

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Matlock, Jack F.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Biographical Analyses of USSR  
Officials (2)  
**Box:** 21

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/21/2005

**File Folder** BIO ANALYSES OF USSR OFFICIALS

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2109

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8929	PAPER	CENTRAL COMMITTEE <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	9	ND	B1
8930	PAPER	CENTRAL COMMITTEE	1	3/8/1986	B1
8931	CHART	PARTY OFFICIALS <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	1	ND	B1
8932	MEMO	DUBININ <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	1	ND	B1
8939	CABLE	241511Z JUN 86 <b>R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6</b>	5	6/24/1986	B1
8940	REPORT	USSR <b>D 3/14/2011 F2006-114/6</b>	2	ND	B1 B3 B6
8933	POST IT NOTE	LODGE TO MATLOCK <b>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	1	5/8/1985	B1
8934	PAPER	USSR GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL ADVISERS <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	7	5/8/1986	B1
8941	REPORT	USSR <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	1	7/19/1985	B1
8942	REPORT	USSR <b>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</b>	2	2/20/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

**Withdrawer**

JET 4/21/2005

**File Folder** BIO ANALYSES OF USSR OFFICIALS

**FOIA**

F06-114/6

**Box Number** 21

YARHI-MILO

2109

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8935	PAPER	LIGACHEV <i>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	6	1/15/1986	B1
8936	POST IT NOTE	LODGE TO MATLOCK <i>PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	2/24/1986	B1
8943	REPORT	USSR	3	2/19/1986	B1
8944	REPORT	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8943	3	2/19/1986	B1
8945	REPORT	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8942 <i>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	2	2/20/1986	B1
8946	REPORT	SAME TEXT AS DOC #8942 <i>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	2	2/20/1986	B1
8937	POST IT NOTE	POINDEXTER <i>R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	1	11/15/1986	B1
8938	PAPER	GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY TEAM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US <i>D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6</i>	8	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Success in the Central Committee: One of Gorbachev's priority goals when he took office was to place his own selectees into positions conferring membership on the Central Committee, while removing as many potential opponents as possible from such slots. (See box) He has been remarkably successful in achieving this goal, with 85 of the 125 new members reflecting appointments after his election. The wide-ranging purge of party and government leaders that he has conducted since taking power in March contributed to the largest turnover of Central Committee members since Khrushchev's times. Over forty percent of the full or voting members of the Central Committee elected at Brezhnev's last congress in 1981 were turned out of office, while almost fifty percent of the full and candidate members elected to the new body are choices approved by Gorbachev, either when he was senior secretary overseeing personnel or since he was named General Secretary. They are presumably beholden to him and his allies for their positions. (See Table)

BOX

Importance of the Central Committee

The Central Committee whose members are elected on the basis of holding key party and government jobs has always been a key lever of control for the General Secretary. In the 1920s Stalin built his powerbase by packing that institution and Khrushchev emulated his strategy in the 1950s. While their role in policy

NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT A GLANCE

Full Members:

Reelected:	179/58%
New Full Members:	128/42%
Elevated from Candidate Member:	23/8%
Newcomers:	<u>105/34%</u>
Total	307/100%

(decreased 12 from 319 elected in 1981)

Candidate Members:

Reelected:	54/32%
Newcomers:	<u>116/68%</u>
Total	170/100%

(increased 19 from 151 elected in 1981)

Grand Total 477/46% new

(increased 7 from 470 elected in 1981)

INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF FULL MEMBERS

	<u>1986</u>	<u>1981</u>
National Party	30 (10%)	31 (10%)
National Government	69 (23%)	77 (24%)
Regional Party and Gov't	117 (38%)	127 (40%)
Military	23 (7%)	23 (7%)
KGB	4 (1%)	4 (1%)
MFA	15 (5%)	16 (5%)
Media Editors	3 (1%)	4 (1%)
Mass Orgs and Unions	8 (3%)	8 (3%)
Scientific	11 (4%)	10 (3%)
Others*	<u>27 (8)</u>	<u>19 (6%)</u>
Total	307 (100%)	319 (100%)

\*Includes: industrial and agricultural managers; workers; honorary retirees; unknown

formulation is indirect--that power resides in the Politburo and the Secretariat--they play a crucial role in policy implementation and can resolve conflicts when opinion in these higher deliberative bodies is divided. They can even decide the fate of the General Secretary, as they did in 1957 when they supported Khrushchev against his Politburo opponents, and in 1964, when they threw their support to Brezhnev and sanctioned Khrushchev's overthrow.


END BOX

---


While engineering an historically high rate of turnover of its members, Gorbachev--unlike many of his predecessors--did not expand the size of the Central Committee nor did the influx of new members shift the relative political influence of the country's major institutions. (See Table) The number of full members actually declined from 319 to 307, with the number of candidate members growing slightly from 151 to 170. While expanding the size would have allowed him to pack it with even more of his supports, he appears to have shifted the body's loyalty toward himself without the giving more of the elite a claim to Central Committee status which might afford them greater political independence from the center--a step which could attenuate central control down the road, as the Brezhnev era showed.

