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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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File Folder BIO ANALYSES OF USSR OFFICIALS (3)

FOIA

F06-114/6

Box Number 21

YARHI-MILO

2110

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8947	POST IT NOTE	LODGE TO MATLOCK PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	12/18/1985	B1
8957	REPORT	USSR D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	2	11/7/1979	B1
8948	PAPER	REJUVENATION OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS LEADERSHIP CONTINUES AND CHINA R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	6	11/20/1985	B1
8949	PAPER	THE USSR'S NEW PREMIER: RYZHKOV D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	13	10/8/1985	B1
8958	REPORT	USSR	2	10/30/1985	B1
8959	REPORT	USSR R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6	1	11/13/1985	B1
8960	REPORT	USSR	2	9/4/1985	B1
8961	REPORT	USSR	1	9/4/1985	B1
8956	CABLE	170841Z SEP 85 R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6	6	9/17/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8950	COVER SHEET	POINDEXTER AND MATLOCK <i>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
8951	MEMO	SOVIET OFFICALS VIEW OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING <i>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	4	9/16/1985	B1
8952	COVER SHEET	POINDEXTER AND MATLOCK <i>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	ND	B1
8953	MEMO	SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES <i>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	5	9/11/1985	B1
8954	PAPER	ARBATOV <i>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	10	9/20/1985	B1
8955	COVER SHEET	MATLOCK	1	ND	B1

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
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File
USSR
BIO

4


USSR

Rejuvenation of Council of Ministers Leadership Continues

The naming of two new deputy premiers, Gosplan First Deputy Chairmen Lev A. Voronin and Yuriy D. Maslyukov, continues the rejuvenation of the Council of Ministers leadership begun with the appointment of Nikolay Ryzhkov as premier in late September and brings another close colleague of Ryzhkov from West Siberia into the top government ranks.

Soviet media announced Voronin's appointment to succeed Nikolay Martynov as deputy premier and chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab) on 15 November. Maslyukov's appointment as deputy premier was announced the following day. Maslyukov succeeded Leonid V. Smirnov, who since 1963 had been a deputy premier (supervising the defense industry) and the chairman of the Military Industrial Commission. Both new deputy premiers have worked together not only as Gosplan first deputy chairmen but as deputy ministers of the defense industry. Voronin served in the Defense Industry Ministry as deputy minister from 1972 to 1979, then as first deputy minister from 1979 to 1980, when he became Gosplan first deputy chairman in charge of the defense industry. Maslyukov was deputy minister of the defense industry from July 1979 until late 1982, when he became a first deputy chairman of Gosplan and took over Voronin's responsibility for the defense industry. Voronin at that time apparently switched to supervision of heavy industry, taking over the responsibility of Gosplan First Deputy Chairman Ryzhkov, who was promoted to Central Committee secretary in November 1982.

Voronin There is a long history of ties between Ryzhkov and Voronin. Both worked together in industrial plants in Sverdlovsk during the 1950's and 1960's, as well as in Gosplan more recently. Later Voronin moved into the Defense Industry Ministry in Moscow, while Ryzhkov became first deputy minister of heavy and transport machine building. Ryzhkov was named Gosplan first deputy chairman for heavy industry in January 1979, and Voronin became first deputy chairman for

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Other Issues

In line with the precedent established at China's urging in the fourth round of talks, the current round of negotiations also included discussions by separate "subgroups" on international issues of mutual concern, on questions of trade, cultural, and technical contacts, and on the thorny issue of a compensation settlement for Indian Embassy property confiscated by Chinese Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

Progress was reported on several of the latter issues. Beijing again noted both sides' satisfaction with the implementation of cultural, scientific, and technical ties and indicated that new programs were worked out for the coming year. Xinhua also cited "progress" on the issue of property and assets, which far more detailed Indian media accounts revealed to be a lease agreement settling the embassy property dispute.

Both Chinese and Indian comment, however, suggested persisting friction on international relations issues. As the news agency did last year, Xinhua's 11 November report said that the two sides "exchanged views on international matters of concern" and that they shared "identical or similar views" only on "some important international issues." The judgment offered by Xinhua last year that "all this has promoted mutual understanding between the two countries" was dropped, however. New Delhi's reports regarding international issues were more frankly desultory, eschewing the previous year's comment that there was "a similarity of views on several issues" to note only that "relations with neighbors as well as within the region were discussed" and that "the two sides referred to the Geneva summit and the situation in the Indochina region, including Kampuchea." (U/FOUO)

defense industry in October 1980. In these two positions they worked side by side until November 1982, when Ryzhkov became CPSU secretary and head of the CPSU Central Committee's new Economic Department.

