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File Folder "CODE OF NUCLEAR CONDUCT"

FOIA

F06-114/6

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YARHI-MILO

2114

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8996	CABLE	271603Z DEC 84 D 3/25/2008 F06-114/6	1	12/27/1984	B1 B3
8989	MEMO	SOVIET OFFICIAL WANTS U.S. RESPONSE TO CHERNENKO SPEECH ON CODE OF CONDUCT FOR NUCLEAR POWERS D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	12/27/1984	B1
8990	CABLE	220615Z DEC 84	1	12/22/1984	B1
8991	CABLE	271603Z DEC 84 D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	12/27/1984	B1
8992	MEMO	PRACTICAL MEASURES TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF CHERNENKO SUGGESTION: R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	2	ND	B1
8993	MEMO	CHERNENKO'S CODE OF NUCLEAR CONDUCT R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	1	ND	B1
8995	MEMO	SUBSEQUENT SOVIET COMMENTARY R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	3	ND	B1
8994	MEMO	SOVIET UNION: DEVELOPMENTS DURING WEEK OF 19 DECEMBER-02 JANUARY (HIGHLIGHTS FROM CABLE REPORTING)	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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The danger of the imperialists policy of the incessant escalation of tension has become obvious. The graver threat it poses to human civilisation, the stronger mankind's forces of self-preservation grow. Indignation is rising in Western Europe over the actions of those who are sacrificing its security to the imperial ambitions of Washington. Millions of participants in the anti-missile movement are quite vocal in making this known.

Also, far from all the leaders of Western countries and influential political parties approve the adventurism of the U.S. Administration. It worries a considerable segment of the U.S. public itself as well. They are realizing ever clearer there that the intensive militarisation and the aggravation of the international situation have not brought nor are going to bring the USA military superiority and political achievements. They only lead everywhere in the world to the escalation of criticism of Washington's belligerent course. People want peace and tranquility rather than war hysteria. I can say that our conversations with the leaders of many foreign delegations who attended the funeral of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov confirmed that with sufficient forcefulness.

All this inspires the hope that developments will eventually be turned around towards peace, the limitation of the arms race and the development of international cooperation.

Detente has struck deep roots. This is evidenced, in particular, by the convocation of the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

~~Of course, it is the bridling of the nuclear arms race that is of key importance to peace and the security of peoples. The Soviet Union's position on that issue is clear. We are against rivalry in building up nuclear arms arsenals. We were and remain proponents of the prohibition and elimination of all types of those weapons. Our proposals on this score were submitted long ago, both to the United Nations and the Geneva disarmament committee, but discussion on them is being blocked by the United States and its allies.~~

As for Europe, we still stand for it being free from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones.

We stand for both sides making the first major step in this direction without wasting time. In so doing, the Soviet Union has no intention of strengthening its security at the expense of others but wants equal security for all.

Regrettably, the United States has turned its participation in talks on this subject into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and cold war policy. We will not participate in this game. The Americans created obstacles to the talks both on "European" and on strategic nuclear weapons by deploying their missiles in Europe. It is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove the need for our measures taken in response) that offers the way to working out a mutually acceptable accord.

The U.S. Administration has lately begun to make peaceably sounding statements, urging us to enter a "dialogue."

Attention was drawn worldwide to the fact that these statements are in sharp conflict with everything what the present United States Administration has said, and, which is the main thing, done and continues doing in its relations with the Soviet Union. Assurances of its good intentions can be taken seriously only if they are substantiated with real actions.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it has always been for a search for mutually acceptable practical solutions to concrete questions for the benefit of both countries, for the benefit of peace. There are quite a few such questions. And the U.S. Administration has many opportunities to prove its peaceableness by deeds.

Why should not the USA, for example, ratify the treaties with the USSR on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which were signed almost ten years ago, and not complete drawing up an agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests? I will remind that the talks on these issues were broken off by the United States. The USA can also make a no small contribution to strengthening peace by concluding an agreement on the renunciation of the militarization of outer space. The USSR is known to have proposed it for a long time.

The peaceable reassurances by the U.S. Administration would inspire by far more trust had it accepted the proposal on a mutual freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons. So many weapons have already been accumulated that this step would not create even the slightest threat to the security of either side. But, at the same time, it would considerably improve the general political atmosphere, and, it must be believed, would facilitate reaching agreement on a reduction of nuclear arsenals.