---

~~SECRET~~




0



~~SECRET~~





Gorbachev also took advantage of the elections to advance several personal advisers, as well as to reward those supportive of his policy views, and chasten opponents.

- o New foreign policy adviser A.S. Chernyayev was promoted to full member, and domestic aides A.P. Lushchikov and V.I. Roldin were made full and candidate members respectively. A possible adviser on ideology, G.L. Smirnov retained his candidate seat as well.
  
- o Arms control spokesman and reputed science adviser Ye. P.



Velikhov was among several Academy of Sciences Vice-Presidents advanced to candidate membership, probably reflecting the stress Gorbachev places on science and technology in achieving his economic goals.

- o Richard Kosolapov, the Kommunist editor who has served as the principal public spokesman for those resistant to economic reform, lost his position as full member.
- o Reform-minded philosopher I.T. Frolov--criticized and demoted in the 1970s for advocating "open debate" of ideologically sensitive issues--was leapfrogged to full membership, lending credibility to reports that he would replace Kosolapov as editor of the important party theoretical journal.

Reorganization of the Central Apparatus: The failure of a number of department chiefs to gain reelection to the Central Committee strongly suggests that Gorbachev also made good on his rumored intention to streamline the party apparatus by reducing the number of Central Committee departments.

- o Letters Department chief Boris Yakovlev failed to regain his position on the Central Auditing Committee. These departments have already been eliminated at the republic level and the Auditing Commission has apparently assumed

this function at the national level. Yakovlev's removal confirms the demise of his department.

- o Agricultural Machine Building Department chief I.I. Sakhnyuk lost his seat on the Central Committee, possibly indicating that this department created during Brezhnev's last years has been merged with the Machine Building Department or with the Agriculture Department in a move parallel to Gorbachevs' recent merging of agricultural ministries on the government side.
  
- o K.S. Simonov, head of the Transport and Communications Department, and V.F. Shauro, head of the Culture Department, were not reelected candidate members. It is unclear whether they have been replaced or their departments eliminated.

These removals mark an almost complete turnover of department chiefs in place when Brezhnev died in 1982, leaving only International Information Department Chief Zamyatin--rumored to going as ambassador to Great Britain, Administrative Organs Department Chief Savinkin, and Agricultural and Food Industry Chief Karlov--all of whom were reelected--in their positions. Continued criticism of the poor performance of several Central Committee departments and their undesirable proliferation by Moscow party boss Yeltsin suggest more streamlining may be under

consideration. [redacted]

Honorable Retirement? In an unusual move, four retired senior party and government officials--premier Tikhonov, Gosplan chief Baybakov, International Department Chief Ponomarev, and Supreme Soviet Presidium First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov--were reelected to the Central Committee. Gorbachev pointedly did not extend this gesture of respect to fallen foes Romanov and Grishin. (See box). This solicitude toward elderly ex-leaders--almost unprecedented in the rough-and-tumble arena of Kremlin politics--is consistent with earlier signs that Gorbachev wants to make retirement a more respectable step, and it may be intended to coax remaining superannuated officials into retirement. It cannot be completely ruled out that the move was a quid pro quo forced upon Gorbachev by remaining old guardists within the leadership. Gorbachev, however, would probably find this a small price to pay for removing those officials who have been major obstacles to his policies. [redacted]

---

BOX

Brezhnevites Left in the Central Committee

While Gorbachev made impressive headway in cleaning deadwood out the Central Committee, some Brezhnev longtimers managed to survive the Gorbachev "purge" before the congress and held onto their seats.

- o Over a dozen regional or republic party leaders of the older generation who have held their posts under Brezhnev for a decade or more remain at helm, some despite criticism in the media and party directives.
  
- o Several superannuated ministers including one who is 87 years old and several others who have been sharply criticized since Brezhnev's death remain at their posts.
  
- o Some key economic functionaries like State Price Committee Glushkov, who shared an obstructionist approach to economic change with ousted officials like Baybakov, also remain in place.

Gorbachev will presumably continue his effort to root out such officials, whose views or capabilities are clearly out of step with his program.