Voronin has strong credentials as an administrator who favors changes in the Soviet economic system. He, like Ryzhkov, was picked by Andropov to become a key figure in post-Brezhnev economic reform efforts. When the Andropov regime unveiled its main reform effort in mid-1983—the economic experiment partially to decentralize controls in several USSR and local ministries—Voronin was selected to organize and lead it. He was named chairman of a Gosplan “Commission for General Leadership of the Economic Experiment,” and in this post he has had high visibility, explaining and promoting the experiment in numerous articles and interviews. The widely acclaimed experiment has been expanded, and, according to Gorbachev, will soon encompass most of industry.

The selection of Voronin to head Gossnab may signal plans to change the present supply system, which is often criticized as undependable and overly centralized. Proposals to reduce centralized allocation of goods and allow plants to work out sales of products and purchases of supplies among themselves (known as “wholesale trade” in Soviet economic discussions) were recently advanced in an August *Novyy Mir* article by prominent economist-journalist Vasilii Selyunin. A 12 July Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree on extending the 1983 economic experiment ordered Voronin's commission to prepare proposals to develop “forms of wholesale trade” and “improvements on this basis” in Gossnab's work.¹

Voronin's rise has been one of the main signs of a post-Brezhnev tendency to turn to defense industry leaders to improve economic management. Not only was Voronin put in direct charge of the 1983 economic experiment, but General Machine Building Minister Sergey A. Afanasyev (another former official of the Defense Industry Ministry) was appointed minister of heavy and transport machine building just before that ministry became one of the two USSR ministries assigned to conduct the experiment. Top leaders may believe that defense industry managers were more efficient than civilian industrialists. This attitude was reflected most recently in a 2 October *Pravda* article by Academician Vadim A. Trapeznikov, who stated that “technology and quality of products in our defense industry are higher than in civilian fields” and suggested the wider use of the experience of defense industry workers, “especially in checking the quality of products.”

¹ *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (Economic Gazette)*, No. 32, August 1985. This provision was not included in the 4 August *Pravda* version of the decree.

Maslyukov Much less is known about Maslyukov, who has spent his whole career in secretive defense industry institutes and plants and has only recently reached national prominence. Other than his contacts with Voronin, his political ties are unclear. Unlike Voronin, he has not granted press interviews or written newspaper articles. According to the biography accompanying his appointment, he was named Gosplan first deputy chairman in 1982, apparently by Andropov, but his appointment was not announced in official journals, and he was not even mentioned in the media in this position until March 1984.

**Ministerial
Rejuvenation** The appointment of Voronin, 57, and Maslyukov, 48, is part of a rejuvenation of the Council of Ministers leadership started by the appointment of 56-year-old Nikolay Ryzhkov to replace 80-year-old Nikolay Tikhonov as premier on 27 September. Since then, five new deputy premiers or first deputy premiers—all young—have been named, and four deputy premiers—all elderly—have been retired. In addition to Voronin's replacement of Martynov, 75, and Maslyukov's replacement of Smirnov, 69, three other changes have been made at the level of deputy premier or first deputy premier since Ryzhkov became premier:

- Deputy Premier Nikolay Talyzin, 56, was named first deputy premier and Gosplan chairman on 14 October, replacing 74-year-old Nikolay Baybakov.
- Stavropol First Secretary Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, 59, became first deputy premier for agriculture on 1 November, succeeding 70-year-old Ziya Nuriyev.²
- Aviation Industry Minister Ivan Silayev, 55, was promoted to deputy premier on 1 November.

With the new additions, the Council of Ministers leadership not only becomes more youthful, but now reflects an unusual dominance by officials from West Siberia and Gosplan who have been involved in efforts to make changes in economic administration and planning. Premier Ryzhkov and Deputy Premiers Voronin and Yakov Ryabov all are from Sverdlovsk and were appointed first deputy chairmen of Gosplan in 1979-80. Ryzhkov and Voronin, as noted above, have been involved in supervising the economic experiment

² See the *Trends* of 6 November 1985, pages 3-4.

begun in 1983, while Ryabov as Sverdlovsk first secretary in the early 1970's wrote articles highly critical of the present planning system. Ryabov was first deputy chairman of Gosplan from 1979 to 1983 and was named deputy premier in September 1984. The advancement of these officials is part of a wider trend of promoting West Siberians to top posts which began under Andropov and accelerated under Gorbachev.³ (U/FOUO)

³ See the *Trends* of 24 April 1985, pages 3-4.

