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**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich  
(elected 02/13/1984) died 03/10/1985 8:30 pm (3)  
**Box:** 21

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8490695)			
<del>1. memo</del>	<del>from George Shultz to the President re: Chernenko's letter and Dobrynin's points (3pp)</del> <i>R 12/8/06 M02-012 #20</i>	<del>6/14/84</del>	<del>P-1 P-5</del>
<del>2. letter</del>	<del>from Chernenko to the President (8pp)</del> <i>R 12/2/00 NLSM00-005 #11</i>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>3. letter</del>	<del>from Chernenko to the President, untranslated (6pp)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>4. talking points</del>	<del>re: letter (4pp)</del> <i>R 12/2/00 NLSM00-005 #12</i>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
5. memo	re: Chernenko (5pp) <i>PART. 10/29/01 M00-005 #13</i>	4/15/84	P-1
letter case (8490925)			
<del>6. memo</del>	<del>from James Lucas to Robert McFarlane re: Chernenko (1p)</del> <i>R 10/17/05 M02-012 #22</i>	<del>8/30/84</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>7. briefing paper</del>	<del>re: Chernenko (2pp)</del> <i>D. 10/30/00 M00-005 #14</i>	<del>8/30/84</del>	<del>P-1</del>
<del>7a. cable</del>	<del>from AmEmbassy Moscow to Sec. of State re: Chernenko NBC interview (2pp)</del> <i>R 12/10/02 M02-012 #23</i>	<del>11/19/84</del>	<del>P-1 P-5</del>
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich [3 of 3] <i>OA 90879 Bot 21</i>			10/19/95

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a))**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - (5 U.S.C. 552(b))**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8491237)			
8. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: presidential letter to Chernenko (1p)	12/6/84	P-1
9. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: letter to Chernenko (1p)	n.d.	P-1
10. letter	to Chernenko (3pp)	n.d.	P-1
<del>11. memo</del>	<del>from Shultz to the President re: letter to Chernenko (1p)</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P-1</del>
12. letter draft	R 10/17/05 MOZ-012 #28 to Chernenko (3pp)	n.d.	P-1
<del>13. memo</del>	<del>from Richard Durt through Michael Armacost to the Secretary re: presidential letter to Chernenko (1p)</del>	<del>11/28/84</del>	<del>P-1</del>
letter case (8491234)			
14. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: reply to Chernenko letter (1p)	12/7/84	P-1 P-5
15. memo	from McFarlane to the President re: reply to Chernenko letter (1p)	n.d.	P-1 P-5
16. letter	to Chernenko (2pp)	n.d.	P-1
<del>17. memo</del>	<del>from Shultz to the President re: reply to Chernenko (1p)</del>	<del>12/3/84</del>	<del>P-1</del>
	R 10/17/05 MOZ-012 #34		
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich [3 of 3] <del>QA 90879</del> Box 21			10/19/95

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - 16 U.S.C. 552(b)**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
18. memo letter case (8590262)	from Paula Dobriansky to Karna Small re: talking points (1p)	2/8/85	P-5
19. memo	from Matlock to McFarlane re: report (2pp)	3/8/85	P-1 P-5
20. briefing sheet	(1p)	3/8/85	P-1
21. cable	(1p) <i>D 10/17/05 MOZ-012 #37</i>	3/8/85	P-1, <i>\$3</i>
COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files			dlb
FILE FOLDER: Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich [3 of 3] <del>GA 90879</del> <i>Box 21</i>			10/19/95

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer** CAS

**Box Number** 21

**FOIA** M02-012

**File Folder** CHERNENK, CONSTANTIN USTINOVIC (3)

**DATE** 3/22/2007

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
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<del>70 @CABLE</del>	<del>191609Z NOV 84 (#23)</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>11/19/1984</del>	<del></del>
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*mv# 3/17/08*

RECEIVED 18 MAY 84 10

TO PRESIDENT FROM CHERNENKO, K DOCDATE 07 MAY 84  
 DOBRYNIN, ANATOLY F 07 MAY 84  
 HILL, C 16 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: USSR HS

*File*

SUBJECT CHNM CHERNENKO 7 MAY THANK YOU LTR TO PRES FOR CONGRATULATORY MSG

-----  
 ACTION. NO RESPONSE NECESSARY DUE: STATUS C FILES WH  
 -----

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

THOMPSON

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *dlh*

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( HW HW )  
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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO  
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DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8413873

Date May 16, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Chairman Chernenko  
Date: May 7, 1984 Subject: Thank you for President  
Reagan's Letter of Congratulations  
WH Referral Dated: N/A NSC ID# N/A  
(if any)

The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.  
 A draft reply will be forwarded.  
 A translation is attached.  
 An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
 We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
 The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
 Other.

Remarks: The attached letter and translation was forwarded by  
Ambassador Dobrynin. It is a boilerplate response to President  
Reagan's message of congratulations. No response is necessary.

*for Rustie A. Kenney*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(Classification)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MSN 416125



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 112837  
LB/AO  
Russian

His Excellency  
Ronald W. Reagan  
President of the  
United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your congratulations on my having been elected  
Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I take this opportunity to emphasize once again that the Soviet  
Union, mindful of its high responsibility for the destinies of mankind,  
is prepared to conduct affairs with the United States on the basis of  
equality, equal security and non-interference in each other's internal  
affairs, in the interests of eliminating the nuclear threat, curbing  
the arms race and strengthening international peace.

Respectfully,

K. CHERNENKO

Moscow, The Kremlin,  
May 7, 1984

8413873

Washington, D.C. May 7, 1984

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am pleased to transmit herewith through you to President Reagan the text of the reply of Chairman Chernenko to the President's congratulations on his election as Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

With best regards,



Anatoly F. DOBRYNIN  
Ambassador

The Honorable  
George P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

Unofficial translation

His Excellency  
Ronald W. Reagan,  
President of the  
United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your congratulations on my having been elected Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to emphasize once again that the Soviet Union, mindful of its high responsibility for the destinies of mankind, is prepared to conduct affairs with the United States on the basis of equality, equal security and non-interference in each other's internal affairs in the interests of removing the nuclear threat, curbing the arms race and strengthening the international peace.

Sincerely,

K. CHERNENKO

Kremlin, Moscow  
May 7, 1984



Его Превосходительству  
Рональду У.Рейгану,  
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки  
г.Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравления в связи с избранием меня  
Председателем Президиума Верховного Совета СССР.

Пользуясь этим случаем, хотел бы вновь подчеркнуть, что  
Советский Союз, сознавая свою высокую ответственность за  
судьбы человечества, готов вести дела с Соединенными Штатами  
на основе равенства, одинаковой безопасности и невмешательства  
во внутренние дела друг друга в интересах устранения ядерной  
угрозы, обуздания гонки вооружений и укрепления международного  
мира.

С уважением,

К.ЧЕРНЕНКО

Москва, Кремль  
7 мая 1984 года

LS/NO. 112001  
Lk/ps  
Russian

Unofficial translation

His Excellency  
Ronald W. Reagan,  
President of the  
United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your congratulations on my having been  
elected Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to emphasize once  
again that the Soviet Union, mindful of its high responsibility  
for the destinies of mankind, is prepared to conduct affairs  
with the United States on the basis of equality, equal security  
and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, in the  
interests of <sup>eliminating</sup> removing the nuclear threat, curbing the arms  
race and strengthening ~~the~~ international peace.

Sincerely,  
Respectfully,

K. CHERNENKO

(The Kremlin, Moscow,  
May 7, 1984

Его Превосходительству  
Рональду У.Рейгану,  
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки  
г.Вашингтон

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Благодарю Вас за поздравления в связи с избранием меня  
Председателем Президиума Верховного Совета СССР.

Пользуясь этим случаем, хотел бы вновь подчеркнуть, что  
Советский Союз, сознавая свою высокую ответственность за  
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на основе равенства, одинаковой безопасности и невмешательства  
во внутренние дела друг друга в интересах устранения ядерной  
угрозы, обуздания гонки вооружений и укрепления международного  
мира.

С уважением,

К. ЧЕРНЕНКО

Москва, Кремль  
7 мая 1984 года



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

For: Jack Matlock

From: Bob Sims

We have a request from Hearst  
re the attached. May I have  
your comments.

6/11/84

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: BOB SIMS  
FROM: JACK MATLOCK  
SUBJECT: Hearst Request

1. Repeats standard Soviet line on ASAT -- I see nothing new, but check with Ron Lehman or Sven Kraemer.
2. Represents a clear tactic of concentration on our alleged unwillingness to negotiate an ASAT to cover Soviet unwillingness to negotiate on INF and START.
3. Ignores fact that Soviets have already tested and deployed an ASAT weapon.
3. While he asserts that verification is possible, our studies do not substantiate this.
4. If Soviets are in fact so interested in this issue, it is difficult to explain why they refuse to discuss it with us. Soviet specialist, for example, recently refused an appointment offered by Secretary Shultz -- apparently on instructions from Moscow.

cc: R. Lilman  
S. Kraemer

Q9001

u w bc-SOVIET 6-10 06-10 0267

bc-SOVIET 6-10

SIDE-BAR WITH CHERNENKO

(350 words)

Washington Bureau, the Hearst Newspapers

WASHINGTON--Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko's response to questions submitted by Kingsbury Smith, national editor, the Hearst Newspapers, was the latest exclusive statement received by the N.Y.-born journalist from every Soviet leader dating back to Stalin.

In 1949 the then European director of Hearst's International News Service received telegrams from Stalin which were later credited with initiating diplomatic negotiations that led to the lifting of the Berlin blockade.

Following Stalin's death, he received statements from Soviet Premiers Melenkov and Bulganin.

In 1955, he participated with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Editor-in-Chief of the Hearst Newspapers, and the late Frank Conniff, Hearst National Editor, in Moscow interviews with Soviet leaders Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin and Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov. These interviews, which marked the beginning of Khrushchev's co-existence policy with the United States and were credited with helping to bring about the restoration of Austria's post-war independence, won the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished international reporting.

In December 1976, then Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev sent a New Year's message to the American people in response to questions submitted by the long-time Hearst journalist.

The late Soviet President Yuri Andropov also sent to Kingsbury Smith in December 1982, a New Year's message to the American people in which he expressed confidence the U.S. and the Soviet Union could reach a compromise agreement on nuclear weapons. Andropov's message was the first exclusive statement he had given to a foreign journalist after he became Soviet leader, as is President Chernenko's statements to Kingsbury Smith.

End.

Hearst Feature Service

610 kh (Washington) wkfdc2.610

AP-NY-06-10-84 1619EDT<



Q9000

u w bc-SCVIETS 6-10 06-10 1680

bc-SCVIETS 6-10

URGENT ATTENTION -- NEWS EDITORS THE HEARST NEWSPAPERS.

The following report based on the first EXCLUSIVE STATEMENT FROM SOVIET LEADER CHERNENKO TO A FOREIGN JOURNALIST IS TO BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE FOR AUTOMATIC RELEASE IN THE MONDAY MORNING HEARST NEWSPAPERS.

IT MUST NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE WIRE SERVICES, RADIO STATIONS OR ANYONE ELSE BEFORE 0600 EST MONDAY. IN ORDER TO ENABLE YOU BE THE FIRST TO PUBLISH CHERNENKO'S RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS, I HAVE PLEDGED THE STATEMENT WILL NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ANYONE ELSE BEFORE 0600 EST MONDAY. PLEASE PROTECT ME. ALSO, PLEASE MAKE NO CHANGES IN THE STORY WITHOUT FIRST CONTACTING ME. I CAN BE REACHED SUNDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING AT 703 882 3327.

Regards, Kingsbury Smith.

CHERNENKO; HEARST

EXCLUSIVE FROM WASHINGTON BUREAU, THE HEARST NEWSPAPERS.

WASHINGTON--In the first Soviet offer to resume arms talks with the U.S. since collapse of the Geneva nuclear arms conference last November, President Konstantin Chernenko proposed today the United States and the Soviet Union "begin without delay formal negotiations" to conclude an agreement to ban further testing of antisatellite weapons and to dismantle existing antisatellite systems.

He said the "unilateral moratorium" on the launching of Soviet antisatellite weapons which the Soviet Government announced last summer "continues in force."

Reiterating what the original Moscow announcement stated in August, 1983, he said the moratorium would be maintained "for as long as other nations, including the U.S., refrain from placing antisatellite weapons of any kind in space."

He added "this obligation covers test launchings of anti-satellite weapons as well." The Tass agency report of what President Chernenko's predecessor, Yuri Andropov, had told a group of American Senators in Moscow did not specifically mention test launching of antisatellite weapons, although it did say the proposal included the "elimination of the existing antisatellite systems and prohibition of the development of new ones."

Early this year, the U.S. Air Force successfully flight tested for the first time its new, highly advanced antisatellite weapon, putting the U.S., according to Pentagon sources, ahead of the Soviets in the development of antisatellite weapons. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government continued to maintain its moratorium, but it is doubtful it will continue to do so if the U.S. continues its testing.

President Chernenko expressed confidence that "effective verification" of a ban on antisatellite systems could be achieved by "national technical means" which both sides possess. "The validity of this conclusion has been proven by the statements of many prominent American experts," he added. He further said that "when necessary other forms (of verification) could be found as well," adding that any problems concerning verification "could be successfully solved in the course of negotiations."

Emphasizing the necessity of reaching agreement to ban space weapons and their development before there are "drastic developments in the arms race in space," he said: "It could be late tomorrow."



[REDACTED]

President Chernenko's statements were in response to questions submitted to him by Kingsbury Smith, National Editor, the Hearst Newspapers. A Soviet Embassy spokesman in Washington said it was the first time the Soviet leader has given an exclusive statement to any foreign journalist since he assumed leadership of the Soviet Union last February following Andropov's death.

The Soviets walked out of the separate Geneva talks on intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons in November on the same day the first component parts of the new American IRM missiles arrived in West Germany. This followed the West German parliament's approval of NATO's decision to deploy in December the Pershing II missile unless agreement was reached in Geneva on intermediate range missiles. The Soviets have insisted they would not return to the Geneva talks until the Pershing II's, which could reach well into Soviet territory with nuclear warheads within 6 minutes of launching from German territory, were withdrawn.

President Chernenko's proposal for the start "without delay" of Soviet-American negotiations on space weapons followed President Reagan's appeal last week to the Soviets to "return to the bargaining table." The President was referring to the Geneva talks rather than to space weapons, but his remarks to the Irish Parliament were considered a conciliatory gesture toward the Soviet Government. Declaring America wanted to "reach out" to the Soviet Union to reduce world tensions, the President said he would be willing "to halt and even reverse the deployment" of the Pershing II missiles in Europe "as the outcome of a verifiable and equitable agreement." National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, accompanying President Reagan, told reporters the President was trying to send "a signal" to Moscow.

It is not clear, nor could it be ascertained, whether President Chernenko's proposal for immediate antisatellite weapon negotiations was prompted by what has been described in the N.Y. Times as President Reagan's "change of tone." However, the Soviet leader's offer to send his diplomats "without delay" to a bargaining table to negotiate a space weapons ban followed within a few days the President's expression of an apparently softer attitude toward the Soviet Government.

President Reagan has ruled out formal negotiations with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive ban on antisatellite weapons on the grounds it could not be verified unless the Soviets agreed to full-fledged international on-site inspection, which they have in the past rejected. However, the President said April 2 that his administration is exploring the possibility of limited agreements that could protect high-altitude satellites, such as those used for arms control information and early warning of strategic nuclear attack.

President Chernenko's response to Kingsbury Smith's questions was connected with the House of Representatives May 23 vote, by 230 to 181, to block funds for American antisatellite weapons tests as long as the Soviets maintain their moratorium on tests. The questions were submitted May 31 through Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin in Washington and the response was received by the Soviet Embassy this weekend.



Following is the Soviet Embassy's english translation of the questions and answers:

Q -- While reviewing military programs submitted by the Reagan administration in its FY 1985 military budget request, the House of Representatives voted to adopt an amendment barring funds for U.S. ASAT tests in space provided the Soviet Union and other countries would continue their abstinence of such tests. In view of this vote would the Government of the USSR be disposed to agree, on a mutual basis, to a Soviet-American freeze on ASAT tests for another year, or longer?

A -- It is obvious that this vote in the House of Representatives reflects the American lawmakers' concern over the possibility of spreading the arms race to outer space. Such concern is well-founded. Now the question is: Either the militarization of outer space is prevented or space will become a source of grave danger hanging over the entire mankind.

As for the Soviet Union, it consistently stands for keeping outer space peaceful. Seeking to facilitate the solution of this task the USSR, as far back as last year, assumed a unilateral obligation not to place antisatellite weapons in outer space. In other words, the Soviet Union put in force a unilateral moratorium on such launches for as long as other nations, including the U.S., refrain from placing antisatellite weapons of any kind in outer space. It goes without saying that this obligation covers test launchings of antisatellite weapons as well.

The moratorium declared by the Soviet Union continues to be in force. At the same time, as useful as it is, the moratorium, in our view, is but a first step towards a complete prohibition of antisatellite weapons, which would include the dismantling of such systems which already exist. It is exactly for this reason that we propose to the United States to begin without delay formal negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on this matter.

Specific proposals of the Soviet Union concerning this problem are well known. They enjoy support of the overwhelming majority of member-states of the United Nations. It is only the United States government which is against these proposals.

Q -- Could a freeze on ASAT tests be effectively verified and, if so, how?

A -- The Soviet Union is convinced that a freeze on ASAT tests could be verified, and verified very effectively, first of all by national technical means which the sides possess. The validity of this conclusion has been proven by the statements of many prominent American experts.

With respect to orbital ASAT weapons, effective verification of the compliance by the sides with the moratorium could be assured by space objects tracking systems which the sides possess. As for non-orbital ASAT systems, in addition to the above mentioned means, other radio-electronic means of the United States and the Soviet Union deployed on land, on high seas and in outer space could be used.

When the situation is not clear, an exchange of information and consultations could take place. If necessary other forms could be found as well.

Any related problems, including those of verification, could be successfully solved in the course of negotiations on ASAT weapons, as well as on the prevention of militarization of outer space in general, which have been proposed by the Soviet Union, provided there is a genuine interest in finding effective solutions.

I would like to emphasize once again: It is necessary to reach an agreement on these problems without delay, before space weapons are deployed and before drastic developments in the arms race in space, with unforeseeable consequences, take place. It could be late tomorrow.

Those who seek to exclude any productive negotiations in this area, referring in advance to the "impossibility" of the verification of agreements limiting the arms race in space, are deliberately trying to have their hands free to pursue the course of the militarization of space in order to gain military advantages.

Let me put it straight: Such a course is hopeless as well as it is dangerous. It leads, if anywhere, to a steep growth of military threat. It must not be allowed. Urgent and effective measures are needed to keep outer space peaceful. The Soviet Union is totally for this approach.

End.

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file Chernenko  
ID 8490695

RECEIVED 14 JUN 84 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MATLOCK

DOCDATE 13 JUN 84

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

06 JUN 84

SHULTZ, G

14 JUN 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

SUBJECT. CHERNENKO LTR REPLYING TO PRES LTR RE STATE OF US - USSR RELATIONS

ACTION. NFAR / NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

No further action required.  
Return to Secretariat  
for file -

*JG W*

COMMENTS

REF#

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *db*

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*MATLOCK*

*S JUN 13 1984*

*prepare memo for Pres*

*NSC/S*

*C 19 July '84*

*NFAR per note from Matlock*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

84 JUN 14 P 2: 34

June 14, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: Chernenko's June 6 Letter and Dobrynin's  
Talking Points: Analysis

I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko's reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over in my meeting last Tuesday.

These communications basically contain nothing new, and confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it does not respond to your Dublin speech. But your last letter already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at Stockholm. Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR. The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to ratchet up their propagand campaign, while claiming privately that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically nothing to back it up.

Chernenko's language is correct and non-polemical. In response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with bases, INF missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we refuse to treat the USSR as an "equal."

On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present some "specific considerations" on our proposals for talks, but all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges of views.

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- 2 -

As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and rescue operations in the northern Pacific.

Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep injecting Soviet internal affairs -- meaning human rights -- into your letters.

On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail worth pointing out:

-- In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control items, the "Chernenko agenda" as it now stands is: negotiations on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations on naval activities and naval armaments (a recent Gromyko "initiative"); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.

-- On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of force, which they propose to discuss separately from the Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the hope that "the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions." Dobrynin's points do not mention non-use of force at all. This suggests there may be some unresolved differences between Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost totally non-committal at this point.)

-- Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin's points turn down our offer of private discussions here on either issue "in view of the character of the latest American proposals." In other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the negotiating sites.

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- 3 -

In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive because we have the initiative in most aspects of our relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin -- in his remarks -- insisted so strongly that they "are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration," and that they can do business even this year. But there may be some daylight between him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the substantial agenda you have put forward. So, despite Dobrynin's complaint about accusations that they are "hibernating," I think that remains a fairly accurate description of what they are doing.

To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly quickly to Chernenko's message, and I will be sending you a draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so successfully in your Dublin speech.

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BY

LOJ

NARA, DATE

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His Excellency  
Ronald W. Reagan  
The President of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

In connection with your letter I would like to express some thoughts in continuation of our exchange of views with you.

I, of course, took note of the pledge of commitment to the lessening of tensions between our countries made by you in the handwritten addition to your letter. In turn, I can affirm once again what I wrote in my first letter to you -- namely, that it has been and continues to be our wish that there be a turn toward steady, good relations between the USSR and the USA. As a matter of fact, the numerous specific proposals submitted by our side, including those proposals put forward in my letters to you, have been aimed at reaching that very objective.

As regards interpreting a certain period in the history of our relations, about which you had already written once before, here our views differ. We have presented our point of view in this regard, so I will not repeat myself. I will note, however, that one side's having military superiority or seeking such superiority cannot be perceived by the other side as an indication of good intentions. There can be only one indication -- a willingness to conduct affairs as equals, a willingness reflected in practical policies. The position of the Soviet Union in this regard is clear and precise: we are not seeking superiority, but we will not allow superiority over us. I do not see anything here that should be unacceptable to the United States, if one wants stability and a lessening of tensions. It is from a position of equality that it is possible to agree on really mutually-acceptable solutions, when neither side can have reason to believe that it is making unilateral concessions.

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- 2 -

I thought it necessary to point this out, having in mind the way in which the intentions of the Soviet Union are interpreted in your letter. I cannot agree with this. This has already been stated on our side in the past. But since you return again to the question of intentions and how they can be perceived, I will express a few opinions, illustrating them with specific examples.

If one is to sum up what on many occasions has been publicly stated by you and other representatives of the Administration, one concludes that the only situation that would be acceptable to the United States would be one in which it was militarily ahead of the USSR. The fact of the matter, however, is that such a situation has not been and is not acceptable to us. In this respect we have experience -- bitter experience. The history of our relations, especially in the postwar period, has seen quite a few complications too. Quite a few attempts have been made to exert political, economic, and even military pressure on us.

Let us take the current situation. There is, it seems, an American idiom "to turn the table." Try to look at the realities of the international situation from our end. And at once one will see distinctly that the Soviet Union is encircled by a chain of American military bases. These bases are full of nuclear weapons. Their mission is well known -- they are targeted on us. Nothing like it can be found around your country.

And what about the fact that entire regions of the globe have been proclaimed spheres of American vital interests? And not only proclaimed, but made the object of a U.S. military presence. And this is done, among other places, at our very doorstep. And again we, for our part, are not doing anything

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like it. What conclusions should we draw from this as to the intentions of the U.S.? I believe the conclusions readily present themselves. Such an approach is nothing other than a hypertrophied idea of one's interests in which the legitimate interests of others are completely ignored, an effort to gain, to put it mildly, positions of privilege at the expense of the other side. This approach is not compatible with the objective of ensuring stability. On the contrary, such an approach as a matter of policy objectively helps to create and sustain tensions.

Or let us take strategic arms. Here, too, no claims can be directed toward the Soviet Union. The fact that there is rough parity between the USSR and the USA and, in a wider sense, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, can be disputed by no expert familiar with the situation. The SALT-2 Treaty was a reflection of this fact. It was not the end of the road, and we did not consider it as such. But the merit of the treaty was, among other things, that it established, I would say, with mathematical precision the strategic balance that has evolved.

Your military experts can tell you that the Soviet Union has done nothing to upset this balance. At the same time we see what kind of attitude is displayed toward the Treaty by the other side. Is it not the criterion by which to judge its intentions?

The same applies as well to medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. I will recall only that it was we who offered to reduce their number to the minimum on the side of the USSR and NATO. In response, "Pershings" and cruise missiles are appearing near our borders. How would you regard it, Mr. President, had something similar happened with respect to the U.S.? I believe



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- 4 -

that your assesment of the intentions of the other side under the circumstances could only be one -- as regards both the other side's approach to negotiations and the essence of its intentions.

But even under these circumstances we have displayed and continue to display utmost restraint. The response we were forced to take, in terms of its scope and character, has not gone beyond the limits necessary to neutralize the threat posed to us and our allies. Moreover, we propose to return to the initial situation and, instead of further unleashing an arms race, to address ourselves in a decisive fashion to curbing the arms race, and to radically limiting and reducing nuclear arms. This is far from imposing conditions. As a matter of fact, what is unfair about the two sides cancelling those measures whose effect was to heighten the level of nuclear confrontation and, conversely, to lessen global security? There can be nothing unfair or damaging for either side in this. A return to the previous situation in the present circumstances would constitute forward movement by both sides toward stabilizing the situation, toward the practical renewal of the entire process of limiting nuclear weapons that is of decisive importance for the future of international relations and for peace as such.

So far, however, we see no indication that the American side proceeds from such an assumption. Regrettably, nothing new on this major issue of the day can be found in your letter either. I say this not for the sake of polemics, but rather in the hope that you will still find it possible to appreciate the way out of the extremely grave situation that we are suggesting.

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- 5 -

From my correspondence with you, Mr. President, as well as from previous correspondence, one can conclude that, in general terms there seems to be an understanding on your part that there are a number of important questions concerning the problem of security which require solutions and where joint efforts by our two countries are necessary.

For my part, in my last message I specifically mentioned several of these questions. Let me remind you that these included renouncing the construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems, entering into negotiations on preventing the militarization of outer space and on banning anti-sattelite weapons, a freeze on nuclear weapons, resuming talks on a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and some other measures. In other words, we are not for dialogue in a general sense between our two countries, but propose to fill it with concrete, weighty substance. We are convinced that practical movement in these and other directions and mutual determination to achieve practical results would fundamentally ease the situation in our relations and throughout the world in general. The degree of trust would increase significantly.

But we have not received a response to these proposals that would enable us to say that the United States is prepared for such concrete actions. I will not make a judgment as to what is the problem here, but I am convinced that, seriously speaking, there is no good reason and, moreover, no justification for avoiding the solution of problems that can play a decisive role in determining the road the world will take in the near future. Awareness of this is growing on the part of the public and the leaders of many states. Graphic evidence of this is the recent appeal by the leaders of six countries from four continents to the governments of the nuclear powers. Mr. President, this

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appeal is a very serious reminder, to our countries as well, of the enormous responsibility they bear for the destinies of the world and mankind. Our common duty is to respond to this appeal honestly, without delay, and through concrete actions. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared for it.

In addition to those of our proposals already mentioned, I would also like to draw your attention to additional areas of possible cooperation in the interests of strengthening peace. One of these is the limitation of naval activity and naval armaments. This problem is very urgent; it is no coincidence that the United Nations has attached such importance to it as well. We have specific ideas on what could be done to reduce the growing tensions on the high seas, to ensure freedom of navigation and the safety of international sea communications. We have spoken in favor of discussing this problem within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or in separate multilateral negotiations. Taking into account the role of our countries, we also propose to discuss this set of questions on a bilateral basis. We would like to know your opinion on this score.

Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact countries recently made a proposal to NATO countries to begin multilateral consultations on the subject of concluding a Treaty on mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. The essence and the importance of the idea of such a Treaty are well known. Attention to this proposal has been growing from the moment of its introduction. And here our two countries could also play an important part. We are ready to study any ideas the American side might have on this question.



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- 7 -

The Soviet Union will, furthermore, do everything in its power to promote agreements on the problem of banning chemical weapons and on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Our delegations in Geneva and Vienna will be prepared to cooperate with American representatives. It goes without saying that, within the framework of these fora, we shall also express in detail our views on recent positions advanced by the American side. However, I have to note that the overall impression -- and not only ours -- is that these positions do not constitute a constructive contribution to the work already done in these fora.

Recently the Soviet Union introduced at the Stockholm conference a concrete and carefully balanced document directed at attaining a really significant agreement, which would fundamentally strengthen security on the European continent. In preparing this document, we took into account the opinions expressed at the first round of the conference as well as in the course of bilateral consultations, including those with American representatives. We would like to expect that in Stockholm the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.

As it has already been pointed out on our part in correspondence with you, we favor a bilateral exchange of opinions on regional matters. Our Ambassador is instructed to present to the Secretary of State more specific considerations on these and some other matters. Here I find it necessary to stress the main point: the need for restraint, for refraining from actions -- no matter what their motives -- which could only intensify dangerous tensions in various regions and make difficult the achievement of a just political settlement. The world has proven more than once that it is a hundred times more difficult to extinguish a fire than to prevent it. To remember this is in everyone's interests.

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- 8 -

I do not want to conclude this letter on a negative note, but in view of some of the remarks in your letter, I must point out that introduction into relations between states of questions concerning solely domestic affairs of our country or yours does not serve the task of improving these relations -- if this is our goal. I wish questions of such a nature did not burden our correspondence, which both of us, as I understand it, value.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

Moscow  
June 6, 1984

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*talking points*

First. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the solution of major questions, including new ones, set forth in the message of K.U.Chernenko would be of principal importance from the point of view of improving the Soviet-American relations and the international situation in general. Thus we again confirm in the practical way the line toward conducting a businesslike exchange of views with the Government of the United States with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on a wide range of issues in the Soviet-American relations. It concerns both the questions of strengthening security and ending the arms race as well as the area of bilateral relations.

Up till now, however, the American side acts in such a way that we do not see its readiness to go forward in practice to improving our relations, though quite a few words about such readiness have been said recently. The repeated promises to do something positive are not followed by anything tangible as yet.

At the same time it is often said that the American side allegedly introduces some concrete proposals, but the Soviet side reacts to them negatively. It is stated even as if we consciously counteract to some constructive efforts by the Administration and do not want progress in our relations. It is obvious for us that the situation is just the opposite. It is not clear, however, why a deliberately false impression is created, if, indeed, there is a desire to find a common language.

It is known, by whose initiative the Soviet-American relations were brought to such a mediocre shape. If an unbiased approach is used, there cannot be two opinions. Nevertheless, not once we proposed to revive our relations and to fill them with concrete contents. These questions have been discussed with the Secretary of State many times.

If businesslike views in this regard were expressed by the American side,--and promises of such nature were given many times,--then, by all means, we would consider them with due attention.

We wish only that it could be something specific and not simply symbolics presented as something positive in the way of formal extension of some agreements which are in fact not

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working. For example, we are told for some time already that a question of allocating fishing quotas for us is being considered. But at the same time, as we find out, measures of the opposite nature are being taken. Is it not the decision on limiting the activity of the joint Soviet-American fishing company on the Pacific coast that speaks about it?

There are attempts to attribute to us the desire to curtail the contacts and ties, including the area of scientific and cultural exchanges. However, the situation here as well rests on the position and acts of the American side. It rests on its unreadiness to solve the question of providing security for Soviet participants in such exchanges and normal conditions for their presence in the US. It is a question of principle and it cannot be avoided. It is again proven by recent hostile acts against Soviet people in the US. The American side also avoids the solution of the question concerning the practical side of such exchanges, connected with the resumption of the flights by the Aeroflot to the United States.

Now the American side keeps some kind of rosters of questions, replies to which should be given by this or that side. But even if to approach the situation with this formal point of view, it still turns out that we constructively develop our position and introduce concrete proposals, while the American side limits itself to promises to think about something and to consider something.

On the Soviet side there is no lack of desire and efforts to really improve the situation in our relations. It is up to the American side.

Second. Questions of security.

The Soviet position on the question of preventing the militarization of outer space has been already presented quite clearly to the Secretary of State. We proceed from the idea that formal negotiations on this matter should start between especially appointed delegations. The organizational side of such



negotiations should be discussed through the diplomatic channels. In other words now the question is this: is the American side prepared to solve this urgent problem, which long ago has already gone because of its importance beyond the framework of the Soviet-American relations only?

A proposal has been introduced by the Soviet side that both sides should reject the very idea of developing and deploying large-scale antiballistic missile defense systems. We would be ready to discuss the means of realization of this proposal - for example to discuss the substance and the form of appropriate statements, the order of making them public, etc.

Our position with regard to the question of the treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions is also clear. The treaties were carefully worked out including the part concerning control. They were signed and should be put in force. There is no necessity in any additional interpretation of any provisions of the treaties. The questions, should the sides have them in the future as the treaties are in force, could be considered and solved in accordance with relevant provisions of those treaties themselves. The issue now is only whether the American side is or is not willing to ratify these treaties. We favor doing this and as far as possible without further delay.

The Soviet side attributes great significance to the banning of chemical weapons, to the reduction of the armed forces and the armaments in Central Europe. These questions must be solved. Our specific considerations in connection with the latest proposals of the United States concerning these questions will be stated by the Soviet representatives at the appropriate forums.

However, it may be said even now that the American position, unfortunately, does not give hope. We would like to think that the American side will properly take into account those observations and remarks which we and not only we shall express in Geneva and Vienna. There the Soviet delegations will be ready to maintain contact with the American side as before.



As for discussing these questions in some other manner, now there is no basis for that in view of the character of the latest American proposals.

Third. Regional problems. We repeatedly expressed our readiness to discuss with the American side regional problems named by it and other ones.

In this connection we are prepared to listen to the possible considerations of the American side in response to what has already been said by us on the South of Africa, and also on the situation in the Middle East and on the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In the future, depending on the progress made, we could agree to hold certain special meetings of our representatives as well. We do not exclude this.

As we have already pointed out, it is especially important that restraint be shown, no actions which could exacerbate the situation be taken. This concerns the above mentioned as well as other regions.

Fourth. The Soviet side intends in the nearest future to propose the date of the next round of negotiations on the convention line in the Bering sea. We expect that the American side has analyzed the results of the previous round and could take the position which would enable us to come to a just and mutually acceptable solution of this question.

We also intend to convey in the near future our views concerning the negotiations on cooperation in the search and rescue operations in the Northern part of the Pacific ocean.



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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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QAS NARA, Date 10/29/01

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

15 June 1984

Chernenko on US-Soviet Relations

Two press interviews and a speech upon the conclusion of the CEMA Summit this week are the latest in a recent flurry of statements by Soviet leader Chernenko.

- Since early May, statements and appearances by Chernenko have been featured prominently in Soviet media, perhaps reflecting a concerted effort to build up his status for both foreign and domestic audiences.

Chernenko's interviews and authoritative press editorials have offered little new in either tone or substance on US-Soviet relations and on the prospects for renewed nuclear arms negotiations.

- They are in line with Moscow's current practice of rejecting US efforts to stimulate a dialogue and of dramatizing the poor state of bilateral relations.

In a 13 June Pravda interview Chernenko dismissed US appeals for renewed arms control talks as an election year tactic. He reiterated the now familiar call that Washington demonstrate a genuine readiness for talks through "concrete actions." While acknowledging in principle the value of negotiations, he contended that US missile deployments in Europe were increasingly blocking the possibility of talks. Negotiations would be possible, he said, if the US withdrew its "essentially preemptory conditions" for talks.

- He did not, however, explicitly call for the removal of US missiles from Europe.
- Nor did he make reference to President Reagan's offer to discuss the principle of non-use of force in the Stockholm Conference.

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In his Pravda interview Chernenko also alluded to the issue of a US-Soviet summit, stating that Moscow was ready "at any moment" to engage in a dialogue provided that the talks were "serious." Soviet spokesman Zamaytin reiterated on Thursday that Chernenko would favor a summit, but he said that it would require careful preparation and that "a lot of demands" would have to met.

- These references to summit conditions may be intended to increase perceived political pressures on the President at home to reduce tensions with Moscow.

Chernenko's interview echoed a 7 June Pravda editorial, which provided Moscow's authoritative response to the President's Irish Parliament speech.

- The editorial dismissed US willingness to discuss the non-use of force principle as representing only a "semblance" of readiness for talks.

Chernenko's interview also singled out Soviet proposals on outer space arms control, claiming that they had been submitted to Washington and that the US had no interest in a dialogue on this subject.

- Moscow's statements alleging the US intends to militarize space and urging ASAT limitations probably are intended to influence Congressional deliberations on ASAT weaponry and probably reflect concern about the US ASAT program and strategic defense initiative.

Apparent Soviet preoccupation with the ASAT issue also was reflected in a 12 June Chernenko interview in Izvestiya in which he responded to an American journalist's questions.

- Chernenko reiterated Moscow's unilateral moratorium on launching ASAT weapons, which is conditioned on other countries refraining from placing such weapons in space.
- Such a moratorium, he proposed, would be "only the first step" toward a total ban on ASAT weapons.
- He called for "official" talks to begin immediately.
- He rejected the US contention that verification of such an accord was not possible and alluded for the first time to the use of radars and other electronic collectors in monitoring compliance.



## Annex of Recent Soviet Statements

7 June Pravda, "Serious Approach Still Unsighted."

- The US president failed to mention that "Washington is making Western Europe into a stage set for a nuclear war, putting ever new first-strike nuclear systems into full scale production, lavishing billions of dollars on militarizing outer space and refusing to hold any talks to curb the arms race."
- "In short, the West Europeans as well as the American voters were regaled with another portion of pseudopeaceful rhetoric."
- "As is known, and this was confirmed by the NATO council's recent session, no changes have occurred in Washington's stance on nuclear armaments in Europe."
- "What kind of talks would that be? They would not be concerned with the mutual reduction of armaments but with NATO's rearmament.... The Soviet Union will not agree to such talks."
- "The President is apparently striving to create also a semblance of US readiness for talks on non-use of force. But this is only a semblance. In reality, the American representatives at Stockholm are unwilling to discuss this issue today."
- "The President's new European speech has been definitely conceived with a view to calming down the West Europeans and creating a semblance of respectability... in the conditions of election struggle in the US."

12 June Izvestiya, Chernenko answers to question from American journalist Kingsbury-Smith.

- "The vote in the House of Representatives clearly reflects concern over the possibility of the arms race spreading to space... either the militarization of space is averted, or space will become the source of a terrible danger hanging over all mankind."
- "Last year the USSR unilaterally assumed a commitment not to place ASAT weapons in space, in other words, a

unilateral moratorium on such launches, as long as other states, the US included, refrain from placing any type of ASAT weapons in space."

- "This moratorium remains in force, and is only the first step toward a total ban on ASAT weapons, including the elimination of such systems that already exist. It is precisely for this reason that we are suggesting to the US that official talks begin immediately in order to reach an agreement on this."
- "The Soviet Union is convinced that monitoring a freeze on ASAT weapons test is possible and moreover is extremely reliable above all through national technical means"
- "Effective monitoring... could be ensured by means of tracking objects in space.... It would also be possible to use other radioelectronic facilities stationed on the ground, in the worlds oceans, and in space.... In uncertain situations an exchange of information and consultations could be effected. Should the need arise, other forms also could be found..."
- "Any questions, including questions of monitoring, could be successfully solved during the talks being proposed by the Soviet Union."

