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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|---|--|---------|--|
| 1. paper letter case (8490207) | re: Chernenko, page 2 (1p) <i>R 10/17/05 MOZ-012 #7</i> | 2/16/84 | P-1 <i>BI</i> |
| 2. memo | from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: Chernenko letter and paper (1p) | 2/27/84 | R-1 <i>BI</i> P-5 |
| 3. memo | from McFarlane to the President re: Chernenko letter and paper (1p) | n.d. | R-1 <i>BI</i> P-5 |
| 4. briefing paper | US-Soviet relations (6pp) | n.d. | R-1 <i>BI</i> P-5 |
| 5. checklist letter case (8401701) | re: US-Soviet relations (6pp) | 2/18/84 | P-1 <i>BI</i> |
| 6. memo | from Matlock to McFarlane re: Sen. Baker's comments (1p) | 3/1/84 | P-1 <i>BI</i> P-5 |
| 7. tracking worksheet | re: letter from Howard Baker (1p, partial) | 2/17/84 | P-5 <i>open</i> |
| 8. letter | from Baker to the President (1p) | 2/17/84 | P-5 <i>open</i> |
| COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files | | | dlb |
| FILE FOLDER: Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich [2 of 3] GA 90879 <i>2/</i> | | | 10/19/95 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--|--|-------------------|---------------------------|
| letter case (8490448) | | | |
| 9. memo | from Matlock to McFarlane re: response to Chernenko letter (1p) | 4/12/84 | P-1 B1 P-5 |
| 10. memo | from McFarlane to the President re: response to Chernenko letter (2pp) R 12/19/05 MO4-018 #1 | n.d. | P-1 B1 P-5 |
| 11. letter | to Chernenko (7pp) R a ~ #2 | n.d. | P-1 B1 |
| 12. memo | from George Shultz to the President re: response to Chernenko letter (3pp) R 10/17/05 MO2-012 # 1b | 4/6/84 | P-1 B1 P-5 |
| 13. letter draft | to Chernenko (1p) | n.d. | P-1 B1 |
| 14. letter | to Chernenko (2pp) R 10/17/05 MO2-012 # 4 | n.d. | P-1 B1 |
| 15. letter draft | from Ronald Reagan to Chernenko (1p) | n.d. | P-1 B1 |
| COLLECTION: MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files | | | dlb |
| FILE FOLDER: Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich [2 of 3] OA 90879 | | | 10/19/95 |

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/5/2007

File Folder CHERNENKO, KNOSTANTIN USTINOVICH (2)

FOIA

M04-018

Box Number 21

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date |
|----|----------|----------------------|-------------|----------|
|----|----------|----------------------|-------------|----------|

| | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---------------|
| 10 | MEMO | MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE RESPONSE TO CHERNENKO LETTER (#1) | 2 | ND |
|---------------|-----------------|--|--------------|---------------|

mvh 3/17/08

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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Box Number 21

FOIA M02-012

File Folder CHERNENK, CONSTANTIN USTINOVIC (2)

DATE 3/22/2007

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|----|----------|---|-------------|----------|--------------|
| 12 | MEMO | SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE RESPONSE TO CHERNENKO (#16) | 3 | 4/6/1984 | |

MVH 3/17/08

The new Soviet leader must somehow improve productivity in a system whose bureaucrats benefit from its inefficiency. Yet he owes his position in part to those very individuals.

By Henry W. Morton


For the Soviet people, who had no say in the choice of Konstantin Chernenko as their new leader, life will continue much the same as before. Industrial bottlenecks will constrict production, shortages of food and consumer goods will remain chronic, a black market for goods and services unavailable through regular channels will thrive, and widespread corruption — from the top down — will persist.

The fact is that the system has become more powerful than its leaders. Chernenko and his cohorts will issue orders — but will they be obeyed? Rule by terror ended with Stalin's death in 1953. Since then, each successive Soviet leader, beginning with Nikita Khrushchev, ruled with less authority than his predecessor. Therefore, who is in charge in the Kremlin may be less significant than many may think.

By contrast, an American president has much greater influence on domestic policy, because he has been legitimized by popular mandate, than his Soviet counterpart, who is appointed, in secret, by a small group of men in the Politburo.

Chernenko will be primarily judged, not on foreign policy achievements, but on his ability to reverse the country's economic woes and get the people working productively in industry and agriculture.

The Soviet political economy can be viewed as a huge feudal system that is gummed by coexisting, self-contained baronies of unequal powers, whose overlords jealously guard their autonomy against one another. It consists of the Communist Party functionaries, the powerful military-industrial establishment, which sucks up the best a stuttering economy has to offer (a Soviet joke points out that the United States has a military-industrial complex, but that the USSR is one), the KGB (reorganized and revitalized by Andropov, who was its head for 15 years), central planners, some 60 economic ministries in charge of areas from coal-mining to fishing, and the scientific, cultural and educational establishment. The name of the



Newsday Illustration / Bernie Cootner

Henry W. Morton, professor of political science at Queens College, is a coeditor of and a contributor to the forthcoming "The Contemporary Soviet City" (M. L. Sharpe & Co.).

game is bureaucratic politics, as each institution works for and protects itself against the others.

Each barony is vertically organized with ministers sitting in Moscow barking orders to plants and agencies in various republics of the USSR. The vertical structure and the centralization of planning combine to harm the economy. From early on, government money went, not to cities for developing municipal services — housing, public transportation, water supply, shops and schools — but to the factories that are controlled by ministries. Such services, particularly in new towns, have therefore been grossly neglected. This has often caused workers to leave their jobs for better living opportunities elsewhere. As a result, many factories find themselves understaffed and unable to meet their production quotas.

The system of vertically organized ministries — meaning that they deal with an industry, not a geographic region — was introduced by Stalin in the late 1920s with the first five-year plan. It worked relatively well because the demand for goods was so great that any product was acceptable, no matter what the quality. Today the economy has become highly diversified, therefore calling for a greater variety in the goods that must be supplied, and quality expectations are much higher than before.

Yet central planners are unable to set more than crude production targets, primarily in terms of weight or numbers. A plant needing a certain type of rolled steel may receive a shipment with wrong proportions or it may not receive any shipment at all in time to fulfill the monthly plan. These failures compel plant managers to send "expeditors" throughout the land to acquire and hoard scarce resources by illegal trades-in-kind with other plants and bribes. Such scarcities also cause shoddy products, since most items are churned out at great speed during the last 10 days of the month. This is called "storming the plan."

This example helps show why the Soviet central plan-

ning system is not working. What plant directors are doing illegally — trading and buying supplies from irregular sources — is precisely what should be encouraged and legalized to make the economy more efficient, namely, effectively decentralizing the economy.

Soviet leaders know the answers to their economic problems: that in order to increase the quality and the quantity of output, it will be necessary to decentralize economic controls and provide meaningful incentives for managers and labor to work more productively.

But such a reform would threaten the dominance and authority of party bosses, ministers and central planners. It would shake up their fiefdoms.

Khrushchev did just that in 1957 when he dismantled the centralized economic ministries and formed small economic regions instead. This was one of the chief reasons that he was removed from power in 1964

Economic Problems Chernenko Must Face Are Bureaucratic

— Continued from preceding page

by Leonid Brezhnev and his associates. Within a year, the old economic order was restored. It is highly doubtful that such an attempt will be made again in the near future.

The first priority of Chernenko as general secretary will be to establish his position as first among equals in the Politburo. This may take some time since he, as leader of the old Brezhnev faction, will need to come to terms with Andropov's supporters, representing the military-industrial establishment and the KGB, and to placate the "Young Turks," Grigory Vomanov (age 61) and Mikhail S. Gorbachev (age 52), who were passed over for the leadership.

Chernenko is in his 73rd year. Unless he has the stamina and longevity of a Konrad Adenauer, it is likely that his will be an interim, caretaker's reign of several years. Yet foreign, domestic and personnel problems will not wait. Of these three categories, the need to improve Soviet domestic economic performance is most pressing. Given the need for Chernenko to first secure and expand his power base in the Politburo, and the uncertainty of the length of his tenure owing to his age, it seems unlikely that meaningful economic reform will be attempted in the foreseeable future.

NEWSDAY, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1984

2/16/84

2. CHERNENKO'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVITY

Although Chernenko is not likely to make any major change in overall policy, he probably will be active in foreign affairs. Andropov, who was unable to receive visitors or travel, has left a backlog for Chernenko.

* * *

No abrupt change of direction in foreign policy appears likely to result from the succession. Gromyko and Ustinov--the architects of Soviet security policy--remain key figures in the leadership. Although Chernenko's Brezhnevite rhetoric tends to give detente more emphasis, there is no reason to assume that he disagrees with current policy lines, which derive from policies Andropov inherited from Brezhnev. Chernenko had ample access to major policy decisions from his secretariat post, and, to the extent that he may have been understood to be general-secretary-elect, Gromyko and Ustinov would have made a point of involving him.

Chernenko will probably want to exercise his role as spokesman for the regime on world affairs as a way of asserting his national leadership. He will presumably devote part of his election speech (probably on March 2) to foreign affairs. He will probably depict the USSR as interested in detente and disarmament, while trying to put the burden on the US to make the first move.

In addition to seeing foreign leaders at the funeral, Chernenko will presumably take up some of the appointments Andropov was unable to keep.

- He might attend the opening of an art exhibit on March 5 sponsored by an American businessman (a KGB officer had promised the American that Andropov would attend).
- He may decide to see Vogel in mid-March. The Soviets put Brandt off until autumn and Chernenko might advance that appointment.
- Both Mengistu and Trudeau had indicated their interest in meeting Andropov.

Ustinov's cancelled trip to India had apparently been scheduled in place of an Andropov visit. Chernenko could elect to go himself.

Chernenko's ability to receive visitors and to travel will be especially important in bloc relations. The agenda for the long-planned CEMA summit has reportedly been agreed on. Now that a Soviet leader can attend, it should be scheduled this spring, and a top-level Pact meeting will presumably also be possible. Chernenko may also revive the summer consultations with Pact leaders in the Crimea. He will presumably pick up Andropov's apparently cancelled trip to Bulgaria and Jaruzelski's rumored visit to Moscow.

NLS MOL-012 #7

BY CLS NARA, DATE 10/17/05

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WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84 102 117

Name of Correspondent: Howard Baker

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) PRES (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: States [redacted] it was an honor to serve with Vice President Bush as your representative to Yuri Andropov's funeral. Relates that "based on only a brief visit and my own political instincts...General Secretary Chernenko is a man with who we can deal, (and) his health is such that we will have him to deal with for some time to come. It is my own hope that you will take the earliest possible opportunity to get acquainted with him"

DISPOSITION

| Office/Agency (Staff Name) | Action Code | Tracking Date YY/MM/DD | Type of Response | Code | Completion Date YY/MM/DD |
|----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------------|----------|--------------------------|
| <u>LA OGLE</u> | <u>ORIGINATOR</u> | <u>84 102 117</u> | <u>MS</u> | <u>A</u> | <u>84 102 24</u> |
| <u>MS atn Secretarial</u> | <u>A</u> | <u>84 102 117</u> | | | <u>1 1</u> |
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ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
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Comments: _____

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February 24, 1984

Dear Senator Baker:

President Reagan very much appreciated talking with you about your meeting with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, and he asked me to reiterate his gratitude for your participation in the funeral services for Yuri Andropov.

