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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/25/2005

**File Folder** USSR-CULTURE

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2117

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9003	REPORT	USSR SIGNS OF RELAXATION OF CONTROLS OVER CULTURE INCREASE	5	4/30/1986	B1
9004	REPORT	USSR-FRG-GDR <b>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	4	4/30/1986	B1
9005	REPORT	IRAN <b>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	1	4/30/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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## USSR-FRG-GDR

### Moscow Links Relations With Bonn to FRG Security Policies

*General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's attack on West German policies at the East German party congress suggests that Moscow will continue to impose limits on East bloc relations with Bonn unless the Kohl government eases its support for U.S. arms policies. Meanwhile, with an eye toward the 1987 Bundestag elections, the Gorbachev regime has vigorously cultivated ties with the West German opposition parties. Moscow has maintained working-level dialogue with the Kohl government but limited its high-level contacts, and has signaled to East Berlin that Moscow's security interests must be taken into account in any effort to upgrade the inter-German dialogue.*

Gorbachev used his 18 April address to the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) congress in East Berlin (*Pravda*, 19 April) to register Moscow's continuing displeasure with the Kohl government's support for U.S. security policies and to signal to Bonn—and East Germany as well—that West German policies must change before a substantial improvement in relations with the USSR and GDR can occur. While Gorbachev reserved his harshest criticism for the United States, his extended critique of West German policies was clearly designed once again to impress upon his East German audience Moscow's reservations about close cooperation with the current government in Bonn:

- Charging that “there is no logic” in West German policies, he accused Bonn of mouthing rhetoric about peace and East-West cooperation but “in reality” allowing U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles to be placed on its territory and giving “wholehearted support” to the U.S. “militarist” SDI program.
- Drawing on a theme that Moscow used heavily in the intense propaganda campaign against the Kohl government that preceded East German leader Erich Honecker's cancellation of his planned trip to West Germany in the fall of 1984, Gorbachev said that Bonn's security policies were “all the more alarming” since the West German “ruling class” continues to claim that there





exists an "open German question" and to harbor "revanchist plans." A TASS report on Gorbachev's 22 April predeparture discussions with Honecker also recorded both leaders as condemning the "current FRG Government" for allegedly "encouraging dangerous revanchist forces."

- While asserting that Moscow "attaches much importance" to the development of relations with West Germany, Gorbachev said that any improvement in relations calls "first and foremost" for West German policies "to meet in practice the interests of peace and security." Seeming to broaden this prerequisite to apply to inter-German relations, Gorbachev asserted that "in this context" the USSR "unconditionally" supports East Germany's "demand" that FRG-GDR relations "be fully brought into accordance with the commonly recognized norms of international law"—an apparent reference to East Germany's demand that West Germany grant it full international recognition.

**Dominance of  
Security Issues**

Gorbachev's remarks are consistent with the stress his regime has placed on the overriding importance of security issues in Moscow's relations with Bonn. The

TASS report on Gorbachev's meeting with Chancellor Kohl after Chernenko's funeral in March 1985, for example, recorded the Soviet side as stressing the "decisive significance" for future Moscow-Bonn relations of West Germany's policy on "matters concerning the security interests of the Soviet Union and its allies." In line with this pronouncement, the TASS report on then-Foreign Minister Gromyko's talks with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1985 quoted Gromyko as warning that Bonn's participation in SDI would mean that West Germany would assume "responsibility for the consequences of the ensuing destabilization of the existing military-strategic equilibrium."

More recently, on 4 April 1986 the Soviet ambassador in Bonn presented a strongly worded message to Genscher protesting the signing of the U.S.-West German agreement on SDI cooperation. At an 8 April meeting with FRG Economics Minister and Free Democratic Party (FDP) leader Martin Bangemann, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov warned that Bonn's support for SDI means that it is assuming "grave responsibility for the escalation of the arms race."

**Limited Contacts** Barring a shift in West German policies, the Gorbachev regime evidently intends to maintain a hard line toward the Kohl government while praising and cultivating ties with the leftwing opposition, at least until the Bundestag elections scheduled for early 1987. In keeping with this strategy, Moscow has limited its leadership contacts with Bonn over the last year largely to meetings of leaders on the periphery of multilateral forums, ceremonial occasions, and funerals. The last full-scale Soviet-West German summit meeting was in July 1983 when Chancellor Kohl visited Moscow, and the most recent strictly bilateral meetings of Soviet and West German foreign ministers were in Moscow in May 1984 and in early March 1985, the last occurring on the eve of Chernenko's death.<sup>1</sup> A Soviet general secretary has not visited West Germany since Leonid Brezhnev went in November 1981, and no Soviet foreign minister has been there since Andrey Gromyko's visit in January 1983. By contrast, from the mid-1970's through the early 1980's, Moscow and Bonn alternated the hosting of summits roughly every 18 months to two years and exchanged foreign minister visits in most nonsummit years.

At the same time, Moscow apparently wishes to preserve its economic ties to West Germany and maintain routine political contacts. Bangemann, for example, was received in Moscow in early April in his capacity as chairman of the FRG delegation to the 14th session of the Soviet-West German Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. Moscow also hosted West German Foreign Ministry State Secretary and former Ambassador to the USSR Andreas Meyer-Landrut in early April. Meyer-Landrut met with Minister of Culture Petr Demichev to discuss cultural exchanges and with First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko.