China

Historical Allegory Echoes Debate on Political Reforms

A recent historical essay in Renmin Ribao appears to deal allegorically with political controversy surrounding Deng Xiaoping's sweeping reform agenda. Drawing suggestive parallels to recent party leadership decisions in particular, the article alludes to divisions among reformers over personnel decisions. Overall it cites the need for caution in pursuing reform policies, particularly with respect to leadership changes, drawing the historical lesson that rashness on this score has led to the defeat of reforms.

The article by Kong Xiangji, a young historian affiliated with People's University in Beijing, was published in the 21 October issue of *Renmin Ribao* in a section of the newspaper earmarked for discussion of academic trends. The article argues for a new interpretation of the failure of radical reforms introduced by the Qing dynasty's Guangxu emperor in 1898. In Kong's view, the reform movement failed because "the pace of reform was too fast" and the reformers were "too rash and too unrealistic," and not, as most historians have concluded, because the reformers were too timid and "unable to go ahead with big strides."

The 1898 reform movement has received considerable attention from Chinese historians in recent years, and essays dealing with the event have often pursued themes evocative of current policy concerns. While debate has been conducted primarily in academic journals, essays on the topic have routinely appeared through 1983 in more authoritative media such as *Renmin Ribao* and *Hongqi*. Since 1983 no articles on the event are known to have appeared in these two periodicals.

The 1898 reform movement easily lends itself to discussion of present-day political issues in historical guise. Political conflict in the Qing court at that time centered on the question of modernization, and more particularly on the issue of how, and to what extent, China should assimilate Western technology, values, and institutions. As most PRC accounts depict the reform period, the principal actors were the arch conservatives, led by the most powerful figure of

Vladimir Sergeyevich ALKHIMOV
(Phonetic: ahlKEEmuf)

USSR

Chairman of the Board, State Bank
(since October 1976)

Addressed as:
Mr. Alkhimov



The head of one of the world's largest banks, Vladimir Alkhimov directs the USSR's centralized banking system, comprising over 4,400 institutions and 80,000 savings banks. The State Bank (Gosbank) issues Soviet currency; handles short- and long-term credits to Soviet industrial, agricultural, and trade organizations; and provides the cash resources for the USSR state budget. Working with the USSR Foreign Trade Bank, of which Gosbank is a stockholder, Gosbank carries out foreign exchange operations involving gold, platinum, and foreign currencies.

A member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1942, Alkhimov was elected to full membership in the CPSU Central Committee in 1982. He is also a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Alkhimov is experienced in US-Soviet foreign trade matters; he was a cochairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council from 1973 until 1977. He has met often with US officials and has visited the United States several times, most recently in 1979.

Alkhimov attended the Leningrad Financial and Economic Institute before the outbreak of World War II. During the war he commanded a platoon and battery, earning the prestigious Hero of the Soviet Union medal for bravery in 1945. Returning to his studies after the war, Alkhimov graduated from the above-cited institute in 1947 and the Foreign Trade Academy in 1950. He holds a candidate of economic sciences degree, for which he wrote a dissertation titled *England's Banking Monopolies*. He served during 1950-57 as a department chief and deputy director of the Scientific Research Institute for Market Research, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. For the next three years he was a commercial counselor in Washington. Alkhimov then returned to the Foreign Trade Ministry, where he served first as deputy chief and then as chief of the Foreign (Currency) Exchange Administration during 1960-67. He supervised international financial transactions as a deputy minister of foreign trade from 1967 until 1976.

In addition to the medal mentioned above, Alkhimov, 65, has been awarded two Orders of Lenin and other medals. He speaks English. He and his wife, Antonina, have two daughters.

