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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

File Folder USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 2/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2204

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9069	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE CABLE FROM HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	3	1/28/1983	B1
9103	COVER SHEET	DEPARTMENT OF STATE R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
9104	CABLE	251348Z JAN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	8	1/25/1983	B1
9106	CABLE	021617Z FEB 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	4	2/2/1983	B1
9070	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO KEMP RE DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE ON SA-5 DEPLOYMENT R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	2/14/1983	B1
9108	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE ON SA-5 DEPLOYMENT IN SYRIA R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	2/10/1983	B1
9110	LETTER	DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE ON SA-5 DEPLOYMENT IN SYRIA R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9071	TALKING POINTS	CLARK'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1982 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	3	ND	B1
9072	MEMO	DOBRYANSKY TO CLARK RE OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY BY SENIOR LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	2/17/1983	B1
9073	MEMO	CLARK RE OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY BY SENIOR LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
9074	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY BY SENIOR-LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	2/15/1983	B1
9075	MEMO	DOBRYANSKY TO CLARK RE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	2/22/1983	B1
9076	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9072 R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6	1	2/17/1983	B1
9077	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9073 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	2/22/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9089	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE APPOINTMENT REQUEST: HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	3/2/1983	B1
9091	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO CLARK TO APPOINTMENT REQUEST: HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	3/4/1985	B1
9093	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE HARTMAN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	3/8/1983	B1
9094	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
9096	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH HARTMAN R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
9113	COVER SHEET	STATE DEPARTMENT R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
9114	MEMO	25131346Z JAN 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	8	1/25/1983	B1
9116	MEMO	021617Z FEB 83 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	4	2/2/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9097	TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH HARTMAN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
9098	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9093 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	3/8/1983	B1
9100	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #9094 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
9102	MEMO	CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	3/18/1983	B1

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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9069	MEMO	3	1/28/1983	B1
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DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE CABLE FROM
HARTMAN

DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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8658

FILE
Dobrynin's
Dyals

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1982

Dear Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin:

Nancy and I appreciate your personal note and thank you for the beautiful, leather-bound book and the caviar and vodka. Please accept our best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
and Mrs. Anatoliy Dobrynin
Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
1125 - 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1982

ch/ro

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: New Year's Greetings from Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin have sent you and Mrs. Reagan New Year's greetings (Tab B) and several gifts: a book entitled "Western European Painting in the Hermitage", and some caviar and vodka (all with Mary Powers in the Gift Unit).

Attached at Tab A is a proposed response for your signature.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

— — That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments:

- Tab A Letter for signature
- Tab B Incoming card from Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 22, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Response to Ambassador Dobrynin's New Year Card

Attached at Tab I is a brief memorandum to the President forwarding a response to Ambassador Dobrynin's New Year card (Tab B). The reply at Tab A has been cleared with Speechwriters.

Dennis *DM* Hair and Bob *BM* Sims concur. Response cleared with Mary Powers.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Proposed response for the President's signature
Tab B	Incoming New Year card

cc: Mary Power
Gift Unit

4



Mr. Cook
Western European Painting
in the Homeage

5



Dear Mr. President and Mr. Reagan

The Ambassadors of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and
Mrs. S. Dolynin send season's

greetings and best wishes
for the New Year

Please, accept our best wishes of happiness and health

A. Dolynin

Mrs. M. Dolynin



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE/NODIS

January 28, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

PAULA DOBRIANSKY (1)

SUBJECT:

Cable from Ambassador Hartman

Attached (Tab I) is Ambassador Hartman's cable on the ongoing arms control negotiations and the projected tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations. I take strong exception to the overall thrust of the Ambassador's argument, namely that the zero-zero option has "outlived" its usefulness and should be abandoned.

Ambassador Hartman's cable begins by citing the most fundamental objective of U.S.-Soviet relations as the lessening of the danger of a nuclear war. This assertion is self-evident; yet, the Ambassador's idea on how to accomplish this objective is faulty. The implication of his argument is that moving away from the zero option would buttress deterrence through the establishment of some, albeit imperfect, arms control regime, and prospective improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, which he alleges hinge upon the successful conclusion of the talks in Geneva. Despite Ambassador Hartman's disclaimers notwithstanding, his argument is a straightforward rehash of the failed approach to arms control pursued during the 1970s.

Deterrence is more likely to fail if the existing strategic-nuclear asymmetries favoring the Soviet Union are not redressed. Meaningless agreements which do not restore at least parity at both the intercontinental and theater levels would not restrain Soviet international behavior but would make Moscow more prone to gamble in a crisis period. Our fundamental policy objective, which simultaneously would provide us with high-quality deterrence, is the restoration of parity at both the intercontinental and theater levels through the combination of arms control and new deployments. Because the Soviets presently enjoy an overwhelming superiority in long-range, Euro-based nuclear systems, a non-zero solution would effectively perpetuate this asymmetry.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F06-114/6*9069

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Ambassador Hartman sought to strengthen his assertion with background on INF history, Soviet propaganda efforts and the likely impact on Alliance unity of U.S. adherence to a zero-zero option. He envisions that the Soviets would continue to peel their "propaganda onion," unraveling more and more suggestions. The Ambassador further anticipates growing European intransigence with U.S. "rigidity", which would place INF deployment in jeopardy.

He correctly notes that the original impetus for INF deployment came from the Europeans, namely Chancellor Schmidt, who among others, was convinced that regional imbalances were impermissible in an age of strategic parity and had to be rectified. The original purpose of INF deployment was to reassure the Europeans and eliminate the growing fear of "decoupling". According to Hartman, what was intended to reinforce Atlantic unity, now has turned into a divisive issue. Moreover, he contends that even if we persist deployment is unlikely given the current European mood. His prescription is to trade-in our increasingly shaky deployment option, while it is partially credible, get an arms control agreement with the Soviets which is supposed to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and buttress deterrence, and remove an irritant from badly strained trans-Atlantic relations. He proposes that we move soon, lest Soviet propaganda would lead the Europeans to reject the projected deployment with all the attendant damaging consequences to U.S. prestige, NATO's unity, etc.

I find two fundamental errors in Ambassador Hartman's argument. First, it is basically irrelevant how the INF decision came about. At this point in time, whether we like it or not, the issue has been made a litmus test of NATO's viability. Non-deployment without the establishment of a genuinely balanced and stable theater arms control regime would cast major doubt on the Alliance's ability to implement any controversial decisions. It would also further embolden the already strong pacifist and anti-American forces in Europe, effectively insuring the eventual demise of NATO as a viable security organization. Moreover, I disagree fundamentally with Ambassador Hartman's reading of the European mood. The recent statements by Mitterand are very supportive of INF; the Italians are still holding firm; and despite recent statements by the British and Germans, it remains more than likely that they would honor their deployment commitments.

I recommend that we hold firm on the zero-zero option and further intensify efforts to demonstrate our sincerity and good faith to the Europeans -- an approach the Administration is already taking with Ambassador Dailey's efforts and Vice President Bush's trip. If, as I expect, the Soviets do not seriously alter their untenable position, we should deploy the first INF units as scheduled. It is then and only then that

fundamental change in the Soviet position might take place. If such a change does not materialize we should complete the full deployment. However, if at this juncture, the Soviets seriously restructure their INF position in a more balanced fashion, we might consider moving away from the zero-zero option toward an arms control regime which would establish theater-nuclear parity through asymmetrical reductions (the Soviets retire most of their systems and we deploy some INF units).

Presently, any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow cable 2673, January 25, 1983

cc: Dick Boverie
Dennis Blair

Please Note: While I recognize that the Vice President's trip may have significant bearing on the outcome of this issue, I still felt compelled to express my views at this time.

PD

Department of State
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

10
EYES ONLY TO:

BOVERIE —

BLAIR —

GREGG FOR VP —

DOBRIANSKY —

Attachment Classification

TO:

Admiral Poindexter

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F06-114/649/03

Executive Secretary

BY

LOT

NARA, DATE

12/13/07

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25 JAN 83 1/2 297
Department of State

10, 03 11
INCOMING TELEGRAM
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z
ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2673

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 00973

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE NOW SEEN ENOUGH OF THE ANDROPOV REGIME'S
FOREIGN POLICY TO DETECT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN
POLICY AND FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS
MESSAGE DRAWS SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHERE WE SHOULD
BE TRYING TO GO IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS AND HOW WE CAN GET THERE.

3. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE
ANDROPOV APPROACH IS NOT MARKED BY SIGNIFICANT
EXPERIMENTATION OR INITIATIVE. INTERNALLY,
ANDROPOV IS MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS TO MAKE THE
ECONOMY RUN BETTER, BUT HE IS USING TRADITIONAL
AND CONSERVATIVE METHODS - AN EMPHASIS ON
DISCIPLINE AND AN ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE. IN

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DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9104

BY kat NARA, DATE 12/13/07

NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS-NODS



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z

FOREIGN POLICY, HE HAS DEPARTED IN NO WAY FROM THE BREZHNEV POLICY. HE SEEMS TO BE GOING OUT OF HIS WAY TO KNOCK DOWN SPECULATION THAT HE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON AFGHANISTAN OR POLAND; AND EVEN ON ISSUES OF LESS IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION, LIKE SOUTHERN AFRICA, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO RELAXATION OF THE HARD LINE. IF ANYTHING, THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR CHANGE, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ACCELERATION OF SOVIET OVERTURES TO CHINA - A DEVELOPMENT THAT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS. I REMAIN NEVERTHELESS CONVINCED THAT A PRIORITY ITEM IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER ANDROPOV IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US. IN SHORT, WE ARE CONFRONTING A REGIME WHICH WILL BE EVERY BIT AS HARD TO DEAL WITH AS THE BREZHNEV REGIME, WHICH IS MORE VIGOROUS AND PROBABLY MORE INTELLIGENT, BUT WHICH HAS A CERTAIN DEPENDENCY ON ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

4. AGAINST SUCH A BACKGROUND, IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULD GO BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR OWN SECURITY. WHATEVER THE CONDITION OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP OUR BASIC APPROACH MUST BE DESIGNED TO LESSEN THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE TWO MISTAKES OF THE 1970'S WERE (1) TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A PARALLEL EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE AND (2) TO COUNT ON ARMS CONTROL TO CARRY TOO MUCH OF THE WEIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP. FORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT PRONE TO THOSE MISTAKES TODAY. IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE, COULD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO--DD--S--NO--DD--S--NO--DD--S--NO--DD--S--NO--DD--S



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NOV-83

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z

UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO CORRECT THESE MISTAKES.

5. IT IS WITH THIS CONTEXT IN MIND THAT I SAY WE MUST NOW GIVE A HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS TO ARMS CONTROL, AND I THINK THIS ISSUE DESERVES HIGH PRIORITY ON YOUR OWN GLOBAL AGENDA. I SAY THIS BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS THE ONLY CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CATALYST TOWARD STARTING A PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THAT FIRST PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY. AND I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS NOW PERCEIVED BY PUBLICS TO BE THE WEAKEST ASPECT OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION - A WEAKNESS WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE EXPLOITING IN WESTERN EUROPE WITH GROWING EFFECT. SINCE THE DEPLOYMENT TIMETABLE MAKES INF A MORE URGENT MATTER THAN START, IT IS INF THAT I WANT TO ADDRESS HERE. IN MY VIEW, OUR INF NEGOTIATING POSITION OF ZERO-ZERO IS REACHING THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS. THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE IT.

6. I WAS IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION; I HAVE BEEN IN MOSCOW DURING THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO TEAR THAT DECISION APART. THE SOVIET STRATEGY IS QUITE PLAIN; IT HAS NOT CHANGED FROM BREZHNEV TO ANDROPOV. THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION TO INF (IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POLICY TOWARD START). THEY WANT TO PREVENT OUR DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT AFFECTING

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Department of State

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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
DISTRIBUTION

THEIRS. THEY ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE THIS BY MANI-
PULATING BOTH THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA
AND THEIR OVERALL PROPAGANDA; THEIR AIM IS TO
SWEET-TALK (AND THREATEN) WESTERN EUROPEAN, AND
PARTICULARLY GERMAN, PUBLIC OPINION. THEIR NEGOTIA-
TING POSITION IS LIKE AN ONION. IT BEGAN AS ABSURDLY
EXTREME; BUT AS THEY HAVE PEELED EXTRANEIOUS LAYERS
OFF ONE BY ONE, IT IS BEGINNING TO LOOK ATTRACTIVE TO
THE EUROPEANS EVEN THOUGH IT REMAINS A SHAM. SO FAR
THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS AT VERY LITTLE COST;
EUROPEAN PUBLIC PRESSURE IS NOW FOCUSSING ON U.S.,
NOT SOVIET, "RIGIDITY" EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE
NOT PROPOSED THE DESTRUCTION OF A SINGLE SS-20.
I EXPECT THAT, AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION, WE SHALL
SEE SOME MORE EXTRANEIOUS LAYERS PEELED OFF. IF WE
DONT MOVE NOW TO ANTICIPATE THIS, I'M AFRAID OUR
DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WILL BE IN REAL TROUBLE.

7. I REMEMBER VIVIDLY HOW THE INF DEBATE AND
ULTIMATE DECISION DEVELOPED BETWEEN 1977 AND 1979.

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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THE ORIGIN WAS WESTERN EUROPE'S FEAR THAT, WITHOUT U.S. WEAPONS IN EUROPE TO RESPOND TO THE SS-20, THE U.S. MIGHT HESITATE TO DEFEND A EUROPE THREATENED BY THE SS-20. THE DECISION TO DEPLOY GLCM'S AND PERSHING-II'S WAS NOT PRIMARILY A MILITARY DECISION (AFTER ALL, WE HAD THE MILITARY MEANS TO RESPOND TO AN SS-20 ATTACK; WE HAD OUR WHOLE STRATEGIC ARSENAL). THE DECISION TO DEPLOY WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL DECISION: TO GIVE THE EUROPEANS CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD TREAT A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THEM AS IF IT WERE AN ATTACK ON OURSELVES. AS I REMEMBER IT, THERE WAS NO GREAT SANCTITY ABOUT THE NUMBERS IN INF. THE NUMBER 572 WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE (1) 572 WAS LESS THAN THE PROJECTED SS-20 WARHEAD ARSENAL (TO EQUALIZE THE SS-20'S WAS CONSIDERED "DE-COUPLING" SINCE THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD THEN TAKE PLACE SOLELY IN EUROPE) BUT (2) 572 WAS ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH U.S. CREDIBILITY IN DEFENDING EUROPE .

8. I RECALL ALL THIS HISTORY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS PERCEIVED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN EUROPE AND, THEREFORE, STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HOWEVER WE COME OUT ON INF, WE SHOULD KEEP THAT OBJECTIVE FIRMLY IN MIND: WE WANT A SOLUTION THAT STRENGTHENS - OR AT LEAST DOESN'T WEAKEN - THE ALLIANCE. THE SECURITY OF THE U.S. IS LESS DEPENDENT ON THE NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WE CAN DEPLOY ON EUROPEAN SOIL THAN ON THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR ALLIES AGAINST

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AN ATTACK.

9. THE GREATEST DANGER IN THE CURRENT INF DEBATE IS THE THREAT TO ALLIANCE UNITY. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: OUR HOLDING TO ZERO-ZERO MUCH LONGER WILL IMPERIL THAT UNITY. ZERO-ZERO (LIKE THE 1979 DECISION ITSELF) WAS AN ALLIANCE, NOT JUST A U.S. DECISION; IF OUR ALLIES BEGIN TO COME OFF IT - AS I BELIEVE TO BE HAPPENING - THEN ALLIANCE UNITY ITSELF IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT ZERO-ZERO; THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO DISMANTLE THEIR ENTIRE SS-20 FORCE, EVEN AT THE PRICE OF NATO'S CARRYING OUT SOME OR ALL OF ITS INF DEPLOYMENTS. THAT WOULD NOT BE ALL BAD IF WE COULD BE SURE OUR DEPLOYMENT WOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET REJECTION OF ZERO-ZERO. BUT WILL THE GERMANS, OR EVEN THE BRITISH, PERMIT DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT OUR SEEKING TO NARROW THE NEGOTIATING GAP? WHILE I'M NOT DEALING WITH THOSE COUNTRIES ANYMORE, I STRONGLY DOUBT IT. GEORGE BUSH SHOULD GET A FEEL FOR THIS DURING HIS TRIP. IF THEY DON'T AGREE TO THE DEPLOYMENT, WE ARE THEN FACED EITHER WITH A CRISIS WITH OUR TWO MAJOR ALLIES OR WITH A FACE-SAVING "DELAY" IN DEPLOYMENT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE (WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THAT THE MISSILES ARE NEVER DEPLOYED). EITHER WAY THE SOVIETS WIN.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00973

