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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/26/2005

File Folder USSR DIPLOMATIC 1/8

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 22

YARHI-MILO

2203

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|-------------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 9051 | MEMO | ALLEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING FOR FORMER U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 9063 | MEMO | HAIG TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | 5/27/1981 | B1 |
| 9064 | MEMO | MEETING OF FORMER U.S. AMBASSADORS TO THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 3 | 5/18/1981 | B1 |
| 9052 | MEMO | ALLEN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE HAIG'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 9065 | MEMO | HAIG TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, JULY 2, 1981 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 2 | 7/7/1981 | B1 |
| 9068 | COVER SHHET | WILLIAMSON TO CLARK RE USSR <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | 2/25/1982 | B1 |
| 9053 | MEMO | WILLIAMSON TO CLARK RE GENE EIDENBERG/USSR <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | 2/22/1982 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|---|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 9054 | MEMO | PIPES TO CLARK RE TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, MONDAY, JULY 12, 1982 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 | 2 | 7/9/1982 | B1 |
| 9067 | CABLE | 081552Z JUL 82 D 3/14/2011 F2006-114/6 | 1 | 7/8/1982 | B1 B3 |
| 9055 | MEMO | POINDEXTER TO PIPES RE HAIG'S EVENING REPORT R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 | 1 | 7/10/1982 | B1 |
| 9066 | MEMCON | STOSSEL DOBRYNIN MEETING R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 | 7 | 7/9/1982 | B1 |
| 9056 | MEMO | PIPES TO CLARK RE TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH HARTMAN, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 | 1 | 9/28/1982 | B1 |
| 9057 | MEMO | PIPES TO CLARK RE HARTMAN'S REQUEST TO MEET WITH YOU R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 | 1 | 9/20/1982 | B1 |
| 9058 | MEMO | CLARK TO DEEVER RE INVITATION FROM SOVIET EMBASSY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6 | 1 | 10/29/1982 | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|------|----------|---|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 9059 | MEMO | PIPES TO CLARK RE INVITATION FROM SOVIET EMBASSY <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | 10/26/1982 | B1 |
| 9060 | MEMO | CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH HARTMAN <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | 10/1/1982 | B1 |
| 9061 | MEMO | CLARK TO HARTMAN RE AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE COUNCIL; LAPINSKI TO POINDEXTER RE CABLE <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | 11/18/1982 | B1 |
| 9062 | MEMO | PIPES TO CLARK RE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE U.S. <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ^{PD}

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President commenting on a memorandum of conversation between Walter Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, which was forwarded by Secretary of State Haig (Tab A). ~~(C)~~

Stearman had no comment; Pipes was unavailable; Lord and Schweitzer gave no response. (U)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Secretary of State Haig's memorandum dated May 27, 1981 (with attachment)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 27, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By emf NARA, Date 6/12/02

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Meeting of Former U.S. Ambassadors to the
Soviet Union

Al Haig forwarded an interesting memorandum of conversation (Tab A) between Walt Stoessel and other former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Malcolm Toon and Tom Watson. Their views on U.S.-Soviet relations center on the importance of revitalizing arms control negotiations (specifically facilitating a new round of SALT talks) and seeking meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership. As Al Haig aptly points out these views clearly manifest those "detente" perceptions which have characterized and guided U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union previously. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review May 27, 1987.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9051BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AH*
Subject: Meeting of Former US Ambassadors
to the Soviet Union

Walt Stoessel recently attended a get-together of former US Ambassadors to the Soviet Union. He has prepared the attached memorandum of conversation on the views of some of the participants. I believe you will find these views interesting as a reflection of the legacy of "detente" perceptions which have surrounded the US-Soviet relationship in the past, and which will still prevail in certain circles, including these former representatives.

Attachment:

As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 5/20/86

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6# 9063
BY LET NARA, DATE 12/13/07

4

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Meeting of Former US Ambassadors to the
Soviet Union

At the initiative of the Committee on East/West Accord, chaired by Carl Marcy, a dinner meeting was held May 13 of former US Ambassadors to the Soviet Union. Present were Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jake Beam, Mac Toon, Tom Watson and myself. Foy Kohler was unable to attend; Toon participated in initial discussions over drinks but could not stay for dinner.

Watson presented a draft letter which he proposed should be sent to the President from the Ambassadors stressing the importance of arms control negotiations and urging prompt initiation of a new round of SALT talks. The others present were not sure that such a letter would be appropriate; I pointed out that the Administration's review of SALT matters was still underway and that a recommendation of the kind proposed by Watson appeared premature. I also noted that his letter did not include the concept of linkage regarding other aspects of Soviet behavior. Toon strongly supported this position and it was agreed by all that the letter should not be sent.

Discussion at dinner was general in nature and covered a number of topics. A recurrent theme, however, voiced in particular by Kennan, was that the Administration seemed to be overdoing the rhetoric concerning the Soviet threat. Kennan noted that, for example, the Soviets -- and the czarist regime before them -- always maintained large military forces and frequently engaged in activities which were not regarded with approval by Western states. He did not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS 5/20/86

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#9064
BY ADT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

feel that we should be so upset by what the Administration refers to as "Soviet adventurism." He noted that the Soviets have many vulnerabilities and, in fact, have suffered a number of defeats in Africa and elsewhere. He also thought that there were some things in our own record which could be criticized.

Kennan said he felt it was important for the United States to seek a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet leadership, despite problems we have with Soviet behavior.

Kennan was supported in his remarks by Harriman and Watson. Beam was in general accord with Kennan although with less emphasis than Harriman and Watson.

I presented counter arguments to Kennan's thesis and feel sure I would have been supported by Mac Toon if he had been able to stay for the dinner discussion. In general, however, it seemed clear that Kennan, Harriman and Watson were not particularly sympathetic to Administration views on US-Soviet relations.

