

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Change in Government, July 1985  
**Box:** 21

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/25/2005

**File Folder** USSR-CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT JULY 1985

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2113

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8978	MEMO	RESHUFFLING OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	7/1/1985	B1
8979	CABLE	011547Z JUL 85 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	7/1/1985	B1
8970	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO MCFARLANE RE SHEVARDNADZE FOR GROMYKO <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	7/2/1985	B1
8971	MEMO	MARTIN TO MATLOCK RE SHULTZ EVENING REPORT OF JULY 2, 1985 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
8980	CABLE	021343Z JUL 85 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	7/2/1985	B1
8981	CABLE	020836Z JUL 85 <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	2	7/2/1985	B1
8982	MEMO	COURTNEY TO ARMACOST RE THOUGHTS ON SHEVARDNADZE ELEVATION <i>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</i>	4	7/2/1985	B1
8972	MEMO	ROGOV ON UPCOMING HELSINKI MEETINGS AND GENEVA SUMMIT <i>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	3	7/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/25/2005

**File Folder** USSR-CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT JULY 1985

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2113

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8973	MEMO	ROGOV ON U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL ISSUES <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	4	7/26/1985	B1
8974	MEMO	ROGOV ON GORBACHEV AND REPLACEMENT ON GROMYKO <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	5	7/26/1985	B1
8975	MEMO	CPSU PLENUM APPROVES NEW PROGRAM, PLAN, LEADERSHIP CHANGES; GORBACHEV MAKES CHANGES IN TOP GOSPLAN LEADERSHIP; AND KOREA <b>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	10	10/17/1985	B1
8983	MEMO	GORBACHEV RENEWS AND RESHAPES TOP LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	11/29/1985	B1
8984	MEMO	USSR: PARTY APPOINTMENTS SPEEDED UP AS CONGRESS LOOMS <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	12/5/1985	B1
8985	CABLE	241530Z DEC 85 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	12/24/1985	B1
8976	CABLE	022314Z JAN 86 <b>D 1/11/2008 NLRRF06-114/6</b>	4	1/2/1986	B1 B3
8977	CABLE	301946Z DEC 85	1	12/30/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/25/2005

**File Folder** USSR-CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT JULY 1985

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2113

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8986	CABLE	271404Z JAN 86 <b>PAR 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	1/27/1986	B1
8987	CABLE	281210Z JAN 86 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	1	1/28/1986	B1
8988	CABLE	011201Z MAR 86 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	2	3/1/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

July 1, 1985

JV  
/~~CONFIDENTIAL~~RESHUFFLING OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Our embassy in Moscow considers the 1 July Plenum of the CPSU and the resulting personnel decisions to be another resounding victory for Gorbachev in his efforts to remold the Soviet leadership.

- o The removal from the Politburo of Leningrad party boss Romanov, under the pretext of his problems with alcoholism, indicates that Gorbachev has consolidated his power to the point where he no longer feels compelled to tolerate a former contender for his job.
- o The elevation of Georgian party boss Shevardnadze to full membership in the Politburo was probably based on his record as a successful regional manager and innovator, rather than on his personal ties to Gorbachev.
- o Grishin, once considered a close associate of Romanov, was retained, probably due to support from the older members of the leadership who are less inclined to back Romanov. Grishin was also quick to support Gorbachev once the latter became General Secretary. The possibility exists that Grishin will be removed at the Party Congress in February 1986.

Other significant personnel changes included the promotion of Zaykov, Romanov's successor in Leningrad, and Yel'tsin, a young and up-and-coming party "apparatchik," to the ranks of the Party Secretariat. These supporters of Gorbachev continue the infusion of new blood into the Soviet hierarchy. (C)

Moscow 8838

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFIED BY MOSCOW  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS FOI-114/6#8978  
BY LDS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

FILE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8838 DTG: 011547Z JUL 85 PSN: 023541  
EOB046 AN002141 TOR: 182/1559Z CSN: HCE815

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01 LEHR-01  
MAT-01 /007 A4

PROVIDED BY ROY MEDVEDEV IN REF A) OF THE ROLE WHICH ROMANOV ALLEGEDLY PLAYED IN TRYING TO BLOCK THE CANDIDACY OF GORBACHEV, AND PREDICTIONS HAD MOUNTED THAT ROMANOV WAS NOT LONG DESTINED TO REMAIN IN THE RULING CIRCLES.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: PUBS SIT MATL  
EOB:

4. GORBACHEV'S ABILITY TO OUST ONE OF THE YOUNGER AND MORE DYNAMIC FIGURES FROM THE POLITBURO IS PERHAPS EVEN MORE STRIKING TESTIMONY TO HIS POLITICAL PRE-EMINENCE THAN THE ADDITIONS TO THE LEADERSHIP WHICH HE ENGINEERED AT BOTH THE APRIL AND JULY PLENUMS. WHILE MOST OF THE LEADERSHIP MIGHT NOT HAVE NEEDED MUCH PERSUASION TO AGREE THAT THE AGING AND DWINDLING RANKS NEEDED REPLENISHMENT, THEY MAY HAVE BEEN LESS COMFORTABLE WITH THE PROPOSAL TO REMOVE ONE OF THEIR COLLEAGUES. REMOVALS FROM THE POLITBURO HAVE OCCURRED ONLY VERY RARELY IN THE LAST SEVERAL DECADES AND AFTER THE LOSER'S POSITION HAD BEEN GRADUALLY ERODED. ROMANOV BEGAN TO LOSE GROUND AS SOON AS CHERNENKO'S HEALTH BEGAN ITS LAST DOWNWARD SPIRAL (AS EVIDENCED BY HIS UNUSUALLY LOW STANDING IN THE FEBRUARY RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET ELECTORAL LINE-UP), WHICH MAY WELL HAVE PROMPTED THE ALLEGED LAST DITCH EFFORT TO FORESTALL THE GORBACHEV CANDIDACY.

OP IMMED  
STU7475  
DE RUEHMO #8838/01 1821548  
O 011547Z JUL 85  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2117

INFO USIA WASHDC 1367  
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 08838

5. GRISHIN, OF COURSE, WAS SUPPOSEDLY THE ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATE PUSHED BY ROMANOV TO BLOCK GORBACHEV. IF SUCH WAS INDEED THE CASE, ONE MAY ASK WHY GRISHIN WAS NOT ALSO UNCEREMONIOUSLY DUMPED ALONG WITH ROMANOV. THERE MAY BE SEVERAL POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR GRISHIN'S REPRIEVE. ONE, AT AGE SEVENTY HE MAY HAVE HAD WIDER BACKING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL DECISIONS OF JULY 1 CC CPSU  
- PLENUM: ROMANOV OUSTED

REF: A) MOSCOW 7037; B) MOSCOW 3429

1. (1 - ENTIRE TEXT)

FROM THE OLDER MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP WHO MAY HAVE BEEN LESS INCLINED TO RALLY TO ROMANOV'S SUPPORT. GRISHIN, OF COURSE, MAY HAVE CLAIMED THAT IT WAS ROMANOV AFTER ALL, AND NOT HIMSELF, WHO PUT FORWARD HIS NAME IN CANDIDACY. WHATEVER THE PLAUSIBILITY OF SUCH A POSSIBLE DEFENSE, WE NOTE THAT GRISHIN WAS QUICK TO THROW HIS SUPPORT TO GORBACHEV ONCE THE LATTER BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY. AS REF B REPORTED, GRISHIN WAS THE FIRST OF THE LEADERSHIP TO REFER TO GORBACHEV PUBLICLY AS "HEAD OF THE POLITBURO" WITHIN DAYS OF GORBACHEV'S INSTALLATION. FINALLY, GRISHIN'S REPRIEVE MAY BE OF ONLY SHORT DURATION, SINCE THE PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY 1986 MAY WELL BRING ABOUT FURTHER  
BT

2. SUMMARY: GORBACHEV'S SECOND REGULARLY SCHEDULED PLENUM (WHICH OPENED AND CLOSED ON JULY 1) SINCE HE ASSUMED OFFICE HAS PRODUCED ANOTHER RESOUNDING VICTORY FOR HIS EFFORTS TO REMOLD HIS INHERITED "CABINET". HIS PUTATIVE ERSTWHILE RIVAL FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP, GRIGORIY ROMANOV, HAS BEEN REMOVED ENTIRELY FROM THE LEADERSHIP WHILE OTHERS SUCH AS ZAYKOV AND YEL'TSIN WHO APPEAR TO HAVE THE BLESSING OF GORBACHEV HAVE MOVED INTO THE CPSU SECRETARIAT. WHILE DIFFERENCES OVER POLICY ISSUES MAY HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN ELIMINATING ROMANOV FROM THE LEADERSHIP, THERE IS AS YET NO EVIDENCE THAT SUCH WAS THE CASE. ROMANOV'S REPORTED PROBLEMS WITH ALCOHOL MAY HAVE PROVIDED THE PRETEXT FOR HIS REMOVAL, WITH THE REAL REASON BEING THAT GORBACHEV HAS SO FAR INCREASED HIS OWN POWER THAT HE NO LONGER FELT COMPELLED TO TOLERATE A FORMER CONTENDER FOR HIS JOB. THE ELEVATION OF GEORGIAN PARTY BOSS SHEVARDNADZE TO THE FULL RANKS OF THE POLITBURO MAY BE A CONSEQUENCE OF HIS INNOVATIVE VIEWS ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

3. THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE JULY 1 PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATED THAT POLITBURO MEMBER AND CPSU SECRETARY ROMANOV HAD ASKED TO BE RELIEVED OF HIS DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH "RETIREMENT ON HEALTH GROUNDS". WHILE ROMANOV'S LONG-RUMORED DRINKING PROBLEMS MAY WELL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECISION TO RETIRE HIM, IT COULD WELL BE THAT "HEALTH REASONS" SIMPLY SERVED AS THE PRETEXT TO GET RID OF GORBACHEV'S PUTATIVE ERSTWHILE RIVAL. ACCOUNTS BEGAN TO CIRCULATE IN MAY (SUCH AS THAT

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS Fol6-114/6#8979  
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8838 DTG: 011547Z JUL 85 PSN: 023543  
EOB047 AN002140 TOR: 182/1601Z CSN: HCE816

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01 LEHR-01  
MAT-01 /007 A4

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: PUBS SIT MATL  
EOB:

OP IMMED  
UTS1261  
DE RUEHMO #8838/02 1821550  
O 011547Z JUL 85  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2118

INFO USIA WASHDC 1368  
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 08838

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: PERSONNEL DECISIONS OF JULY 1 CC CPSU

RESHAPING OF THE GENERATIONAL COMPLEXION OF THE  
SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

6. THE "LENINGRAD" SEAT ON THE POLITBURO IS NOW VACANT WITH THE REMOVAL OF FORMER LENINGRAD PARTY BOSS ROMANOV. HIS SUCCESSOR IN LENINGRAD, LEV ZAYKOV, WILL NOW MOVE TO MOSCOW TO TAKE UP HIS AS YET UNKNOWN DUTIES IN THE SECRETARIAT. GIVEN LENINGRAD'S LEADING ROLE WITHIN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, ZAYKOV MAY BE INTENDED TO INHERIT ROMANOV'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY PORTFOLIO AS WELL AS OTHER RELATED ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES. GORBACHEV, IT WILL BE RECALLED, WARMLY PRAISED ZAYKOV FOR HIS LOCAL ACHIEVEMENTS IN THESE SPHERES DURING HIS MAY 17 ADDRESS AT THE SMOL'NYI INSTITUTE. AN EARLIER SIGN OF TIES BETWEEN THE TWO WAS THE PRESENCE OF GORBACHEV AT ZAYKOV'S 1983 INSTALLATION AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE LENINGRAD OBKOM.

7. ZAYKOV'S FELLOW NEW APPOINTEE TO THE SECRETARIAT, BORIS YEL'TSIN, WILL ALSO PRESUMABLY WORK IN THE ECONOMIC AREA AND MAY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE LEADERSHIP AT RYZHKOV'S BEHEST. BOTH MEN ARE GRADUATES OF THE URAL POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND THEIR CAREERS IN SVERDLOVSK OBLAST' OVERLAPPED FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS. YEL'TSIN IS OBVIOUSLY A REAL COMER -- HE WAS ONLY BROUGHT INTO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPARAT BY GORBACHEV IN APRIL TO HEAD THE CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT AND AT FIFTY-FOUR IS ONLY A FEW MONTHS OLDER THAN GORBACHEV -- STILL THE YOUNGEST MEMBER OF THE LEADERSHIP.

8. GEORGIAN PARTY FIRST SECRETARY EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN PROMOTED INTO THE FULL RANKS OF THE POLITBURO ON THE BASIS OF HIS RECORD AS A SUCCESSFUL REGIONAL MANAGER AND INNOVATOR RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF PERSONAL TIES

TO GORBACHEV. SHEVARDNADZE HAS ALWAYS MADE IT A POINT TO PRAISE LAVISHLY WHOMEVER IS IN POWER ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED TO HAVE EXCEEDED EVEN HIS NORM WHEN IT CAME TO CHERNENKO. SHEVARDNADZE, HOWEVER, HAS FOSTERED INNOVATIONS IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS WHICH MAY WELL HAVE PROVED ATTRACTIVE TO GORBACHEV AND THUS BROUGHT ABOUT HIS PROMOTION.

9. FOR EXAMPLE, GEORGIA PIONEERED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIONAL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (RAPO) APPROACH WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE GREATER LOCAL INTEGRATION. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS COMPLAINED THAT RAPOS ARE NOT WORKING THE WAY THEY SHOULD AND SHEVARDNADZE'S ELEVATION MAY AFFORD HIM GREATER AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE RAPO NATIONALLY AS WELL AS OTHER LOCAL INNOVATIONS SUCH AS THE POTI INDUSTRIAL EXPERIMENT SIMILARLY DESIGNED TO FACILITATE GREATER LOCAL COORDINATION. GORBACHEV SURELY ALSO APPROVED OF THE GEORGIAN DECISION TO MERGE THREE REPUBLIC AGRICULTURAL MINISTRIES, GIVEN THE INCREASING RHETORIC FROM GORBACHEV AS WELL AS ECONOMICS "CZAR" RYZHKOV ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF ABOLISHING SUPERFLUOUS ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENTS. A JUNE 16 INTERVIEW WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN "MOSCOW NEWS" ALSO DEMONSTRATED A CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MINISTRIES' BUILT-IN RISK-AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOR AND THE TENDENCY TO SUBORDINATE NATIONAL CONCERNS TO NARROW BRANCH INTERESTS, POINTS WHICH GORBACHEV HAS HIMSELF MADE. FINALLY, GEORGIA'S RECENTLY INSTITUTED POLICY REQUIRING STRICT INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTING BY PARTY MEMBERS HAS RECEIVED NATIONAL ENDORSEMENT. HARTMAN  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To: Steve Sestanovich

5266

F414

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

① Name is spelled Shevardnadze

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 2, 1985

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *CRS*

SUBJECT: Shevarnadze for Gromyko

Who is Eduard Shevarnadze? Some misleading phrases are being thrown around about this appointment.