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
DISTRIBUTION

10. I THEREFORE BELIEVE WE MUST PUT FLEXIBILITY INTO OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WHILE THERE IS STILL SOME CREDIBILITY IN OUR DEPLOYMENT OPTION. WE SHOULD COME FORWARD WITH A FORMULA WHICH PROVIDES MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN ZERO-ZERO. IN FACT, WE MIGHT PRODUCE DIFFERENT FORMULAS AT DIFFERENT STAGES - DOING SOME ONION-PEELING OURSELVES FOR EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO PRESENT ALTERNATIVES WHICH ARE SO REASONABLE THAT OUR ALLIES CAN HAVE NO PLAUSIBLE EXCUSE FOR NON-DEPLOYMENT IF THE SOVIETS REJECT THEM. WHATEVER OUR FORMULAS, ZERO-ZERO CAN AND SHOULD REMAIN OUR STATED IDEAL SOLUTION AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. IF WE GET AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR NEW APPROACH, WE WILL HAVE REINFORCED ALLIANCE UNITY, REDUCED THE SS-20 PROGRAM, AND CREATED A CATALYST FOR MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 03 OF 03 251417Z

11. ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO OFFER A NEW U.S. APPROACH, I LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS. THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT REMOVE ANOTHER LAYER OF THE UNION UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION. THUS, WE CAN PROBABLY WAIT TILL THEN. THERE MAY BE GERMAN REASONS FOR WAITING, TOO, SINCE A U.S. MOVE BEFORE MARCH 6 MIGHT STRENGTHEN THOSE IN THE FRG WHO ARE LEAST COMMITTED TO THE DOUBLE DECISION. IN ANY CASE, I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DELAY MUCH BEYOND MARCH 6, SINCE AT THAT POINT WILL BEGIN THE PERIOD OF MAXIMUM SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.

12. MOVEMENT ALONG THE LINES I HAVE PROPOSED CAN PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR THE ACCELERATED BILATERAL DIALOGUE THAT WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. IF WE MOVE ON INF, YOUR NEXT TALK WITH GROMYKO--WHETHER HERE OR ELSEWHERE--COULD BE THE OCCASION FOR INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEA OR--IF ALREADY TABLED IN GENEVA--FOR EMPHASIS TO SOVIET LEADERS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP OF AN EARLY INF AGREEMENT. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO COME TO MOSCOW WOULD DEPEND ON THE WEIGHT WE ATTACH TO GETTING DIRECTLY AT ANDROPOV. AFTER SUCH A ROUND WE COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHERE TO TAKE THE PROCESS NEXT. HARTMAN

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Department of State

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HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2959

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SCUL, OEXC, OSCI, UR US
SUBJ: US/SOVIET EXCHANGES

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MEMORANDUM (NSDD) HAS BEEN ISSUED CALLING FOR EXPANDED EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FOR AN OFFICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN SUCH EXCHANGES. I WELCOME THIS.

3. IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, WE LACK A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN OUR OPEN AND THE SOVIET CLOSED SOCIETY. NEGOTIATION OF THE FORMER AGREEMENT PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A BALANCING-OUT OF U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS, WHEREAS THE CURRENT SITUATION ENABLES THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR OPEN SOCIETY WITHOUT GRANTING US ACCESS TO THEIR CLOSED ONE. THE

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NLS F06-114/6 #9106

BY MS NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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Department of State

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FREQUENT APPEARANCES OF ARBATOV AND HIS FRIENDS ON NATIONWIDE AMERICAN MEDIA, THE SOVIET FILM WEEKS, AND THE HAMMER-WEINTRAUB AND AXELROD IMPRESARIO ACTIVITIES ARE BUT SELECTED EXAMPLES, WHICH CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH MY LIMITED PROGRAM OF FILM SHOWINGS AND CULTURAL EVENTS IN SPASO HOUSE.

4. MOREOVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE CUTTING OURSELVES OFF FROM IMPORTANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FROM ACCESS TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THROUGH OUR CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE OFTEN CITED THE FACT THAT MANY OF MY BEST YOUNG OFFICERS ARE PRODUCTS OF THE EXHIBIT GUIDE EXPERIENCE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM NO LONGER POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, AT LEAST FOUR OF MY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN EXHIBITS AND/OR ACADEMIC EXCHANGES UNDER THE FORMER AGREEMENT. GIVEN THE SAD STATE OF SOVIET STUDIES IN THE U.S., WE'RE COASTING RIGHT NOW ON CAPITAL WE GAINED WHEN THE EXCHANGES WERE AT THEIR PEAK. WITHOUT THE EXCHANGES AS A NATION WE'LL SOON BE VERY HARD UP FOR GOOD RUSSIAN LINGUISTS AND PEOPLE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT SOVIET AFFAIRS.

5. IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET REGIME, NEED MORE AMMUNITION FOR THE COMPETITION FOR PEOPLES' MINDS - A COMPETITION WHICH WE ARE BOUND TO WIN. THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC IN AMERICAN EXHIBITS, BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS, FILMS, TV PROGRAMS AND RADIO HAS NO COMPARABLE COUNTERPART IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, GIVEN THE LATTER'S UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE BEST FROM THE ENTIRE WORLD.

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

6. THUS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE NSDD, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION OF AN UMBRELLA/FRAMWORK AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH A BROAD RANGE OF ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, INFORMATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES COULD FUNCTION IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. THE BROADER THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, THE BETTER WE CAN TRADE OFF OUR INTERESTS AGAINST THEIRS - AND THUS ACHIEVE RECIPROCITY. IT WOULD THUS BE A MISTAKE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AGREEMENT WOULD EASE THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, WHICH BOTH OUR FINDINGS AND A RECENT NAS STUDY SHOW COMES PRIMARILY FROM PRIVATE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL EXCHANGES CONTACTS. IF WE OPEN UP OFFICIAL EXCHANGES AGAIN WE CAN CONTINUE TO CONTROL THEM CLOSELY; AT THE SAME TIME, OPENING UP THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE PRIVATE SIDE, WHICH IS HARDER FOR US TO POLICE.

7. IN STARTING THE PROCESS TOWARD A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVEY A POLITICAL SIGNAL UNLESS WE WANT TO. WE SHOULD PLAY THIS AS A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT THAT IS NO SIGNAL ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND THAT IS AIMED AT MAKING POSSIBLE A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES NO MORE THAN A FRAMEWORK.

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NO DISSEMINATION



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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01331 02 OF 02 021636Z
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FULL
POLITICAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF
OUR RELATIONSHIP.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT WE BEGIN PREPARING FOR
NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, LOOKING
FOR IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
GREATER RECIPROCITY AND ACCESS, WHILE ASSERTING
THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. THERE IS NO REASON,
FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR RESUMPTION
OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, WHY WE CANNOT
ACHIEVE GREATER ACCESS TO NATIONWIDE SOVIET TV
AUDIENCES, TV HAVING REPLACED FILM, WHICH WAS CITED
BY LENIN IN HIS TIME AS THE "GREATEST MEDIUM FOR
EDUCATING THE MASSES",
HARTMAN

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

February 14, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFF KEMP

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Dobrynin Demarche on SA-5 Deployment

I concur with the general thrust of State's assessment but have provided some additional comments below.

The Soviet demarche on the SA-5 deployment to Syria sheds light on the likely Soviet behavior in the event of an Israeli attack on Soviet manned installations. It appears that the Soviets are trying to indirectly signal to the U.S. that in the event of a successful Israeli attack, the Soviets would be forced to drastically augment their military presence in Syria (i.e., analogous to the massive infusion of Soviet personnel into Egypt during the 1970 War of Attrition). If the Israelis "take out" Syrian SAMs, the Soviets would be probably forced to rebuild Syrian air defenses and bring in their own pilots and support crews. The Soviets do not realistically expect that the U.S. would be able or willing to avert an Israeli attack, if Israel decides to proceed with this option.

I think this Soviet demarche is most likely intended to mitigate the adverse international effects of their future involvement in Syria, enabling them to claim that they had honestly tried to warn the U.S. of such impending dangers.

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NLS F06-114/6#9070
BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8390154 ²⁵

RECEIVED 10 FEB 83 14

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 10 FEB 83

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smj NARA, Date 6/12/02

KEYWORDS: USSR

SYRIA

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F

SUBJECT: AMB DOBRYNIN DEMARCHE ON SA-5 DEPLOYMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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KEMP

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 90154

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
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I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Kemp - action

Teicher, Orr, DeBriensky, Lenczowski

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90154

February 10, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Dobrynin's Démarche on the SA-5 Deployment to Syria

Ambassador Dobrynin called on Under Secretary Eagleburger February 8 to present further Soviet views on the deployment of SA-5 missiles to Syria, about which we had an exchange with the Soviets last month. At that time, we expressed our belief that these deployments were destabilizing and told the Soviets they would bear full responsibility for any consequences. They replied that the anti-aircraft missiles were supplied to Syria purely for self-defense and denied they would bear any responsibility for adverse results.

The new element in Dobrynin's approach yesterday was an expression of heightened concern about a possible Israeli attack on Syria. Dobrynin said that Israel "declares its intention to deliver a strike against Syria" and that "according to available information... the Israelis are carrying out corresponding preparatory measures as well." He added that the air-defense systems now being deployed in Syria were to meet this Israeli threat and suggested that the U.S. should use its influence with Tel Aviv to reduce the danger of renewed conflict. He noted that "preventing an attack on Syria is a guarantee that those systems will not be used."

We believe that the latest Soviet démarche is part of a campaign to justify deployment of the SA-5s in Syria and to create an atmosphere unfavorable to an Israeli strike against them during the crucial period when the missile sites are becoming operational. The Soviets also see advantages in maintaining a sense of crisis in the Mideast, suggesting to Arab audiences that they continue to face a serious threat from Israel, despite any negotiations in progress. While such a strategy is helpful to the Soviets in creating continuing concern about Israel's long-term intentions and possible problems in US-Israeli relations, Moscow may genuinely fear a successful Israeli strike on the sites which would, at least in an immediate sense, display Soviet powerlessness in the face of Israel's regional military superiority.

The Soviets are also trying to build a case for the recent missile deployments as a defensive response to a pre-existing Israeli threat, thereby denying our assertion that their actions represent a major new destabilizing element in the region.

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BY LOT NARA DATE 12/13/07~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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According to intelligence reports, the Soviet Ambassador in Tunis recently made a similar démarche to the Tunisian Foreign Minister. For the last month, the Soviet media have been reporting Israeli military preparations to attack Syrian forces in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. (We have no evidence of such Israeli preparations and we doubt the Soviets do either.)

The other primary objective of the Soviet démarche, as well as much of their recent diplomatic and public relations activity, is to put Israel on the defensive while the SA-5s are being deployed. Intelligence shows the missile sites are just about to become operational--an especially vulnerable moment and the best time for staging a pre-emptive attack. The Soviets have undoubtedly calculated that a campaign to focus public and diplomatic attention on Israel's actions offers the best opportunity to prevent Israel from attacking the missiles.

In addition, by reiterating--in more explicit form--their previous statement that the missiles are purely for the defense of Syria and will not be used unless that country is attacked, the Soviets are working to ease our concerns in the hope of avoiding a bilateral crisis over this issue.

Moreover, the fact that the Soviets have made a second approach on this issue, less than a month after our previous exchange, implies that the Mideast has a high priority for them in our bilateral dialogue and that they intend to continue engaging us, perhaps to underline that they cannot be excluded from evolving events in the region. Moscow may also wish to signal that it has no intention to withdraw the SA-5s and that, in fact, it has a case which justifies even more deliveries of new types of military equipment to the Syrians.

Ambassador Eagleburger promised Dobrynin a response to his demarche in the near future.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Dobrynin's Speaking Note

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

As is known, there has already been an exchange of views between us and the U.S. side concerning certain defensive measures that are being taken by the Government of Syria with the assistance of the Soviet Union. To avoid misunderstanding we clearly presented the actual state of things to the U.S. side. In doing so we proceeded from the assumption that the United States would exercise a restraining influence on Israel.

Nevertheless, Israel continues to build up tension. Maintaining that it will not put up with the "threat to its security", though there is no ground whatsoever to pose the issue in such a way, Israel, in fact, declares its intention to deliver a strike against Syria. The matter is not confined to declarations alone - according to the available information the Israelis are carrying out corresponding preparatory measures as well.

It appears that Tel Aviv, intoxicated by impunity, is not capable of assessing realistically the far-reaching consequences that the implementation by Israel of its threats would entail.

We would like to believe, though, that the U.S. Government cannot be indifferent to such a turn of events both from the standpoint of a possible impact on the situation in the Middle East and in a broader context.

In this connection we would like to emphasize again with all clarity that the measures being taken by Syria to strengthen its defense capabilities are the ones it is forced to take and are of a legitimate nature. They represent nothing else but a natural reaction to the unceasing aggressive actions by Israel, and to its constant threats against Syria.

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NLS F06-114/6 #9110

BY KDJ NARA DATE 12/13/07

This is the reason also for our steps in helping friendly Syria by supplying it with more advanced types of defensive weapons.

If an unbiased view is taken of this issue the fact that Syria is acquiring air-defense systems capable of making it safe from air attacks can be regarded in no other way but as a means to exercise a restraining influence on Israel, that is, as a factor objectively stabilizing the situation in that region.

As we have already stated to the U.S. Government - and we wish to reaffirm it once again - the air-defense systems being deployed in Syria are intended for no other purposes except to protect it against an aggression on the part of Israel. We have every reason to say it with full confidence. The deployment as such of those air-defense systems does not pose a threat to Israel or to anyone else. Preventing an attack on Syria is a guarantee that those systems will not be used.

It is in this direction that the U.S. could apply proper efforts, given the possibilities it has at its disposal.

We would like to hope that the U.S. side will properly appreciate this message on our part and will make its practical contribution towards quieting the situation.

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NLS Feb-11/4/6 #907
BY LBJ NARA DATE 12/3/07

TALKING POINTS

Judge Clark's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Sunday, February 21, 1982

Q: US-Soviet Relations: Why is the Reagan Administration bent on a course which will destroy what is left of detente?

A: The United States took seriously the terms of detente, including those spelled out in the Helsinki Final Act, but it was disappointed to see that the Soviet Union repeatedly violated both the spirit and letter of detente (e.g., assistance to North Vietnam in its conquest of South Vietnam, invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet and Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, interference in Poland, all this accompanied by a steady military buildup). The American people were deeply disappointed with this course and gave President Reagan a mandate to establish a more equitable relationship. We are always ready to negotiate our differences with the Soviet Union, but not on terms which allow the Soviet Union to claim, "What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable" (President Kennedy).

Q: Poland: Why is the United States interfering in the internal affairs of Poland and introducing aggressive sanctions against the Soviet Union?

A: As a signatory of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, the Polish Government has committed itself to the community of nations to respect human rights in its country. Martial Law violates

these rights in the grossest manner: to protest such acts is not to interfere in internal Polish affairs but to call on the Polish Government to honor its solemn international obligations. As concerns the Soviet Union, there exists incontrovertible evidence that it has precipitated with its pressures the imposition of Martial Law in Poland and played an active part in its implementation.

Q: Arms Control: Why does the United States pose unrealistic demands at the INF talks and postpone the opening of START? Does this not signify a lack of serious interest in arms negotiations?

A: Not at all. Our current proposals in Geneva are based on a fair assessment of the existing force structures of both powers. The Soviet approach rests, by contrast, on an entirely one-sided calculation of U.S. and Soviet theater weapons. The Soviet offer of a "freeze" on existing TNF would unilaterally favor its own side. As concerns START, we were quite prepared to proceed this spring when the Polish Government, under Soviet pressure, imposed Martial Law. Since strategic arms talks must take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust, the present time does not favor such negotiations.

Q: China: Why is the United States arming China against the Soviet Union?

A: We have been very cautious in meeting Chinese requests for arms, but Soviet global activities,

including those in Southeast Asia, are very menacing. We view with sympathy the anxieties of the Chinese Government over its security. Such military assistance as we plan for the PRC is purely defensive in nature.

NOTE

I would suggest that Judge Clark not involve himself in any political discussions with Dobrynin other than those that touch on U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. He need not feel compelled to involve himself in discussion of such subjects as the Middle East and Central America where Soviet interests are not directly involved. To do otherwise would be to concede that the USSR has a right to participate in the solution of regional problems all around the globe.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 17, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{AD}

SUBJECT: Official Contacts with Soviet Embassy by Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

State forwarded you a memorandum (Tab II) on U.S. Government official contacts with the Soviet Embassy. It asserts that as part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social contacts with Soviet officials. Contacts with the Embassy were limited to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and to those officials with routine working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to these guidelines has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who has each year been designated as the senior United States Government representative at the Soviet national day reception. State's memorandum reports two breaches of this policy and urges you to issue a reminder of the policy at the Cabinet level.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to all Cabinet level officials reaffirming our policy guidelines on contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

^{JL}
Roger Robinson and John Lenczowski concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to all Cabinet level officials.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Cabinet level officials
- Tab II State's memorandum, dated February 15, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/6 #9072
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
 THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
 THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
 THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
 THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
 COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
 THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
 NATIONS
 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by
 Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

Recently, several unauthorized visits to the Soviet Embassy by United States Government officials have taken place. I would like to reaffirm the Administration's policy on such contacts. As part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social meetings with Soviet officials. Specifically, contacts with the Embassy were limited to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and to those officials with routine working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to these guidelines has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs who has each year been designated as the senior U.S. Government representative at the Soviet national day reception. I urge that all high-level officials affected by these restrictions strictly adhere to the Administration's policies.

William P. Clark

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 NLS F06-114/6 #9073
 BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

United States Department of State 36

Washington, D.C. 20520



February 15, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE


SUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by
Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

BACKGROUND

As part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social contacts with Soviet officials. In Washington the level of USG official permitted social contact with the Soviet Embassy and its associated offices was limited to Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and specifically to officials with regular working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to this has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who has each year been designated as the senior USG representative at the Soviet national day reception. Senior officials have understood this policy and until recently strictly adhered to it.

However, the Department learned of two breaches of this policy when two Executive Branch officials above the Deputy Assistant Secretary level recently attended a reception given by an element of the Soviet Embassy.

We regularly remind other agencies of this policy and provide guidance if requested. It may be timely, however, for the White House to issue a reminder of the policy at the Cabinet level. Such a reminder might also serve to quiet speculation about a change in our stance toward the Soviets in response to their change of leadership.


 L. Paul Bremer, III
 Executive Secretary

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DECL: OADR

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 NLS F06-114/6#9074
 BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 22, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet Embassy

With regard to your query on my memorandum concerning U.S. official contacts with the Soviet Embassy (Tab A), the two officials who breached the Administration's policies were Seeley Lodwick, Under Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, and Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade. Both attended the New Year's Celebration, January 10, 1983, at the Office of the Soviet Trade Representative.

Attachment:

Tab A Previous memoranda

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NLRR FOI-114/6 #9075

BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 17, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Official Contacts with Soviet Embassy by Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials

State forwarded you a memorandum (Tab II) on U.S. Government official contacts with the Soviet Embassy. It asserts that as part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social contacts with Soviet officials. Contacts with the Embassy were limited to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and to those officials with routine working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to these guidelines has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who has each year been designated as the senior United States Government representative at the Soviet national day reception. State's memorandum reports two breaches of this policy and urges you to issue a reminder of the policy at the Cabinet level.

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to all Cabinet level officials reaffirming our policy guidelines on contacts with the Soviet Embassy.

Roger Robinson ^{Paul} and John Lenczowski ^{JL} concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to all Cabinet level officials.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Cabinet level officials
 Tab II State's memorandum, dated February 15, 1983

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NLRR FDC-114/6 #9076
 BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/83

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED
NATIONS
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Official Contacts with the Soviet Embassy by
Senior-Level U.S. Government Officials (U)

Recently, several unauthorized visits to the Soviet Embassy by United States Government officials have taken place. I would like to reaffirm the Administration's policy on such contacts. As part of the sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan, restrictions were placed on social meetings with Soviet officials. Specifically, contacts with the Embassy were limited to the rank of Deputy Assistant Secretary and below, and to those officials with routine working relationships with the Embassy. The only exception to these guidelines has been the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs who has each year been designated as the senior U.S. Government representative at the Soviet national day reception. I urge that all high-level officials affected by these restrictions strictly adhere to the Administration's policies. (C)



William P. Clark

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS F06-114/6# 9077
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 22, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *b*

SUBJECT: Request by Ambassador Morton Abramowitz for
Appointment with You

I believe it would be useful politically and substantively if you would grant Morton Abramowitz (U.S. MBFR) his request for a brief office appointment sometime before March 1/2.

Sven Kraemer, Dennis Blair and I could sit in with you if you like.

sd
Sven Kraemer and Dennis Blair concur.

Atch

Jmp - 41
FYI
Beckman
sig

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 2, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request: Ambassador Arthur Hartman

State forwarded a memorandum (Tab II) recommending that you and the President meet with Ambassador Hartman sometime during March 7-11. As he will be in Washington for consultations on those dates, he would like appointments with the President and with you to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Ambassador met with both of you in the fall of 1982. Since that time there have been significant developments in the Soviet Union -- leadership changes, new domestic policies which manifest the regime's movement toward better control, strict discipline, purge of corruption, etc. Soviet foreign policies have remained essentially unchanged, but have been carried out with greater vigor and imagination. Given these considerations, I recommend that a meeting with the President and you be approved, schedules permitting. I will provide talking points prior to the meeting. At Tab I for your use is a schedule proposal to William Sadleir.

I do not concur - JL
John Lenczowski and Roger *Robinson* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Schedule Proposal
- Tab II State's memorandum, February 28, 1983

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NLS FOI-114/6#9089
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Arthur Hartman
(U.S. Ambassador to Moscow)

PURPOSE: To brief the President on the situation
in the Soviet Union

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman has valuable information
to impart to the President about the current
situation in the USSR and U.S.-Soviet
relations -- leadership changes, new
domestic policies and more vigorous foreign
affairs initiatives.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Meeting with the President on October 1,
1982.

DATE AND TIME: 9:30 a.m.; March 9, 1983 DURATION: Open

LOCATION: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs William P. Clark
Ambassador Arthur Hartman

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Ambassador Hartman will brief the President.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking Points to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open

RECOMMENDED BY: National Security Council
Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: William P. Clark

SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/12/02

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



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
February 28, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request - Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

Our Ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, will be in Washington March 7-11 for consultations. He would like appointments with the President and with you to discuss recent developments in US-Soviet relations. Ambassador Hartman possesses a unique vantage point on the Soviet leadership and we feel that it would be especially valuable for the President and for you to review with him the state of our relations with the Andropov regime, and to discuss possible directions for US policy. We recommend that you and the President meet with the Ambassador.



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 4, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Appointment Request: Ambassador Arthur Hartman

I do not concur with the recommendation made by Paula Dobriansky and Roger Robinson that the President meet with Ambassador Hartman. Unless the President has made a regular policy of routine meetings with Ambassadors, there does not appear to be a compelling reason why he should take the time for such a meeting.

Although there has been a leadership change in the USSR with a few minor shifts of emphasis in domestic policy that are not out of the ordinary, nothing has occurred that is of such significance that would warrant a special briefing of the President.

Unless the State Department can furnish some more compelling reasons, such as recommendations for new courses of action or the presentation of policy dilemmas that require Presidential-level attention, I see no particular benefit for the proposed meeting.

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NLS F06-114/6-#9091
BY 105, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 8, 1983

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman's Meeting with the President

Attached for your use are talking points and questions (Tab II) that you might want to raise with Ambassador Hartman. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing background and suggested talking points (Tab A).

It is likely that Ambassador Hartman will use this occasion to discuss his cables on INF (Tab B) and U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C). In the first cable, the Ambassador maintains that the zero-zero option has outlived its usefulness. You should point out that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.

In his second cable (Tab C), the Ambassador suggests we lay the groundwork for a renegotiation of an umbrella agreement on U.S.-Soviet scientific, cultural and technical exchanges. There is a need to assert that before this idea can be contemplated, ideological reciprocity must be ensured -- that is, our ability to present our views to Soviet audiences (general, as well as specialized) should be at a level commensurate with Soviet access to the U.S. media and academic institutions (i.e., television, op eds in Pravda, etc.). Before we express any agreement in principle to Hartman's suggestion, we should also examine alternatives. John is working on this issue.

JL
John Lenczowski and Dick Boverie concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Moscow Cable 00973, January 25, 1983
- Tab C Moscow Cable 1331, February 2, 1983
- Tab II Talking Points for Clark meeting with Hartman

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UNCLASSIFIED
NLS - F06-114/6# 9093
BY - 401, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90269

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

On March 9 or later this week, Ambassador Hartman will accompany me to your morning briefing at 9:30 a.m. Your last meeting with the Ambassador was on October 1, 1982 -- before the death of Brezhnev and the subsequent leadership changes.