Kennan spoke with some emotion about his concern regarding the accumulation on both sides of nuclear weaponry. He said he would be making a speech next week in Washington on the occasion of his receiving the Einstein Peace Award in which he would speak about the dangers of the present situation and would recommend urgent actions toward a reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Another meeting of this group is scheduled to be held in October. As a member of this Administration, and given the views of the others, I am not entirely comfortable with my participation but it would be awkward to refuse to join the meetings. I believe the views will be better balanced if it is possible

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

for Kohler and Toon to take part.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

cc: S/S - Mr. Bremer
EUR - Ambassador Eagleburger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT: Haig's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

At Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum to the President transmitting Secretary Haig's report on his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 2. Haig's memorandum is at Tab A. (S)

No comments from Stearman, Bailey, Lilley, Kemp and Gregg.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Your memorandum to the President
- Tab A Haig's memorandum to the President.

~~SECRET~~

Derivative from State Review July 6, 2001.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/12/02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Haig's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

Al Haig's memorandum (Tab A) summarizes his conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin on July 2 following the delivery of a Soviet note on China. Essentially, Dobrynin was seeking further indications on what the United States expects from the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the Persian Gulf. He also sought information on U.S. economic policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and U.S. intentions on arms control. Except for the demarche on China (which is discussed in a separate memorandum) this is rather routine diplomatic stuff. (S)

~~SECRET~~Derivative from State
Review July 6, 2001DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6# 9052
BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*

Subject: My Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin,
July 2, 1981

I called Dobrynin in primarily to stress the importance of the initiatives on Afghanistan and Poland. I told him that the EC conference proposal was a serious one, not an anti-Soviet gesture, and stressed that the U.S. was prepared to help find a solution to Afghanistan. The essential factor was that we would not agree to a puppet regime in Kabul that ignored the reestablishment of a non-aligned Afghanistan. On Kampuchea, I said we also viewed the forthcoming international conference as a serious initiative and thought the Soviets should either participate or come to the UN with a proposal of their own. What was needed on both issues were constructive approaches from the Soviets, which might include proposals for transitional arrangements pending full settlement.

Dobrynin described the mood in Moscow as one of growing doubt as to where our relationship was headed and said my forthcoming meeting with Gromyko was viewed as a benchmark in determining whether there was to be any future to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. He said he needed to know whether we were saying that Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was an absolute condition for any future relationship with the Soviet Union.

I reminded Dobrynin that we had already broken TNF out of the complex of issues facing us and had agreed to negotiations, and that in due course we would have something to say about a future long term grains agreement. Dobrynin said that he had heard that we were planning to try to isolate the Soviets economically. I denied that this was so, but said that future trade relations would of course be affected by Soviet conduct in other matters. I added that it should be clear that the pace of our dealings with the Soviets in all areas would be affected by their conduct on the Afghanistan and Kampuchea issues -- and also by their conduct in two other areas of crucial importance, Iran and Poland. It was vital to any future relationship that there be no Soviet intervention in either of these countries.

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 7/06/01

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9065

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

10

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Dobrynin made another reference to the Soviet Persian Gulf initiative by saying it was essential that we talk about that area with Gromyko in September. I told him there was no possibility of any concerted U.S.-Soviet action concerning either the Persian Gulf or the Middle East so long as the Soviets remained in Afghanistan.

On arms control issues, Dobrynin asked about our plans for Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and how we saw the relationship between TNF and SALT. He was told that all these issues were under review.

Dobrynin also raised the subject of our relations with China. I am sending you a separate memo on this subject.

~~SECRET~~

01 JUL 7 P 3: 02

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

je 7/1502

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*To Secretariat
for staffing
je has copy*

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

ACW

July 21, 1981

Duplo

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES ^{RP}

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Jack Matlock

→ Pipes

I strongly endorse State's recommendation that you meet with Jack Matlock when he is in Washington later this month. He is a most knowledgeable person and there is a lot to be learned from him on the mood in Moscow.

Bill Stearman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet with Moscow Charge d'Affaires Jack Matlock.

Approve RP Disapprove _____

I know him — in fact, arranged for his going to Moscow!! (during transition)

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum of July 18, 1981.

RVA - Thurs 7/30 10:30 am
RP - Tues 7/28 4pm



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7211
13

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request for Jack Matlock

Jack Matlock, our Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, would like to see you to discuss recent developments in US-Soviet relations while he is back for consultations. He will be in Washington from July 27-31.

I recommend that you agree to a brief call by Jack Matlock.

L. Paul Bremer, III.
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED 26 FEB 82 14

14

TO CLARK

FROM ROBERTS, JAMES C

DOCDATE 23 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

BLOC CONTACT

SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE FELLOWS MTG AT SOVIET EMBASSY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 03 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

JENNINGS

Talked to Roberts on phone.
OBE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

NSC/S C 4 Mar 82 OBE Pipes talked to Roberts

by phone - gave negative recommendations (over)

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON WHITE HOUSE FELLOWSHIPS
THE WHITE HOUSE

February 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Honorable William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

FROM: James C. Roberts, Director

SUBJECT: White House Fellows' Meeting at the Soviet Embassy

As part of their Fellowship educational program, the 1981-82 White House Fellows would very much like to visit the Soviet Embassy to meet with embassy officials. The primary purpose of the meeting would be to discuss foreign policy issues.

Prior to initiating contacts with Soviet Embassy personnel to arrange such a meeting, I wanted to ensure that you would have no objection. I would appreciate hearing from you in this regard.