1. "Agro-reformer." Georgian agriculture has done well under Shevarnadze, but all the same the really big break of his career came when he took over the Georgian security apparatus. After 8 years (1964-72) as top cop, he was Moscow's (perhaps slightly unusual) choice to head the Georgian party, replacing Vasily Mzhavanadze, who had been ousted for too-obvious corruption. (Moscow rumors included stories of the diamonds and emeralds that Mzhavanadze would send to his superiors' wives.) Shevardnadze's job was to control this political problem by cleaning house, and he apparently did so with verve. It was not his job, by the way, to stop corruption altogether: Georgia prospers on it.

2. "Close to Gorbachev." As interior minister of Georgia, Shevarnadze worked under Nikolai Shchelokov (interior minister of the USSR as a whole) and was thereafter considered his protege. It turned out to be a bad connection. Although Shchelokov was one of Brezhnev's very best buddies, he too became a target of the Andropov shake-up, at a time when Andropov was using the corruption charge against Brezhnev's faction. (Remember all the stories about Brezhnev's daughter.) This may explain why Shevarnadze, despite his police background, gained no promotion under Andropov and was so cool in speaking of him: he never lavished on Andropov the sycophantic praise he had heaped on Brezhnev -- and that he later heaped on Chernenko. But although his fawning identification with Chernenko raised some doubts about he would do under Gorbachev, Shevarnadze seemed to weather the change well, even before this new job. He came back to Georgia from last April's Central Committee meeting, for example, and declared himself "inspired, filled with great creative thoughts and an ineradicable wish to implement them sooner." Such flexibility is, of course, the hallmark of Gorbachev's own patron-hopping career, but for now there probably should still be a question mark over the relationship between the two men.

3. "Silver-haired, silver-tongued." In the Kremlin milieu, liveliness is at such a premium that smooth operators with any charm or natural political instincts really stand out. This may be why there was a mini-cult around Geidar Aliyev too -- like Shevarnadze, he is from the Caucasus and makes the real Russians

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

he managed to get M's job & candidate PB member status.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 106-11416 #8970  
BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07  
He was formally under Shchelokov, but very likely actually conspired with Andropov to get at Brezhnev by starting with the Mzhavanadze connection. Andropov failed to reward him properly in the end -- although in the first instance,



look dull and wooden. On the other hand, Shevarnadze gives among the longest speeches of anyone in the leadership, and although they are full of hectoring at this or that official who hasn't done a good job, he still comes across as something of a gas bag. (His speeches are also full of the picayune detail that is especially characteristic of out-of-Moscow leaders. For example: "We have not found an optimum solution to the problem of eliminating inefficient rail runs. Not all containerized hauling within the republic is being done by truck. The quality indicators of the use of the motor vehicle fleet are considerably inferior to the growth of truck hauling", etc.)

*Presumably  
how a  
"can-do"  
admin. gets results  
- that  
system.*

4. "Reward for Gromyko." It seems fair to say that if Gromyko wanted to retain control over the Foreign Ministry he would have pushed for the promotion of his deputy Korniyenko. This would have left the Ministry with weak leadership (like the military now) but also left Gromyko in charge, and probably provided more policy continuity/stagnation. In this respect, the move serves Gorbachev's interest. At the same time, it may suggest a residual limit on his power: other things being equal he would almost certainly have preferred to take the "presidency" himself. This point goes double if Shevarnadze is in fact not close to Gorbachev. (One aspect of the move that may irritate Gorbachev: Gromyko is a good candidate to come to the UNGA this fall with his new title, the better to preserve his international prominence and maybe meet the President again.) As for the new foreign minister's views, we know nothing and have to work with hints like his membership since the 50's on the Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African countries; some people will read this as a sign of interest in the Third World, but it may only be the kind of assignment that Georgians draw. What we do know about Shevarnadze is one large fact: he is a party politician whose recent background is in the problems of internal security and economic management. This probably implies, first, the same kind of priority to domestic issues that Gorbachev himself seems to have, and second, the same kind of internal power connections that would make possible -- when and if the time comes -- real changes in policy (something that Korniyenko would have been far less able to do).

*yes only  
- sense  
that he  
still  
has to  
manage  
the old  
guys out  
if there  
are rival  
boys  
you  
either  
get them  
removed  
(Romanov  
or separate  
them  
from  
their  
power  
base  
(Gromyko)*

Note: Particularly inasmuch as the "presidency" is now held by someone other than the General Secretary, we should refer to it by its correct name "chairman" (predsedatel), so as not to imply any equivalence to the office of American President.

*I doubt  
this. The  
move gives  
Gorbachev  
real control  
over foreign  
policy, which  
is probably  
what he wants  
to prefer at  
this point,  
given the  
alternatives  
i.e. leave  
to take the  
himself.*

*I doubt this.*

*At this point, he  
has to be close in the  
sense that his apt almost  
certainly depends on G, and  
even if this is questionable,  
his political future seems  
And, as you have pointed out  
he has a record of  
sycophancy -*

cc: Don Fortier, Jack Matlock

*One must assume, however, that  
someone who has lived all his  
life in Georgia is more acutely  
aware of countries like Iran  
and Turkey than a Moscow official.*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Matlock

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report of: 7-2-85

The following excerpt is for your information only. Please do not refer to it in any discussions.

1. The Soviet Union. Today's session of the USSR Supreme Soviet named Gromyko Chairman of its Presidium, and newly promoted Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze to replace Gromyko as Foreign Minister. Gromyko's promotion to the largely ceremonial role of head of state represents a further consolidation of Gorbachev's power. At the very least it will massively dilute Gromyko's influence on Soviet foreign policy, since he was succeeded by another Politburo member rather than by one of his own protégés. The new Foreign Minister is more in tune with Gorbachev's management style and no more experienced in foreign policy than Gorbachev himself. Shevardnadze, Georgian party boss since 1972, is associated with an effective anti-corruption campaign, innovative agricultural experiments that have found nationwide application, and a personnel policy of self-criticism and discipline. While these personnel shifts (including Romanov's ouster yesterday) may have freed up the summit decision, it would be imprudent to predict immediate foreign policy changes. The shifts lay the groundwork for Gorbachev to assume greater responsibility in the foreign policy area and for a longer term shakeup of the foreign policy apparatus, including the possible replacement of Dobrynin here. The most immediate impact will be one of style, with Shevardnadze likely to be more articulate and activist, providing a significant public relations face-lift following the dour Gromyko. (C)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#8971

BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07

File 7

LATE ITEM

USSR: GROMYKO ELECTED PRESIDENT, REMOVED FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY

The Supreme Soviet July 2 elected Gromyko ~~president~~ of the Soviet Union and relieved him of the foreign ministry post he has held since 1957, according to press reports. The unanimous election of the 75-year-old Gromyko followed a brief nominating speech by Gorbachev. Eduard Shevardnadze, 57, who had been party chief in Georgia, was appointed foreign minister. (UNCLASSIFIED)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON8  
JLSITUATION ROOM NOTE

July 2, 1985

UNCLASSIFIEDLeadership Changes in the Soviet Union

In a radical departure from Soviet tradition, Mikhail Gorbachev today nominated Andrei Gromyko for the presidency of the Soviet Union. The appointment was approved by a unanimous show of hands and Gromyko was released from his positions of foreign minister and deputy premier. Gromyko, 75, had been foreign minister for twenty-eight years. A Reuter report speculates this move may be an honorable way to ease Gromyko out of the arduous role of foreign minister into a position as an elder Soviet statesman. Other press reports say the transfer could insure Gorbachev's domination of Soviet foreign affairs.

To replace Gromyko, Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov nominated Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze, 57, was made a full member of the Politburo yesterday, after serving as an alternate member since 1978. He has spent his career in the Georgian Party apparatus, serving until today as that republic's party chief. Shevardnadze has visited nine foreign countries, but Western diplomats say his foreign affairs experience is limited. His campaign against corruption in the Republic of Georgia and his experimentation with economic reforms drew praise from Moscow. According to diplomats, these successes contributed to his surprising rise to prominence. (U)

Various Press

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

9

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL NST GENEVA 6260 DTG: 021343Z JUL 85 PSN: 025829  
S1T969 AN008512 TOR: 183/1831Z

DISTRIBUTION: LINH MATL /002

THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK IT. FINALLY, MRS. KURLANOV SAID THAT THEY HAVE A DACHA NOT FAR FROM THE YAROSLAVL HIGHWAY, APPROXIMATELY 20 KILOMETERS BEYOND ZAGORSK. MRS. KURLANOV IS A PLEASANT, NOT AT ALL BASHFUL PERSON. SHE APPEARS TO BE APPROXIMATELY 55-60 YEARS OLD AND IN GOOD HEALTH. SHE, LIKE HER HUSBAND, DRANK RED WINE MODERATELY DURING DINNER. LIKE HER HUSBAND, SHE IS ALSO A NON-SMOKER.

7. COLONEL MEDVEDEV CONFIRMED THAT HE HAS ONE CHILD, A DAUGHTER, AGE 19.

8. COLONEL IVLEV. THE COLONEL SAID THAT HE WAS BORN (1932 OR 1933 JUDGING BY HIS SCHOOLING) AND RAISED IN MOSCOW AND SPENT THE WAR YEARS IN THE CITY WITH HIS MOTHER. HE ATTENDED THE MOSCOW AVIATION TEKHNIKUM (TRADE SCHOOL) FROM WHICH HE GRADUATED IN 1952. UPON GRADUATION, HE ENTERED THE SOVIET ARMY AND APPLIED FOR PILOT TRAINING. THE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION REVEALED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT HE IS SLIGHTLY CROSS-EYED (KOSOGLAZNY). TO THE CASUAL OBSERVER, THE DEFECT IS NOT NOTICEABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, HE WAS ACCEPTED FOR NAVIGATOR AND NOT PILOT TRAINING. HE ENTERED THE CHELYABINSK AVIATION UCHILISHCHE (OCS) IN THE FALL OF 1952 AND GRADUATED IN 1956. HE TRAINED IN IL-28S (HE ADDED "BEAGLES") BUT UPON GRADUATION WAS ASSIGNED TO A HEAVY

BOMBER (TUPOLEV-95) UNIT AND FLEW IN TUPOLEV BOMBERS UNTIL HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN 1979. HE IS MARRIED AND HAS TWO DAUGHTERS AND ONE GRANDSON. HIS WIFE IS A DESIGNER (DIZAYNER), APPARENTLY OF SOME TYPE OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS. HE SAID THAT SHE WORKS UNDER VERY SHORT DEADLINES. COLONEL IVLEV IS APPROXIMATELY 6'1" IN HEIGHT AND WEIGHS AN ESTIMATED 190-200 POUNDS. HE APPEARS TO KEEP HIMSELF IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION. HE IS RESERVED IN Demeanor BUT ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS BACKGROUND READILY. HE IS ARTICULATE IN DEFENSE OF SOVIET INF POSITIDNS AND IS TAKING A MORE ACTIVE PART IN POST-PLenary DISCUSSIONS THAN HE DID AS AN ADVISOR TO THE SOVIET SCC COMPONENT IN 1980. HE IS OUTWARDLY CALM BUT IS PRACTICALLY A CHAIN SMOKER OF CIGARETTES. HE DRINKS MODERATELY AT JOINT SOCIAL FUNCTIONS.  
BT

EXDIS

PRIORITY  
UTS3056  
DE PUFHGV #6260/01 1831344  
F 021343Z JUL 85  
FM USDEL NST GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1375

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1276  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1281  
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 NST GENEVA 06260

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, PINR

SUBJECT: (U) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON SOVIET MILITARY PERSONALITIES

EXDIS

1. THIS IS NST MEMCON NST-11-M-004. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DATE: JUNE 21, 1985  
-- TIME: 1800-2030 HOURS  
-- PLACE: U.S. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

3. PARTICIPANTS

U.S. USSR

GEN. VAN INWEGEN (PART-TIME) GEN-LT V. P. STARODUBOV  
COL. C. G. FITZGERALD GEN-MAJ. AND MRS. A. D. KURLANOV

4. SUMMARY: DURING A BARBECUE FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET NST DELEGATION AND THEIR WIVES HOSTED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION ON JUNE 21, 1985, THE SOVIET PARTICIPANTS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS.

5. GEN-LT. STARODUBOV: THE GENERAL STATED THAT HIS WIFE HAD RETURNED TO MOSCOW FROM GENEVA TO BE PRESENT FOR THE BIRTH OF THEIR THIRD GRANDCHILD -- A GRANDSON. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE FIRST TWO HAD BEEN GRANDDAUGHTERS.

6. GEN-MAJOR AND MRS. KURLANOV: MRS. KURLANOV AT ONE POINT REFERRED TO THE GENERAL AS "ALEXANDER DMITRIYEVICH" (SECOND NAME NOT CERTAIN). SHE SAID THAT HE WEIGHS 115 KILOS (253 LBS). IN ADDITION, SHE SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED "5S" (A) IN HIS ENGLISH COURSES AT OCS (UCHILISHCHE) AND THE "ACADEMY (PRESUMABLY DZERZHINSKIY ARTILLERY ACADEMY)." THE GENERAL ADDED THAT HE STILL UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH FAIRLY WELL BUT IS HESITANT ABOUT TRYING TO SPEAK THE LANGUAGE BECAUSE OF

EXDIS

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/b #8980

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL NST GENEVA 6260 DTG: 021343Z JUL 85 PSN: 025770  
SIT972 AN008515 TOR: 183/1804Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: LINH MATL /002  
-----

EXDIS

PRIORITY  
STU0589  
DE RUFHGV #6260/02 1831345  
P 021343Z JUL 85  
FM USDEL NST GENEVA  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1376

EXDIS

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1277  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1282  
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 NST GENEVA 06260

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

EXDIS

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, NST, PINR  
SUBJECT: (U) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON SOVIET MILITARY

9. MR. BARDIN CONFIRMED THAT HE TRANSFERRED FROM MOD TO  
MFA IN 1973. HE HAS ONE SON AND ONE GRANDSON. KAMPELMAN  
BT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

✓  
FILE 11

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 8857 DTG: 020836Z JUL 85 PSN: 024999  
EOB522 AN002434 TOR: 183/0921Z CSN: HCE102

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01 LEHR-01  
MAT-01 /007 A2  
WHSR COMMENT: --RED TAG--

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: MCF JP MART VP SIT MATL EOB  
EOB:

EXDIS

OP IMMED  
UTS2437  
DE RUEHMO #8857 1830836  
O 020836Z JUL 85  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2133  
CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 08857

*Armb  
Mintwood*

EXDIS

EXDIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV MOVES AGAIN

EXDIS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE MAN WHO NOMINATED CHERNENKO FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET IN APRIL 1984 AND SO PERSUASIVELY ARGUED WHY IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE JOBS OF HEAD OF STATE AND HEAD OF PARTY IN ONE MAN HAS TURNED HIS LAWYERLY SKILL TO THE OPPOSITE CASE. IN A SHORT AND EMOTIONLESS INTERVENTION GORBACHEV MADE AN EQUALLY GOOD CASE FOR NOT COMBINING THE JOBS. HIS BASIC POINT WAS THAT TO GALVANIZE THE PARTY IN ITS "LEADING ROLE" IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO CONCENTRATE HIS ENERGIES ON PARTY WORK.