While keeping its high-level contacts with the Kohl government to a minimum, the Gorbachev regime has vigorously courted FRG opposition groups, highlighting their more palatable views on arms control. Moscow has on several occasions praised the arms control policies of the SPD and Green Party and over the last year has hosted officials from these parties in Moscow. During SPD Chairman Willy Brandt's May 1985 visit to Moscow Gorbachev lauded Brandt and the SPD for playing a "prominent role in the struggle for resolving questions of war and peace," and he specifically praised the SPD's

<sup>1</sup> Former Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko did meet briefly with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher in May 1985 at the time of the 30th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. His successor Eduard Shevardnadze had a meeting with Genscher in Helsinki in August 1985, on the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords and at the annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 1985.



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FBIS TRENDS  
30 April 1986

opposition to Washington on SDI and other arms control issues. Similarly, during prospective SPD Chancellor candidate Johannes Rau's September 1985 visit to Moscow Gorbachev endorsed the SPD's proposal for a chemical-weapons-free zone in Central Europe. The official Soviet description of the Gorbachev-Rau talks pointedly noted that the experience of the 1970's—when a Social Democratic Government was in power in Bonn—demonstrates that the two countries "can cooperate well as partners in solving cardinal problems of peace and security."

Moscow has also hosted numerous lower level SPD officials and representatives of the West German Green Party. On 18 April, Central Committee Secretary Mikhail Zimyanin and International Department First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin met with a Green Party delegation in Moscow and, judging from the TASS account of their talks, reached broad agreement on a number of issues, including SDI. (U/FOUO)

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## Iran

### Prime Minister Calls for Domestic Austerity

*In the clearest leadership admission to date of the serious economic pinch caused by the oil price slump, Prime Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi has called for cutbacks in nonmilitary government and consumer spending to help deal with the problem. Musavi's statement is a departure from other leaders' public claims that the economy is not heavily dependent on oil revenues.*

Musavi called for government and consumer belt tightening at a 23 April joint meeting of the cabinet and visiting provincial governors. As reported by Tehran radio and the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), he said the measures would be necessary as long as oil prices remain at "their current levels" and announced that the government has already taken unspecified "preliminary steps" to reduce expenditures. He promised that Iranians would "foil the oil price conspiracy" and accused Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq of having cooperated at the recent meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries "against the Islamic Revolution."

The prime minister urged the governors to "place greater importance" on increasing income for the government through taxation and called on the Majlis (parliament) deputies to help in this regard. Several days before his speech to the governors Musavi had alluded to the difficulty of winning popular acceptance of the need for enhanced tax collection efforts. In a 21 April address to the minister of economics and financial affairs and his deputies reported by IRNA, he said that the ministry would have to "promote the need for tax payment" and that the people should be encouraged to pay the due taxes "as their religious obligation."

**Appeal for Sacrifice** In his 23 April speech, Musavi also put the Iranian people on notice that as a result of the decline in oil prices, further sacrifices would be required. Noting that the people had already demonstrated their "readiness to make all kinds of sacrifices," Musavi said the government was now compelled to "exploit this vigilant and selfless spirit of the people to the maximum" in order to commit greater resources to the war effort.



USSR ?  
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 5, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Photo Opportunity with Pearl Bailey

State recommends (Tab II) that the President and USIA Director Wick meet with Pearl Bailey now that she has returned from a cultural mission in the USSR. Its recommendation is based on the opportunity that can be used here to underline the President's interest in people-to-people exchanges.

Ms. Bailey would share her impressions with the President and participate in a photo session. If the President has the time and the inclination, this meeting would be useful. A Schedule Proposal is attached at Tab I.

Jack Matlock concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Schedule Proposal at Tab I to Fred Ryan.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I Schedule Proposal
- Tab II State's memorandum, March 20, 1984

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 5/11/02

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Declassify on: OADR

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2310

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR  
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

REQUEST: Pearl Bailey to have brief meeting with the  
President following her recent trip to the  
USSR.

PURPOSE: Given the President's interest in cultural  
exchanges with the USSR, a brief meeting with  
Ms. Bailey would provide a photo opportunity  
that would serve to underline people-to-  
people contact with Soviet citizens and  
indirectly demonstrate our serious approach  
to cultural relations between the two  
countries.

BACKGROUND: Ms. Bailey has just returned from a very  
successful short stay in the Soviet Union  
with her band at the invitation of Ambassador  
Hartman, with heavy administrative and  
financial support from USIA. She played to  
select but enthusiastic audiences in Moscow  
and Leningrad.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Various social meetings.

DATE AND TIME: To be determined. DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Director of USIA Wick, Robert  
C. McFarlane

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Fifteen-minute meeting followed by photo  
opportunity.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points to be provided.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity.

RECOMMENDED BY: Department of State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt/John Lenczowski

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DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 6/11/02



Washington, D.C. 20520

March 20, 1984

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WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Pearl Bailey Trip to USSR: Possible Photo Opportunity

Performer Pearl Bailey is now returning from a very successful short stay in the Soviet Union. She went with her band at Ambassador Hartman's invitation and with heavy administrative and financial support from USIA. Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad tell us that she played to select but enthusiastic audiences of Soviet musicians and fans in both locales.

Although we have not raised the possibility with her, Ms. Bailey might appreciate the chance to share impressions of her tour during a brief visit with the President and, given his interest in cultural exchanges with the USSR, with USIA Director Wick. Such a meeting could provide a photo opportunity that would serve to underline the President's interest in people-to-people contacts with Soviet citizens, as expressed in his January 16 speech on U.S.-Soviet relations and in the State of the Union message, and would indirectly demonstrate our serious approach to cultural relations between the two countries.

If the President approves the concept, we will be in touch with you and Ms. Bailey to set up the meeting at a mutually convenient time.

*Charles Hill*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987  
By smf NARA, Date 6/11/02

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