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8201205

US-USSR
16
|

RECEIVED 25 FEB 82 19

TO CLARK

FROM WILLIAMSON, R

DOCDATE 22 FEB 82

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F06-114/64 9068

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

KEYWORDS: USSR

BLOC CONTACT

EIDENBERG, GENE

SUBJECT: PREVIOUS WH EMPLOYEE UNDER CARTER ADMIN SEEKS AVICE RE SOVIET EMBASSY CONTACTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 01 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

JENNINGS

File

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

NSC/S C 3/4/82 NFAR - Pipes talked to Eidenberg 3/4/82

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

1205
24 FEB 1982

17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM CLARK

FROM: RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON

Rich

x7007

SUBJECT: GENE EIDENBERG/USSR

I was talking to a friend of mine, Gene Eidenberg who worked in the Carter White House and is currently Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee. Gene told me that he thought he should talk to someone within the Administration as a result of various contacts made with him by representatives of the Soviet Embassy.

797-5900
3/3 wdr
appx 3/4
10³⁰

I would request that you refer this matter to the appropriate staff person and that that individual talk to Gene at their earliest convenience. While a Carter liberal, Gene is a straight shooter and is sincerely seeking guidance from the Administration.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6# 9053
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

US-USSR
18

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8201328

RECEIVED 27 FEB 82 13

TO PRESIDENT

FROM DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F DOCDATE 22 FEB 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

fm Soviet Amb

SUBJECT: LTR RE DIPLOMATIC CORPS DINNER PRES RECENTLY ATTENDED & OPEN
INVITATION TO BE GUEST OF HONOR ANY TIME

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 04 MAR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

TYSON

*No response required.
W*

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8200821 8201006 NSCIFID (D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

| ACTION OFFICER (S) | ASSIGNED | ACTION REQUIRED | DUE | COPIES TO |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------------|-----|-----------|
| <i>NSC/S</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>4 Mar 82 NFAR per RP</i> | | |
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AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

February 22, 1982


Dear Mr. President,

I would like to bring to your knowledge that the splendid and hospitable dinner given by you and Mrs. Reagan at the White House in honor of the Diplomatic Corps is still a major topic of discussions and conversations in the Washington diplomatic community

We really valued that happy and special occasion to share the evening with you, and we are thankful. My colleagues Ambassadors asked me to let you know about their sincere wish to consider from now on the recent dinner to be a precedent and to turn the latter into a tendency, and the tendency - into a tradition.

Mr. President, I would like to renew the invitation to you and Mrs. Reagan to be the guests of honor of the Diplomatic Corps any time you find a spot in your very busy schedule.

Respectfully,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN
Ambassador

P.S. My wife Irene was delighted to be sitting next to you. She is convinced that if she had been so empowered she would have easily reached an understanding with you, Mr. President, on any problem no matter how complicated it could be.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE OUTLINE

March 10, 1982

TO: GREGORY J. NEWELL

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVERA

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman,
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

PURPOSE: The President may obtain valuable first-hand
information on internal developments in the
Soviet Union.

BACKGROUND: The President was unable to see the Ambassador
before he left to take up his post in Moscow.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Unknown

DATE: Ideally, week of March 8. However, Ambassador
Hartman is expected to be in the country in
March and April. DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary of State Haig, Ambassador Hartman,
William P. Clark, Richard Pipes, William Stearman

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Friendly get-acquainted meeting.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photo opportunity

RECOMMENDED BY: Department of State and National Security Council

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1982

SIGNEDACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Appointment Request
by Moscow Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

Ambassador Hartman is expected in this country in March and April and would like to have an appointment with the President, ideally in the second week of March. This is an eminently sensible suggestion, given that the President was unable to see the Ambassador before he left to take up his post. The President may obtain from him valuable information on internal developments in the Soviet Union and on Soviet perceptions of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union and Poland.

A Schedule Outline to Greg Newell is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That an appointment for Ambassador Hartman with the President be scheduled in March or April 1982; if possible, in the second week of March.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Schedule Outline

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 24, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT***SIGNED**FROM: RICHARD PIPES *R*SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Appointment Request
by Moscow Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

The attached, self-explanatory memorandum to Michael Deaver (Tab I) is forwarded with a Schedule Outline to Greg Newell (Tab A) with a strong recommendation that the President arrange to meet with Ambassador Hartman while he is in the United States during March and April.

The Department of State recommendation, with Talking Points and a Bio sheet on Ambassador Hartman is at Tab II.

William Stearman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to Michael Deaver, in order that an appointment be scheduled for Ambassador Hartman to meet with the President.

Approve *RP* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Michael Deaver

Tab A Schedule Outline

Tab II Memorandum from State, dated February 17, 1982.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 24, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Appointment Request
by Moscow Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

The attached, self-explanatory memorandum to Michael Deaver (Tab I) is forwarded with a Schedule Outline to Greg Newell (Tab A) with a strong recommendation that the President arrange to meet with Ambassador Hartman while he is in the United States during March and April.

The Department of State recommendation, with Talking Points and a Bio sheet on Ambassador Hartman is at Tab II.

William Stearman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to Michael Deaver, in order that an appointment be scheduled for Ambassador Hartman to meet with the President.

Approve *✓* Disapprove

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Michael Deaver
- Tab A Schedule Outline
- Tab II Memorandum from State, dated February 17, 1982.

3/5
Package given to
Shirley Moore. Notified Wilma.
W



S/S 8203975

24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1068

Washington, D.C. 20520


LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

February 17, 1982 FEB 17 10:24

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSELIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SITE 100-100000Subject: Presidential Appointment Request: Ambassador Arthur
Hartman

Ambassador Hartman would like to arrange for consultations in Washington during March or April, ideally during the second week of March. He has an invitation to speak at an Arden House conference on the Soviet Union the weekend of March 5, and would plan to schedule consultations immediately thereafter if possible. He would not do so, however, unless the President were able to receive him during the week of March 8. Due to a scheduling conflict, the President was unable to see Hartman prior to his departure for Moscow last fall.

