  
Pinal  
Santa CruzARKANSASCleburne  
Conway  
Crittenden  
Cross  
Faulkner  
Jefferson  
Lee  
Mississippi  
Monroe  
Ouachita  
Pulaski  
St. Francis  
Van Buren  
White  
WoodruffCALIFORNIAAlameda  
Contra Costa  
Fresno  
Humboldt  
Inyo  
 Kern  
Los Angeles  
Merced  
Monterey  
Napa  
Orange  
Riverside  
Sacramento  
San Bernardino  
San Diego  
San Joaquin  
San Luis Obispo  
San Mateo  
Santa Barbara  
Santa Clara  
Solano  
Sonoma  
YubaCOLORADOAdams  
Arapahoe  
Bent  
Boulder  
City of Denver  
Douglas  
Elbert  
El Paso  
Jefferson  
Las Animas  
Logan  
Prowers  
Pueblo  
Teller  
WeldCONNECTICUTFairfield  
Hartford  
New LondonDELAWARE

Kent

FLORIDA

Alachua  
Baker  
Bay  
Bradford  
Brevard  
Columbia  
Dade  
Duval  
Franklin  
Gulf  
Hillsborough  
Holmes  
Monroe  
Nassau  
Orange  
Osceola  
Okaloosa  
Polk  
Pinellas  
Santa Rosa  
Seminole  
Union  
Walton

GEORGIA

Bibb  
Bryan  
Bullock  
Burke  
Camden  
Cobb  
Chattahouchee  
Columbia  
Crawford  
Dawson  
DeKalb  
Fanin  
Forsyth  
Fulton  
Houston  
Jefferson  
Jenkins  
Lincoln  
Lumpkin  
Marion  
McDuffie  
Muscogee  
Quitman  
Richmond  
Stewart  
Talbot  
Taylor  
Union  
White

HAWAII  
All points

IDAHO

Butte  
Canyon  
Elmore  
Fremont  
Owyhee  
Payette

ILLINOIS

Carroll  
Cook  
De Kalb  
Du Page  
Henry  
Kane  
Lake  
Lee  
Mercer  
Ogle  
Rock Island  
Scott  
St. Clair  
Whiteside  
Will

INDIANA

Allen  
Bartholomew  
Boone  
Brown  
Clark  
Daviess  
Decatur  
Dearborn  
Floyd  
Franklin  
Greene  
Hamilton  
Hancock  
Jackson  
Jefferson  
Jennings  
Johnson  
Lawrence  
Marion  
Martin  
Miami  
Morgan  
Ohio  
Ripley  
Scott  
Shelby  
Switzerland  
Vermilion

IOWA

Clinton  
Des Moines  
Louisa  
Mills  
Muscatine  
Pottawatamie  
Scott



# DRAFT

## KANSAS

Butler  
 Chatauqua  
 Cherokee  
 Crawford  
 Cowley  
 Douglas  
 Elk  
 Harvey  
 Jefferson  
 Johnson  
 Kingman  
 Labette  
 Leavenworth  
 Meosho  
 Montgomery  
 Reno  
 Sedgwick  
 Shawnee  
 Sumner  
 Wilson

## KENTUCKY

Bourbon  
 Bullitt  
 Calloway  
 Carlisle  
 Christian  
 Clark  
 Fulton  
 Graves  
 Hickman  
 Hardin  
 Jefferson  
 Lyon  
 Marshall  
 Madison  
 McCracken  
 Meade  
 Oldham  
 Todd  
 Trigg  
 Trimble

## LOUISIANA

Acauegard  
 Bossier  
 Caddo  
 De Soto  
 Jefferson  
 Natchitoches  
 Plaquemines  
 Rapides  
 Sabine  
 St. Bernard  
 St. Charles  
 Vernon  
 Webster

## MAINE

Androscoggin  
 Aroostook  
 Cumberland  
 Kennebec  
 Lincoln  
 Penobscot  
 Sagadahoc  
 Somerset  
 Washington  
 York

## MARYLAND

Allegany  
 \*\*Anne Arundel  
 Baltimore  
 Charles  
 Frederick  
 Harford  
 Howard  
 Kent  
 Washington

## MASSACHUSETTS

Barnstable  
 Essex  
 Middlesex  
 Ncrfolk  
 Plymouth  
 Suffolk  
 Worcester

## MICHIGAN

Arenac  
 Charlevoix  
 City of Detroit  
 Emmett  
 Iosco  
 Macomb  
 Marquette

## MINNESOTA

City of Minneapolis  
 City of St. Paul  
 Hennepin  
 Ramsey

## MISSISSIPPI

Hancock  
 Harrison  
 Jackson  
 Lowndes

# DRAFT

## MISSOURI

Benton  
 Barton  
 Bates  
 Boone  
 Camden  
 Cass  
 Cedar  
 Cooper  
 Dallas  
 Dent  
 Henry  
 Hickory  
 Howard  
 Iron  
 Jackson  
 Jasper  
 Jefferson  
 Laclede  
 Madison  
 Moniteau  
 Morgan  
 Pettis  
 Pulaski  
 Reynolds  
 Shannon  
 Sr. Francois  
 St. Genevieve  
 Saline  
 St. Clair  
 St. Louis  
 Texas  
 Vernon