END BOX

---

Table 2  
REGIONAL PARTY OFFICIALS REPLACED SINCE GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY

	Buro or Politburo*	Secretariat			Full Mbrs	Central Committee		% Replaced
		1st Sec	2nd Sec	Other Secs		Cand Mbrs	Total	
Armenia	4 (of 18)	no	yes	4 (of 4)	52 (of 121)	29 (of 61)	81 (of 182)	44%
Azerbaijan	6 (of 18)	no	no	0 (of 4)	53 (of 128)	29 (of 72)	82 (of 200)	41%
Belorussia	8 (of 19)	no	no	0 (of 4)	92 (of 151)	44 (of 68)	136 (of 219)	62%
Estonia	7 (of 17)	no	yes	0 (of 3)	48 (of 131)	43 (of 68)	91 (of 199)	46%
Georgia	5 (of 19)	yes**	no	2 (of 4)	73 (of 148)	38 (of 63)	111 (of 211)	53%
Kazakhstan	4 (of 11)	no	no	2 (of 4)	122 (of 175)	39 (of 67)	161 (of 242)	67%
Kirgiziya	8 (of 14)	yes	yes	3 (of 3)	89 (of 142)	35 (of 58)	124 (of 200)	62%
Latvia	6 (of 14)	no	no	2 (of 3)	63 (of 141)	35 (of 65)	98 (of 206)	48%
Lithuania	0 (of 14)	no	no	0 (of 3)	61 (of 146)	29 (of 73)	90 (of 219)	41%
Moldavia	6 (of 15)	no	no	0 (of 3)	54 (of 125)	35 (of 55)	89 (of 180)	49%
Tadzhikistan	7 (of 12)	yes	yes	0 (of 3)	76 (of 132)	42 (of 56)	118 (of 188)	63%
Turkmenistan	5 (of 14)	yes	no	1 (of 3)	86 (of 154)	27 (of 44)	113 (of 198)	57%
Ukraine	1 (of 16)	no	no	1 (of 5)	74 (of 197)	56 (of 92)	130 (of 289)	44%
Uzbekistan	10 (of 17)	no	yes	2 (of 3)	123 (of 167)	65 (of 75)	188 (of 242)	78%
Moscow Gorkom	13 (of 17)	yes	yes	1 (of 4)	125 (of 175)	35 (of 57)	160 (of 232)	69%
Leningrad Obkom***	9 (of 19)	yes**	no	2 (of 4)				

\*The Buros in Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine were increased in size, while those in Georgia, Kirgiziya, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were reduced.

\*\*The Georgian and Leningrad Oblast first secretaries were promoted; others appear to have been removed for shortcomings.

\*\*\*Comparative figures are not available for Leningrad Oblast.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR FOI 114/6 #8931

BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

<.DTG> 241511Z JUN 86

<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PSN: 044794

<PREC> 5 ROUTINE

<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOS

< TO> UTS1547

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6605

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 10759

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR

13

*File:  
Gorbachev bio*

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: VIGNETTES ABOUT GORBACHEV

<TEXT> 1. ~~X~~ ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY

2. THIS CABLE PROVIDES INFORMATION RELATING TO GORBACHEV ACQUIRED RECENTLY BY SEVERAL EMBOFFS FROM A VARIETY OF SOVIET AND DIPLOMATIC SOURCES. WE CANNOT CONFIRM ANY OF IT BUT BELIEVE IT WORTH REPORTING. IN BRIEF:

AN ACADEMIC SOURCE REPORTED THAT GORBACHEV, UNLIKE BREZHNEV, SUBMERGES HIMSELF IN THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUES;

A SOVIET JOURNALIST AND A REFUSENIK REPORTED THE GENERAL SECRETARY SUFFERS FROM DIABETES AND A SERIOUS HEART PROBLEM, RESPECTIVELY;

A STAVROPOL' JOURNALIST DESCRIBED WHAT GORBACHEV HAD DONE FOR HIS HOME TOWN AND HIS MODEST STYLE OF LIVING WHEN HE WAS FIRST SECRETARY THERE;

A SOVIET OFFICIAL DISCUSSED GORBACHEV'S MOTHER AND HER LIVING CONDITIONS; AND

A SOVIET ACADEMIC REPORTED THAT GORBACHEV READ THE RIOT ACT TO KUYBYSHEV OBKOM FIRST SECRETARY MURAV'YEV WHEN THE GENERAL SECRETARY VISITED THAT OBLAST IN APRIL.  
END SUMMARY

GORBACHEV THE MANAGER

3. A DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN ACADEMIC VISITOR, CITING A SENIOR SOVIET ACADEMIC WHO ALSO OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC), CLAIMED THE SOVIET ACADEMIC DESCRIBED GORBACHEV AS "VERY ANALYTICAL" IN HIS APPROACH. THE GENERAL SECRETARY REPORTEDLY WORKS THROUGH EVERY PROBLEM HIMSELF, WHILE RELYING HEAVILY ON HIS ADVISERS, WHO WERE EXPECTED TO BE ON TOP OF THE ISSUES. GORBACHEV'S APPROACH TO WORK WAS THUS UNLIKE THAT OF BREZHNEV, SAID THE SOVIET ACADEMIC. BREZHNEV FUNCTIONED MORE AS AN "EMPEROR," ESPECIALLY IN HIS DECLINING YEARS. HE SIMPLY SIGNED OFF ON PROJECTS WITHOUT HIMSELF GETTING INVOLVED.