Please let us know if the President will be able to meet with Ambassador Hartman during the week of March 8.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

105
2/18/82

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARTMAN:
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

-- KNOW THAT LIFE IN MOSCOW IS DIFFICULT; APPRECIATE WORK THAT OUR
EMBASSY AND OUR CONSULATE IN LENINGRAD DO UNDER TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES

-- WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR OVERALL IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET SCENE:
MOOD OF THE LEADERSHIP, MOOD OF THE PEOPLE

-- WHAT IMPRESSION HAS THIS ADMINISTRATION MADE ON THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
AND ON THE PEOPLE? HOW HAVE THEY REACTED TO OUR SANCTIONS STEMMING FROM
THEIR POLISH POLICY?

-- WHERE ARE THE SOVIETS GOING IN THEIR POLICY TOWARDS POLAND?

-- WE HAVE PLACED CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY.
HAS THIS HAD A BENEFICIAL EFFECT?

-- WHAT IS THE CURRENT SITUATION OF THE SIX PENTECOSTALISTS STILL IN
OUR EMBASSY? WHAT IS YOUR PROGNOSIS?

PERSONNEL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 5, 1982
No: 9

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION

Arthur A. Hartman, of New Jersey, was sworn in as United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union on October 14, 1981. Mr. Hartman is a career Foreign Service Officer holding the rank of Career Minister.

Mr. Hartman was born on March 12, 1926, in New York, New York. He received his B.A. degree from Harvard University in 1947 and attended Harvard Law School during 1947-48. He served in the United States Army from 1944 to 1946.

Entering Government service in 1948, he was assigned as Economic Officer, Economic Cooperation Administration (Warrenton Plant), Paris, under its first chief, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce. In 1952 he was in the U.S. Delegation to the European Army Conference in Paris, and in 1954 he joined the U.S. Mission to NATO in Paris, where he remained until 1958, when he was assigned to Saigon in a joint Embassy/aid mission function. From 1958 to 1961, Mr. Hartman worked on European integration affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs. During 1961-63 he served as Staff Assistant and then Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, George Ball. In 1963 he was assigned to London, where he was Chief of the Economic Section. A position he held until 1967.

From 1967 to 1972, he served in the Department of State, first as Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State William Katzenbach and Staff Director of the Senior Interdepartmental Group (1967-69), and then as Deputy Director for Coordination reporting to Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson.

In 1972 he was appointed Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister-Counselor at the United States Mission to the European Communities in Brussels. From 1974 until 1977 Mr. Hartman served as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. He was sworn in as United States Ambassador to France on June 13, 1977, and served in Paris until his appointment as the USSR.

In 1970 Mr. Hartman received the Professional Management Improvement Award and in 1972 the Distinguished Honor Award.

Mr. Hartman is married to Donna Van Dyke Ford. She has had a varied career as mother (of five children), student of sociology, teacher and as garden consultant in a partnership known as "Garden for All Seasons." In relation to their assignment in Paris, Mrs. Hartman arranged with leading horticulturists and collectors for a collection of American art to hang in the American Embassy.

For further information contact:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *Judge Clark - use*

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEEVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff

Information

Action

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 1068

02 MAR 2 10:41

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | ACTION |
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| John Poindexter | <u>1</u> | | |
| Bud McFarlane | <u>2</u> | <u>M</u> | |
| Jacque Hill | <u>3</u> | | |
| Judge Clark | <u>4</u> | | |
| John Poindexter | <u>5</u> | | |
| Staff Secretary | | | |
| Sit Room | | | |

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

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| CY To VP | | Show CC | |
| CY To Meese | | Show CC | |
| CY To Baker | | Show CC | |
| CY To Deaver | | Show CC | |

Other

COMMENTS

*NA Campbell
to Clark*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 9, 1982

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meeting with Dobrynin,
Monday, July 12, 1982

Ambassador Dobrynin has requested a meeting with you in order to secure information. The information he most likely seeks has to do with the President's thinking about political, economic, and military matters, especially as these bear on the Soviet Union. Some of the President's recent actions -- notably his London speech, which rattled them severely, and the extension of sanctions -- have thrown confusion into the Politburo. The prevalent view there had been that Ronald Reagan would sooner or later succumb to Allied pressure and the force of U.S. public opinion and adopt a more conciliatory position vis-a-vis Moscow. His move in the opposite direction in June, combined with the concurrent departure of Haig, seems to indicate to Moscow some major shift in U.S. foreign policy the drift of which they would like to know. This is of particular importance at this time since some of them seem to have concluded (Tab I) that "the President is now in command of foreign policy". (S)

I believe that it is good for us that they are uncertain and confused: this tends to make them hesitant and less aggressive. It would not serve much purpose for you to clarify in Dobrynin's mind what our strategy is, for once they know it is easier for them to prepare effective countermeasures. It would be best therefore if, to the extent possible, you drew him out on such subjects as:

- Soviet position on Afghanistan: Do they really regard the situation there as "irreversible" (Gromyko's words to Haig)? How long do they intend to wage this losing war?
- Soviet pressure on Poland: Do they believe that by preventing any kind of liberalization in Poland they will be able to solve Poland's catastrophic economic situation?
- Concerning their own economic situation: How do they expect to overcome in the future a steadily falling rate of economic growth and perennial agrarian failures?
- Will they show flexibility in INF and START negotiations instead of reiterating fixed positions?