CR M 84-15416
13 November 1984

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15



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~~S E C R E T~~ MOSCOW 12953

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: JUDGING FROM OUR FIRSTHAND AND SECONDHAND INFORMATION ABOUT GORBACHEV, THE GENERAL SECRETARY CONTINUES TO LIVE UP TO HIS BILLING AS AN INTELLIGENT AND ENERGETIC INTERLOCUTOR. HE CAN BE CHARMING AND HUMOROUS; HE CAN ALSO BE CONTENTIOUS AND ASSERTIVE--EVEN A BIT ARROGANT--AS GORBACHEV DEMONSTRATED DURING HIS MEETING WITH CODEL BYRD/THURMOND. OUR IMPRESSIONS ARE DRAWN FROM THE CHARGE'S DIRECT OBSERVATION OF GORBACHEV'S LENGTHY BYRD/THURMOND MEETING, PLUS OBSERVATIONS OF THE FRG DCM (WHO ATTENDED A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH GORBACHEV), THE UK AMBASSADOR (WHO WAS PRESENT AT SEVERAL OF GORBACHEV'S MEETINGS IN LONDON LAST DECEMBER), AND THE FRG AMBASSADOR (WHO WAS BRIEFED ON GORBACHEV'S RECENT MEETING WITH GERMAN SPD POLITICIAN RAU). THESE SOURCES SHOULD BE STRICTLY PROTECTED. END SUMMARY.

3. IN HIS MEETING WITH CODEL BYRD/THURMOND, GORBACHEV

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CAME ACROSS AS MASTER OF HIS BRIEF, IN FULL CONTROL OF HIMSELF AND OF THE MEETING. INTELLIGENCE, ALERTNESS, AND ENERGY CHARACTERIZED HIS PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT. AT THE SAME TIME, GORBACHEV SEEMED DISINCLINED TO ACCEPT WHAT HE HEARD FROM THE CODEL AS NEW OR INSIGHTFUL. RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING TO UNDERSTAND THE VIEWS OF HIS AMERICAN GUESTS OR TO REFLECT UPON THEIR REMARKS, GORBACHEV APPEARED TO CONCENTRATE UPON ASSESSING WHAT HE HEARD IN LIGHT OF HIS CONCEPTION OF U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS (A CONCEPTION THAT SMELLS STRONGLY OF ARBATOV). HIS DEMEANOR, IN SHORT, WAS MORE THAT OF A SELF-CONFIDENT ADVOCATE THAN OF AN INQUIRING STATESMAN.

4. GORBACHEV MADE VIRTUALLY NO MENTION OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP DURING THE BYRD/THURMOND MEETING. IN CONTRAST TO THE SEVERAL REFERENCES TO HIS LEADERSHIP COLLEAGUES IN THE TIME INTERVIEW. HE SHOWED NO TENTATIVENESS IN PRESENTING SOVIET VIEWS, REINFORCING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE FELT HE HAD FULL AUTHORITY IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AREA. THIS IMPRESSION WAS ALSO BOLSTERED BY THE ABENCE, AT BOTH THE TIME INTERVIEW AND THE CODEL MEETING, OF SENIOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY FIGURES (E. G., GROMYKO, SHEVARDNADZE, KORNIYENKO, DOBRYNIN). THE SECONDARY SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS AT THE TWO MEETINGS-- ALEKSANDROV, ARBATOV, ZAMYATIN, ZAGLADIN, BESSMERTNYKH--FUNCTIONED AS NOTETAKERS AND RESOURCE PERSONS, NOT AS PARTICIPANTS IN THE DISCUSSION.

5. GORBACHEV USUALLY SPOKE WITH THE BYRD/THURMOND CODEL IN A SMOOTH, CONTROLLED CADENCE AND QUIET TONE, EVEN WHEN THE MEANING OF HIS WORDS WAS

SHARPLY CRITICAL. THERE WERE TIMES WHEN HIS REMARKABLE SELF-CONFIDENCE APPROACHED ARROGANCE.

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ONE SUCH MOMENT WAS WHEN GORBACHEV FORCEFULLY PROCLAIMED THAT THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS SEEMED TO FORGET THEY WERE DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ANOTHER WAS GORBACHEV'S HEAVILY SARCASTIC REJECTION OF SENATOR BYRD'S COMMENTS ON THE RELEVANCE OF SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE FOR U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS.

6. U.K. AMBASSADOR CARTLEDGE (PROTECT), WHO ACCOMPANIED GORBACHEV ON OFFICIAL MEETINGS DURING GORBACHEV'S DECEMBER 1984 VISIT TO THE U.K., FOUND GORBACHEV LESS ASSERTIVE AND LESS SELF-CONFIDENT ON THAT OCCASION THAN WE SAW HIM WITH THE CODEL. OF COURSE, IN DECEMBER 1984 GORBACHEV WAS STILL SUBORDINATE TO GENERAL SECRETARY CHERNENKO. STILL, AS CARTLEDGE DESCRIBED IT, FROM TIME TO TIME "THE MASK SLIPPED," PARTICULARLY WHEN THE U.K. SIDE RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS, REVEALING TYPICAL RUSSIAN BLUSTER, INTOLERANCE AND THE IMPULSE TO COUNTERATTACK IN THE FACE OF TELLING CRITICISM.