## MONTANA

Cascade  
 Chouteau  
 Fergus  
 Judith Basin  
 Liberty  
 Pondera  
 Teton  
 Toole  
 Wheatland

## NEBRASKA

Adams  
 Banner  
 Burt  
 Cheyenne  
 Douglas  
 Hall  
 Kimball  
 Sarpy

## NEVADA

Clark  
 Lincoln  
 Mineral  
 Nye

## NEW HAMPSHIRE

Hillsborough  
 Rockingham

## NEW JERSEY

Atlantic  
 #Bergen  
 Burlington  
 Camden  
 #Essex  
 #Hudson  
 Mercer  
 #Monmouth  
 #Morris  
 Ocean  
 #Passaic  
 Salem  
 #Union

## NEW MEXICO

Bernalillo  
 Curry  
 Dona Ana  
 Lincoln  
 Los Alamos  
 McKinley  
 Mora  
 Otero  
 Roosevelt  
 Santa Fe  
 Sierra  
 Socorro  
 Taos  
 Torraine

## NEW YORK

Albany  
 Broome  
 Cayuga  
 Clinton  
 Erie  
 Jefferson  
 Lewis  
 Madison  
 Niagara  
 Oneida  
 Onondaga  
 St. Lawrence  
 Saratoga  
 Schenectady  
 Seneca  
 Suffolk  
 Tioga

## NORTH CAROLINA

Brunswick  
 Buncombe  
 Cumberland  
 Dare  
 Harnett  
 Hoke  
 Hyde  
 Johnston  
 Madison  
 Moore  
 Sampson  
 Scotland  
 Transylvania  
 Wayne



# DRAFT

## NORTH DAKOTA

Bottineau  
 Burke  
 Burleigh  
 Cass  
 Cavalier  
 Emmons  
 Grant  
 Grand Forks  
 Griggs  
 McHenry  
 McLean  
 Mercer  
 Morton  
 Mountrail  
 Nelson  
 Oliver  
 Pembina  
 Ramsey  
 Renville  
 Sioux  
 Sheridan  
 Steele  
 Walsh  
 Ward

## OHIO

Ashland  
 Ashtabula  
 Auglaize  
 Allen  
 Butler  
 Champaign  
 Clark  
 Delaware  
 Franklin  
 Greene  
 Hardin  
 Logan  
 Madison  
 Marion  
 Miami  
 Morrow  
 Medina  
 Montgomery  
 Pike  
 Preble  
 Portage  
 Richland  
 Shelby  
 Summit  
 Union

## OKLAHOMA

Comanche  
 Jackson  
 Oklahoma  
 Pittsburg

## OREGON

Coos  
 Douglas  
 Morrow  
 Multnomah  
 Umatilla  
 Washington

## PENNSYLVANIA

Adams  
 Allegheny  
 Beaver  
 Centre  
 Cumberland  
 Dauphin  
 Franklin  
 Lackawanna  
 Lebanon  
 Monroe  
 Montgomery  
 York

## SOUTH CAROLINA

Aiken  
 Barnwell  
 Beaufort  
 Berkeley  
 Calhoun  
 Charleston  
 Colleton  
 Dorchester  
 Edgefield  
 Horry  
 Lexington  
 McCormick  
 Orangeburg  
 Richland  
 Sumter

## SOUTH DAKOTA

Butte  
 Corson  
 Haakon  
 Jackson  
 Lawrence  
 Meade  
 Pennington  
 Ziebach

# DRAFT

## TENNESSEE

Anderson  
 Blount  
 Bradley  
 Benton  
 Cocke  
 Carroll  
 Cheatham  
 Coffee  
 Crockett  
 Dyer  
 Decatur  
 Dickson  
 Franklin  
 Greene  
 Grundy  
 Hamblen  
 Hamilton  
 Hawkins  
 Henry  
 Houston  
 Humphreys  
 Jefferson  
 Knox  
 Loudon  
 Lauderdale  
 Lincoln  
 Marion  
 Meigs  
 Monroe  
 McMinn  
 Montgomery  
 Moore  
 Obion  
 Polk  
 Perry  
 Rhea  
 Roane  
 Sequatchie  
 Sevier  
 Stewart  
 Sullivan  
 Unicoi  
 Washington  
 Weakley

## TEXAS

Bell  
 Bexar  
 Bowie  
 Coryell  
 Dallas  
 El Paso  
 Harris  
 Harrison  
 Hunt  
 Lampasas  
 McLennan  
 Potter  
 Randall  
 Tarrant  
 Taylor  
 Tom Green  
 Travis

## UTAH

Davis  
 Salt Lake  
 Tooele  
 Weber

## VERMONT Chittenden

## VIRGINIA

Albermarle  
 Campbell  
 Clarke  
 Craig  
 Gloucester  
 Isle Of Wight  
 King George  
 Loudon  
 Matthews  
 Montgomery  
 Northampton  
 Prince William  
 Pulaski  
 Surry  
 York  
 City of James  
 City of  
 Chesapeake  
 City of Newport  
 News  
 City of  
 Virginia Beach  
 City of Norfolk  
 City of  
 Portsmouth  
 City of Hampton