The President welcomes your counsel on the issue of an early meeting with General Secretary Chernenko, and was pleased to have the additional observations in your February 17 letter. Let me assure you that your advice, as always, will be given most careful consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO/KRJ/tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for
appropriate action

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

207434

February 17, 1984

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It was both a pleasure and an honor to serve with Vice President Bush as your representative at the State funeral of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Yuri Andropov. As I mentioned during our brief telephone conversation Wednesday, I came away from our 30 minute meeting with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko with some definite impressions.

The first is that George Bush, as head of the delegation, was an excellent representative of the United States for this important and delicate mission. He was, in all respects, a skilled and able diplomat and I am grateful that I had the opportunity to serve with him.


The second is that I feel General Secretary Chernenko has entered his important office without the burden of deeply seated personal animosity against the United States. Although I did not meet with Chairman Andropov, I twice met with Chairman Brezhnev and anticipated that the new Soviet Leader would have the same personal dislike and mistrust for the United States that I sensed from Brezhnev. With Chernenko, that was not the case.

Third, Chernenko seemed very much his own man--very much in charge. He was sure of himself, perfectly willing to engage in spontaneous conversation, and not intimidated by the presence of Foreign Minister Gromyko. In fact, Gromyko's only words were in response to your letter to Chernenko and they were muttered as an aside and not so that Chernenko could hear them.

Finally, despite the various reports on his health, Chernenko seemed well and robust. He was quick, alert and animated in his conversation.

Mr. President, based on only a brief visit and my own political instincts, I have two basic conclusions. First, General Secretary Chernenko is a man with whom we can deal. Secondly, his health is such that we will have him to deal with for some time to come. It is my own hope that you will take the earliest possible opportunity to get acquainted with him.

Sincerely,



Howard H. Baker, Jr.

HHBJr:rdt

Chernenko

RECEIVED 03 MAR 84 12

TO NONE

FROM NONE

DOCDATE 02 MAR 84

KEYWORDS USSR

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

SUBJECT: TEXT OF CHERNENKO SPEECH TO ELECTION MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NONE

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

COBB

FORTIER

LEHMAN, R

KRAMER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

FBIS 049

TEXT OF CHERNENKO SPEECH TO ELECTION MEETING

TAKE 1 -- CHERNENKO SPEECH

LD021524 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1510 GMT 2 MAR 84

("PARTY AND PEOPLE UNITED" -- TASS HEADLINE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW MARCH 2 TASS -- FOLLOWS THE FULL TEXT OF TODAY'S SPEECH BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO TO VOTERS WHO NOMINATED HIM AS THEIR CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR:

"DEAR CONRADES,

ALLOW ME TO EXTEND MY SINCERE THANKS TO ALL THE SPEAKERS HERE, TO ALL WORKING PEOPLE OF MOSCOW'S KUYBYSHEV DISTRICT WHO NOMINATED ME AS THEIR CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TO THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR. I REGARD THEIR CONFIDENCE AS SUPPORT FOR OUR PARTY'S LENINIST COURSE, AS APPROVAL OF THE ACTIVITY OF ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE, OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL DO MY BEST TO JUSTIFY THE HIGH HONOUR OF BEING YOUR DEPUTY.

QUITE RECENTLY, WE SUFFERED A HEAVY LOSS -- YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV, AN OUTSTANDING FIGURE OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE, PASSED AWAY. HE WAS A LEADER OF THE LENINIST TYPE. HE COULD NOT STAND ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPE, * (WORDS INDISTINCT) HOW TO OVERCOME INERTIA AND ATTUNE PEOPLE TO CONCERTED WORK IN THE NAME OF STRENGTHENING THE MOTHERLAND'S MIGHT, IN THE NAME OF PEACE ON EARTH. IT IS UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE LAUNCHED MAJOR POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE COUNTRY'S LIFE.

(MORE)
2 MAR 1549Z HJO

* ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPE, AND KNEW HOW

FBIS 063

CORRECTION 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

LD021604

MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH AT 1525 GMT ON 2 MARCH RETRANSMITS THE FIRST TASS TAKE OF THE CHERNENKO SPEECH RUN AS FBIS 049 WHICH ALLOWS FOR THE FOLLOWING FILL:

LAST PARAGRAPH, LINE FOUR, MAKE READ///ROUTINE AND STEREOTYPE, AND KNEW HOW TO OVERCOME///(SUPPLYING INDISTINCT WORDS).

2 MAR 1650Z SH

FBIS 053

TAKE 2 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///THE COUNTRY'S LIFE.

LD021538

(TEXT) THE COLLECTIVELY DEVELOPED GUIDELINES ON THE KEY DIRECTIONS OF SOCIETY'S DEVELOPMENT, EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED OF LATE CONSTITUTE A WEIGHTY POLITICAL CAPITAL, AND WE WILL TAKE CARE OF IT, AND MULTIPLY IT.

CONRADES,

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS NEARING COMPLETION. THIS YEAR, IT WAS CHARACTERISED BY GREAT ACTIVITY, BUSINESSLIKE COURSE OF VOTERS' MEETINGS. IT BECAME VIVID EVIDENCE OF THE UNSHAKEABLE UNITY OF THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE. THE CPSU ATTACHES IMMENSE IMPORTANCE TO THE ELECTIONS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET. FOR THIS IS, IN FACT, AN ACCOUNT BY SOVIET POWER TO THE WORKING PEOPLE. THIS IS ALSO A FORM OF THE MASSES' CONTROL OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF THOSE WHOM THEY EMPOWERED TO GOVERN THE SOCIALIST STATE.

IT IS IN KEEPING WITH THE PARTY'S TRADITIONS TO CONDUCT AN OPEN, HONEST CONVERSATION WITH THE MASSES. PRECISELY THIS APPROACH PERMEATES THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S ADDRESS SETTING FORTH THE PARTY'S ELECTION PLATFORM.

WHEN ADDRESSING VOTERS, MY COLLEAGUES IN THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SPOKE IN DETAIL ABOUT OUR HOME AND FOREIGN POLICY, ABOUT PLANS FOR THE FUTURE. ALLOW ME AS WELL TO SET FORTH SOME IDEAS ON THIS MATTER.

1.

YOU KNOW WELL HOW MUCH ATTENTION THE PARTY IS GIVING TO ECONOMIC ISSUES. THEY FEATURED MOST PROMINENTLY IN THE WORK AND DECISIONS OF THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS. THEY WERE SUBJECT OF A REALISTIC ANALYSIS AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S PLENUMS IN NOVEMBER 1982 AND IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR. THE IMPORTANCE OF A NUMBER OF CARDINAL PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS STRESSED AT THE FEBRUARY PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

WHAT CAN BE SAID IN THIS RESPECT ABOUT THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUS ELECTIONS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET?

(MORE)

2 MAR 1607Z SH

///THE SUPREME SOVIET?

LD021544

(TEXT) ON THE WHOLE, THIS WAS A FRUITFUL PERIOD. THE COUNTRY'S PRODUCTIVE FORCES BECAME STRONGER AND SUBSTANTIALLY RENOVATED. MORE THAN A THOUSAND INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, FITTED OUT WITH MODERN MACHINERY, WERE MADE OPERATIONAL. THE RECONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE OPERATING PLANTS AND FACTORIES WERE CONDUCTED ON A LARGE SCALE. BUT, I'LL PUT IT BLUNTLY, LESS WAS DONE IN THIS SPHERE THAN WE WOULD LIKE. THE FUEL AND ENERGY BASE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY WAS DEVELOPED. ABOUT 40,000 KILOMETRES OF TRUNK GAS PIPELINES WERE BUILT -- UNPRECEDENTED SCALES AND TEMPO IN WORLD PRACTICE. WE SUCCEEDED IN TRANSFERRING A MULTITUDE OF FACTORIES, CITIES AND VILLAGES TO USE OF NATURAL GAS. THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE USING GAS AT HOME GREW BY 30 MILLION.

THESE YEARS SAW SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN MANY OTHER FIELDS TOO. A UNIQUE NUCLEAR REACTOR WITH A CAPACITY OF 1.5 MILLION KILOWATT, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS DEVELOPED IN OUR COUNTRY. POWERFUL ATOMIC ICE-BREAKERS, BUILT IN OUR COUNTRY, OPENED A NEW CHAPTER IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE ARCTIC. MINERAL PROSPECTING WITH THE HELP OF ULTRADEEP WELLS WAS STARTED. TECHNICAL LASERS ARE NOW EXTENSIVELY USED IN INDUSTRY AND MEDICINE.

QUITE A LOT WAS DONE TO DEVELOP AGRICULTURE. POWER AVAILABILITY PER WORKER IN THIS SPHERE INCREASED BY 30 PER CENT. MINERAL FERTILIZER DELIVERIES TO COLLECTIVE AND STATE FARMS GREW NEARLY BY A THIRD. COMBINED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE OF NEW FORMS OF ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, THIS PRODUCES TANGIBLE RESULTS.

JUDGE FOR YOURSELVES. WE WERE UNLUCKY WITH THE WEATHER LAST YEAR AS WELL, BUT THE GRAIN CROP EXCEEDED 190 MILLION TONNES. PRODUCTIVITY OF LIVE-STOCK FARMING NOTICEABLY GREW TOO. ALL THIS CONFIRMS ONCE AGAIN THAT WELL-ORGANIZED, PERSISTENT WORK YIELDS FRUIT EVEN IN DIFFICULT CONDITIONS. THE CONCRETE POINT AT ISSUE NOW IS MOBILIZING PEOPLE, PREPARING ALL MACHINERY AND ENSURING A SMOOTH ORGANIZATION OF FIELD-WORK. THERE IS NO TIME TO WASTE -- THE SPRING SOWING IS NOT FAR OFF. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO SEE TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE WINTERING OF CATTLE.

(MORE)

FBIS 057

TAKE 4 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///WINTERING OF CATTLE.

LD021548

(TEXT) DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS, THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE COMPELLED US TO DIVERT CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES TO THE NEEDS CONNECTED WITH THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY. BUT WE DID NOT EVEN THINK OF CURTAILING SOCIAL PROGRAMMES, SINCE THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ALL OUR WORK IS IMPROVING THE WELL-BEING OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. AND OUR APPROACH TO THIS TASK IS BROAD. WE WANT THE PEOPLE NOT ONLY TO BE BETTER OFF MATERIALLY, BUT ALSO HEALTHY PHYSICALLY, DEVELOPED SPIRITUALLY, ACTIVE IN SOCIAL LIFE.

FOUR-FIFTHS OF THE NATIONAL INCOME WERE DIRECTED OVER THE PAST PERIOD TO PEOPLE'S WELL-BEING. THE REAL INCOMES OF THE POPULATION INCREASED. THE PUBLIC CONSUMPTION FUNDS BECAME RICHER AS WELL. AND THIS IS THE SOURCE FROM WHICH MONEY IS DRAWN FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH SERVICE, PAYMENT OF PENSIONS, AND UPKEEP OF HOUSES.

OUR FOOD PROGRAMME, AS WELL AS THE PROGRAMME OF DEVELOPING THE MANUFACTURE OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES SYSTEM, CURRENTLY BEING DRAWN UP, ARE ALSO DIRECTED AT RAISING THE PEOPLE'S WELL-BEING. MUCH IS BEING DONE NOW TO EXPAND THE PRODUCTION OF POPULAR COMMODITIES OF GOOD QUALITY. THE MODERNIZATION OF LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRY ENTERPRISES HAS BEEN STARTED. IN THIS AREA, WE ARE ACTIVELY COOPERATING WITH CMEA COUNTRIES.

AMONG THE PARTY'S PERMANENT PRIORITIES ARE SUCH VITAL PROBLEMS AS CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING, CHILD-CARE CENTRES, EXPANSION OF THE NETWORK OF HOSPITALS AND POLYCLINICS. LAST YEAR, MORE THAN TWO MILLION FLATS WERE BUILT -- MORE THAN IN ANY OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS. THE HOUSING CONSTRUCTION TARGET FOR THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD IS VERY HIGH. BUT THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING THAT IT WILL BE MET.

WE REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE HOUSING PROBLEM IS FAR FROM
BEING RESOLVED, AND WE WILL LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE FURTHER
HOUSING CONDITIONS. WHAT THIS IMPLIES IS NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTION
WITH STATE MONEY. IT APPEARS THAT THE EXPANSION OF COOPERATIVE AND
INDIVIDUAL CONSTRUCTION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED MORE VIGOROUSLY. AS TO
KINDERGARTENS AND NURSERIES, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN EASING THE TENSION
HERE. MUCH, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE DONE.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1623Z SH

FBIS 058

TAKE 5 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///TO BE DONE.

LD021558

(TEXT) IT IS PLANNED TO INCREASE IN THE COMING YEARS THE SALARIES OF TEACHERS AND OTHER WORKERS ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EDUCATION. ATTENTION WILL BE GIVEN IN THE FUTURE AS WELL TO WAR AND LABOUR VETERANS, LARGE FAMILIES, NEWLY-WEDS, AND TO IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE IN GENERAL.

IT IS, PROBABLY, WORTHWHILE MAKING SPECIAL MENTION OF THE YEAR 1983. AS YOU KNOW, THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WORKED OUT IN NOVEMBER 1982 A PACKAGE OF MEASURES WHICH IMPARTED GREATER DYNAMISM TO OUR ECONOMY. WE STARTED OVERCOMING THE UNFAVORABLE TREND OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD WHEN ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES HAD SLOWED DOWN. OF PARTICULAR VALUE IS THAT LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY STARTED GROWING FASTER AND THAT QUALITY INDICATORS IN MANY BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY IMPROVED.

TO TAKE YOUR DISTRICT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ENTIRE INCREMENT IN INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT HAS BEEN OBTAINED WITHOUT INCREASING THE WORKFORCE. YOU HAVE ACTIVELY JOINED THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN FOR OVERFULFILLING THE PLAN ASSIGNMENT ON LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND REDUCTION OF PRODUCTION COSTS. ALLOW ME TO CONGRATULATE WITH PERSONAL LABOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS MARIA DMITRIYEVNA POLESCHCHUK, A WEAVER, ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOVICH GORBUNOV, A TURNER, NINA SERGEYEVNA IZMAILOVA, A GLASS-BLOWER, ALEKSANDR NIKOLAYEVICH SEROV, A FITTER, ALL FRONT-RANKING WORKERS OF KUIBYSHEV DISTRICT.

OF COURSE, COMRADES, WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IS ONLY A BEGINNING OF GREAT WORK. THERE ARE STILL MANY THINGS, AND URGENT ONES, TO BE DONE. WE CAN AND WE WANT TO MOVE FORWARD FASTER. WE CAN AND SHOULD BE MUCH MORE VIGOROUS IN SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF INTENSIFYING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. FOR IT IS ONLY ON THIS BASIS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO MEET EVER FULLER THE MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE.

(MORE)

FBIS 061

TAKE 6 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

//OF THE PEOPLE.

LD021612

(TEXT) IN BRIEF, SPEAKING ABOUT PLANS FOR THE FUTURE, ONE SHOULD NEVER FORGET ONE SIMPLE TRUTH: IN ORDER TO LIVE BETTER, IT IS NECESSARY TO WORK BETTER. IN ORDER TO ADVANCE SUCCESSFULLY IN IMPLEMENTING OUR SOCIAL PROGRAMMES, IT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A STABLE, DYNAMIC GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY AND, ABOVE ALL, ITS EFFICIENCY. THIS WAS THE TOPIC BOTH AT THE DECEMBER AND THE FEBRUARY PLENUMS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

WE HAVE SUCCEEDED SO FAR IN IMPROVING ECONOMIC INDICATORS CHIEFLY THROUGH RESERVES LYING, SO TO SAY, AT HAND, ON THE SURFACE. WE STARTED ENHANCING ORDER, ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE. AND THIS IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED A NOTICEABLE ECONOMIC EFFECT.

IT IS NECESSARY TO ADVANCE FURTHER -- TOWARDS PROFOUND QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

OUR ECONOMY STILL HAS NO FEW SECTORS WHERE LAGGING JUST LEAPS TO THE EYE. THE AVAILABLE PRODUCTION POTENTIAL IS FAR FROM BEING FULLY USED. THE EXPERIMENTAL BASE OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING IS IMPERMISSIBLY WEAK. THE SHARE OF ARDUOUS MANUAL AND UNSKILLED WORK IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION IS BEING REDUCED SLOWLY.

IT IS A MUST THAT WE ENSURE A SWIFT AND CONTINUOUS MODERNIZATION OF ALL BRANCHES OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ON THE BASIS OF THE LATEST ACHIEVEMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. THIS IS ONE OF OUR BASIC TASKS. WITHOUT THIS, PROGRESS OF THE SOCIETY IS SIMPLY UNTHINKABLE.

THE PARTY ALSO LAYS KEEN EMPHASIS UPON THE ISSUE OF STARTING A LARGE-SCALE IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM. THE MAIN GUIDELINES FOR THIS WORK HAVE BEEN DEFINED. THEY FULLY ACCORD WITH THE LENINIST PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM.

WE SHOULD, NO DOUBT, STRENGTHEN CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING; ENSURE THAT THEY ARE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE AND FLEXIBLE. THINGS SHOULD BE ARRANGED IN SUCH A WAY THAT NATIONAL-LEVEL ECONOMIC BODIES DIRECT ALL THEIR RESOURCES AT RESOLVING THE QUESTIONS OF REALLY KEY IMPORTANCE FOR THE COUNTRY. SOME OF THEIR PRESENT DUTIES CAN WELL BE HANDED OVER TO SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS, EITHER BRANCH OR LOCAL ONES.

WE HAVE AND WILL CURB ANY ACTIONS THAT ARE DICTATED BY NARROW DEPARTMENTAL OR PAROCHIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

BUT, COMRADES, NO DENYING IT, THERE ARE STILL INSTANCES WHEN LOCAL INITIATIVE IS FETTERED UNDER THE PRETEXT OF CURBING PAROCHIALISM. THAT WON'T DO AT ALL. ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC INITIATIVE, CREATIVE WORK AT THE LEVELS OF ECONOMIC REGIONS, AMALGAMATIONS AND FACTORIES IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS PRECISELY AS A COUNTRY-WIDE CHARACTER.

THIS IS, I'D SAY, ALSO THE QUESTION OF FURTHER CONSOLIDATING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF OUR COUNTRY -- ONE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE PARTY'S LENINIST POLICY. IT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A GROWTH OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF EACH REPUBLIC TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPING THE SOVIET UNION'S ECONOMY AS A SINGLE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMPLEX. OF COURSE, THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE SHOULD BE PLACED HIGHEST. THIS DIRECTLY FOLLOWS FROM THE INTERNATIONALIST NATURE OF OUR SOCIETY; FROM OUR WORLD OUTLOOK.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1641Z SH

FBIS 066

TAKE 7 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///OUR WORLD OUTLOOK.

LD021626

(TEXT) FORMS OF MANAGEMENT, CONRADES, SHOULD CORRESPOND TO PRESENT-DAY DEMANDS. THIS WILL BE, UNDOUBTEDLY, FACILITATED BY THE CURRENT ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS. THEIR ESSENCE IS THAT MORE RIGHTS BE GIVEN TO ENTERPRISES AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY ENHANCED, WHILE EXCESSIVE SUPERVISION FROM THE CENTRE BE REMOVED. EXPERIMENTAL TESTING WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO TURN FROM THE STAGE OF SEARCH TO CONFIDENT ADVANCE. BUT, OF COURSE, CONRADES, THE SEARCH FOR AND INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO ENTERPRISES INVOLVED IN THIS OR ANOTHER EXPERIMENT.

- IT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, OBVIOUS FOR ALL THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO GIVE THE GREEN LIGHT TO THE UNIVERSAL INTRODUCTION OF COST-ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES. EVERYTHING THAT IS STANDING IN ITS WAY SHOULD BE REMOVED.

ONE OF OUR CHIEF CONCERNS IS THAT THE SOCIALIST PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO ONE'S WORK BE PUT INTO LIFE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE. THOSE WHO WORK WITH COMPLETE DEVOTION SHOULD BY ALL MEANS HAVE A BETTER PAY. SOME MAY SAY: BUT WE CAN, EVEN TODAY, PUNISH SLACKERS FINANCIALLY AND AWARD BONUSES TO CONSCIENTIOUS WORKERS. THIS IS SO. BUT, IT SEEMS, THE PENALTIES STILL LACK STRICTNESS, WHILE MATERIAL INCENTIVE LACKS PROPER FAIRNESS AND, SOMETIMES, I WOULD SAY, GENEROSITY. THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY DEALT WITH, AND WITHOUT DELAY EITHER.

IT IS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME RESOLUTELY AND CONSERVATISM AND SLUGGISHNESS. IN BRIEF, THE SLOGAN OF THE DAY IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE SHOULD BE: FROM THE CORRECT IDEA, PRIMED WITH EXPERIENCE -- TO BOLD ACTIONS!

AS YOU SEE, COMRADES, A GREAT DEAL OF WORK IS BEING DONE TO RAISE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. THIS, NATURALLY, IS NOT EASY WORK. AND THEN, AT THE HEIGHT OF THIS WORK, IN JUNE LAST YEAR, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE GATHERED FOR A PLENARY MEETING TO EXAMINE QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL WORK OF THE PARTY AMONG THE MASSES. WHY? WHAT CONNECTION IS THERE WITH OUR ECONOMIC TASKS? THE RELATIONSHIP IS DIRECT, INSEPARABLE.

THE MATTER IS THAT TODAY, AS NEVER BEFORE, SUCCESSES OF PARTY GUIDANCE OF SOCIETY DEPEND ON THE CONSISTENT OBSERVANCE OF THE LENINIST PRINCIPLE OF THE UNITY OF IDEOLOGICAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND ECONOMIC WORK. BUILDING SOCIALISM AND PERFECTING IT MEANS NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN FACTORIES AND POWER PLANTS, MAKING OUR LAND, OUR VILLAGES AND CITIES MORE BEAUTIFUL. THIS IS A NECESSARY, BUT FAR FROM SOLE CONCERN OF COMMUNISTS. WHILE TRANSFORMING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF PEOPLE, IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE FOR THEIR IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL ELEVATION. OBVIOUSLY, THE TASKS OF PERFECTING DEVELOPED SOCIALISM CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT A GREAT DEAL OF WORK TO SPIRITUALLY DEVELOP PEOPLE AND THEIR SOCIALIST EDUCATION.

- IT IS PRECISELY THE ESSENCE OF THE JUNE PLENUM'S DECISIONS THAT ALL CREATIVE FORCES, CONTAINED IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION OF THE MASSES, BE PUT INTO MOTION. THIS IS THE BASIS OF THEIR LABOUR AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1704Z SH

FBIS 067

TAKE 8 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY.

LD021634

(TEXT) I HAVE MENTIONED THE NEED FOR A DRASTIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. IT IS APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT IMPROVEMENT OF THIS SYSTEM IS IN NO WAY LIMITED TO ELIMINATING SHORTCOMINGS IN THE WORK OF THE, SO TO SAY, MANAGERS BY PROFESSION. ANOTHER THING IS NO LESS IMPORTANT: CONDITIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR ENHANCING THE INITIATIVE AND CREATIVE SPIRIT OF THE BROADEST SECTIONS OF THE WORKING MASSES IN THEIR ENTIRE FRUITFULNESS AND STRENGTH.

I HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT INDUSTRIAL ROBOTS HAVE STARTED PERFORMING SOME PRODUCTION OPERATIONS AT SEVERAL ENTERPRISES OF YOUR DISTRICT. THERE WILL BE MORE OF THEM WITH TIME, OF COURSE. BUT EVEN THEN, I ASSURE YOU, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CALL THE HUMAN FACTOR OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS WILL NOT BE LESSENER. BY THIS WE MEAN THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE, THE INTERESTS AND MOOD OF PEOPLE. FOR WORK IS DONE BY MAN AND RENOWNED THROUGH MAN. THIS OLD TRUTH WILL NEVER BE MADE OBSOLETE BY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS.

IN PRODUCTION, THE SOVIET MAN SHOULD ALWAYS BE THE FULL-FLEDGED AND RESPONSIBLE MASTER. THIS AIM IS SERVED BY THE LAW ON WORK COLLECTIVES WHICH WAS ADOPTED LAST YEAR. IT IS AIMED AT FURTHER DEVELOPING PRECISELY THE MANAGERIAL INITIATIVE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE.

THE EDUCATIONAL FORCE OF MORAL INCENTIVES IS TREMENDOUS IN THE LIFE OF EVERY WORK COLLECTIVE. IN OUR COUNTRY WORK IS THE BASIS FOR THE SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF MAN, HIS SOCIAL PRESTIGE. THE PEOPLE ARE JUSTLY INDIGNANT AT SHIRKERS, JOB-SWITCHERS AND DRUNKARDS, WHO TRY TO USE THE LOFTY NAME OF THE WORKING MAN AS A COVER FOR THIER OWN LAZINESS AND SLIPSHODNESS, AND EVEN DEMAND PUBLIC RESPECT FOR THEMSELVES. ONE OF THE MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE EDUCATIONAL WORK IS TO FORM AND STRENGTHEN IN SOCIETY AN ATMOSPHERE OF RESPECTFULL ATTITUDE TO WORK AND, AT THE SAME TIME, OF INTOLERANCE AND CONTEMPT TO ALL KINDS OF IDLENESS, SLOPPINESS AND IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE SPECIAL MENTION OF THE FOLLOWING. THE PARTY AND THE STATE, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE STEPPED UP THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SUCH DISGRACEFUL PHENOMENA AS SQUANDERING OF STATE FUNDS, EYEWASH AND ABUSE OF OFFICE, EMBEZZLEMENT AND BRIBES. THIS IS NOT A TEMPORARY CAMPAIGN. THIS IS A LINE WHICH WILL BE PURSUED PERMANENTLY AND UNDEVIATINGLY. THERE IS AN THERE WILL BE NO INDULGENCE TO ANYBODY IN THIS RESPECT. NOBODY SHOULD HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THAT. THEREFORE, IT TAKES EVEN HIGHER RESPONSIBILITY AND INSISTENCE ON HIGH STANDARDS ON THE PART OF EXECUTIVES, PERMANENT ATTENTION TO THOSE ISSUES OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND WORK COLLECTIVES, ALL SOVIET PEOPLE, EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL, LAW, ORDER AND JUSTICE ORGANS.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1707Z SH

FBIS 069

TAKE 9 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND JUSTICE ORGANS.

LD021646

(TEXT) CONRADES, THERE IS, PERHAPS, NO SUCH CORNER IN OUR VAST COUNTRY, WHERE THE PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE SOVIET SCHOOL WERE NOT DISCUSSED. THE QUESTION OF ITS REFORM HAS LEFT NOBODY INDIFFERENT. IT CONCERNS LITERALLY, AS THEY SAY, BOTH OLD AND YOUNG. THE NATION-WIDE DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT REFORM OF THE GENERAL EDUCATIONAL AND VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IS GRAPHIC EXAMPLE OF HOW ISSUES OF GENERAL STATE SIGNIFICANCE ARE RESOLVED BY THE SOVIET POWER, AN EXAMPLE OF TRUE DEMOCRACY. YOU ARE, CERTAINLY, FAMILIAR WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THAT REFORM. I WOULD LIKE TO DWELL HERE ONLY ON ONE ASPECT -- THE LABOUR EDUCATION.

LABOUR WILL NEVER BE AN AMUSEMENT, A PASTIME, EVEN UNDER COMMUNISM IT WILL REMAIN, AS MARX PUT IT, A DEVILISHLY SERIOUS MATTER. WORKING IS DIFFICULT, AND NOTHING CAN BE DONE ABOUT THAT. YET PARENTS ARE AT TIMES TEMPTED TO SPARE THEIR CHILDREN OF DIFFICULTIES. BUT IT IS ONLY SOCIALLY USEFUL LABOUR THAT MAKES HUMAN LIFE MEANINGFUL. THAT IS WHY CHILDREN SHOULD BE TAUGHT NOT WHAT IS EASY, THEY WILL THEMSELVES COPE WITH THAT, BUT WHAT IS DIFFICULT. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES OF EDUCATION IS TO INSTILL IN THE SCHOOLCHILDREN LOVE FOR WORK, TO INCLUDE, IN FULL MEASURE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCTIVE LABOUR INTO THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION.

THE POINT, AS YOU UNDERSTAND, IS BY NO MEANS TO BELITTLE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENERAL CULTURAL STANDARDS, OF KNOWLEDGE, TO INTRODUCE SOMETHING LIKE LABOUR CONSCRIPTION. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE REFORM OF THE SCHOOL HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE IDEAS, THAT ARE DISHED BY HOSTILE RADIO VOICES. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS DIFFERENT: A MAN, WHO HAS NOT BEEN EDUCATED TO WORK, CANNOT BE A CONSCIOUS BUILDER OF THE NEW WORLD.

WE TAKE PERMANENT CARE TO TRAIN SUCH YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WILL NOT FALTER; NOT BEND BENEATH THE WEIGHT OF HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRY'S DESTINY; FOR THE DESTINY OF SOCIALISM AND PEACE. SUCH YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE ABLE NOT ONLY TO ASSIMILATE THE EXPERIENCE OF THE OLDER GENERATIONS, BUT ALSO TO ENRICH IT WITH THEIR OWN ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THIS IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SCHOOL AND THE FAMILY; BUT NOT ONLY OF THEM. THIS IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE, TRADE UNIONS AND WORK COLLECTIVES.

THIS IS A MAJOR TASK OF THE PARTY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT IS THE QUESTION OF RELIABLY ENSURING OUR SOCIALIST HOMETLAND'S FUTURE. WE ARE RESOLVING THIS TASK. AND DOING IT SUCCESSFULLY.

3.

CONRADES, IT WAS WAY BACK ON THE EVE OF THE BIRTH OF THE WORLD'S FIRST STATE OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS THAT LENIN WROTE: "UNDER SOCIALISM...THE MASS OF THE POPULATION WILL RISE TO TAKING AN INDEPENDENT PART, NOT ONLY IN VOTING AND ELECTIONS, BUT ALSO IN THE EVERY-DAY ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE." AND TODAY THE KEY TO FRESH SUCCESSES IN THE WORK OF THE BODIES OF OUR PEOPLE'S POWER, ABOVE ALL, OF THE SOVIETS, LIES IN THE EVER-WIDER DRAWING IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE OF CONSCIOUS, POLITICALLY MATURE AND CREATIVELY THINKING CITIZENS. THESE ACTIVISTS OF THE SOVIETS, WHO NUMBER TENS OF MILLIONS, SHOULD BE REALLY ACTIVE. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THAT HAVE CONSIDERABLY GROWN IN RECENT YEARS. THE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS OF ALL LEVELS HAS GROWN IN RESOLVING DIVERSE ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-POLITICAL TASKS.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1718Z SH

FBIS 072

TAKE 10 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND SOCIO-POLITICAL TASKS.

LD021700

(TEXT) IT IS TOTALLY JUSTIFIED THAT THE LOCAL SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO COORDINATE TO A GREATER EXTENT THE ACTIVITIES OF ENTERPRISES OF DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES IN THEIR TERRITORIES. AND IT IS A GOOD THING THAT THEY ENHANCE CONTROL OVER THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SERVICES, OVER ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE SOVIETS' FUNCTIONS OF CONTROL SHOULD BE ENHANCED FURTHER. THERE IS MUCH ROOM FOR WORK HERE.

IT IS INVALUABLE FOR THE FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC BASIS OF THE SOVIET STATE TO KEEP PEOPLE BETTER INFORMED OF THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS AND TO ENHANCE PUBLICITY IN THE WORK OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS. THE MASS MEDIA HAVE A GREAT ROLE TO PLAY HERE. THEIR WORK HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT INTENSIFIED DURING THE RECENT PERIOD. HOWEVER, WE EXPECT FROM THEM MORE INDEPTH AND INTERESTING MATERIALS ABOUT THE LIFE OF THE COUNTRY AND THE WORLD AT LARGE, AND A BOLDER APPROACH TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

AND, OF COURSE, IT IS ALWAYS NECESSARY TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE PROPOSALS AND CRITICAL REMARKS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE AND TO BE INTOLERANT OF ANY FORM OF THE SUPPRESSION OF CRITICISM.

WE COMMUNISTS TAKE PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT THE PARTY AS THE NUCLEUS OF THE ENTIRE POLITICAL SYSTEM HAS A GREAT INFLUENCE IN THE SOVIETS. MOREOVER, THIS IS ENSURED NOT BY THE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF PARTY MEMBERS IN THE SOVIETS: AS EVERYONE KNOWS, WE HAVE MORE NON-PARTY DEPUTIES. THE PARTY ASSERTS ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN SOCIETY BY TIRELESS EFFORTS FOR THE GOOD AND HAPPINESS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE AND BY THE ABILITY TO DRAFT AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY MEETING THE NEEDS OF ONE STAGE OF OUR DEVELOPMENT OR ANOTHER.

THE PARTY ATTACHES MUCH IMPORTANCE TO ANALYSING THE SPECIFIC FEATURE OF THE PRESENT PERIOD AND TO DETERMINING IN A SOBER, ENTIRELY NON-UTOPIC WAY THE LEVEL OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MATURITY OF THE NEW SOCIETY WE HAVE ACHIEVED. DETERMINING IT, WE WORK OUT STRICTLY SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE CPSU'S POLICY.

A GREAT ROLE IS PLAYED HERE BY THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPED SOCIALISM AS AN HISTORICALLY PROTRACTED PERIOD, AT THE BEGINNING OF WHICH OUR COUNTRY IS NOW. IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS OF PERFECTING DEVELOPED SOCIALISM THAT GRADUAL ADVANCE TOWARDS COMMUNISM IS TAKING PLACE.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO OVERESTIMATE THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE PARTY. THEY MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR SOCIETY IN ALL ITS COMPLEX, CONTROVERSIAL AND MULTIFACETED ENTIRETY. THEY HELP TO REMOVE IN PRACTICE THOSE DISCREPANCIES WHICH HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN ALLOWED TO OCCUR BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS, BETWEEN THE REAL POSSIBILITIES OF SOCIETY AND UNSUBSTANTIATED FORECASTS. IT IS WITH THESE POINTS IN VIEW THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS DOING TODAY THE EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT WORK OF PREPARING A NEW EDITION OF THE CPSU PROGRAM.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1728Z SH

///THE CPSU PROGRAM.

LD021723

(TEXT) THE PARTY IS STRIVING TO ENSURE THAT LENIN'S STYLE IN ALL ITS DIVERSITY AND RICHNESS BECOMES A HEARTFELT NEED AND AN IRREPLACEABLE WORKING TOOL OF EVERY PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OFFICIAL. OUR LEADERS HAVE VAST POWERS AND RIGHTS; BUT ALSO BEAR VAST RESPONSIBILITY. THERE CAN BE NOTHING WORSE FOR A LEADER THAN ARROGANCE AND CONCEIT, AND "USING THE POWER CRUDELY," IN LENIN'S WORDS; "AS NOTHING BUT POWER, AS THOUGH TO SAY: 'I HAVE THE POWER, I HAVE GIVEN MY ORDERS, AND YOU MUST OBEY'." THE STRENGTH OF THE LEADER LIES IN HIS ABILITY TO BLEND TOGETHER HIS AUTHORITY OF AN OFFICIAL AND THAT OF A PERSONALITY.

PARTY AND GOVERNMENT CADRES WIN THE AFFECTION AND RESPECT OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE FIRST AND FOREMOST IN PRACTICAL PUBLIC ACTIVITY; WIN THEM WITH THEIR ENERGY AND KNOWLEDGE, BY THEIR PERSONAL EXAMPLE AND CONDUCT THAT ARE FREE OF ANYTHING WHICH OFFENDS THE MORAL FEELINGS OF THE PEOPLE. THE LEADER CAN BE EXACTING TOWARD OTHERS PRECISELY BECAUSE HE IS EVEN MORE EXACTING TOWARDS HIMSELF. IN THIS WAY HE GETS A MORAL RIGHT IN ADDITION TO HIS OFFICIAL RIGHT TO SHOW FIRMNESS WHEN IT IS BETTER, AS THE SAYING GOES, "TO SPARE WORDS WHEN AUTHORITY MUST BE INVOKED." THE BASIS OF THE LEADER'S AUTHORITY IS POPULAR APPROVAL AND SUPPORT. AND THOSE WHO LOSE THEM, WHO ARE DEAF TO THE OPINION OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE, CANNOT AND MUST NOT HOLD POSTS OF AUTHORITY.

THERE IS ANOTHER MATTER. WE HAVE QUITE A FEW EFFECTIVE FORMS OF THE INITIATIVE OF THE MASS OF PEOPLE AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOCIETY AND THE STATE. BUT THERE ALSO ARE ARTIFICIALLY INVENTED FORMS, WHICH SHOULD BE DROPPED.

FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS AN UNDUE LIKING IN SOME DISTRICTS AND REGIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL SORTS OF HEADQUARTERS AND COMMISSIONS ON ANY OCCASION. SOMETIMES THERE ARE SO MANY OF THEM THAT THE ORGANIZERS THEMSELVES CANNOT SORT OUT WHO HAD TO DO WHAT AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT. SOME OFFICIALS CHAIR WELL NIGH A DOZEN DIFFERENT COMMISSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE PREJUDICE OF THEIR IMMEDIATE OFFICIAL DUTIES. ALL THIS ONLY DRAWS AWAY PEOPLE TO ATTEND SUPERFLUOUS MEETINGS, SCATTERS FORCES BUT IN NO WAY HELPS BUSINESS. SOMETIMES CERTAIN OFFICIALS, INSTEAD OF TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR JOB, ONLY "TAKE SHELTER BEHIND COMMISSIONS." AS LENIN ACTIVELY REMARKED.

OUR DEMOCRACY IS ESSENTIALLY A DEMOCRACY IN ITS ENTIRETY. ITS EXTENSION AND THE PERFECTION OF SOVIET STATEHOOD IN ITS ENTIRETY CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT DIRECTION OF THE ADVANCE OF OUR SOCIETY. AND THE PARTY IS THE POWER PACK, THE MOTIVE FORCE OF THIS PROGRESS. BY ITS ENTIRE INTERNAL LIFE IT SETS AN EXAMPLE OF GENUINELY SOCIALIST DEMOCRATISM, OF A HARMONIOUS COMBINATION OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND IRREVOCABLE DUTIES.

4.

NOW LET US TURN TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND INSISTENT INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET VOTERS WAS, IS AND WILL REMAIN THE INSTRUCTION TO SAFEGUARD PEACE LIKE THE APPLE OF OUR EYE AND TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF OUR HOMELAND. I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE PARTY AND THE SOVIET STATE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING UNSWERVINGLY THIS INSTRUCTION, DOING SO IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES.

YOU KNOW THAT THE PAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN A DRAMATIC INTENSIFICATION OF THE POLICY OF THE MORE AGGRESSIVE FORCES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM, A POLICY OF BLATANT MILITARISM, CLAIMS TO WORLD DOMINANCE, RESISTANCE TO PROGRESS, AND VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS AND FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLES. THE WORLD HAS SEEN QUITE A FEW EXAMPLES OF THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THIS POLICY. THESE INCLUDE THE INVASION OF LEBANON, THE OCCUPATION OF GRENADA, THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA, THREATS TO SYRIA AND, FINALLY, THE TURNING OF WESTERN EUROPE INTO A LAUNCHING SITE FOR U.S. NUCLEAR MISSILES TARGETED AT THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1812Z SH

FBIS 080

TAKE 12 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND ITS ALLIES.

LD021737

(TEXT) ALL THIS COMPELS US TO ATTACH MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENCES. THE SOVIET PEOPLE WANT NOT AN ARMS BUILDUP BUT THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY BOTH SIDES. BUT WE MUST TAKE CARE TO ENSURE SUFFICIENT SECURITY FOR OUR COUNTRY, ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THIS IS PRECISLY WHAT IS BEING DONE. AND LET EVERYONE KNOW THAT NONE OF THOSE GIVEN TO ARMED VENTURES WILL CATCH US UNAWARES AND NO POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR CAN HOPE TO AVOID DEVASTATING RETALIATION.

AT THE SAME TIME IT IS PRECISELY THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION THAT COMPELS US TO REDOUBLE AND TRIPLE OUR EFFORTS IN PURSUING A POLICY OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

ONE CAN HARDLY RECALL A PROBLEM OF IMPORTANCE TO STRENGTHENING PEACE ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS CONCRETE AND REALISTIC PROPOSALS. THE INITIATIVES OF OUR COUNTRIES ARE WINNING EVERY BROADER SUPPORT FROM OTHER STATES. THIS HAS BEEN FORCEFULLY CONFIRMED BY THE LATEST SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IMPERIALIST POLITICIANS ARE TRYING IN EVERY WAY TO LIMIT THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO IMPAIR THEIR COHESION AND TO ERODE THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM WHEREVER THEY THINK THEY CAN COUNT ON SUCCESS. IN THESE CONDITIONS IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE SOLIDARITY OF FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE LEADERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AGAIN UNANIMOUSLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION OF THIS DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING IN MOSCOW.

THE USA USES AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND MILITARY THREATS AGAINST SOCIALIST CUBA. BUT THE HOPES TO SCARE IT AND TO MAKE IT SWERVE FROM ITS CHOSEN ROAD ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE. THIS IS GUARANTEED BY THE INFLEXIBLE WILL OF THE HEROIC CUBAN PEOPLE RALLIED AROUND THEIR COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS IS GUARANTEED BY THE SOLIDARITY DISPLAYED WITH THE ISLAND OF FREEDOM BY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND BY MANY PARTICIPANTS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THE CUBAN PEOPLE ARE RESOLUTELY SUPPORTED BY THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. AS FOR THE USSR, IT WAS, IS AND WILL REMAIN ON CUBA'S SIDE IN FAIR WEATHER AND IN STORM.

THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA COULD, OF COURSE, CONTRIBUTE TO THE GROWTH OF THE ROLE OF SOCIALISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE ARE CONSISTENT PROPONENTS OF THIS NORMALISATION. POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS SHOW, HOWEVER, THAT THERE REMAIN DIFFERENCES ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. IN PARTICULAR, WE CANNOT MAKE ANY AGREEMENTS TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES. EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS CONTINUES, HOWEVER, AND WE CONSIDER IT USEFUL. THE SOVIET UNION STANDS FOR THE LEVEL OF CONTACTS BEING RAISED TO THE EXTENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

IT IS ALSO USEFUL THAT MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL CONTACTS IN THE ECONOMY, CULTURE, SCIENCE AND OTHER FIELDS ARE BEING GRADUALLY RE-ESTABLISHED. THIS IS NOT TO THE LIKING OF THOSE WHO WANT TO BENEFIT BY THE AGGRAVATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA. BUT IT IS TO THE GOOD OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE OVERALL WORLD SITUATION.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1819Z SH

FBIS 081

TAKE 13 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///OVERALL WORLD SITUATION.

LD021746

(TEXT) THE DANGER OF THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF THE INCESSANT ESCALATION OF TENSION HAS BECOME OBVIOUS. THE GRAVER THREAT IT POSES TO HUMAN CIVILISATION, THE STRONGER HUMANITY'S FORCES OF SELF-PRESERVATION GROW. INDIGNATION IS RISING IN WESTERN EUROPE OVER THE ACTIONS OF THOSE WHO ARE SACRIFICING ITS SECURITY TO THE IMPERIAL AMBITIONS OF WASHINGTON. MILLIONS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANTI-MISSILE MOVEMENT ARE QUITE VOCAL IN MAKING THIS KNOWN.

ALSO, FAR FROM ALL THE LEADERS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES AND INFLUENTIAL POLITICAL PARTIES APPROVE THE ADVENTURISM OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. IT WORRIES A CONSIDERABLE SEGMENT OF THE U.S. PUBLIC ITSELF AS WELL. THEY ARE REALIZING EVER CLEARER THAT THE INTENSIVE MILITARISATION AND THE AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAVE NOT BROUGHT NOR ARE GOING TO BRING THE USA MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS. THEY ONLY LEAD EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD TO THE ESCALATION OF CRITICISM OF WASHINGTON'S BELLIGERENT COURSE. PEOPLE WANT PEACE AND TRANQUILITY RATHER THAN WAR HYSTERIA. I CAN SAY THAT OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF MANY FOREIGN DELEGATIONS WHO ATTENDED THE FUNERAL OF YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV CONFIRMED THAT WITH SUFFICIENT FORCEFULNESS.

ALL THIS INSPIRES THE HOPE THAT DEVELOPMENTS WILL EVENTUALLY BE TURNED AROUND TOWARDS PEACE, THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

DETENTE HAS STRUCK DEEP ROOTS. THIS IS EVIDENCED, IN PARTICULAR, BY THE CONVOCATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

OF COURSE, IT IS THE BRIDLING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE THAT IS OF KEY IMPORTANCE TO PEACE AND THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES. THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION ON THAT ISSUE IS CLEAR. WE ARE AGAINST RIVALRY IN BUILDING UP NUCLEAR ARMS ARSENALS. WE WERE AND REMAIN PROPONENTS OF THE PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION OF ALL TYPES OF THOSE WEAPONS. OUR PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE WERE SUBMITTED LONG AGO, BOTH TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE, BUT DISCUSSION ON THEM IS BEING BLOCKED BY THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES.

AS FOR EUROPE, WE STILL STAND FOR IT BEING FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH MEDIUM-RANGE AND TACTICAL ONES.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1820Z SH

FBIS 082

TAKE 14 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND TACTICAL ONES.

LD021806

(TEXT) ATTENTION WAS DRAWN WORLDWIDE TO THE FACT THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH EVERYTHING WHAT THE PRESENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID, AND, WHICH IS THE MAIN THING, DONE AND CONTINUES DOING IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ASSURANCES OF ITS GOOD INTENTIONS CAN BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ONLY IF THEY ARE SUBSTANTIATED WITH REAL ACTIONS. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONCRETE QUESTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES, FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE. THERE ARE QUITE A FEW SUCH QUESTIONS. AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVE ITS PEACEABLENESS BY DEEDS.

WHY SHOULD NOT THE USA, FOR EXAMPLE, RATIFY THE TREATIES WITH THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, WHICH WERE SIGNED ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO, AND NOT TO COMPLETE DRAWING UP AN AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS? I WILL REMIND THAT THE TALKS ON THESE ISSUES WERE BROKEN OFF BY THE UNITED STATES. THE USA CAN ALSO MAKE A NO SMALL CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE. THE USSR IS KNOWN TO HAVE PROPOSED IT FOR A LONG TIME.

THE PERCEABLE ASSURANCES BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD INSPIRE BY FAR MORE TRUST HAD IT ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL ON A MUTUAL FREEZE ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO MANY WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCUMULATED THAT THIS STEP WOULD NOT CREATE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE GENERAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, AND, IT MUST BE BELIEVED, WOULD FACILITATE REACHING AGREEMENT ON A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

A VERY IMPORTANT TASK IS TO DELIVER MANKIND FROM THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TALKS ON THAT HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS ALREADY FOR A LONG TIME, BUT NOW IT SEEMS THAT PREREQUISITES ARE BEGINNING TO RIPEN FOR RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION, DESTRUCTION OF ALL OF ITS STOCKPILES. WE ARE FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THAT CONTROL SHOULD COVER THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- FROM BEGINNING TO END.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1831Z HJO

FBIS 082 (SUB FOR FBIS 082)

TAKE 14 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///AND TACTICAL ONES.

LD021806

(TEXT) WE STAND FOR BOTH SIDES MAKING THE FIRST MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WITHOUT WASTING TIME. IN SO DOING, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO INTENTION OF STRENGTHENING ITS SECURITY AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS BUT WANTS EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL.

REGRETTABLY, THE UNITED STATES HAS TURNED ITS PARTICIPATION IN TALKS ON THIS SUBJECT INTO A TOOL OF PROPAGANDA TO CAMOUFLAGE THE ARMS RACE AND COLD WAR POLICY. WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS GAME. THE AMERICANS CREATED OBSTACLES TO THE TALKS BOTH ON "EUROPEAN" AND ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY DEPLOYING THEIR MISSILES IN EUROPE. IT IS THE REMOVAL OF THESE OBSTACLES (WHICH WOULD ALSO REMOVE THE NEED FOR OUR MEASURES TAKEN IN RESPONSE) THAT OFFERS THE WAY TO WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ACCORD.

THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS LATELY BEGUN TO MAKE PEACEABLY SOUNDING STATEMENTS, URGING US TO ENTER A "DIALOGUE."

ATTENTION WAS DRAWN WORLDWIDE TO THE FACT THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH EVERYTHING WHAT THE PRESENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION HAS SAID, AND, WHICH IS THE MAIN THING, DONE AND CONTINUES DOING IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ASSURANCES OF ITS GOOD INTENTIONS CAN BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY ONLY IF THEY ARE SUBSTANTIATED WITH REAL ACTIONS. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO CONCRETE QUESTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BOTH COUNTRIES, FOR THE BENEFIT OF PEACE. THERE ARE QUITE A FEW SUCH QUESTIONS. AND THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVE ITS PEACEABLENESS BY DEEDS.

WHY SHOULD NOT THE USA, FOR EXAMPLE, RATIFY THE TREATIES WITH THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, WHICH WERE SIGNED ALMOST TEN YEARS AGO, AND NOT TO COMPLETE DRAWING UP AN AGREEMENT ON THE GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS? I WILL REMIND THAT THE TALKS ON THESE ISSUES WERE BROKEN OFF BY THE UNITED STATES. THE USA CAN ALSO MAKE A NO SMALL CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE BY CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT ON THE RENUNCIATION OF THE MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE. THE USSR IS KNOWN TO HAVE PROPOSED IT FOR A LONG TIME.

THE PEACEABLE ASSURANCES BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD INSPIRE BY FAR MORE TRUST HAD IT ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL ON A MUTUAL FREEZE ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO MANY WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCUMULATED THAT THIS STEP WOULD NOT CREATE EVEN THE SLIGHTEST THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE GENERAL POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, AND, IT MUST BE BELIEVED, WOULD FACILITATE REACHING AGREEMENT ON A REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

A VERY IMPORTANT TASK IS TO DELIVER MANKIND FROM THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. TALKS ON THAT HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS ALREADY FOR A LONG TIME, BUT NOW IT SEEMS THAT PREREQUISITES ARE BEGINNING TO RIPEN FOR RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION, DESTRUCTION OF ALL OF ITS STOCKPILES. WE ARE FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONTROL FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THAT CONTROL SHOULD COVER THE WHOLE PROCESS OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- FROM BEGINNING TO END.

(MORE)

2 MAR 1961Z SH

FBIS 094

TAKE 15 OF 15 -- 049 (CHERNENKO SPEECH)

///BEGINNING TO END.

LD021909

(TEXT) IT IS NOT RULED OUT THAT REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ISSUES WOULD SIGNAL THE START OF A REAL DRASTIC CHANGE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE. WE WOULD WISH SUCH A DRASTIC CHANGE. NOW IT IS UP TO WASHINGTON TO ACT.

THE POLICY OF THE POWERS POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN OUR TIMES. THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE OF MANKIND; THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATESMEN TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS REQUIRE THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE POWERS SHOULD BE REGULATED BY CERTAIN NORMS. OUR IDEA OF THESE NORMS IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- TO REGARD THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF ONE'S FOREIGN POLICY. TO PREVENT SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH NUCLEAR CONFLICT. IN THE EVENT SUCH A DANGER EMERGES, URGENT CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE HELD TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION FROM BREAKING OUT.

-- TO RENOUNCE THE PROPAGANDA OF NUCLEAR WAR IN ANY OF ITS VARIATIONS -- EITHER GLOBAL OR LIMITED.

-- TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES; IN WHOSE TERRITORY THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS. TO RESPECT THE STATUS OF A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ALREADY CREATED AND TO ENCOURAGE THE CREATION OF NEW NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE WORLD.

-- TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY FORM; NOT TO HAND OVER THESE WEAPONS OR CONTROL OVER THEM TO ANYBODY; NOT TO DEPLOY THEM ON THE TERRITORY OF THE COUNTRIES, WHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS; NOT TO SPREAD THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO NEW SPHERES, INCLUDING OUTER SPACE.

-- TO PRESS STEP BY STEP, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY FOR THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, UP TO THEIR COMPLETE LIQUIDATION IN ALL THEIR VARIETIES.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE THESE PRINCIPLES THE FOUNDATION OF ITS POLICY. WE ARE READY TO REACH AGREEMENT AT ANY TIME WITH THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS ON THE JOINT RECOGNITION OF NORMS OF THIS KIND AND IMPARTING THEM A MANDATORY CHARACTER. I THINK THAT THIS WOULD MEET THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE WORLD.

COMRADES, ALL WE HAVE, ALL WE ARE PROUD OF -- THE FREEDOM AND RIGHT OF THE HOMELAND, ITS HIGH PRESTIGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, THE FULL-BLOODED PEACEFUL LIFE OF THE PEOPLE -- WE ALL OWE TO THE INTENSIVE CREATIVE WORK OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. IT IS THIS WORK THAT IS AN INEXHAUSTIBLE SOURCE OF OUR CONFIDENCE OF THE FUTURE.

THE WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE FARMERS, SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND WORKERS IN CULTURE, TEACHERS AND SERVICEMEN ARE MEETING THE ELECTIONS TO THE SUPREME SOVIET WITH NEW ACHIEVEMENTS IN THEIR WORK. MAY THESE ACHIEVEMENTS FURTHER MULTIPLY. AND THEN OUR STATE -- THE BULWARK OF LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY OF PEOPLES -- WILL BE EVEN STRONGER. THEN THE LIFE OF EVERY SOVIET FAMILY WILL BECOME EVEN BETTER. THEN OUR COUNTRY WILL EVEN MORE SUCCESSFULLY ADVANCE ALONG THE ROAD OF BUILDING COMMUNISM."

(ENDALL)

2 MAR 1941Z SH

FURTHER ON CHERNENKO 2 MARCH MEETING WITH ELECTORS

LD021539 FOR YOUR INFORMATION

AT 1458 GMT MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE AND MOSCOW TELEVISION SERVICE IN RUSSIAN TO RELAY CHERNENKO'S MEETING WITH THE VOTERS. CHERNENKO IS SHOWN STANDING UNAIDED, WHILE THE CAMERA SHOWS THE AUDIENCE APPLAUDING UNTIL HE REACHES THE ROSTRUM. AT THE ROSTRUM HE IS SHOWN STANDING AND RESTING HIS HANDS ON THE DESK, READING HIS SPEECH QUICKLY, BREATHING HEAVILY AND AUDIBLY AFTER EVERY HALF-DOZEN OR SO WORDS. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 5 MINUTES HE DONS A PAIR OF GLASSES, AND DELIVERS HIS SPEECH SO RAPIDLY THAT SOME OF THE WORDS ARE MUMBLED AND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND.

CHERNENKO THANKS PREVIOUS SPEAKERS AND THOSE WHO NOMINATED HIM. HE EXPRESSES GRIEF AT ANDROPOV'S DEATH, NOTING THE PARTY'S AND COUNTRY'S PROGRESS UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. HE SPEAKS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS AND THE PARTY'S APPROACH.

CHERNENKO THEN SPEAKS OF THE COUNTRY'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN MODERNIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, ALTHOUGH HE REMARKS THAT LESS HAS BEEN DONE THAN IS DESIRABLE. HE NOTES PROGRESS IN ENERGY AND SCIENCE, AND THEN TURNS TO LAST YEAR'S GRAIN HARVEST SAYING THAT IT AMOUNTED TO 190 MILLION METRIC TONS. HE SAYS THAT MORE HAS TO BE SPENT ON DEFENSE BECAUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, BUT THAT THE AIM IS STILL TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THE FOOD PROGRAM IS STILL GOING AHEAD, HE CONTINUES. THERE IS ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH CEWA AND HOUSING CONSTRUCTION IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PARTY. HE SAYS TEACHERS ARE TO RECEIVE A WAGE INCREASE NEXT YEAR AND THAT THERE ARE TO BE BETTER PROVISIONS LARGE FAMILIES AND NEWLYWEDS.

REFERRING TO 1983 IN PARTICULAR, CHERNENKO NOTES THE NEW MEASURES AND THAT THE DECLINE IN GROWTH HAS BEEN HALTED. HE RECOMMENDS THAT PEOPLE BE MORE ENERGETIC IN DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY; THERE HAVE TO BE MORE PROFOUND CHANGES; THE POTENTIAL IS NOT BEING FULLY EXPLOITED. HE SAYS THAT THE NARROW LOCAL APPROACH MUST BE ERADICATED BUT THAT LOCAL INITIATIVES MUST NOT BE SHACKLED. HE ADDS THAT CURRENT EXPERIMENTS GIVE MORE RESPONSIBILITY AND POWERS TO ENTERPRISES, THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF HIGH PAYMENT FOR BETTER WORK MUST BECOME UNIVERSAL, AND THAT THE PARTY IS PRESSING AHEAD WITH WORK ON IMPROVING THE ECONOMY'S EFFICIENCY.

. CHERNENKO CONTINUES TO SPEAK, GAINING STRENGTH IN DELIVERY, AND AT 1523 GMT A MAN BRINGS A GLASS OF AMBER LIQUID TO HIM AT THE ROSTRUM AND REMOVES A SIMILAR GLASS.

CHERNENKO SPEAKS OF THE JUNE PLENUM DECISIONS, THE NEED FOR THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO BE IMPROVED AND THE WORKING MASSES' INITIATIVE TO BE ENCOURAGED. HE EXPRESSES INDIGNATION AT IDLERS AND DRUNKARDS, SAYING THAT AN IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD WORK MUST NOT BE TOLERATED. HE ADDS THAT THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION WILL CONTINUE. HE SPEAKS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND FOREIGN CRITICISM OF IT.

CHERNENKO OBSERVES THAT CITIZENS ARE BECOMING MORE INVOLVED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE AFFAIRS, SAYING THAT ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS CRITICISM SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED. HE REMARKS THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS NOW WORKING ON THE NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY'S PROGRAM, SAYING THAT THE LENINIST STYLE OF WORK IS A SPIRITUAL REQUIREMENT, DENOUNCING ARROGANCE IN MANAGERS, AND URGING PARTY MEMBERS TO SET A PERSONAL EXAMPLE. THOSE MANAGERS NOT UP TO THESE PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT BE IN MANAGEMENT POSTS, CHERNENKO STATES. HE DENOUNCES THE TREND OF SETTING UP MANY COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS.

TURNING TO FOREIGN POLICY, CHERNENKO REMARKS THAT LAST YEAR THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE AGGRESSIVE TENDENCIES OF IMPERIALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AND THERE WERE INVASIONS IN LEBANON AND GRENADA. ON THE U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WEST EUROPE HE SAYS THAT "THIS OBLIGES US TO GIVE MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO STRENGTHENING OUR DEFENSE," AND THAT "NO LOVERS OF MILITARY ADVENTURES WILL CATCH US UNAWARES; NO AGGRESSOR WILL AVOID A CRUSHING RETURN STRIKE." HE ADDS THAT THE USSR'S PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC AND GAINING SUPPORT. HE STRESSES SUPPORT FOR CUBA, NOTING THE USEFULNESS OF CONTACTS WITH IT. HE SAYS THE DANGERS OF IMPERIALIST POLICIES ARE EVER MORE APPARENT, COMMENTING THAT MILLIONS ARE PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-WAR MOVEMENTS IN WEST EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. CHERNENKO STATES: "WE HOPE TO TURN EVENTS BACK INTO THE PATH OF DETENTE, FURTHERING THE CAUSE OF PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION." HE SAYS THAT THE USSR OPPOSES THE BUILDUP OF MILITARY ARSENALS, BUT THE UNITED STATES IS BLOCKING ITS PROPOSALS.

AS HE SPEAKS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVING OPPORTUNITIES TO SHOW GOOD WILL IF IT WISHES, CHERNENKO SEEMS TO LOSE HIS PLACE. THERE IS A 5 TO 6 SECOND PAUSE; THE AUDIENCE APPLAUDS, AND CHERNENKO RESUMES HIS SPEECH. DURING THE SILENCE THE CAMERA SWITCHES TO THE AUDIENCE AND THEN RETURNS TO CHERNENKO AS HE BEGINS TO SPEAK.

CHERNENKO SAYS THAT IT COULD BE POSSIBLE REACH AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HE SAYS THE USSR IS PREPARED TO RESPECT NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NO ARMS IN SPACE, AND THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD BE REDUCED AND EVENTUALLY COMPLETELY LIQUIDATED IN ALL THEIR FORMS ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS. HE ADDS THAT THE USSR IS READY TO COME TO AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER STATES ON THIS BASIS.

HE CONCLUDES BY SAYING THAT ALL OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS ARE THE RESULT OF THE WORK OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND EXPRESSES WISHES FOR FURTHER ADVANCEMENT. AT 1547 GMT CHERNENKO'S SPEECH ENDS TO PROLONGED APPLAUSE. A DISTANT SHOW SHOWS HIM WALKING BACK FROM THE ROSTRUM. THE AUDIENCE STANDS, AS DOES THE PRESIDIUM, INCLUDING CHERNENKO, WHO IS THE FIRST TO SIT DOWN.

AT 1550 GMT, PROKOFYEV GIVES A VOTE OF THANKS, WHILE THE CAMERA SHOWS CHERNENKO SCRATCHING BEHIND HIS EAR AND COUGHING. GRISHIN IS SHOWN SPEAKING TO CHERNENKO, WHO ACKNOWLEDGES HIM WITH A NOD OF THE HEAD. AS PROKOFYEV CALLS ON ALL TO VOTE FOR CHERNENKO, THERE IS PROLONGED APPLAUSE.

AT 1553 GMT THE MEETING IS DECLARED CLOSED. THE PRESIDIUM, INCLUDING CHERNENKO, ALL STAND AND THE CAMERA SWINGS FROM THEM TO THE AUDIENCE.

THE RELAY ENDS AT 1554 GMT.

2 MAR 1841Z SH

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THE WHITE HOUSE
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter

Issue

Whether to sign a reply to Chernenko's letter of March 19.

Facts

Chernenko wrote you on March 19 a letter which accepted the need for a dialogue in general but held fast to Soviet positions on key issues. Following the March 27 NSC meeting, you directed that a reply be staffed. George Shultz sent you a draft with his memorandum of April 6 (Tab B), and it was subsequently revised slightly by the NSC staff with State's concurrence.

Discussion

As you directed in NSDD-137, the reply focuses on refuting Soviet allegations in Chernenko's letter, and on our readiness to reopen talks on INF and START. It makes clear to Chernenko the inconsistency in his position that we should negotiate in areas of interest to them while they refuse to negotiate on these central issues. It also suggests that we would be willing to consider ways to deal with their proposal for a non-use-of-force declaration at the Stockholm Conference, provided the Soviets deal seriously with the confidence-building measures proposed by us and our Allies.

Some Soviet representatives have suggested that our movement on this point would be considered a "signal" that we were serious in taking Soviet concerns into account. I think it is worth a try. I would point out, however, that we have not yet fully staffed all the implications of the trade-offs between our proposal and the Soviet proposal, and we will proceed to do this before we go beyond generalities in discussions with the Soviets.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M04-018 #1

BY CS, NARA, DATE 12/19/05

Regarding George's comments on the interagency process, I agree that Presidential correspondence should not be drafted by interagency committees, but believe that positions taken in the correspondence must reflect decisions you take following discussion on an interagency basis, so that you will have all the facts at your disposal when you make your decision. I do not agree with George that discussion in the SACPG has delayed the decision-making process.

If you find the letter acceptable, George intends to have Art Hartman deliver it in Moscow on Monday, and he would follow up here in a meeting with Dobrynin.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Chernenko at TAB A.

OK No

— —

Attachments:

Tab A -- Letter to Chernenko

Tab B -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19, together with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin in recent discussions with Ambassador Hartman and Secretary Shultz. I welcome the fact that you too recognize the value of direct exchanges of views on the important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

First of all, I would like to reiterate my congratulations upon your assumption of the new and responsible position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I look forward to productive working relations with you in your new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our peoples.

In looking at the present state of affairs between our two countries, I believe it will be useful to reflect upon our differing perceptions of one another. You have expressed concern about U.S. actions and military programs which you see as threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate the priority you attach to the security of the Soviet state, particularly in light of the enormous costs shouldered by your people in helping to defeat Nazi Germany, but I cannot understand why our programs can be considered threatening. On the contrary, in our view there are many Soviet actions and military programs which we and our Allies consider to be threatening to our own vital security interests.

For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship massive quantities of arms to sensitive areas near our borders, and appears bent on promoting instability rather than peaceful change in many areas of the developing world. Your country's large-scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan,

DECLASSIFIED / 22/07/80

NLS 104-018 #2

BY CLS, NARA, DATE 12/19/05

in close proximity to one of our closest friends, Pakistan, makes less reassuring your government's frequent avowals of peaceful intent.

Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous increase in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces targeted against the United States and our Allies. This build-up may initially have been designed to attain parity with the United States, yet at some point in the last decade that goal was achieved; we have good reason to question, therefore, why the growth in Soviet nuclear forces has nonetheless continued unabated.

Take strategic offensive forces as an example. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, five new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and at least thirteen modernized versions of existing missiles. As you well know, the USSR is now flight-testing two new ICBMs, plus another new type of SLBM. As we see it, you claim to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new missiles have been deployed years ahead of their U.S. counterparts, not to mention in greater numbers.

In the area of ballistic missile defense, your country has been engaged for many years in a research effort similar to that recently initiated in the United States and, indeed, is the only nation to deploy an active anti-ballistic missile system; moreover, your deployment of a network of advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to question whether the USSR is laying the basis for a nationwide ABM defense of the USSR. And there are, of course, other aspects of existing arms control agreements where the concerns we have raised with you have not been alleviated.

As you know, your country's deployment of the SS-20 has been of especially grave concern both to the United States and our Allies. Since NATO's December 1979 decision, when your country asserted that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238 additional SS-20's with over 700 additional warheads. These missiles constitute a far greater threat to the security of the western alliance --

both in quantitative and qualitative terms -- than previous Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads and lower accuracy.

These are some of the realities of the international situation as we see it. I recognize that neither of us will be able to persuade the other as to who is to blame for the present poor state of our relations. Nor would it be productive for the two of us to engage in a lengthy debate on this subject. I doubt, however, that we can make progress in reducing the tensions between our countries, or in reducing the high levels of armaments, if either of us is unwilling to take into account the concerns of the other.

As for myself, I am prepared to consider your concerns seriously, even when I have difficulty understanding why they are held. I am willing to explore possible ways to alleviate them. But solutions will elude us if you are unable to approach our discussions in the same spirit, or if you demand concessions as an entry fee for the discussions themselves.

As for the negotiations now underway, I believe the Stockholm conference provides an opportunity for both our countries to take steps to reduce some of the apprehensions about each other's military activities. I was encouraged by your expression of hope for positive results at Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at building confidence between East and West. As you know, we and our Allies have presented a package of specific measures which, if implemented, could substantially reduce the dangers of misunderstanding and miscalculation in Europe.

If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously on such concrete confidence-building measures, the United States will be prepared to discuss the question of reciprocal assurances against the use of force and the context in which such an agreement can be reached. You have asked for a "concrete signal" in the area of arms control, and your representatives have specified that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force would be considered such a signal. In this connection let me add that I am pleased that our

Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have agreed to get together soon. This will provide an opportunity to discuss an arrangement that would meet both countries' concerns.

There are many other arms control topics where we hope to move forward in the weeks and months ahead. As I said in my previous letter, the Western countries plan to present new proposals at the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid basis for progress on the related issues of data and verification. In the Conference on Disarmament, the Vice President will table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons on April 18. In addition to this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps the time has come when bilateral consultations on the issue could advance the prospects for an effective and verifiable ban.

While the foregoing issues are important, and while there may be other arms control areas -- including those raised in your letter -- where steps forward could be made, we have always considered the central element of our dialogue on arms control to be the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The United States has advanced proposals that would substantially reduce the most threatening nuclear weapons systems on both sides. We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in an effort to respond to the concerns your negotiators have expressed. I must state frankly that I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet shown such flexibility, or taken advantage of the opportunity for private discussions on ways to make progress in the START and INF negotiations.

I am well aware of your views regarding the impasse in these negotiations. You are, I am sure, equally aware of the fact that we and our Allies do not agree with your analysis of the balance in intermediate-range missiles or your assessment of the "obstacles" that supposedly stand in the way of further negotiations. For our part, we are prepared to consider any equitable outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate entirely our deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles in the context of an agreement between the two sides.

Experience has shown that neither side can hope to impose its view of the situation on the other as a precondition for negotiations. Rather, what is needed is for our representatives to sit down and devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that is consistent with the security interests of both our nations. So let us focus on the concrete task of reaching agreements in this spirit, rather than wasting our energies debating further the meaning of "equality and equal security."

I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness of the United States to explore with the Soviet Union possible ways for moving forward on the nuclear arms negotiations. As I have said previously, we have a number of specific ideas to present for overcoming some of the fundamental differences that have divided us in the negotiations. We are prepared to discuss these in private diplomatic channels or between our respective negotiators. If the Soviet side is prepared to match U.S. flexibility, I would hope that, by this means, the way could be cleared to resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms reductions. I would welcome any concrete suggestions you might have on how to proceed.

I am pleased that we agree on the importance of exchanges of views on regional problems. As you state, such exchanges should be directed toward the peaceful settlement of local disputes and the strengthening of peace. Over the past three years, the United States has taken the initiative to discuss a number of regional problems in precisely this spirit. For example, we have initiated formal consultations with your country's experts on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While such exchanges have not been as fruitful as we had hoped, I would like to pursue them, with the objective of establishing a more productive dialogue on regional issues. I believe it would be useful for our experts to hold more detailed discussions of developments in southern Africa -- as Foreign Minister Gromyko has suggested -- because there are promising signs of progress toward a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement would serve the interests of the states in the area, and of all those who value stability and prosperity there.

The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area where a further exchange of views would be helpful. In this regard, I was pleased to read of your personal commitment to seeking an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions which might lead the parties to prolong or expand it. I wish to assure you that the United States shares these objectives, and that we will continue making every effort to achieve them.

To improve mutual understanding on this issue, Secretary Shultz has on several recent occasions voiced to Ambassador Dobrynin our concerns about any expansion of the war to other areas of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to communicate the importance we attach to maintaining freedom of navigation there for the ships of all nations. We believe our interest in supporting this principle of international law serves all and threatens none, and we regret the misrepresentations of our position which have appeared in the official Soviet news media. Such commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the area.

With respect to our bilateral relations, I think we agree that we should seek to enlarge the areas of mutually beneficial cooperation and inject real content into our bilateral agreements. My representatives will continue to present specific proposals in this regard, and I hope that the Soviet side will not put any artificial barriers in the way of progress.

I must add that I am disappointed that you did not respond to the appeal in my March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues. Steps in this area could have a substantial impact on other aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will continue to give them serious consideration.

To conclude, let me state once again that the United States is ready for a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have made a concerted effort to put content into our dialogue. We have a number of specific ideas to explore with you on questions of vital importance to both our peoples. We intend to continue our efforts in this direction. Real progress, however, will

require similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union.

I look forward to receiving your comments on the thoughts I have expressed.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90448

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GB*
SUBJECT: Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter

We have drafted a response to Chernenko's March 19 letter (attached), taking into account my meeting with Dobrynin last Monday, Art Hartman's exchange with Gromyko last Tuesday, and the guidance you provided in NSDD-137 on nuclear arms control strategy.

The letter serves a number of the policy objectives you stressed at the March 27 NSC meeting:

-- it counters the Soviets' arguments about an alleged U.S. "threat" by describing some of the Soviet actions and military programs which make them appear a threat to us;

-- it reaffirms the U.S. commitment to arms control and our readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements; and

-- it attempts to reassure the Soviets we are not a threat, and to "get Chernenko's attention," by expressing our readiness to consider in the CDE a non-use of force undertaking if the Soviets agree to some of the specific confidence-building measures we have proposed.

On this last point, the Soviets at all levels have been asking for just such a "concrete signal" from us. Although they are now giving somewhat more attention to outer space arms control, they also have been signalling for months that they consider our attitude toward non-use of force as a kind of litmus test of U.S. "seriousness" in the arms control field. Chernenko's April 4 message to the Socialist International cited non-use of force once again. By highlighting our willingness to move in reciprocal fashion on this issue, therefore, our proposed letter provides tangible evidence for Chernenko of your commitment to moving the relationship forward.

The Soviets today invited Jim Goodby to Moscow for consultations with his Soviet counterpart; we are now working on the dates. This would be an opportunity to begin exploring the idea.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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NLS M02012 #16

BY CU, NARA, DATE 10/17/05

Jim Goodby is confident that our Allies will support our pursuit of a trade between non-use of force and CBMs at the next round of the CDE. In fact, the Allies and he have been planning on the Western countries agreeing to a working group discussion of non-use of force -- which would represent implicit acceptance of it. Gromyko, however, may try to obscure the significance of our willingness to have working group discussions unless we broach the idea directly with Chernenko -- only through the letter can we ensure that you will get credit for our move.

Without this language on CDE, there will be nothing in this letter to get Chernenko's attention. Pending your approval of the proposal, we have put the relevant language in brackets.

In addition to the above, our proposed reply reviews the rest of our arms control agenda (our paramount interest in START and INF; our disappointment that the Soviets have failed to take up the offer of private exploratory exchanges; and our desire for progress on CW and MBFR). The subsequent discussion of regional problems takes into account Gromyko's interesting démarche on southern Africa and my agreement with Dobrynin to more intensive exchanges on regional issues, including the Mideast and Persian Gulf. The letter concludes with paragraphs on bilateral issues and human rights, noting in particular your regret at Chernenko's failure to respond to your appeals for humanitarian gestures.

Bureaucratic Considerations: In NSDD-137, you requested a letter to Chernenko be drafted focusing on START and INF -- the flexibility we have shown to date, our readiness to reopen talks anytime, anywhere, etc. -- and refuting Soviet allegations about the U.S. threat. We believe our draft, while perhaps not going into all the detail envisaged in the NSDD, fulfills its main requirements without neglecting other areas of our agenda. For this reason, we believe that this letter should be sent now, and that it not be coordinated with the other agencies. Based on previous experience, reaching consensus in the SACPG on anything specific will take weeks if not months. Moreover, I believe strongly that, as a general rule, the drafting of Presidential correspondence should not become the province of the bureaucracy. Of course, as constructive ideas develop from the process launched by the NSDD, they can be incorporated into other letters to Chernenko.

A Final Point: A Supreme Soviet session has been called for early next week, and it is widely anticipated in Moscow that the meeting will "elect" Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium, the titular Head of State. Thus our draft includes bracketed language congratulating Chernenko on his new appointment, and addressing him as "Mr. Chairman."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

If you approve our proposed reply, I would envisage having Art Hartman deliver it in Moscow next week. I would at the same time call in Dobrynin to give him a copy, as well as to continue our discussions of last Monday.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached reply to Chernenko's March 19 letter.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Not signed

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have asked His Excellency Juan Antonio Samaranch, President of the International Olympic Committee, to present this message to you during his visit to Moscow.

I have personally assured President Samaranch and Mr. Peter V. Ueberroth, President of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, that the Government of the United States is thoroughly committed to upholding the Olympic Charter and fulfilling its responsibilities as the host nation of the Games of the XXIII Olympiad.

President Samaranch is visiting your country to ensure that your government and your sports officials are fully informed that the United States will warmly welcome all athletes from all teams and provide nondiscriminatory treatment for all Olympic nations.

I know that you share my enthusiasm for this great sporting event, and I am looking forward to seeing all the outstanding athletes of the world marching behind their flags in Los Angeles on July 28. I consider sport to be one of the finest opportunities for people of all nations to come to know and understand each other.

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NLS MO4-018 #4

BY CH, NARA, DATE 12/19/05

The American people look forward to serving as host for the Olympic Games and to providing an hospitable climate in which the athletes can perform to the best of their abilities.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Unclass PAGES 2
FROM Bob Kimmitt 456 2224 WH
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Letter to Chernenko

| <u>TO (AGENCY)</u> | <u>DELIVER TO:</u> | <u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u> | <u>EXTENSION</u> |
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REMARKS: This draft would replace letter sent to you on Friday. Need comments by COB today, 5/7.

Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee

Los Angeles, California 90084 USA
Telephone (213) 209-1984
Telex: 194694 • (Int'l) 4720482



Reply To:
1015 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 905
Washington, D.C. 20005
Telephone (202) 682-1984

May 7, 1984

MEMO TO: Michael Deaver
FROM: Jay Moorhead
SUBJECT: Letter to Chernenko

Ueberroth has requested that, if possible, the letter from Reagan to Chernenko be changed. Peter thinks that if the reference to him is changed to Samaranch it will carry more weight with the Russians, especially since he will have just met with the President. Samaranch would be independently confirming, to Chernenko, that both the U.S. Government and the LAOOC are upholding the Olympic Charter etc. The Russians will have no excuse.

The letter Peter wants to suggest is taken from your previous letter.

SOVIET UNION

Chernenko's Health:

- o Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko has not appeared publicly since December 27. There are many reports that he is ill but although we follow this quite closely here and in Moscow, there are few hard facts.
- o Press reports have variously said that he has suffered a stroke or heart attack, that he has pneumonia, that he is near death, that he will soon resign, or that he was very sick but is now recovering.
- o He was reported Thursday by TASS, a bit ambiguously, to have "addressed" the Politburo meeting but, as is usual for these meetings, there was no film footage or photographic coverage of the event.
- o I believe it would serve no useful purpose for me to speculate or comment on this subject.

Succession Politics:

- o It would also not be appropriate to discuss likely Soviet succession scenarios or their impact on U.S.-Soviet relations.
- o It is clear that there is a functioning Soviet government with whom we continue to do business.

Geneva Arms Talks:

- o Our agreement with the Soviets to undertake new arms control negotiations in Geneva on March 12 is a useful first step. We hope eventually to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons and to increase strategic stability that would benefit both sides. We also continue to press our concerns about Soviet human rights abuses, to seek progress on regional issues and to expand bilateral cooperation in a variety of fields on the basis of reciprocity and mutual benefit.
- o Intensive work is underway here to prepare for the opening round of negotiations. We have every reason to believe that this also is true in Moscow. Just as we have appointed three individuals to lead our delegation, the Soviets, too, have appointed three experienced negotiators.

National Security Council
The White House

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| Dep. Exec. Sec'y | | | |
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| NSC Secretariat | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
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I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Jack: Please redo this letter by
COB today. Ueberath is not going
to Moscow