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9054~~SECRET~~Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review July 9, 2002BY LoJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

-- Is authority in Moscow at present in secure hands?
(You need not be embarrassed to ask -- he will understand we must know if there is someone there we can deal with.) (S)

It will be hard to get him to talk but gentle persistence may do the trick. (S)

In response to his questions, I would stick to fixed, declared positions:

1. Sanctions: We intend to adhere to them (Gelb's article was without substance) until and unless there is significant improvement in Poland.

2. INF and START: The President is determined to obtain equitable reductions and we are not likely to be worn out by Soviet intransigence to the point where we will start negotiating among ourselves. At the same time we do not strive for military superiority as is mistakenly asserted in Moscow.

3. Middle East: The current crisis is the result of Soviet support of Syria and the PLO which between them have destroyed Lebanon; Israel will not stay there once foreign troops are out. No return to previous situation of threatening Israel from Lebanon.

4. Summit: This can take place only if and when much progress has been made on outstanding differences between us: not in the cards yet. (S)

On all other questions I would be evasive and/or vague. (S)

You may want to make it clear that this meeting was exceptional, that you normally do not deal with Ambassadors and that in the future he should communicate with Shultz; otherwise he may feel he has opened a new "channel". (S)

Attachment:

Tab I TD/00-B-321/22381-82

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

32

~~Secret~~

July 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard Pipes

FROM:

JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT:

Acting
Secretary ~~Haig's~~ Evening Report, *July 9*
Stressel

The following excerpt is for your information.

1. Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. I lunched today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, who will be leaving next week for the USSR for consultations and vacation. He expressed continued Soviet interest in a US-Soviet summit, saying his understanding, following the Haig-Gromyko talks in June, was that the US agreed in principle about a summit this fall and that the ball was now in our court to come up with proposals for a time and place. I stressed the need for careful preparation and the prospect of a positive outcome with regard to such a meeting. On Lebanon, Dobrynin emphasized Soviet concern about a possible US military presence in Beirut, saying that this injected the US-Soviet relationship into the Middle East situation in a direct way. While vague in his comments, he said that it should be understood that the USSR was also a super power and must react in some way if the US sends Marines to Lebanon. Dobrynin asserted that the Soviets would not necessarily object to some outside military forces being used -- preferably under UN auspices -- but that a US presence would be of particular concern to the Kremlin. I reviewed our policies in detail and indicated that we would participate in an international force on a temporary basis to facilitate the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut if requested to do so by all parties.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#9055BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07~~Secret~~



United States Department of State
Deputy Secretary of State

July 12, 1982

Judge Clark
The White House

Bill:

Herewith the memcon of my luncheon
discussion with Dobrynin.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Walt". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

34 Dobrynin
Put in same file as Mary - Gromyko or make new one for Dobrynin

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: July 9, 1982
Time: 1:00 p.m.
Department of State

SUBJECT : U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.S.R.

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

United States

Acting Secretary Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

In response to Dobrynin's suggestion that we have lunch before his departure for the Soviet Union on consultations and leave on July 14, I invited him to lunch at the Department July 9. Following are the highlights of our conversation.

U.S.-SOVIET AFFAIRS

General

Dobrynin asked how I saw the future development of relations between our two countries. He could tell me quite frankly that the view of most of the Politburo members was that it was "hopeless" to expect an improvement in the relationship during the Reagan Administration. He acknowledged that the President himself had toned down somewhat the sharpness of his anti-Soviet rhetoric and this was helpful. However, the President still referred to the idea -- which Dobrynin called "ridiculous" -- that the Soviet Union could be toppled by economic sanctions.

Overall, Dobrynin said the view in Moscow was that the general attitude of the Reagan Administration toward the Soviet Union was so negative that it was simply not realistic to think in terms of a basic improvement of relations. It is true that we are talking about various subjects, but the talk refers only to details and no progress is made. He felt that what is needed is a break with this approach and a new initiative from the U.S. which could overcome the obstacles between us.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6-9066

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
RDS-1 7/12/02

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

In response, I said that the U.S. Administration took a realistic view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It was true that we were critical of many aspects of Soviet performance and policies. No one hid this, least of all the President, and I thought this attitude was reflective of the wide majority of the U.S. people. In this regard, I noted our concern, inter alia, about the Soviet military buildup; Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; Soviet pressures against Poland; increased Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba; and continued support of Communist interference in Central America. I said that progress on such issues would be welcomed and would contribute to improving the climate between our two countries.

With regard to Afghanistan, I noted our proposal for beginning expert talks in Moscow July 22-23 and said we hope the Soviets would agree to this. Dobrynin thought that this proposal already had been approved and promised to check on it.

Referring to Poland, I said we continued to hope that steps would be taken in Poland to lift martial law, release the prisoners and reinstitute a dialogue with Solidarity. I wondered if any moves in this direction could be expected on July 22, the Polish National Day. Dobrynin made no substantive response.

I raised the question of Namibian independence and said that Secretary Haig had the impression from his talk with Gromyko that the Soviet Union might be interested in working cooperatively to create conditions to make independence possible.

Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviets would be interested in further discussions in this regard. I indicated that we might propose a continuation of expert talks with the Soviets as a follow-up to the discussions Assistant Secretary Crocker had in New York with Korniyenko. Dobrynin said this would be viewed favorably.

Summit

Dobrynin asked for our views regarding a U.S.-Soviet Summit. He disclaimed any intention of pressing for such a meeting, but said that Secretary Haig had agreed "in principle" to such a meeting in his discussion with Gromyko in New York. Dobrynin said that the Soviets consider that the ball is now in our court to come up with suggestions for a time and place for a

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

summit. He recalled that Brezhnev had spoken of a meeting in October in either Helsinki or Geneva.