## WASHINGTON

Benton  
 Clark  
 Cowlitz  
 Franklin  
 Jefferson  
 King  
 Kitsap  
 Kittitas  
 Lewis  
 Mason  
 Pierce  
 Spokane  
 Thurston  
 Yakima

## WEST VIRGINIA

Mineral  
 Pendleton

## WISCONSIN

Brown  
 Kenosha  
 Milwaukee  
 Racine

WYOMING  
 Big Horn  
 Campbell  
 Converse  
 Goshen  
 Laramie  
 Natrona  
 Platte  
 Sweetwater  
 Weston

---

‡ Except for those portions within the New York, San Francisco or Washington free-movement zones.

\* Except for the open city of Los Angeles, as defined in Enclosure No. 2

\*\* Only those portions north of route 50.



DRAFT

Enclosure 2

OPEN CITIES IN CLOSED AREAS

Albany, New York  
Anaheim, California  
Atlanta, Georgia  
Austin, Texas  
Baltimore, Maryland  
Birmingham, Alabama  
Boston, Massachusetts  
Bridgeport, Connecticut  
Brookline, Massachusetts  
Buffalo, New York  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
Camden, New Jersey  
Chattanooga, Tennessee  
Chicago, Illinois (incl O'Hare Airport)  
Columbia, South Carolina  
Columbus, Ohio  
Great Adventure Amusement Park, New Jersey  
Hartford, Connecticut  
Independence, Missouri  
Indianapolis, Indiana (incl all enclaves)  
Kansas City, Kansas  
Kansas City, Missouri  
Kenner, Louisiana  
Knoxville, Tennessee  
Lawrence, Kansas  
Little Rock, Arkansas  
\*Los Angeles, California  
Louisville, Kentucky  
Macon, Georgia  
Metairie, Louisiana  
Miami Beach, Florida  
Miami, Florida  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
New Orleans, Louisiana  
Omaha, Nebraska  
Phoenix, Arizona  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania  
Portland, Oregon  
Savannah, Georgia  
Shreveport, Louisiana  
Somerville, Massachusetts  
Spokane, Washington  
Stamford, Connecticut  
Stockton, California  
Topeka, Kansas  
Trenton, New Jersey  
Tucson, Arizona  
Worcester, Massachusetts

\* Only those portions of the County of Los Angeles within the following boundaries are open: the Pacific Ocean coast from route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway) northwest to California route 27 (Topanga Canyon Road); thence north on California route 27 to route US 101 (the Ventura Freeway), east on U.S. 101 to California route 2, and north and east on California route 2 to the area of "Little Jimmy Spring" in Angeles National Forest (34° 20' 43" N., 117° 49' 42" W), then south along a straight line bearing 183.5° East of North to California route 39, thence south on California route 39 to route I-10 (the San Bernardino Freeway), west on route I-10 to California route 19 (Rosemead Blvd.), south on California route 19 to route I-5 (the Santa Ana Freeway), north on route I-5 to Slauson Avenue, west on Slauson Avenue to route I-465 (the San Diego Freeway), north on route I-465 to route I-10 (the Santa Monica Freeway), and west on I-10 to the Pacific Coast. Off shore, along the Pacific Coast between I-10 and California route 29, the open area is limited to an area within 100 meters of the low water line.

Enclosure 3

OPEN TRANSIT ROUTES  
THROUGH CLOSED AREAS

California

I-5	Entire length north of Anaheim
I-80	Entire length
I-580	between Castro Valley and junction of I-5
Cal.152	between intersection of I-5 and Santa Cruz County line.

Connecticut

I-95	Entire length
I-91	Entire length

Georgia

I-75	between Macon and Monroe County line
I-16, I-95	between Savannah and Candler County line

Illinois

I-190	between O'Hare Airport and Chicago
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Kansas

I-70	between Kansas City and Lawrence
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Maine

Maine 202	between Rochester and Augusta
Maine 105	between Augusta and Knox County line

Maryland

I-95	entire length
US 301	between Pioneer Pt. and Delaware State line
I-270	between Rockville and junction of I-70
I-70	between junction of I-270 and Pennsylvania State line

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Massachusetts

- I-90 entire length
- I-95 between Rhode Island State line and junction of I-90

New Jersey

- N.J. Turnpike entire length
- N.J. 33, 571 between NJT exit 8 and Princeton
- US 206 between NJT and Trenton
- NJ 73 between Philadelphia and NJT exit 4
- I-195 between NJT and Great-Adventure
- NJ 38 between Camden and NJT exit 4

New York

- I-87 between Albany county line and Glens Falls
- I-87 between exit 34 and exit 41
- US 9, 9B between I-87 and Rouse's Point through Chazy and Coopersville (transit to and from Canada only)
- I-90 entire length
- I-190 between Buffalo and Niagara Falls