7. FRG DCM ARNOT (PROTECT) SAW A MORE SUBDUED GORBACHEV LAST APRIL, WHEN ARNOT (WHO WAS THEN CHARGE) ACCOMPANIED FRG BANKER CHRISTIANSON (PHON) TO A TWO-HOUR KREMLIN MEETING WITH THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY. ON THAT OCCASION GORBACHEV WAS RELAXED AND RELATIVELY CASUAL, ALTHOUGH ALWAYS ALERT AND PERCEPTIVE. HE FIRST READ FROM A BRIEFING PAPER, THEN ENGAGED IN LOW-KEY CONVERSATION. GORBACHEV BECAME "A BIT FLUSTERED," HOWEVER, WHEN THE BANKER TOLD GORBACHEV HE WAS TOTALLY WRONG IN HIS ANALYSES OF FRG ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS.

8. GORBACHEV REPORTEDLY WAS ON HIS BEST BEHAVIOR DURING HIS TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH SPD POLITICIAN RAU SEPTEMBER 10. WE UNDERSTAND THE GENERAL SECRETARY

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IMPRESSED RAU AS ALERT, RELAXED, AND FRIENDLY--
UNDOUBTEDLY BECAUSE GORBACHEV WANTED TO FLATTER
HIS WEST GERMAN GUEST. GORBACHEV CITED COMMON
POSITIONS OF THE CPSU AND SPD WHERE NONE EXISTED.
HE TONED DOWN HIS CRITICISM OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
AND THE KOHL GOVERNMENT, LEAVING IT TO RAU'S OFFICIAL
HOST--POLITBURO MEMBER VOROTNIKOV--TO COMPARE THE
USG (UNFAVORABLY) TO NAZI GERMANY AND TO CONDEMN
FRG "REVANCHISM."

9. COMMENT. GORBACHEV'S RELATIVELY PRICKLY
PERFORMANCE BEFORE THE SENATORS MAY HAVE BEEN
CALCULATED TO IMPRESS BOTH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.
HE MAY HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO CONVEY THE IMAGE
TO WASHINGTON OF AN ASTUTE, FORMIDABLE SOVIET
LEADER. HE MAY ALSO HAVE WANTED TO ASSURE HIS
COLLEAGUES WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT HE
COULD REPRESENT SOVIET INTERESTS EFFECTIVELY
BEFORE SENIOR AMERICAN POLITICIANS. MORE GENERALLY,
HE MAY HAVE BEEN CONCERNED TO ENHANCE HIS PERSONAL
IMAGE AT HOME AND ABROAD AS THE AUTHORITATIVE
SPOKESMAN FOR SOVIET FOREIGN AS WELL AS DOMESTIC
POLICY.

10. THERE IS ANOTHER EXPLANATION FOR GORBACHEV'S
SELF ASSERTIVENESS WITH THE SENATORS THAT WE WOULD
NOT RULE OUT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT HE IS NO LESS
A COMMITTED DEFENDER OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ITS
IDEOLOGICAL WORLD VIEW THAN WERE HIS PREDECESSORS.

HIS SELF-CONFIDENCE AND SENSE OF SELF-IMPORTANCE
MAY HAVE GROWN AS HE HAS CONSOLIDATED POWER SINCE
BECOMING GENERAL SECRETARY SIX MONTHS AGO. IN
ADDITION, AS THE FIRST CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY TO
HAVE REACHED POLITICAL MATURITY AFTER THE POSTWAR
STALIN PERIOD, GORBACHEV MAY FEEL MORE STRONGLY
THAN HIS PREDECESSORS (I. E., KRUSHCHEV, BREZHNEV,

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ANDROPOV, AND CHERNENKO) THAT THE USSR IS A
SUPERPOWER EQUAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND THUS
ENTITLED TO THE SAME "RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES" AS THE
UNITED STATES. HENCE HE MAY HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED TO REBUT THE CONTRARY VIEWS HE THOUGHT
HE HEARD FROM THE SENATORS. HIS AGGRESSIVENESS WITH
THE SENATORS, IN OTHER WORDS, MAY HAVE REFLECTED HIS
PERSONAL CONVICTIONS, AS OPPOSED TO A CALCULATED ACT
THAT HE PUT ON FOR OTHER REASONS.