EXDIS

3. WHAT HE DID NOT SAY BUT WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN UNDERSTOOD BY THE LOYAL PARTY FOLK IN THE HALL IS THAT HE HAS MANAGED IN THESE SHORT DAYS SINCE HIS ELEVATION TO ELIMINATE HIS MAJOR OPPONENT (ROMANOV), PROMOTE HIS MOST LOYAL AND COMPETENT AIDES (LIGACHEV, RYZHKOV, AND CHEBRIKOV), AND DO WHAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUREAUCRATS HAVE WANTED TO DO FOR A LONG TIME--I.E. GET GROMYKO OUT OF THE WAY. HE HAS ALSO MANAGED TO PUT THE MILITARY IN A SECONDARY POSITION. RUMORS ARE FLYING THAT A MAJOR SHAKE-UP IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE STAFF WILL SOON TAKE PLACE. THE TWO NEW SECRETARIES APPOINTED ON JULY 1 ARE DEFINITELY GORBACHEV'S TEAM. THE MAIN LAST CHANGE TO BE MADE--PRIME MINISTER--APPARENTLY AWAITS THE PARTY CONGRESS.

4. THUS THE CONCLUSION MUST BE DRAWN THAT HE HAS AMASSED POWER FASTER THAN MOST EXPERTS HAD THOUGHT POSSIBLE. HE NOW FACES THE NEAR-TERM TASKS OF RE-MAKING THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND DRAWING UP

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS 506-114/648981  
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 8857

DTG: 020836Z JUL 85 PSN: 024999

THE NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY PROGRAM AND THE NEXT FIVE YEAR PLAN--ALL OF WHICH SHOULD BE IN PLACE BY THE TIME OF THE FEBRUARY 1986 PARTY CONGRESS. HE ALSO FACES ALL THE CONTINUING INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE EMPIRE--WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO OVERCOME. BUT HE DOES THIS WITH A CONFIDENCE THAT APPEARS TO COME FROM YOUTHFUL ENERGY, A STRONG BELIEF IN ORTHODOX COMMUNISM, AND A FINE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS SENSE.

5. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HE HAS NOT YET SET HIS MARK. APPOINTING A NEOPHYTE LIKE SHEVARDNADZE TO BE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR GORBACHEV AND THE PARTY APPARAT TO STEP INTO WHAT HAS BEEN FOR ALMOST THIRTY YEARS THE PRESERVE OF ANDREI GROMYKO. SHEVARDNADZE IS NOW A FULL POLITBURO MEMBER BUT ESSENTIALLY A MAN KNOWN FOR ROOTING OUT CORRUPTION AND MAKING AGRICULTURE WORK MORE EFFICIENTLY. OVER TIME WE SHOULD SEE MANY CHANGES AT THE TOP OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE. EXCITING TIMES. I ASSUME THAT SHEVARDNADZE WILL GO AHEAD WITH GROMYKO'S SCHEDULE AND YOU WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SIZE UP THIS HANDSOME, SOUTHERN ACTIVIST WHO HAS A LOT OF SUCCESS BEHIND HIM BUT UNKNOWN VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY. MY COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE MET HIM IN GEORGIA SAY THAT HE HAS ALWAYS HAD A BIG INTEREST IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SPOKE KNOWLEDGEABLY FROM A BRIEF.  
HARTMAN  
BT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS



BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

**SECRET**

July 2, 1985

To: P - Mr. Armacost

From: P - William H. Courtney *WHC*

Subject: Thoughts on the Shevardnadze Elevation

Gorbachev's Power. In his leadership maneuverings over the past several years, Gorbachev has been adroit. Kicking Gromyko upstairs fits the pattern. As Chernenko's tenure drew to a close, Gromyko may have come to embody the interests (and anxieties) of the Old Guard. While Gorbachev's elevation to General Secretary was probably not in doubt, the Old Guard Brezhnevites may have sought assurances. The deal to kick Gromyko upstairs may have emerged from such jockeying. It preserves dignity and some power for Gromyko and the Old Guard. Gorbachev probably would have preferred to become Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, especially since Chernenko, Andropov, and Brezhnev had gained the title. But Gorbachev does not need to be Chairman to wield real power, and he claims not to want a lot of trappings of power.

Gromyko's Power. In the 1960s and 1970s Gromyko achieved important successes as an architect of detente and arms control. But since then he may have backed failed policies. From 1979 through 1984 he conducted a policy that raised Soviet hopes that NATO INF deployments could be stopped by stimulating peace movements in Europe. When in early 1983 the Soviets seemed to have concluded that this policy would fail, he made a rare televised press conference, seemingly to take the blame and tell the Soviet people that the most important Soviet foreign policy goal of the early 1980s was going to fail. (Gromyko's press conference bore a similarity to Ogarkov's later that year, when he took the heat for the KAL shootdown.)

In 1984 Gromyko appeared to cause even more grousing in some Soviet quarters when he led the USSR into a policy toward the U.S. of deep freeze and pessimism about future relations. A year ago the impact on his prestige began to show: his 75th birthday celebration was unexpectedly low-keyed, and Central Committee and KGB sources complained privately to Westerners about Gromyko's stewardship. Gromyko was further embarrassed earlier this year when the Shultz-Gromyko agreement in January did not lead to U.S. willingness to negotiate a space arms ban, a concession Gromyko apparently thought he had won. Perhaps as a result, the Politburo did not publicly "approve" his work in Geneva, as it had after he met with the President last September. Then at the end of May, Gorbachev ally and

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

14

-2-

Politburo member Ryzhkov sharply disparaged Gromyko in conversation with a Westerner, unprecedented sniping by a Soviet Politburo member about a colleague.

This suggests that Gromyko is in bad odor with Gorbachev. Gromyko's evident lack of enthusiasm for a summit which Gorbachev appears to want may have further heightened personal strains. For these reasons, Gorbachev may seek quickly to push Gromyko to the background on foreign policy, and swing an early and strong broom in the MFA hierarchy. Dobrynin, Korniyenko, and others close to Gromyko could go, although some figures may have other protectors.

Embassy Moscow speculates that Gromyko may come to the U.S. for the 40th anniversary of the UN, an occasion that takes place on the eve of the November summit. In my view, Gorbachev would be reluctant to have Gromyko play any role that would appear as preparing the groundwork for the summit. He'll want this done by more trustworthy aides.

Soviet Policy. Gorbachev's top priorities appear to be to lift the USSR out of the sense of economic, political, and social stagnation which has gripped the country for the past decade. He has criticised Brezhnev for failing to recognize problems in time and take actions to deal with them. While showing no signs yet of being a bold reformer, Gorbachev has championed administrative economic reforms, revived Andropov's discipline effort, and launched an anti-alcoholism campaign. He's also bringing younger, more technocratic leaders to the fore.

The implication for foreign and defense policy is that an extreme hardline does not aid, and may hinder, Gorbachev in pursuing his top domestic priorities (which may have some popular appeal). He needs to raise Soviet morale, and recent Soviet foreign and military policies do the opposite. It is not that the USSR is on the ropes and needs to relieve external pressure so it can recover its balance. Rather, it is that the USSR has a number of urgent domestic priorities, and its foreign and defense policies are out of synch with them.

The ouster last year of Ogarkov, who wanted more resources (and perhaps more political voice) for the military, was an apparent effort by the party to bring the military and the party into better synch. So was the elevation to Defense Minister of Marshall Sokolov, a relative nonentity, and the awarding to him of only candidate Politburo member status.

Gromyko's ouster and Gorbachev's interest in a summit may likewise reflect a party and personal desire to get foreign policy in better synch with domestic priorities. The General Secretary now has considerable power to put his own stamp on defense and foreign policy, and to use it more flexibly to pursue national priorities.

~~SECRET~~

P1

USSR--SHEVARDNADZE REPLACES GROMYKO AS FOREIGN MINISTER  
Munich, July 2, 1985 (RLR/Teague)

The Kremlin's veteran foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, was today appointed to the post of Soviet President and replaced by the leader of the Georgian Party organization, Eduard Shevardnadze. The appointment comes as a surprise since Shevardnadze has no previous foreign experience and has been appointed over the heads of prominent career diplomats who, as Gromyko celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday last year, might well have been hoping that this plum would shortly fall to them.

Shevardnadze is aged fifty-seven. Tough and energetic, he has built up a strong reputation in his native Georgia as an efficient economic manager and a ruthless campaigner against widespread corruption and nepotism. In striking contrast to the poker-faced Gromyko, Shevardnadze has what can only be described as charisma. He has clear links with Mikhail Gorbachev who, as the Party's agricultural secretary, took considerable interest in the innovative experiments in agricultural management and remuneration put into operation in Georgia during Shevardnadze's thirteen years as Party leader in the republic.

As an outsider appointed to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shevardnadze will doubtless take some little time to establish himself and to put his personal stamp on the Soviet Union's foreign policy. As President, too, Gromyko will retain considerable influence and his long years of experience will be at the disposal of his Politburo colleagues. Gromyko's retirement, however, must be seen at least to some extent as a "dropping of the pilot." It represents, in particular, an opportunity for the new Party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, to start to put his own stamp on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, something that has evidently been difficult for him to do as long as Gromyko remained in the saddle. Yesterday's Politburo changes, which saw the dropping of Gorbachev's reputed rival, Grigorii Romanov, and the elevation of Shevardnadze to full Politburo membership, clearly strengthen Gorbachev's hand. The personnel changes that took place at the April plenum of the Central Committee gave him a working majority within the Politburo; he has now solidified that majority. During his first four months in office, Gorbachev appeared to be concentrating on the USSR's economic problems and on strengthening his own position in the Kremlin. Now he seems ready to try and assert control over the conduct of foreign policy, too.

Throughout his long career, Gromyko has epitomised the self-effacing bureaucrat. Born into a Russian peasant family in 1909, he was sent to Moscow in 1934 under a Party program to train gifted young specialists. In 1939, he was recruited into the foreign service.

Promotion came quickly. Gromyko was one of a generation of ambitious young men who were elevated to office as Stalin's purges decimated the ranks of their superiors. In 1943, at the age of only 34, Gromyko was promoted to the post of Soviet ambassador to the United States. After World War II he was appointed the USSR's first permanent representative to the UN Security Council, and it was there that a constant stream of Soviet vetoes and walkouts won him the nickname in the West of "Mister Nyet."

Since his appointment as foreign minister in 1957, Gromyko gradually gained in influence. His skill and expertise made him indispensable to leaders who had little first-hand foreign experience of their own (Andropov, for example, never set foot in a Western country). His influence grew further when Andropov was replaced by Chernenko, whose foreign policy experience was minimal. For most of his forty-six years in the foreign service, Gromyko had carried out orders rather than making foreign policy; under Andropov and Chernenko, he appeared to become its initiator and chief architect.

As Gromyko's power grew, his tone became progressively harsher. Many western observers blamed him for the intransigent posture adopted by the USSR toward East-West relations in the most recent period, particularly over questions relating to arms control. Some western observers speculated that Gromyko had run Soviet policy into a "blind alley."

While recent statements by Soviet officials, including last week's pronouncement by Mikhail Gorbachev, have contained no hint that any greater flexibility is imminent in Soviet positions, nonetheless the appointment of Shevardnadze represents far more than a reshuffle of the top leadership. In the first place, it is a clear sign that Gorbachev intends to put his own stamp on foreign policy.

In the second place, Shevardnadze, despite his inexperience, is likely to prove a formidable spokesman of Soviet foreign policy positions. Everything that is known about him indicates that his is a forceful and energetic personality and that he is a skilful manipulator of public opinion. Gromyko, who described Gorbachev as a man with "a nice smile but iron teeth," could well have used the same words to describe Shevardnadze.

[Redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency

26 JUL 1985

(b)(1) [ ]  
(b)(3) [ ]



Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

Subject:

[Redacted]  
Upcoming Helsinki Meetings and November  
Geneva Summit

1 [Redacted]

2. The USSR views the upcoming 31 July 1985 Helsinki meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and newly appointed Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as a golden opportunity for opening a new chapter in relations between the Secretary and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

3. [Redacted] regarding the actual content of the Helsinki meeting, the Soviets will make no new proposals, and while they may anticipate that Secretary Shultz could bring some new ideas on arms control, they do not really expect anything. What the Soviets hope will not happen, [Redacted] is that Shevardnadze, on his maiden voyage, will encounter polemics on human rights violations or other matters. If that happens, Shevardnadze has been instructed to reply in the same spirit and will not be able to communicate to the Secretary a Soviet desire to do real business with the U.S. in arms control. In addition, [Redacted] the new foreign minister as a pleasant but ruthless administrator who reports directly to Gorbachev alone and should be seen as Gorbachev's mouthpiece.



4. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

that the Helsinki meeting must be seen in light of Gorbachev's consolidation of power and "purge" of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

10/1/80  
Clair George  
Deputy Director for Operations



Distribution

Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

National Intelligence Officer/USSR

Director, Office of Soviet Analysis

Director, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

~~SECRET~~

20

[Redacted]



Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

23 JUL 1985

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
 Assistant to the President  
 for National Security Affairs  
 Director of Intelligence and Research  
 Department of State  
 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
 Director, Arms Control and Disarmament  
 Agency

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]  
 [Redacted] U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Issues

1 [Redacted]

2. The USSR recognizes that its position of banning all research under the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was too inflexible, and it is now willing to make extensive cuts in offensive arms in return for negotiated bans or controls on aspects of SDI.

[Redacted] former Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko is viewed as having been responsible for pushing

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-11416 #8973

BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

for a ban on all SDI-related research, and this position is now regarded as being too inflexible to reach an arms control agreement with the U.S. [Redacted] the USSR still adamantly opposes the deployment of space-based weapons as well as their "development and testing."

3. [Redacted] Comment: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] strong impression that the basic motive for Soviet flexibility on SDI is the tremendous financial cost of not being flexible--or of trying to match the U.S. in this area.)

4. In exchange for negotiated bans or controls on aspects of SDI, the Soviet Union is fully prepared to offer extensive cuts in offensive arms--warheads as well as launchers.

[Redacted] these cuts could amount to 25, 30, or "even 40" percent, not only in overall ceilings but in sub-ceilings as well. [Redacted] proportionate percentage cuts in sub-ceiling areas where one sub-ceiling area could have a greater percentage cut than another.

5. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov's status as subordinate to the full Politburo and to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's obvious majority with his recent appointments. [Redacted] the defense ministry has been relegated to a position of technical support for the arms negotiations and contrasted this situation to the period when the late Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov was a full Politburo member, or when Gromyko ran arms control negotiations as Foreign Minister and full Politburo member.

6. [Redacted] Comment: [Redacted]

[Redacted] Gromyko was clearly the hardliner behind past Soviet arms control positions, especially during the illness of former leader Yuriy Andronov and afterwards. [Redacted]


[Redacted] even after the ministry

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

lost its full Politburo status, Gromyko was still very much influenced by the military's views on arms control. [REDACTED] the "revisionist" view of Gromyko being promulgated by the new foreign ministry: Gromyko the "hawk" versus Gorbachev and Shevardnadze the "doves." [REDACTED] Gorbachev is a tough negotiator who will not be finessed out of the trade-offs the Soviets still want between a reconstituted, stripped down SDI and deep reductions in offensive arms. [REDACTED] the concept of interrelationship still exists, but there is more room for bargaining than might have been the case had Gromyko remained as Foreign Minister.)