Pennsylvania

- Pa. Turnpike entire length

South Carolina

- I-26 between Columbia and exit 85 (Little Mountain)

Tennessee

- I-75 between Knoxville and Caryville

Virginia

- I-95 between Alexandria and Fredricksburg
- I-66 between Fairfax and Front Royal

Washington

- I-90 between Spokane and Coeur d'Alene

Wisconsin

- I-94 between Milwaukee and Waukesha County line



MAJOR CHANGES FROM 1967 MAP

CITIES NEWLY CLOSED

Denver, Colo.  
Fremont, Calif.  
Houston, Texas  
Minneapolis, Minn.  
Oklahoma City, Okla.  
San Antonio, Texas  
San Jose, Calif.  
Seattle, Washington  
St. Paul, Minn.

CITIES NEWLY OPENED - 100,000+

Birmingham, Alabama  
Cedar Rapids, Iowa  
Cleveland, Ohio  
Columbia, S.C.  
Duluth, Minn.  
Indianapolis, Ind.  
Little Rock, Ark.  
Livonia, Mich.  
Louisville, Ky.  
Lubbock, Texas  
Memphis, Tenn.  
Metairie, Louisiana  
Mobile, Alabama  
Montgomery, Alabama  
New Bedford, Mass.  
Parma, Ohio  
Peoria, Ill.  
Phoenix, Ariz.  
Raleigh, N.C.  
Rochester, N.Y.  
Rockford, Ill.  
Savannah, Georgia  
Shreveport, Louisiana  
Spokane, Wash.  
Springfield, Mass.  
Stockton, Calif.  
Topeka, Kansas  
Tucson, Ariz.  
Warren, Mich.  
Winston-Salem, N.C.

NEWLY OPENED - UNDER 100,000

Adirondack Mtn. Area, N.Y.  
Boise, Idaho  
Carson City, Nevada  
Decatur, Alabama  
Eugene, Ore.  
Helena, Mont.  
Lake Tahoe Area, Calif./Nev.  
Newport, R.I.  
Oxnard, Calif.  
Port Huron, Mich.  
Provo, Utah  
Reno, Nevada  
Saginaw, Mich.  
Salem, Ore.  
Salina, Kansas  
Sioux City, Iowa  
Springfield, Ill.  
Terre Haute, Ind.  
Twin Falls, Idaho  
Ventura, Calif.

WHSR  
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

0  
0  
0

STAFF	C/O
Clark	C - DACOM
McFarlane	
Poindexter	C
SIMS	C
VP	C
LENCZOWSKI	C
DOBRIANSKY	C
Kimmitt	
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

C : Copy

O : Original

32

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OPERATIONS CENTER

INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKOVA

FINAL SITUATION REPORT

SITUATION AS OF 2000 EDT, AUGUST 18, 1983

Andrei Berezhkov Departs the U.S. At 1908 EDT Andrei Berezhkov, accompanied by his parents, departed the United States aboard TWA flight 890 to Paris. Earlier, at 1500, the Soviet Embassy staged a press conference at their Mt. Alto residential complex with Valentin Berezhkov as the principal speaker. There were three U.S. and two Soviet journalists present; no USG officials attended. Berezhkov Sr. berated the U.S. for blowing up a private family matter out of proportion, and denied that his son had ever intended to remain in the U.S. Andrei stated that he wished to leave the United States with his parents, and denied authorship of the letters. Andrei appeared calm, collected and completely in control of himself, in marked contrast to the more emotional presentation of the father. (Press reports indicated that Andrei was "tired" and "red-eyed," but this was not immediately apparent from the TV footage monitored in the Operations Center.) After the press conference, the Berezhkovs and other Soviet officials left for Dulles Airport in a motorcade, led by EUR Assistant Secretary Burt. At the airport, the party was greeted by Burt and HA Assistant Secretary Abrams, and escorted into a controlled customs and immigration area. A press pool of three reporters (no film crews or still photographers were permitted) questioned Andrei closely about his intentions and motives. Andrei repeated his earlier Embassy performance at the U.S.-controlled site, specifically stating his firm resolve to return with his family to the Soviet Union. Following the interview, Assistant Secretary Burt and Chargé Sokolov accompanied the Berezhkov family in a private mobile lounge to planeside.

A Final Moment of Confusion In an understandable mixup, the Berezhkovs' passports and tickets were separated from the travelling party. TWA at this point threatened to take off without the family at the scheduled departure time of 1840. The State

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F06-114/6#9197  
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07


DIST.  
NP  
G-0  
(2)  
G-3  
(3)  
STEO  
ILREP  
EDITOR  
GRP  
P  
MO  
P  
A HO  
SIA  
SA  
(LDX)  
HOUSE  
(LDX)  
R  
(2)  
S/CPR  
A  
Y  
HA



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Department contingent at the airport notified the Operations Center, which immediately requested FAA intervention to have the plane held until the situation could be rectified. Shortly thereafter the passports and tickets were delivered to the mobile lounge. The Berezhkovs then boarded the airplane. At that point the final moment of confusion erupted as the 20 journalists and cameramen aboard the flight attempted to ply their trade. After firm action by the pilot, who threatened to turn the plane around in mid-air if necessary, order was restored to the cabin and wheels up occurred at 1908.