11. IN ANY EVENT, DURING THE MEETING WITH
CODEL BYRD/THURMOND WE SAW AN UNFLATTERING SIDE
TO GORBACHEV'S PERSONALITY THAT MAY BE IN EVIDENCE
AT THE NOVEMBER MEETING IN GENEVA: RIGIDITY,
SELF-ASSERTIVENESS AND OVER-POSITIVENESS IN THE
FACE OF A CHALLENGE TO MOSCOW'S CURRENT LINE ABOUT
U. S. -SOVIET RELATIONS, HOWEVER UNREALISTIC THAT
LINE MAY BE. END COMMENT. COMBS

~~SECRET~~

NO DISSEMINATION

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	VADM J. Poindexter	9/18	
2	J. Matlock	9/18	
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION		FILE
APPROVAL	X	INFORMATION
COMMENT		PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE		RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY	X	RETURN
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REMARKS:


d Gorb. Intel reports
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[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Central Intelligence Agency



16 SEP 1985

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NLRR FOI 11416 #8951

BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Director of Intelligence and Research
 Department of State
 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 Chief of Intelligence Staff
 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: [Redacted] Preparations for the Reagan-
 Gorbachev Meeting

1.

[Redacted]

the Soviet Union has made important proposals for the meeting, especially concerning arms limitations, but the US has flatly rejected them.
 Comment: [Redacted] referring to the "militarization" of space.)

2.

[Redacted] the Soviet Union now expects some concessionary proposals from the American side because US public opinion will require certain initiatives, and, to a degree, the Reagan Administration is captive to international public opinion as well.

[Redacted] the Soviet Union is not certain whether the President will commit himself to specific proposals during his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in September. In any case, it is expected that the President will say nothing and do nothing to undermine the summit. More than likely, the President will listen to what Shevardnadze says, but reserve bigger plans for the

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

summit. Probably the President will make some goodwill statements calling for solutions to the arms race and the development of orderly relations between the two countries. The Reagan-Shevardnadze meeting will be an important political test for the President in view of the summit which will follow.

3. The most important problem for the Soviet Union in preparing for the meetings is the number of proposals which have been advanced in connection with disarmament. The Soviets consider all problems relating to disarmament as interrelated, not in isolation. The Soviets are ready to undertake substantial reductions in the field of strategic weapons, and even in European-based missiles, provided that the US abandons its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

[Redacted] Comment: [Redacted]

[Redacted] the US program calls not only for research, but development of space weapons. This is a stand that the Soviet Union cannot accept.)

4. It is understood, [Redacted] that if there is no real progress in the field of arms control, and if the US does not change its position--and the Soviets have seen no indication of a change--it means the summit talks will be deprived of substance. The idea behind Shevardnadze's meeting with the President is to attempt to convince him that now is the right time to make constructive proposals. The Soviet Union believes there are two main areas in which the US could make concessions. The first is SDI, which Shevardnadze will discuss with the President. Secondly, the US could halt further deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe. In turn, the Soviets might be willing to renounce their countermeasures.

5. Turning briefly to bilateral relations, [Redacted] it is possible to make certain arrangements with regard to the resumption of Aeroflot flights to the US and the opening of consulates in New York City and Kiev.

6. The Soviets do appreciate the exchange of views with the US on regional problems such as the situation in South Africa, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, which have already taken place, as well as talks scheduled for 12 September in Moscow regarding the situation in Southeast Asia. However, in their opinion, these talks have seen only a reiteration of respective positions and have not helped to solve the




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problems in these regions.