I said that, as the President had suggested, he would have been prepared to meet with Brezhnev in New York at the time of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. In general, we felt that any summit meeting should be well prepared and should hold the prospect of positive results.

Dobrynin agreed and inquired whether we were now engaged in specific preparation for a summit. I said that I felt the talks already underway on INF and START could be considered in this light; we would wish to review the status of those talks as well as anything which might develop from our contacts on Afghanistan and Southern Africa in connection with our consideration of a summit meeting. Poland is important, too.

Dobrynin observed that Secretary Shultz and Gromyko presumably would be meeting in New York at the time of the General Assembly in September. It would be natural to expect that they would take up the question of a summit meeting at that time; while the period following New York and before a possible summit in October would be short, it probably still would be possible to prepare adequately for a summit.

Humanitarian Questions

I referred to the general area of humanitarian questions, including emigration, reunification of families and treatment of dissidents and said that progress on these would be very helpful in terms of our relationship. These matters, of course, were of concern to the Administration, to Congress and to the general public.

I drew particular attention to the situation of the Pentacostalists and expressed hope for a favorable resolution of this long-standing problem. I also mentioned the recent cases involving U.S.-Soviet marriages, noting that two Soviets spouses of American citizens were now on a hunger strike to protest their inability to receive visas to come to the United States to join their wives.

Dobrynin had no substantive comment to make on these questions except to say that family reunification cases are easier to handle than emigration cases (the latter presumably a reference to the Pentacostalists).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Dobrynin said that he understood that our list of reunification cases had decreased and said he attached importance to resolving reunification questions.

Secretary-Designate Shultz

Dobrynin noted that the Secretary-Designate had visited Moscow several times and was known to some of the Soviet leaders. He thought this was a positive factor. He recalled that, whatever Secretary Haig's views may have been, the anti-Soviet rhetoric of his speeches had been particularly noted in Moscow and had not been appreciated. He hoped Secretary Shultz would avoid such statements.

Dobrynin said he had heard a rumor that Mr. Shultz would be making a trip to China in the near future and asked if this was true. I said I had heard nothing about such a trip and that the Secretary-Designate's travel plans for the fall had not been worked out.

Dobrynin wondered if it would be possible for him to call on the Secretary-Designate before his (Dobrynin's) departure the afternoon of July 14. He noted in this regard his status as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. I said that the Secretary-Designate was not seeing any Ambassadors prior to his confirmation and that I did not think an appointment would be possible.

(I confirmed this to the Soviet Embassy July 10.)

INF-START

Dobrynin took a rather negative view about both negotiations. He observed that INF had been going on for many months but the two sides seemed as far apart as ever and he could not see any realistic prospect for achieving agreement. He agreed with me that the START talks had begun in a business-like and serious manner but said this was hardly unusual. He thought the positions of the two sides seemed so different that little progress was in prospect.

LEBANON

Dobrynin asked if a reply had been made to the latest letter from Brezhnev concerning Lebanon. I said that it had not been, but that the President was considering it and would

respond in due course. Dobrynin went over again the substance of his remarks concerning the situation in Lebanon which he made in his call on me July 7, with particular reference to the announced intention of the U.S. to send a Marine contingent to Beirut. He said he could not understand the rationale for an international force and that, in any event, he felt that U.S. forces should not be sent. If it were really necessary to have an international force, then it should be done preferably under UN auspices and using forces which would not include the U.S.

I explained in detail our views regarding the need for strengthening the central government of Lebanon and achieving peace. In this regard, as a first step it was necessary to resolve the question of the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut. The idea of an international force and of the inclusion of a U.S. contingent had been suggested by the Lebanese. I noted that we would not send the Marines unless all parties agreed and I stressed that their stay in West Beirut would be temporary, not to exceed 30 days.

Referring to Brezhnev's letter, I commented that some of the language could be interpreted as being threatening in nature. I also could not understand why the Soviets had seen fit to publish almost immediately the substance of the letter; this violated the traditional confidential character of correspondence at the highest level.

Dobrynin squirmed a bit at this saying that, while the Soviets generally wished to observe the principle of confidentiality, the publication of the substance of the Brezhnev letter in this instance was an indication of the Kremlin's concern about the proposed move by the U.S. to put its soldiers into Beirut. He said so long as the conflict preserved a regional character involving Israelis, Palestinians and Syrians, it could be regarded as something regrettable but not of major concern. He remarked that "we would never go to war for the Syrians, and we told the Syrians that". However, if the U.S. forces enter the picture, then a new element is introduced -- that of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The Soviet Union is a super power like the United States, Dobrynin said, and it should be understood that it would have to react in some way if the U.S. introduced its forces. He could not predict what the consequences would be, but there would be consequences.

Dobrynin continued that the Soviet leadership is elderly and it could be said that this has an advantage in that old men

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-6-

don't want to take risks or get involved in new problems. At the same time, they cannot be seen as "chicken". If the U.S. puts Marines into Lebanon, an area not far removed from the Soviet Union, it could be seen by some as a challenge to the Soviet Union and this is bound to produce a reaction.

I emphasized again our peaceful intent and the limited nature of our involvement if it occurs. I made clear that we would proceed with our plans if there is agreement with all parties concerned.

LAW OF THE SEA

Dobrynin said he understood that we would be announcing our opposition to signing the Law of the Sea Treaty. He was puzzled, since he thought the U.S., like the Soviet Union, believed that the provisions in the treaty covering navigational passage through straits, etc., were advantageous.

I explained the problems we had with the portion of the treaty concerning the deep seabed mining regime and said that the treaty as it stood could never be ratified by our Senate.