4. ON THE SUBJECT OF GORBACHEV'S ADVISERS, AN INFORMED WESTERN COMMUNIST (PROTECT) CLAIMED THAT A.S. CHERNYAYEV WAS EXTREMELY CLOSE TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY, OFTEN SPENDING AS MUCH AS SIX HOURS A DAY WITH HIM. CHERNYAYEV ALSO PERSONALLY HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR DRAFTING GORBACHEV'S SPEECHES ON FOREIGN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F06-114/6#8939

BY HOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07

AFFAIRS BUT ALSO HAS AN INPUT ON THOSE DEALING WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES, IN WHICH CHERNYAYEV HAS BOTH AN INTEREST AND INFLUENCE. A ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT REPORTED THAT ANOTHER AIDE, A.P. LUSHCHIKOV, WAS GORBACHEV'S MOST IMPORTANT AIDE, AN AGRICULTURE SPECIALIST, AND HAD BEEN WITH HIM SINCE 1967 OR 1968.

POSSIBLE MEDICAL AILMENTS?

5. A SOVIET JOURNALIST COMMENTED THAT "EVERYBODY KNOWS GORBACHEV WAS SICK, THAT HE HAS DIABETES," IN TRYING TO EXPLAIN WHY LIGACHEV AND RYZHKOV, BUT NOT GORBACHEV, HAD VISITED CHERNOBYL' SHORTLY AFTER THE ACCIDENT THERE. ANOTHER SOVIET, A REFUSENIK WELL KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY, CITED A FRIEND WHO ALLEGEDLY WORKED AS A MEDICAL TECHNICIAN IN THE KREMLIN CLINIC TO THE EFFECT THAT GORBACHEV WAS REGULARLY CHECKED FOR HEART PROBLEMS, TAKES SPECIAL MEDICATION FOR HIS HEART DAILY, AND HAS ALREADY SUFFERED TWO HEART ATTACKS, THE LAST IN THE EARLY 1980S.

BACK HOME IN STAVROPOL'

<TIME>

ORIG DTG: 241511Z JUN 86

WHCA TOR: 176/0543Z

~~CONF~~  
PSN: 044794 VAX663

CMC TOR: 25 JUN 86 02:23

DB ADD: 25-JUN-86 02:25:00

< GE#>000118 <SECT> 01 < PSN> 044794 < SSN> 0759

<TOR> 860625022500

< DTG> 241511Z JUN 86

<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

PSN: 044797

<PREC> 5 ROUTINE

<CLAS> ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOS

< TO> UTS1548

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6606

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 10759

16

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: VIGNETTES ABOUT GORBACHEV

<TEXT> TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR

6. A VARIETY OF SOURCES PROVIDED INFORMATION RELATING TO THE EMERGING "GORBACHEV MYTH" THE "CULT OF MODESTY" HIS STYLE OF LIFE, AS WELL AS ABOUT HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY.

A "STAVROPOL'SKAYA PRAVDA" REPORTER, WHO CLAIMED TO BE PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH THE GORBACHEV FAMILY, REPORTED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY SHUNNED THE USE OF PERSONAL SERVANTS EVEN NORMALLY WALKING TO WORK DURING HIS TENURE AS FIRST SECRETARY OF STAVROPOL' KRAY. THE JOURNALIST CLAIMED HAVING SEEN GORBACHEV REGULARLY DOING SUCH CHORES AS TAKING OUT THE GARBAGE AND WALKING THE FAMILY'S DOG. GORBACHEV REPORTEDLY ENJOYED PUTTERING AROUND HIS HOUSE, FIXING WINDOWS, PAINTING AND TAKING CARE OF THE GARDEN.

7. ANOTHER STAVROPOL' SOURCE, AN AGRONOMIST AT THE AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE THERE, LIKEWISE PRAISED THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S PERSONAL QUALITIES. THE AGRONOMIST ADDED THAT GORBACHEV HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TO TRANSFORM STAVROPOL' FROM A DUSTY PROVINCIAL CAPITAL TO A GROWING, MODERN CITY. HE HAD ORDERED THE RENEWAL AND RESTORATION OF THE CITY'S CENTER AND SUPPORTED THE BUILDING OF A MAMMOTH SPORTS/CULTURAL CENTER WHICH OPENED JUST LAST YEAR. HE HAD BROUGHT BOTH PRIDE AND MATERIAL PROGRESS TO THE CITY.