The purpose of this meeting should be twofold: to solicit Ambassador Hartman's views on what is going on in the USSR right now and what we can expect in the future and to share with him the Administration's current thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations. He may discuss his two cables on INF and U.S.-Soviet exchanges:

- In the first cable on INF (Tab B), Ambassador Hartman maintains that the zero-zero option has outlived its usefulness. You should point out that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.
- In his second cable on U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C), the Ambassador suggests we lay the groundwork for a renegotiation of an umbrella agreement on U.S.-Soviet scientific, cultural and technical exchanges. There is a need to assert that before this idea can be contemplated, ideological reciprocity must be ensured -- that is, our ability to present our views to Soviet audiences (general, as well as specialized) should be at a level commensurate with Soviet access to the U.S. media and academic institutions (i.e., television, op eds in Pravda, etc.).

Attached for your use at Tab A are talking points.

Attachments:	Tab A	Talking Points
	Tab B	Moscow cable 973
	Tab C	Moscow cable 1331

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

~~SECRET~~

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NLS Feb-11/86 #9094
BY WJ NARA DATE 12/3/07

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN (MOSCOW)

- GREET HARTMAN AND PRAISE HIM FOR HIS OUTSTANDING SERVICE.
- PURPOSE OF MEETING TWOFOLD: SEEK HIS VIEWS ON CURRENT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS & WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED IN FUTURE -- SHARE VIEWS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
- REAFFIRM POSITION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO IMPROVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT SEEK CONCRETE IMPROVEMENT -- (ACTION) NOT JUST WORDS. (I.E., LOOK FOR SOVIET RESTRAINT IN REGIONAL CRISES, MOVEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL.)

-2-

- IDEOLOGICAL RECIPROCITY MUST BE ENSURED IN ANY PROSPECTIVE U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGE FRAMEWORK.
- ZERO-ZERO OPTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

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 BY LDI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Department of State
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

EYES ONLY 99
BOVERIE —
BLAIR —
GREGG FOR VP
DOBRIANSKI —

Attachment Classification

TO: Admiral Poindexter

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973

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BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

Executive Secretary

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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE NOW SEEN ENOUGH OF THE ANDROPOV REGIME'S
FOREIGN POLICY TO DETECT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN
POLICY AND FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. THIS
MESSAGE DRAWS SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHERE WE SHOULD
BE TRYING TO GO IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS AND HOW WE CAN GET THERE.

3. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE
ANDROPOV APPROACH IS NOT MARKED BY SIGNIFICANT
EXPERIMENTATION OR INITIATIVE. INTERNALLY,
ANDROPOV IS MAKING MAJOR EFFORTS TO MAKE THE
ECONOMY RUN BETTER, BUT HE IS USING TRADITIONAL
AND CONSERVATIVE METHODS - AN EMPHASIS ON
DISCIPLINE AND AN ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE. IN

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BY LDS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z

FOREIGN POLICY, HE HAS DEPARTED IN NO WAY FROM THE BREZHNEV POLICY. HE SEEMS TO BE GOING OUT OF HIS WAY TO KNOCK DOWN SPECULATION THAT HE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON AFGHANISTAN OR POLAND; AND EVEN ON ISSUES OF LESS IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION, LIKE SOUTHERN AFRICA, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO RELAXATION OF THE HARD LINE. IF ANYTHING, THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR CHANGE, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ACCELERATION OF SOVIET OVERTURES TO CHINA - A DEVELOPMENT THAT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS. I REMAIN NEVERTHELESS CONVINCED THAT A PRIORITY ITEM IN SOVIET POLICY UNDER ANDROPOV IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US. IN SHORT, WE ARE CONFRONTING A REGIME WHICH WILL BE EVERY BIT AS HARD TO DEAL WITH AS THE BREZHNEV REGIME, WHICH IS MORE VIGOROUS AND PROBABLY MORE INTELLIGENT, BUT WHICH HAS A CERTAIN DEPENDENCY ON ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

4. AGAINST SUCH A BACKGROUND, IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULD GO BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS OUR OWN SECURITY. WHATEVER THE CONDITION OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP OUR BASIC APPROACH MUST BE DESIGNED TO LESSEN THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE TWO MISTAKES OF THE 1970'S WERE (1) TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT A PARALLEL EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE AND (2) TO COUNT ON ARMS CONTROL TO CARRY TOO MUCH OF THE WEIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP. FORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT PRONE TO THOSE MISTAKES TODAY. IF WE ARE NOT CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE, COULD

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 00973 01 OF 03 251421Z

UNDERMINE OUR ABILITY TO CORRECT THESE MISTAKES.

5. IT IS WITH THIS CONTEXT IN MIND THAT I SAY WE MUST NOW GIVE A HEIGHTENED EMPHASIS TO ARMS CONTROL, AND I THINK THIS ISSUE DESERVES HIGH PRIORITY ON YOUR OWN GLOBAL AGENDA. I SAY THIS BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS THE ONLY CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CATALYST TOWARD STARTING A PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP. I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THAT FIRST PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY. AND I SAY IT BECAUSE ARMS CONTROL IS NOW PERCEIVED BY PUBLICS TO BE THE WEAKEST ASPECT OF OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION - A WEAKNESS WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE EXPLOITING IN WESTERN EUROPE WITH GROWING EFFECT. SINCE THE DEPLOYMENT TIMETABLE MAKES INF A MORE URGENT MATTER THAN START, IT IS INF THAT I WANT TO ADDRESS HERE. IN MY VIEW, OUR INF NEGOTIATING POSITION OF ZERO-ZERO IS REACHING THE END OF ITS USEFULNESS. THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE IT.

6. I WAS IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION. I HAVE BEEN IN MOSCOW DURING THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO TEAR THAT DECISION APART. THE SOVIET STRATEGY IS QUITE PLAIN; IT HAS NOT CHANGED FROM BREZHNEV TO ANDROPOV. THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION TO INF (IN CONTRAST TO THEIR POLICY TOWARD START). THEY WANT TO PREVENT OUR DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT AFFECTING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
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THEIRS. THEY ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE THIS BY MANIPULATING BOTH THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA AND THEIR OVERALL PROPAGANDA; THEIR AIM IS TO SWEET-TALK (AND THREATEN) WESTERN EUROPEAN, AND PARTICULARLY GERMAN, PUBLIC OPINION. THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION IS LIKE AN ONION. IT BEGAN AS ABSURDLY EXTREME; BUT AS THEY HAVE PEELED EXTRANEUS LAYERS OFF ONE BY ONE, IT IS BEGINNING TO LOOK ATTRACTIVE TO THE EUROPEANS EVEN THOUGH IT REMAINS A SHAM. SO FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THIS AT VERY LITTLE COST; EUROPEAN PUBLIC PRESSURE IS NOW FOCUSSED ON U.S., NOT SOVIET, "RIGIDITY" EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT PROPOSED THE DESTRUCTION OF A SINGLE SS-20. I EXPECT THAT, AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION, WE SHALL SEE SOME MORE EXTRANEUS LAYERS PEELED OFF. IF WE DON'T MOVE NOW TO ANTICIPATE THIS, I'M AFRAID OUR DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE WILL BE IN REAL TROUBLE.

7. I REMEMBER VIVIDLY HOW THE INF DEBATE AND ULTIMATE DECISION DEVELOPED BETWEEN 1977 AND 1979.

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 02 OF 03 251417Z

THE ORIGIN WAS WESTERN EUROPE'S FEAR THAT, WITHOUT U.S. WEAPONS IN EUROPE TO RESPOND TO THE SS-20, THE U.S. MIGHT HESITATE TO DEFEND A EUROPE THREATENED BY THE SS-20. THE DECISION TO DEPLOY GLCM'S AND PEKSHING-II'S WAS NOT PRIMARILY A MILITARY DECISION (AFTER ALL, WE HAD THE MILITARY MEANS TO RESPOND TO AN SS-20 ATTACK; WE HAD OUR WHOLE STRATEGIC ARSENAL). THE DECISION TO DEPLOY WAS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL DECISION: TO GIVE THE EUROPEANS CONFIDENCE THAT WE WOULD TREAT A NUCLEAR ATTACK ON THEM AS IF IT WERE AN ATTACK ON OURSELVES. AS I REMEMBER IT, THERE WAS NO GREAT SANCTITY ABOUT THE NUMBERS IN INF. THE NUMBER 572 WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE (1) 572 WAS LESS THAN THE PROJECTED SS-20 WARHEAD ARSENAL (TO EQUALIZE THE SS-20'S WAS CONSIDERED "DE-COUPLING" SINCE THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE COULD THEN TAKE PLACE SOLELY IN EUROPE) BUT (2) 572 WAS ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH U.S. CREDIBILITY IN DEFENDING EUROPE .

B. I RECALL ALL THIS HISTORY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE DOUBLE DECISION WAS PERCEIVED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC PRIMARILY AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING U.S. CREDIBILITY IN EUROPE AND, THEREFORE, STRENGTHENING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. HOWEVER WE COME OUT ON INF, WE SHOULD KEEP THAT OBJECTIVE FIRMLY IN MIND: WE WANT A SOLUTION THAT STRENGTHENS - OR AT LEAST DOESN'T WEAKEN - THE ALLIANCE. THE SECURITY OF THE U.S. IS LESS DEPENDENT ON THE NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WE CAN DEPLOY ON EUROPEAN SOIL THAN ON THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR COMMITMENT TO DEFEND OUR ALLIES AGAINST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 . MOSCOW 00973 02 OF 03 251417Z

AN ATTACK.

9. THE GREATEST DANGER IN THE CURRENT INF DEBATE IS THE THREAT TO ALLIANCE UNITY. ONE THING IS BECOMING CLEAR: OUR HOLDING TO ZERO-ZERO MUCH LONGER WILL IMPERIL THAT UNITY. ZERO-ZERO (LIKE THE 1979 DECISION ITSELF) WAS AN ALLIANCE, NOT JUST A U.S., DECISION; IF OUR ALLIES BEGIN TO COME OFF IT - AS I BELIEVE TO BE HAPPENING - THEN ALLIANCE UNITY ITSELF IS CALLED INTO QUESTION. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ACCEPT ZERO-ZERO; THEY ARE NOT ABOUT TO DISMANTLE THEIR ENTIRE SS-20 FORCE, EVEN AT THE PRICE OF NATO'S CARRYING OUT SOME OR ALL OF ITS INF DEPLOYMENTS. THAT WOULD NOT BE ALL BAD IF WE COULD BE SURE OUR DEPLOYMENT WOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF SOVIET REJECTION OF ZERO-ZERO. BUT WILL THE GERMANS, OR EVEN THE BRITISH, PERMIT DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT OUR SEEKING TO NARROW THE NEGOTIATING GAP? WHILE I'M NOT DEALING WITH THOSE COUNTRIES ANYMORE, I STRONGLY DOUBT IT. GEORGE BUSH SHOULD GET A FEEL FOR THIS DURING HIS TRIP. IF THEY DON'T AGREE TO THE DEPLOYMENT, WE ARE THEN FACED EITHER WITH A CRISIS WITH OUR TWO MAJOR ALLIES OR WITH A FACE-SAVING "DELAY" IN DEPLOYMENT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE (WHICH WILL GUARANTEE THAT THE MISSILES ARE NEVER DEPLOYED). EITHER WAY THE SOVIETS WIN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2675

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

S/S CHECK WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM ABOUT ANY WIDER
DISTRIBUTION

10. I THEREFORE BELIEVE WE MUST PUT FLEXIBILITY INTO OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WHILE THERE IS STILL SOME CREDIBILITY IN OUR DEPLOYMENT OPTION. WE SHOULD COME FORWARD WITH A FORMULA WHICH PROVIDES MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN ZERO-ZERO. IN FACT, WE MIGHT PRODUCE DIFFERENT FORMULAS AT DIFFERENT STAGES - DOING SOME ONION-PEELING OURSELVES FOR EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO PRESENT ALTERNATIVES WHICH ARE SO REASONABLE THAT OUR ALLIES CAN HAVE NO PLAUSIBLE EXCUSE FOR NON-DEPLOYMENT IF THE SOVIETS REJECT THEM. WHATEVER OUR FORMULAS, ZERO-ZERO CAN AND SHOULD REMAIN OUR STATED IDEAL SOLUTION AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. IF WE GET AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR NEW APPROACH, WE WILL HAVE REINFORCED ALLIANCE UNITY, REDUCED THE SS-20 PROGRAM, AND CREATED A CATALYST FOR MOVEMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

NON-SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 00973 03 OF 03 201417Z

11. ON THE QUESTION OF WHEN TO OFFER A NEW U.S. APPROACH, I LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS. THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT REMOVE ANOTHER LAYER OF THE UNION UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTION. THUS, WE CAN PROBABLY WAIT TILL THEN. THERE MAY BE GERMAN REASONS FOR WAITING, TOO, SINCE A U.S. MOVE BEFORE MARCH 6 MIGHT STRENGTHEN THOSE IN THE FRG WHO ARE LEAST COMMITTED TO THE DOUBLE DECISION. IN ANY CASE, I THINK WE SHOULD NOT DELAY MUCH BEYOND MARCH 6, SINCE AT THAT POINT WILL BEGIN THE PERIOD OF MAXIMUM SOVIET PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.

12. MOVEMENT ALONG THE LINES I HAVE PROPOSED CAN PROVIDE A GOOD BASIS FOR THE ACCELERATED BILATERAL DIALOGUE THAT WE DISCUSSED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. IF WE MOVE ON INF, YOUR NEXT TALK WITH GROMYKO--WHETHER HERE OR ELSEWHERE--COULD BE THE OCCASION FOR INTRODUCTION OF THE IDEA OR--IF ALREADY TABLED IN GENEVA--FOR EMPHASIS TO SOVIET LEADERS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP OF AN EARLY INF AGREEMENT. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO COME TO MOSCOW WOULD DEPEND ON THE WEIGHT WE ATTACH TO GETTING DIRECTLY AT ANDRUPOV. AFTER SUCH A ROUND WE COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHERE TO TAKE THE PROCESS NEXT. HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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SITUATION ROOM

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W
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R 021617Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2959

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: SCUL, DEXC, OSCI, UR US
SUBJ: US/SOVIET EXCHANGES

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I UNDERSTAND THAT A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MEMORANDUM (NSDD) HAS BEEN ISSUED CALLING FOR EXPANDED EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FOR AN OFFICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN SUCH EXCHANGES. I WELCOME THIS.

3. IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, WE LACK A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSURING RECIPROCITY IN THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN OUR OPEN AND THE SOVIET CLOSED SOCIETY. NEGOTIATION OF THE FORMER AGREEMENT PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A BALANCING-OUT OF U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS, WHEREAS THE CURRENT SITUATION ENABLES THE SOVIETS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR OPEN SOCIETY WITHOUT GRANTING US ACCESS TO THEIR CLOSED ONE. THE

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NLS F06-114/6#9116

BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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FREQUENT APPEARANCES OF ARBATOV AND HIS FRIENDS ON NATIONWIDE AMERICAN MEDIA, THE SOVIET FILM WEEKS, AND THE HAMMER-WEINTRAUB AND AXELROD IMPRESARIO ACTIVITIES ARE BUT SELECTED EXAMPLES, WHICH CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH MY LIMITED PROGRAM OF FILM SHOWINGS AND CULTURAL EVENTS IN SPASO HOUSE.

4. MOREOVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE CUTTING OURSELVES OFF FROM IMPORTANT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS FROM ACCESS TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THROUGH OUR CURRENT RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I HAVE OFTEN CITED THE FACT THAT MANY OF MY BEST YOUNG OFFICERS ARE PRODUCTS OF THE EXHIBIT GUIDE EXPERIENCE AS AN EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM NO LONGER POSSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXCHANGES AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, AT LEAST FOUR OF MY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN EXHIBITS AND/OR ACADEMIC EXCHANGES UNDER THE FORMER AGREEMENT. GIVEN THE SAD STATE OF SOVIET STUDIES IN THE U.S., WE'RE COASTING RIGHT NOW ON CAPITAL WE GAINED WHEN THE EXCHANGES WERE AT THEIR PEAK. WITHOUT THE EXCHANGES AS A NATION WE'LL SOON BE VERY HARD UP FOR GOOD RUSSIAN LINGUISTS AND PEOPLE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT SOVIET AFFAIRS.

5. IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET REGIME, NEED MORE AMMUNITION FOR THE COMPETITION FOR PEOPLES' MINDS - A COMPETITION WHICH WE ARE BOUND TO WIN. THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC IN AMERICAN EXHIBITS, BOOKS AND PUBLICATIONS, FILMS, TV PROGRAMS AND RADIO HAS NO COMPARABLE COUNTERPART IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, GIVEN THE LATTER'S UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE BEST FROM THE ENTIRE WORLD.

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03

MOSCOM 01331 01 OF 02 021635Z

6. THUS, IN IMPLEMENTING THE NSDD, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATION OF AN UMBRELLA/FRAMWORK AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH A BROAD RANGE OF ACADEMIC, CULTURAL, INFORMATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES COULD FUNCTION IN A CONTROLLED MANNER. THE BROADER THE RANGE OF ACTIVITIES COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, THE BETTER WE CAN TRADE OFF OUR INTERESTS AGAINST THEIRS - AND THUS ACHIEVE RECIPROCITY. IT WOULD THUS BE A MISTAKE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND IMPOSSIBLE TO ISOLATE SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES FROM ACADEMIC EXCHANGES. AT THE SAME TIME, AN AGREEMENT WOULD EASE THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, WHICH BOTH OUR FINDINGS AND A RECENT NAS STUDY SHOW COMES PRIMARILY FROM PRIVATE RATHER THAN OFFICIAL EXCHANGES CONTACTS. IF WE OPEN UP OFFICIAL EXCHANGES AGAIN WE CAN CONTINUE TO CONTROL THEM CLOSELY; AT THE SAME TIME, OPENING UP THE OFFICIAL CHANNEL WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO CLAMP DOWN ON THE PRIVATE SIDE, WHICH IS HARDER FOR US TO POLICE.

7. IN STARTING THE PROCESS TOWARD A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, THERE IS NO NEED TO CONVEY A POLITICAL SIGNAL UNLESS WE WANT TO. WE SHOULD PLAY THIS AS A TECHNICAL AGREEMENT THAT IS NO SIGNAL ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AND THAT IS AIMED AT MAKING POSSIBLE A RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. IT SHOULD ALSO BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES NO MORE THAN A FRAMEWORK.

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Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2960

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 01331

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER

S/S PLEASE PASS TO USIA FOR DIRECTOR WICK ONLY

INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO FULL
POLITICAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE OF
OUR RELATIONSHIP.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT WE BEGIN PREPARING FOR
NEGOTIATION OF A NEW EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, LOOKING
FOR IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN
GREATER RECIPROCITY AND ACCESS, WHILE ASSERTING
THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST. THERE IS NO REASON,
FOR EXAMPLE, GIVEN THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR RESUMPTION
OF A CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT, WHY WE CANNOT
ACHIEVE GREATER ACCESS TO NATIONWIDE SOVIET TV
AUDIENCES, TV HAVING REPLACED FILM, WHICH WAS CITED
BY LENIN IN HIS TIME AS THE "GREATEST MEDIUM FOR
EDUCATING THE MASSES".
HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN

- Indicate the purpose of the meeting is twofold: to solicit his views on current Soviet developments and what can be expected in the future and to share with him the Administration's current thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations.
- If raised, address Hartman's two cables on INF (Tab B) and U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C). On INF, assert that the zero-zero option has not outlived its usefulness. State that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise. On U.S.-Soviet exchanges, mention that there is a need to secure ideological reciprocity -- that is, an ability to present our views to Soviet audiences at a level commensurate with Soviet access to U.S. media and academic institutions -- before this idea can be contemplated seriously.
- Time permitting, pose some of the following questions:
 - U.S.-Soviet Relations. What is on Andropov's agenda? What is he prepared to give for genuine improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations?
 - Sino-Soviet Relations. Are the Soviets prepared to thin out forces along the Sino-Soviet border and put pressure on the Vietnamese to make them more flexible on Cambodia?
 - Arms Control. In the wake of Kohl's election, can a more flexible Soviet position be anticipated?
 - Soviet Foreign Policy Mix. What serious departures from Brezhnev's course, if any, can be anticipated?
 - Afghanistan. Ask what is his explanation for the recent flurry of Soviet articles on Afghanistan which for the first time unequivocally mention Soviet casualties and portray the Afghan situation as a difficult one? Can we expect escalation or moves toward disengagement?
 - Human Rights. Can we expect the continuation of the present harsh policies on dissidents, Jewish emigration, etc.?

FILE - 63
USSR - Dipl

Dobronsky

National Security Council
The White House

570

Package # 90269

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>J</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
Recommend you skin this.
I don't think anything needs
to go to the President.
J

DOBriansky
SYSTEM II
90269

64

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 8, 1983

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPC HAS SEEN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman's Meeting with the President

Attached for your use are talking points and questions (Tab II) that you might want to raise with Ambassador Hartman. At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing background and suggested talking points (Tab A).

It is likely that Ambassador Hartman will use this occasion to discuss his cables on INF (Tab B) and U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C). In the first cable, the Ambassador maintains that the zero-zero option has outlived its usefulness. You should point out that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.

In his second cable (Tab C), the Ambassador suggests we lay the groundwork for a renegotiation of an umbrella agreement on U.S.-Soviet scientific, cultural and technical exchanges. There is a need to assert that before this idea can be contemplated, ideological reciprocity must be ensured -- that is, our ability to present our views to Soviet audiences (general, as well as specialized) should be at a level commensurate with Soviet access to the U.S. media and academic institutions (i.e., television, op eds in Pravda, etc.). Before we express any agreement in principle to Hartman's suggestion, we should also examine alternatives. John is working on this issue.

JL
JB
John Lenczowski and Dick Boverie concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Talking Points
- Tab B Moscow Cable 00973, January 25, 1983
- Tab C Moscow Cable 1331, February 2, 1983
- Tab II Talking Points for Clark meeting with Hartman

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Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED
 NLS F06-114/6#9098
 BY FOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

NLS Feb 14/16 #900

BY LOJ

NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~SECRET~~

W.P.C. HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

On March 9 or later this week, Ambassador Hartman will accompany me to your morning briefing at 9:30 a.m. Your last meeting with the Ambassador was on October 1, 1982 -- before the death of Brezhnev and the subsequent leadership changes.

The purpose of this meeting should be twofold: to solicit Ambassador Hartman's views on what is going on in the USSR right now and what we can expect in the future and to share with him the Administration's current thinking on U.S.-Soviet relations. He may discuss his two cables on INF and U.S.-Soviet exchanges:

-- In the first cable on INF (Tab B), Ambassador Hartman maintains that the zero-zero option has outlived its usefulness. You should point out that any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.

-- In his second cable on U.S.-Soviet exchanges (Tab C), the Ambassador suggests we lay the groundwork for a renegotiation of an umbrella agreement on U.S.-Soviet scientific, cultural and technical exchanges. There is a need to assert that before this idea can be contemplated, ideological reciprocity must be ensured -- that is, our ability to present our views to Soviet audiences (general, as well as specialized) should be at a level commensurate with Soviet access to the U.S. media and academic institutions (i.e., television, op eds in Pravda, etc.).

Attached for your use at Tab A are talking points.

Attachments: Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Moscow cable 973
Tab C Moscow cable 1331

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Lenczowski

CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE

March 18, 1983

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN

Q: Can you confirm that the President met recently with Dobrynin? What was discussed at this meeting?

A: I can confirm that the President and Secretary Shultz recently met with Ambassador Dobrynin at the White House for a discussion of US-Soviet relations.

--The meeting was an element in the [active] diplomatic dialogue [at all levels] which we have conducted with the Soviet Union since the beginning of the Administration. This dialogue has included a meeting between Andropov and the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, and Ambassador Hartman at the time of the Brezhnev funeral, as well as four meetings at the level of Foreign Minister and numerous contacts through the embassies in Washington and Moscow.

--At their recent meeting, the President and Dobrynin addressed all areas of the comprehensive agenda we have established for US-Soviet dialogue -- human rights, arms control, regional issues, and bilateral relations. In accordance with our normal practice, I will not go further into the substance of a confidential diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Union.

Q: Was this the first meeting between the President and Dobrynin?

The President was received by Dobrynin when he visited the Soviet Embassy to sign the condolence book for the late President Brezhnev.

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BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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Lenzowski
RR

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FROM/LOCATION/

1. JUDGE CLARK, THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT CAMP DAVID TOR:

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INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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CAMP DAVID

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/12/02

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