Dobrynin commented that, while he could understand our objection to some of the terms of the seabed regime, he did not see why we could not go along with the treaty as a whole, particularly since, by our refusal to sign, we would be isolating ourselves from almost all other nations.

SOVIET UNION - INTERNAL

In answer to my query, Dobrynin said he was not aware of any Central Committee Plenum to be held this summer. While one could be called on short notice, his personal view was that this was unlikely, given the absence of Brezhnev from Moscow and the vacation plans of Gromyko this summer.

I inquired whether Andropov would be chairing meetings of the Politburo in Brezhnev's absence. Dobrynin said he did not know for certain. He remarked that, before he died, Suslov had always taken Brezhnev's place in chairing the Politburo. After Suslov's death, Kirilenko assumed this role. More recently, Kirilenko has not been active because of failing health and Chernenko took over the chairmanship in Brezhnev's absence. Dobrynin acknowledged that Andropov has become "increasingly

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

active" recently and he thought that there might be some system whereby Andropov and Chernenko would alternate in taking the Politburo chair when Brezhnev was not there. He stressed, however, that he did not know for sure.

Dobrynin speculated that Andropov may have been made responsible for ideological affairs previously supervised by Suslov. If this is the case, it might also be that Chernenko is responsible for personnel matters in the Party. Again, Dobrynin said this was all speculation on his part.

Speaking of Andropov, Dobrynin said he had always found him easy to deal with. He is a man with long experience in government and foreign affairs and is generally well informed about the world.

Commenting on the organization of the Foreign Office, Dobrynin said that Gromyko to an increasing extent is delegating day-to-day activities to his deputies, reserving to himself only items of major importance. The two deputies are Korniyenko and Maltsev. Dobrynin said that Korniyenko is the person Gromyko relies on the most; he is a professional who is thoroughly capable and experienced. On the other hand, Dobrynin said that Maltsev, while a very good person, has primarily Party background (although he did serve as Ambassador to Sweden) and is not generally as capable of handling the details of foreign affairs as is Korniyenko.

Dobrynin recalled that when Kuznetsov had left the Foreign Office position as First Deputy several years ago for the Presidium, Gromyko had wanted him (Dobrynin) to take Kuznetsov's place. However, Dobrynin related, Brezhnev had objected to such a move, saying that Dobrynin would be more useful in the United States in view of his long experience here. Dobrynin asserted that he was quite content with this decision and that he preferred to be in Washington rather than in the Foreign Office in Moscow.

DRAFTED:WJStoessel, Jr.:edh:cos
7/10-12/82 (0328A)

USSR 41

6434 add-on

Pipes

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 28, 1982

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meeting with Ambassador Hartman
(Thursday, September 30, 1982; 3:00 p.m.)

INFO HAS BEEN

Following are talking points for your meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman:

1. The political atmosphere in Moscow: Is there any sense of unified direction? Is anyone obviously in charge? The mood of inhabitants: there are reports of widespread grumbling that Russia has no "leader" -- is this true?
2. Succession politics: recent reports indicate Chernenko is regaining influence. The role of the KGB in promoting its one-time boss, Andropov. The attitude of the military in this succession struggle.
3. Food situation, especially outside big cities: how bad is it? Availability (or, rather, non-availability) of meat?
4. Any signs of a thaw in relations with China?
5. Perceptions in Soviet government of Reagan Administration: do they perceive it as decisive? Does Moscow continue to believe there are two or three currents in the Administration, one of which wants accommodation?
6. View of Middle East crisis and Soviet role there.

~~SECRET~~

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NLS F06-114/6#9056
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 6434

SEP 29 P 3: 28

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| John Poindexter | <u>1</u> | <u>J</u> | _____ |
| Bud McFarlane | <u>2</u> | <u>M</u> | _____ |
| Jacque Hill | <u>3</u> | <u>J</u> | _____ |
| Judge Clark | <u>4</u> | _____ | <u>I</u> |
| John Poindexter | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Staff Secretary | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Sit Room | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| <u>JH</u> | <u>5</u> | _____ | _____ |

I-Information
 A-Action
 R-Retain
 D-Dispatch
 N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

For Thursday 3:00 p.m.
meeting with Amb. Hartmann
TO JH for mtg folder

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 20, 1982

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Ambassador Hartman's Request to Meet with You

Ambassador Arthur Hartman will be in Washington September 29-October 1 and requests an opportunity to brief you on recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations (Tab I). If you have the time and inclination, this may be a useful meeting; if not, I will be glad to speak with him and report to you the substance of his briefing.

Paula Dobriansky concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No

 That you meet with Ambassador Hartman, if possible, between September 29 and October 1.

 Alternatively, that I meet with Ambassador Hartman.

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum of September 16, 1982

*Has been scheduled for 3:00 - Sept. 30.
J. Hill*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/16#9057

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

6434 44

8227860



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 16, 1982

82 SEP 16 P10 49

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Appointment Request - Ambassador Hartman

Our Ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, will be in Washington from September 29-October 1 on consultations following Secretary Shultz's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. While the Ambassador is back he would like to discuss recent developments in US-Soviet relations with you. We recommend that you agree to meet with him.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

National Security Council The White House

Package # 6434

21 - 3 - 80

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | ACTION |
|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| John Poindexter | <u>1</u> | <u>[initials]</u> | <u> </u> |
| Bud McFarlane | <u>2</u> | <u>M</u> | <u> </u> |
| Jacque Hill | <u>3</u> | <u>[initials]</u> | <u> </u> |
| Judge Clark | <u>4</u> | <u>[initials]</u> | <u>A</u> |
| John Poindexter | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| Staff Secretary | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| Sit Room | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Deaver Other

5

*Please provide
follow-up for the
press release.*

USSR/Dydo
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 30, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON ^{LF}
_(P/M)

FROM: RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with the President
for Ambassador Hartman

As requested, attached at Tab I is a Schedule Proposal requesting an appointment for U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman to meet with the President tomorrow, October 1. This is the only day available since Ambassador Hartman will be in New York on Monday for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting and departs for Moscow on Tuesday, October 5.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I to William Sadleir.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

REQUEST: Meeting with Ambassador Arthur Hartman
(U.S. Ambassador, Moscow)

PURPOSE: To brief the President on the situation
in the Soviet Union.