8. A MID LEVEL STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (SCST) OFFICIAL RELATED A STORY ABOUT GORBACHEV'S MOTHER, WHO REPORTEDLY CONTINUES TO RESIDE IN A SMALL COTTAGE ON A LANE OFF THE MAIN STREET OF THE VILLAGE OF PRIVOL'NOYE. SINCE HER SON'S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP, SHE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A KGB BODYGUARD APPARENTLY AGAINST HER WISHES. THIS WAS DONE NOT BECAUSE SHE WAS CONSIDERED TO BE IN PERSONAL DANGER BUT BECAUSE SHE WAS BEING BESIEGED BY SOVIETS WHO HAD TRAVELLED FROM FAR AND WIDE TO REQUEST HER INTERCESSION WITH MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH ON THEIR BEHALF. THE SCST OFFICIAL ALSO RELATED THAT SHORTLY AFTER GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY, THE LOCAL STAVROPOL' AUTHORITIES PAVED THE LANE LEADING TO MRS. GORBACHEV'S COTTAGE. SHE, HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY CALLED HER SON THE NEXT DAY, COMPLAINED THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED, MAINTAINED THAT NO OTHER STREETS IN THE VILLAGE HAD BEEN SO PAVED AND SHE WAS THEREFORE



RECEIVING UNFAIR TREATMENT, AND ASKED THAT  
THE LANE BE RESTORED TO ITS ORIGINAL STATE.  
THAT THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY DID THE NEXT DAY.

17

GORBACHEV READS THE RIOT ACT IN KUYBYSHEV  
9. ACCORDING TO A RETIRED HISTORIAN, CITING  
FRIENDS IN KUYBYSHEV, DURING HIS APRIL 7 9  
VISIT TO THAT CITY, GORBACHEV PUBLICLY CHASTISED  
THE OBLAST FIRST SECRETARY, YE. F. MURAV'YEV,  
FOR NEGLECTING THE NEEDS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION,  
FOR ARBITRARILY EXPELLING PARTY MEMBERS WHO  
CRITICIZED HIS STEWARDSHIP OF THE OBLAST  
(AS WELL AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE TOL'YATTI CITY  
PARTY COMMITTEE ON THE SAME COUNT) AND GENERAL  
DISORGANIZATION THERE. CITING HIS KUYBYSHEV  
SOURCES, THE HISTORIAN SAID THAT GORBACHEV  
HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THE PUBLIC  
IN TOL'YATTI NOT ONLY AT THE AUTOMOBILE FACTORY  
BUT AT THE CENTRAL DEPARTMENT STORE AND MARKET.  
THERE THREE THOUSAND AND TEN THOUSAND PEOPLE  
REPORTEDLY GATHERED, RESPECTIVELY. THE MEETINGS  
WERE CALLED OFF, HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY ON THE  
INSISTENCE OF GORBACHEV'S SECURITY DETAIL.  
(COMMENT: SOVIET TV COVERAGE SHOWED GORBACHEV  
VISITING OTHER SITES IN TOL'YATTI, BUT WITHOUT  
CROWDS OF THIS MAGNITUDE. END COMMENT)  
AT THE AIRPORT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, GORBACHEV  
REPORTEDLY ORDERED MURAV'YEV TO GET THINGS IN  
ORDER ASAP AND ASKED HOW LONG THAT WOULD TAKE.  
MURAV'YEV REPORTEDLY REPLIED, "A YEAR, A  
YEAR AND A HALF," TO WHICH GORBACHEV BARKED  
IN A MENACING TONE, "THAT IS NOT SOON ENOUGH,"  
TURNED AND, WITHOUT SHAKING HANDS, BOARDED HIS PLANE.

<TIME>

ORIG DTG: 241511Z JUN 86

WHCA TOR: 176/0545Z

PSN: 044797 ~~CONF~~ VAX670

CMC TOR: 25 JUN 86 02:27

DB ADD: 25-JUN-86 02:31:24

< GE#>000124 <SECT> 02 < PSN> 044797 < SSN> 0759

<TOR> 860625023124

< DTG> 241511Z JUN 86 <ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PSN: 044799  
<PREC> 5 ROUTINE <CLAS> ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOS  
< TO> STU7309  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6607  
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 10759

78

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: VIGNETTES ABOUT GORBACHEV

<TEXT> TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR  
10. RAISA GORBACHEVA REPORTEDLY HAD HER OWN ITINERARY IN KUYBYSHEV AND TOL'YATTI, VISITING SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, STORES AND EVEN A FEW FACTORIES. IN ONE OF THOSE, THE SWEETS PLANT "ROSSTYA," A LARGE GROUP OF WORKERS REPORTEDLY SURROUNDED RAISA AND HER BODYGUARDS AND SEVERAL TRIED TO PASS TO HER "PETITIONS" ADDRESSED TO HER HUSBAND. WHEN ONE OF HER BODYGUARDS SOUGHT TO INTERVENE, RAISA REPORTEDLY ORDERED HIM TO ALLOW THE PETITIONS THROUGH AND NOT INTERFERE WITH HER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE WORKERS.

12. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOVIET ACADEMIC, RAISA GORBACHEVA'S MAIDEN NAME WAS TITARENKO, WHICH IS UKRAINIAN IN ORIGIN. SHE WAS NOT BORN IN UKRAINE, HOWEVER, BUT APPARENTLY IN THE URALS, ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE. HARTMAN

<TIME>  
ORIG DTG: 241511Z JUN 86  
WHCA TOR: 176/0546Z PSN: 044799 ~~CONF~~ VAX666  
CMC TOR: 25 JUN 86 02:24  
DB ADD: 25-JUN-86 02:27:47  
< GE#>000120 <SECT> 03 < PSN> 044799 < SSN> 0759  
<TOR> 860625022747

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

Date

8 May 1986

(b)(3)

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr.		
2. Sepcial Assistant to the President		
3. Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs		
4. National Security Council		
5. Rm 368, 01d EOB		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

FYI

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	1-G 23, HQS.
OCR/USSR-EE/POL	Phone No.

5041-102

U.S.G.P.O.: 1983-421-529/320

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR F06-114/6 #8933  
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

File;  
USSR-  
BIO

# USSR

## Ligachev Oversees Turnover Among Regional Leaders

*Since Gorbachev became general secretary last March there has been massive turnover in the regional party apparat, and the changes have been accelerating as next month's CPSU congress approaches. Second Secretary Ligachev has supervised the selection of new leaders for regional party organizations. The remarkable number of regional leaders who are being selected from among his direct subordinates—either his deputies in the cadres department or Central Committee inspectors in the department—would seem to increase his clout in the Gorbachev regime.*

Gorbachev's accession last March brought a sharp break with earlier cadre practices. Heads of local party organizations increasingly are being drawn from outside the local area, often from the Organizational-Party Work Department of the Central Committee. Under Brezhnev, regional leaders were rarely changed; when they were, local subordinates usually were advanced to replace them. Andropov altered the Brezhnev pattern, rapidly replacing many oblast first secretaries and greatly expanding the introduction of outsiders (to about half the appointees). But almost all those outsiders were people drawn from other provinces or from republic-level posts—not from the Central Committee bureaucracy. Only three CPSU Central Committee inspectors were named kray or oblast first secretaries under Andropov and Chernenko.<sup>1</sup>

Under Gorbachev, the list of new regional leaders drawn from the Organizational-Party Work Department has already reached 20, counting cadres department leaders and Central Committee inspectors, all of whom appear to work in this department. (Announcements of appointments of these inspectors never mention any specific Central Committee department, but recently two of the inspectors who have been appointed oblast first

<sup>1</sup> The three inspectors were P. M. Telepnev in Arkhangelsk in November 1983, G. G. Vedernikov in Chelyabinsk in January 1984, and D. N. Gagarov in Primorskiy Kray in April 1984. (The latter two were locals brought to Moscow for short periods; Telepnev was previously from Tyumen in West Siberia.)

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRRF06-114/6#8935  
BY rw NARA DATE 11/16/15

secretaries—Udmurt First Secretary P. S. Grishchenko and Kalmyk First Secretary V. A. Zakharov—were identified at a conference as “inspectors of the Organizational-Party Work Department of the CPSU Central Committee” in the 26 November Ukrainian daily *Radyanska Ukraina*.)

**Gorbachev Appointees From CPSU Cadres Department**

Name	New Appointment	Date
<b>Cadres Department Leaders</b>		
Yu. V. Petrov (deputy head of department)	Sverdlovsk first secretary	19 April
I. K. Polozkov (head of a sector)	Krasnodar first secretary	3 June
G. I. Revenko (deputy head of department)	Kiev Oblast first secretary	4 November
P. A. Smolskiy (deputy head of department)	Ryazan first secretary	14 December
<b>Central Committee Inspectors</b>		
V. V. Bakatin	Kirov first secretary	22 March
V. P. Anishchev	Uzbek CC secretary	29 March
Yu. P. Kochetkov	Armenian second secretary	12 April
Ye. S. Stroyev	Orel first secretary	22 June
A. N. Plekhanov	Kurgan first secretary	25 June
L. V. Sharin	Amur first secretary	29 June
M. A. Knyazyuk	Ivanovo first secretary	15 July
V. A. Kuptsov	Vologda first secretary	20 July
Yu. I. Livintsev	Tula first secretary	5 August
A. M. Masaliyev	Kirgiz first secretary	2 November
I. S. Boldyrev	Stavropol first secretary	4 November
V. V. Sakalauskas	Lithuanian premier	18 November
P. S. Grishchenko	Udmurt first secretary	13 December
G. N. Kiselev	Kirgiz second secretary	13 December
V. A. Zakharov	Kalmyk first secretary	20 December
V. V. Grigoryev	Vitebsk first secretary	6 January

By drawing on cadres department personnel for local appointments, Ligachev has had a good opportunity to get to know most of the new regional leaders before they are appointed. Some of the inspectors are locals brought to Moscow to serve briefly before returning to their home province, apparently a process of grooming them for leadership. For example, Masaliyev was relieved as first secretary of Kirgizia's Issyk-Kul Oblast in late June to become a CPSU inspector in Moscow and then returned to Kirgizia as republic first secretary at the beginning of November. Kuptsov, identified as Vologda second secretary as late as 28 February 1985, became an inspector and then on 20 July returned as Vologda first secretary. Boldyrev was still identified as a Stavropol Kray secretary on 30 January, then did a short tour as inspector, and returned as Stavropol first secretary on 4 November.