7. This report is being made available to the US ambassadors to Moscow and Geneva and to the chief NST negotiators.

Clair E. George
Deputy Director for Operations



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The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Chief of Intelligence Staff
US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Deputy Director for Intelligence

National Intelligence Officer for USSR

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

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Director, Office of European Analysis

Chief, Arms Control and Intelligence Staff

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
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[Redacted]

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 401063

Central Intelligence Agency



11 SEP 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: [Redacted]
Gorbachev's Domestic and Foreign Policies

1. [Redacted]

2. [Redacted]

[Redacted] internal developments in the Soviet party and government, as well as recent trends in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and with the West since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the position of Soviet Communist Party General Secretary. [Redacted]

[Redacted] wide-ranging personnel changes which are currently taking place in all levels of the state and party bureaucracy. Older cadres are being forced into retirement or relegated to positions of reduced importance. There are also indications that Gorbachev is trying to reduce the overall number of official positions in the state and party apparatus in order to make these institutions into more flexible and effective instruments for carrying out his policies. In the past few months, a concerted effort has begun to introduce new work methods in all sectors of the party and state administration.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

3. In connection with personnel changes at the highest levels of the party and government, [redacted]

[redacted] Gorbachev seems to be trying to concentrate all essential decisions about foreign and domestic policies in his own hands. [redacted] it is merely a matter of time before Nikolay Tikhonov is required to step down as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, given the critical importance of this position for Gorbachev's consolidation of power over the government and economic administration. Tikhonov already appears to have less and less influence over the decisions being made by the government bodies nominally subordinate to him and is evidently being pushed aside in a decorous but firm manner.

4. [redacted] former

Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko appears no longer to play any serious role in the formulation of foreign policy. Moreover, the new Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, seems to function more as an executor of policy guidelines laid down by Gorbachev rather than as the architect of Soviet diplomatic strategy. [redacted]

[redacted] these and other personnel changes which have been underway in the various sectors of the Soviet foreign policy establishment appear to portend a significant change in the strategy and tactics for conducting relations with the West. [redacted]

[redacted] there will likely be further changes in the staffing of the Foreign Ministry, but could not provide the specific names of individuals who would be moved in or out. [redacted]

[redacted] Gorbachev's elevation of Gromyko from Foreign Minister to head of state was regarded as a sincere tribute to the latter's decades of faithful service--and as a token of Gorbachev's personal gratitude for Gromyko's nomination of him to the post of General Secretary--rather than as a sign of the new leader's disfavor towards him. Since it has long been evident that Gorbachev intended to make broad changes in the conduct of Soviet foreign relations, no one found it surprising that as soon as he assumed the position of General Secretary he would remove Gromyko and replace him with his own man.

5. [redacted] the

middle and lower echelons of the party, including the Central Committee itself, have so far received very little information or guidance from above concerning the preparations underway for the Party Congress scheduled for February 1986. Due to [redacted] a "total blockage of information from Gorbachev's cabinet," the Central Committee departments responsible for press and propaganda

[redacted]

[redacted]

have been able to provide almost no information to the party press about the political line which is now being worked out in the highest echelons of the party, and this makes it extremely difficult for editors and journalists to carry on their day-to-day work.

6.

[redacted] the current Polish regime will soon regain control of the situation in that country and that it will then be able to resolve all existing problems and to eliminate the various anomalies of contemporary Polish national life, by means of traditional (i.e., pre-1980) methods of political control. Among the tasks which [redacted] the current Polish regime must accomplish in the not-too-distant future are the suppression of the church and effecting the "disappearance" of the political opposition. [redacted] Comment: [redacted] seemed unable to comprehend the objections of a Polish interlocutor that what he was proposing would require years to accomplish and that there was no guarantee that such a course of action would in the long run succeed.)

7. Turning to the area of foreign policy, [redacted]

[redacted] under Gorbachev Soviet official pronouncements on East-West relations have become a good deal more flexible and diplomatic than they have been in the past. Although this fact to a certain extent testifies to the new leadership's desire to achieve certain accords (NFI) with the US and the West on arms control and other international issues, [redacted] there has been no change in the Soviet Union's view of the US and its role in world affairs. [redacted] a significant difference in the way East-West issues are presented in the official press and in the public statements of Soviet leaders on the one hand, and the way they are presented in party cadre indoctrination programs, both formal and informal, on the other hand. Whatever Soviet leaders may be saying in their public statements, the US continues to be portrayed as the irreconcilable and relentless enemy of the Soviet Union and indeed "the personification of evil" in speeches and documents intended for internal party consumption. If anything, the tone of anti-US propaganda disseminated within the party has grown shriller and harsher in the past few months than it has been for many years. [redacted] the fiercest attacks on the US (and for that matter on any of the Soviet Union's perceived enemies) take the form of informal diatribes which are passed from mouth to mouth rather than put down on paper in a finished form for which the author could conceivably be called to account in the future.

~~SECRET~~

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8. This report is being made available to the US Ambassador to Moscow and the US Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw.

Clair E. George
Deputy Director for Operations

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