Clair George  
Deputy Director for Operations



Distribution

Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director, Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agency

Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

National Intelligence Officer/USSR

National Intelligence Officer/SP

Director, Office of Soviet Analysis

Director, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

~~SECRET~~

24

[Redacted]

26 JUL 1985

Central Intelligence Agency

(b)(1) [ ]  
(b)(3)



Washington, D.C. 20505

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR F06-114/6#8974  
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

Subject:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Gorbachev Consolidation of Power and  
Replacement of Gromyko as Foreign Minister

1 [Redacted]

2. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is rapidly consolidating power and will continue to make both personnel and policy changes. [Redacted]  
[Redacted] the rather charismatic nature of Gorbachev's leadership, saying that as far as the Soviet public is concerned there is a strong mood of giving him considerable room for experimentation. [Redacted] an example that liquor consumption, under Gorbachev's policy of abstinence, has dropped by one-third throughout the USSR. [Redacted] while Gorbachev's primary emphasis is on domestic policy and economic reform, his appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze as foreign minister indicates that Gorbachev not only wants to be his own foreign policy czar, but that he wants to purge the Foreign Affairs Ministry (MFA) of the "Gromyko Mafia."

*I think this is true of the public at large.*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. [redacted] personnel changes will continue to be made and that Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Tikhonov will be replaced before the February 1986 Party Congress and possibly even before October 1985. [redacted] the most likely candidate for the job is Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers Vitaliy Vorotnikov, with heavy industry head Nikolay Ryzhkov as a second possibility.

4. Regarding the Foreign Ministry purge, [redacted] changes will continue there as well, and [redacted] the appointment of Andrey Gromyko to the chairmanship of the Presidium (commonly known as the President) was both a reward for his support to Gorbachev in his succession to the Party chairmanship and part of an effort by Gorbachev to break Gromyko's hold on the MFA and gain control of foreign policymaking himself. In addition, [redacted] Gromyko had pushed for his protege, Georgiy Korniyenko to be his replacement. [redacted] Comment: [redacted] Gromyko may have known privately that he was to be replaced before Gorbachev actually settled on a successor.)

5. [redacted] Gromyko had to be pushed upstairs instead of simply retired as a debt of gratitude for Gromyko's critical support to Gorbachev during the succession. [redacted] the Politburo vote on Gorbachev was split, with Grigoriy Romanov on one side supporting Viktor Grishin and Gorbachev and his supporters on the other. [redacted] Romanov put Grishin forward with the idea of succeeding him soon after Grishin took power. Only nine out of the ten voting Politburo members were present for the final vote as Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was in the U.S. and, although called home, did not return in time to vote. [redacted] while Shcherbitskiy "would have voted his conscience," it is possible that the vote could have split evenly at five to five. [redacted] Comment: [redacted] the final vote was five to four, with Gromyko being critical for Gorbachev's success. It leads one to wonder if Gorbachev's support in government and party circles is still roughly 50-50 and if Tikhonov's replacement by Vorotnikov will alter the votes.)

6. [redacted]

[redacted] Dobrynin may be angling for the first deputy secretary position at the MFA--but only for this position. [redacted] although Dobrynin was once closely aligned with Gromyko, he is less confrontational and is

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

considered to have some popularity in Washington. However, [REDACTED] this popularity could also be a negative factor and may have cost him the foreign minister's job and possibly the first deputy position. If Dobrynin does not win the latter, [REDACTED] he will certainly return to Washington in September. [REDACTED] Israeli press reports that Soviet Ambassador to France Yuliy Vorontsov might replace Dobrynin in Washington, but [REDACTED] the rumor would be embarrassing for Vorontsov in Moscow.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USA and Canada Institute (IUSAC) Director Georgiy Arbatov was planning a trip to Washington in September, but due to pressing business connected with the upcoming Party Congress, he may not come at all. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. Gorbachev decided against the presidency position, [REDACTED] because he only wanted to be involved in "decisionmaking tasks"--foreign policy as well as domestic policy. Concerning foreign policy, [REDACTED] Gorbachev has, as yet, no clear direction in that area. While it is true that one thrust will undoubtedly be greater emphasis on Western Europe, China, and Japan--areas which Gromyko saw as part of the East-West conflict--there will continue to be strong emphasis on relations with the U.S. as well. Especially in long term policy matters, relations with the U.S. will have a very high priority, and any current de-emphasis will be a function of dealing with the current U.S. Administration, rather than a fundamental reevaluation.

8. [REDACTED] the USSR will quickly establish a new emphasis on China. For the first time in quite a while, the Soviets see the Chinese as quite eager to do business, and the USSR is quite prepared to make major concessions across the board in its differences with China.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. Gorbachev recognizes, [REDACTED] that Gromyko's policy on arms control in the European theater was "flawed by excessive optimism"--meaning that Gromyko thought he could hang tough in the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks and win over the affections of Western Europe in a straight confrontation with the U.S. However, [REDACTED] Gorbachev will take a much more sophisticated approach and be more flexible now that he is in charge of foreign policy. [REDACTED] the current feeling in Moscow is that not only was Gromyko the architect of a flawed Soviet INF strategy, he was also the author of the Soviet position on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) banning all research. [REDACTED] the USSR will now become more sophisticated in its approach to SDI and the latter's relation to arms control. [REDACTED] just as former Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov became the defense czar during one Soviet succession crisis, Gromyko became the absolute czar of foreign policy, especially during Yuriy Andropov's illness. [REDACTED] Shevardnadze reports directly to Gorbachev without any interference from "Gromyko's Mafia" and [REDACTED] Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov is not even a full Politburo member. [REDACTED] influence of the Soviet defense and foreign ministries on arms control matters to be at its lowest level since 1972.

/s/ Clair E. George  
Clair George  
Deputy Director for Operations



Distribution

Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

Deputy Director for Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

National Intelligence Officer/USSR

Director, Office of Soviet Analysis

Director, Arms Control Intelligence Staff



File

## USSR

**CPSU Plenum Approves New Program, Plan, Leadership Changes**

*The CPSU Central Committee, meeting on 15 October, approved several major documents in preparation for the upcoming party congress and took limited personnel actions—dropping former Premier Nikolay Tikhonov from the Politburo and new Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov from the Secretariat but failing to fill the vacancies created.*

The main purpose of the Central Committee plenum was to approve drafts of three documents prepared for the 27th CPSU Congress: a new version of the CPSU Program, revisions to the CPSU Statutes, and guidelines for the 12th Five-Year Plan and the 15-year period to the year 2000. According to the official report, the plenum ordered the publication of the documents for discussion at party and public meetings leading up to the congress in February.

In a brief report to the plenum, General Secretary Gorbachev summarized the contents of the documents (which have not yet been published), saying that the central point of all three is the “acceleration” of the Soviet Union’s development but providing few details:

- **CPSU Program revisions.** Although Gorbachev drew attention to the “continuity” of the new version of the program with the “basic content” of the 1961 edition, he indicated it contained significant changes, saying that the party had “reconsidered” those formulations that had “not stood the test of time.” The principles underlying the revision, he said, were an avoidance of “excessive” detail and “groundless fantasy” on the one hand and of “bookish pedantry” on the other. He suggested that the writing of the new program had engendered controversy, saying that some “tricky” questions—“both theoretical and political”—had arisen during the process.

30  
→  
→

- **Five-year and 15-year economic guidelines.** Gorbachev spoke of changing old habits and pledged that the growth in national income and output “in all sectors of material production” during the upcoming five-year plan would be obtained “entirely through an increase in labor productivity.” Regarding the 15-year period ahead, he ambitiously forecast that industrial output would “almost double.”
- **CPSU Statutes.** Gorbachev said, without elaboration, that the primary aims of the alterations in the party statutes were to “expand democracy within the party” and to raise the party organizations’ “responsibility for resolving common concerns.”

**Personnel Actions**

Two of the plenum’s personnel actions were predictable followups to Tikhonov’s 27 September resignation as premier—the removal of Tikhonov from the Politburo and of his successor, Ryzhkov, from the Secretariat. In addition, the plenum elected Deputy Premier Nikolay Talyzin, named chairman of Gosplan on 14 October, as candidate member of the Politburo.<sup>1</sup>



*Nikolay Talyzin*

The removal of Ryzhkov from his post as senior secretary for economic affairs appears to leave a significant gap in the leadership. There is now only one senior secretary besides Gorbachev—Yegor Ligachev, who supervises ideology and cadres. This leaves Politburo candidate member Dolgikh, who appears not to be a Gorbachev ally, the most senior among secretaries supervising economic spheres. Secretaries Kapitonov (light industry), Zaykov (defense industry),

Yeltsin (construction), and Nikonov (agriculture) have no Politburo status. It is unclear who in the Secretariat will now supervise economic policy and the Central Committee’s Economic Department. (U/FOUO)

<sup>1</sup> See the next article in this *Trends*.

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

## **Gorbachev Makes Changes in Top Gosplan Leadership**

*Gorbachev has pressed his reforms to the heart of Soviet economic planning and administration with major personnel changes in the top leadership of Gosplan—the USSR State Planning Committee. In moves apparently designed to fulfill his promises to transform economic planning, Gorbachev removed longtime Gosplan head Nikolay Baybakov, an opponent of reform, and elevated the status of Gosplan by giving key government and party posts to Baybakov's replacement, Nikolay Talyzin. Movement toward reform also had been signaled some weeks earlier with the appointment of an economic reform advocate, Dzhermen Gvishiani, to be a Gosplan deputy chairman.*

The shakeup in Gosplan was made public on 14 October with an announcement that Deputy Premier Talyzin had replaced Baybakov, head of Gosplan since 1965, and been promoted to first deputy premier. The following day Talyzin was elected a Politburo candidate member by the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

### **Baybakov Retirement**

The retirement of the 74-year-old Baybakov was necessary for serious change at Gosplan—the central organ of economic planning and administration—since he had been a tenacious opponent of changes in the Soviet system of central planning and control. Baybakov fought Khrushchev's reform efforts in the 1950's, bitterly assailed most proposals by reformist economists to modernize planning during the following two decades, and publicly undercut Andropov's efforts to make changes in 1983:

- As chairman of the USSR State Committee for Long-Term Planning in the mid-1950's, he resisted Khrushchev's ideas, and Khrushchev finally demoted him to a minor post in Krasnodar.
- Returned to power as head of Gosplan by Brezhnev and Kosygin in the wake of Khrushchev's ouster, Baybakov was a staunch defender of strong centralized planning and the ministerial system restored by Khrushchev's

successors. He repeatedly rejected proposals by econometrist Nikolay Fedorenko and others to expand the role of computers and mathematical modeling in planning, sometimes suggesting that these methods were subversive since they supposedly were based on non-Marxist Western theories and bourgeois economics (*Planovoye Khozyaystvo—Planned Economy*—July 1968, for example).

- Baybakov also appeared to be a major obstacle in the drive to change planning and administration after Brezhnev's death. At an unusual press



*Nikolay Baybakov*

conference in mid-August 1983, Baybakov seemed to be openly undercutting Andropov's efforts in this area when he minimized the importance of recent economic decisions and denied that they would weaken centralized administration of the economy (*Pravda*, 18 August 1983). Measures to change the economic mechanism were apparently under preparation as early as February 1983, judging by a 13 February *Pravda* report of a Politburo session, and Andropov pressed for such measures in his last speech, read for him at the December 1983 Central Committee Plenum, but they never materialized in public.

Since Gorbachev has come to power, changes in planning and administration have acquired a new urgency, and dissatisfaction with Gosplan's modus operandi has become increasingly obvious. Gorbachev has specifically indicated his interest in reducing Gosplan's role in making detailed plan assignments to industries, suggesting it should focus instead on broader national economic tasks:

- At an 8 April conference of economic managers he called for expanding the rights of plants and reduction of central controls and "removing the fetters" of superfluous central instructions (*Pravda*, 12 April).
- At an 11 June science and technology conference, he promised to transform Gosplan into a "scientific and economic organ gathering together leading scholars and leading specialists" (*Pravda*, 12 June).

- In a 6 September speech in Tyumen he suggested that changes in the economic mechanism were imminent, stating that "documents" on creating new organs to manage groups of ministries have "already been prepared" (*Pravda*, 7 September).

In Tyumen Gorbachev appeared to be deliberately trying to embarrass Baybakov before a national television audience. He turned to Baybakov while deploring widespread waste and mismanagement and asked: "What kind of an economic mechanism do we have, Nikolay Konstantinovich, that makes it possible for both leaders and labor collectives to carry on unperturbed while resources are being used in such a way?"<sup>1</sup>

Gorbachev was also probably expressing dissatisfaction with Baybakov in his Tyumen speech when he portrayed oil and gas policy as shortsighted and mistaken. Baybakov, onetime oil minister and longtime oil specialist, has played an important role in oil and gas policy, and Gosplan under his leadership has been repeatedly accused of opposing resources for West Siberian oilfields and of failing to uphold the regime's priority on West Siberian development.

### **Talyzin Appointment**

The public record of the new Gosplan chief, Nikolay Talyzin, provides no direct indication of the changes Gorbachev may want implemented. The 56-year-old Talyzin has risen through the present ministerial structure and has not been associated with any public discussion of reform. He was deputy minister, then minister, of communications from 1965 to 1980; since then he has been a deputy premier and Soviet representative to CEMA. He had some exposure to East European reform ideas as deputy chairman of a council set up in late 1980 or early 1981 to study economic management experiences in socialist countries and to prepare proposals on implementing some of these experiences.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The television reference to Baybakov's name was left out of the *Pravda* version.

<sup>2</sup> The only known public reference to his membership in this council was in a speech by CPSU Secretary Rusakov at an April 1981 ideology conference which was later published in a book. See the *Trends* of 6 January 1982, pages 11-12. Baybakov headed the council.

Gosplan's hierarchical status has been notably upgraded, however, by Talyzin's promotion from deputy premier to first deputy premier and his elevation from Central Committee membership to Politburo candidate membership. This is the highest status of any Gosplan head since the 1940's and 1950's, when Gosplan Chairman Voznesenskiy and his successor Saburov were full members of the Politburo and its successor body at the time, the Presidium.

The new status accorded Talyzin suggests that Gorbachev intends a bigger role for Gosplan in managing the economy and coordinating the dozens of powerful central ministries. Soviet reformers have often identified the central ministries as the backbone of resistance to change and the most immediate targets of any reform, but Gosplan in the past has had neither the power nor the will to enforce the ministries' cooperation.

### **Gvishiani Assignment**

While the appointment of Talyzin gives no clear signal about any new direction in Gosplan's methodology, the shift of Deputy Chairman of the State



*Dzhermen Gvishiani*

Committee on Science and Technology Dzhermen Gvishiani to Gosplan deputy chairman is an unambiguous sign of change. The 57-year-old Gvishiani is a specialist precisely in new methods of planning and administration, has made detailed proposals on altering the present system, and is even bringing his own team of specialists with him into Gosplan.

The Gvishiani appointment was made in mid-July, although only recently made known publicly, and seems to be part of a larger shakeup in economic planning and strategy begun at that time.<sup>3</sup> During the same period Gorbachev brought economic reformer Abel Aganbegyan to Moscow to head a new unit of the Academy of Sciences working on economic strategy.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The *Sobraniye Postanovleniy Pravitelstva SSSR (Collection of Decrees of the USSR Government)*, No. 23, carried the 15 July official decree announcing Gvishiani's appointment. The *Sobraniye* bears no signed to press date but arrived in the West in early October. Gvishiani is not known to have made any publicized appearances since the appointment.