The practice of selecting regional officials from among Central Committee inspectors is not new but has dramatically increased, apparently both as a training and testing process and as part of an effort to get more central control over regional party organizations and break up the development of the entrenched local baronies which flourished under Brezhnev. The position of CPSU inspector was originally created by Stalin in 1946 to create a group of powerful plenipotentiaries who could crack down on local leaders and who themselves sometimes were appointed first secretaries of republics. Since the 1950's, however, they had not been much in evidence.

**Pattern in RSFSR** The tendency to appoint inspectors or other cadres department officials has been notably strong in the RSFSR, where the heads of kray and oblast party organizations usually are full Central Committee members. Virtually all new RSFSR kray and oblast first secretaries appointed under Gorbachev are either not from the province in question or are locals who have been serving in Moscow just prior to appointment. Only two of the 22 RSFSR kray or oblast first secretaries appointed under Gorbachev have been promoted directly from below (the normal pattern under Brezhnev): Tambov Executive Committee Chairman Ye. M. Podolskiy was promoted to first secretary in April, and Kostroma Executive Committee First Deputy Chairman V. I. Toropov was promoted to first secretary in January 1986.

Of the 22 new first secretaries, three have been drawn from other regional party organizations (Saratov, Kabardino-Balkar, Khakass), while 13 are from the CPSU cadres department (ten inspectors and three department deputy

heads or sector heads). Three are from central ministries in Moscow (Industrial Construction Minister Yu. F. Solovyev became Leningrad Oblast first secretary, Deputy Agriculture Minister N. F. Tatarchuk became Kalinin Oblast first secretary, and Agriculture Minister V. K. Mesyats became Moscow Oblast first secretary) and one was from the Central Committee's Heavy Industry Department (first deputy head N. S. Yermakov, who became Kemerovo first secretary).


**Pattern Outside  
RSFSR**

The changes in the pattern of appointments have not been as extensive outside the RSFSR, where oblast leaders fall under republic cadre departments rather than directly under the CPSU cadre organs. Among the 18 new oblast first secretaries named under Gorbachev in non-Russian republics, five were simply promoted within the oblast (as under Brezhnev) while most of the others were promoted from within the republic. Only three were from Moscow: new Andizhan First Secretary M. M. Aripdzhanov (an Uzbek) listed vaguely as working in the CPSU Central Committee apparat, new Kiev Oblast First Secretary G. I. Revenko, a Ukrainian from Kiev who worked as CPSU cadres department deputy head during 1985, and new Vitebsk First Secretary V. V. Grigoryev, a CPSU inspector. Another official identified with the CPSU Central Committee apparat, B. F. Satin, was named first secretary of Tashkent city in September. Most new republic-level party officials have also been promoted from within the republic, but there are exceptions: CPSU inspectors were named as an Uzbek Central Committee secretary in late March, as Armenian second secretary in mid-April, and as Kirgiz first and second secretaries in November and December.

There has also been a slight increase in the infusion of Slavs in this process of increasing introduction of outsiders. Russians and Ukrainians replaced natives as ideology secretary in Latvia in late March and as Latvian industry secretary in December, as Tashkent city first secretary in September, as first secretary of Uzbekistan's Ashkhabad Oblast in November, as first secretary of Kazakhstan's Mangyshlak Oblast in November, and as first secretary of Alma-Ata city in December.

**Ligachev as  
Cadre Leader**

Ligachev, 65, was first brought to Moscow by Andropov to become cadres department head in April 1983 and was promoted to Central Committee secretary at the December 1983 plenum. He worked under senior Secretary Gorbachev's supervision, serving as Gorbachev's right-hand man in running



Ligachev (Soviet TV,  
20 November 1985)

cadre affairs and, later, agriculture as well. He and Gorbachev presumably did most of the work in developing the new cadre policy adopted by the Politburo in October 1984, while Chernenko was still general secretary.<sup>2</sup> That policy called for less tolerance of incompetent officials and more aggressive promotion of younger leaders.

Ligachev, who became second-ranking secretary and a full Politburo member after Gorbachev became general secretary, has applied the new cadre policy in an unusually vigorous and tough manner, demanding sharp improvements and tongue-lashing lower officials.

In a 26 July speech kicking off the regional election campaign leading up to next month's party congress, for example, Ligachev decried the prevailing atmosphere of tolerance in which "boot licking, servility, and conceit flourish like wild thistles, and party principles of cadre selection . . . are consigned to oblivion." He claimed that "serious measures" were being implemented to improve cadre selection and warned that "while showing as considerate an attitude as possible toward experienced workers, we must free ourselves of unenterprising, inert people who avoid real organizational work among the masses" (*Kommunist*, No. 14, August).