13 June, Chernenko answers the Pravda on London Summit.

- "Again the Soviet Union was urged to engage in a dialogue and talks.... Regrettably, however, these intentions and appeals failed to be backed up with anything tangible. Why? It is considerations connected with the US presidential elections."
- "The dialogue and talks are mentioned since they need a screen to somehow cover up the transformation of Western Europe into a launching pad for new US missiles. The line of missile deployment remains unshakeable... and this is increasingly blocking the possibility of talks."
- "Is there a need for a dialogue and for talks? Both yesterday and today our answer has been the same-- Yes. But a dialogue which is honest, and talks that are serious. In these we stand ready to engage at any moment."




- "We hold that these issues be considered in earnest at the negotiating table as soon as the American side withdraws its essentially preemptory conditions for talks."
- "I will single out as an example the problem of preventing the militarization of space. Our proposals on how to resolve this problem have been submitted to Washington. But it does not want to handle this problem, it does not want even to discuss it."
- "In all likelihood the US administration is fond only of its own ambitious stance whose essence is opening outer space to formidable armaments and thus trying to gain military superiority. We do not see a reciprocal desire for solid talks."
- "It is high time the US and its allies confirmed by concrete deeds their share of the responsibility for peace... and display genuine readiness for dialogue.... The USSR is not wanting in such readiness."



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~~Matlock~~  
Chernenko  
SYSTEM II  
90925  


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 30, 1984

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JAMES W. ~~LUCAS~~ *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Chernenko Chronology

As I mentioned to you this morning, we are watching the Chernenko health situation closely. I have asked Rick Jones of my staff to monitor the intelligence reporting closely and to stay in touch with the Intelligence Community components who are following this situation. Rick has prepared the attached chronology based on message traffic received by CMC.

Subject to your approval, we will continue to maintain a chronology and provide periodic updates to you, Matlock, and Cobb. The intelligence community is giving this situation the "Death Watch" treatment with an emphasis on the succession issue.

RECOMMENDATION: That the CMC continue to provide updated chronologies to you on a a periodic basis or more frequently as the pace of events dictates.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:  
Chernenko Health Chronology

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~  
Declassify on: OADR

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NLS MOB-012 #22

BY CS, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: CHERNENKO NBC INTERVIEW: UPBEAT ON PROSPECTS  
FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CHERNENKO'S INTERVIEW WITH NBC NEWS IS THE MOST FORTHCOMING LEADERSHIP ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN MONTHS. CHERNENKO'S POLICY PROPOSALS ARE WELL-KNOWN SOVIET NON-STARTERS, BUT HE STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FROM THE US SIDE WOULD BE GIVEN CAREFUL SOVIET CONSIDERATION. THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED TO PORTRAY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS READY FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE, WHILE UNDERSCORING THAT IT IS UP TO THE US TO TABLE CONSTRUCTIVE NEW PROPOSALS. END SUMMARY.

3. DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE SEEN FBIS TEXT OF CHERNENKO'S INTERVIEW WITH NBC NEWS AS PRINTED BY PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA IN THEIR SUNDAY EDITIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET READERS WILL BE STRUCK BY SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE SPEECH:

-- IT IS DEVOID OF CRITICISM OF US POLICY OR THE

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. THE CLOSEST APPROXIMATION TO SUCH CRITICISM IS CHERNENKO'S REFERENCE TO THE TENDENCY IN CERTAIN UNSPECIFIED "WESTERN CAPITALS" TO PILE UP "MOUNTAINS OF WEAPONS" -- A PARTICULARLY TAME FORMULATION FOR READERS USED TO COMPARISONS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WITH NAZI GERMANY;

-- IT INVITES SERIOUS PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE AND SUGGESTS THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. CHERNENKO DOES WHEEL OUT A NUMBER OF SOVIET NON-STARTERS (NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE, A FREEZE, A CTB), BUT HE ALSO MAKES CLEAR THAT HIS LIST OF POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IS NOT EXHAUSTIVE;

-- IT REPHRASES THE FAMILIAR SOVIET REFRAIN THAT US WORDS MUST BE BACKED UP WITH DEEDS. BUT IT DOES SO IN A WAY THAT DOES NOT ASSUME OR ASSERT BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF WASHINGTON;

-- IT REPLACES MOSCOW'S TRADITIONAL DEMAND FOR "EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" WITH A MORE NUANCED FORMULATION: "EQUALITY WITH DUE ACCOUNT TAKEN OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF EACH OTHER AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE INTERESTS OF THIRD PARTIES."

4. CHERNENKO'S INTERVIEW IS NOT WITHOUT PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS. HIS DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR TESTING DROPS MENTION OF RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET WHILE RETAINING A CALL FOR A CTB KNOWN TO BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. FURTHER COUNTERPOINT TO CHERNENKO'S POSITIVE TONE IS PROVIDED BY TIKHONOV IN A BRIEF SECTION ON FOREIGN POLICY IN A TBILISI SPEECH PRINTED IN THE SAME ISSUE OF PRAVDA AS CHERNENKO'S INTERVIEW. TIKHONOV'S REMARKS DIRECTED AT A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE COVER MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND AS THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW BUT GIVE GREATER EMPHASIS TO THE INTENSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION, THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET MILITARY POTENTIAL IN AVOIDING WAR, AND MOSCOW'S REFUSAL TO "RETREAT" IN THE FACE OF IMPERIALIST EFFORTS TO UPSET THE "EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES." INTERESTINGLY, TIKHONOV JOINED CHERNENKO IN DROPPING RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND PNET FROM HIS LIST OF POSSIBLE US-SOVIET INITIATIVES.

5. THE SOVIET MEDIA HAVE PREDICTABLY BEGUN TO PLAY BACK FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE CHERNENKO BT

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

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BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/10/02



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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UR, US  
SUBJECT: CHERNENKO NBC INTERVIEW: UPBEAT ON PROSPECTS

INTERVIEW. ACCORDING TO A TASS DISPATCH CARRIED IN PRAVDA NOVEMBER 19, THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW HAS BEEN RECEIVED "WITH INTEREST" IN "OFFICIAL CIRCLES" IN WASHINGTON. TASS FURTHER REPORTS IN STRAIGHTFORWARD FASHION SECRETARY SHULTZ' COMMENTS ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING A WEEKEND TV INTERVIEW.

6. COMMENT: THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW IS ASTUTE PUBLIC RELATIONS AS US-SOVIET RELATIONS MOVE INTO A NEW AND POTENTIALLY MORE VOLATILE PERIOD. THE TONE IS THE MOST OPTIMISTIC AND POSITIVE OF ANY MAJOR SOVIET LEADERSHIP STATEMENT ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS IN MANY MONTHS. THE INTERVIEW SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED TO PORTRAY MOSCOW AS READY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION, WHILE KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON WASHINGTON TO TABLE CONSTRUCTIVE NEW PROPOSALS. ONE ADDITIONAL INTRIGUING ASPECT OF THE CHERNENKO INTERVIEW IS THE FACT THAT KALB'S REQUEST WAS SELECTED, DESPITE SOVIET PIQUE OVER HIS EXPOSE ON THE PAPAL ASSASSINATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, MFA USA DIVISION OFFICER CHETVERIKOV RECENTLY CONFIRMED TO EMBOFF THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE RECEIVED NUMEROUS REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH CHERNENKO.



RECEIVED 04 DEC 84 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM ARMACOST, M

DOCDATE 28 NOV 84

KEYWORDS: USSR ARMS CONTROL CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI  
HS

SUBJECT: DRAFT PRES LTR TO CHERNENKO RE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz  
SUBJECT: Letter to Chernenko

We owe a response to Chernenko's letter of November 17, in which he agreed to open new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the full range of arms control issues. Your response offers an opportunity to build on the momentum we have now developed. Specifically, I suggest that you stress your personal interest in seeing our new negotiating effort succeed and outline further your views on the scope and form negotiations might take. The Soviet Embassy has asked pointedly whether there will be an answer to Chernenko's last letter, and we have an interest in keeping your correspondence with him active, since you will almost certainly need to use it to break logjams as negotiations proceed.

We have prepared the attached draft letter to Chernenko which builds on his last letter and sets forth our views in three areas:

-- the points on arms control negotiations on which we now agree, including the inherent relationship between offensive weapons and space weapons;

-- our readiness to hold follow-up meetings between Gromyko and myself if necessary after Geneva, alternating between Moscow and Washington; and

-- a restatement of the utility of designating special representatives to work with me and Gromyko in the negotiations.

Another key message in the letter is that we intend at Geneva not just to talk about the procedures for starting new negotiations, but to get into the substance of the issues involved in the search for mutually acceptable agreements in the nuclear and space weapons fields. (In this connection, I will want to discuss with you in greater detail the specific proposals I would like to be able to present to Gromyko at the January meeting.)

The letter also reiterates our hope that arms control will have a favorable impact on efforts to achieve progress in other areas of our relationship. It then touches briefly on regional and bilateral issues, and makes the point again that resolution of human rights issues could have a positive impact on improving relations in every other area.

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BY CIS, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

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DECL: OADR



Sec-Pres revised in P 11/29.  
Action Memo sent to Secretary  
by 11/30-5a.m. pouch. mvs

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'84 NOV 28 P7:16

**ACTION MEMORANDUM**

S/S *11/28*

NOV 28 1984

TO: The Secretary  
THROUGH: P - Michael H. Armacost *MA*  
FROM: EUR - Richard Burt *RB*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Chernenko

We have drafted a letter from the President to Chernenko in response to the Soviet leader's letter of November 17 in which he agreed to begin new arms control negotiations. Our draft attempts to build on the momentum we have developed and outline further our views on the scope and form negotiations might take in Geneva and beyond. A key message in the letter is that we intend at Geneva not just to talk about the procedures for starting new negotiations, but to get into the substance of the issues involved in the search for mutually acceptable agreements in the nuclear and space weapons' fields.

A memorandum from you to the President covers the text and explains the rationale behind the current draft.

Recommendation

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President enclosing a draft letter to Chernenko.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Drafted: EUR/SOV: JFTefft *JFT*  
11/28/84 Ext. 20821 3299M  
Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons *TWS*  
EUR: MPalmer  
P: WHCourtney *WHC*

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BY C/S, NARA, DATE 10/17/05



National Security Council  
The White House

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Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
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Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Matlock --</u>
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			<u>package.</u>

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COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
91234

December 3, 1984

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Chernenko Letter on Nicaragua

We need to reply to Soviet Chairman Chernenko's November 16 letter to you on Nicaragua. Chernenko states his "growing concern" about developments in the region, and warns that increased tensions in Central America will have an impact on the course of US-Soviet relations. The letter avoids a hostile tone, but is highly, if indirectly, critical of United States policy toward Nicaragua. Chernenko also professes Soviet support for peaceful resolution of problems in the region, and specifically commends the Contadora process. The subject of combat aircraft for Nicaragua is addressed circuitously: the Soviet text gives no guarantees against shipment of aircraft, but disclaims any "malicious designs" on the part of the USSR.

Our reply very firmly sets the record straight concerning United States policy toward Nicaragua. Our text also acknowledges Chernenko's comments regarding the impact of tensions in Central America on US-Soviet relations, but turns these comments on linkage back at the USSR by making it clear that responsibility for the escalation of tensions in the region lies with the Soviet Union and Nicaragua.

Concerning possible shipment of combat aircraft to Nicaragua, we took advantage of Chernenko's decision to raise the topic, and put the Soviets on notice that we consider Chernenko's "clarification" a tacit assurance that the USSR will not provide such arms to Nicaragua. The reply also restates our longstanding position that shipment to Nicaragua of jet fighter aircraft would be unacceptable to the United States.

In sum, our text leaves the Soviets in no doubt as to the resolve of US policy toward Nicaragua, while reaffirming our commitment to constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and our hope for peaceful resolution of Central American problems.

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DECL: OADR

BY CS NARA, DATE 10/17/05



USSR  
Chernenko


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 8, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR KARNA SMALL

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY 

SUBJECT: Talking Points

Any comments on Chernenko's health by the President or a ranking Administration official, even on background, will become press headlines. It is not in our interest to add to the current rumors and speculation or to encourage an air of crisis which the press is only too likely to promote.

Regarding V.V. Shcherbitiskiy's visit to the U.S., the Congress has not yet publicly announced his planned March visit to Washington. (He is Ukrainian First Secretary and a Politburo member.)

Attachment:

Talking Points

cc: Jack Matlock

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BY CW NARA DATE 6/18/07

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
1 - 8 March 1985

SPOT COMMENTARY: USSR--Reports That Chernenko Has Died

Around 0700 Washington time,



had been told by "an official source" Chernenko had died. We have no further details from that source.



Soviet Politburo members minus Chernenko and Romanov, appeared at a meeting yesterday in the Bolshoy Theater in honor of the holiday. It is not unusual for ceremonies to be held on a day other than the actual holiday.

Moscow media are following scheduled programming, with features devoted to the holiday.

the Soviets in the Shcherbitskiy delegation here in Washington have displayed no unusual activity thus far.

Comment: In the last two cases, the Soviets announced the death of the Soviet leader in about 24 hours. It is possible Chernenko might be dead and the Politburo is withholding the news. If Chernenko really is dead, we believe the Politburo will not withhold the news much longer. With each hour that passes without information, the story becomes more unlikely to be true.



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