<sup>4</sup> Aganbegyan's economic program is discussed in *FBIS Analysis Report* FB 85-10047 of 4 October 1985, "Abel Aganbegyan: Gorbachev Adviser on Economic Reform."

Gvishiani's role as someone who is to bring new thinking to Gosplan is suggested by his being the first official to be introduced into Gosplan's leadership from outside the ministerial bureaucracy since Brezhnev's death. (All the other six new Gosplan deputy chairmen appointed under Andropov and Chernenko have been deputy ministers and have made no apparent changes in Gosplan operations.) He has long concentrated on ways to improve administration and planning, repeatedly writing about systems approaches and management experiments. Moreover, last year he laid out detailed proposals for reorganization of planning and administration. In the March 1984 *Kommunist* (No. 4) and, in somewhat toned down language, in the July 1984 issue of Gosplan's own journal *Planovoye Khozyaystvo* (*Planned Economy*) he advocated a number of basic changes:

- ***Alteration of Gosplan's functions and practices.*** Gvishiani advocated shifting Gosplan's focus to large-scale and long-term planning, cutting the number of centrally planned products and relying more on contracts between plants and consumers to determine production, raising the role of program planning that cuts across branch and territorial lines and creating strong organs to lead these programs, and strengthening local planning rights, for example, by creating more territorial planning units.
- ***Reduction of central ministries' powers and ministerial reorganization.*** Gvishiani proposed an expansion of the rights of plants and production associations and a redefinition of administrative responsibilities to force more decisionmaking at local levels rather than at the top. He urged the consolidation of what he insisted was an excessive number of ministries, the creation of organs to manage whole groups of ministries in fields such as transport, the weakening of the ministries by creating organs to administer programs cutting across ministerial lines, and the creation of production associations of plants belonging to various ministries.
- ***Decentralization of present distribution system.*** Gvishiani argued for reducing the power of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab), transferring more sales functions to ministries, and allowing contracts between producers and consumers to determine distribution of products.

There are indications that Gvishiani will work precisely on improvement of planning and administration in his new post within Gosplan and, moreover, that he will have his own team to help him. He has long been director of the All-Union Institute for Systems Research (VNIISI) and this institute has

apparently now been transferred to Gosplan along with him. VNIISI has always been identified as belonging to the State Committee for Science and Technology and the Academy of Sciences, but a 29 September *Moskovskaya Pravda* reference to it identified it as belonging to **Gosplan** and the Academy of Sciences. The institute has pursued studies on improved administration and planning using systems analyses of economic development and computer-based economic modeling.

In addition to Gvishiani, the institute includes such other prominent scholars as deputy director Bentsion Z. Milner, laboratory head Stanislav S. Shatalin, and department head Leonid V. Kantorovich, who have a history of fighting the economic bureaucracy and agitating for planning changes. Milner, former head of the department that followed foreign managerial systems in the USA and Canada Institute, has advocated program-goal planning and reorganization of the ministerial structure. Shatalin, former deputy director of the Central Mathematical Economics Institute (TsEMI) and close ally of controversial TsEMI Director Nikolay Fedorenko in his feuds with Gosplan, has pressed for mathematical methods, systems modeling, improvement of management, and more flexible pricing that would reflect supply and demand.<sup>5</sup> Kantorovich, the father of linear programming and also an ally of Fedorenko, has publicly criticized Gosplan and others for resisting use of mathematical economics.

**Gvishiani's Career** Gvishiani may be a more effective choice for making changes in Gosplan than most other reformers since he has successfully combined the roles of administrator and academician and has been adept at taking advantage of political ties and surviving political changes. His early career apparently benefited from the influence of his father-in-law, then-First Deputy Premier Aleksey Kosygin. By the age of 34, in 1962, he was deputy chairman of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, and in 1965, when this body was reorganized into the present state committee, he was appointed deputy chairman of the new committee.

In the mid 1970's a special institute for research on management, the All-Union Institute for Systems Research, was set up under the State Committee for Science and Technology, and Gvishiani became its director. He also became chairman of the Vienna-based International Scientific Research

<sup>5</sup> Recent controversies involving Fedorenko are discussed in FBIS *Analysis Report* FB 84-10010043 of 5 July 1984, "Divisions Among Soviet Economists Impede Reform."



Institute on Problems of Administration in 1977 and has continued to head both institutes, at least until recently. Elected a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences in 1970 and a full member in 1979, he has chaired the Academy's Scientific Council on Socioeconomic and Ideological Problems of the Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Academy's Committee on Systems Analysis.

The retirement and death of Kosygin in 1980 did not end Gvishiani's influence, perhaps because he had already established a reputation as a valuable innovator in the fields of planning and administration. In 1981 he organized a special national conference to discuss administrative innovations and experiments in the USSR and East Europe (according to a May 1984 *Kommunist* article by A. Prigozhin), and in October 1983 he opened a Sverdlovsk conference on program-goal planning (reported in the April 1985 *Voprosy Filosofii—Problems of Philosophy*). In 1983 his Vienna institute began issuing a new journal, *Problemy Teorii i Praktiki Upravleniya (Problems of Theory and Practice of Management)*, and Gvishiani was named chairman of the editorial board (*Obshchestvennyye Nauki—Social Sciences—*No. 1, 1984, page 180). (U/FOUO)

## Korea

### Pyongyang Adopts Accommodating Posture on Olympic Proposal

*Pyongyang played down differences with Seoul in reporting the recent talks in Lausanne on the Olympics, projecting itself as flexible regarding its own proposal to cohost the 1988 Seoul games and ready to consider other proposals.*

North Korean media attention to the 8-9 October Lausanne talks between the North and South Korean Olympic committees and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was limited to brief accounts of press conferences during the talks by the deputy head of the North Korean delegation, Chin Chung-kuk. In treating similar events in the past Pyongyang's decision not to offer elaborating comment appeared to reflect an effort not to cloud the atmosphere surrounding further dialogue.

According to these accounts, Chin acknowledged that "no agreement" was reached, but he stopped short of providing details of issues in dispute at the talks. He did not mention the South's response to the North Korean proposal that the two sides cohost the games, and he failed to use the occasion to criticize, or even mention, the ROK counteroffer to let the North host some preliminary matches. His only reference to the South Korean position was his assertion that the South made no proposal at the meeting.

**Signs of Flexibility** Implying that there was flexibility in the North Korean position, in his remarks on 9 October Chin expressed confidence that the second round of talks will bear fruit if "all parties seek progressive and realistic proposals." Pyongyang had sounded a similar note of accommodation in a statement delivered by the head of the North Korean delegation, Kim Yu-sun, on his arrival in Geneva on 3 October. According to KCNA, Kim said that the North would raise its cohosting proposal at the talks but added that the delegation would "sincerely" approach "any proposal, whoever makes it," if it furthered the cause of the international Olympic movement and Korean reunification.

✓ JAC 39

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH -ANALYSIS- NOVEMBER 29, 1985

1. GORBACHEV RENEWS AND RESHAPES TOP LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

Gorbachev has moved rapidly to restaff top levels of the Soviet government and regroup economic ministries. The premier and six of his 12 deputies have already been replaced by younger men linked to Gorbachev or by technocrats. The 23 ministerial appointments to date reflect generational replacements, policy-based transfers, or trouble-shooting. Gorbachev benefits politically from the appointments; he also hopes that better management will cut waste and boost production.

\* \* \*

As a seasoned apparatchik, Gorbachev starts at the top. Installing a new premier in September opened the way for a new Gosplan chief (and two more allies on the politburo). He then pushed through an enabling act permitting establishment of special governmental organs to direct major groupings of economic agencies.

One of Gorbachev's priorities is the integration of civilian machine-building under a single bureau. The draft five-year plan stipulates major investment in this comparatively neglected industry. The promotion of Aviation Industry Minister Ivan Silayev to deputy premier in November suggests that he may become chief of the new bureau, which, unusually, will have authority to redistribute resources among its several ministries.

Creation last week of a new state committee for agrobusiness, chaired by new First Deputy Premier Murakhovskiy, reflects lessons drawn by Gorbachev from his long stint as party secretary for agriculture--that saving crops customarily lost or spoiled is more cost effective than increasing gross harvests. The new committee absorbs five ministries and one state committee and will plan the activities and finances of three more ministries. Six members of the present government apparently will lose their status, thus shrinking the members of government from 103 to 97.

Gorbachev has also acted decisively on foreign affairs and trade personnel. He moved Gromyko upstairs and installed Shevardnadze, grasping the policy reins himself. He put Boris Aristov in the foreign trade ministry and last week named the incumbent ambassador to Havana, Konstantin Katushev, chief of the state committee for foreign economic relations.

A generational replacement in the defense industry leadership took place in mid-November when military-industrial commission chairman Smirnov (60) retired in favor of Yuriy Maslyukov. State supply committee chairman Martynov (73) stepped down for Lev Voronin. Both jobs carry the rank of deputy minister.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS File-114/6-8983  
BY LQJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~Jack~~ 40 ✓

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH -ANALYSIS- DECEMBER 5, 1985

1. USSR: PARTY APPOINTMENTS SPEEDED UP AS CONGRESS LOOMS

On the eve of important pre-congress party conferences, Gorbachev has doubled the rate of appointments of local party bosses. Counting Andropov's changes, about two-fifths of all local party officials have now been replaced. The status of more than one third of the full members of the present central committee has been altered as well, and the scope of recent personnel shifts suggests that Gorbachev may shuffle half or more of that body before the February party congress.

\* \* \*

Since taking power, Gorbachev had been making local party personnel appointments at the rate of almost one per week. In November he doubled this rate. At the same time, he sharply stepped up his restaffing of the government and the reshaping of its structure. The November surge in appointments clearly is in preparation for the December-January round of oblast party conferences which name the ruling bodies and select delegates to the next higher party conference. The conferences will continue through the kray and republic levels through January and into February.

Gorbachev has mixed retirements and transfers almost equally in his 31 local party appointments to date. (Some of the local party leaders were promoted and others transferred laterally to party jobs or to the state sector.)

One new wrinkle is the practice of transferring a local party official to a tour of duty in the central party apparatus in Moscow and then returning him to his bailiwick as the new party boss. With his political loyalties switched to Gorbachev at the center, he automatically becomes the enemy of entrenched local interests. As a result, Moscow breaks down the local independence built up during the Brezhnev years when leaders were left in place long enough to build virtual fiefdoms.

Gorbachev has filled only about one fifth of the 157 local party jobs so far, but if the approximately 20 percent named by Andropov are counted in, a goal of a 50-percent turnover seems easily feasible in the remaining time.

Meanwhile, more than one third of the 319 full members of the central committee elected by the 26th party congress in 1981 have died (33), retired (60), or been transferred to new jobs (62). Some of these new jobs do not have central-committee status attached.

Until November, only Shcherbitskiy had been able to keep his Ukrainian bailiwick free of Gorbachev's appointments, but two important personnel shifts there showed that the barrier had now fallen. ✓



FILE 91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 8601 DTG: 241530Z DEC 85 PSN: 007681  
EOB105 AN005928 TOR: 358/15502 CSN: HCE369

DISTRIBUTION: CANN-01 MAN-01 MALY-01 DOBR-01 STEI-01 SOMM-01  
MAT-01 /007 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: SIT PUBS  
EOB:

REPLACE GRISHIN WERE GEORGIAN PARTY SECOND SECRETARY  
BORIS NIKOL'SKIY (WHO, WE UNDERSTAND, IS ALSO IN  
LINE TO REPLACE VLADIMIR PROMYSLOV AS CHAIRMAN --  
MAYOR -- OF THE MOSCOW CITY SOVIET), IRKUTSK OBLAST  
FIRST SECRETARY VASILIIY SITNIKOV, AND KGB CHIEF  
VIKTOR CHEBRIKOV.

THE NEW MOSCOW PARTY BOSS

OP IMMED  
UTS3579  
DE RUEHMO #8601 3581530  
O 241530Z DEC 85  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8747

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE  
USIA WASHDC 2957

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 18601

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: YEL'TSIN REPLACES GRISHIN AS MOSCOW PARTY CHIEF

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. VIKTOR GRISHIN WAS RELIEVED DECEMBER 24  
AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE MOSCOW CITY PARTY COMMITTEE.  
HIS RESIGNATION INDICATES HE WILL ALSO GIVE UP HIS  
FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO. GRISHIN'S DEPARTURE  
HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED. HE WAS REPLACED AS MOSCOW  
FIRST SECRETARY BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY  
BORIS YEL'TSIN WHO WILL PROBABLY BECOME AT LEAST A  
CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AT THE XXVII CPSU  
CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. WITH YEL'TSIN'S DEPARTURE  
FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, TWO ECONOMIC  
PORTFOLIOS ARE NOW VACANT. END SUMMARY.

GRISHIN RETIRES

3. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE FROM WIRE SERVICE REPORTS,  
MOSCOW PARTY CHIEF VIKTOR GRISHIN WAS RELIEVED OF  
HIS DUTIES AT A PLENUM OF THE MOSCOW CITY PARTY  
ORGANIZATION DECEMBER 24. GORBACHEV WAS PRESENT  
AT THE PLENUM. ACCORDING TO TASS, GRISHIN "RETIRED."  
GRISHIN, 71, HAD BEEN HEAD OF THE MOSCOW CITY PARTY  
ORGANIZATION SINCE 1967, A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE  
POLITBURO SINCE 1961 AND A FULL MEMBER OF THAT BODY  
SINCE 1971. GRISHIN IS THE FORTIETH OBKOM OR  
KRAYKOM FIRST SECRETARY TO LEAVE SINCE GORBACHEV  
CAME TO POWER. GRISHIN WAS WIDELY EXPECTED TO BE  
RETIRED -- AS HAD BEEN FELLOW POLITBURO MEMBER  
TIKHONOV IN SEPTEMBER -- BECAUSE OF HIS AGE AND,  
IN PARTICULAR, HIS LONG PERSONAL AND POLITICAL  
ASSOCIATION WITH LEONID BREZHNEV. GRISHIN'S  
DEPARTURE AS MOSCOW CITY PARTY CHIEF INDICATES  
HE WILL LEAVE THE POLITBURO, CERTAINLY NO LATER  
THAN THE XXVII CPSU CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. WHILE  
GRISHIN'S DEPARTURE COMES AS NO SURPRISE, HIS  
SUCCESSOR, BORIS YEL'TSIN, DOES. AMONG THOSE WHOSE  
NAMES WERE FREQUENTLY MENTIONED AS CANDIDATES TO

4. A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF PREMIER NIKOLAY RYZHKOV AND  
A MEMBER OF THE "URALS MAFIA," BORIS YEL'TSIN, 54,  
IS THE NEW MOSCOW CITY PARTY COMMITTEE FIRST SECRETARY.  
HE COMES TO THAT POST FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
SECRETARIAT WHERE HE HAD HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
CONSTRUCTION (HE WAS HEAD OF THE CC'S CONSTRUCTION  
DEPARTMENT) AND APPARENTLY FOR ENERGY. HE HAD ONLY  
BEEN APPOINTED TO THESE POSITIONS IN JULY 1985.  
PRIOR TO THAT, HE HAD SERVED SINCE 1976 AS FIRST  
SECRETARY OF SVERDLOVSK OBKOM IN THE URALS. THERE  
HIS CAREER OVERLAPPED WITH THAT OF PREMIER NIKOLAY  
RYZHKOV FOR YEARS.