Thomas W. Simons, Jr.  
Berezhkov Working Group

Ruth Davis  
Senior Watch Officer

Cleared: RBuk

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

83 AUG 18 P 8: 52

B

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

S/S #

MESSAGE NO 1139 CLASSIFICATION \_\_\_\_\_ No. Pages 1

FROM: B. MCKINLEY S/S 23126 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRESS STATEMENT ON ANDREI BEREZHKOV

<u>TO (Agency)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>Extension</u>	<u>Room No.</u>
NSC	1- R. KIMMITT	395-3044	
	<del>_____</del>		
	3-SIMS		
	<i>MacLock</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

S/S Officer: *C. Solomon for*  
*Quinn*

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By *smf* NARA, Date *8/12/02*

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PRESS STATEMENT ON ANDREI BEREZHKOVA

Andrei Berezhkov left this evening for Moscow with his parents.

Andrei's letters to President Reagan and the press raised reasonable doubt as to whether Andrei's travel would be voluntary. In several days of intensive discussions with Soviet officials, officials of the U.S. Government made clear that the United States wanted to see this painful situation resolved in a way that protected Andrei's interests and the rights of his parents, while respecting the rights, commitments and obligations of both countries. And we therefore insisted that Andrei be given an opportunity to clarify his own wishes in a setting that permitted him to do so freely.

Tonight Andrei had that opportunity. At the airport, in the presence of U.S. officials, he stated clearly and firmly that he wished to return to the Soviet Union with his parents. On that basis, having heard him state his wish to return home with his parents in a situation where he could make a choice, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt and Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams made the determination that he was voluntarily departing the U.S.



BRIAN MERCHANT  
TION ROOM  
PROFILE

SECRET

*file USSR/Depts*

ID 8305807

RECEIVED 19 AUG 83 08

TO PRES

FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 18 AUG 83

*36*

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *smf* NARA, Date *6/18/02*

URGENT

KEYWORDS USSR  
CM

MEDIA

BEREZHKOV, ANDREI

SUBJECT MEMO TO PRES RE ANDREI BERZHKOV THE LAST DAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE: 19 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

*Lenzowski*

LENCZOWSKI

SIMS

ROBINSON

FORTIER

KIMMITT

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( S / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*NSC/S* *C* *19 Aug* *(per Set Room)* *Copy sent to CALIFORNIA to Tyson & Clarke NFAH per JL*

DISPATCH

RECEIVED 19 AUG 83 08

37

TO PRES FROM DAM, K

DOCDATE 18 AUG 83

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By smf NARA, Date 6/18/02

URGENT

KEYWORDS USSR MEDIA BEREZHKOVA, ANDREI  
CM

SUBJECT MEMO TO PRES RE ANDREI BEREZHKOVA THE LAST DAY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: 19 AUG 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MAPLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SIMS

ROBINSON

FORTIER

KIMMITT

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( S / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

August 18, 1983

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

Subject: Andrei Berezhkov: The Last Day

Discussions with the Soviets concluded this morning with an agreement that met our essential requirement that Andrei be given an opportunity to state his wishes in an environment we controlled. The game plan called for a press conference at the Soviet residential complex without U.S. official presence, followed by another at the airport with U.S. officials in attendance to hear Andrei and make the necessary decisions. EUR Assistant Secretary Burt told Chargé Sokolov and Minister-Counselor Isakov that he could not be at the Soviet residential compound for their press conference, and that he could not guarantee Andrei's unhindered departure if he stated an intention or desire to stay in talking to the press. The Soviets accepted those conditions, and the game plan proceeded.

After the 3:30 P.M. press conference at the compound, the Soviets proceeded, accompanied by Burt and with a police escort, to Dulles airport. There they were greeted by Burt and Human Rights Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams, and introduced to three media representatives under conditions where U.S. official control was clearly recognizable. The elder Berezhkov made a statement, and Andrei answered a number of press questions. He clearly and firmly repeated that he wished to go home with his parents. In those conditions and on the basis of Andrei's statements, Burt and Abrams determined that he should be allowed to depart.

Burt then spent 45 minutes in a mobile lounge with only Andrei and his parents and Chargé Sokolov. Burt detected no signs that the young man was having second thoughts or was acting under Soviet duress. He left Andrei and his parents on board the aircraft, which departed at 7:08 P.M. EDT.

It is still too early to draw general conclusions from this episode. In terms of the specifics, however, it seems clear already that our firm but businesslike approach convinced the Soviets both that we were not out to keep Andrei, and that we would not allow him to leave until he could state his intentions in a setting where he could do so freely. Once both facts were clear to the Soviets, a solution proved possible which protected Andrei's interests while respecting the positions of principle of both Governments.



USSR - Dipl. 39

6289

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *jl*

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet Officials by U.S. Government Personnel

Attached at Tab II is a memorandum to you from State recommending that the White House remind other government agencies about existing policy on social contacts with the Soviets.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies for your signature.

Gaston Sigur concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reminder memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies

Tab II State's memorandum, September 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *smf* NARA, Date 6/18/02

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT:           Contacts with Soviet Officials by Senior U.S.  
                  Government Personnel

This memorandum is to remind all senior personnel that restrictions on social contacts with Soviet officials imposed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remain in effect. In Washington, the only officials permitted social contact with the Soviet Embassy and its associated offices are those of the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and below and only those with working relationships with the Embassy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 6/15/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 8, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by  
Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

With the Korean airliner tragedy, the Department recommends that senior USG officials be reminded that restrictions placed on social contacts with Soviet officials as part of the sanctions imposed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remain in effect; we have sent a message to all overseas posts to remind that the restrictions still apply. In Washington the level of USG official permitted social contact with the Soviet Embassy and its associated offices is limited to Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and specifically to officials with regular working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to this is the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who has each year been designated as the senior USG representative at the Soviet national day reception. Senior officials have understood this policy and in most cases strictly adhered to it.

However, earlier this year the Department learned of two breaches of this policy when Executive Branch officials above the Deputy Assistant Secretary level attended a reception given by an element of the Soviet Embassy. At that time the White House accepted our recommendation and on February 22 issued a reminder of the policy at the Cabinet level. We know of no breaches of the policy since that was done. In view of current circumstances, however, we believe it timely for the White House to issue a reminder that will leave no question about our policy.

*Charles Hill*Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL  
DECL: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9198BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



*Lenarczycki  
file USSR Diplo*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 20, 1983

*[Handwritten mark]*

## MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet Officials by Senior U.S.  
Government Personnel

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FOR THE PRESIDENT:

*[Handwritten signature]*

William P. Clark

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 6/18/02

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

National Security Council  
The White House

System # I  
Package# 6289  
ra

RECEIVED *JM*

83 SEP 10 25:46

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 16, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

SEP 20 1983

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet Officials by U.S. Government Personnel

Attached at Tab II is a memorandum to you from State recommending that the White House remind other government agencies about existing policy on social contacts with the Soviets.

At Tab I is a memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies for your signature.

JL/jm GS  
Gaston Sigur concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reminder memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓ \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies  
Tab II State's memorandum, September 8

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smj NARA, Date 6/18/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR





United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 8, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by  
Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

With the Korean airliner tragedy, the Department recommends that senior USG officials be reminded that restrictions placed on social contacts with Soviet officials as part of the sanctions imposed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remain in effect; we have sent a message to all overseas posts to remind that the restrictions still apply. In Washington the level of USG official permitted social contact with the Soviet Embassy and its associated offices is limited to Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and specifically to officials with regular working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to this is the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who has each year been designated as the senior USG representative at the Soviet national day reception. Senior officials have understood this policy and in most cases strictly adhered to it.

However, earlier this year the Department learned of two breaches of this policy when Executive Branch officials above the Deputy Assistant Secretary level attended a reception given by an element of the Soviet Embassy. At that time the White House accepted our recommendation and on February 22 issued a reminder of the policy at the Cabinet level. We know of no breaches of the policy since that was done. In view of current circumstances, however, we believe it timely for the White House to issue a reminder that will leave no question about our policy.

*Charles Hill*Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~DECL: OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9199

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

USSR - Kiplo  
46

SYSTEM II  
91081

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 22, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Soviet Spies, Reciprocity and U.S. National Security

State has sent you a memorandum, which I understand you have already seen, on the subject of the expulsion of Lon Augustenborg from the USSR and of two Soviet spies from the U.S. (Tab A). The weak-kneed and impotent response to the brutal treatment of Augustenborg sends an unfortunate signal of American weakness to the Soviets.

State's logic as to why we cannot do anything about this is yet another example of how the detentist and appeasement mentality of that institution prevents us from sticking up for ourselves. There are, of course, legions of "experts" who will explain that our reaction in this case is one of a "mature" and "confident" power which can withstand the "infantile" provocations of the Soviet bully. The problem here, however, is that the more the infantile bully feels he can get away with such behavior, the more likely he is to continue or escalate that behavior in other arenas, and the more likely it is that other countries who witness all this will be convinced that the communists can play hardball but the "mature" republicans cannot. This can only send yet another message to the world about the balance of power and the credibility of the forces on each side of the balance.

Although some kind of retaliation is clearly called for in this case, I believe we should take this opportunity to resolve the much deeper underlying problem: the excessive hostile intelligence and disinformation presence in our country and the grossly unreciprocal conditions surrounding this situation.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President outlining some of the problems raised by this case and recommending that decisions be made soon to rectify them. Two and a half years of the Reagan Administration have passed and we are still living with the unreciprocal conditions that are the legacy of a decade of "detente", a decade of ever-intensifying disinformation and communist subversion in America, and a decade of unparalleled influence of Soviet propaganda on the minds of increasingly uneducated Americans. Unless some decisive measures are taken

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOI 104/6 #919D  
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13



soon to cripple the Soviets' ability to use their presence here to inflict psychological aggression and steal our technology to shift the military balance, we risk only further aggravating an ongoing dismal situation that is disarming us militarily and psychologically on a daily basis.

Ken de Graffenreid<sup>Kd</sup> concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A State's memorandum, September 12, 1983



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Soviet Spies

As you know, the State Department has informed us about the Soviet rough handling and expulsion of U.S. consulate official in Leningrad, Lon Augustenborg (Tab A). Although not publicized, Augustenborg's car windshield was smashed, he was grabbed, held by a choke-hold (which resulted in a neck sprain) his arms twisted behind his back, and manacled tightly and detained for several hours before the Consulate was informed.

State's response to this act of unprovoked brutality was to protest to the Soviets, to issue a veiled threat that their people may face similar treatment, and to announce publicly the expulsions of two Soviet spies last month. State does not recommend any further retaliation, such as PNG-ing one or more Soviet "diplomats," and maintains the position that we must restrict expulsions to cases where actual violations have been detected or else we will lose in any extended tit-for-tat with the Soviets. State's logic behind this argument is that the Soviets have many more American specialists than we have Soviet specialists and that therefore they can replace expelled diplomats more easily.

Although there is a superficial plausibility to this argument, I share the feelings of the counter-intelligence community which believes that it ignores the unreciprocal nature of our respective intelligence capabilities in each other's countries. The fact is that the Soviets have many more spies here than we have there, and their ability to gain access to information, to people whom they can recruit, and to the news media is much greater than ours.

The unreciprocal nature of this situation is highlighted even more by the Soviet license to treat our people with such brutality. State's veiled threat of possible future retaliation has no real credibility in Soviet eyes. The Soviets know that the FBI could never treat a Soviet diplomat the same way: they would be subject to press criticism for "police brutality" and the international communist propaganda apparatus, including its agents in our country, could drown out any explanations on our part.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6 #9191BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

The net result of the current situation is that the Soviets will go effectively unpunished for yet another act of bully behavior. They will not even suffer from any bad publicity, because State chose to downplay the incident. Expelling another Soviet diplomat or two in retaliation should be standard operating procedure for such outrageous behavior. But, because the current overall unreciprocal situation is most clearly a much graver problem than this particular case, I believe that we should instead come to some decisions very soon on the intelligence community's recommendations to reduce the hostile intelligence presence. The SIG-Intelligence has produced a paper with these recommendations, and we shall be considering it soon in the appropriate forum.

Prepared by:  
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A State memorandum, September 12, 1983





United States Department of State

~~SECRET~~

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II  
91081September 12 1987  
65 SEP 12 P 11:37MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOMSUBJECT: Recent Expulsions of Soviet Intelligence Personnel  
from the United States

On August 17, we declared an Attache at the Soviet Embassy, Anatoliy Yevgenyevich Skripko, persona non grata after he was apprehended by the FBI with a classified document. Two days later, on August 19, we declared the Soviet Assistant Air Attache Yuriy Petrovich Leonov persona non grata after he was caught by the FBI with classified information. In both cases, there was close cooperation between the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure that known Soviet intelligence operatives were ordered out of the United States when they violated U.S. law. Both Soviet officials left the U.S. shortly after they were PNG'd.

Following the PNG of the second official, Under Secretary Eagleburger called in Soviet Charge Sokolov and gave him a stiff lecture on the violations of U.S. law by officials of his Embassy and told him it was particularly stupid that these activities were being carried out at a time of high tensions caused by the Andrei Berezkhov case. Sokolov clearly registered Eagleburger's points. We also told him we would not publicize the cases unless Soviet publicity or misbehavior made this necessary. With the Soviet announcement of the expulsion of Lon Augustenborg, we told the press at noon today about our earlier PNG actions.

Prior to the expulsion of Lon Augustenborg, the Soviets had PNG'd two other American diplomats from the Soviet Union since 1981. We have expelled six in this same period. Thus, we remain far ahead of the Soviets in PNG actions during this Administration. Over the longer period, the historical average has been approximately three Soviets PNG'd to every two Americans. So long as we continue to concentrate on specific cases where violations occur, we can expect the ratio to continue to work substantially in our favor. The Soviets, by contrast, have a natural advantage if we operate on the basis of reciprocal expulsions, because of their numbers and the larger cadre of American specialists on which they can draw to replace any PNG losses.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/16 #9200

~~SECRET~~

BY

KAS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

We strongly protested the Soviet rough handling of the Augustenborgs during a meeting today with the Sokolov. We contrasted the professional handling of the PNG cases on our side with their crude treatment of our diplomats and demanded the Soviets take action against those who perpetrated this incident. It was made crystal clear to Sokolov that such actions against our people in the USSR could lead to less careful conduct against their personnel in the United States. We believe he understood our point very well and will inform Moscow of the dangers involved in the Leningrad case.

We believe this protest and the announcement of the earlier PNG actions are an adequate response for now to the Augustenborg case. We do not recommend any reciprocal PNG action in retaliation.

*Parson McKinley*  
for Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

52

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

File

October 13, 1983.

MEMORANDUM FOR *Jack Matlock*  
*John Lenczowski*

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of *Oct 12, 1983*

The following excerpt is for your information only. - Please do not refer to it in any discussions.

Meeting With Dobrynin. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on Larry Eagleburger today ostensibly to hand over copies of their nuclear arms proposals freeze, but was clearly interested in a broader discussion. Larry took the opportunity to tell Dobrynin that the evidence is pointing toward North Korean involvement in the bomb attack on the South Korean leadership. He said that we are cautioning the South Koreans to exercise restraint and we hoped the Soviets would convey the same message to Pyongyang. Larry also chided Dobrynin on Andropov's negative reaction to our INF proposal. Dobrynin said Andropov was not enunciating a new Soviet policy--merely drawing conclusions from ours--and his remarks should not be interpreted to mean that our discussions could not be continued. Dobrynin then complained about announcing arms control initiatives in the press, a practice which limited their flexibility to respond, and urged more private consultation. Dobrynin described our present communication problem as the worst he could recall, with too much misunderstanding on both sides and too little dialogue. He did mention his meeting with you in very positive terms, obviously hoping for more such sessions. When Larry cited Shcharanskiy as a clear case in which we had been misled, Dobrynin acknowledged that there had been a "misunderstanding", said their man Kondrashev had been "grilled" about what he had told Max Kampelman, and stated flatly that if Kondrashev had promised anything it had not been authorized. (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FD6-114/6 #9201  
BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

USSR - Dipl  
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53

RECEIVED

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10/19/83

J. Mitchell

MEMORANDUM

02 OCT 19 5:56

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Amb. Arthur A. Hartman

DATE: October 24, 1983

TIME: 9:45 am

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: No

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

- |               |                   |               |
|---------------|-------------------|---------------|
| cc: R. Darman | C. McCain         | J. Poindexter |
| R. Deprospero | J. Rosebush       | C. Tyson      |
| K. Duberstein | R. Scouten        | R. Kimmitt    |
| B. Elliott    | B. Shaddix        | J. Matlock    |
| D. Fischer    | W. Sittmann       |               |
| C. Fuller     | L. Speakes        |               |
| W. Henkel     | WHCA Audio/Visual |               |
| E. Hickey     | WHCA Operations   |               |
| G. Hodges     | A. Wrobleski      |               |
|               | Nell Yates        |               |



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY <sup>PD</sup>

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President's meeting with Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman on Monday, October 24, 1983, at 9:45 a.m. The Ambassador will be informing the President on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations and will make recommendations as to what next steps should be taken.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum with 3x5 card

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smj NARA, Date 6/18/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: October 24, 1983  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 9:45 - 10:00 a.m.  
  
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE:

To review the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

II. BACKGROUND:

Hartman will be returning to Moscow at the end of October, and the meeting provides an opportunity for him to inform the President of the current mood in Moscow and to receive any instructions the President may have.

3x5 card with talking points attached.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Amb. Hartman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Mr. Jack F. Matlock, NSC Staff Member  
Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State  
Messrs. Meese, Baker, Deaver, at their discretion.

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- 1. Photo opportunity
- 2. Meeting

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smj NARA, Date 6/18/02

Prepared by: Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

MEETING WITH AMB. HARTMAN - OCTOBER 24, 1983

- QUERY AMBASSADOR ON CURRENT STATE U.S.-  
SOVIET RELATIONS.
  
- ASK WHAT SHOULD BE OUR NEXT STEPS IN OUR  
RELATIONS.



REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on October 24, 19 83

for The President of The White House  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The Vice President  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Mr. Jack F. Matlock  
Messrs. Meese, Baker, Deaver, at their discretion.

State:

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman  
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing White House Requested by Rachel C. Ashley  
Room No. Oval Office Room No. 368 Telephone 5112  
Time of Meeting 9:45 Date of request October 21, 1983

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

Dobrianstky  
*02*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

DATE: October 24, 1983  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 9:45 - 10:00 a.m.  
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *all for*

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II. BACKGROUND:

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3x5 card with talking points attached.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President  
The Vice President  
Amb. Hartman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Mr. Jack F. Matlock, NSC Staff Member  
Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State  
Messrs. Meese, Baker, Deaver, at their discretion.

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

1. Photo opportunity
2. Meeting

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *sm* NARA, Date 6/18/02

Prepared by: Jack F. Matlock

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

# National Security Council The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package# \_\_\_\_\_

OCT 20 8:00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	2	K	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	3	OCT 21 1 1983	D
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    **DISTRIBUTION**    Deaver    Other    **BUD**

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: **ASAP**  
(Date/Time)



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*

SIGNED

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

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RECOMMENDATION

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Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachment:

Tab I. Memorandum with 3x5 card

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *smf* NARA, Date 6/18/02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

# National Security Council The White House

System #

I.

Package#

2045

83 OCT 20

5:35

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	<u>u</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Mallock</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>redo</u>

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

### DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



65

# National Security Council The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package# \_\_\_\_\_

00721 P. 31. 88

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	<u>ll</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Paula</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>dedo</u>

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

### DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other    \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)