Ligachev has already addressed three party election conferences and has used his speeches to stress the urgency of cadre improvement as well as the regime's impatience with the status quo. According to the 13 October *Pravda* account of a speech at Chelyabinsk, for example, Ligachev attacked the later years of the Brezhnev era, claiming that "trust in cadres was frequently not linked with high exactingness toward them." He called those years a time "when accountability for assignments declined," and he insisted that it was "necessary to radically change the attitude toward cadre training." He followed with a 20 November speech to the party conference of the State Committee of Television and Radio Broadcasting, in which he promised "to completely cleanse the moral atmosphere and eradicate careerism, individualism, flattery, servility, and . . . everything that fetters our progress" (*Pravda*, 21 November). In a speech at the Baku city party conference on 21 December, he warned that party officials, even "those in leadership positions, must answer for their misdeeds" (*Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, 22 December). (U/FOUO)

<sup>2</sup> See the *Trends* of 10 April 1985, pages 12-13.



## China

*Authoritative speeches and commentary marking the New Year and emerging from a recent conference on agricultural work reflected concern and controversy over effects of the radical economic reforms Beijing initiated over the past year and over the social and economic implications of China's first grain shortfall in six years. The commentary indicated that the pace of reform would be slowed down, though it also emphasized Beijing's determination to press forward with the reform agenda.*

### **New Year Celebrations Indicate Slowed Pace of Reforms**

Both this year's *Renmin Ribao* New Year's editorial and the keynote address at the annual New Year's gathering held by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) made clear that the party's economic reform goals for the coming year are considerably less ambitious than those of recent years. While acknowledging last year's problems in implementing the reforms, the editorial nonetheless took as its keynote the Chinese folktale of "the foolish old man who moved the mountain"—immortalized in a 1945 speech by Mao Zedong—that stresses optimism in the face of overwhelming obstacles. Calling for emulation of the spirit of the foolish old man, the editorial stated "we must do things with relentless perseverance, forge ahead despite difficulties, and refuse to stop until our goal is achieved."

The editorial appraised the reforms begun over the past year as a "giant step," but called in the coming year for "concentrating our efforts in consolidating, digesting, and supplementing the achievements that we have already scored." Steps to "promote the beneficial and abolish the harmful" in the reforms and to solve "outstanding problems" in the coming year should supplement efforts, it said, to study, experiment, and make "preparations for an important step forward for the next year's reform."

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY <b>DOCUMENT RECEIPT</b>		<b>NOTICE TO RECIPIENT</b> Sign and Return as Shown on Reverse Side		COURIER REC. NO. 326037	DATE SENT 21 Feb 86
SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S) DI/OCR/UE/POL			ROOM 1G23	BLDG. HQS	DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT 21 Feb 86
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S) SENT					
CIA NO.	DOCUMENT DATE	COPIES	DOCUMENT TITLE (IN BRIEF)	ATTACHMENTS	CLASS
86-10746	2-19-86	2	Bios (Gorbachev)		<i>e</i>
86-10758	2-20-86	2	Bios (Ryzhkov)		<i>s</i>
RECIPIENT					
ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT Amb Jack Matlock, NSC Rm 368, Old EOB			SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S)) <i>J. Matlock</i>		
			OFFICE	DATE OF RECEIPT	

(b)(3)

FORM 5-72 615

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(33)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 24 Feb 86
TO: Amb Jack Matlock NSC		
ROOM NO. 368	BUILDING OLD EOB	
REMARKS:  FYI -- updated Gorbachev & Ryzhkov profiles		
FROM:		CIA/OCR/UE
ROOM NO. 1G23	BUILDING HQS	EXTENSION 351-5864

FORM NO. 1 FEB 56 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

File: —  
Soviet Leaders —  
BIO

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR F06 114/6 #8936  
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15

Secret NoFORN  
CLASSIFICATION

49

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 15

IMMEDIATE

SECURE FAX # 123

DTG 190105Z 10

PRIORITY

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

RELEASER LVS

ROUTINE

RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION

1. The White House Situation Room

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Bill Martin / Geneva Intercontinental

✓ 2. Paul Thompson / Geneva Intercontinental

TOR: 190140Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

1340

File:  
BIO -  
Soviet  
Officials

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997.  
By smf NARA, Date 6/10/02

Secret NoFORN  
CLASSIFICATION

National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1.	<i>J</i>	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	2	_____	DACUM

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Regan    Buchanan    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Send to Bill Martin  
Paul Thompson*

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE	15 Nov. 85
TO: Admiral Poindexter, Dep. Asst. to the President, NSA			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
	White House		
REMARKS:			
FROM:		CHIEF, DP/LP	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
4865	HQ	4211	

FORM NO. 1 FEB 58 241

REPLACES FORM 36-S WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DECLASSIFIED  
 NLRR E06-114/6 #8937  
 BY kw NARA DATE 11/16/15