COMMENT

5. WHILE GRISHIN'S DEPARTURE HAD BEEN EXPECTED FOR  
SOME TIME, GRISHIN REPORTEDLY VIGOROUSLY RESISTED.  
INDEED, THE POLITBURO HAD ONLY RECENTLY AGREED TO  
RETIRE GRISHIN, ACCORDING TO ONE OF OUR CONTACTS.  
YEL'TSIN PROBABLY OWES HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE  
INFLUENCE OF FELLOW SIBERIANS RYZHKOV AND LIGACHEV.  
THE LATTER, SOME CONTACTS REPORT, HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY  
ANXIOUS TO REPLACE GRISHIN WITH A VIGOROUS, CAPABLE  
AND "MORALLY UPSTANDING" OFFICIAL WITH THE AIM OF

CLEANING UP THE CORRUPTION FOR WHICH MOSCOW HAS  
BECOME NOTORIOUS. YEL'TSIN, IN THIS CONNECTION,  
SHARPLY CRITICIZED CORRUPTION IN THE CPSU IN A  
RECENT SPEECH IN TASHKENT. HE HAS THE REPUTATION  
OF A DYNAMIC, VIGOROUS AND CAPABLE ADMINISTRATOR.

6. WE CONSIDER YEL'TSIN'S APPOINTMENT A PROMOTION  
WHICH WILL PROBABLY LEAD TO ELECTION TO AT LEAST  
CANDIDATE MEMBERSHIP ON THE POLITBURO BY OR AT THE  
XXVII CPSU CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. HIS PROMOTION,  
HOWEVER, NOW MEANS TWO ECONOMIC PORTFOLIOS ON THE  
CC SECRETARIAT ARE VACANT -- HIS AND THAT LEFT OPEN  
BY RYZHKOV WHEN HE BECAME PRIME MINISTER IN SEPTEMBER.  
IN LIGHT OF THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON THE ECONOMY BY  
THE NEW LEADERSHIP, WE EXPECT THAT THESE SECRETARIAT  
PORTFOLIOS WILL HAVE TO BE FILLED FORTHWITH. COMBS  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F06-114/6#8985  
BY WJS, NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 1388 DTG: 271404Z JAN 86 PSN: 062737  
EOB633 AN009329 TOR: 027/1418Z CSN: HCE472

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 STEI-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01  
/006 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT:  
EOB: ~

OP IMMEDIATE  
UTSS765  
DE RUEHMO #1388/01 0271406  
O 271404Z JAN 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9925

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 01388

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV REPLACES INTERIOR MINISTER --  
SHCHERBITSKIY NEXT?

REF: 85 MOSCOW 13540

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: INTERIOR MINISTER FEDORCHUK HAS BEEN RE-ASSIGNED TO UNSPECIFIED "OTHER DUTIES" AND REPLACED BY A.V. VLASOV, AN APPARENT GORBACHEV PROTEGE FROM ROSTOV OBLAST. RUMORS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING THAT FEDORCHUK WILL REPLACE UKRAINIAN PARTY BOSS SHCHERBITSKIY. WE BELIEVE FEDORCHUK IS MORE LIKELY HEADED TO A MILITARY RETIREMENT POST. END SUMMARY.

FEDORCHUK OUT - VLASOV IN

3. THE SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM RELIEVED VITALIY FEDORCHUK OF HIS DUTIES AS MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS ON JANUARY 25 IN CONNECTION WITH HIS TRANSFER TO "OTHER DUTIES." THE PRESIDUM NAMED ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH VLASOV TO REPLACE FEDORCHUK.

WHITHER FEDORCHUK?

4. FEDORCHUK BECAME INTERIOR MINISTER IN 1982 AFTER A SHORT STINT AS KGB CHAIRMAN (HIS ENTIRE CAREER HAS BEEN WITH THE SECURITY APPARATUS). HIS PRIMARY MISSION AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY (MVD) WAS TO ROOT OUT CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY AMONG THE RANKS OF THE POLICE. RECENT PRESS ACCOUNTS, INCLUDING AT LEAST ONE ARTICLE BY FEDORCHUK HIMSELF (REF A) INDICATED THAT HE HAS HAD LIMITED SUCCESS. RECENTLY, RUMORS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING THAT FEDORCHUK MIGHT REPLACE VLADIMIR SHCHERBITSKIY AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UKRAINE. SHCHERBITSKIY, WHO WILL BE 68 ON FEBRUARY 17, IS ONE OF THE FEW PROMINENT BREZHNEV-ERA HOLDOVERS STILL IN HIGH OFFICE. IF FEDORCHUK DOES SUCCEED SHCHERBITSKIY, WE JUDGE THAT IT WILL ONLY BE AS A SHORT-TERM EXPEDIENT UNTIL A MORE SUITABLE REPLACEMENT

IS FOUND. ALTHOUGH THE TIMING OF FEDORCHUK'S DEPARTURE IS CONGRUENT WITH THE UKRAINIAN CONGRESS OPENING FEBRUARY 6 AS WELL AS A PRE-CPSU CONGRESS CC PLENUM WHICH COULD MAKE CADRE CHANGES, WE DOUBT FEDORCHUK WILL GO TO KIEV:

-- HE IS A MERE 10 MONTHS YOUNGER THAN SHCHERBITSKIY, AND HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD FLY IN THE FACE OF GORBACHEV'S PRACTICE OF PUTTING YOUNGER PEOPLE INTO SUCH POSITIONS.

-- FEDORCHUK IS NOT CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVES, EXCEPT PERHAPS THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE.

-- HE HAS NO REAL BACKGROUND IN PARTY WORK, OR WITH THE ECONOMY.

-- HE HAS APPARENT TIES TO SHCHERBITSKIY HIMSELF.

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] COMMENTED AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF FEDORCHUK'S TRANSFER TO "OTHER DUTIES" THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY, THOUGH POSSIBLE, HE WOULD SUCCEED SHCHERBITSKIY. THIS SOURCE THOUGHT FEDORCHUK WOULD PROBABLY BE NAMED TO THE MILITARY INSPECTOR GENERAL'S STAFF. (MOST OFFICIALS WITH MILITARY FLAG RANK DO NOT RECEIVE PENSIONS, BUT HONORIFIC RETIREMENT POSTS FREQUENTLY AS "INSPECTORS." FEDORCHUK IS AN ARMY GENERAL.)

AND SHCHERBITSKIY?

6. MANY, BUT NOT ALL, OF OUR SOURCES CONTINUE TO PREDICT SHCHERBITSKIY'S DEPARTURE.

[REDACTED] BELIEVES SHCHERBITSKIY WILL RETIRE, AS DO YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN DIPLOMATS AND A WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST WITH GOOD ACCESS WITH WHOM WE RECENTLY TALKED.

-- THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES SPECIALIST ALSO PREDICTED SHCHERBITSKIY'S DEPARTURE.

-- TWO RECENT UKRAINIAN CADRE MOVES MAY PRESAGE SHCHERBITSKIY'S DEPARTURE: FORMER IVANO-FRANKOVSK OBKOM SECRETARY LYAKHOV WAS APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE UKRAINIAN CC ORGANIZATIONAL-PARTY WORK DEPARTMENT IN DECEMBER, BT

FOIA(b) (1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS FOI-114/6 #8986  
BY 605 NARA, DATE 12/13/07

48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01  
EOB634

MOSCOW 1388  
AN009328

DTG: 271404Z JAN 86 PSN: 062739  
TOR: 027/1419Z CSN: HCE473

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 STEI-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01  
/006 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT:  
EOB:  
-----

OP IMMED  
STU9542  
DE RUEHMO #1388/02 0271407  
O 271404Z JAN 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9926

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 01388

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR  
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV REPLACES INTERIOR MINISTER --

AND UKRAINIAN CC SECRETARY KAPTO WAS PACKED OFF TO CUBA  
AS AMBASSADOR.

7. HOWEVER, TWO OTHER SOVIET SOURCES HAVE DISCOUNTED  
THE POSSIBILITY THAT SHCHERBITSKIY IS ABOUT TO BE  
REPLACED. BOTH A SOVIET TRADE OFFICIAL AND

RECENTLY UNDERScoreD SOLID UKRAINIAN  
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SAID THE CHANCES WERE  
SUBSTANTIAL THAT SHCHERBITSKIY WOULD REMAIN IN PLACE.

VLASOV -- NEW CHIEF POLICEMAN  
-----

8. VLASOV IS 54, AND HIS ENTIRE BACKGROUND IS IN PARTY  
WORK, MOSTLY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. HE APPARENTLY HAS  
NO DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT. HE HAS SPENT  
MUCH OF HIS CAREER IN SIBERIA, FIRST IN KOMSOMOL WORK  
AND THEN IN VARIOUS OBKOMS. IN 1972 HE MOVED TO MOSCOW  
AS A CC INSPECTOR. THREE YEARS LATER, HE BECAME FIRST  
SECRETARY OF THE CHECHEN-INGUSH OBKOM, AND IN 1984 MOVED  
TO THE ROSTOV OBKOM AS FIRST SECRETARY. BOTH CHECHEN-  
INGUSH AND ROSTOV BORDER ON STAVROPOL', AND VLASOV'S  
PROMOTION TO THE MORE IMPORTANT ROSTOV OBLAST CAME  
SHORTLY AFTER GORBACHEV ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
CADRES UNDER CHERNENKO.

COMMENT:  
-----

9. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN DISSATISFACTION WITH FEDORCHUK'S  
EFFORTS TO IMPART DISCIPLINE AND INTEGRITY TO THE  
FORCES OF LAW AND ORDER. THE APPOINTMENT OF A MTN WITH  
APPARENT CLOSE TIES TO GORBACHEV UNDERScores THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY'S DETERMINATION TO MOVE FORWARD WITH  
THE DISCIPLINE AND ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN. WE  
ANTICIPATE THAT SOME SHAKE UP MAY OCCUR AT THE MVD, A  
PROCESS THAT TO ALL APPEARANCES WAS MOVING SLOWLY UNDER  
FEDORCHUK. HARTMAN

BT

FOIA(b) ( / )

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT



PAGE 01 MOSCOW 1460 DTG: 281210Z JAN 86 PSN: 064788  
EOB519 AN009825 TOR: 028/1301Z CSN: HCE781

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 STEI-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01  
/006 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT:  
EOB:

OP IMMED  
STU2845  
DE RUEHMO #1460 0281210  
O 281210Z JAN 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9979

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 01460

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PREL, UR  
SUBJECT: NEW FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF CC INTERNATIONAL DEPT

REF: MOSCOW 1393

1. (C) SUMMARY. V.S. SHAPOSHNIKOV HAS BEEN NAMED  
FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC)  
INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT. VADIM ZAGLADIN RETAINS  
THE SAME POSITION PENDING AN APPARENTLY IMPENDING  
PROMOTION TO UNSPECIFIED NEW DUTIES. WE EXPECT  
ZAGLADIN'S NEW ASSIGNMENT TO BE ANNOUNCED SOON.  
SHAPOSHNIKOV IS A WEST EUROPEAN SPECIALIST. END SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) THE JANUARY 28 PRAVDA IDENTIFIED V.S.  
SHAPOSHNIKOV, 64, AS FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CC'S  
INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT IN CONNECTION WITH HIS  
ATTENDANCE AT THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESS.  
VADIM ZAMYATIN IS THE CURRENT INCUMBENT. ON  
JANUARY 25, IN CONNECTION WITH THE LATVIAN CONGRESS,  
"MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA" IDENTIFIED SHAPOSHNIKOV AS ONLY  
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, A  
POSITION HE HAS HELD SINCE 1970, ACCORDING TO OUR  
RECORDS. AS LATE AS JANUARY 19, THE SOVIET PRESS  
IDENTIFIED ZAMYATIN AS FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THAT  
DEPARTMENT. FINALLY, IN A FRONT PAGE PHOTO IN THE  
JANUARY 28 PRAVDA, ZAGLADIN APPEARS SEATED NEXT TO  
GORBACHEV DURING HIS JANUARY 27 MEETING WITH VISITING  
PCI LEADER NATTA. ZAGLADIN, HOWEVER, IS NOT IDENTIFIED  
BY TITLE.

3. (C) RECENTLY RUMORS HAVE BEGUN TO CIRCULATE THAT  
ZAGLADIN WOULD SOON RECEIVE A MAJOR PROMOTION (REFTEL).  
SOME OBSERVERS BELIEVE HE WILL REPLACE OCTOGENARIAN  
BORIS PONOMAREV AS HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT.  
WHILE IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT ZAGLADIN WILL MOVE ON, IT IS  
NOT YET CLEAR WHERE. HIS OFFICE CONFIRMED TO US THIS  
MORNING (JAN. 28) THAT ZAGLADIN REMAINED FIRST DEPUTY  
CHIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, AND PONOMAREV'S  
OFFICE CONFIRMED THAT HE LIKEWISE REMAINS IN PLACE.  
ONE OF THE AUTHORS OF THE PRAVDA STORY, V. LOGUNOV  
(STRICTLY PROTECT), CONFIRMED TO US THAT SHAPOSHNIKOV

HAD BEEN PROMOTED. HE SAID THERE WERE NOW TWO FIRST  
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, BUT NOTED  
THAT THE SITUATION WAS ONLY TEMPORARY. LOGUNOV SAID  
ZAGLADIN WAS GIVING UP HIS PRESENT POST BUT CLAIMED NO  
KNOWLEDGE OF WHERE ZAGLADIN WAS HEADED.

4. (C) SHAPOSHNIKOV, THE NEW FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF, IS  
A WESTERN EUROPEAN SPECIALIST. HE HAS HEADED THAT SECTOR  
WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT SINCE AT LEAST 1982,  
ACCORDING TO OUR RECORDS. HE IS NEITHER A FULL NOR A  
CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE CC, BUT CAN PROBABLY BE EXPECTED  
TO OBTAIN AT LEAST CANDIDATE CC MEMBERSHIP AT THE  
UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS. ZAGLADIN, FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF  
SINCE 1975, BECAME A CANDIDATE AND FULL MEMBER OF THE CC  
IN 1976 AND 1981, RESPECTIVELY.

COMMENT

5. WE BELIEVE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SHAPOSHNIKOV'S NEW  
ASSIGNMENT PRESAGES AN IMPORTANT PROMOTION FOR ZAGLADIN,  
ONE THAT WILL BE ANNOUNCED SOON. WHERE HE IS LIKELY TO  
LAND IS UNCLEAR, BUT HE APPEARS TO BE A STRONG CANDIDATE  
TO REPLACE PONOMAREV AS CHIEF OF THE IMPORTANT  
INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT. AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS  
ARE PUSHING HARD ON A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY FRONTS,  
INCLUDING IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL FOLLOWING  
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSAL, ZAGLADIN'S EXPERTISE  
WOULD BE ESPECIALLY USEFUL IN THAT DEPARTMENT. NEVERTHE-  
LESS, WE HAVE ALSO HEARD RUMORS THAT HE MAY RECEIVE AN  
IMPORTANT ASSIGNMENT OUTSIDE THE CC (REFTEL).