BACKGROUND: Ambassador Hartman has valuable information
to impart to the President about the current
situation in the USSR and U.S.-Soviet --
relations which is relevant to our current
talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs,
A. Gromyko, in New York. -- Leadership
changes, new domestic policies which manifest and
more vigorous foreign affairs initiatives,

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: *March 7-11*

DATE AND TIME: Friday, October 1, 1982 DURATION: Open

LOCATION: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs William P. Clark

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Briefing of the President by Ambassador
Hartman.

REMARKS REQUIRED: *None. Talking pts. to be provided*

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open

RECOMMENDED BY: William P. Clark

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: ~~Richard Pipes~~ (NSC) *Clark*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *anj* NARA, Date 6/12/02~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Types
ASK
Diplo
48

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~INFORMATION~~

October 29, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Invitation from Soviet Embassy

I suggest that you do not accept the invitation to a reception at the Soviet Embassy. We are, as a rule, boycotting such affairs: the State Department has a list of a handful of Americans who attend ex officio (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and officials directly concerned with Soviet affairs).

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DECLAS: OADR

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NLS F06-114/6# 9058
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

October 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Invitation from Soviet Embassy

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for your signature suggesting that Mike Deaver not attend the reception at the Soviet Embassy (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION

OK NO

 ✓ —

That you send the attached memo to Mike Deaver.

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Mike Deaver

Tab A Copy of invitation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLAS: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/64 9059
BY LDT NARA, DATE 12/13/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *NSC*

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff

- Information
- Action

*COMMENTS
PLEASE*

*On the Occasion of the Sixty-fifth Anniversary
of the Great October Socialist Revolution*

*The Ambassador
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and Mrs. Anatoly F. Dobrynin
request the pleasure of your company
at a reception
on Friday, the fifth of November, 1982
from six-thirty until eight-thirty p.m.
at the Embassy.*

*Regrets only
628-7551*

NOT TRANSFERABLE
PLEASE PRESENT THIS CARD AT DOOR

*1125 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.*

399

National Security Council The White House

Package # 7409

OCT 26 P 8: 25

| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | ACTION |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| John Poindexter | <u>1</u> | <u>[initials]</u> | <u>[initials]</u> |
| Bud McFarlane | <u>2</u> | <u>m</u> | |
| Jacque Hill | <u>3</u> | <u>✓</u> | |
| Judge Clark | <u>4</u> | <u>✓</u> | <u>A</u> |
| John Poindexter | | | |
| Staff Secretary | <u>5</u> | | <u>D</u> |
| Sit Room | | | |

OCT 29 1982
Jone

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

Pipes file USSR/Diplo 6793 53

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 1, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meeting with
U.S. Ambassador to Moscow
(Friday, October 1, 1982, 1:45 p.m.)

Following are talking points for your meeting this afternoon with U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman:

- The political atmosphere in Moscow: Is there any sense of unified direction? Is anyone obviously in charge? The mood of inhabitants: there are reports of widespread grumbling that Russia has no "leader" -- is this true?
- Succession politics: The role of the KGB in promoting its one-time boss, Andropov. The attitude of the military in this succession struggle.
- Food situation, especially outside large cities: how bad is it? Availability (or rather, non-availability) of meat?
- Any signs of a thaw in relations with China?
- View of Middle East crisis and Soviet role there.
- The effect of new sanctions.

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

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NLS F06-114/6#9060

~~SECRET~~

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

National Security Council The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 633

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| | SEQUENCE TO | HAS SEEN | ACTION |
|-----------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|
| John Poindexter | <u>1</u> | <u>[initials]</u> | <u> </u> |
| Bud McFarlane | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| Jacque Hill | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| Judge Clark | <u>2P</u> | <u>✓</u> | <u>A</u> |
| John Poindexter | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| Staff Secretary | <u>3</u> | <u> </u> | <u>D</u> |
| Sit Room | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 1, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*SUBJECT: Talking Points for the President's Meeting
with U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Hartman

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President for his use today in his meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman. These talking points are basically the same as those provided you earlier.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve Disapprove

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
SECRET Attachment
Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Diplo
56

CHANNEL MESSAGE

November 18, 1982

~~TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HAR~~
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
FOR AMBASSADOR ARTHUR HARTMAN

The President was very impressed by your forceful statement to the American-Soviet Trade Council. Well done.

WILLIAM P. CLARK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 18, 1982

TO: ADMIRAL POINDEXTER

Attached for your use is a proposed cable dictated by Richard Pipes, as requested.

Flan
Francesca Lapinski

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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NLS FOG-114/6-#9061
BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07

PIPES TO CLARK

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRSENCE IN THE USA

The State Department's Bureau of Ibtellogence and Research has released recently a report on the "Soviet Presence Around the World". From it transpires that far and away the largest deplomatic, military, and intellitence presence the Soviet Union has anywere is in the United States. There are presently nearly 1,500 Soviet official personnel in this country (followed by France and India with 960 each, and Switzerland with 859).

Our corresp-nding staff in the Soviet Union is .

It seems to me that there is a great deal of fat to be cut out here should we decide to take some further moves against the USSR.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOG-114/6# 9062

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07