A very important task is to deliver mankind from the possible use of chemical weapons. Talks on that have been in progress already for a long time, but now it seems that prerequisites are beginning to ripen for resolving this question. The point at issue is the complete and general prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, their development and production, destruction of all of its stockpiles. We are over [as received] an effective control for the implementation of such an agreement, that control should cover the whole process of destruction of chemical weapons -- from beginning to end.

It is not ruled out that reaching an agreement on the above-mentioned issues would signal the start of a real drastic change in Soviet-American relations, and in the international situation as a whole. We would wish such a drastic change. Now it is up to Washington to act.

The policy of the powers possessing nuclear weapons is of special significance in our times. The vital interests of the whole of mankind, the responsibility of statesmen to the present and future generations require that relations between these powers should be regulated by certain norms. Our idea of these norms is as follows:

- * * -- To regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of one's foreign policy. To prevent situations fraught with nuclear conflict. In the event such a danger emerges, urgent consultations should be held to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out.
- * * -- To renounce the propaganda of nuclear war in any of its variations -- either global or limited.
- * * -- To undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
- * * -- Not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries, in whose territory there are no such weapons. To respect the status of a nuclear-free zone already created and encourage the creation of a new nuclear-free zone in various areas of the world.

- more -

- * * -- To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form: Not to hand over these weapons or control over them to anybody; not to deploy them on the territory of the countries, where there are no such weapons; not to spread the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including outer space.
- * * -- To press step by step, on the basis of the principle of equal security for the reduction of nuclear arms, up to their complete liquidation in all their varieties.

The Soviet Union has made these principles the foundation of its policy. We are ready to reach agreement at any time with the other nuclear powers on the joint recognition of norms of this kind and imparting them a mandatory character. I think that this would meet the fundamental interests not only of the participating countries, but also of the peoples of the whole world.

Comrades, all we have, all we are proud of -- the freedom and might of the homeland, its high prestige in the international arena, the full-blooded peaceful life of the people -- we all owe to the intensive creative work of the Soviet people. It is this work that is an inexhaustible source of our confidence of the future.

The workers and collective farmers, scientists and engineers, physicians and workers in culture, teachers and servicemen are meeting the elections to the Supreme Soviet with new achievements in their work. May these achievements further multiply. And then our state -- bulwark of lasting peace and security of peoples -- will be even stronger. Then the life of every Soviet family will become even better. Then our country will even be more successfully advanced along the road of building communism."

FURTHER MEDIA COVERAGE OF CHERNENKO SPEECH

PRAVDA Version

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 3 March in its First Edition carries on pages 1 and 2 an unattributed account of K.U. Chernenko's election speech. This has been compared to the TASS English version published on pages R8-19 of this section, revealing the following variations:

Page R 8, paragraph four, line five, reads in PRAVDA: ...his leadership that the party's Central Committee, the...(adding word)

Last paragraph, line one, reads: ...curtailing social programs even in these conditions, since the ultimate...(adding phrase)

Page R 10, paragraph three, last line, reads: ...it will be fulfilled and, maybe, overfulfilled.

We realize, ...(expanding passage)

Appendix C

Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics¹

Signed at Washington September 30, 1971
Entered into force September 30, 1971

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties:

Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risk of outbreak of such a war, including measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, and is in no way contrary to the interests of any other country,

Bearing in mind that continued efforts are also needed in the future to seek ways of reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party undertakes to maintain and to improve, as it deems necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control.

¹ The text is from *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980), pp. 111-112.

Article 2

The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the event of such an incident, the Party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon without causing damage.

Article 3

The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of signs of interference with these systems or with related communications facilities, if such occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.

Article 4

Each Party undertakes to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party.

Article 5

Each Party, in other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents, undertakes to act in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party. In any such situation, each Party may inform the other Party or request information when, in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Article 6

For transmission of urgent information, notifications and requests for information in situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the Direct Communications Link between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

For transmission of other information, notifications and requests for information, the Parties, at their own discretion, may use any communi-

communications facilities, including diplomatic channels, depending on the degree of urgency.

Article 7

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at further implementation of the purposes of this Agreement.

Article 8

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

DONE at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Appendix D

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War¹

Signed at Washington June 22, 1973

Entered into force June 22, 1973

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind,

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated,

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the agreements to which either Party has subscribed,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972,

Reaffirming that the development of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not directed against other countries and their interests,

¹ The text is from *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1980), pp. 159-160.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

Article II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

Article III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

Article IV

If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

Article V

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United

Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.

Article VI

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

- (a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
- (b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and
- (c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or other countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.

Article VII

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

DONE at Washington on June 22, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

~~The Associated Press~~

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~~December 24, 1984, Monday, AM cycle~~

SECTION: Washington Dateline

LENGTH: 639 words

HEADLINE: Analyst Worried About 'Dialogue of the Deaf'

BYLINE: ~~An AP News Analysis, By BARRY SCHWEID, AP Diplomatic Writer~~

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

KEYWORD: Shultz-Gromyko

BODY:

Will George Shultz and Andrei Gromyko talk past each other when they meet next month in Geneva?

William Ury is afraid they might. It could be "a dialogue of the deaf," dashing hopes of a slowdown in the nuclear arms race, says the director of Harvard University's Nuclear Negotiation Project.

But Ury has a prescription for success. It's that Secretary of State Shultz propose a number of small steps to keep the dialogue going and to improve crisis communication between the superpowers.

"What we need to do is to go through a symbolic dance at first, to warm up the relationship and build some confidence to the point where we can talk effectively without letting a lot of emotion get in the way," he said the other day.

Ury speaks with authority.

A specialist in negotiation and mediation, he has lectured at the Pentagon, the Arms Control Agency and the State Department, co-authored two books and had unusual access to Foreign Ministry and other Soviet officials on a recent trip to Moscow.

Before returning to Harvard, he shared some of his thoughts informally with policy-makers at the White House and the Pentagon.

The problem, Ury says, is that the United States and the Soviet Union traditionally approach negotiations in very different ways.

"We Americans tend to focus on concrete, pragmatic details and the Soviets focus on broad declaratory principles," Ury said.

This could mean Shultz will concentrate on trying to fix an agenda for future arms control talks while Foreign Minister Gromyko will be talking about

The Associated Press, December 24, 1984

banning weapons in outer space, a freeze and a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests.

"It's like talking straight past each other," he said.

Ury also worries about their different views of detente, the period in the 1970s when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit various types of nuclear weapons.

"The Soviets look back to detente as a model for what relations can be," he said. "The United States essentially was playing a game, 'Let's Make a Deal.' We weren't that interested in great friendship with the Soviet Union."

Ury thinks it's a mistake not to realize how important it was to the Soviets to be treated as an equal partner _ and then in the 1980s to be condemned.

The Harvard professor thinks of the Soviet Union as a bride slapped in the face by the American groom in front of the whole world. "I think we underestimate the extent to which they walk around with a chip on their shoulder, with a sense of inferiority," Ury said.

If his analysis is correct, the Reagan administration ought to proceed with sensitivity and caution as it mends the torn relationship.

~~Soviet President Konstantin U. Chernenko made a speech last March proposing a code of conduct for nuclear powers. Ury says Shultz ought to consider telling Gromyko the United States is interested.~~

Beyond that, the negotiations expert would like to see the two governments pay more attention to crisis control _ procedures to prevent an escalation of tensions.

The Washington-Moscow hotline has been strengthened, but Ury would go further. He would begin with an agreement to deal with intrusions into Soviet and U.S. airspace. Ury says that could have prevented the shooting down of a Korean airliner over Soviet territory last year.

"The analogy I would like to use is fire prevention," he said. "Some fires are started deliberately. Others are started accidentally. Two centuries ago cities used to burn down _ Boston, San Francisco, Chicago. But then people started to build up a fire prevention system with fire stations, fire exits, safety regulations, fire drills.

"Now we still have fires, but cities don't burn down anymore. The same could be done with U.S.-Soviet crises."

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EDITOR'S NOTE: Barry Schweid has reported on diplomacy for The Associated Press since 1973.

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Summary of World Broadcasts

March 23, 1984, Friday

SECTION: Part 1 The USSR; A. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; 1. GENERAL AND WESTERN AFFAIRS

PAGE: SU/7599/A1/1

LENGTH: 212 words

HEADLINE: 'Pravda' on 'Code of Conduct for Nuclear Powers'

SOURCE: (b) Tass in Russian for abroad 0005 and in English 0455 gmt 22 Mar 84

Excerpts from report of article by Vasilyev

BODY:

Konstantin Chernenko's election speech, expressing the Soviet Union's readiness to come to terms with other nuclear powers on joint recognition of norms of relations between them and on making those norms obligatory, has been received with immense attention throughout the world, today's 'Pravda' says.

It is significant, the paper points out, that no official and categorical negative reply to the Soviet initiative has come from either Washington or the capitals of other nuclear powers. Even opponents of the initiative resort to passing it over in silence or taking up a position of 'doubt'. In doing so they apparently hope to evade the need to put forward their own proposals and enter into honest debate. . .

'Pravda' recalls the Soviet Union's proposal - step by step and on the basis of the principle of equal security - to seek a reduction in nuclear arms, right up to the full liquidation of all types, yes, the paper continues; precisely on the principle of equal security. The USA also maintains that it wants a reduction in nuclear arms. However, it is known that all US proposals to this effect are based on endeavours to disarm the other side. Washington's 'zero' in actual fact turns out to be plus to the USA and minus to the other side. . .

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Summary of World Broadcasts

March 9, 1984, Friday

SECTION: Part 1 The USSR; A. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; 1. GENERAL AND WESTERN AFFAIRS

PAGE: SU/7587/A1/1

LENGTH: 554 words

HEADLINE: Importance of Chernenko's 'Code of Conduct for Nuclear Powers'

SOURCE: Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union in Russian for abroad 2354 gmt 7 and in English 0650 gmt 8 Mar 84

Text of report of 8th March 'Pravda' article by political news analyst Vitaliy Korionov

The 'World Service' in English 2200 gmt 7 Mar 84

BODY:

'The foreign press has described as a genuine code of peace in relations between states the foreign policy principles proposed by the Soviet leader,' 'Pravda' political news analyst Vitaliy Korionov says in his articles on international response to Konstantin Chernenko's election address. 'It is noted, in particular, that they feel that all the nuclear powers should view the prevention of nuclear war as the main goal of their foreign policies, renounce nuclear war propaganda in any form and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Observance of these principles also means that nuclear weapons should not under any circumstances be used against non-nuclear countries which have no such weapons on their territories, that they should not proliferate in any form, that the nuclear arms race should not be spread into areas - including outer space - and that reductions in nuclear arms should be ensured step by step on the basis of the principle of equal security to the point of their complete elimination in every form.

'The proclamation of a code of conduct for nuclear powers by the Soviet Union is another major contribution by the CPSU and the Soviet Union to the preservation and strengthening of universal peace,' the journalist stresses.

Vitaliy Korionov says that Washington's pledges of its commitment to peace are not backed by deeds, as is illustrated by the statement issued by the US State Department on the occasion of Konstantin Chernenko's speech. 'That statement contained no concrete proposals capable of contributing to genuine Soviet-US dialogue and no constructive response to the latest concrete Soviet proposals,' the article continues. On the contrary, all the actions undertaken by the Washington administration can only worsen and aggravate the international situation.

'The arms race inspired by the aggressive US forces has assumed unprecedented dimensions. Plans for unleashing nuclear war are being openly discussed. Military appropriations are growing like an avalanche. Washington's

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course is disturbing the entire international atmosphere.'

'One basic characteristic of socialist foreign policy is that it is free of the deceit and hypocrisy which typify imperialist diplomacy,' the author stresses.

'When the CPSU and the Soviet state say that they want a real breakthrough in relations with the USA and the other Western powers there is not a grain of falsehood in these statements. This desire represents the vital interests of virtually all the peoples of the world. Such a breakthrough could pave the way to improving the overall political atmosphere in the world.

'The Soviet Union is open to peaceful, mutually beneficial co-operation with any country. Anyone genuinely seeking peace will find in the USSR a dependable partner. Now that our country has offered to mankind another package of extensive measures aimed at achieving practical agreements to avert the threat of nuclear war, the Soviet people would like to hope that common sense would eventually triumph in Washington and the other capitals of NATO countries.'

[Note: The 'World Service' (in English 2200 gmt 7 Mar 84) quoted 'Pravda' as saying that Chernenko's proposals for policy principles for nuclear powers was 'the first such clear-cut formula'.]

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Summary of World Broadcasts

March 23, 1984, Friday

SECTION: Part 1 The USSR; A. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; 1. GENERAL AND WESTERN AFFAIRS

PAGE: SU/7599/A1/1

LENGTH: 332 words

HEADLINE: US Failure to Respond to Soviet Initiatives

SOURCE: (a) Soviet television 1800 gmt 21 Mar 84

Excerpts from commentary by political observer Eduard Mnatsakanov, 'On genuine and imaginary dialogue'

BODY:

Speaking at a news conference, George Shultz, head of the US State Department, once again reassured the public in every way of the USA's readiness to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union. And echoing Shultz, Assistant Secretary of State Burt even talks about drawing the USSR into a realistic dialogue. There is talk in Washington about dialogue; but so far not a single step has been taken or a proposal made in this direction. The Soviet Union has for its part put forward for consideration a whole range of large-scale, realistic and constructive measures whose acceptance would represent a major step forward towards consolidating trust between states and improving the entire international situation [Chernenko's nuclear 'code of conduct' proposals outlined]

Why should Washington be silent now? It is to be assumed that the USSR's position is well known to President Reagan, Shultz and other US officials. Already on 6th March, an official White House representative stated that the Soviet leader's speech would be carefully studied. But isn't this taking too long? Why does Washington - which is so fond of holding forth on the norms of conduct between states when it is a question of attempting to interfere in someone else's affairs - not wish now to respond to a call which is permeated with a spirit of goodwill, co-operation and desire for people's peace and security?

The Soviet Union does not make any claims to have some exclusive right here (Russian: isklyuchitelnost). We are willing to consider counter-proposals - provided there is a sincere desire to seek a solution to these pressing issues. Instead, there is empty talk in Washington about readiness for dialogue, but not a word about the Soviet proposals; Washington has put forward no proposals of its own. Tactics of this sort could, perhaps, be called a policy - but it is an unworthy policy. It cannot set in motion the resolving of any single one of the problems facing mankind today.

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Summary of World Broadcasts

March 10, 1984, Saturday

SECTION: Part 1 The USSR; A. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; 1. GENERAL AND WESTERN AFFAIRS

PAGE: SU/7588/A1/1

LENGTH: 1810 words

HEADLINE: Importance of Chernenko's 'Code of Conduct for Nuclear Powers'

SOURCE: 'Pravda' 8 Mar 84

Text of article by political observer Vitaliy Korionov, 'Efforts should be doubled and trebled'

BODY:

(SU/7587/A1/3)

The response generated throughout the world by the speech delivered by Comrade K.U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the election meeting of voters in the capital's Kuybyshev constituency was enormous. This response is one more piece of testimony to the outstanding role of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the world today.

'The most important manifestation of democracy,' V.I. Lenin used to say, 'is in the basic issue of war and peace.' The Soviet state's very profound democracy is expressed in the fact that on this basic issue of the present day it struggles implacably against the threat of war created by the policy of overt militarism and the claims to world domination pursued by the most aggressive forces of US imperialism.

'Of key importance for peace and the people's security is the curbing of the nuclear arms race which is giving rise to the danger of a world nuclear catastrophe. The inexhaustible interest in Comrade K.U. Chernenko's speech shown in all corners of the world is explained above all by the fact that the speech outlines the correct path for resolving that most urgent task for mankind. The norms which should be placed at the foundation of the policy of all powers possessing nuclear weapons are formulated for the first time in such a precise form.

The foreign press calls the foreign policy norms proposed by the Soviet leader a veritable code of peaceloving inter-state relations. In particular it is noted that in accordance with these norms all nuclear powers would regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main aim of their foreign policy and would renounce the propaganda of nuclear war in any version and would undertake not to make first use of nuclear weapons. Adhering to these norms also means in no circumstances using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries on whose territory no such weapons are deployed, preventing the proliferation of these weapons in any form, not transferring the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including space and, on the basis of the principle of equal security, making step by step reduction in nuclear arms right up to their total elimination in

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all forms.

'The Soviet Union,' K.U. Chernenko said, 'has placed these principles at the basis of its policy. We are ready to agree any time with other nuclear powers on the joint recognition of norms of this kind and on making them compulsory. I think that this would accord with the fundamental interests not only of the countries involved but also of the peoples of the whole world.'

The Soviet Union's proclamation of norms of conduct for nuclear powers is an outstanding new contribution by the CPSU and the Soviet Union to the preservation and consolidation of world peace. The land of the Soviets has shown once again how deeply it is aware of its duty to the present and future generations. It has been reaffirmed yet again in the most persuasive way that it is from our country that emanate the most constructive proposals opening up a realistic path towards resolving pressing problems of the nuclear age.

The socialist policy of peace is blazing a trail in circumstances of most acute antagonism with the forces of imperialist reaction.

'Of all the dogmas of the sanctimonious policy of our time, not one has caused as much damage as the dogma which proclaims 'If you want peace, prepare for war'. That great truth, distinguished mainly by the fact that it contains a great lie, is the war cry which has called all Europe to arms and which has generated fanaticism among the Landsknechts to such a degree that every new peace concluded is viewed as a new declaration of war and becomes the subject of corresponding speculation. . . In this state of affairs it is no surprise if the general trend towards barbarity becomes methodical, if immorality is promoted to the rank of a system, if lawlessness finds its legislators, and the law of the fist finds its codes.' These lines come from K. Marx's pen. Written over 120 years ago, they retain their topicality to this day.

The greater the rebuff given to Washington's imperial ambitions by the forces for man's self-preservation, then the subtler the present administration's attempts to assure everyone of its good intentions. But this is precisely the kind of situation of which people say that the way to hell is paved with good intentions.

Of course, they can succumb to election rhetoric and scatter phrases left and right about how 'America must be a symbol of peace throughout the world', but the cause of preventing war will not gain one iota. Washington's assurances of its desire for peace can be taken seriously only if they are accompanied by real actions. But there are not even hints on this score.

If any new confirmation of this were needed, then it was given recently by the US State Department which issued an official statement on K.U. Chernenko's speech. This statement contained no specific proposals which might have promoted genuine Soviet-US dialogue and no constructive attitude towards the specific new Soviet proposals. On the contrary, all the practical actions by the Washington administration can only worsen and aggravate the international situation.

The arms race unleashed by aggressive US circles has acquired unprecedented dimensions. Plans for unleashing nuclear war are being discussed for all to hear. Military appropriations are snowballing. This course of Washington's is inflaming the entire inter-national atmosphere to fever pitch. A report published recently by the private US research organization Worldwatch noted

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that last year world military expenditure had reached 663,000 million dollars, which is approximately 20 times more than in the 1930s.

The majority of arms limitation and disarmament talks have been blocked by Washington. A graphic example is the use of the Geneva talks by the US side as an instrument of propaganda covering up Western Europe's transformation into a Pentagon launching pad.

As a result of Washington's obstructionist policy, it is not nuclear arms which have been frozen, as the Soviet Union proposes, but the solution of a whole package of issues connected with reducing nuclear arsenals, drafting agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, etc. Moreover, they are now trying to move the nuclear arms race into space.

Militarization of the USA is continuing at a growing pace. As Harvard University Professor John Kenneth Galbraith wrote recently, under the present administration the key posts in the Defence Department have been given to bigwigs of military-industrial firms. 'That is not civilian control but a highly distorted management of the military-industrial complex by the military-industrial complex itself in the interests of military-industrial complex.' Are present-day US military, Galbraith observes, 'no longer considered defenders of life but bringers of horror and death'.

The facts therefore attest that the Washington administration's approach to the disarmament problem bars the way to its solution.

What a contrast is presented by the Soviet Union's approach towards this very important problem! As a great socialist power the USSR is fully aware of its responsibility to the peoples for preserving peace.

Describing the morals of bourgeois society, V.I. Lenin wrote: 'This old world has its own old diplomacy which cannot believe that it is possible to speak frankly and openly. The old diplomacy believes that there must be some guile here.' The fundamental feature of socialist foreign policy is that it is free from the deception and hypocrisy inherent in imperialist diplomacy and reflecting the weakness of bourgeois society. The honesty of Soviet diplomacy is the result of socialism's power and its confidence in its powers.

No-one will succeed in taking us unawares and no potential aggressor has the slightest chance of avoiding a crushing retaliatory strike. But in no way does that mean that our country has ever been, or could be, the initiator of the arms race.

When the CPSU and the Soviet state declare that they want a real breakthrough in relations with the USA and with the other Western powers, there is not a grain of deception here. This desire expresses the vital interests of essentially all peoples of the world. After all, such a breakthrough could open the way to the normalization of the general political atmosphere in the world.

The voice of our socialist power in the international arena has an authoritative and imposing ring. Hundreds of millions of people in all corners of the world heed it, because this voice is calling for peace and co-operation. The Soviet peace programme is shared by many states, including non-socialist ones. This is confirmed in particular in the UN where, the 'New York Times' notes, 'the Soviet Union has become a most influential member'.

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Fluctuations based on considerations of expediency are alien to the USSR's foreign policy course. The profoundly peaceloving nature of our country's policy is determined by the Soviet people's vital interests and has been enshrined by the resolutions of CPSU Congresses and the USSR Constitution. The Soviet Union is open to peaceful mutually advantageous co-operation with the states of the whole world. Anyone who is really seeking peace will find a reliable partner in the USSR. Now that our country has submitted for mankind's examination one more package of large-scale measures aimed at achieving practical accords on averting the threat of nuclear war, Soviet people would like to hope that common sense will nonetheless prevail in Washington and the other NATO states' capitals. 21

Side by side with the Soviet Union, the fraternal socialist countries are fighting to preserve peace. All-round intensification of the cohesion and solidarity of the community countries on the basis of the principle of socialist internationalism is and will be the priority direction of Soviet foreign policy.

In response to the growth of the military threat, the people's masses of the non-socialist countries are stepping up their incursion into the sphere of foreign policy. The anti-war and anti-missile movement has swept the NATO countries in a broad wave. The forces of reason are also being activated in the USA itself.

Profound belief in the people's ability to preserve reason has always been inherent in the CPSU and Soviet state. And now too Soviet people believe that ultimately the course of events will be successfully returned to the direction of the consolidation of peace, the limitation of the arms race and the development of international co-operation. Lenin's Party, the Soviet state and our whole people are devoting all their efforts to the solution of this most urgent task.

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Abstracts

SOURCE: NEWSWEEK (NWK)

DATE: July 2, 1973, Monday

SECTION: Page 24, Column 1

ABSTRACT:

Week of summit talks between Pres Nixon and USSR Soviet Party leader Leonid I Brezhnev brings dedication to detente with nuclear arms agreement, agreement to end arms race by setting earlier deadline, and establishment of code of nuclear conduct for world; other agreements are reached in oceanography, agr, transportation, taxation, cultural exchs, atomic energy and civil aviation; Soviets are disappointed in not achieving most-favored-nation status

SUBJECT: AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS; AIRLINES; ARMAMENT, DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES; ARMS CONTROL AND LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT; ATOMIC ENERGY AND WEAPONS; CULTURE; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND WORLD MARKET (GENERAL); OCEANS AND OCEANOGRAPHY; TAXATION; TRANSPORTATION

NAME: BREZHNEV, LEONID ILYICH (1906-82); NIXON, RICHARD MILHOUS

GEOGRAPHIC: UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS; UNITED STATES (1973 PART 2)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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January 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK

FROM: TY COBB *TC*

SUBJECT: Papers

Attached is the first of a few papers we want to get to you to mull over on your trip. It is, first, a compilation of what the Soviets have been saying since March on the proposal for a "Code of Nuclear Conduct," followed by some thoughts on where we might go.

Attach.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smf NARA, Date 6/10/02

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Declassify: OADR

Practical measures toward implementation of Chernenko suggestion:

- o No objection to reiteration of 1973 agreement that Chernenko seems to want, such as "prevention of nuclear war is main objective" of our foreign policy; prevent situations fraught with danger of nuclear conflict; conduct consultations should situation threaten.
 - o Undertake not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. We need to test this by raising the President's suggestion in Dublin that we would be prepared to renounce the use of force -- all means of. Could also state that the only rationale for the possession of nuclear weapons is the prevention of aggression, and pledge never to resort to their use except as direct counter to aggression against self or Allies.
 - o Renounce the propoganda of nuclear war. This has lots of potential and might be pursued by a working group established at Geneva. Certain guiding themes might be agreed on -- such as "Nuclear War must never be fought," "Cannot be One," "Would have terrible consequences for mankind."
 - o Nuclear Free Zones: Not much here, except that it might be interesting to know what they consider the Baltic to be (does it include the Kola??) On the non-proliferation paper attached, I have a thought on tying this to the Treaty of Tlateloco.
-
- o As a further development of the code of conduct, it would be useful to try to get the Soviets to sign on to some principles we advocate. For example, to renounce the quest for superiority and a concomitant commitment to parity. How about a definition of strategic stability and get some thoughts in on hard-target kill capacity and destabilizing systems.
 - o On defensive systems, we need to get away to have the Soviets move away from their successful ability to focus attention only on our ASAT and SDI program. Their broad and aggressive program of strategic defense should be highlighted. Our chart at the SDI backgrounder helped, and it should be an integral part of our Allied and other debriefs following the session.

- o Verification: Can we get them to acknowledge need to move towards something other than NTM? They have tacitly done it in other fora, an explicit statement here would help.

STRATEGY

- o Chernenko is in his twilight, but probably would like to leave a legacy. He'll have a hard time doing so, unless he becomes explicitly identified with the arms control process, as Brezhnev had. Our goal should be to see that this happens, then his reputation will fluctuate with the success/failure of this process. To do so, we might consider giving him an image boost, not as a great man of peace, but at least as a bold statesman.

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Chernenko's Code of Nuclear Conduct

At the special plenum of the Party Central Committee in February 1984, and again in his election speech in March, Chernenko put forth a code of conduct for the nuclear powers. Subsequent to his statements, the official Soviet press has treated the code as an authoritative Soviet "peace proposal" and "another major contribution by the CPSU and the Soviet Union to the preservation and strengthening of universal peace." (Ref: Soviet political news analyst Korionov, The "World Service" in English 7 March 1984). The code of conduct entails the following elements, as articulated by the Chairman, CPSU:

"To regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of one's foreign policy. To prevent situations fraught with nuclear conflict. In the event such a danger emerges, urgent consultations should be held to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out.

"To renounce the propaganda of nuclear war in any of its variations -- either global or limited.

"To undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

"Not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries, in whose territory there are no such weapons. To respect the status of a nuclear-free zone already created and encourage the creation of a new nuclear-free zone in various areas of the world.

"To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form: Not to hand over these weapons or control over them to anybody; not to deploy them on the territory of the countries, where there are no such weapons; not to spread the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including outer space.

"To press step by step, on the basis of the principle of equal security for the reduction of nuclear arms, up to their complete liquidation in all their varieties (Ref: text of Chernenko's election speech, TASS, 2 March 1984).

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Subsequent Soviet Commentary

Since March 1984 the Soviets have continued to stress the importance of Chernenko's proposal for a code of nuclear conduct.

Pravda commentator Vitaliy Korionov on 8 March 1984 wrote: "The Soviet Union's proclamation of norms of conduct for nuclear powers is an outstanding new contribution by the CPSU and the Soviet Union to the preservation and consolidation of world peace."

TASS on 22 March considered it significant that "no official and categorical negative reply to the Soviet initiative" had come from either Washington "or the capitals of other nuclear powers." It chirped that "even opponents of the initiative resort to passing it over in silence or taking up a position of 'doubt'. In doing so they apparently hope to evade the need to put forward their own proposals and enter into honest debate" (excerpted from article by Vasilyev, 22 March 1984).

Eduard Mnatsakanov, Soviet television commentator, on 21 March 84 discussed the proposed code of conduct and added that acceptance would represent a major step forward towards consolidating trust between states and improving the entire international situation." He then called upon Washington to "respond to a call which is permeated with a spirit of goodwill, co-operation and desire for people's peace and security" (BBC Summary 23 Mar 84).

Vladimir Pavlichenko, a staff member with the Academy of Sciences told a visiting U.S. professor that the "the subject of a code of nuclear conduct for nuclear powers is regarded by the Soviet Union as a key arms control initiative" (emphasis added). He added that "the West had responded to this speech primarily with rhetoric (CIA 271903 Dec 84).

Gorbachev, in his 18 December address to the British Parliament, reiterated Chernenko's proposal for the code of conduct (DIA 220615 Dec 84). Also indicated that "partial measures" toward solving addressing "radical solutions" was ok.

U.S. Commentary

After a visit to the USSR William Ury, Harvard University's director of the Negotiation Project recommended that Secretary Shultz consider telling Gromyko that we are interested in Chernenko's proposal for a code of nuclear conduct.

Prepared by Doug Doan and Eric Larson (X3305)

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Thoughts on Possible Movement Toward Proposal
on Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

CPSU Chairman Konstantin Chernenko, in his 2 March 1984 speech, described several general principles supportive of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. These principles included respect for "the status of a nuclear-free zone already created," the "creation of a new nuclear-free zone in various areas of the world," and preventing "the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form."

This paper treats several ideas on elements which might be included in developing an agreement on nuclear nonproliferation.

Points Both Sides Can Agree On:

- o Strengthening the international^a nonproliferation regime by expanding the number of states party to the NPT;
- o Measures to improve international safeguards, including increased funding for IAEA safeguards research;
- o Promoting the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and making these advances available to non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT;
- o Furthering cooperation among nuclear supplier states with the aim of tightening nuclear export controls (e.g. developing more precise definitions for sensitive technologies and their components);

Areas Where Movement Is Possible If Not Without Difficulty

- o Strengthening Tlatelolco, including Soviet assistance in altering Cuban opposition to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, bilateral and multinational nonproliferation agreements involving Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, and Chile (e.g. CTB, No-PNE Use), and resolution of the Falklands/Malvinas dispute;
- o Soviet adoption of specific pledge to return spent fuel from Cuba;
- o Endorsing joint crisis management center with focus on state and subnational nuclear threats;
- o Expanding bilateral U.S.-Soviet consultations on nonproliferation to include discussion of specific problem countries and alternative superpower options for influencing their nuclear programs;

The Soviet Position Articulated

- o The Soviets have expressed support for The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The "USSR attaches much importance to the [IAEA] system of guarantees, regards it as a valuable instrument for strengthening the non-proliferation regimen and comes out for raising its effectiveness. The Soviets have also stated that they are willing to "raise the authority of the NPT and extend the sphere of its application and strengthen the security guarantees for non-nuclear states." (Alexander Petrosyants chairman of USSR State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, October 1984);