HARTMAN  
BT

*Ant*  
*max 606*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#8987

BY HOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

56



PAGE 01 OF 02      MOSCOW 3427      DTG: 011201Z MAR 86      PSN: 050105  
EOB274      AN008300      TOR: 060/1824Z      CSN: HCE983

DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01 /005 A2  
WHSR COMMENT: 5 LINER

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: VP SIT  
EOB:

EXDIS

OP IMMED  
STU3004  
DE RUEHMO #3427 060120Z  
O 011201Z MAR 86  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1450  
INFO USDEL NST GENEVA 0276  
CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 03427

EXDIS

EXDIS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN  
NST GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR KAMPLEMAN

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PINS, PREL, US, NST, PARM  
SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE REPORTEDLY TO LEAVE MFA

REF: (A) GENEVA 01583; (B) MOSCOW 3002

EXDIS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. EVIDENCE HERE INCREASINGLY SUGGESTS THAT OUR INITIAL SKEPTICISM ABOUT SHEVARDNADZE'S DEPARTURE WAS MISPLACED, AND THAT MAX'S REPORT (REFTEL A) WAS ON TARGET. SOVIET MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOKIN RECENTLY TOLD MY DANISH COLLEAGUE THAT:
  - SHEVARDNADZE WILL LEAVE THE MFA AND REPLACE PONOMAREV AS INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT HEAD AND POSSIBLY ON THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT; AND
  - DOBRYNIN WILL BECOME FOREIGN MINISTER. FOKIN IMPLIED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WOULD REPLACE DOBRYNIN, AND THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S MOVE MEANT AN INCREASED PARTY ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. A PROBABLE KGB SOURCE HERE REPORTED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STORY, EXCEPT FOR NAMING BOTH DOBRYNIN AND AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE VORONTSOV AS CANDIDATES FOR SHEVARDNADZE'S JOB. WESTERN JOURNALISTS ARE ALSO BEING FED THIS STORY.

QUESTIONS RAISED:  
-----

3. THESE REPORTED CHANGES RAISE SEVERAL QUESTIONS:
  - PARTY ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
    - THE SHIFT MIGHT APPEAR TO BE AN ODD TWIST, WITH

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS Folio-114/6 # 8988  
BY KDJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02      MOSCOW 3427      DTG: 011201Z MAR 86      PSN: 050105

E  
X  
D  
I  
S

- POLICY BEING MADE MORE IN ONE PLACE - THE PARTY -
- AND IMPLEMENTED IN ANOTHER - THE MFA. WITH
- GROMYKO AS FOREIGN MINISTER, PARTICULARLY AFTER
- HE BECAME A FULL POLITBURO MEMBER AND PONOMAREV
- DID NOT, HE AND THE MFA RATHER CLEARLY PLAYED AN
- IMPORTANT POLICY FUNCTION. THE SHEVARDNADZE RECORD
- IS MORE AMBIGUOUS, AND HIS REPLACEMENT'S ROLE
- REMAINS UNCLEAR. HOWEVER, GROMYKO'S LONG TENURE
- AND POLICY ROLE WERE ANOMALOUS. A SHIFT TOWARD
- GREATER PARTY CONTROL WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH
- THE WAY MOST BUSINESS HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN
- CONDUCTED HERE, AND CLEARLY REMAINS SO EXCEPT FOR
- THE ECONOMY WHERE PRIME MINISTER RYZHKOV SEEMS TO
- ENJOY REAL AUTHORITY.

E  
X  
D  
I  
S

-- U. S. ACCESS:  
-----

- IN TURN, THE QUESTION ARISES OF HOW MUCH REAL
- ACCESS WE WILL HAVE TO POLICY MAKERS HERE.
- DOBRYNIN APPEARED TO BE BUTTERING UP HIS BOSS
- WHEN YOU LAST WERE HERE, BY PROMPTING HIM ON
- REJOINDERS TO YOUR POSITIONS. WILL WE BE
- DEALING MORE WITH A SYCOPHANT THAN A POLICY
- MAKER?

E  
X  
D  
I  
S

-- KGB ROLE:  
-----

- HOWEVER ACCURATE THE STORY MAY BE, THE KGB HAS
- PORTRAYED THE SHIFT IN UNFLATTERING TERMS
- FOR THE NEXT FOREIGN MINISTER, IN SUGGESTING
- DIMINISHED CLOUT FOR HIM.

E  
X  
D  
I  
S

-- MEANING FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS:  
-----

- THE IMPENDING CHANGE COULD WELL EXPLAIN IN PART
- THE SOVIET DELAY IN SCHEDULING YOUR NEXT MEETING
- WITH SHEVARDNADZE. AS TO SUBSTANCE ON POLICY,
- WE HAVE LITTLE CURRENT BASIS FOR FIRM CONJECTURE,
- AND I WOULD CAUTION AGAINST QUICK JUDGMENTS.
- SUCH PERSONNEL CHANGES COULD MAKE POLICY SHIFTS MORE
- POSSIBLE, BUT THEY CERTAINLY ARE NOT A SURE BET.

4. WE WILL HAVE A LOT TO CHEW ON IF THESE STRONG  
RUMORS PROVE ACCURATE. IN ANY CASE, OUR HAT IS OFF  
TO MAX FOR PICKING IT UP FIRST.  
HARTMAN  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Composition of CPSU Central Committee Reported***PM071143 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 86**Second Edition p 2*

[Text] The following is the composition of the CPSU Central Committee, elected at the 27th CPSU Congress:

**Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:**

Aksenov, A.N.; Aleksandrov, A.P.; Aliyev, G.A.; Altunin A.T.; Anishchev, V.P.; Antonov, A.K.; Arbatov, G.A.; Aristov, B.I.; Arkhipov, I.V.; Arkhipov, V.M.; Auyelbekov, Ye.N.; Afanasyev, V.G.; Afanasyev, S.A.; Akhromeyev, S.F.; Bagirov, K.M.; Bazovskiy, V.N.; Baybakov, N.K.; Bakatin, V.V.; Bakin, B.V.; Baklanov, O.D.; Balandin, A.N.; Balandin, Yu.N.; Balmont, B.V.; Bartoshevich, G.G.; Batalin, Yu.P.; Bakhirev, V.V.; Bashilov, S.V.; Bashtanyuk, G.S.; Belousov, I.S.; Belyakov, O.S.; Berezin, A.I.; Biryukova, A.P.; Bobkov, F.D.; Bogomyakov, G.P.; Boyko, V.G.; Boldyrev, I.S.; Borisenkov, V.M.; Borodin, L.A.; Brovnikov, V.I.; Bugayev, B.P.;

Vayno, K.G.; Vasilyev, N.F.; Vashchenko, G.I.; Vedernikov, G.G.; Velichko, V.M.; Vlasov, A.V.; Voystrochenko, A.F.; Volodin, B.M.; Volskiy, A.I.; Voronin, L.A.; Vorontsov, Yu.M.; Voropayev, M.G.; Vorotnikov, V.I.; Voss, A.E.; Gagarov, D.N.; Gerasimov, A.N.; Gerasimov, I.A.; Glushko, V.P.; Govorov, V.L.; Golubeva, V.N.; Golubeva, M.A.; Goncharenko, B.T.; Gorbachev M.S.; Gorshkov, L.A.; Gorshkov, S.G.; Gostev, B.I.; Grekov, L.I.; Gribkov, A.I.; Grishkyavichus, P.P.; Grishchenko, P.S.; Gromova, M.S.; Gromyko, A.A.; Grossu, S.K.; Gudkov, A.F.; Guzhenko, T.B.; Gusev, V.K.; Gustov, I.S.;

Demidenko, V.P.; Demirchyan, K.S.; Demichev, P.N.; Dinkov, V.A.; Dobrik, V.F.; Dobrynin, A.F.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Yegorov, A.G.; Yezhevskiy, A.A.; Yeltsin, B.N.; Yelchenko, Yu.N.; Yemokhonov, N.P.; Yermakov, N.S.; Yermin, L.B.; Yershova, N.M.; Yefimov, A.N.; Zagladin, V.V.; Zaykov, L.N.; Zaytsev, M.M.; Zamyatin, L.M.; Zatornitskiy, V.A.; Zakharov, V.G.; Zimyanin, M.V.; Zolotukhin, G.S.; Zorkaltsev, V.I.; Ivanovskiy, Ye.F.; Ignatov, V.N.;

Kavun, V.M.; Kazakov, L.D.; Kalashnikov, V.I.; Kamentsev, V.M.; Kapto, A.S.; Karlov, V.A.; Karpova, Ye.F.; Katushev, K.F.; Kachalovskiy, Ye.V.; Kachin, D.I.; Kachura, B.V.; Klepikov, M.I.; Klimenko, I.Ye.; Klyuyev, V.G.; Knyazyuk, M.A.; Kovalev, M.V.; Kolbin, G.V.; Koldunov, A.I.; Kolesnikov, A.Ya.; Kolesnikov, V.G.; Kolpakov, S.V.; Konarev, N.S.; Konoplev, B.V.; Korniyenko, G.M.; Korolev, A.M.; Kostin, V.S.; Kochemasov, V.I.; Kruglova, Z.M.; Kruchina, N.Ye.; Kryuchkov, V.A.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Kulikov, V.G.; Kulikov, F.M.; Kunayev, D.A.; Kuptsov, V.A.; Kurkotkin, S.K.;

Lemayev, N.V.; Ligachev, Ye.K.; Lizichev, A.D.; Litvintsev, Yu.I.; Logunov, A.A.; Lomakin, V.P.; Lomako, P.F.; Lomonosov, V.G.; Loshchenkov, F.I.; Lukyanov, A.I.; Lutak, I.K.; Lushchikov, A.P.; Lyashko, A.P.; Mayorets, A.I.; Makarenko, V.S.; Maksimov, Yu.P.; Malofeyev, A.A.; Malykhin, V.M.; Malkov, N.I.; Maltsev, V.F.; Manayenkov, Yu.A.; Manyakin, S.I.; Markov, G.M.; Marchuk, G.I.; Masaliyev, A.M.; Maslennikov, N.I.; Maslyukov, Yu.D.;

Makhkamov, K.; Medvedev, V.A.; Melnikov, A.G.; Mendybayev, M.S.; Mesyats, V.K.; Mironov, V.P.; Miroshkhin, O.S.; Mishin, V.M.; Mozgovoy, I.A.; Morgun, F.T.; Morozov, I.P.; Motornyy, D.K.; Muravyev, Ye.F.; Murakhovskiy, V.S.; Mynsichenko, V.P.; Myasnikov, A.P.;

Nazarbayev, N.A.; Nikonov, V.P.; Niyazov, S.A.; Novozhilov, G.V.; Nochevkin, A.P.; Ogarkov, N.V.; Odintsov, V.Ye.; Orlov, V.P.; Pavlov, V.Ya.; Panov, K.N.; Parubok, Ye.N.; Patiashvili, D.I.; Paton, B.Ye.; Pervyshin, E.K.; Pereverzeva, N.V.; Petrov, V.I.; Petrov, V.A.; Petrov, Yu.V.; Pletneva, V.N.; Plekhanov, A.N.; Pleshakov, P.S.; Polozkov, I.K.; Polyakov, V.N.; Ponomarev, A.F.; Ponomarev, B.N.; Ponomarev, M.A.; Popov, N.S.; Popov, F.V.; Prokopyev, I.P.; Prokopyev, Yu.N.; Putsyn, V.N.; Pugin, N.A.; Pugo, B.K.; Razumov, Ye.Z.; Razumovskiy, G.P.; Rakhmanin, O.B.; Revenko, G.I.; Rekunkov, A.M.; Reut, A.A.; Rybakov, A.Ya.; Ryzhkov, N.I.; Rykov, V.N.; Ryabov, Ya.P.;

Savinkin, N.I.; Sazonov, A.P.; Saykin, V.T.; Salykov, K.; Sizenko, Ye.I.; Silayev, I.S.; Sitnikov, V.I.; Slavskiy, Ye.P.; Sliyunkov, N.N.; Smirtyukov, M.S.; Smolov, P.A.; Smyslov, V.I.; Sokolov, Ye.Ye.; Sokolov, S.L.; Solov'yev, Yu.F.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Stepanov, V.S.; Stroyev, Ye.S.; Stukalin, B.I.; Systsov, A.S.; Tabeyev, F.A.; Talyzin, N.V.; Tarazevich, G.S.; Taratuta, V.N.; Tatarchuk, N.F.; Telepnev, P.M.; Terebilov, V.I.; Tereshkova, V.V.; Tereshchenko, N.D.; Titarenko, A.A.; Tikhomirov, V.P.; Tikhonov, N.A.; Tolkunov, L.N.; Tolubko, V.F.; Tretyak, I.M.; Tretyakov, P.I.; Trofimov, Yu.N.; Trunov, M.P.; Tyazhelnikov, Ye.M.;

Udalaya, R.S.; Usmanov, G.I.; Usmankhodzhayev, I.B.; Utkin, V.F.; Fedirko, P.S.; Fedoseyev, P.N.; Filatov, A.P.; Finogenov, P.V.; Foteyev, V.K.; Frolov, I.T.; Khodyrev, V.Ya.; Khomyakov, A.A.; Khristoradnov, Yu.N.; Chazov, Ye. I.; Chakovskiy, A.B.; Chebrikov, V.M.; Chervonenko, S.V.; Cherdintsev, V.M.; Cherkashina, V.N.; Chernavin, V.N.; Chernomyrdin, V.S.; Chernyy, A.K.; Chernyayev, A.S.; Chirskov, V.G.; Chicherov, V.S.; Shabanov, V.M.; Shakirov, M.Z.; Shalayev, S.A.; Shamshin, V.A.; Sharin, L.V.; Shevardnadze, E.A.; Shevchenko, V.S.; Shkabardnya, M.S.; Shkolnikov, A.M.; Shulyak, Ye.A.; Shchadov, M.I.; Shcherbina, B.Ye.; Shcherbitskiy, V.V.; Yusupov, M.Yu.; Yagodin, G.A.; Yakovlev, A.N.

**Candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee:**

Ageyev, G.Ye.; Aleshin, G.V.; Alimov, T.A.; Antonov, N.A.; Aripdzhanov, M.M.; Afonin, V.G.; Babenko, A.A.; Basistov, A.G.; Batsanov, B.T.; Belikov, V.A.; Belyakov, A.M.; Bibin, L.A.; Bobovikov, R.S.; Bobykin, L.F.; Boldin, V.I.; Borovikova, Z.I.; Brakov, Ye.A.; Brezhnev, V.A.; Brutents, K.N.; Bryzga, L.D.; Budyka, A.D.; Burenkov, S.P.; Busygin, M.I.;

Valov, Yu.N.; Varennikov, V.I.; Varnachev, Ye.A.; Vasilyev, L.B.; Velikhov, Ye.P.; Velichko, I.I.; Vladychenko, I.M.; Voronovskiy, G.P.; Gellert, N.V.; Girenko, A.N.; Gladkiy, I.I.; Glushkov, N.T.; Gonchar, A.T.; Gramov, M.V.; Gribachev, N.M.; Grigoryev, V.V.; Grintsov, I.G.;

Davydov, N.G.; Dzhabbarov, I.; Dementsev, V.V.; Dmitriyev, V.I.; Dmitriyev, I.N.; Dybenko, N.K.; Yegorov, G.M.; Yeliseyev,

Ye.A.; Yermash, F.T.; Yefimov, A.S.; Zhukov, G.A.; Zakharov, V.A.; Ivanova, T.G.; Ivashko, V.A.; Iyevlev, A.I.; Ilichev, L.F.;

Kazakov, V.I.; Kadyrov, G. Kh.; Kalin, I.P.; Kamay, A.S.; Kamalidenov, Z.; Kapitanets, I.M.; Karabasov, Yu.S.; Karpov, V.V.; Kasimova, V.A.; Kvitsinskiy, Yu.A.; Kirgizbayeva, T.B.; Kiselev, G.N.; Kleyko, S.V.; Kletskov, L.G.; Kozlovskiy, Ye.A.; Kolbeshkin, A.Ye.; Kolmogorov, G.D.; Kolomiyets, Yu.A.; Komarov, N.D.; Kononov, V.N.; Konstantinov, A.U.; Koptuyug, V.A.; Korkin, A.G.; Korolev, M.A.; Kochetkov, Yu.P.; Koshoyev, T.Kh.; Kravtsov, B.V.; Kryuchkov V.D.; Kunyshev, O.S.; Kulidzhanov, L.A.;

Laptev, I.D.; Listov, V.V.; Lobov, Yu.I.; Loginov, V.P.; Lukanenko, V.M.; Lunkov, N.M.; Luchinskiy, P.K.; Mamarasulov, S.; Masol, V.A.; Matafonov, M.I.; Menteshashvili, T.N.; Merkulova, G.V.; Metonidze, G.A.; Meshkov, A.G.; Mironenko, V.I.; Mozhayev, P.P.; Mukashev, S.; Myrzashv, R.;

Nenashev, M.F.; Nikitin, V.V.; Nikiforov, V.M.; Nikolskiy, B.V.; Obratsov, I.F.; Ovchinnikov, Yu.A.; Osipov, V.V.; Pavlov, N.A.; Parshina, V.R.; Paskar, P.A.; Pentyukhov, I.A.; Petrishchev, A.G.; Pogrebnyak, Ya.P.; Podolskiy, Ye.M.; Popkov, M.D.; Popov, N.I.; Posibeyev, G.A.; Primakov, Ye.M.; Radyukevich, L.V.; Rachkov, A.I.; Reshetilov, V.I.; Rodin, V.S.; Romazan, I.Kh.; Romanin, D.V.; Ruben, Yu.Ya.; Rybakov, A.M.; Ryzhikov, M.B.;

Sakalauskas, V.V.; Salimov, A.U.; Sarkisyan, F.T.; Saul, B.E.; Seidov, G.N.; Sidorov, V.V.; Skiba, I.I.; Sklyarov, Yu.A.; Slezko, P.Ya.; Smirnov, V.I.; Smirnov, G.L.; Snetkov, B.V.; Sologub, V.A.; Sorokin, A.I.; Spiridonov, L.N.; Stashenkov, N.A.;

Toropov, V.I.; Troyanovskiy, O.A.; Ulanov, G.I.; Falin, V.M.; Fomichenko, K.Ye.; Frolov, K.V.; Khayeyev, I.; Khitrin, L.I.; Khrennikov, T.N.; Chaplin, B.N.; Cherepanov, I.M.; Chekharin, Ye.M.; Chikin, V.V.; Shapiro, L.B.; Shirshin, G.Ch.; Shitov, A.I.; Shubnikov, N.M.; Shuralev, V.M.; Shchepetilnikov, A.N.; Shcherbakov, S.G.; Yazkuliye, B.; Yazov, D.T.; Yastrebov, I.P.

**AFP Summarizes Central Committee Changes**  
AU061931 Paris AFP in English 1918 GMT 6 Mar 86

[Pierre Bocev report]

[Text] Moscow, March 6 (AFP) — Nearly one third of the voting members of the new Communist Party Central Committee elected at the 27th party congress that ended here Thursday have never held high-level party posts, analysts noted.

They represent 97 of the new committee's 307 members named in a TASS news agency dispatch, according to which 24 others were former alternate members of the committee and seven were promoted from the revision commission.

Altogether, 104 Central Committee seats, or 40 per cent of the total, went to new members, compared with 17 per cent at the 1981 party congress.

The only major innovation was that seven members of the outgoing leadership kept their Central Committee seats although they retired from posts that gave them the right to sit on the committee. They include former Premier Nikolay Tikhonov and Boris Ponomarev, who is in charge of international relations but was not re-elected Thursday. Analysts said this special status aimed to set them apart from disgraced colleagues such as Grigoriy Romanov, a one-time rival of party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and Viktor Grishin, former Moscow party chief.

Most of the regional officials and ministers eased out by Mr. Gorbachev, apparently to breathe new life into the party machine after 18 years of stagnation under the late Leonid Brezhnev, have left the Central Committee.

Less expected was the departure of the Soviet ambassador to Japan, Petr Abrasimov, who is rumored to have been blamed for a scandal that rocked the Foreign Trade Ministry in December.

That of Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the powerful former interior minister who was abruptly assigned to unspecified "other duties" in January, confirms that he is in disgrace, analysts noted.

By contrast, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov kept his Central Committee seat, thus retaining some political influence, although he was removed from the Armed Forces General Staff in September 1984.

More difficult to explain are the departures of Yevgeniy Velikhov, the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences who is seen as a close aide to Mr. Gorbachev, and economist Abdel Aganbegian, a staunch advocate of reforms.

The new Central Committee includes 24 workers, 58 government officials, 48 representatives of the party's central apparatus, 23 representatives of the military of the KGB security police, and 35 members of the intelligentsia — diplomats, writers or scientists.

**New CPSU Central Auditing Commission Members**  
PM071139 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 86  
Second Edition p 2

["Composition of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission Elected by the 27th Party Congress" — PRAVDA headline]

[Text] G.A. Avakyan, V.T. Adylov, A.V. Aleksankin, G.I. Anufriyev, L.K. Balykova, A.A. Baranov, Z. Beyshekeyeva, A.A. Belyayev, N.I. Bukharin, V.A. Bykov, Ya.Ya. Bagris, B.G. Vladimirov, S.F. Voyenushkin, G.M. Voskanyan, D.P. Galkin, P.G. Gilashvili, V.A. Grebenyuk, Z.S. Gulova, A. Dzhumagulov, D.A. Dragunskiy, Yu.V. Dubinin, A.P. Dumachev, P.I. Yerpilov, L.N. Yefremov, A.I. Zverev, Yu.A. Izrael, G.S. Kabasin, I.V. Kapitonov, G.V. Kasyanova, A.G. Kovalev, D.P. Komarova, V.G. Komplektov, V.F. Konnov, Kh.-M.O. Koppel, I.I. Kostyukov, V.F. Krasnenkova, L.L. Krivoruchko, P.P. Laptev, S.A. Losev, A.M. Maksimkina, N.A. Moiseyev, A.A. Moku, I.S. Nayashkov, A.A. Nizovtseva, V.S. Odobesku, G. Pallayev, N.I. Popov, S.I. Postnikov, T.N. Rzayeva, K.Z. Romazanov, N.F.

Rubtsov, I.V. Rybakov, A.N. Ryndina, A.F. Ryuytel, M.R. Sagdiyev, N.I. Samilyk, G.F. Sizov, L.YE. Smirnova, T.I. Snetkova, R.-B. I. Sundayla, V.T. Stepanov, A.V. Storozhuk, Z.A. Stulpinene, A.M. Subbotin, G.F. Sukhoruchenkova, S.B. Tatl'yev, S.P. Tkachev, T.G. Trofimova, N.T. Trubilin, M.A. Ulyanov, A.M. Fateyev, M.I. Khaldeyev, A.P. Kharlamov, A. Khodzhamuradov, Yu.M. Khusainov, V.A. Shabanov, A.B. Shalyev, L.G. Sharayev, V.V. Sharapov, L.I. Shvetsova, I.A. Shinkevich, N.N. Shcherbakova, and R.G. Yanovskiy.

#### 'Information Report' on 5 Mar Proceedings

PM061000 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 86  
Second Edition p 1

["Information Report on Course of 27th CPSU Congress" — PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The 27th CPSU Congress continued its work 5 March 1986.

During the morning session Comrade M.R. Sagdiyev, first secretary of Kokchetav Kazakhstan Communist Party Obkom, spoke in the debate discussing the report "On the Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and the Period Through the Year 2000." Then the congress was greeted by Comrade Gordon MacLennan, secretary general of the Communist Party of Great Britain. Comrades I.V. Frantsenyuk, director of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine named for Yu.V. Andropov, and V.I. Sitnikov, first secretary of Irkutsk CPSU Obkom, spoke later in the debate. With that the debate discussing the report ended.

Comrade L.N. Zaykov spoke on behalf of the commission formed by the congress to prepare a draft resolution on the question under discussion. The congress unanimously approved the Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and the Period Through the Year 2000 with the submitted additions and changes and adopted a resolution on this question.

The report from the congress secretariat on the work it had done to examine the letters, appeals, proposals, remarks, and petitions addressed to the 27th CPSU Congress was noted. The congress instructed the CPSU Central Committee to complete this work and adopted an appropriate resolution.

Then the congress began examining the next point on the agenda — the election of the party's central organs.

#### General Delivers Army Greetings to Congress

PM051120 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Mar 86  
Second Edition pp 1, 7

[TASS report: "Guarding Peace and Creation. Greetings Message From USSR Armed Forces Representatives to 27th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] The USSR Armed Forces are part of the people's flesh and blood and the reliable guardian of the socialist motherland's

peaceful life and creative labor. On 4 March their representatives greeted the delegates and guests of the 27th CPSU Congress.

Columns of servicemen marched crisply into the hall of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses beneath their combat banners. The soldiers, sailors, sergeants, master sergeants, ensigns, warrant officers, officers, generals, and admirals in their formation represented all branches of the Armed Forces and categories of troops.

Servicemen from the Suvorov and Nakhimov schools froze on guard to the right and the left of the presidium. A row of Heroes of the Soviet Union stood in front of them. The successors of the Great Patriotic War veterans' martial glory stood shoulder to shoulder with them: cosmonauts and young internationalist servicemen — the heroes of our time.

"Pay attention!" the fanfares announced. The words of the servicemen's greetings message, which was read out by Major General V.S. Mikhaylov, commander of a tank division, rang out solemnly beneath the vaults of the palace.

Dear comrades, he said, the attention of the whole world is now focused on the work of the 27th CPSU Congress. Every word spoken here meets with an ardent response among Soviet people and our millions of friends abroad. USSR Armed Forces servicemen are following the work of the congress with tremendous interest and deep emotion. Allow me on their behalf, on behalf of those who at this time are at their combat posts and are vigilantly protecting the socialist motherland's security, to convey ardent combat greetings to you congress delegates and guests! (applause)

The 27th party congress opens up a qualitatively new stage in Soviet society's development. The implementation of the strategic course of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development put forward by the party will make it possible to raise still higher our state's economic and defense might and to ensure the further improvement of the Soviet people's well-being and the growth of their spiritual culture.

The high assessment of Soviet servicemen's martial labor made in the CPSU Central Committee Political Report evoked in our hearts ardent gratitude to the beloved party and a desire to fulfill with still greater responsibility and selflessness our sacred duty to defend Soviet people's peaceful, creative labor.

Thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, the Armed Forces have highly skilled cadres and a powerful combat potential. Through the intellect and talent of workers, scientists, designers and engineers, first-class weapons and combat hardware have been created. The modern missiles, tanks, aircraft, nuclear submarines, and automated control systems that we have today make it possible to maintain the strategic balance that has been achieved and to preclude military superiority on the part of imperialism's forces.

The Army and Navy servicemen, like all Soviet people, prepared to greet the 27th CPSU Congress in a worthy fashion. Their combat skill improved. The number of excellent-rated servicemen and class specialists increased. As always, the Communists

— the genuinely cementing force of military collectives — are in the vanguard of the struggle to successfully resolve the tasks of combat and political training. They set an example of high conscientiousness and the exemplary performance of their military duty.

For each of us, service in the Armed Forces is a great school of life, a school fostering lofty moral and political qualities, patriotism, and internationalism, a school of courage, discipline, and physical fitness.

The sons and grandsons of the Great Patriotic War veterans now stand in the formation of the motherland's valiant defenders. Like their fathers and grandfathers, they are faithful to the heroic traditions of the party, the people, and the Armed Forces. In recent years alone tens of thousands of servicemen have been awarded combat orders and medals. Within the Armed Forces delegation greeting the congress you also see today Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded that lofty title for exploits performed nowadays in the fulfillment of their international, patriotic duty. (prolonged applause)

Comrades!

Assessing the results that have been achieved from the standpoint of the party's present demands, we are well aware that it is necessary to improve our field, flying, and maritime skills still more intensively and persistently. The spirit of innovation, creative initiative, and great responsibility must become the law of military collectives' lives. Commanders, political organs, party organizations, and all Army and Navy servicemen will continue to enhance the vigilance and combat readiness of units and ships and to strengthen discipline and organization.

This is also required of us by the complex international situation, the headlong arms race unleashed by imperialist circles, and the attempt to extend it to space.

Not forgetting for even a minute the price at which our people won their freedom and independence, Soviet servicemen are deeply aware that the higher their readiness to thwart any aggressive intentions on imperialism's part is, the more reliable the socialist motherland's security will be.

Our love for the cherished Leninist party is boundless. Our loyalty to its ideals is limitless.

Permit me, dear comrades, from this lofty rostrum to assure the party congress and the entire Soviet people that the servicemen of the Armed Forces are always ready, together with the servicemen of the socialist community countries' fraternal armies, to deal a crushing rebuff to any aggressor. (prolonged applause) We will defend the socialist homeland as the military oath demands — steadfastly and skillfully, sparing neither our blood nor our lives themselves.

Long live our beloved motherland!

Long live the great Soviet people — builders of communism!

Glory to the CPSU — the inspirer and organizer of all our victories! (tumultuous applause)

Glory! Glory! Glory! — the serviceman chanted three times.

The delegates and guests of the 27th CPSU Congress rose to their feet and gave a tumultuous ovation to the heroic defenders of the gains of socialism.

### Reportage on Final Day of Congress Proceedings

#### Information Report

PM071045 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 86  
Second Edition p 1

["Information Report on the 27th CPSU Congress" — PRAVDA headline]

[Text] At the morning session of the 27th CPSU Congress on 6 March, Comrade M.S. Solomentsev, chairman of the counting [schetnyy] commission, read out the results of the election of central party bodies.

During a break in the congress work a CPSU Central Committee plenum was held.

When the session resumed, the congress listened to a report on the results of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and session of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, elected by the 27th party congress.

Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was unanimously elected general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum elected the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and appointed the chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee.

At its session the CPSU Central Auditing Commission elected the commission chairman.

At the end of the session, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade M.S. Gorbachev made a final speech which was listened to very attentively and was repeatedly interrupted by prolonged applause.

M.S. Gorbachev declared the 27th CPSU Congress closed.

The congress participants gave an enthusiastic rendition of the party anthem, the "Internationale."

#### Zamyatin Briefs Press

LD061606 Moscow TASS in English 1557 GMT 6 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow, March 6 TASS — A briefing held today at the press centre of the 27th CPSU Congress was devoted to the final sitting of the 27th CPSU Congress and the speech delivered there by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee